

From Acceptance to Rejection: Two Critical Moments of the Early History of the
Turkish-EEC Relations, 1959 and 1979.

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by
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To the memory of my beloved grandfather

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ABSTRACT

From Acceptance to Rejection: Two Critical Moments of the Early History of the
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The thesis will focus upon the question that after coming from a long tradition of westernization project, which culminated in Turkey's application to the EEC for associate membership in 1959, why the major political actors chose to freeze Turkey's relations with the EEC in 1978. The thesis focuses upon the anti-westernization sentiments that exacerbated in the late 1970s, as the main reason for the formation of unfavourable policy choices against the EEC.

It argues that two major factors were critical in the rise of anti-westernization sentiments, namely, the structural factor and the conjunctural factors. The structural factor is based upon the understanding that the anti-westernization stance was historically embedded in the Turkish society within the framework of centre-periphery polarity that characterizes the Turkish society from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic. It connotes a confrontation between the westernizing central bureaucratic elites and the Eastern-Islamic/peripheral masses.

The conjunctural factors is analysed at four levels, namely, the *economic factors* such as incompatibility of the economic policies of the both parties; *foreign*

policy factors such as the Cyprus Issue and the American Imposed Embargo; *political factors*, the emergence of multipartyism and the rise of alternative radical minority parties as a result of the neo-legal constitutional framework that was established under the 1961 Constitution. Fourthly *ideological-cultural factors*, the mobilization of the society along ideological cleavages with the rise of many syndicals, worker's associations, religious organizations, and the nationalist right wing organizations accompanied with their youth organizations and alternative publications.

KISA ÖZET

Kabulden Redde: Erken Tarih Türkiye-AET ilişkilerinde, İki Kritik Dönem,
1959 ve 1979

Yeşim Pekiner

Bu tez uzun bir gelenek haline gelmiş olan batılılaşma projesi kapsamında, (projenin tepe noktası Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'na 1959 yılında yapılan başvurudur) 1978 yılında önde gelen siyasi aktörlerin neden AET ile ilişkileri dondurdukları sorusunu araştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, araştırma, AET ile ilişkiler karşısındaki bu olumsuz siyasi seçimlerin, 1960'lardan başlayarak ama büyük ölçüde 70'lerde hem toplum hem de devlet düzeyinde artmış bir batı karşıtlığının temel bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını öne sürmektedir.

Batı karşıtlığı, onu belirleyen iki temel faktörle açıklanacaktır. Birincisi yapısal faktör, ki bu faktör tarihsel olarak batı karşıtlığının Türk toplumunda içkin olarak varolduğu anlayışına dayanmaktadır. Bu anlayış, batılılaşmayı bir bütünleştirici devlet politikası olarak izleyen merkezi bürokratik elite, çevre halkın bir zıtlaşmasını ifade etmektedir.

İkinci faktör olan konjonktürel faktörler özellikle 1970-1980 döneminde batı karşıtlığının artmasında belirleyici olan dört ana nedenle açıklanacaktır. Bunlar sırasıyla ekonomik nedenler; Türkiye ve AET'nin uyumsuz ekonomi politikaları ve Uluslararası siyasi ekonomide meydana gelen olumsuz gelişmelerin sonuçları; ikincisi dış politika nedenleri; özellikle Kıbrıs meselesi ve onu takip eden Amerikan

ambargosunun Türkiye üzerindeki olumsuz sonuçları; üçüncü olarak siyasi nedenler, çok partili sisteme geçiş ve de seçim sisteminin değişmesi ile birlikte radikal partilerin Türk siyasi hayatına girişi ve son olarak ideolojik kültürel nedenler ki bunlar, 1961 anayasasının sağladığı özgürlükler ortamı ile halkın radikal ideolojik hareketler çevresinde mobilize olması konularına işaret etmektedir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

I. Political Parties

DP: Democrat Party

JP: Justice Party

NAP: Nationalist Action Party

NOP: National Order Party

NSP: National Salvation Party

RPP: Republican People's Party

RRP: Republican Reliance Party

TUP: Turkish Unity Party

TWP: Workers Party of Turkey

II. Others

CU: Customs Union

EEC: European Economic Community

EIB: European Investment Bank

EC: European Community

ECU: European Monetary Unit

IMF: International Monetary Fund

OECD: The organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

TGNA: General National Assembly of Turkey

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Purpose of the Study

The problematic that will be analyzed in the thesis is that coming from a long tradition of westernization and modernization project, which culminated in Turkey's application to the EEC for associate membership in 1959, why major political actors chose to freeze Turkey's relations with the EEC in 1978. With the aim to explain the reasons underlying the decision for freezing relations with the Community in 1978, the thesis will focus upon the anti-westernization sentiments that were exacerbated in the late 1970s both at the society and the state level, as the main reason for the formation of unfavorable policy choices with regard to the EEC.

I will argue that two major factors were critical in the rise of anti-westernization sentiments, namely, the structural factor and the conjunctural factors. The structural factor refers to the anti-westernization stance that was historically embedded in the Turkish society within the framework of the centre-periphery polarity, and has characterized the Turkish society from the very beginning of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. It mainly connotes a confrontation between the westernizing central bureaucratic elites and the Eastern-Islamic/peripheral masses, the origins of which can be traced back to the late Ottoman Era, particularly

as a result of the westernizing policies of the Ottoman central elite. This centre/periphery polarity dominated Turkish political life under the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution when the primordial traditional ties of the society started to revive within the new legal-constitutional framework of the political system, as a reaction to the authoritarianism of the central bureaucratic elite that reigned between 1923-1950.

The revival of the primordial/traditional ties of society within the ideological movements was in parallel with the modernization of the country, which had resulted in economic development, industrialization, urbanization and social mobilization. (Sayarı, 1978: 51). Developments in the socio-economic structure, urbanization, the rise of new social groups, such as the working class and the entrepreneurs, which were the basis of social fragmentation, and increasing communications between urban areas and the countryside, the rising importance of religion and ethnicity all contributed to the ideological polarization of the country. (Ergüder, 1980: 693)

Within this framework the centre-periphery duality gained a new dimension in which the periphery no longer included solely the eastern-Islamic masses but it also includes the new social classes, which had been born as a result of industrialization and urbanization paving the way for the formation of new cleavages and of differentiation within the periphery. These new cleavages and differentiations within the periphery led to the mobilization of society around diverse radical ideological movements both on the extreme right, in the form of radical Islamist and nationalist stances and on the extreme left, in different versions of socialism. They were formulated both within the society and within the parliament interactively bred with the primordial/traditional cleavages (such as religious, ethnic, sectarian cleavages) within society. All these ideologies had a very basic common

characteristic that they defined their fundamental existence in opposition to the official westernization policy of the central bureaucratic elite. In this respect, all these ideologies were anti-official, anti-centre and, accordingly, anti-western.

Secondly, the conjunctural factors were mainly the factors that were critical in the rise of the anti-western sentiments within society and the state, specific to the period of the 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, these factors will be taken into consideration to the extent that they have created, at the state and the society level, a resentment towards the western countries, and have resulted in the unfavorable policy choices of the late 1970s.

The conjunctural factors shall be analyzed at four levels. First, I will discuss the *economic factors* such as the incompatibility of the economic policies of major parties, the RPP and the JP, the adverse effects of the provisions of the Additional Protocol on the Turkish economy, and the adverse developments in the international political economy such as the OPEC Oil crisis; second, *foreign policy factors* such as the Cyprus Issue and the American Imposed Embargo; third; *political factors* namely the emergence of multipartyism and the rise of radical political parties, and movements as a result of the legal framework that was established under the 1961 Constitution; fourth, *ideological-cultural factors*, the mobilization of society along ideological cleavages with the emergence of trade unions, religious brotherhoods, youth organizations and political magazines. In this respect, it is basically argued that when the conjunctural factors pointed to an anti-western stance, they intersected with the structural factor, which connoted a historically embedded centre-periphery polarity between the westernizing central bureaucratic elite and the peripheral masses. In this event, it led to the formation of anti-EEC policy choices in the late 1970s.

B. Methodology and Sources

One major data source for this study was the speeches of the political leaders, as can be found in the Record Books of the National Assembly and in the daily newspaper Milliyet, as well as in books and pamphlets written by the leaders themselves.

Due to time limitations, only a few interviews could be done with the high level bureaucrats who were in office during the 1970s, whereas no interviews could be made with the political leaders. Another shortcoming of the study is that much less space could be given to the radical leftist movements of the 1970s. This was mainly due to the fact that the radical left parties were not represented in the parliaments and did not take part in the governments during that period.

C. Chapters

In chapter 2, I will focus upon the main argument of the thesis and I will make a critical review of the debate. Chapter 3 will set forth the background to the westernization policy of the Turkish Republic as from the early cold war era to the point in which Turkey eventually applied to the EEC for membership.

In chapter 4 entitled "Political Polarization in the 1960s", I will analyse the period of the 1960s, which became a scene of political polarization under the relatively free atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution. This chapter will focus upon the rise of the radical ideological movements both on the right, in the form of the radical nationalist and Islamist stances, as well as on the left, in various forms of socialism. These ideological movements had a very basic common characteristic in that they all opposed to the westernization project of the Republic. In this period, the radical ideologies have spread their influence to the major parties too, particularly during the coalition governments.

Chapter 5 entitled “Towards the Freezing of Relations in 1978” will focus upon the 1970s as a period of political polarization, military intervention and coalition governments.

The period after 1973 general election was important in the sense that for the first time in Republican history, radical rightwing openly opposing the westernization project of the Republic had a chance to participate in the coalition governments. In this respect, for the first time in Turkish politics, the voices of the periphery became critical in the formation of a policy choice concerning Turkey’s westernization policy.

In chapter 6, I will summarize the discussion of the radical ideological formations, within the general society and in the political system, which commonly had an influence upon the anti-western and anti-EEC policy choices.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM

AND

THE CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DEBATE

The common approach of researches concerning Turkey-EEC relations, perceives Turkey's relations with the EEC as part of the westernization and modernization project of the Turkish bureaucratic elite, which can be traced back to the reform movement in the 1830s.

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a secular nation-state under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the policy of westernization was reinterpreted. Atatürk carried out a policy of Westernization in its extreme form whereby European civilisation was to be adopted as an “indivisible whole”. This led to a complete rejection of the Ottoman past both in its legal and political aspects, as well as a rejection of the Arabic-Asiatic culture and tradition. (Redmond, 1993; 21)

Inheriting a number of characteristics from the Ottoman Empire, the basic concern for the Republican Elite was to create a European state from a multicultural, multireligious and multiethnic society, which would be convened under a single entity through a nationalist, secularist and authoritarian revolution. To this end,

Turkey defined itself as a modern, secular European state and reserved a certain distance from its Middle Eastern neighbors and the Republics of the former Soviet Union's. (Müftüler-Bac; 1997; 13-16) The reforms, which were launched in the legal, political and cultural spheres of life, aimed to establish a consciousness of Turkishness and Turkish identity among the public through the complete secularization of the education and legal system (Turan, 1995; 444)

Secularisation was the fundamental tenet of the Kemalist reforms due to the fact that Islam was perceived as a contra-ideology facing the Republican westernization policy. The Kemalist revolution had the aim to create a Modern State, which was defined within the framework of westernization and necessitated the assimilation of western civilization into every sphere of Turkish State and society from science to state administration to law, politics, economics and culture. (Karluk; 1996, 389) It preconditions the assimilation of the ideas, ideals, institutions, systems, structures, living standards and values of life, of the west into the administrative, judicial and social structures of the country.

