

HEIDEGGER ON KANT: TEMPORALITY AND IMAGINATION

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HEIDEGGER ON KANT: TEMPORALITY AND IMAGINATION

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Thesis Abstract

Cansen Mavituna, "Heidegger on Kant: Temporality and Imagination"

The subject matter of this thesis is Heidegger's reading of Kant with temporality as the central concern. Heidegger interprets Kant's project in *Critique of Pure Reason* as an ontological inquiry and appreciates Kant for giving imagination and temporality central roles. Thus, in this study, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in terms of temporality and Heidegger's own understanding of temporality is established. Furthermore, Heidegger's fundamental ontology and existential analytic of Dasein is presented, as they are fundamental for understanding the significance of Heideggerian temporality.

Tez Özeti

Cansen Mavituna, “Heidegger’in Kant Yorumu: Zamansallık ve İmgelem”

Bu tezin konusu, merkezde zamansallık problemi olmak üzere, Heidegger’in Kant yorumudur. Heidegger, Kant’ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi*’ndeki projesini ontolojik bir soruşturma olarak yorumlamakta ve Kant düşüncesine imgelem ve zamansallığa merkezi roller vermiş olduğu için değer vermektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada zamansallık ekseninde Heidegger’in Kant yorumu ve Heidegger’in kendi zamansallık anlayışı sunulmaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak, Heidegger’in temel ontolojisi ve varoluşsal Dasein analizi de sunulmaktadır, çünkü bunlar Heidegger’in zamansallık anlayışını kavrayabilmek açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır.

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PREFACE

In this thesis, I will try to explore the relation between Heidegger's understanding of temporality and Kant's understanding of time and imagination. For Heidegger, temporality is the horizon for any understanding of being; this means that temporality is the ground of the possibility of ontological knowledge. Since understanding being is a capacity that is peculiar to Dasein, he begins his inquiry in *Being and Time* with an existential analysis of Dasein, whose pre-ontological understanding of being is the starting point for ontological investigation. Thus, in the first chapter of this thesis, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, its fundamental existential being-in-the world and its everydayness will be established, along with brief accounts of Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy in comparison to Kant's understanding of transcendental philosophy. After that, Heidegger's reading of Kant will follow in the second chapter. In this chapter, I will focus on what Heidegger interprets from Kant's first *Critique* and not be concerned with whether his interpretation is true or accurate to what Kant says. Main points that I will emphasize are the finitude of human knowledge, ontological synthesis and knowledge, Heidegger's interpretation of threefold synthesis, schematism and transcendental imagination. This chapter will show what Heidegger appreciates in Kant in terms of the problem of temporality. The third chapter is concerned with Heidegger's own understanding of temporality and the notion of care. In that chapter, I will try to establish the relation between care and imagination in reference to temporality which Heidegger considers as the ground of both care and imagination. Lastly, Heideggerian temporality and its phenomenological significance will be given a rather brief account.

CHAPTER I

EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC OF DASEIN AND HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF ONTOLOGY

In this chapter, Heidegger's main project in Division I of *Being and Time* will be established. Heideggerian fundamental ontology with Dasein's existence at its core and its importance in attaining the meaning of being will be presented. After the presentation of phenomenology as Heidegger's method for ontology, I will discuss how Heidegger's project can be seen as transcendental philosophy. This will lead to being-in-the-world which is the fundamental existential of Dasein and to discussion of the priority of practical knowledge over theoretical knowledge and thus to the presentation of handiness.

The Question of Meaning of Being and Primacy of Dasein

Heidegger's main concern in *Being and Time*¹ is to carry out an inquiry on being. What he wants to do in this inquiry is to answer the question of meaning of being. On the very first page of *Being and Time*, he states that "this question has today been forgotten."² Thus, it is highly important to pose the question of meaning of being all over again and seek ways to give a proper answer to that question. He also thinks that time is the possible horizon for understanding being; therefore an analysis of time is

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010)

² *Ibid.*, p.1

crucial for his larger project which is to understand the meaning of being. However, relating being and time as the horizon for understanding being and for ontology is an important issue that Heidegger deals with in the later chapters of *Being and Time* in a detailed way. The first division of *Being and Time* is dedicated to the analysis of human way of being. To say it in Heideggerian terminology, the first division is concerned with the existential analysis of Dasein; and this analysis, according to Heidegger, is essential for attaining the meaning of being.

Heidegger gives a preliminary definition of being in the early pages of *Being and Time*: “What is *asked about* in the question to be elaborated is being, that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have always been understood no matter how they are discussed.”³ This early statement on the meaning of being is related to the way in which the human being, as Dasein, experiences the world and the beings that reside in the world. Even though Dasein does not understand the meaning of being explicitly or theoretically, it always already has an implicit, or pre-ontological, understanding concerning being. Dasein, in every action it takes, deals with its surroundings; it interacts with the entities and distinguishes those entities which it encounters. All those entities make sense to Dasein, thus Dasein always already understands being as that which determines entities as the entities they are. In other words, Dasein understands being as being of the beings in the first place. However, this pre-ontological understanding of being is not enough for Heidegger's investigation, because, when Heidegger questions the meaning of being, he wants to clarify what being as such and not only being of the beings is. Nevertheless, this preliminary understanding of being, which is peculiar to Dasein, is crucial, because it can constitute the starting point of the investigation and the ground

³Ibid., p.7

for ontology. Even though the inquiry is fundamentally about being, still we should first carry out an inquiry concerning entities in order to understand being, since being is always already grasped as being of the entities by Dasein. Given the definition of being above, it can be said that being can be understood as being of some entity, so with the help of an analysis of being of a particular entity, we could come to answer the question of meaning of being. Nevertheless, that entity, through which the meaning of being can be attained and manifested, cannot be just any being in the world. Dasein is the one that should be investigated ontologically in order to grasp the meaning of being. There are several reasons why Heidegger gives primacy to Dasein in this investigation. First of all, Dasein's own being is an issue for it: "Every Dasein relates itself to its own being as a question."⁴ Even in everyday activities, Dasein relates itself to its own being. This means that Dasein understands its being and the being in one way or another, though not fully explicit or theoretical, and therefore Dasein is able to come to understand the ontological structures of its existence. Also, Dasein always deals with the entities in its surrounding and therefore it always already has an understanding about their being too; Dasein relates to them in accordance with their being which determines those entities as the entities they are. Dasein's peculiar relation to being and to its own being makes it central to an investigation of the meaning of being: "Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being -one who questions- transparent in its being. Asking this question, as a mode of *being* of a being, is itself essentially determined by what is asked about in it -being."⁵ In this inquiry on the meaning of being, the inquirer who asks the question of meaning should be analyzed, because the being of the being who asks the question can shed a light on the ultimate question of the inquiry. Dasein

⁴Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 17

⁵Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 6

exists and in the core of its existence, it already understands being, and thus its existence is ontological in character. Thus Heidegger says: “The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.”⁶ Those peculiarities of Dasein's existence make it central to Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Heidegger's starting point is Dasein and the analysis of its existence, but this analysis should begin with an investigation of Dasein in its everydayness, because with the help of that analysis, the structures that constitute Dasein's existence would reveal themselves. However, along with the aim of discovering the meaning of being, there is another agenda in this analysis: “The meaning of being of that being we call Dasein will prove to be *temporality*.”⁷ This aspect of the analysis is a point that links all the parts of Heidegger's main inquiry with each other and it can be summarized as the following: Heidegger seeks for the meaning of being and with this goal, he turns to Dasein in order to understand meaning of being by way of an analytic of Dasein and its existence. This analytic has a preliminary goal which is to show that temporality is the ultimate structure of Dasein and temporality is the root of ontological meaning of Dasein. This will lead the inquiry to the point that being is also understood in reference to temporality.

Phenomenological Concept of Phenomenon and Phenomenology as the Method for Ontology

Heidegger's inquiry on meaning of being and Dasein's main role in it thus stated, the methodology he will use in this inquiry, namely phenomenology, should be made clear, because the phenomenology which Heidegger utilizes as his method is

⁶Ibid., p.10

⁷Ibid., p.17

remarkably different from the orthodox phenomenology. Heidegger's definition of phenomenology is analogous to his preliminary definition of being. Just as being is what determines beings as beings, phenomenology is what determines phenomena as the phenomena they are. However, the notion of phenomenon that Heidegger thinks about in this context does not correspond to the ordinary meaning of the term. "The phenomenological meaning of the phenomenon"⁸ is what is meant in Heideggerian methodology. However, before getting into details of the phenomenological meaning of phenomenon, the distinctions that Heidegger makes concerning the ways in which entities show themselves should be established.

The first sense of the phenomenon is the following: "What shows itself in itself, what is manifest."⁹ This is the general and broad meaning of phenomenon and Heidegger says that Greeks use this definition to mean simply entities (*ta onta*). Secondly, there is "seeming" (*Schein*). In this sense of the phenomenon, there is something that shows itself as something that it is not in reality. "Heidegger does not give any example, but optical illusions (such as Descartes's seemingly broken stick) seem to be a plausible option."¹⁰ Nevertheless, seeming is related to phenomenon in the first sense mentioned above, since it depends on the condition that there must be something that is able to show itself one way or another. If there were not something that is able to show itself in the first place, there would not be the possibility for the thing to appear as something different than itself.

Along with those different ways of beings to show themselves, there is another distinction between appearance and mere appearance. Appearance can be

⁸Ibid., 29

⁹ Ibid., 27

¹⁰Béatrice Han-Pile. "Early Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant". In *A Companion to Heidegger*, edited by H.L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 83

best established with analogy to illness and its symptoms. An illness does not show itself directly, but through the symptoms, one can come to understand that there is illness in the body. Symptoms show themselves and indicate the illness and this way illness is manifested indirectly by the existence of the symptoms. In other words, appearance points out and indicates something which does not show itself directly. To continue with the analogy of illness, just like symptoms are conditioned to an illness to show themselves in the first place, appearance is conditioned to the phenomenon which underlies it. Appearance of the symptom indicates the phenomenon of illness. The difference between appearance and mere appearance is that what is indicated by mere appearance is concealed and remains hidden entirely, whereas in the case of appearance, what is indicated is manifested, though not directly.

There is another important distinction concerning different senses of the phenomenon which is more central to our discussion here. According to Heidegger, there are two things that are meant when one uses the word “phenomenon”. Phenomenon in the ordinary sense covers all of the things that show up, that come to appear, whereas phenomenon in the phenomenological sense is what underlies all of the appearances; it is their “sense and ground.”¹¹ Heidegger makes analogies with Kantian concept of phenomenon and forms of intuition to explain his understanding of different meanings of phenomenon. Phenomenon in the ordinary sense is what is accessible empirically with the help of our perceptive capacities; in other words, they are the “empirical intuitions in Kant's sense.”¹² Phenomenon in the phenomenological sense is what grounds and makes possible the phenomenon in the ordinary sense. Along similar lines, Kantian forms of intuition, namely space and

¹¹Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.31

¹²Ibid, p.31

time, are the ground of the possibility of having empirical intuitions and they are the conditions that any being must conform to in order to be the objects of experience by showing themselves. In other words, all of the appearances are subjected to the spatio-temporal structure of our knowing capacities. Hence, every phenomenon in the ordinary sense, i.e., everything that shows itself, is accompanied by the spatial and temporal conditions of our experience which is what is referred by the phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. To be more precise, every appearance is necessarily temporal, because both inner and outer experiences are subjected to the form of inner sense which is time; and outer experiences are subject to both time and space. This means that every appearance is accompanied by the form of time, even though this accompaniment is not explicitly, or thematically, understood.