This aspiration was further consolidated starting from the interwar period and throughout the Cold War period as the Turkish bureaucratic elite launched a swift program of incorporating European economic and political institutions as part of the westernization policy. Accordingly, Turkey joined the League of Nations, OECD, the Council of Europe, and NATO. The westernization policy reached a climax point with Turkey's application to the EEC in 1959 for associate membership. (Redmond, 1993; 22)

According to Mehmet Uğur, after 1945, in the aim to guarantee a secure place in the post WWII international system that was to be constructed under the leadership of the US and the EU countries, the "westernization" policy of the central

bureaucracy gained a new meaning in which westernization was also perceived as a way to "ensure the irreversibility of the modernization process" (Uğur, 1999; 2)

There were three factors underlying this new interpretation. Firstly, in the case that Turkey stayed outside the post-war western security and economic system, it would have been completely isolated and have received no economic and military assistance. Hence, the application to the EEC was the logical extension of a policy of integration with Western institutions that had already been begun in the post-war international system on the basis of three policy considerations; Firstly the security considerations, which were based upon the motivation to survive in the Cold War period against the Soviet threat by becoming a part of the containment policy in alliance with the US and the Western European Countries; secondly the economic considerations, which were based upon the motivation to have access to material resources in the form of flow of credits, financial assistance or machinery, those were necessary for Turkey's economic development. (Eralp, 1993; 24-44) The DP government, in confrontation with the escalating debt problem and political instability saw EEC membership as a way to have easy access to financial credit. As seen there was the motivation for Turkey to "secure a firm arrangement with its largest trading partner, the EC" (Baç, 1997; 56). In this way, Turkey would also be able to influence the entire tariff, duties and other restrictive decisions of the Community concerning Turkey's agricultural exports. Furthermore, the EEC would be the new market where Turkish labour forces could be transferred assuaging the unemployment problem. (Balkır, 1993; 111-112 and Redmond, 1993; 25); Finally the modernization project, which had been imposed on the Turkish society from the top bureaucracy, still lacked the complete popular support, which was especially necessary for the stability of the political system and the irreversibility of the

modernization mission of the Turkish Republic after the establishment of the multi-party system. One major fear of the policy makers of the period was that, the emerging multi party regime might provide the ground for the emergence of anti system parties, which might engender hostile sentiments against the policies of the central bureaucracy by utilizing populist policies.

Hence, membership to the inchoate western institutions was seen as a way to anchor the modernization project against the perceived threat of the populist parties that were still rudimentary. In this respect, Turkey's membership to the EEC and later on to the EU was seen by the advocates of the membership as the only option to anchor its westernization policy. In the alternative scenario where Turkey was the outsider, policy makers in Turkey feared that Turkey would be swayed by Islamist forces and lean towards the Middle Eastern countries in foreign policy. Thus, on the political side, the major aim was to "win the final seal of approval on Turkey's European Status" (Buzan, 1999: 1-11; Uğur, 1999: 2-10; Baç, 1997: 56)

It is certain that during the actual application for associate membership in 1959, the aim to strategically balance the Greek's application due to the perceived threat of any possible membership of Greece where Turkey remained as the outsider was also an important factor for the policy makers in the government. Hence one of the main motivations was to prevent Greek's possible utilization of the European platform for policy manipulation concerning conflictual issues between the two neighbors such as; the sovereignty and control over the Aegean Seas, and airspace, rights over the Aegean continental shelf, minority issues and the Cyprus Issue. (Gürel, 1993; Keskin, 2001; Birand, 2000; Uğur, 1999)

However, the aspiration to integrate with the EEC as the culmination point of the westernization policy of the Republican Turkey started to follow a reverse track

especially in the 1970s. This eventually led to Ecevit's decision to freeze the relations with the Community in 1978 for a five year period. Within this framework, the problematic that will be analyzed in the thesis is that; coming from a long tradition of westernization and a modernization project, which culminated in Turkey's application to the EEC for associate membership in 1959, why did the major political actors chose to freeze Turkey's relations with the EEC? In an aim to explain the reason underlying the decision for freezing relations with the Community in 1978, the thesis will focus upon anti-westernization sentiments that were exacerbated in the late 1970s both at the society and the state level, and present as the main reason for the formation of unfavorable policy choices against the EEC. In this respect, the thesis will focus upon the two major factors which were critical in the rise of anti-westernization sentiments namely; the structural factor and the conjunctural factors.

A. The Structural Factor

The structural factor is mainly based upon the understanding that the anti-westernization stance was historically embedded in the Turkish society within the framework of the centre-periphery polarity that characterized Turkish society from the very beginning of the establishment of the Republic. It mainly refers to a confrontation between the westernizing central bureaucratic elites and the eastern-islamic/peripheral masses, the origins of which can be traced back to the late Ottoman Era, and as a result of the westernizing policies of the Ottoman central elite. One of the basic characteristics of Ottoman society had been its plural composition constituted of different ethnic, religious and sectarian groupings in which Islam had been the core of the folk culture and the unifying element of the society. (Karpat,

1980: 23) Turkish Republic was established by imposing thereon the *Myth of the Homogeneity of Modern Turkey*. (Mardin, 1980: 559-566)

The basic concern for the Republican elite was to create a European State from a multicultural, multi religious and multi ethnic society, which would be convened under a single entity through nationalist, secularist and authoritarian revolution. To this end, Turkey defined itself as a modern, secularist and European state. Atatürk's reforms in the legal system, the calendar, the dress code, and women's emancipation were all aimed at creating a Westernized Turkish identity based upon the principle of secularization in which the elimination of Islam from the Turkish political life was the ultimate aim as Islam had always been perceived as a contra ideology facing the Republican Westernization policy. (Karpat, 1980: 23)

Atatürk carried out this policy of westernization in its extreme forms whereby the European civilization was to be adopted as an indivisible whole. It preconditions the assimilation of the ideas, ideals, institutions, systems, structures and living standards and the values of life of the West into the administrative, judicial and social structure of the country. (Karluk, 1996: 389) This led to a complete rejection of the Ottoman past, both in its legal and political aspects, as well as rejection of the Arabic-Asiatic culture and tradition. (Redmond, 1993:21). Under the authoritarianism of the central bureaucratic elite that reigned between 1923-1950 as the peripheral masses were suppressed with the denial of any access to the state apparatus, these westernizing reforms and mainly secularism as the building block of reforms could not be openly criticized by the society. In this respect, the westernization policy of the central bureaucratic elite was pursued to a great extent without any opposition from society. This subsequently led to Turkey's membership in western security and economic organizations such as NATO, OECD, and others,

culminating in its application to the EEC in 1959 for associate membership. However, starting with the 1960s under the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution, the primordial/ traditional ties of society started to revive as a reaction to the authoritarianism of the central bureaucratic elite within the neo legal-constitutional framework of the political system.

During the period of 1946-1960, the left and the right were excluded from party competition. Under the liberties that were recognised within the new Constitution both the left and the right had the chance to compete within the party system. Cleavages such as Left-Right, Secular-Islamist, Alevi-Sunni, Kurdish Chauvinist-Turkish Chauvinist reformulating in diverse and complex combinations led to the formation of different cultural and social cleavages upon which the Turkish political system was to be based. In addition to these were the societal norms that were indoctrinated in the society such as hatred towards the intelligentsia, racism, masculinism, heroism (Mardin, 1978: 229-254; Frey, 1975: 65-78; Ergil, 1980:53-97), and led to the generation of a heterogeneous mass, which could easily be mobilized, for political purposes. (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995, 483)

It should be noted herewith that among all these rising ideological, ethnic and sectarian cleavages, Islam and nationalism were one of the very powerful ideologies along with socialism, would leave their mark on the period. According to Karpat, this was due to the fact that secularism as the building block of the Kemalist reforms started to be openly criticized by the society only starting in the 1960s. The impact of secularism and Islam on the Turkish national identity and historical identity had been a major issue for both the pious and nonpious. One consequence of this was that starting with the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Turkish National Identity began to be redefined on the basis of two historically-rooted sub identities of Turkish society,

namely Islam and nationalism, in a reaction to the official Republican policy of westernization. Atatürk's reforms, namely the republican regime, the legal system, the calendar, the dress code, and women's emancipation were all aimed at creating a westernized Turkish society based upon the principle of secularism. Throughout the Ottoman history until the Republican Era, Islam had been the core of folk culture and the basis of the Turkish national culture. In this respect, the restrictive measures that were imposed on the freedom of worship and religious education and on traditional customs and mores for the advancement of secularism were hostile to the society's sense of cultural and historical identity. Hence, the rejection of society's traditional historical memories and cultural attachments had on the societal level, a repercussion that led to the cultural alienation of the masses from the centralized bureaucratic culture that was based upon Westernism. (Karpat, 1980: 23; Mardin, 1980: 559-566)

As the former restrictions that were inflicted upon Islam were abolished, social unrest against the application of secularism began to be voiced by society in general in the aim to restore society's real identity and historical continuity. For the majority, the aim was to redefine Turkish identity in order to combine both the historical and cultural traditions of society with the identity of the modern citizen in one embodiment. (Karpat, 1980: 23) In one way, the cultural and historical legacy of the Turkish society, which was derived from the customs and mores of Islamic tradition, would be recognised and reabsorbed into the Turkish identity. In this respect, the climax point for all the discussions concerning the identity and history was the adoption of religion and nationalism as the ideological basis of the two radical minority parties, the NSP and NAP.

As the electoral system was changed by the coup leaders from a simple plurality system to proportional representation, it provided the radical minority

parties both on the right and the left with the opportunity to be represented in the parliament. Hence, desertion from the major parties increased, especially after 1965. This was seen in RPP in 1967 with the formation of Republican Reliance Party, and in to the JP 3 years later, with the formation of splintered DP. Also, the radical minority parties such as the NSP and the NAP were formed by some of the dissident parliamentary members of the RPP and the JP. (Sayarı, 1980: 624) In this respect, the ideological and religious/sectarian cleavages within the society structure started to gain a voice in the party system with other emerging minority parties such as the Turkish Labour Party in the 1960s and the NSP and the NAP in the late 60s and 70s. (Sayarı, 1980: 624-626)

The revival of the primordial/traditional ties of the society within the ideological movements developed in parallel with the modernization of the country, which had in turn, resulted in economic development, industrialization, urbanization and social mobilization. (Sayarı, 1978: 51). Developments in the socio-economic structure; urbanization, the rise of new social groups such as the working class and the entrepreneurs, (which were the basis of social fragmentation); increasing communications between the urban areas and the countryside, and the rising importance of religion and ethnicity all contributed to the ideological polarization of the country. (Ergüder, 1980: 693)

Within this framework the centre-periphery duality gained a new dimension in which the periphery no longer constituted solely the Eastern-Islamic masses but also included the new social classes, which were born as a result of the industrialization and urbanization paving the way for the formation of new cleavages and of differentiation within the periphery. Even certain members of the bureaucracy, as demonstrated in the formulation of new left of the centre ideology of the RPP, and

the intelligentsia retreated into these radical ideological stances. In this respect, “two facets of the peripheral code seem to have emerged with clearer outlines during modernization; the periphery as made up of primordial groups, and the periphery as the centre of a counter official culture.” (Mardin, 1973: 169-187) Some westernist elites sought to isolate themselves by devoting themselves to an alternative form of westernism that is Marxism. But the majority retreated into history and religion. The former group was the leftist and the latter who retreated into history and religion, was rightist. However, both of the groups were alienated from the sociopolitical and cultural structures of the society for the same reason. (Mardin, 1980: 559-566)

Within this framework, the polarization of politics forced political parties away from parliamentary practices to seek ideological allies in the society. In particular, the growing radicalisation of Turkish political life increased polarization among the parties in line with their ideological differences. These ideological differences were determined by different perceptions of several issues such as; economics (socialism versus liberalism), religion (secularism versus Pro-Islamic orientation) and culture (moderate versus aggressive nationalism). (Sayarı, 1980: 627) Even the major parties at the centre, such as the RPP and the JP, started to adopt a more radical line swayed by these new ideological formations within the society.

According to Sabri Sayarı, those cleavages manifested themselves at three levels. Firstly at the level of elite interactions, the bureaucrats of the parties in opposition conflicted with each other on the basis of their ideological differences. The ideological rhetoric they used was mainly centred on the themes of anti-communism and anti-fascism. Even the leaders of the center-right and center-left parties (JP and the RPP) accused each other of being involved in extreme ideological activities.

Demirel accused the RPP of being infiltrated with "militant leftist", and the RPP criticized the JP on the grounds that it had allied with "Fascist political forces".

Second, ideological polarization occurred at the mass electoral level. This polarization was mainly caused by the tension that was pursued by the extreme leftist and rightist groups as a strategy to mobilize society along their ideological lines and by the antagonistic ideological discourses that were used by the party elites in confrontation with each other, communicated to society through the mass media. The harassing speeches made by the party elites using anti-communist and anti-fascist rhetoric intensified the ideological polarization at the mass level. "Those pro-and anti-leftist postures appeared to be influenced by religious (laicist versus pro-Islam), sectarian (Alevi versus Sunni) and intra-communal factional cleavages." (Sayarı, 1980: 629)

Terrorism, which gave its imprint to the period, was also significant in the sense that most of such activities were connected with legally organized political groups and such a relationship undermined the idea of democracy in the country. The connection of the NAP, especially its youth groups, and the Ülkü Ocakları with the right-wing terrorism was almost certain. However, some of the other rightist groups such as the NSP and its youth group, the Akıncılar, remained outside of the terrorist war. (Karpat, 1980: 20; Sayarı, 1980: 628; Özbudun, 2000; 38) Hence, at the final level, polarization manifested itself at the level of government-opposition fragmentation and patterns of coalition formations as observed in the government formations throughout the period. (Sayarı, 1980: 627)

In this respect, with the maturation of competitive politics in the 1960s and 1970s, it had been very difficult for the bureaucratic center to establish strict control over the political system. As Pandora's Box was opened with the constitutional

arrangements under the 1961 constitution, the voices of the periphery started to be heard assertively both at the society and the state level. Especially with the establishment of the coalitionary governments with the participation of the radical minority parties in the aftermath of the 1973 elections, the voices of the periphery became critical in the decision making process. (Tachau, 1980: 659)

It should be noted herewith that, although these ideological movements both at the extreme right and the extreme left severely clashed with each other during the period of 1960-1980, they had a very basic common characteristic in that they defined their fundamental existence in opposition to the official westernisation policy of the central bureaucratic elite. In this respect, all these ideologies were extremely counter-official, counter-centre and accordingly anti-western. All these ideologies expressed a belief in the incompatibility of western democracy with the values of the non-western, Turkish culture due to the fact that the intellectual elites failed in reaching a consensus concerning critical issues of social justice, economic development, and the place of Turkish history, culture and religion. Radical leftists denounced the parliamentary democracy on the grounds that it was the cause of all the social injustice in the country and Turkey's underdeveloped status. The rightist blamed it for damaging the traditional social order and its values, which would eventually lead to the loss of national unity and basic character. Instead, democracy and the freedoms that were guaranteed there under were exploited and manipulated by the radical factions of the intelligentsia, paving the way for the extreme ideological polarization of the country. (Karpat, 1980: 6-9)

Within this framework there occurred increasing criticisms against any relations with the West both within the parliament, by the political parties and in the society through dominant ideological movements. Especially, anti-western views put

forth by the radical left, the Islamists and the nationalist right led to the questioning of political and socio-economic relations that had been established with the west from the initial periods of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, such movements forced the ruling governments to adopt a new policy outlook in Turkey's relations with the west, which aimed to give the national interests of Turkey an utmost priority. In particular, in the aftermath of the 1973 election, with the participation of the radical minority parties in the coalition governments that survived until the Military Coup of 1980, the voices of the periphery became critical in the decision making process. The existence of the radical minority parties namely, the NSP and NAP in the coalitionary governments was one of the very important factors that led the centre parties, the RPP and the JP, to adopt a critical perspective towards the EEC in the aim of not risking the dissolution of the coalition for the sake of securing a political stability in the country. (Çayhan, 1997: 153-209)

In summary, on the basis of the theoretical framework indicated above, the thesis basically argues that, when the centre-periphery polarity, which connoted a confrontation between the central bureaucratic elite and the peripheral masses was veiled under an authoritarian rule as exemplified by the authoritarianism of the central bureaucratic elite between 1923-1950, the peripheral masses were suppressed. In this respect, as anti-westernization sentiments historically embedded within the society, did not have the liberal atmosphere to dominate the Turkish politics; the central bureaucratic elite pursued the official republican policy of westernization to its extremes as observed in the year 1959 with Turkey's application to the EEC.

By contrast, when the peripheral masses had the liberal atmosphere to voice these anti-western sentiments as a reaction to the authoritarianism of the central bureaucratic elite, the decision-makers in Turkey opted for an unfavorable policy

choice concerning Turkey's relations with the West. It is important to note herewith that the radical left and the right wing minority groups within society, which had an anti-western outlook, had no voice in the governments that were established by the two majority parties until 1970s. Hence, anti-system parties, which had a much critical outlook concerning the traditional policies of the central bureaucracy, were unable to influence the policy-making in the prior period. On the other hand, starting from the 1970s with the formation of the coalitionary governments where the parties such as, the NAP and the NSP had strongholds in the coalitions, the voices of the periphery began to be critical in the decision-making, which will in fact be the case study of this subject thesis.

As peripheral voices gained an opportunity to be heard in the government through representation by the radical minority parties and, to a certain extent, by the centre right and centre left parties in the government coalitions, the anti-western rhetoric consolidated in unfavorable policy choices concerning Turkey's relations with the EEC.

In fact, other theoreticians argue the cultural differences between Turkey and the Community countries constitute an important factor that might be influential in the recurrent crises-led relationship¹ between Turkey and the EEC, valid for all periods not exclusive of the 1970s. According to Meltem Müftüler Baç and Mehmet Uğur, this cultural difference originally stemmed from the historically rooted cleavage between Islam and Christianity. The animosities, which were sown in the religious wars that were held until the 11th century, engendered a messianic element in each one of the cultures, which perceived the other as a target for conversion. As the heir to these historically rooted animosities, both of these cultures, although they now

¹ The term recurrent crises-led relationship was initially used by Mehmet Uğur (1999).

have closer connections with one another due to strategic political, economic and security considerations, still keep the mutually hostile perceptions of each other. Therefore, an inevitable distrust there between, still created non-credible commitments on the part of both, preventing further proximity. (Baç, 1999; Uğur, 1999)

According to the same theoreticians, the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a structure of state society relation where the state and society are linked to each other through the religion of Islam. Each individual in the country was not considered as individual citizens but identified as part of the “umma” (ümme), and derived their status and identity from that collectivity. Political sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire was imposed on the society by the will of God as revealed to the Ottoman Emperor, in this respect it conflicts with the sovereignty of the European nation-state where sovereignty is derived from the society. When the Republic of Turkey was founded on the principles of the European political and legal structure, the aim was to create a unified secular nation state out of the heterogeneous society of the Ottoman Empire, which had, until then melted their sub-identities under the Islamic religion. This had periodic unfavorable repercussions in the Republican history. As nationalism was unable to replace Islam religion as part of the identity of the Turkish society, the traditional elements of the society revived intermittently, especially during the multi party period. This parameter of Turkish societal structure is also critical in explaining the crises-led relationship between Turkey and the EEC, where the latter symbolized the consolidation of the Westernization and “Europeanness” policy of the central bureaucracy. (Baç, 1997)

Although Meltem Müftüler Baç and Mehmet Uğur point out Islam as one of the fundamental elements of the Turkish society, that might have impeded the

intensification of Turkey's relations with the EEC, they do not go on to prove how these traditional elements are indispensable to Turkish society and have been revived within society and verified as the mechanism that has influenced decision makers in the formation of unfavorable choices towards the EEC in 1978. The lack of any statistical or qualitative research that analyzes the perceptions of society and the decision-makers of the time toward the EEC on the basis of critical factors, such as the Islamic religion is the major discrepancy of the theoretical argument indicated above.

A contemporary study, conducted in 2003, statistically analyses the Euro-scepticism within Turkish society, on the basis of questionnaires that were made with a sample of 2123 citizens in cities and the villages. (Yılmaz, 2003)

The questionnaire includes questions such as;

- With which of the below-mentioned identity definition would you identify yourself? (Turkish, Turkish-European, European-Turkish etc)
- Will membership to the EU violate the national sovereignty rights of Turkey?
- Is Turkey a part of Europe?
- Is the EU a Christian Club?
- Considering the commitments that the EU expects from Turkey, are they similar to the Capitulations or the provisions of the Sevres Agreement?

As can be analyzed from the below-mentioned chart, of the 2123 samples more than 80% of the samples identified themselves as either Turkish or Turkish-European. Whereas only 8,8% of the samples identified themselves as either European or European-Turkish.

B. THE CONJUNCTURAL FACTORS

Conjunctural factors are mainly the factors, which were critical in the rise of the anti-western sentiments within the society and the state, specific to the period of 1970s. The common researches on Turkey's relations with the EU have already specified these conjunctural factors as the main reasons underlying the crises-led relationship between Turkey and the EU. However, as will be analyzed below together with the first part of the argument namely the structural factor, these researches did not analyze how and why these conjunctural factors might have led to an unfavorable policy choice of Turkey concerning its relations with the Community. They mainly indicated the facts and related those to the decisions of the policymakers of the time. These researches do not methodologically attempt to verify how these conjunctural factors might have created at the state and the society level a certain kind of resentment towards the western countries consolidating in the unfavorable decisions in 1976 and 1978. As shall be demonstrated below and analysed specifically under the section, "Towards the freezing of relations in 1978", which is the case study of the thesis, these factors shall be taken into consideration to the extent that they exacerbated the anti-western stance of the society and of the decision makers in the state, on the basis of the discourse analysis of the leaders of the time.

For the review of the literature, these factors can be analyzed at four levels namely; the economic factors, foreign policy factors, political factors and ideological-cultural factors.

1. The Economic factors

In order to make a comparison between the two critical periods where in the former Turkey applied to the EEC for association membership and in the latter she decided to freeze its relations with the Community in 1978, firstly it is necessary to consider the economic situation in 1959 which paved the way for Turkey's application to the EEC and then focus upon the economic reasoning behind Turkey's unfavorable decision in 1978.