Nevertheless, we always see things in spatial relations, even if we do not see the space itself; or all experiences are held in a temporal order, even if we do not recognize time in itself in a thematic way. This means that forms of intuitions underlie and ground our experiences, even though they do not show themselves thematically in our experiences. Accordingly, it can be claimed that phenomenon in the phenomenological sense accompanies all the phenomena in the ordinary sense by constituting the ground of their possibility.¹³ Just as Dasein understands beings with the help of an implicit understanding of being which it always already has and being could not make sense to Dasein without that pre-ontological understanding, no phenomenon (in the ordinary sense) could show itself to Dasein without an implicit grasp of the phenomena (in the phenomenological sense) which, as the ground of the possibility, determines the way entities show themselves to Dasein. All those implicit understandings of being and of phenomenon that are used in the ontological inquiry

¹³ Ibid., p. 33-4

are pre-ontological, because our subject matter here, namely being, is implicit in character; it conceals itself, and thus we cannot get an explicit understanding of it out of our everyday experiences. Nevertheless, pre-ontological notions and understandings are the only way to get started with an ontological inquiry. Thus, Heidegger uses phenomenology as his method in ontology, because only in this way can the concealed meaning of being and ground of phenomena appear to Dasein; with a phenomenological inquiry of pre-ontological understandings and the structures of everydayness, being and the forms of intuitions would show themselves as well and they become explicit and thematic. Because of that, Heidegger says that “only as phenomenology is ontology possible.”¹⁴ With this phenomenological study, one becomes able to investigate what is concealed in the everyday experiences; phenomenology is the way for uncovering what it is concealed in everyday experience. This aspect of phenomenology is connected to transcendental philosophy in the traditional sense. Phenomenology is the method that can discover the grounds that constitute the everydayness of Dasein; in other words, this discovery can reveal the transcendental ground of Dasein's everyday existence, and it can let the ground be discovered. With the phenomenological analysis of everyday structures of Dasein, what transcends and grounds the everydayness can be understood.

Kant, Heidegger and Transcendental Philosophy

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's aim is to establish his fundamental ontology and the existential analysis of Dasein in order to show that the meaning of being can be attained through the transcendence that is provided by the temporal constitution of

¹⁴Ibid., p.35

Dasein's existence. The transcendental horizon that is grounded in time constitutes the field of experience for Dasein; and since Dasein is fundamentally being-in-the-world, its transcendental constitution makes it possible for Dasein to understand being and beings without creating a dichotomy between subject and object. Time has the central role in this project in *Being and Time*, and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*¹⁵ is important for establishing the role of time as the ground of transcendence and thus the ground of human knowledge and experience. Time is at the ground of Dasein's existence and, at the same time, it provides the ground for experience by also constituting the ground for imagination to perform its function of producing representations. Kantian philosophy is important for Heidegger, because Heidegger thinks that Kant gives time a central position by postulating the imagination with its temporal character as the central faculty of human knowledge.¹⁶ (Heidegger also thinks that Kant does not pursue this as far as he should have.) This understanding of imagination as temporal is in accord with Heidegger's claim that the temporal constitution of Dasein is the ground of the possibility of experience and the pre-ontological understanding of being which grounds the possibility of the ontological knowledge. Heidegger also appropriates Kantian approach to ontology; according to Heidegger's reading, Kant thinks that the possibility of metaphysics lies in the proper understanding of ontology and ontology should take the experiencing subject as its central concern. This means that the possibility of experience can be understood by a study of the role and place of the one who experiences as constituting the structure of experience. This approach is similar to the Heidegger's understanding of fundamental ontology which is concerned with the existential

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Taft, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997)

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 138

analytic of Dasein as the one being that has the possibility to posit the question of the meaning of being. Heidegger interprets Kant's inquiry in the first *Critique* as an ontological study, even though what Kant investigates is the possibility of human knowledge in relation to its finitude. One of the main reasons of Heidegger's reading of Kant is that Heidegger wants to avoid the dichotomy between subject and object and once this dichotomy is avoided, the possibility of experience and knowledge becomes a question concerning Dasein, who is being-in-the-world with its concerns about the world and other beings in it. According to Heidegger, the fact that Dasein is being-in-the-world indicates that the possibility of experience is grounded in the existence of Dasein. With this move, world and the other beings in it are no more considered as external for Dasein. Hence, the investigation of the relation between Dasein and the world in which it dwells is one of the central points of Heidegger's inquiry. When Heidegger investigates the possibility of experience, he deals with this issue as an ontological problem, because he wants to establish that the being of Dasein is the ground of the possibility of experience. Because of this, he turns to an analysis of the existence of Dasein as constituting the ground for experience with its finitude. Moreover, since Dasein and its world are inseparable, he also makes an inquiry on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. These inquiries on the existence of Dasein and the phenomenon of being-in-the-world are related to the transcendental philosophy, because in this picture Dasein is transcendental in the sense that it is the one who constitutes the temporal horizon in which the possibility of experience is established and the meaning of being can be understood. Nevertheless, Heidegger's understanding of transcendental philosophy and transcendence is remarkably different from Kantian understanding of the two.

Heidegger reflects on the act of transcendence as the possibility for avoiding

the dichotomy between subject and object. According to Kantian approach to the issue of transcendence, world of objects and the experiencing subject are distinct; we need the act of transcendence to attain the a priori knowledge concerning the world and objects and this a priori knowledge would reveal the ontological and transcendental structures of objects of experience and our knowledge. This understanding of transcendence suggests that the subject, in some sense, needs to step out of itself to the objects through the capacity of transcendence in order to relate to them. However, this picture does not work for Heidegger, because according to him the world and Dasein are fundamentally intertwined. He explicates this claim in his discussion of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

Being-in-the-world

Heidegger declares that the existential analytic of Dasein should start with the investigation of Dasein in its everydayness, because, by the phenomenological examination of the everyday structures of Dasein, the fundamental and ontological structures of Dasein's existence can be discovered. Even though this investigation is on everydayness, the ultimate aim is to go beyond the everyday structures, thus, in this sense this investigation is transcendental, since what is intended here is to disclose what underlies but remains hidden as the ground of the everydayness. Being of Dasein, through the analysis of the existence of Dasein, is what is to be disclosed. Heidegger wants to disclose the being of Dasein by way of the analysis of the structures of its everydayness. In order to carry out this phenomenological analysis of Dasein, the ground of the possibility of those structures should be made clear and investigated.

Being-in-the-world, which is peculiar to Dasein as an existential structure, is one of those fundamental structures that should be analyzed, because it is the ground of the possibility of average everydayness. When analyzing being-in-the-world, Heidegger divides it into three components, but he makes this division only methodologically, because, in fact, being-in-the-world is “a unified phenomenon” and those divisions are as the following: in-the-world, the being that is in the world, and being-in as such.¹⁷ Being-in is an existential. This means that being-in of Dasein should not be understood like a spatial characteristic, to use Heidegger's example, Dasein's being-in is fundamentally different from water's being in the glass. Being-in of Dasein, as an existential, denotes the fact that Dasein dwells in its world, it has possibilities and activities in the world, and it cares and concerns with the world and things. The world matters to Dasein and Dasein feels familiar to the world, since it is the only being that “leads a life” in the world. Notion of existentials has an important role in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein, since this notion is used to mean the fundamental structures of Dasein which are different from those structures that other entities in the world might have which Heidegger calls categories. Existentials constitute the being of Dasein and thus they determine the way in which Dasein relates to the world and experience the world. They constitute the world of Dasein in a way that each and every Dasein accesses the world and is open to being through those structures.

In many of his arguments in which he describes the nature of these existentials, Heidegger points out that, like the Kantian categories, they are not the result of an abstraction from an experience; rather, they are presupposed in an experience and make that experience possible: hence they logically come prior to any experience and are a priori.¹⁸

¹⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 54

¹⁸ Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 15

Heidegger wants to investigate what it is to be in the world for Dasein, it is not an investigation of the world *per se*, and existentials determines the ways in which Dasein lives in its world and they have a similar role with the transcendental a priori constitutions which are the grounds of the possibility of Dasein's existence.

“Heidegger's existential analytic is an analysis of the a priori conditions under which one's existence is made meaningful.”¹⁹ On this point, a similarity between Kant and Heidegger can be seen. Kant also investigates the ways in which human subject relates to world and the conditions that make experience possible. Kantian categories and apperception are the a priori conditions which make experience and knowing possible. However, there is a fundamental difference between two thinkers and this difference is the issue of subject and object duality. First of all, it can be said that Kant's investigation, to say it in the Heideggerian terminology, is an ontic one, because Kant deals with the human subject as objectively present among other entities which become objects of knowledge and experience of the human subject. This point of view does not question the phenomenon that Heidegger calls being-in-the-world; according to this Kantian understanding of subject and object, world is examined in a subjective manner in accordance with the human point of view. One of the main achievements of Heidegger is to get away from this model, which is based on a fundamental division between subject and object. Even the notion he uses to mean human being denotes this agenda. Dasein is an existential totality whose main characteristic is being there, existing in the world. In the Kantian picture, there is the human subject and there are possible objects of knowledge and the human being comes to know the world through the interaction with the other entities or objects; hence Kant investigates the ground of the possibility of that kind of an interaction.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.16

However, according to Heidegger, there is a more fundamental question. We should first investigate how human beings have this central place that enables them to interact with the world. We should first investigate how it is possible for Dasein to be in a place where it can understand being and beings. Thus, we should investigate the relationship between Dasein and the world without creating a dichotomy between the two. Being-in-the-world, as an existential of Dasein, should be examined with this in mind. World in this context cannot be thought as an ontic totality which consist in the entities in the world. World is Dasein's home, as such it matters to Dasein. Moreover, an investigation of the entities in the world is also useless for this goal. The point of investigation should be Dasein in its relation to world and entities and how Dasein encounters with the entities by its care structure. The meaning of being-in is important to understand the relationship between world and Dasein. Dasein is in the world in the sense that it dwells in the world, it cares the world and this is not an ontic characteristic, it is in Dasein's existence. With this, Heidegger gets away from the object and subject dichotomy, since being-in-the-world is an existential of Dasein. Dasein cannot isolate itself from the world and other entities in it, dealing with and concerning about the world is not a matter of choice. Dasein has a fundamental connection to the world.

Being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of Dasein points out the fact that Dasein does not just present in the world, it means that Dasein lives and experiences the world. Other beings or entities do not experience their being in the world, they are just present, whereas Dasein dwells in the world, cares about the world in relation to its everyday activities and future possibilities.²⁰

²⁰ Ibid., p.58-9

Handiness

Heidegger uses two notions to describe Dasein's relation to the world; those are handiness (*zuhandenheit*) and present-at-handness (*vorhandenheit*). According to Heidegger, handiness is the primary way of relating to world, whereas present-at-handness is like looking things in a theoretical way, in other words it is like considering an entity as if it is isolated from its surrounding and its web of relations. Heidegger thinks that we interact with entities by using them, this is the primordial relationship that we establish with the world and things. In other words, at first we are concerned with things in their handiness and present-at-handness is derived from the handiness, according to Heidegger. For instance, we use the hammer to drive nails; thinking about whatness of hammer in isolation from nails, walls, wood and so on comes later. Heidegger thinks that Dasein's relation to entities in terms of their handiness is primordial, because he thinks that Dasein sees entities *as* something, as things that are appropriate or inappropriate to achieve a certain goal. Dasein, in its average everydayness, encounters entities and considers them in terms of their usefulness. Considering entities as present-at-hand is a theoretical attitude which a scientist might take to study on a certain subject matter. Scientists see objects of their study as mere objects deprived of web of relations. To take this stance toward an entity, one must consider the entity simply as a thing that is to be studied at the theoretical level. Heidegger criticizes the philosophers before him because he thinks that there is a long tradition of considering world consisting in present-at-hand things. It is because of this tradition that human being is taken as an object among other objects. Both present-at-handness and handiness are the ways to relate to world for Dasein, however, for Heidegger, handiness is primary way and present-at-

handness is derived from it. This is related to the fundamental existential of Dasein, namely being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world also denotes the fact that world is familiar to Dasein and the entities in the world also familiar to Dasein and this familiarity is constituted by the fact that Dasein uses the entities for certain goals in mind; in other words, entities in their handiness are the primordial concern for Dasein. In its average everydayness, Dasein goes on its life in somewhat routine fashion. One goes outside through the door, for instance, uses the keys to unlock the door and never thinks about doorness or keyness unless there is a disturbance in the routine. If the key does not fit the keyhole, one stops and thinks about the key as a thing, as something present-at-hand. If the key works, its sole meaning for me is the goal for which I used it. The key in this context is equipment and its significance lies in its function. Heidegger assigns a primacy to handiness, because it is the way in which we deal with beings primordially. We see, use and describe entities in their contexts and we do not isolate them from their contexts unless we have to take a theoretical stance. This is a turn that Heidegger makes that is opposed to the traditional epistemological view that assumes that cognition of the objects is prior to ascribing functions to them. According to such a view, human beings first cognize the object in isolation and understand its whatness and then they ascribe a function to that object in order to use it for a certain goal. However, Heidegger's view is that we first understand entities in terms of their functions, because we understand them through using them. The meaning of the entities as their function is understood primordially before theorizing comes into play. Dreyfus thinks that Heidegger does not simply change the order of priority: "Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primary; he wants to show that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind and an

independent world.”²¹ In the traditional epistemological view, world and human being are distinguished and human being is considered like an observer who encounters entities which are independent of her and then she defines and uses them accordingly. Heidegger’s claim is that we should not subscribe to this kind of a world picture in which there is duality of subject and object, because this kind of an approach distorts the way in which Dasein exists. Dasein exists through its actions in the world; hence it encounters beings in terms of their handiness. According to both Heidegger and Kant, intuition is the primary way for relating to world and the beings. Through our sensibility, beings are accessible for us by showing themselves from themselves. Heidegger considers intuition as the act of letting something be encountered by Dasein.²² This means that our intuition allows us to attain the knowledge of beings by opening up the possibility of encounter. Heidegger thinks that this first encounter happens between Dasein and beings at their handiness.