Under the DP government, Turkey as an exception to the traditional Statist policy of the country was going through gradual liberalization of the economy. Adnan Menderes in addition to following the Greek application saw the membership as an instrument to restore political stability in the country. Due to extensive credits that were taken from the US and the international organizations, the country became very much dependent on external finance in order to be able to overcome its debt problem. Especially by 1957, the international financial institutions such as IMF, World Bank, OECD in the face of the increasing debt of the country started to warn the financial institutions concerning Turkey's ineligibility for any further financial aid. The balance of payment problem was exacerbated due to increasing inflation, combined with a change in the International political economy where the terms of trade turned against the agricultural producers, one of the major producers being Turkey, in favor of the producers of the industrial goods.

These economic problems had serious repercussions at the social level where any opposition against the government, particularly the oppositionary party, RPP was repressed through authoritarian means. The DP government saw the membership to EEC not only as a new source of financial aid and credit but also as a way to restore

the stability in the country by winning back the confidence of the Turkish public in the DP government, which had been devastated as a result of these adverse economic developments. (Birand, 2000: 51-60; Eralp, 1993: 24-44) It should also be noted that under the liberal policies of the DP government it was much easier for Turkey to receive credit from the international institutions, whereas in the latter period as Turkey left the anti-*Etatist* policies for the sake of the ISI policies, considering the incompatibility of the ISI economic policy with the liberal economy understanding of the Western financial institutions, it would be much difficult for Turkey to have access to foreign financial aid that was necessary to pursue the ISI policies.

According to Uğur (1999), Tekeli and İlkin (1993), in the 1970s, the incompatible economic policies of the EEC and Turkey were the major sources of conflict preventing Turkey to fulfil its commitments as specified in the Additional Protocol. Especially, the Import Substitution Industrialization policies, which were aggressively pursued by the Turkish politicians during the 1970s, were completely incompatible with the liberal economic policies of the Community. While the former necessitates the state intervention as the regulator of the economy for the protection of the domestic industry, the latter requires that the state intervention to the economy should completely be abrogated for the application of liberal economic policies. In fact, as a result of the ISI policies that were pursued during the 1970s, Turkey failed to compromise with the provisions that were set forth in the Additional Protocol, which necessitated the gradual reduction of tariffs and adoption of structural reforms. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993)

Due to the policy of *Etatism*, the extent to which Turkish policy-makers can commit themselves to a credible European orientation and the policy reform was uncertain. With its characteristic of historically strong state and its tradition of heavy

state involvement in the economy as the regulator and the producer, Turkey failed to fulfil its policy commitments associated with the Protocols that he signed with the EEC. Especially the economic policy of Etatism, which was being implemented since 1930 had attributed a very active role to the Turkish State in the economy whereby the state, became the major producer and employer in the trade. In fact, until 1988 the public sector accounted for majority of the total output and its share in total fixed capital formation remained very high.

According to Uğur (1999), Etatism had several consequences. Firstly, policy outcomes of Etatism were turned out to be inefficient as a result of the politically manipulated pricing and employment decisions. The private sector also demonstrated a rent-seeking behavior even in the aftermath of the 24th decisions, which had introduced the trade liberalization. Also state's extensive intervention and involvement in the economy cultivated a dependency culture on the part of the private sector, which sought protection by solely utilizing the lower risk investment opportunities themselves, and leaving the riskier ones to State as part of the subsidization policies. As a result, the Etatist policies prevented the state to fulfil the commitments set forth in the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol that were specified in order to adjust the Turkish Economy to the standards of the European Economic Community.

As far as state/society interaction is concerned, societal assertiveness in the Turkish society is very high especially concerning the economic policy issues. Certain societal groups have always been influential in policy making process by asserting their own sectoral demands for the formation of a favourable policy decisions in favour of their own but at the expense of another societal group. This tendency can also be named as rent-seeking mechanism. Specifically, the societal

groups will attempt to postpone the gradual liberalization of trade or ask for special sectoral treatment in the form of subsidies or tax incentives in the case of liberalization. (Uğur, 1999) However, considering the incompatible economic policies of the two parties as the sole reason underlining Turkey's unfavorable policies towards the EEC becomes invalid in the controlling case when Turkey with the economic package of the 24th January, 1980 started to pursue an ambitious liberal economic policy. On the basis of the argument indicated above, in this latter period with the liberalization of the economy, it would be expected that Turkey's relations with the Community would develop auspiciously. However, the crises-led relationship between Turkey and the EEC continued during this period as well.

The inability of Turkey to compromise with the provisions of the Protocol and its continuous pursuit of ISI policies were due to the developments that were occurring in the domestic and international arena. Especially, the Opec Oil Crises and the subsequent economic depression that hit most of the countries specifically the western countries prevented both Turkey and the EEC to fulfil their commitments as specified in the Additional Protocol. Also, the trade provisions, which provided the EEC with the ground to impose restrictions upon the Turkish agricultural and textile exports, had increased the foreign trade deficit of Turkey against the EEC. Under the pressures of the Economic Depression, the EEC countries also distanced themselves from the integrationist policies of the Community adopting many inward-oriented, nationalist policies holding their nationalist interests at best. (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993)

Accordingly the resentments against the provisions of the protocol was begun to be voiced by different segments of the society, the businessmen, the industrialists, the bureaucrats of the SPO and the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Industry and

Finance began to express the adverse effects of any possible membership with the Community to the Turkish infant industry. Due to the increasing balance of payment difficulties because of the 1973 OPEC Oil Crises, industrialists demanded to extend the transitional period that had necessitated the restructuring of the Turkish industry in a very short period. Even the Pro-European segments of the society began to voice their resentments concerning the Customs Union and asked for alternative ways of associating with the Community other than the EEC. Furthermore, the State Planning organization started to declare openly the adverse effects of the Customs Union on the Turkish Industry. The only bureaucratic organization in the 1970s, which stucked to its prior policies on the matter was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had traditionally considered EEC in political terms as the extension of Turkey's modernization and westernization project. Eralp (1993) herewith suggests that this period was basically characterized by the clash between Turkey's national projects of westernization and development. In confrontation with another tariff reductions scheme, which would aggravate the balance of deficit problem of Turkey in the face of the exacerbated debt problem, which was unable to be compensated due to lack of any financial credit from international institutions, Ecevit decided to freeze the relations in October 1978. (Eralp, 1993: 24-44)

The resentments that were expressed by the different segments of the society and the bureaucracy were predominantly based upon the economic considerations. Canan Balkır argues that the economic situation of Turkey which was extremely devastated as a result of several factors that were in play both in the domestic and international arena. Firstly, as Turkey passed to the second phase of the Import Substitution Industrialization which was based upon the production of consumer durables and intermediate good, she became much more dependent on the imported

goods and the advanced technology that could only be met with the increase in foreign-exchange. However, the worsening of international terms of trade against the producers of agricultural goods accompanied with the lessening of the workers remittances that was the main source of foreign exchange in the face of the Oil crises, led the country to a difficult economic situation. In confrontation with the increasing foreign deficit, which was the consequence of the economic policies of the successive coalitionary government in the 1970s that pursued policies extremely dependent upon foreign debt, Turkey faced with a balance of Payment crises in the mid 1977. The Payment deficit was mainly caused by the increase in the oil prices between 1973-1977 and was tried to be compensated especially by the "Nationalist Front" governments by obtaining short-term loans, which increased Turkey's dependence on the West. The failure of the Turkish government to implement the IMF standby agreement led to an increasing tension with the International financial community. (Balkır, 1993: 100-140; Karluk, 1996: 395; Çayhan, 1997: 194)

Such developments in the domestic and international arena also restricted both parties to fulfil their commitments as specified in the additional protocol. One such issue was the community's inability to act in accordance with the provisions concerning the free circulation of labour. The deterioration of the situation of Turkish workers in Europe was the inevitable consequence of the 1973 Oil Crises, which led to the deep economic crises within European countries characterized by high levels of unemployment and inflation. Consequently, the high levels of inflation and unemployment caused governments to send back most of the expatriate workers to their home countries and to take precautions against new immigration of workers. These reasons also endangered the "Free Movement" provision of the protocol. (Çayhan, 1997: 153-197)

Furthermore, the concessions that were granted to the Less Developed countries and the Mediterranean Countries under the General System of Preferences and the Global Mediterranean Policy in the aftermath of the Oil Crises had melted down the preferential treatments that were given to Turkey in agriculture and industry under the auspices of Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol. As specified by Esra Çayhan and Müftüler Baç, the Mediterranean countries had received the similar trade concessions that were given to Turkey under the auspices of the Association agreement. Furthermore, the direct and indirect quotas and tariffs that were imposed on the specific agricultural products such as raisins, fresh fruit and vegetables, and the textile exports of Turkey eroded all the possible benefits of the integration with the EEC to Turkish economy.

According to Meltem Müftüler Baç (1997) there was a certain kind of misinterpretation of both parties concerning the provisions in the Protocol such as the harmonization of agricultural policies. Both parties have attributed two different meanings to the provisions of the Protocol; for the Turkish side harmonization meant joining the Common Agricultural Policy of the Community, for the EEC however, it was meant to be trade liberalization. For Turkey the main aim was to receive certain concessions concerning Turkish agricultural exports to the EEC, which was being protested by the two main agricultural producers of the Community namely Italy and France for the fact that such concessions might have an adverse effect on their own farmers. As the prior concessions that were promised by the community was not as well adopted, Turkey started to have certain suspicions concerning the enforcement of the protocol by each party. (Müftüler Baç, 1997: 53-73) Although the argument put forth by Baç, is sound these arguments are not based upon methodological

researches but they are theoretical arguments based upon the existing literature on the subject.

However, the major problem was Turkey's inability to harmonize its economic parameters to that of the Community. Especially due to the balance of payment deficit problems and the economic crises, Turkey could not fulfil its obligation for the third phase and fourth phase of tariff reduction. The argument, which was voiced by the industrialists, bureaucrats of the State Planning Organization, was that Turkey was not ready for the restructuring of its industry as envisaged in the Protocol. Hence, the period should be extended in order to prevent the devastating effects of the early integration with the EEC. The relations were strained as the Community failed to give a favorable response to Turkey's demand for an aid package in the face of an American-imposed arms embargo leading upto to the eventual freezing of relations in 1978 according to the Article 60 of the Protocol. (Karluk, 1997: 1-32; Eralp, 1993: 24-44; Balkır, 1993: 100-139)

Within this framework, the extension of Turkey's commitments on the industrial products and the foreign currency crises that occurred due to the failure of the exportation of the agricultural products to the Community Countries in expected levels caused great disillusionment and hence Turkey adopted a more critical perception concerning its relations with the West. The requirements for Revision were adopted by every government that ruled between 1973-1977. (Çayhan, 1997: 161-194) However, the analysis of the period solely focusing upon the economic factors; looking at the devastating effects of the provisions of the Protocol and the new Mediterranean policies of the Community on the Turkish economy in parallel with the adverse economic developments in the international arena which had serious repercussions both in Turkey and EEC, does not give the whole picture of the matter

in consideration. The main weakness in such approaches is that they do not analyze how/and through which process these provisions and adverse economic developments might have affected the perceptions of the certain segments of the society and the decision makers of the time so that these different perceptions at the state and the society level consolidated in unfavorable policy choices. In this respect, these researches ignore the domestic determinants of state behavior. As it was specified above, the thesis does not deny the importance of these factors in the decision making process, but it takes those factors into account to the extent that they exacerbated the main argument of the thesis that is the anti-westernization stance that culminated in the 1970s as the main reason for explaining the unfavorable policy choices. In the case study whereby the discourses of the decision makers of the time shall be analyzed, those economic factors underlining the decision of freezing shall be sought in order to understand whether they were a major consideration of the decision makers during the formation of a policy choice and in what way they have affected a change in the perceptions of the society and the decision makers.

2. The Foreign Policy Factors

The anti-western views declared by the radical right and the left were further consolidated in the Turkish political life as a result of the developments that occurred in the foreign policy arena. Especially "1974 Cyprus Military Operation" which brought with it an imbroglio at the diplomatic level led upto Turkey's isolation in the international arena by the western countries. The "Greek Question" and the "Cyprus Issue" had always been perceived in the eyes of the Turkish society as part of the western question. Historically, western countries had supported the Greek side, which was thought to be changed by Turkey's integration to the several European institutions in the 1950s. However, the Johnson letter of 1964, which rejected

Turkey's demand for using the US supplies for the purpose of military intervention in the island and notified of the same of the fact that Nato's assistance would not be at hand in the case of Soviet aggression, engendered a certain suspicion among the Turkish public against its western allies. Such suspicion turned into xenophobia in the aftermath of the Second Cyprus Operation in 1974, which was subsequently followed by an American imposed arms embargo, and the biased attitudes of the European Community towards the Greek.

Gürel herewith establishes that the growing suspicion and xenophobia that was cultivated as a result of the developments since 1964, which were indicative of the traditional bias of the western countries to the Greek case, led Turkey specifically by 1978 to search for "new national security concept". (Gürel, 1993: 161-190) In this aim, as set forth by Paul Kubicek concerning the same matter, Turkey as a reaction to the implicit favoritism of the EEC to the Greek case "began a flirtation with the Soviet Union, and Turkish leftists, Islamists and nationalists began to see their country as a victim of Western Imperialism".² 1974 Cyprus Operation and the reactions of the US and the EEC to the issue consolidated Turks' conviction on the matter that Turkey had not been considered on equal terms with the Greek side and the long years status as the Nato ally did not help to overcome the historically rooted prejudices against the Turks. (Kubicek, 1999: 157-167) In this respect, Cyprus crises not only cultivated a certain degree of suspicion concerning the capacity of the Community to resolve international conflicts but it also engendered a xenophobia on the part of the Turkish government and the society based upon the assumption that the community was discriminating its Euro-Christian neighbors against the Muslim

² As cited from Paul Kubicek (1999, 157-174)

Turks. The failure of the community to handle the issue on equal terms exacerbated Turkey's mistrust to the Europeans and Turkey started to distance itself from its European neighbors. (Müftüler Baç, 1997: 53-73) Hence, the search for an independent path from the west also in foreign politics became the dominant view. Although the arguments put forth by Gürel, Baç and Kubicek could be reasonable, none of the theoreticians actually analyzed how these resentments that occurred due to the Cyprus issue against the EEC revealed themselves at the state and society level and how these resentments interact and effect a change in the decision making process concerning Turkey's policy choices against the EEC. In this respect, no methodological research was made such as the analysis of the first hand resources of the period to illuminate what kind of reactions were given by the society and decision makers at the time or whether any questionnaires were made with the individuals to verify those perceptions and also to analyze whether the decision makers had given a prior consideration to the Cyprus Issue during the decision-making process. These are sole theoretical arguments made up on the basis of the interpretation of the developments in the foreign policy arena that were contemporaneous with the critical periods in Turkey's relations with the EEC.

When the rejection decision was taken in October 1978 Mehmet Ali Birand argues that the relations with the EEC did not have even any priority in Ecevit's agenda. The primary concern for Ecevit was to find the financial assistance that was necessary against the pressing demands of the Turkish economy, which could only be guaranteed by the green light of the IMF and only from the countries as the banks had labelled Turkey as one of the highly risky countries that should not receive any financial credit. In addition to securing any financial credit for the revitalisation of the economy, the American-imposed arms embargo, which was followed by an

economic embargo as one of the reasons for the inability of government to find any financial credit from the international institutions, was another concern for Ecevit. The embargo could only be abrogated if only Turkey compromised with the US and the European Countries on the Cyprus Issue.

According to Kemal Karpat, the worsening of the relations with the west on issues such as Cyprus Issue where west supported Greece on the matter, and the ensuing Arms Embargo that was imposed by US gave birth to xenophobia on the part of the Turkish society against the west aggravating the anti-western stance within the society. West was started to be perceived in terms of its colonial past, imperialism and cultural hegemony over Turkey. Its idealised image as the centre of civilisation and humanism was tainted by the eventual dissolution of British and French colonial empires, the rise of third world and the Vietnam War. (Karpat, 1980: 27)

What Kemal Karpat discusses as the general evaluation of the effects of the Cyprus Issue and the subsequent American imposed Embargo on the perceptions of the Turkish society, establishing how the Turkish society started to perceive the west in terms of its colonial past, imperialism and cultural hegemony is also one of the main arguments of the subject thesis. However, these perceptions are not based upon any methodological research such as a questionnaire which would analyze the actual perceptions of the society or the discourse analysis of the decision makers of the time, that would actually give a hint of what kind of reactions those developments in foreign politics might have created upon the society and the policymakers of the time. In this respect, the subject thesis based upon the discourse analysis of the leaders of the radical nationalist and Islamic right wing parties as well as the leaders of the center right and center left parties, shall attempt to overcome the lack of researches on the subject matter

3. The Political Factors

Starting with the 1960s and throughout the 70s, the political system was mainly characterized by political polarization and fragmentation. After the 1960 Military Intervention, the electoral system was changed by the coup leaders from a simple plurality system to proportional representation. (Sayarı, 1980:624.) The electoral system was significant in the sense that it provided the minority parties with the opportunity to be represented in the parliament. Hence, dissections from the major parties increased especially after 1965 as it happened to the RPP in 1967 with the formation of Republican Reliance Party and to the JP 3 years after, with the formation of splintered DP. Even the radical minority parties such as NSP and the NAP were formed by some of the dissident parliamentary members of the RPP and the JP.

Also, with the 1961 Constitution the legal-constitutional framework of the political system changed to a great extent. During the period of 1946-1960, the left and the right were excluded from party competition. Under the liberties that were recognised within the new constitution, both the left and the right had the chance to compete within the party system. This in fact, led to the representation of the ideological and religious/sectarian cleavages within the society, in the new party system with the emergence of radical minority parties such as Turkish Labour Party in the 1960s and the NSP and the NAP in the late 60s and 70s. (Sayarı, 1980: 624-626)

This trend was completely different from the pattern that was observed during the period 1946-1960. In the aftermath of the transition to the multi-party system until 1960, RPP and the DP had a monopoly over the political system. However, after the 1961 election the two-party structure left its place to Multipartism as a result of the

new electoral system that was changed from simple plurality to the proportional representation. Hence, with the maturation of competitive politics in the 60s and 70s, it had been very difficult for the bureaucratic center to establish a strict control over the political system. As the Pandora's box was opened with the constitutional arrangements under the 1961 constitution, it led to increasing criticisms against any relations with the west both within the parliament by the political parties and in the society through dominant ideological movements. Especially, anti-western views put forth by the radical left, the islamists and the nationalist right led to the questioning of the political and economic relations that were established with the west as from the initial periods of the Decline of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, such movements forced the ruling governments to adopt a new policy outlook in Turkey's relations with the West, which aimed to give the national interests of Turkey an utmost priority. Especially the existence of the radical minority parties namely NSP and NAP in the coalitionary governments was one of the very important factors that led the centre parties RPP and the JP to adopt a critical perspective towards the EEC in the aim not to risk the dissolution of the coalition for the sake of securing a political stability in the country. (Çayhan, 1997:153-209)

The existence of coalitionary governments also prevented Turkey to take decisive actions in order to harmonize Turkey's economy to the EEC standards as specified in the Protocols. This was basically due to the fact that the coalitionary governments of the time were established by political parties, which had ideologically deep discrepancies with each other and hence could not compromise in any of the economic, political, social issues. This fact caused in time-to-time deadlocks in the operation of the Turkish government. As Turkey adopted a more critical perspective towards its relations with the West, the requirements for Revision

were adopted by every coalitionary government that ruled between 1973-1977. (Çayhan, 1997: 153-209)

4. The Ideological/ Cultural Factors

Starting from the very beginning of the 1960s the Turkish Republic became a stage to wide protests led by labour organizations, professional and student groups notably in reaction to the political authoritarianism that reigned between 1923-1950. The ideological commonality between the two major parties resulted in the 1960s under the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution, and throughout the 1970s in an extreme degree of politicization and polarization. On the one hand, unions and syndicals began to mobilize under the leftist movement and on the other hand, the right-wing groups attempted to establish an "idealist" model that would be an alternative to the left. The rapid development of capitalism also had strengthened the social bases, which these social movements appealed to; in the first place an extensive number of working class was formed and secondly the traditional social structure began to dissolve. All these movements on the right and the left tried further to increase their social bases by exploiting the historical heritage of Kemalism. These new movements also caused the main central parties to search for new ideologies in order to redefine themselves. (Keyder, 1999: 268-269)

On the left as the Turkish Workers began to struggle for higher wages and better working conditions they began to mobilize in politicized unions. Two groups of unions emerged in result, namely Turk-İş and Disk (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers). (Hale, 1981: 122). It is within the same period that the right of the workers to strike and organize under their own syndicals, led to the establishment of the Turkey's Workers' Party (as of 13 February, 1961) by leading trade unionists and the intellectuals in order to represent the interests of the workers

and peasants. The TWP began to be represented in the parliament and the leftist policy discourse started to be formulated both within the parliament and within intellectual groups. Furthermore, high degree of debates and criticisms on various social and political issues began to be declared by the intelligentsia, students and university professors. These criticisms found expression in various magazines that were published in the period. One major example of such magazine was the *Yön* magazine, which had appeals from various leftist groups from radical Marxist to the moderate left movements. The basic significance of these magazines was that they prepared the ground for the formation of different factions and parties within the left. (Zürcher, 2000: 370-373)

The intellectuals and the students were also mobilized around the leftist ideology through the organizations such as the "Ideas Clubs", which were the first attempts of a civil society formation in Turkey. These clubs had been established in all of the major universities and later in the second half of the 1960 were dominated and ruled by the activist student branches of the WPT (Workers' Party of Turkey) under the name of the "Revolutionary Ideas Clubs".

1960s also witnessed the Revival of the RPP in the new "left of the centre" ideology. Influenced by the radical trends that were developing under the atmosphere of freedom provided by the 1961 Constitution, it responded by turning to left. The search for new ideology was developed by intellectual circles of the party, which had the magazines *Yön*, *Özgür İnsan*, and *Forum* as the discussion ground for further deliberation. The main debating issues were the extent of state control on the economy, individual freedoms, associational rights, democratization of the political regime in terms of equality and equity, social justice and class conflicts. In this respect, the party aimed at the establishment of a Welfare State, which was similarly

proposed by the many social democratic/socialist parties of the Western Europe. (Zürcher, 2000: 370-373)

The party started to advocate policies such as nationalization of oil industry, and establishment of state control over primary industries, tax and land reforms, public housing and social insurance policies based upon the principles of equality and social justice. (Tachau, 1980: 656) This was in fact contrasted with the liberal economy that was envisaged by the EEC.