²¹ Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world*, (New Baskerville: MIT Press, 1991), p.32

²² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.83

CHAPTER II

HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT

Kant's transcendental philosophy has been subjected to different interpretations. Whereas most Neo-Kantians take it as a theory of knowledge, Heidegger considers it as ontology, a metaphysics of experience. Heidegger thinks that when Kant carries an inquiry on possibility of experience, his investigation goes further than the scope of field of experience and he seeks for the possibility of ontic knowledge which, according to Heidegger, is grounded in ontological knowledge. Without investigating the ontological knowledge which is the knowledge of being of beings, ontic knowledge cannot be understood. With this agenda, our preliminary understanding of being, which is the starting point of our ontological knowledge, should be examined in a way to understand how we, as Dasein, can come to know that which is beyond what experience might offer.²³ However, first of all, structure and essence of human knowledge should be revealed, because human knowledge is the key to the task of laying ground for metaphysics. In this chapter, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant regarding temporality will be presented. After presenting the finitude of knowledge and priority of intuition, pure intuition and pure understanding and their synthesis will be presented. This discussion leads to possibility of ontological synthesis and Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis and Schematism which constitutes the core of Heidegger's reading of Kant. Last section, Heidegger's interpretation of imagination, will be somewhat a concluding part; in that section, Heidegger's appropriation of Kant because of his insight of the importance of

²³ Ibid., p. 12

temporality will be also be presented.

The Finitude of Knowledge and the Priority of Intuition

According to Heidegger, the mark of human knowledge is the fact that it is a finite knowledge. Heidegger says that finitude of knowledge is the essence of structure of Dasein's knowing, for that reason the character of this finitude should be investigated in order to understand what can be known within the limits of this finite knowledge. The essence of knowledge, which is finitude, is grounded in intuition. Kant says that every knowing is related to intuition, in one way or the other. The immediacy of intuition is the ground upon which knowledge can be constituted and thought is directed to intuition. Heidegger quotes Kant in this regard:

What Kant says in the first sentence of the thematic discussion in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is usually appraised much too lightly: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a knowing [*eine Erkenntnis*] may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it relates itself immediately to them, and upon which all thought as a means is directed."²⁴

Even though Heidegger claims that there is priority of intuition over thinking, he does not underestimate the role of thinking; however he says that without the reports of intuition, there would be nothing on which thinking can operate. In this regard, even though there could not be any knowledge without the unity of intuition and thought, intuition has the priority in the sense that only intuition can immediately relate to objects which show themselves and which Dasein is directed towards.

Human intuition is finite and the fact that it is "the authentic source of knowledge"²⁵ marks the essence of finitude of knowledge. To illustrate the point, Kant reveals the distinction between finite and infinite intuition. In the infinite intuition, there is no

²⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p.15

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16

need for thinking, because the object of infinite and absolute intuition is not something at hand, rather is the creation of the divine knowing and therefore it can be seen and comprehended as a whole without the agency of thinking. Finite intuition is in need of concepts in order to think the object, so the need for thinking pertains to finite knowing. Along these lines, Heidegger also thinks that the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself is also based on the difference between finite and infinite intuition. Because of the limited character of our intuition, we can only perceive appearances, the aspects of the beings which we able to take in stride by our sensibility in accordance with our a priori structures and limitations of knowledge. An infinite knower would be able to perceive all the aspects that are concealed from our finite intuition. Thus, finitude of intuition, which grounds the finitude of human knowledge, should be investigated in order to grasp the finitude in general.

Finite intuition is essentially receptive and needs, for its functioning, things that exist independent of the knower. What intuition does is to “take things in stride” which have to announce themselves in the first place. Things should “show themselves from themselves” in order to be subjected to receptivity of intuition. Since Dasein is finite and exists amongst other beings which already exist before it, it must relate itself to the beings that are already there independently. This relating is possible only if Dasein gives the other beings the possibility to announce themselves. This announcement is made possible through human sensibility which constitutes the ground of intuition. We need sensibility to have a relation with other beings which have the possibility to announce themselves; this is again caused by our finitude. With this, Heidegger says, Kant puts forward an ontological concept of sensibility.²⁶

²⁶ Ibid., p. 19

However, receptivity of intuition and its capacity to represent beings immediately does not suffice to constitute knowledge. The representation that intuition brings forward needs a determination which can make the intuition understandable. This is representing in concepts²⁷ which represents what is represented in accordance with the intuition in general. This determinative representing is “representation (concept) of a representation (intuition), an assertion of something about something”²⁸, hence judgment which is “the representation of a representation of it.”²⁹ This judging act of determination is dependent on intuition and its reports; therefore it is always in unity with intuition and dependent on it. This unity is the “veritative synthesis”³⁰ which makes thinking relate mediately to the beings. With this synthesis, the being, which is encountered through its announcement of itself, is determined as an object. This synthetic act is “bringing-forward of the related determinateness of the beings themselves”³¹ which ground the aforementioned act of determination. Veritative synthesis points out the finitude of knowledge and the need for determination of intuition. Veritative synthesis contains other two syntheses which are predicative and apophantic synthesis. Former is the “representing unity of unifying concepts in their character as predicates”³²; it represents the relation between the same insofar as they constitute a concept and the latter makes possible to relate a being to its proper predicates. Thus, the picture so far is like this: Intuition takes a thing in stride and understanding is an act of bringing-forth. Finite intuition is also dependent on

²⁷ Ibid., p. 20

²⁸ Ibid., p. 20

²⁹ Ibid., p. 20

³⁰ Ibid., p. 20

³¹ Ibid., p. 21

³² Ibid., p. 20

understanding for determination which is representation by concepts. Intuition must be coupled with concepts in order that the perception is comprehended as representation. Therefore, it can be claimed that our knowledge is finite in several ways. Firstly, we need objects to intuit and then to think about in order to have knowledge, we need beings to announce themselves, because we cannot create our objects of knowledge, only through the beings' announcing themselves, we can have the raw material of knowledge. Secondly, we perceive through sensibility which has its own limits, this means that, through sensibility, we can perceive only those beings whose ontological structures conform to the transcendental structures of our knowing capacities. This means that our intuition and perception is partial, we deal with beings as they appear to us, some parts of the beings remain concealed because of our limited capacity to attain knowledge and because our intuition is finite. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, understanding is even more finite because it does not have a direct relation to beings.

The finitude of human knowledge underlines the fact that intuition is limited and only receptive rather than creative. Thus, there should be a way to pass beyond these limits in order to understand being and ontological structures of beings for Dasein. Heidegger thinks that Dasein should have an understanding of being before it encounters beings in order to have knowledge about them. It means that there should be an a priori ground of knowledge which gives the possibility to have knowledge of beings; and this is the ground for the act of transcendence. Even though the receptivity of intuition is the heart of attaining knowledge, still there is the need for something a priori which precedes the givenness of beings. This is the search for the possibility of ontological knowledge, the possibility to have a priori knowledge which does not come from experience, from ontic knowledge. Heidegger thinks that

Kant's investigation on synthetic a priori knowledge has the same goal with his fundamental ontology. By understanding the way of being of Dasein and its ontological structures, Heidegger aims at attaining the knowledge of being. What Kant does in the search for possibility of synthetic a priori, for Heidegger, is also an investigation of the possibility of ontological knowledge. In the synthetic a priori judgments, there is the knowledge about being which we do not acquire from our experiences, in other words there is a synthesis which is grounded in the way we relate to being of beings pre-ontologically. "This pure "relation-to ..." (synthesis) forms first and foremost the that-upon-which [das Worauf] and the horizon within which the being in itself becomes experienceable in the empirical synthesis. It is now a question of elucidating the possibility of this a priori synthesis."³³ Since what is at issue here does not concern objects, but rather the knowledge we can have about objects, this is a transcendental investigation. The act of transcendence which enables Dasein to pass beyond beings to the being should be investigated.

Hence, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of Being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the Being of the being. It concerns the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the being, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object.³⁴

The a priori synthesis which is mentioned above is different from the veritative synthesis which concerns only ontic knowledge. This synthesis, as the ground for transcendence, is pure in the sense that it is non-experiential; rather it precedes and grounds the experience. Heidegger calls this synthesis the ontological synthesis. Thus, pure knowledge along with its constituents, pure intuition and pure understanding, should be analyzed.

³³ Ibid., p.10

³⁴ Ibid., p.10

Pure Intuition, Pure concepts and the A Priori Synthesis

Pure intuition is somewhat creative, says Heidegger,³⁵ in the sense that pure intuition creates the spatio-temporal order that any appearance should be conformed to in order that it can be perceived. Even though the object is not created by pure intuition, it is structured as the phenomenal object by pure intuition. Space and time are the pure intuitions that accompany our outer and inner experiences. Space is the form of outer sense, every being must announce itself in a spatial manner in order to be an object of knowledge and the representation of space is prior to actual encounters with outer objects with spatial relations. Time is the form of inner sense, but Kant also notes that time forms the outer experiences as well, because outer experiences also yield representations in the mind, and thus “time is the formal condition a priori of all appearance whatsoever.”³⁶ Since even the external phenomena are subjected to time as the form of inner sense and temporal relations, time is the universal pure intuition and, for Heidegger, it has a more important role than space as the pure intuition. Even though both space and time are pure intuitions, time is related to the subject in a more fundamental way according to Heidegger, because it is the form of inner sense and every experience occurs in inner sense and is subjected to temporal order in one way or the other. “Time (as space) is a function, the capacity of the subject to have internally coherent experience; it is a mode of relating experiences; in itself it has no content but it is the way in which any content is to be had.”³⁷

Appearances, as the aspects of the beings that can be received by sensibility, yield

³⁵ Ibid., p. 31

³⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.163, A 33, B50

³⁷ Charles Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant and Time*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1971), p. 54

representations in mind through intuition. Beings give themselves to our sensibility as appearances and they yield representations in the mind. Thus, since time is the form of inner sense, every appearance in order to be an object of experience must be temporal; in other words, a being can only appear under the form of time.