On the right Islam was adopted as a distinctive principle. New right-wing organizations were established with the propaganda of Islam as a solution to the growing zeal of "communism" as they named it. (Hale, 1981: 123) The centre-right parties since the end of the single party reign of the Kemalist regime tried to incorporate Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics. In this respect, Turkish politics was opened to the social forces of periphery, which had been excluded by the kemalist elite. (Ahmad, 1993: 142) Until then, the religion did continue to survive in private lives especially in families and in the small communities. This was not only the solid expression of people's cultural identity but it also turned into a kind of *diffuse ideology* that represented the dissatisfaction of certain segments of the society with the elite values and institutions. (Ayata, 1980) However, since the 1950s it had great appeals within lower and middle class "bazaar groups" which were populated in small towns and provincial cities. However, the nascent of Islamism had a climax point during the 1970s and 80s due to the rise of a new social group namely the "moyen bourgeoisie". This new social group consisting of merchants, businessmen and petty industrialists was formed as a result of the developments that were led in the national market. Ayata argues that the very same group had in their world-outlook formed a synthesis of the Islamic religiosity of the

traditional bazaar community with the attitudes of the modern bourgeoisie. (Ayata, 1980)

On the political arena, 1960s foresaw a significant degree of intimacy between political and religious organizations. This was partly due to the fact that the fragmented party system, which was the result of the new electoral system of proportional representation and the consistent change in electorate's party affiliation, had caused the party leaders to establish tight relations with the religious orders as part of their political propaganda. Starting from the early 1950s most Nurculuk groups had already established long lasting relations with the major centre-right parties such as the Democrat Party and its successors. Its successor, Justice Party in the 1960s owed its political success to its affinity with the leading Islamic orders. (Kramer, 2000: 63-64)

In the meanwhile, Sheikh Mehmet Zait Kotku, whom was the leader of the Nakshibendi Order, formed the political agenda of the far-right Islamists. While the members of the Naksibendi order were trying to infiltrate the bureaucratic organisations such as the State Planning Organisation, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kotku played a crucial role in the establishment of a radical Islamist party, namely the NOP under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. With the establishment of National Order Party, the Turkish Islamic movement was "no longer limited to providing a value system for organizing and guiding the personal and social life of the more traditional parts of the Turkish society. It now also became an ideology for gaining power." (Kramer, 2000; 62-64) In this respect, it would inevitably clash with the official secularist doctrine of the Republic.

It is to be noted herewith that the rise of Islamic movement in the 1960s is significant in the sense that Islam was the only powerful ideology against the

Republican westernization ideas, which had also a strong appeal among the Turkish society. Until the 1960s, the integrationist rhetoric of the single party regime was never questioned or criticized by the Turkish intellectuals. This rhetoric is mainly based upon the rejection of any kind of divisions among the Turkish public primarily the existence of ethnic or class differences. Hence, the basic division had been the division between the secularists and the anti-secularists sections of the society, which were also identified respectively as progressive and the conservative. (Toprak, 1995: 387) However, the ideal of the Kemalist elite to recreate a westernized Turkey had little place in the value systems of the masses of people living in Turkey. Hence, the secularization policy of the Republic had jolted the value system of a traditional Islamic society. As the religious elements in the society were pushed to the margins of the political system, they evolved into anti-system movements later in the 1960s. (Toprak, 1995: 390-395)

As the new Islamic organizations started to enter into the Turkish political system they hampered further political radicalization of the Turkish society. The establishment of the *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Intellectual's Hearth) in the 1970s, which had integrated the Islamists and the nationalists within its embodiment, is one of the developments along these lines. Their main aim was to create a united front within the right, which could curtail the growing socialism in the 1970s. (Toprak, 1990; 10-15) Such a united front was formed of centre right parties, Islamist groups and the military leadership against the leftist -communist groups who were considered to be the main enemies of the Republic during 1960s and 1970s. (Kramer, 2000; 64)

Nationalist Action Party was another rightwing party, which had integrated the Islamist and Nationalistic aspirations under its umbrella. With the election of Alparslan Türkeş to the party chair in 1965, Turkist and anti-Communist elements

were started to be used under the party rhetoric. This Turkism basically entailed the convergence of Turkish nationalism with Islamic characteristics.

In the second half of the 1960s the party, had close connections with extreme right-wing organizations, which were fascists in the sense that they advocate extreme nationalism, stand in opposition to liberalism, capitalism and communism. To name some of the organizations; Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği (Turkish Nationalist Unions), Aydınlar Kulübü (Intellectuals Club), Vatansever Türk Teşkilatı (Patriotic Turkish Organisations), and Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri (Struggle Against Communism Clubs) In 1967, under the influences of these organisations the party redefined its ideology under the name of "Communitarian Nationalism" and the "Nine Lights Doctrine" combining the main tenets of nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, positivism, ruralism, freedom and character building, development and industrialism. The new ideology used Islam as a political tool in order to mobilize the conservative-religious segments of the society in its struggle against the Marxist-Communist adversaries. This new nationalism that was invented by the NAP and its affiliated organizations namely the "Youth Hearts" was to be named as "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". It basically conceived Islam as the indispensable element of the Turkish identity. (Çınar and Arıkan; 2002: 25-40) MHP's understanding of Islam is intertwined with its understanding of state-centric Turkish nationalism whereby the Turkish identity is defined by shared religion namely Islam and the shared historical heritage of Ottoman culture (Yavuz, 2002: 6)

It is to be noted herewith that although these radical ideological movements both at the right and the left, harshly clashed with each other, they had a very basic common characteristic that they defined the fundamentals of their existence in holding an opposite stance to the westernization policy of the central bureaucratic

elite. Hence, these ideologies were mainly counter-official, counter-centre and accordingly anti-western.

Within this framework, the political and cultural integration started to be a major source of dispute especially in the 1970s. When Turkey applied to the EEC for associate membership, under the authoritarianism that reigned during the 1923-1950 period, Turkey's integration with the EEC was being criticized at the society level neither politically nor culturally. The major consideration was the economic outcomes of a full integration, which was being only discussed and negotiated at the state level. However, in the 1970s the extreme political fragmentation in the Turkish political life led at the society level a turbulent environment where fundamental parameters of the Turkish politics were being questioned and criticized, one aspect being the relations with the EEC as part of the westernization policy of the central bureaucratic elite.

The 1961 constitution provided the society with extensive civil rights whereby the universities had greater autonomy and the students had the freedom to mobilize and collaborate in associations, which they themselves formed independent from any state institution. In such an atmosphere with a relatively greater degree of freedom, there was constant criticism of the status quo and the search for alternative solutions to that of the major two parties, namely the Justice party and the Republican People's Party. (Ahmad, 1993: 133-134) These protests were consolidated within alternative network of organizations paralleled with alternative left wing and right wing publications, their youth organizations uncontrolled by the centralized power of the state. The youth organizations, journalists, academics both, at the right and the left which did not have the atmosphere to mobilize and openly declare their ideological views in the prior period started to protest against any integration with the

community on the basis of religious, national and ideological cleavages. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 94-179)

Within this framework, in the thesis, by focusing upon the structural factor, that is the historically embedded center/periphery polarity which dominated the Turkish political life under the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s and throughout 70s via the formation of radical ideological movements, I shall first; attempt to verify historically how these radical ideological movements rose in reaction to the westernizing policies of the center second; demonstrate the close relationship between those movements and the political parties both at the center and the right and left of the political spectrum, and third; through the discourse analysis of the decision makers during the period of the coalition governments between 1974-1978 (as this is the period when the voices of the periphery were critical in the decision-making process through the participation of radical minority parties, the NSP and the NAP in the coalitionary governments that were established throughout the period) I shall attempt to reveal how these new ideological formations characterized by anti-western stance both as represented by the radical parties, and as reformulated by the center right and the center left parties in the government were critical in the formation of the unfavorable policy choices towards the EEC. The two-fold methodological analysis of the domestic politics shall be located in a related spatio-temporal context as framed by the developments in the international political economy, and the foreign policy together with the evaluation of their effects on the domestic politics and the political economy of the country. In this way, it is aimed to demonstrate how the conjunctural factors specified above were critical in exacerbating the anti-western stance both at the state and the society level. The chart below summarizes the argument of the thesis.

CHAPTER THREE

WESTERNIZATION POLICY AFTER THE 2ND WORLD WAR

A. The Early Cold War Era

Starting from the interwar period Turkish bureaucratic elite launched a swift program of incorporating with the European organizations as part of the westernization policy. After the Second World War Soviet threat, which would give its characteristic to the whole cold war period, became the prior concern of the Turkish governing elite. It is at this period that the international system provided Turkey the atmosphere to integrate into the western alliance through organic institutions. In the emerging Cold War context the EC's viewpoint was to create a united front against the Communist block of the Soviet Union, where Turkey would be positioned as a front-line state. As implied by the term "Turkish Ace" which was used by the European Commission, Turkey had a strategic importance in the sense that it would be a pillar against the Soviet Expansion and against Arab threat in the Middle East. (Redmond, 1993: 44)

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Turkey, the main considerations underlining Turkey's orientation towards the western alliance can be explained firstly in terms of domestic politics, secondly in security terms and thirdly in economic terms. In terms of domestic politics, after 1945, "westernization" policy of the central bureaucracy gained a new meaning where westernization was also perceived as a

way to "ensure the irreversibility of the modernization process". One major fear of the policy makers of the period was that, the emerging multi party regime might provide the ground for the emergence of anti system parties, which might have engendered hostile sentiments against the policies of the central bureaucracy by utilizing populist policies. Hence, membership to the inchoate western institutions was seen as a way to anchor the modernization project against the perceived threat of the populist parties that were still rudimentary. (Uğur, 1999: 2-12) In the alternative scenario where Turkey was the outsider, policy makers in Turkey feared that Turkey would be swayed by Islamist forces and lean towards the Middle Eastern countries in foreign politics. (Buzan, 1999: 1-11)

In terms of the security considerations, the soviet threat played a major factor in shaping Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War. (Eralp, 1993: 26) After the Second World War, the Soviet Union renounced the policy of mutual trust and friendship that had prevailed since the Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression that was signed in the year 1925. This was first become obvious when Stalin in the attempt to revive the traditional Czarist intentions in the Turkish Straits, demanded the revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention asking for a joint defence of the straits on November 26, 1940. Furthermore, Molotov demanded that the area south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognized as the soviet territory and asked for a military base on the Bosphorous and Dardanelles for the naval forces of the USSR. These demands were repeated in the conferences that were held in Teheran, Yalta and Postdam. (Eren, 1997: 12-15) On March 11, 1945 Moscow officially denounced the Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression and asked for a new treaty that would determine the relationship between the two states in accordance with the changing circumstances.