Appearances must conform to temporality which is the formal condition of our sensibility; and representations “as modifications of the mind, nevertheless belong to inner sense, (...) and all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense -namely, time- as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations.”³⁸ Hence, because time is more pervasive than space and it accompanies our inner states, thus to every “I think”, it becomes the universal pure intuition within which every representation is to be had. “As universal, pure intuition, it [time] must for this reason become the guiding and supporting essential element of pure knowledge, of the transcendence which forms knowledge.”³⁹

In the case of constituting empirical knowledge, the determination of intuitions by concepts and the synthetic unity of intuition and concept, which is provided by imagination, are fundamental. In the case of pure knowledge, same act of determination and synthetic unity also stands.⁴⁰ Pure knowledge consists in unity of pure intuition and pure concepts; it is a kind of knowing through pure intuition that is subsumed under pure concepts. Being pure, they are a priori and their content is not taken from experiential data. Representation of a being functions as determining a perceived being in reference to something which “applies to many.” In this way, different instances of the same sort of things, by the representation of those

³⁸ Kant, *Critique*, A 98–9

³⁹ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 34

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42

particular instances, the particulars are united under “one”. This unity of “one” determines a standard within which every particular being that may fall under this “one” is anticipated and kept in view. “This preliminary keeping in view of the one within which the many should be able to agree is the basic act of the forming of a concept.”⁴¹ It is clear that the content is acquired from the intuition by comparison or abstraction.⁴² In this act of determining and uniting different representations in reference to concepts, there is also a reference to unity itself. This means that in every act of representation, there is also a representation of unity itself. This represented unity constitutes the content of pure concepts. Pure concepts give order and ground to empirical knowledge by relating to objects a priori “as the modes of synthesis of the kinds of concepts we use in experience.”⁴³ Together with pure intuition, they draw the limits of a field of possible experience as a priori grounds of knowledge. Heidegger considers pure concepts, or categories, as ontological predicates. Kant derives the categories from the table of judgments, however Heidegger does not agree with him on this claim of derivation. Heidegger thinks that the source of categories should be investigated in their application to intuition, since, as we have already noted, thought is always in service of intuition. This issue will be elaborated later, when it comes to the discussion on the possibility of ontological synthesis.

The unity of pure intuition and pure thought is not consequential but originary, in the sense that their union constitutes their ground. This unity is also the essential unity of pure knowledge which is the key element for ontological knowledge and laying ground for metaphysics. Since the elements of pure

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 37

⁴² Ibid., p. 37

⁴³ Sherover, p. 59

knowledge are united in their origin and their essential dependence on each other is at the heart of this unity, this unity is called a synthesis in order to denote its originary character.⁴⁴ This act of synthesis is performed by the transcendental imagination and it is concerned with the unity of time and categories, since universal pure intuition is addressed as time and pure thinking is grounded in the use of categories. The investigation on the essence of the unity of ontological knowledge, which is ontological synthesis⁴⁵, would reveal the application of a-temporal categories to intuitions which are fundamentally temporal.

Both pure intuition and pure concepts are synthetic in character. Synopsis of intuition refers to the fact that every intuition contains a manifold and the parts of this manifold are in unity, i.e., synthesized. Every intuition, being a representation of unity of a manifold, is synthetic by nature. Pure concepts are the source of unity; they have an a priori representation of pure unity which grounds and guides the unity. In order for them to be connected, another faculty must be operative which shares the nature of both pure intuition and pure thought. Heidegger quotes Kant saying that “synthesis in general is a power of imagination.”⁴⁶ Pure synthesis which is the unity of pure intuition and pure thought is an act of imagination. Therefore, the pure knowledge is constituted in this way:

What must first be given to us -with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects- is the manifold of pure intuition; the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of the power of the imagination is the second, but even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of a proposed object and they rest on the understanding.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 42

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45

Pure synthesis, which is an act of transcendental imagination, is the basis of ontological knowledge. This is one of the main reasons of Heidegger's giving imagination a central role in his reading of Kant.

The Ontological Synthesis

As it is briefly mentioned, Kant derives categories from the table of judgments, but Heidegger thinks that such a derivation is not plausible. Thus, Heidegger wants to investigate the content of pure concepts and their ground of application to intuition and their relation to time and temporality. He thinks that categories, their origin and function, can be explained with reference to their relation to time. However, this task is not completed in Deduction; the picture will be completed in Schematism where the application of categories to intuition and their relation to time is revealed. In his interpretation of Transcendental Deduction, Heidegger wants to show that time is not only known through intuition, but it is also known conceptually. This claim amounts to say that time is intrinsic to all a priori principles of cognition and knowledge, and structures of human knowledge.

In the Deduction, Kant investigates the possibility of the application of the categories; the question of how this application works is a matter that he discusses in the Schematism. The kernel of this inquiry is to discover what understanding can know without its unity with intuition, what the possibility of thought is in itself. This investigation leads to the question of the way in which understanding provides categories. This is again a transcendental investigation, since the inquiry is on the a priori structures of how we know rather than what we know. Heidegger takes great interest in Deduction and usage of categories, because he is concerned with the

function of categories as ontological predicates. In Heidegger's reading, categories are treated in their function of predication that renders the being of beings. The ontological and transcendental content of categories is the aspect that Heidegger wants to point out and emphasize. The synthesis of concepts with time (which is provided by transcendental imagination) is the central theme of Heidegger's interpretation of Deduction, which Kant, for Heidegger, fails to recognize because of Kant's deriving the categories from the table of judgments and thus sticking with logic and overlooking the categories' relation to time through the act of synthesis of transcendental imagination. This synthesis is the ontological synthesis which grounds the unity of time as pure intuition and pure concepts of understanding. The important difference between A and B editions of Deduction is also crucial for Heidegger. The reasons for Heidegger's choosing to work on A Deduction instead of B Deduction will be made clear later as the thesis progresses, but, for now, it can be briefly said that Heidegger finds the postulation of the transcendental imagination as the central element of knowledge which provides the unity of pure intuition and pure concepts by its power of synthesis very important, because Heidegger also thinks that imagination which provides the synthesis of principles of pure knowledge is interconnected with time, and temporality is grounded in imagination. Thus, temporality will be shown as the horizon for human knowledge. Moreover, the temporalization of understanding has a great importance too, Deduction will show that time is also intrinsic to conceptual knowledge and temporality is immanent to pure principles of understanding.

Heidegger also interprets the goal of Deduction as an attempt to elucidate the act of transcendence of finite reason. Ontological knowledge constitutes the focal point of Heidegger's philosophical inquiry, since through this kind of knowledge, the

knowledge of the being of beings, which is the ground for the possibility of attaining the meaning of being, is revealed. The possibility of ontological knowledge lies in the act of Dasein's turning toward a being which lets that being stand in opposition to the knower.⁴⁸ "In this original turning-toward, the finite creature first allows a space for play [*Spielraum*] within which something can "correspond" to it. To hold oneself in advance in such a play-space, to form it originally, is none other than the transcendence which marks all finite comportment to beings."⁴⁹ This "play-space" which is constituted by Dasein's comportment toward beings corresponds to the horizon of transcendence. Since the acts of standing against and turning toward are grounded in ontological knowledge and ontological synthesis makes possible the ontological knowledge, the synthesis must be revealed as the ground for transcendence. Moreover, since the function of pure concepts is to determine pure intuition in order to constitute ontological knowledge, the purpose which pure understanding serves "within the making-possible of the essential structure of transcendence"⁵⁰ becomes very important. Nevertheless, the act of synthesis which makes the unity of knowledge possible is of greatest importance both for Heidegger and Kant. Thus the inquiry of Deduction begins with the analysis of threefold synthesis: "the synthesis of apprehension in intuition", "the synthesis of reproduction in imagination" and "the synthesis of recognition in concepts". The parts of threefold synthesis will be examined individually in accordance with the way in which Kant establishes them in the *Critique*; after that Heidegger's interpretation of the threefold synthesis with reference to temporality will be presented.

⁴⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 50

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.50

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.50

The Threefold Synthesis

The elements in the threefold synthesis are not like different and distinct steps or distinct syntheses, they are separated for analytic purposes only and actually they are connected and constitute one act of synthesis for forming cognition.

The synthesis of apprehension in intuition concerns the temporal order of manifold of intuition. Apprehension is the immediate awareness when there is an object that is perceived, an awareness of some representation.⁵¹ Since this awareness takes place in the mind, it is subjected to time which is the form of inner sense as it is established in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This means that any apprehension is formed and ordered by time, in other words “temporally framed”⁵². Manifold of sensation, which is given to intuition, should be already ordered temporally in order to have unified and coherent experience. This temporal order makes our representations in time, in a successive order. With this synthesis, the manifold is represented as a manifold in the sense that we are aware of the fact that there is a manifold in every intuition. The parts of this manifold are distinguished temporally, since they occur in different times; nevertheless we comprehend them as a whole, as a unity which endures throughout the spread of time in which we receive the manifold of intuition. In this regard, Kant says:

It is necessary to first run through and then to take up together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure presents a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis.⁵³

⁵¹ Sherover, p. 72

⁵² Ibid., p.72

⁵³ Kant, A 99

This synthesis is a priori, because it is also applied on pure manifolds of space and time which are the ground of the possibility of experience.

The synthesis of apprehension in intuition requires something like an act of memory recall, since, in order to be aware of a time span of a perception, we must recall previous phases and their relation to each other as belonging to the same perception. This requirement leads to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. For the manifolds to be held together as constituting a single representation, an awareness of a spread of time and recalling the sequential perceptions are necessary, along with the immediate awareness of having perceptions at the present moment. “This selective recall is itself a temporal process and is effected by an exercise of imagination.”⁵⁴ This synthesis provides the union of past and present and the awareness concerning the fact that objects of perception are in time. With this synthesis, one is able to apprehend that some present perceptions are in relation with some past perceptions in the sense that they just represent the temporally different phases of the same object. This synthesizing capacity is presupposed to any experience, thus it is also a priori. “As a transcendental synthesis, it provides the possibility for the necessary unity of the content of appearances and underlies the possibility for the application of concepts to things.”⁵⁵ The synthesis of apprehension in intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination are fundamentally connected to each other, since the reproduction of past ideas is necessary for the awareness that intuitions persist through time. This also holds for pure intuition, because they also consist in manifolds and their apprehension is bound to time. “The pure synthesis of the apprehension of time is the necessary condition of all knowledge (whether empirical or pure), since all ideas are given to us in time. Hence

⁵⁴ Shereover, p. 74

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.74

the pure synthesis of the reproduction of time (as inseparably connected with the synthesis of apprehension) is also a necessary condition of all knowledge.”⁵⁶ Since the act of synthesis belongs to the imagination and these pure syntheses are transcendental because they ground the a priori knowledge, transcendental synthesis of imagination becomes central in the process of having experience and knowledge as being the ground of the possibility of any empirical synthesis.

Lastly, there is the synthesis of recognition in a concept. With the first two syntheses, it is seen that we have to first apprehend the manifold in the intuition of an object and then reproduce the past data and connect them to each other. Nevertheless, there should be another synthesis which relates the syntheses of imagination to concepts of understanding. This third synthesis also enables us to be aware of the unity of synthesis, in other words, by this we recognize the concept synthesis.⁵⁷ As the second synthesis shows, we connect certain past and present representations with each other when they belong to the same object, but this connection is not random or arbitrary, there is a rule behind this synthesis. In order to recognize an object, the apprehension and reproduction is not sufficient, there should be a rule which can organize the association of previous and present representations. This rule of synthesis is grounded in concepts. Concepts determine the rules with which we can discern which representations are to be held together because of belonging to the same object. With the help of concepts, representations are compared and combined when they belong to same object as constituting the different aspects of it. Every object is seen under a concept and the concept is what determines the relationship between different representations and synthesizes the relevant representations. There

⁵⁶ Herbert James Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936), vol. I, p. 364

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 375

is necessity in this synthesis in a concept and according to Kant any necessity should be grounded transcendently, since the necessity cannot come from experience; rather it grounds the experience.

The empirical manifold given to sense is conditioned by the form of time (and space); the empirical synthesis of the given manifold is conditioned by the transcendental synthesis of time (and space); and the recognition of the empirical object and of the complex synthesis by which it is combined is conditioned by the unity of thought or of self-consciousness.⁵⁸

On this point, Kant introduces the transcendental apperception as the fundamental condition of any synthesis and any experience one might have. It is “that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representations of objects is alone possible.”⁵⁹ In order to apprehend, reproduce and recognize, first of all, I have to be aware of the fact that I am the one who apprehends, reproduces and recognizes. Without being aware of the fact that all those representations and relations among representations and perceptions belong to my mind, a coherent experience would be impossible. Before I even know what my representations might mean, I am aware that I have representations and they have unity. In other words, transcendental apperception, as being the ground of any synthetic unity, bases all cognition. This self-consciousness is prior to any knowledge concerning the representations that one might have and carries a necessity in the sense that without it there would be no cognition or coherent experience. Kant further argues that source of transcendental apperception cannot be intuition, hence it should be belong to understanding and because of that, it should be in accordance with the rules of understanding, namely categories.