Furthermore, in 1946 the Soviet Government submitted a proposal requesting that the straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black sea powers and that Turkey and Soviet Union should establish joint means of defense in order to prevent the utilization of straits by states that were pursuing hostile policies against the Black Sea Powers. In brief terms, this proposal would turn the Black Sea into a *mare clausum Russicum*. (Eren, 1997: 15)

Within this context, in the aim to become a part of the strategic alliance against communism and soviet expansionism Turkey sought protection within the western security system. On this basis, in the attempt to consolidate Turkey's European identity, Turkish government launched a policy of applying to the main European organizations for membership and accordingly Turkey became a member of the following organizations in subsequent order; OECD in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO 1952 (Müftüler-Baç, 1997: 56) Its strategic importance for the EC was based upon two facts of strategic importance. Firstly, Turkey was holding a border with the Soviet Union and secondly she had a geographical proximity to the Middle East. In these respects, Turkey was crucial for providing a front line within the Southern Mediterranean flank of NATO against the Soviet expansion and also it was considered as a bulwark against any attempt of Soviet Russia to invade Iranian Azerbaijan and as a potential military base for any US deployment on this region. Hence, Turkey began to play a key role in western security system

Within this context, Turkey's orientation towards the west was realized on the grounds that by allying with the United States and the Europe these three powers would build a security defense against a common enemy. Turkey's application to the European Economic Community for full membership was a one step further for the

complete realization of this ideal. However, in addition to the security concerns there were other factors, which caused Turkey's application. (Müftüler-Baç, 1997: 30-33)

With respect to the economic considerations, the economic situation of the country was critical in determining Turkey's foreign policy towards the EC. At this period, the country was going through severe economic difficulties, which was mainly caused by the liberal trade policies that were pursued by the DP government since the beginning of its incumbency period in the year 1950. A substantial amount of financial credit was received from the United States and Turkey gained an easy access to the foreign funds transmitted via international financial institutions. With the financial resources available to the government, it pursued economic policies whereby the agricultural sector was subsidized through cheap credits and a significant amount of public investment was made in infrastructural construction projects. Together with the expanded bank credits available to the private sector the economy demonstrated a rapid growth rate between 1950-1953. But there was one side effect of these policies; the country was gradually becoming more dependent on external finance. (Eralp, 1993: 28)

After 1954, as the international terms of trade turned against the producers of agricultural commodities, Turkey's trade deficit visavis the European Community to increase up to enormous levels. Inflation rate was 16.9 %, which was the result of DP's economic policy of investment in expensive infrastructural projects. Furthermore, as the balance of payments structure got worsened, this led to less amount of financial capital to be invested in the economic development of the country. Under these pressures, DP government agreed to an IMF Stabilization Program in 1957, which was based upon anti-inflationary measures with large-scale devaluation. However, these economic policies would create a public discontent

against the DP government, leading to an increasing competition between the RPP (as the alternative party) and the DP. (Balkır, 1993: 111-112) Within this context, DP government saw the membership to the European Community not only as a new source of financial aid but also as a new source of political instrument in order to restore its reputation among the public. In summary, on the economic side, there were three expectations on the part of Turkish State; Firstly, the expectation that full membership to the EEC would provide Turkey with the material resources necessary for its economic development; these would be by means of foreign financial aid, flow of credit, technological machinery and infrastructure. Secondly it would alleviate unemployment whereby the Turkish labour force would be canalized into the European labour market. Thirdly the expectation that Turkey would secure a firm trade agreement with the EC whereby it would gain a free access to the European market for its exports and also would be able to have an influence upon the setting of duties and tariffs EC products specifically on the Agricultural goods. (Balkır, 1993: 111-112) Hence, the DP government saw the membership to EEC not only as a new source of financial aid and credit but also as a way to restore the stability in the country by winning back the confidence of the Turkish public in the DP government, which had been devastated as a result of these adverse developments. (Birand, 2000: 51-60; Eralp, 1993; 24-44)

Considering the political dimension, Greek application was another important factor. It was mainly in response to the Greek application, which was submitted to the European Community 2 months earlier that Turkey applied to the EEC on 31st of July 1959. The basic consideration of the Turkish foreign policy makers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that Greece in case of its membership to the EEC where Turkey is the outsider might utilize all the political and economic advantages

of the relationship with the EEC against Turkey and hence might inflict a great damage upon the same. Historically rooted suspicion and fear between the two countries are also implied in the words of Fatih Rüşti Zorlu, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the period, "Even if Greece dives into an empty pool, you should follow them without any hesitation as it is very dangerous to leave the Greek alone". (Redmond, 1993: 25)

B. The Application for Associate Membership

Both the Greek application and the Turkish application were accepted by the EEC in order not to be unfair against any one of the parties. However, as both countries were not politically and economically developed to be eligible for full membership, the Commission created an "association" status for the applicants. "Association" in the Community terminology meant "a form of institutionalized relationship between one or more states and an intergovernmental organization which permits the integration of some functional dimensions, while keeping others separate." (Birand, 1985: 56) Both of the association agreements namely; the Ankara agreement signed with Turkey and the Athens Agreement signed with Greece are preliminaries and both carried a promise of full membership to the EC. The basic motivation underlying the positive response of the EC towards the Turkish application was the fact the EEC was very much concerned to keep Turkey within NATO, as Turkey was an important defense power of the Mediterranean flank of NATO.

The official negotiations with Turkey began with the opening of the first Preparatory meeting between Turkey and the Commission, which was held between 28th of September 1959-21st of October 1960. The parties agreed on a Customs Union to be realized within 12-24 years period, which would lead upto eventual

membership. (Keskin, 2001: 6) However, the attitude of the EEC towards Greece was different from the attitude towards Turkey in the sense that the Community had certain reservations concerning Turkey's eligibility for membership. Firstly, Turkey's European identity was questioned and with a specific emphasis upon its Islamic identity the cultural and religious differences between the Christian members of the Community and the Islamic Turkey were pinpointed. Furthermore, Turkey's low level of economic and political development and the uncertainty and instability of its democratic and political structure were put forth as basic points of consideration. (Kinnas, 1979: 11) However, in the light of the commitments set forth in the Association Agreement which had a promise of full accession of Turkey and on the basis of the pronouncements made by the President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, who had declared at the time that "Turkey is part of Europe", the Community would not enter into such commitments and made such pronouncements if it had then believed the Turkey was disqualified for membership in terms of its geographic, religious and cultural features. (Karluk, 1997: 9)

On the 1st and 2nd of March, 1960 the EEC started its official negotiations with Greece which was responded by Turkey with a memorandum that Turkey should not be overlooked. The Association Council during the meetings held on the 22nd of March and 21st of April agreed upon the proposal that the applications of both Turkey and Greece should be negotiated simultaneously. However, due to the military coup, which was held against the Government under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, the negotiations with Turkey came to a halt. At this period, the French President General De Gaulle had been extensively influential in Community's policy towards Turkey, which would eventually end up in the freezing of the relations with Turkey as demanded by De Gaulle upon the executions of the Former Prime Minister

Adnan Menderes, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatih Rüstü Zorlu and the Ministry of Finance, Hasan Polatkan by the military rule. (Müftüler-Baç, 1997: 54)

In the meanwhile, on July 9, 1961 Greece signed the Association Agreement (Athens Agreement) with the EEC, which was responded by Turkey with formal notes of protest. It was not until the 24th of July 1962 that the official negotiations with Turkey were resumed. However, as far as timing is concerned, Turkey was not good at timing with respect to Greece. The Greek agreement was negotiated during a period where the EEC was pursuing an outward oriented policy in terms of "expansionism" in the belief that it would bring the Community a diplomatic success. Furthermore, the United States was an enthusiastic proponent of Community's expansionist policy advocating the understanding that the EEC should assist a NATO member. However, when negotiations resumed with Turkey on July 24, 1962, under the influence of De Gaulle and due to the Italian pressure EEC became much more inward-oriented reversing its policy towards Southern Europe. As mentioned above the EC members had certain reservations concerning the European identity of Turkey and some questionmarks about the Islamic identity of the country and the cultural and social differences between the two different populations. (Hale and Avci, 2001: 5)

As the negotiations restarted, they were sporadically ended up in stalemates due to the opposing views held by different bureaucratic organizations of the government namely the State Planning Organization and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Planning Organization, which was responsible for central economic planning were against any kind of relations with the EEC on the grounds that any relation would prevent Turkey's economic development, blocking industrialization and devastating already existing economic sectors. Whereas the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was strongly advocating Turkey's membership on the grounds that it would accelerate economic and political development of the country especially for the consolidation of democracy.

Besim Üstünel, whom had published an academic research (entitled; *Milletlerarası İktisadi Birleşmeler Teorisi; Avrupa Müşterek Pazarı ve Türkiye*) during the negotiations for the Ankara Agreement upon the request of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, was invited by İsmet İnönü in order to give his expertise views on the matter, to the meeting held between the bureaucrats and the government leaders. On the basis of his observations in the meeting, he pointed out the basic conflicts with the SPO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Turkey's integration with the EEC;

*"Planlamadan gelen ekip çok katı birşekilde karşı çıkıyorlar. Dışişleri Bakanlığından gelen ekip kayıtsız şartsız teslim."*³

According to Ziya Müezzinoğlu, who was the undersecretary of the State Planning Organisation during the negotiation phase of the Ankara Agreement, the State Planning Organization had solid reservations concerning the Association Agreement which were simply based upon the arguments that Turkey as a developing country which was in the early phase of its industrial development, would be adversely affected by integrating with the developed economies of the Western countries, which had already established giant industries;

"DPT'nin başlangıçta bazı çekinceleri vardı, böyle bir işbirliğine karşı. Bu da o zaman ki plan ve kalkınma anlayışı çevresinde bunun getirebileceği sakıncalarla ilgili bulunuyordu. Fakat, Planlamanın felsefesi nedeniyle, bu anlaşmaya karşı bir özel heyecan da duymadı. Bu özellikle, benden ve Planlama müsteşarı olmadan önce oluşan bir havaydı. Benim zamanımda, yaklaşımımızı

³ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview that was made by Besim Üstünel by the author in April, 2003.

olumluya çevirmiş olmakla beraber Planlama anlaşmaya karşı özel bir ilgi ve heyecan duymadı. Bu kalkınma planlarında da görülür. İlk 5 yıllık kalkınma planlarında hemen hemen hiç sözedilmez AET'den ne de Türkiye AET ilişkilerinden. Ondan sonra ki Planlarda konu yavaş yavaş işlenmeye başlanmıştır.”⁴

SPO's reservations on the matter, continued during the discussions between the bureaucrats and the political leaders for the possibility of signing the Additional Protocol whereby Turkey would directly pass to the Transitional Period. Ziya Müezzinoğlu, this time as the ambassador of Turkey in Brussels before the EEC, whom had advocated the policy that Turkey should directly go to the Transitional Phase without extending the Preparatory Phase, encountered with the criticisms put forth by the undersecretary of the SPO, Turgut Özal.

“DPT ki o sırada müsteşar olarak Turgut Özal bulunuyordu. Karşı çıktı bunlara. Yani Türk ekonomisi henüz kalkınma halindedir. Sanayileşme sürecini henüz tamamlamamış ve Böyle bir birliktelik Türkiye'nin sanayileşmesini ve gelişmesini önleyebilir anlayışı ile karşı çıkıldı. Bu uzun boylu tartışıldı hükümette. Bu müzakereler sonunda 1970 kasım ayı sonunda Katma Protokol imzalandı...”

DPT teşkilat olarak bir kalkınma modelinin sorumlusu ve sahibi olduğu için yani gelişmiş bir ekonomi ile gelişme yolunda bir ekonominin birlikteliğinin getireceği sakıncalar nedeniyle bu konuya daima duyarlı olmuştur “⁵

These criticisms were based upon the same arguments that were made during the discussion for the Association Agreement which was based upon the fact that further integration would prevent Turkey's economic development primary its

⁴ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview that was made by Ziya Müezzinoğlu by the author in November 2002.

⁵ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview that was made by Ziya Müezzinoğlu by the author in November 2002.

industrialization as a developing country which was in the early phase of industrialization.

Likewise, Bilsay Kuruç, who was the undersecretary of the State Planning Organization in the period 1977-1978 establishes that especially starting with the discussions over the signing of the Additional Protocol between the bureaucrats and the government leaders in the second phase of the 1960s, the different views held by these two different segments of the bureaucracy began to clash with each other.