Transcendental apperception gives the identity of the self, who endures and has representations through time, and also it is the ground of the possibility of

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 380

⁵⁹ Kant, A 107

synthesis as such; hence it is concluded that it should accompany all of our representations. It is prior to any experience and it grounds all experience. According to Kant, this consciousness concerning the fact that one has representations comprises a synthetic unity. “Kant interprets this knowledge of our possession of all of our representations as knowledge of a connection or unity among them, indeed a synthetic connection because he takes them not just to share a name or a property but to be connected to one another.”⁶⁰ This synthetic unity is also a priori, since we know this unity before any experience we have and before we know the significance of the representations we have. Thus, Kant arrives at the conclusion that this a priori synthetic unity should be in virtue of a synthesis and this synthesis is the a priori synthesis. Even though Kant claims that all synthesis is performed by imagination, nevertheless he concludes that this synthesis gives the unity of self which endures through time and since it yields a concept, it is related to understanding rather than imagination. This attribution of a priori synthesis to understanding makes pure understanding and categories central and leads to the claim that every experience involves the application of categories to intuition, since all experience is conditioned to apperception, unity of which is grounded in understanding and conforms to rules of categories. With this move, categories are shown as the condition of apperception and as the ground of the possibility of the synthesis itself. However, Heidegger thinks that categories can only function in relation to “intuition and its synthesis through imagination”⁶¹ and criticizes Kant for reducing synthesis to a function of understanding and giving imagination’s central role to understanding. Heidegger considers the aspects of the threefold synthesis in their relation to the three aspects of

⁶⁰ Paul Guyer, “The Deduction of the Categories”. In *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 132

⁶¹ Kant, A 119

time, namely present, past and future and also he deals with this synthesis in its time-forming function. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition is related to present since it concerns the present intuitions in terms of their manifoldness. By distinguishing the present instants, or nows, we are able to be aware of the manifold in an intuition. Moreover, there is the pure synthesis of apprehension which provides the representation of time as pure intuition. In the case of pure synthesis of apprehension, what is concerned is not a present impression but rather the present itself; in other words, not the intuition in this now but the particular now as such. With this pure synthesis, the pure manifold of the representation of time is apprehended. The synthesis of reproduction in imagination is related to past, because it is a kind of recalling which enables one to connect past representations with the present ones. Pure synthesis of reproduction functions like the pure synthesis of apprehension. With this pure synthesis of reproduction, the nows that have been past, thus the past as such, are represented. This act of connection of past and present is made possible with the help of a rule which is determined by a concept. The synthesis of recognition in a concept is related to future. In this synthesis there is some sort of anticipation; when one recognizes an object through concepts, there is the capacity to reproduce it and then recognizing it again as the same sort of object. Pure synthesis of recognition represents future by projecting the concepts into nows that will be coming in the future. Just as past, present and future are the aspects of the same unified whole that is temporality, aspects of threefold synthesis comprise a unity of one synthesis. Heidegger thinks that threefold synthesis is performed by the transcendental imagination and the time-forming character of this synthesis stems from the fact that there is a fundamental relation between time and transcendental imagination. Heidegger also criticizes Kant, because he thinks that Kant comes short

of establishing the relation between transcendental apperception and time. Kant thinks that transcendental apperception is the ground of the possibility of the threefold synthesis, but Heidegger argues that transcendental apperception can only be the ground of the threefold synthesis if it is related to temporality in a fundamental way. "Time and 'I think' no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds; they are the same."⁶²

The import of Kant's doctrine of threefold synthesis and the postulation of transcendental apperception shows that pure concepts determined the rules which our appearances must conform to in order to constitute knowledge, because pure concepts are what give the necessary unity to the elements of our experiences. Being a priori, they constitute the conditions which beings should meet in order to become our objects of knowledge. In other words, pure concepts define the limits of human knowledge as being the conditions of thought and intuition as such. These claims also underlie the subjective ground of human experience. Our transcendental structures and limitations of knowing predetermine the ontological structure of beings that we might encounter. This claim marks the act of transcendence. The knowledge of the structure of being of a being that I encounter is recognized by me in accordance with the subjective and transcendental structure of my experience. This knowledge is the ontological knowledge. "This apriori knowledge was termed transcendental by Kant when viewed from my cognition possibility as knowing subject; this same apriori knowledge is ontological when viewed from the side of the structure which the object must possess insofar as it can be known by me."⁶³ Heidegger, in fact, uses the notion of transcendental and ontological as if they refer to same meaning. This a priori knowledge means that ontological structure of an

⁶² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* p. 134

⁶³ Sherover, p. 80

object must conform to my transcendental structures of knowing, if it is to be encountered at all and this means that the being status of any being that might be encountered is predetermined and it enables one to turn toward beings that can be known and to let them stand in opposition. This constitutes the “play-space” that is mentioned above which is the originally formed open domain that is nothing but transcendence. According to Heidegger, the being of beings is constructed transcendently; this is a construction in the sense that ontological structures of objects which is the condition of the possibility of being an object of experience is at the same time the transcendental structure of the knowing which is the condition of the possibility of experience as such. This framework of transcendence is parallel to Kant’s “highest principle of all synthetic judgments.”

Ontological knowledge, by rendering possible the knowledge of being of beings in our experiential field, is grounded in pure synthesis. This also supports Heidegger’s consideration of categories as ontological predicates. This pure synthesis consists in the system of ontological predicates that we can come to attribute to the objects we encounter and it lets beings be encountered as possible objects of experience. With this synthesis and act of transcendence, the possibility of going beyond the momentary apprehension and attaining unified and coherent experience is made possible. There are some remarkable differences between the understanding of transcendence of Heidegger and of Kant. In the Kantian framework, transcendence marks the possibility of having a priori knowledge of objects of experience. In the picture of Kant’s understanding of transcendence, the question is how the subject can come to know the object by its a priori structures of knowing. However, Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence is based on his attempt to get rid of the subject-object dichotomy. In the Heideggerian picture, Dasein and world with the other

beings in it are fundamentally intertwined and thus transcendence does not mean subject's transcending in order to get the knowledge of objects and the world. "By thus going to the transcendental ground of our knowledge of objects, the façade of their complete independence has been stripped off and the dualism of an object-subject dichotomy has been bridged."⁶⁴ For Heidegger, transcendence is an act of constructing a horizon in which Dasein can understand beings and being by its openness to being.

Interpretation of Schematism

According to Heidegger, categories' relation to time should be revealed, since he thinks that categories turn out to be ontological predicates in their relation to time. Categories are the representation of unities and they are dependent on pure intuition through pure synthesis which is performed by transcendental imagination. The Deduction shows that any cognition involves categories, but the way in which categories are applied to appearances is left to Schematism where, according to Heidegger's reading, Kant reveals the categories' relation to time. As the form of inner sense, time is the formal condition that every object should conform to in order to be an object of experience. This is shown by the Transcendental Aesthetic. After this, with Deduction, it is established that transcendental imagination, as the source of unity of intuition and thought and synthesis in general, is the ground of unity of time which is the formal condition of any cognition. It is also shown that categories should be related to time, or, in other words, they should relate to objects in temporal terms. In the Schematism, Kant establishes how a-temporal categories and temporal

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 82

intuitions are connected by the agency of unity of time. The role of time in this act of connection is to constitute the way in which an appearance is subsumed under a pure concept in order to be made intelligible by being organized by the concepts.

Heidegger asks this question of application of categories to appearances or subsuming the appearances under categories in a different way. He questions the meaning of subsumption and by way of answering this, he establishes the way in which transcendental imagination forms categories in temporal terms. Heidegger's reading is, once again, also related to transcendence; and in his reading of Schematism, he wants to show that sensibilization of concepts is related to formation of transcendence and it is performed as schematism.

In Deduction, we see that categories, as being the forms of thought, determine the ontological status of beings if they are to become the objects of our experiences. In Schematism, the question becomes how this determination or application of categories to appearances functions and what the limit of their scope of application is. Since every object is perceived under the unity of time, categories should relate to appearances in accordance with their temporal form. This means that the form of inner sense, that is time, is the mediating factor which unites a-temporal categories with particularly temporal reports of intuition. Time has this bridging role because it is both a priori and intuitional and thus it relates both pure thought and pure intuition which are fundamentally different from each other.⁶⁵ When categories are reformed by schematization in terms of temporality and relate to appearances in terms of temporality, they acquire temporal reference and a particular content. This reformation of categories is performed by transcendental schemata which are the rules that associate categories to particular appearances. Transcendental schemata are

⁶⁵ Shereover, p.105

produced by imagination; imagination forms a schema in accordance with time. According to Kant, transcendental schema is an a priori time determination which defines and limits the application of categories to specific appearances. Concepts must be subjected to sensibilization in order that they can relate to objects and thus acquire meaning and content. This reconciliation of concept and intuition is performed by a schema and with this schematization not only concept gains a meaning but also the object that is perceived gains a determination and the knowledge of that object is rendered possible; and the object of knowledge offers its image to the knower. This is related to the ground of ontological knowledge (and transcendence) which is the act of turning toward and letting stand in opposition. By being open to beings through the sensibility, knower turns toward a being and by the schema, the image of the object is revealed and thus that being stands in opposition to the knower.⁶⁶ This procedure of making sensible of concepts, which is again performed by transcendental imagination and its synthesizing power, is what makes transcendence operative.⁶⁷ The necessity of schematization of categories, in order that categories can be related to intuitions hence to cognition, shows that categories without reference to sensibility remain only as forms of thought with no meaning. Accordingly, this amounts to say that schematized categories are primary and thus categories acquire their meaning only in their relation to time, to form of inner sense. “Temporalizing synthesis of imagination 'procedures' schemata, in terms of which we represent and understand what is given and from which we abstract the pure concepts (categories) by detemporalization.”⁶⁸ Moreover, in Schematism, it is established that

⁶⁶ William Richardson, *Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), p.131

⁶⁷ Shereover, p. 111

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 131

time is not only the form of inner sense but also the form of schemata which provide the ground of applicability of categories to appearances. As it is pointed out several times, time is the primal condition that any being must meet if it is to become an object of experience. Thus, temporality, or being subjected to form of time, is a common feature that both knower and the object of knowledge share. Accordingly, the transcendental conditions of knowing and the ontological structures of objects of knowledge are bound to time in the sense that time predetermines those conditions and structures and constitutes the horizon for transcendence. "Time is then, as Kant left it, within the entire realm of possible finite human knowledge, universal and pervasive; it is the prime ground of all our representations, of all phenomena appearing to-be for us, of all conceptual representations in terms of which they are known by us."⁶⁹ This also supports Heidegger's claim that categories are ontological predicates, because Schematism shows that categories as schematized, i.e. temporalized, defines the ontological characteristics that beings should have in order to be received by human being. They ground the possibility of experience, along with the finite intuition, by revealing the being of beings in accordance with transcendental structures of our knowing capacity. With the Schematism, for Heidegger, the picture of the possibility of ontological knowledge is complete. In order to cognize, a being must appear in a temporal form and this appearance is related to schematized categories which is the transcendental time determination that structures time in my experiential field. This means that schemata give the knowledge of being of beings and thus they ground the ontological knowledge.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 116

Heidegger's Reading of Transcendental Imagination

Transcendental imagination, as the common root of intuition and thought and as the source of synthesis, is of great importance for Heidegger. He is mainly interested in imagination regarding its productive and ontological character. As it is established in Heidegger's interpretation of Schematism, imagination is the source of the act of temporalizing of all categories; and with this power of temporal synthesis, it is what delimits and defines the horizon of the field of experience, thus the basis of transcendence. Role of transcendental imagination in the act of transcendence, according to Heidegger, is the fact that it provides the "play-space" within which one can encounter beings and have the knowledge of their being through the preliminary understanding of being which is peculiar to Dasein. "As reproductive, it brings into present awareness specific or ontic memories; as productive, it delineates the ontological possibility of transcending the particularity of the present moment."⁷⁰ Heidegger does not take transcendental imagination as a faculty along with sensibility and understanding. Since it is the source of the essential unity of sense and thought, which are the two stems of knowledge, it is a dynamic process⁷¹ that constitutes transcendence and the possibility of experience; moreover it is presupposed to any experience as the ground of the ontological knowledge. Imagination does not function merely as a mediator between sense and thought, because, if this were the case, it would mean that sense and thought are essentially distinct faculties and there is the need for a mediator and thus the unity of the two is consequential. However, according to Heidegger, their unity is prior and sense and

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 134

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 136

thought are the distinguished aspects of the function of imagination.⁷² We have seen that time is known both intuitionally and conceptually and time is pervasive in cognition and knowledge. Imagination, as the root of both sense and thought, should be interconnected with time. According to Heidegger's reading, time is grounded in imagination.

Time, in the Kantian framework, consists in a flow of continuing nows. However, Heidegger thinks that time as a now sequence does not fit the general picture of Kant's transcendental philosophy. Even though we experience time as now sequences and as present oriented in our everyday experiences, still there must be a transcendental source which constitutes the ground of the possibility of this experience of time. Hence, Heidegger wants to establish that imagination constitutes this transcendental ground of time as the primordial temporality. Heidegger interprets Deduction by treating the threefold synthesis as the central concern and he thinks that all three aspects of this synthesis are performed by imagination. He also thinks that the threefold synthesis, which is the ground of any cognition, is fundamentally temporal. These claims help Heidegger to attain his central claim that temporality is interconnected with imagination. Moreover, with his reading of Schematism, Heidegger says that temporality is the source of unity of knowledge as the bridging factor between categories and intuition. "If knowledge is only expressible in temporalist terms, if the transcendental temporalizing imagination grounds the possibility of knowledge, then the conclusion is apparent: the transcendental capacity for imaginative synthesis is primordial time."⁷³

The temporal character of the aspects of threefold synthesis is rather straightforward regarding the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 144

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 185

reproduction. However, temporal character of the synthesis of recognition in a concept should be elaborated further with the light of the import of Schematism. Moreover, this synthesis has importance in Heideggerian framework because of another reason; it is related to future which, as we shall see, has the central role in Heidegger's understanding of temporality. This synthesis concerns the rules with which past and present representations are connected and united, and thus rendered intelligible. Schematism establishes that the rules which order our intuitions function in reference to the form of time which is the formal condition of human knowledge. This means that the rules, which are determined in reference to temporality, constitute a conceptual framework and this framework defines the limits in which the objects might be apprehended and reproduced. As transcendental, the synthesis of recognition in a concept defines a horizon in which one can anticipate possible apprehensions that one might have in the future. This amounts to say that this conceptual framework, which is defined transcendently, forms the future. This synthesis has a higher importance according to Heidegger, in the sense that by constituting the limits of future experiences, "it sets out a field of characteristics of possible objects, thereby a possible world of objects. Within this experiential possibility the other two aspects of the triune synthesis are able to function."⁷⁴ Even though Kantian understanding of time is present oriented, Heidegger gives the primacy to future. Every now, as the representative of the present, is formed in relation to future possibilities, thus future is present in every now. Moreover, one recalls the past experiences regarding their relevance to one's present and future possibilities. Kant thinks that the synthesis of reproduction in a concept has no reference to temporality unlike first two syntheses, but Heidegger considers the

⁷⁴ *ibid*, p. 190

synthesis of reproduction in its reference to future and by his analysis he points out one of the most important aspects of his understanding of temporality which is his claim that time temporalizes itself out of future.⁷⁵ Conception of time as now sequences overlooks the subjectivity of experience, which is underlined by the transcendental philosophy of Kant, because this conception of time is object oriented as it is delineated by the succession of events or motion in terms of before and after. Time should be defined in reference to subjectivity and subject's inner sense, because time is not derived from the experience of objects but rather we impose time on objects of experience. Accordingly, the structure of time and the structure of the self should be shown to have implications on each other. Projecting a temporal horizon is the ground of the possibility of experience; by imposing the form of time on the objects, we constitute an experiential field and define the ontological characteristics of the objects of experience. In this way, objects' affecting the inner sense is made possible. This capacity to be affected by the objects is grounded transcendently by the temporal structure of the subjectivity and self. Heidegger claims that this time-forming activity, which makes it possible to be affected by the objects of experience, also enables the self to be affected by itself through its own activities of inner sense. This claim is based on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world which, according to Heidegger, is the fundamental structure of Dasein's existence. Dasein is being-in-the-world and this means that Dasein establishes a cognitional relation to other beings by its existential involvement with the world and the beings in that world. It is not the case that Dasein first exists and is aware of its existence independent of other beings and then constitutes a relationship with them, rather Dasein is essentially with the other beings and by cognizing them it attains the knowledge of its own self and

⁷⁵ *ibid*, p.191

existence. “Therefore, the self, structured by time, affects itself by constituting the possibility of becoming aware of objects in temporal terms and is thereby essentially a being-in-the-world as a continuing act of temporalization.”⁷⁶ Thus, time grounds the possibility to have knowledge of beings and constitutes the field of experience, and through this possibility, Dasein has the knowledge of its subjectivity and self. According to Heidegger, transcendental apperception as the ground of the unity of experience emphasizes the self which is constitutive of the fundamental relation between world and Dasein. Even though Heidegger criticizes Kant’s conception of transcendental apperception on the ground that in this conception, the self is considered as worldless, he develops this conception by saying that every “I think” is essentially a “I think something”, because Dasein is being-in-the-world, and thus every “I” presupposes a world. Furthermore, “I” as transcendental relates to world through temporality. This claim can be seen clearer when Heidegger’s reading of Transcendental Aesthetic and Schematism is taken into consideration. In the Aesthetic, time has been shown as the form of inner sense and universal pure intuition which is formal condition of any experience and with the Schematism it is established that temporalized categories are originary and any synthetic act is temporally framed. This means that, even though transcendental apperception is the ground of the unity, still there is the need for temporality in any synthesis. In other words, the structure that enables transcendental apperception to give unity is temporality.

Heidegger, by claiming that imagination is involved in the threefold synthesis, makes imagination the source of any cognition. Accordingly, the possibility of the self as experiencing is also made possible by imagination. This also

⁷⁶ *ibid*, p. 207

means that human self is ultimately temporal; it creates itself by time-forming activities. Imagination makes manifest the primordial temporality which is the basis of not only human experience but also of human existence. Heidegger thinks that, in the first *Critique*, Kant does not venture to investigate the human existence in a deeper fashion, but Heidegger finds this investigation crucial for founding a new, critical metaphysics. Hence, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, introduces his notion of care which is the fundamental ontological structure of Dasein's existence. In the following chapter, Heidegger's analysis of the existential care will be revealed and after that care's relation, which is the essential structure of human existence, to Kant's transcendental imagination, which is the essential structure of human knowledge, will be established. Since Heidegger's understanding of temporality is at the center of this relation between care and transcendental imagination, I will also present Heideggerian temporality.

CHAPTER III

HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF TIME AND CARE

Preliminary Sketch of Care and Heideggerian Temporality

Care is the fundamental structure of the existence of Dasein who is essentially being-in-the-world. As it is stated in the first chapter of this thesis, Dasein's existence is an issue for it and also Dasein is the only being which dwells in the world and is concerned with its own existence and its surrounding. The world and the beings is a matter for Dasein and, more importantly, Dasein is capable of understanding its own being and the being as such. Heidegger establishes care as the fundamental structure that grounds the existence of Dasein with all of its existentials and aspects.

Heidegger's definition of care is the following: "The being of Dasein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the-world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)."⁷⁷ This structure implies that Dasein, in its totality of being, exists as a "thrown projection", it lives in a present moment that is grounded in its past and that grounds its future. Behind this existential structure, there is the presupposition of openness to time. As "being-ahead-of-itself", Dasein is open to future; "already-being-in" is Dasein's openness to past and being-together-with presupposes the process of making present or enpresenting. These three dimensions of openness to time are internally connected to each other; however Heidegger ascribes a relative importance to the future, because Dasein's existence is fundamentally a projection to the future through present action, always having its

⁷⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 186

past operative at the background. Being-ahead-of-itself also indicates Heidegger's claim that Dasein is its possibilities and the present is always shaped in accordance with those possibilities. When Heidegger claims that Dasein's existence is an issue for it, he also means to emphasize the futural aspect of Dasein's existence. Dasein is always occupied with its plans, possibilities and future expectations and it constantly re-determines its existence in regard to its future. "Dasein's way of being is an ongoing concern, something that it is constantly taking a stand on and determining. Thus, Dasein is always on the way to being what it is, and so is always characterized by a 'not yet'."⁷⁸ However, this futural aspect and Dasein's existence in accordance with its possibilities is grounded in the world which always already exists before Dasein comes to the world. This corresponds to the aspect of being-already-in (the world) and points out what Heidegger calls Dasein's attunement (*Befindlichkeit*). Even though Dasein could make decisions about its future possibilities, it nevertheless lives in a world and web of relations and significations that it does not choose or create. In other words, Dasein finds itself in and orients itself towards a world which is there with its established meanings, references and with the entities in it before Dasein's existence. This aspect of the care structure also points out Dasein's thrownness. Dasein is thrown into the world and its existence, and this world or this existence is not a matter of choice for Dasein. It exists with a past, background and web of relations that it has no control over, even though Dasein could choose what to do with its own existence in the world that it is thrown into. Nevertheless, this does not change the thrownness of Dasein. Third aspect of the care structure, being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered), concerns the present of Dasein and Heidegger names this aspect *falling prey*. Being-together with shows the fact that

⁷⁸ David Cerbone, *Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 59

current occupations and agendas that Dasein has are determined by Dasein's future and past. We consider and choose what to do in the present in reference to what we want to do or be in the future; and when doing something, we have always a background that serves our present moment and future possibilities. For instance, now I am writing my thesis in order to get my MA degree in philosophy, my current activity is for the sake of some specific goal which is to complete my graduate education, and the fact that I am able to write the thesis now is based on my former philosophy education and studies. "Heidegger's point here is that human activity more generally has a kind of horizontal structure, where my current situation is informed and sustained by its relations to my past and future."⁷⁹

Heidegger thinks that temporality, which is "the unified phenomenon of future that makes present in the process of having-been"⁸⁰ is the basis and meaning of care structure, thus, as it can be seen, the definitions of components of care structure have reference to temporality by corresponding different aspects of temporality, namely future, past and present. Temporality, as the meaning of being of Dasein, gives the possibility to be a whole to the care structure. As Heidegger says, Dasein is concerned with being essentially, being concerned with being is its essence and this essence is related to time and hence openness to time. Thus, meaning of being must be related to time and temporality. This intertwined relation between being and time makes temporality an inseparable part of Dasein's existence. In other words, just as time cannot be thought completely apart from Dasein, Dasein exists *as* temporality rather than being in time. Also, past, present and future are not metaphysically distinct dimensions of time, rather they are "essentially integrated

⁷⁹ *ibid*, p. 65

⁸⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 300

phenomena.”⁸¹ More importantly, time is not like the sequence of “nows” as a point moving along a line from future to past through the present; and time is not a property that anything has or could have, it is self-generating process that underlies the being of Dasein; and since it underlies Dasein's being, it is also ecstatic and shares this capacity of being-ahead, being-behind and being-with oneself. Therefore, since Dasein's existence is not linear and static in its structure, time, which is being of Dasein, cannot be static and linear either. “Temporality's essence is temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases.”⁸² Heidegger's understanding of time is considerably different from common sense and traditional thinking and conception of time. Vulgar notion of time, time as we conceive in our everydayness, is present oriented and according to that conception, time is considered as the sequence of nows that are successive. Heidegger thinks that this conception of time is not entirely erroneous; it is just a derivation from the primordial temporality. This point will be elaborated more in the following sections.

In our everyday dealings with time, we talk of time as something we can possess or lose, as if time is a kind of property that we might have or lack, for instance, we hear people say that they have no time to do something and so on. Clearly, this everyday conception and talk of time comes into conflict with Heidegger's conception of time. The traditional philosophical thinking about time is also along the same lines with this everyday understanding of time. Aristotle might set a good example to understand the traditional thinking, where time is conceived as the sequence of nows which are self-contained. Even though it is obvious that those conceptions conflict with the Heideggerian understanding of temporality, Heidegger does not think that those conceptions or interpretations of temporality are erroneous

⁸¹Ibid., p. 146

⁸²Ibid., p. 302

or they stem from a misunderstanding of temporality, rather he thinks that those are different modes of relating to time. Heidegger thinks that our everyday understanding of time is always present oriented and even when we talk about past or future, there is an implicit now, because we always use the present as a reference point. When we say “then” it is “not yet now” and when we talk of a past event it is “no longer now”. The reason of this present oriented everyday understanding of time is the fact that Dasein, in its everyday dealings with the entities that it encounters, concerns them in their handiness or unhandiness and this kind of a concern is occupied with the present situation; and even though there is a certain concern about past and future, still present is the focus of the concern. One important aspect of this everyday understanding of time is its being objective and public. When we use “now” as a reference point or the duration of something, they are accessible for everyone. Time, in this sense, is a web of reference that is recognized by all. The question is: “How does the possibility of our orienting ourselves by reference to such datable spans of time, our seeming ability to come across time in our dealings with the world, relate to the temporalizing roots of Dasein’s Being?”⁸³ Heidegger, in order to answer this question, speaks of how Dasein begins to reckon with time. He says that Dasein's primitive concern with time is astronomical, meaning that people were reckoning the periods and passages of dark and light and recording the movements of the sun in order to set their daily work accordingly. This concern stems from the fact that Dasein's being is care. Back then, Dasein was concerned with day and night as things that it encountered in the world in terms of their relation to its own projects and possibilities. Dasein sets its work in accordance with this world time as a being that exists as “thrown projection” and was in need of reckoning time for its everydayness.

⁸³Mulhall, p.184

It goes without saying that this understanding of time in everydayness is public, mostly because it depends on astronomical observation and recording. Heidegger also thinks that this primitive dealing with time is essentially worldly, in the sense that “reckoning with the sun presupposes the network of ‘in-order-to’ and ‘for-the-sake-of’ relations which make up the interpersonal structures of significance, grounding all of Dasein’s practical activities – the worldliness of the world.”⁸⁴ Also, observing sun and using it as a kind of clock shows that Dasein's existence is inherently worldly, in other words Dasein, in its existence in the world, always encounters entities and Dasein's worldliness is constituted by the care structure which is “founded upon temporalizing temporality.”⁸⁵ This means that time is not a derivation that follows the invention of any clock or a way of reckoning of time, rather reckoning time and building a clock is preconditioned by the temporality of Dasein. Heidegger also says that, not only measurement of time in accordance with sun but also every method of reckoning time involves reference to worldliness of Dasein and time, explicitly or implicitly.

Reckoning with electrical impulses or the decay of atomic nuclei is no less dependent upon the human being’s disclosedness of its world, and the time thus measured is accordingly no less world time. And since such modes of reckoning presuppose time’s inherent worldliness, they presuppose the essentially temporal foundation of human existence as being-in-the-world.⁸⁶

According to Heidegger, in our everyday practical activities, we function according to the vulgar notion of time. Its main characteristic is the theoretical attitude towards the things around one and abstinence from any practical activity. This way of relating to the world is not in the least, for Heidegger, the primordial way of Dasein, it is only a derivative way of relating to the world and also it is quite related to the vulgar

⁸⁴Ibid., p.185

⁸⁵Ibid., p.185

⁸⁶Ibid., p.185

notion of time in which the present has the primacy over past and future. Heidegger offers to approach the issue of time and way of relating to the world in the true context of Dasein what he calls as average everydayness. Dasein, according to Heidegger, behaves in its average everydayness setting forth certain future possibilities and looking at itself from the perspective of these possibilities, hence the primacy is on the future regarding Dasein's way of relating to world in everyday life. Heidegger calls this notion of time primordial time in which not the present but future has the primacy. One studies philosophy or management, for one sees oneself accordingly from the perspective of a future possibility in which one is a philosophy teacher in a university, or from that in which one is a manager in a company. In a similar way, our way of approaching objects around us is shaped by this primordial time. We see things not merely as things in themselves deprived of any use for us, on the contrary in the context of their usefulness of different sorts. Heidegger stresses that not objective presence but concern about things in their handiness is primordial. The claim that the primordial way of treating things is handiness is parallel to Heidegger's claim that primordial temporality, not the vulgar notion of time, is primary. Heidegger also points out the relation between these two notions of time. Vulgar notion would not be possible, if primordial notion were not at work in Dasein's existence, hence vulgar notion is derivative from primordial time which is the primary one, as the name suggests. Temporality is the existential structure of Dasein, it is Dasein's way of being; hence Dasein relates to world and beings in temporal terms. This claim amounts to saying that if Dasein's existence were not temporal, or there were not primordial temporality, there would not be vulgar understanding of time. Heidegger thinks that vulgar notion of time is derived from one aspect of care structure, namely being-together-with (innerworldly beings

encountered) which corresponds to present and to falling prey.

In its daily activities, Dasein lives in accordance with the vulgar notion of time where time is conceived as a constant sequence of nows and as something objectively present, present-at-hand, and Dasein understands time in everydayness through the entities that are encountered and dealt with in the sequence of nows. Hence, temporality remains unthematized even though it is the ground of the possibility of encounter as such. This relation to entities in the perspective of present denotes “in-order-to” which is “Heidegger’s general term for the involvement relation that binds the available to the human practices in terms of which they make sense and are defined.”⁸⁷ This relation of in-order-to is present oriented, because in this relation, ready-to-hand things are put in use in accordance with their usefulness in the present, even though they serve a task which involves a future possibility. Thus, because of the way in which Dasein is concerned with beings in its everydayness, present becomes central in everyday, vulgar understanding of time. This stems from Dasein’s fallenness which belongs to care structure. “Dasein falls in among entities and eventually comes to understand itself in terms offered by these encounters.”⁸⁸

Though the notion of primordial temporality gives the most credit to future in its relevance to being, past and present are not totally neglected. Dasein is thrown into the world and is brought up factually up to a point; it had no control over this fact. It finds itself already-in-the-world and this constitutes its facticity which is related to past. Moreover through life Dasein falls prey to other people thus lives in the present being-with-other Dasein. Dasein’s existence is related to future in that

⁸⁷ William Blattner, “Temporality”. In *A Companion to Heidegger*, edited by H.L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 319

⁸⁸ John Protevi, *Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida*, (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994), p. 147

Dasein constantly projects itself into future possibilities, thus it is a being which is ahead-of-oneself. “Authentically futural, Dasein is equally authentically ‘having been’ (*gewesen*). To anticipate one's ultimate and ownmost possibility is to come back comprehendingly to one's ownmost ‘having-been.’”⁸⁹ This means that projecting towards future includes the past, in this way Dasein might avoid the forgetfulness of its true self. Accordingly, present is dependent on future and having-been, since present includes anticipating future and turning to past in order to understand Dasein’s being. “Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future which already is in the process of having-been releases the present from itself. What is meant by temporality is precisely the unity of this structural whole: the future which makes present in the process of having-been.”⁹⁰

Care and Imagination

Heidegger considers care as the structure of existence of Dasein which is fundamentally finite, thus the structure of care would reveal the structure of being of Dasein with its finitude. When considered with a Kantian perspective, Heidegger’s investigation on care is parallel to Kant’s investigation on the structure of human knowing. Both inquiries aim at finding out our transcendental structures which are operative in our finite existence. Nevertheless, Heidegger thinks that Kant does not investigate the human stand point in experience in a detailed fashion; Kant concerns himself with the structure of our experience and knowledge primarily, but Heidegger thinks that the way in which human being is able to experience beings by projecting its transcendental structures to objectively present beings should be elaborated

⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 236

⁹⁰ *ibid*, p. 237

further. Heidegger wants to investigate the ontological significance of Dasein and its transcendental ground which enables Dasein to relate being and beings. Thus, he thinks that fundamental ontology which is concerned with the Dasein's finite existence is essential, because understanding our finitude and the way we exist is fundamental to any metaphysical inquiry. According to Heidegger, discovery and acknowledgement of the subjective ground of ontology is crucial. He thinks that Kant points out this fact by postulating transcendental imagination as the ground of human cognition in *A Deduction*. Even though Kant abandons this claim later, Heidegger insists on reading transcendental imagination as the ground of the possibility of human experience.

Heidegger explicated the unity of the apriori grounds of knowledge in the comprehensive unity formed by the temporalizing transcendental imagination. Similarly, in the development of his own existential analytic, he finds the unity of our apriori transcendental structures in the comprehensive unity formed by the temporalizing manifestation of care.⁹¹

Heidegger defines transcendence as Dasein's ability to understand the being of beings through its pre-ontological understanding of being. As it is established in the second chapter of this thesis, synthesizing power of transcendental imagination constitutes the temporal horizon in which any experience can be had. This temporal horizon defines the field for any encounter with beings and opens up the play-space for transcendence, since within this field, Dasein comports itself toward beings and lets the beings stand in opposition; and these acts of turning towards and letting stand against are what constitute the ground of the possibility of experience. Hence, it can be said that all experience is grounded in the temporalizing power of transcendental imagination and since, according to Heidegger, transcendental imagination is originated from primordial temporality, whole domain of human experience is

⁹¹ Sherover, p. 229

grounded in temporality. This also means that transcendental imagination, with its temporal ground, constitutes the subjectivity of the subject by opening up the field where Dasein confronts the beings as a subject; and objectivity of the object is also constituted in that way, since beings become objects for Dasein in this opening up.⁹² Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein's transcendence is the essence of its subjectivity and since transcendental imagination grounds transcendence, transcendental imagination is the center of Dasein's self. "The relation between the self (= transcendence) and the subject (= consciousness) is articulated here in terms of the relation between transcendental imagination (= center of transcendence) and transcendental apperception (= transcendental unity of consciousness) expressed by the ego's "I think."⁹³ On this point, a parallelism between transcendental imagination and care can be established. Heidegger thinks that the unity of Dasein's existence cannot be founded by ego, self or subjectivity; rather he thinks that what constitutes the unity of Dasein's existence is its care structure. According to Heideggerian framework, Dasein's existence and experience are not fundamentally distinct. Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world and its existence is defined in accordance with its relation to the world. Care, which is the fundamental structure of Dasein's existence, has a significant role in encountering beings and experiencing them. As it is stated several times, according to Heidegger, being is an issue for Dasein, the word issue here has several connotations. First all of all, it means that Dasein can understand its own being and being as such; being is a matter for Dasein. Moreover, Dasein has the ability to understand beings by encountering them in the play-space that is opened up by transcendental imagination. More importantly, as the name of the fundamental

⁹² Joseph Kockelmans, *Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Washington: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1989), p. 243

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 243

structure of Dasein suggests, world and beings is a matter of concern for Dasein. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, establishes a fundamental relation to the world; it lives in the world where it has different possibilities and care about the world and beings, since it is always ahead-of-itself by constantly pursuing the future possibilities. Dasein projects itself into the future in its attempts to realize its future possibilities. Even though projection towards future is primordial for Dasein, the character of having-been, past, is also essential. This temporal structure constitutes the ground of care structure. In its temporal existence, Dasein cares for the world and beings both in its everydayness and in accordance with the anticipation of future possibilities. Care, as the structure of existence, is what makes the being-in-the-world and thus transcendence possible in the first place. Through care, Dasein relates to world and beings and this relation begins with turning towards and letting stand against which is the fundamental structure of act of transcendence.

Phenomenological Significance of Heideggerian Temporality

Heidegger thinks that Dasein's everyday experience with time is grounded in the primordial temporality and claims that primordial temporality might provide an explanation of the way in which Dasein experiences time in its everydayness. "When we have shown that the "time" that is accessible to Dasein's intelligibility is not ordinary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic temporality, then we are justified in labeling temporality, which has just been exhibited, ordinary time."⁹⁴

Heidegger holds that Dasein's experience with time in its average everydayness is derived from the primordial temporality which is the structure of Dasein's existence which is care. Heidegger also makes a further distinction; he distinguishes two

⁹⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 329

different ways of experiencing time in everydayness, world-time and vulgar concept of time which is sometimes referred as now-time. World-time is the time that Dasein experiences without a theoretical attitude; it contains the specific and meaningful events. For instance there is work time in which people perform their jobs and there are appropriate and inappropriate times for work; or the Second World War had occurred in a specific time period which is known publicly. On the other hand, vulgar concept of time is a pure succession of nows and a linear understanding of time devoid of significant events that occur in time; it is like the theoretical thinking on world-time. The distinction between world-time and vulgar time is parallel to the distinction between handiness and present-at-handness. “World-time differs from ordinary time in that the times of world-time are overtly defined in terms of their relation to human interests, whereas ordinary times are conceptualized as independent of human interests.”⁹⁵ Dasein lives in the world in accordance with the world-time, since, as the name suggests, world-time is similar to the structure of Dasein’s daily activities in the world “‘in which’ a factual Dasein ‘lives’.”⁹⁶ World-time is what measures worldly events, our activities or the events that happened in the world are subjected to world-time and they are temporally framed in terms of their time and duration. World-time orders worldly events in terms of “when” and “how long”. “To answer *when vis-à-vis* world-time is to ask how an event is situated with respect to dinner time or the American Civil War. These are the contentful, meaningful times in terms of which we lead our lives: they make up world-time.”⁹⁷ Thus, world-time has the character of datability, publicness and significance. It also

⁹⁵ William Blattner, “Temporality”. In *A Companion to Heidegger*, edited by H.L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 316

⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 65

⁹⁷ Blattner, p. 317

relates to handiness, because handy things are put into use in accordance with the world-time and they gain their meanings as tools in the human activities in which they are used in order to achieve some goal. World-time contains the daily and mundane activities involving handy things. Dasein acts in accordance with this world-time, for instance there is work time or sleeping time in the span of the day. Vulgar time differs from world-time in that, in some sense, vulgar time has no content or significance and the character of datability, since it is the pure, linear succession ofnows. It relates to present-at-handness in the sense that in vulgar concept of time, time is conceived as something objectively present, as detached from its relational qualities; it is the pure sequence ofnows devoid of Dasein and its concerns and interactions.

Primordial temporality is the ontological structure of Dasein; it is ground of the possibility of the understanding of being and the horizon of transcendence. Heidegger thinks that world-time and vulgar concept of time is dependent on primordial temporal, since, time arises out of primordial temporality as Dasein's ontological structure and time pertains to Dasein's existence, way of being. In the Heideggerian framework, both world-time and now-time are dependent upon primordial temporality as their source and ground; they are derived from primordial temporality and this derivation is a kind of phenomenological "leveling-off".⁹⁸ Primordial temporality is leveled off as world-time and world time is leveled off as pure sequence ofnows, namely vulgar time. In order to understand how primordial temporality in which future has primacy can be leveled off as world-time and vulgar time in which present has the primacy, Heidegger's understanding of present and its role in the ecstatic primordial temporality should be briefly examined.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 318

Present, or enpresenting, is related to handy things in Heideggerian temporality. “In-order-to” relations are peculiar to present and usefulness of handy things in Dasein’s everyday activities and goals. “The in-order-to is Heidegger’s general term for the involvement relation that binds the available [handy] to the human practices in terms of which they make sense and are defined.”⁹⁹ In-order-to gives handy things their meaning and significance in the web of relations of things. As being an aspect of ecstatic temporality, present is connected to past and future; and it corresponds to the aspect of being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered) of care structure and denotes fallenness of Dasein. The leveling off of originary temporality as world-time and vulgar time is caused by understanding one horizon of temporality, namely present, that is privileged in everydayness as if it were not related to other horizons. Because of the fallenness and getting lost in worldly activities, primordial temporality is concealed and present oriented world-time comes to be understood as disconnected from the structural whole of care and other ecstases of primordial temporality. “Heidegger’s point is that insofar as we are immersed in a now in which we deal with the paraphernalia of our world, we are aimed ahead into the completion of our tasks and rely upon the wherewithal of our environment.”¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, this understanding of in-order-to relations and the present it represents is only an ecstasis of primordial temporality. When Dasein uses a handy thing in order to achieve something, it means that Dasein has an understanding of itself and its plans and activities in the first place. “The now-dominated experience of perceiving and using things is grounded in the future dominated experience of self-understanding. Heidegger thus grounds the now, the reference point of consciousness, in the future, the reference point of self-

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 319

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 320

understanding.”¹⁰¹ For instance, when a student reads a book in order to be prepared for the class, she understands herself as a student. The book in this context has significance for past, present and future, because even though reading the book is happening at the present moment, that present moment is related to the care structure and thus related to background and future possibilities. “We can recognize phenomenologically that the now experienced in engaged everyday practice is part of a larger whole, the whole that is the care-structure of Dasein.”¹⁰² Nevertheless, because of Dasein’s fallenness and being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered), the fact that now and in-order-to is related to care and ecstatic temporality is concealed and time becomes to be conceived as now-oriented. Derrida says that the Heideggerian distinction between primordial temporality and vulgar time is metaphysical and the discourse of fallenness has Platonic connotations:

The extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in *Being and Time* still remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics. And all the conceptual pairs of opposites which serve the destruction of ontology are ordered around one fundamental axis: that which separates the authentic from the inauthentic and, in the very last analysis, primordial from fallen temporality. (...) Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to the derivative still metaphysical? Is there not at least some Platonism in the *Verfallen* [fallenness]?¹⁰³

However, I will argue that the distinction between primordial temporality and vulgar notion of time is not metaphysical; rather this is a phenomenological distinction which aims at explaining the ontological structure of human existence.

There are different modes of being and different ways to relate to objects; existence which is peculiar to Dasein, handiness and present-at-handness. In the

¹⁰¹ John Brough and William Blattner, “Temporality”. In *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, edited by H.L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 132

¹⁰² Blattner., p. 321

¹⁰³ Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 64

Heideggerian framework, these modes of being correspond to primordial temporality, world-time and vulgar concept of time, respectively. Every mode of being opens up a different way of relating to world and to entities and these different ways of relations cause primordial temporality to “degenerate” in a phenomenological sense. In order to understand how Heidegger’s distinction between primordial temporality and vulgar concept of time can be seen as a phenomenological distinction, Wrathall’s definition of existential phenomenology and phenomena are quite useful.¹⁰⁴ According to those definitions, certain phenomena, which Wrathall calls existential phenomena, show themselves if one relates to them in a certain way, in other words, they “only show themselves to one who is engaged with the world in a certain kind of way.”¹⁰⁵ Dealing with handy things and being fallen into the world gives way to world-time, which is grounded in the primordial temporality as the structure of Dasein’s existence. The relation of in-order-to discloses Dasein’s everyday understanding of time. Heidegger thinks that temporality is the horizon of any understanding of being; this explains why different modes of being and the ways of relating to beings always have temporal reference. Any understanding of and relation to being, be it to being as such or to being of a being, is held in the horizon of temporality, thus from primordial temporality, different interpretations of time derive.

As it is already established, world-time and vulgar time are related to fallenness. Because of Dasein’s occupation with worldly activities and tasks, primordial temporality is leveled off as now-oriented understandings of time. Derrida thinks that this discourse of fallenness implies that there are higher and lower levels

¹⁰⁴ Mark Wrathall, “Existential Phenomenology”. In *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, edited by H.L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 32

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32

of temporality like a Platonic hierarchy of sensible and intelligible. However, this criticism is not accurate. Heidegger says that there is no negative meaning in explaining the derivation of vulgar time from primordial time in terms of fallenness. Being fallen points out to Dasein's condition in the world, its being absorbed in mundane activities, it is a part of Dasein's care structure and it is not negative or less pure (in a Platonic sense) than other aspects of care structure. In this regard, Dastur writes:

Fallenness means in Heidegger's view the mere fact of being absorbed in the tasks of the everydayness, which involves something like a loosening of Dasein's transcendence, a kind of "potential drop" in Dasein, which is its "normal" state of being, in comparison to which the "jump" into authenticity can be understood as the fact of restoring the process of transcendence, which happens in the philosophical attitude of wonder in front of the world.¹⁰⁶

To conclude, Heidegger establishes temporality as something descriptive of Dasein's existence, its existential structure and its relations to entities in the world. As Dasein relates to entities or to itself, temporality gains different phenomenological aspects. Heidegger aims at discovering the horizon of Dasein's understanding; this horizon is claimed to be temporality and it is where intelligibility of being and being of beings is granted. When Heidegger tries to discover this horizon, he does not resort to metaphysical definitions or assumptions, rather he tries to lay bare how phenomena in everydayness of Dasein is related to and grounded in Dasein's ontological and existential structures by way of different phenomenological definitions of aspects of Dasein's care structure.

¹⁰⁶ Françoise Dastur, "Derrida's reading of Heidegger". In *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, edited by Daniel Dahlstrom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.281

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's project is to answer the question of meaning of being and establish the relation between time and being. In order to do this, he investigates Dasein's existential structures, because Dasein is peculiar with its capacity to understand being and beings. Dasein's preliminary understanding of being is the starting point of Heidegger's ontological inquiry, thus he also takes interest in the horizon, namely temporality, in which this understanding is made possible. Heidegger's interest in Kantian philosophy is based on the fact that he sees Kantian philosophy as an ontological inquiry which emphasizes the relation between time and being; for Heidegger, ignoring this relation between time and being is the fundamental problem that leads to forgetting the meaning of being.

In this study, I emphasized Heidegger's reading of Kant in its relation to issue of temporality, since the main concern of this study is time and temporality. The analysis of Heidegger's thinking in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* showed that transcendental imagination and temporality are related to each other in a fundamental way. Since imagination performs threefold synthesis, which is the ground of the possibility of any cognition, and schematization, or temporalization, of categories, it becomes central to human experience and knowledge by defining and limiting the "play-space" in which Dasein is able to encounter with beings. Since temporality is taken as the horizon for any understanding, Heidegger thinks that imagination and temporality are connected in a fundamental way. Imagination projects a temporal field by imposing form of time to beings; in this way the possibility of act of transcendence is opened up. Through this projection, the

ontological structures of beings are defined and the ontological knowledge is rendered possible. This means that Dasein's subjective transcendental structures and ontological structures of beings are known through projection of temporality by temporalizing power of imagination. This shows that temporality and imagination constitute the ground of the possibility of ontological knowledge.

In the Heideggerian framework, care also has a central role in Dasein's existence and experience. Care is the fundamental ontological structure of existence and it can be claimed that care and imagination are parallel to each other, former being the structure of existence of Dasein and latter being the structure of experience and knowledge. In this thesis, it has been shown that, according to Heidegger, Dasein's existence and experience are not distinct; this claim is emphasized by Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world. Thus, imagination as the fundamental structure of experience and care as the fundamental structure of existence are connected to each other. In the experiential field that is opened up by temporalizing power of imagination, Dasein is able to encounter beings in virtue of its care structure which makes Dasein to turn toward beings and let them stand in opposition.

The phenomenological significance of Heideggerian primordial temporality is another point that this study establishes. Since Dasein's everyday dealing with and understanding of time is very different from the primordial temporal, which is the ontological structure of Dasein, Heidegger claims that ordinary time is derived from primordial temporality and primordial temporality is the ground of the possibility of ordinary understanding of temporality. Since primordial temporality is Dasein's ontological structure and thus it is descriptive of Dasein's existence, this derivation is explained through Dasein's existential structures and Dasein in its everydayness. Three aspects of Dasein's care structure correspond to three aspects of ecstatic

temporality and ways of relating to the world. The ecstatic unity of past, present and future give way to present oriented ordinary understanding of time, because one of the aspects of Dasein's care structure, which is fallenness or being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered), is prevalent in Dasein's everydayness.

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