“O aşamadan başlamak üzere hissettiğim Dışişleri ile DPT'nin görüşleri farklılaştı. Neden? Çünkü Dışişleri müzakereci olmakla birlikte, bizim Ortak Pazar'a nasıl entegre olabileceğimizin müzakeresini yapmak istiyordu. Bunu tercih ediyordu. Yani entegrasyon isteyen provokatif bir müzakereci gibi bu. DPT'nin tavrı ise şöyle birşeydi; “Biz ekonomik yönden handicap”liyiz dolayısıyla gümrük birliğinin esaslarıTürk ekonomisinin büyümek isteyen bir yavru halini engeller....bu yavrunun büyümesine engel olur, onun için biz bu işi biraz geciktirelim. Hatta ortak gümrük birliği anlaşmasına girmektense ikili ticaret anlaşmaları yapalım. Yani avantajlarımızı kaybetmeksizin bir müzakere yapalım. Bu noktada Dışişleri ve Planlama teşkilatı arasında farklılık görüldü. Bu Katma Protokol görüşmelerinde ortaya çıktı. Dışişleri açıkça olmamakla birlikte planlamayı ve onunla birlikte olan Sanayi Bakanlığı'nı, Tarım bakanlığı'nı, Ticaret bakanlığı'nı yani teknik kuruluşları yavaş yavaş Ortak Pazar aleyhtarı bir platforma kaymakla suçladı. Bu kuruluşlarsa, Dışişleri'ni teknik esası sağlam olmayan bir şekilde Avrupa'ya erken engaje olmakla suçlamadıysa da böyle bakmaya başladılar. Bu farklılık sonra keskinleşti. Yani griyken siyah beyaz bir hale geldi. Ne zaman 1970'lerde, yani Türkiye'nin gündemindeki değişmelere paralel olarak.”⁶

In addition to the arguments specified by Ziya Müezzinoğlu concerning the perception of the SPO on the matter, Bilsay Kuruç added that contrasted with the hesitant and cautious approach of the SPO to the provisions of the Protocol, which emphasized the necessity of negotiating on the provisions of the protocol in the face

⁶ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview, which was made by the author with Bilsay Kuruç in April, 2002.

of the possible damages that might be inflicted thereby upon the Turkish economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs were advocating full integration with the EEC in due course. In this respect, as the main bureaucracy which was leading the negotiations with the EEC concerning the Additional Protocol they were acting as if they were not the negotiators of the Turkish party but as the provocators of the pro-integrationist view admitting the Protocol as it was without negotiating for any provisions on the basis of any possible damages that they might inflict upon the Turkish economy.

“DPT tarafında benim gördüğüm karşı diye birşey yok. Fakat şu var biz bu adamlarla herşeyi başabaş bir müzakere edelim, bakalım. Türkiye'nin handicaplerini ortaya koyalım. Sonra anlayış bekleyelim karşı taraftan. Böyle bir müzakere yapalım diyor. Fakat orası müzakereci bir yer değil. Dolayısıyla, şikayeti Dışişlerinin böyle bir müzakere yapmadığı ve Dışişlerinin bakışı ise muhtemelen DPT çok şey istiyor. Bunlarla Avrupalularla konuşulmaz. Adamların ne vereceği belli. Daha fazlasını istemek, ben bu işlerde yokum demek anlamına gelir diyor Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Böyle bir aynı dille konuşmayan Dışişleri ve Planlama tablosu çıkıyor karşınıza . Ama bu o günün gereği karşı olmak veya taraftar olmak olarak yansıtılıyor. Bu 73'ten sonra da böyle devam etti.”⁷

The conflict between these two bureaucratic organisations would prevail in every critic phase of the relations between Turkey and the EEC, SPO accusing the MFA of selling out the country and the MFA accusing SPO of religious fanaticism. (Karluk, 1997: 9) Since the Turkish Government was very much divided within its own ranks which prevented the Turkish delegates to set up a unified proposal, they did not have a negotiating power during the meetings as reflected in the Ankara Agreement (Association Agreement) that was finalized on September 12, 1963. (Redmond, 1993: 25)

⁷ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview, which was made by the author with Bilsay Kuruç in April, 2002.

Before the finalization of the Ankara Agreement on 12th of September 1963, all the parties in the TGNA the JP, RPP, RPNP, and the NTP expressed their views in favour of Turkey's integration to the EEC with the exception of the Turkish Worker's Party (TWP). According to the report, which was published in the aftermath of the finalization of the Ankara Agreement, the agreement was considered as violating the high national interests of the country which would lead to the destruction of the traditional artisan crafts, small and middle size agricultural enterprises paving the way for grand capitalist business enterprises. Hence the situation of the peasantry would worsen causing urban immigration and high degrees of unemployment. Furthermore, the infant industry unable to compete with the European industrial products that entered into the Turkish market would die off. The same report declares the continuation of the western colonialism as the basic purpose of the EEC and hence established that the subject agreement would lead to Turkey's devastation by assuring her a semi colonial status within the capitalist world system. The perceptions of the TWP were criticized by the parties, which basically evaluated those perceptions as an extension of the communist movement that was threatening the Western World in the period and also declared such approaches to be against the Constitution and the national interests of the country.⁸ (Çayhan, 1997: 46-52)

1. The Ankara Agreement of 1963

Ankara Agreement consisted of three stages, which would in subsequent phases lead to Customs Union and eventually to full membership. These are namely;

- 1) The Preparatory Phase (First Stage)
- 2) The Transitional Period (Second Stage)

⁸ The above interpretation is the summary of the views revealed by the declaration of the Turkish Workers Party in the aftermath of the Ankara Agreement as cited from Esra Çayhan 1997.

3) The Definitive Period (Third Stage)

The Preparatory Stage was initially designed to cover a period of 5 years, however it ended in second half of 1970. At this stage, the Community would provide Turkey with unilateral trade concessions and financial aid in order to pave the way for Turkey's economic development. It was a "preparation" for Turkey in the sense that Turkey in order to be able to realize the obligations involved in the gradual establishment of Customs Union would reorganize its internal and external economic structure. (Birand, 1990: 165-167)

Turkey enjoyed preferential treatment with respect to four of Turkey's main agricultural products; namely hazelnuts, dried figs, tobaccos and raisins that also constitute 40% of Turkish exports.⁹ The Duty rates on these commodities were lower than the common external tariff and the volumes were increased twice before 1970. Furthermore, Turkish cotton exports entered to the EEC duty free and there was no quantitative restriction on the amount of cotton exported to the EEC. In 1967, the Community granted additional preferential tariff duties and extra tariff quotas with respect to selfish and sea products, quality wine, table grapes, citrus fruits, household items in textile industries and hand made carpets. However, it is to be noted that the percentages of export earnings from these commodities in the total Turkish export earnings were very small. (ex: in 1967, % share of the export earnings from sea fish and sea product exports in total Turkish exports was 0, 011 %) (Baysan, 1975; 13)

Furthermore, in order to aid Turkish economic development, a total amount of 175 \$ million ECU were granted in loans through the European Investment Bank.

⁹ A Tariff Quota is a device whereby imports, within certain limits, are permitted duty free or at reduced rates, and any amount imported in excess of the fixed quotas is subject to the common external tariff. as cited from Tercan Baysan, (1974, 14).

At this period, in comparison to Community's obligation to grant financial assistance and preferential tariff treatment to Turkey, Turkey had no obligation visavis the EEC with the sole exception of achieving higher economic growth. During the Preparatory Stage, Turkey pursued an import substitution strategy with high protection rates. Its exports entering into the common market were basically limited to traditional agricultural crops. (Baysan, 1974: 16)

The Preparatory phase as it had ended neither did it bring any major advantage to Turkish economy nor did it create any discernible devastating effect thereupon. But it did sow the seeds of future problems. The number of Turkish workers in the EEC increased to a large extent and Turkey had achieved a rapid growth of industrialization during the period. However, the tariff concessions, which were granted to a limited number of agricultural exports did not extenuate Turkey's trade deficit visavis the EEC, on the contrary it increased in real terms.

The Transitional Period foresaw the gradual establishment of a customs union. Turkey would realign her policies in accordance with the Common External Tariff (CET). The concessions would be given by both parties on a reciprocal basis. Turkey would gradually reduce its custom duties on the imports coming from the EEC member states and would realign its external tariffs in accordance with the Community's. At the final stage, it would impose Community's CET on its trade with third parties. On the other hand, the EEC would extend its tariff concessions in the form of tariff reductions on textiles.

The terms of the Definitive Phase, which was the last stage before the eventual accession of the country to the EEC would be determined by an additional protocol after the completion of the Transitional Period; provided that both parties fulfil the requirements of the preceding stages. It was anticipated that it would start

after the end of the 22 years period as from the date the Additional Protocol entered into force.

The Preparatory Stage lasted for 7 years. The eventual opening of the negotiations concerning the second stage, namely the Transitional Period started as of 6th of February, 1969. While the negotiations were proceeding, during the Assembly meetings held in the Turkey's Grand National Assembly on May 1970, all the political parties with the exception of the governing Justice Party emphasized the necessity of extending the Preparatory Stage. However, it should be noted that none of the political parties but the National Salvation Party completely rejected the development of Turkey's relations with Europe and proposed an alternative economic integration with other regional countries instead. (Balkir, 1993: 111-112) The negotiations focused on three main issues; Firstly, the exact status of the agricultural and industrial goods which would have access to the European Community Market. Secondly, the status of the migrant Turkish workers in Europe and the social and economic conditions which they were to live in. Thirdly, the nature and extent of the financial assistance that would be granted to Turkey.

2. The Additional Protocol of 1970

The Additional Protocol, establishing the second stage was eventually signed in Brussels as of 23rd of November 1970. It basically envisioned the gradual establishment of a customs union between the two parties within a period of 22 years. The Protocol was mainly consisted of three documents. First one was the Additional Protocol. Second one was the Financial Protocol the negotiations of which promised 195 million dollars of financial aid to be granted to Turkey. The financial aid would amount to a total of 220 million dollars approximately together with the credit of 25 million dollars that was to be granted by the European

Investment Bank. Third Document was the Protocol concerning the provisions that were being dealt under the competence of the European Coal and Steel Community. It envisioned that the Coal and Steel Products, which were currently outside the sphere of the Customs Union, were to be included within the scope of the Association Regime in accordance with the provisions/regulations that would be determined by both parties for this matter. (Çayhan, 1997: 35-254) The Associate Council would be the main consulting organ for both parties in order to coordinate the social and economic policies between them.

The main provisions of the Protocol can be summarized as follows;

Provisions concerning the *industrial goods*: Turkey would reduce tariffs on its imports from the EEC gradually in stages. These imports were divided into two lists whereby the tariffs on the first list (55% of Turkey's imports from the Community) was to be reduced in 12 years time and the tariffs on the second list (45% of Turkey's imports from the Community) was to be reduced within 22 years time. For the items in the first list each customs tariff was to be reduced by 10% of the base duty as from the date the Additional Protocol entered into force. Second and the Third reductions would be at the end of 3rd and 5th years respectively. The following customs reductions would be made at each succeeding year so that zero-tariff duty on industrial imports would be realized at the end of the 12-year period. With respect to the second list, initially customs tariffs were to be reduced by 5% of each base duty and the at the end of 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 years an additional 5% reductions were to be effected at each successive period. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 93) Furthermore, Turkish tariff quotas namely, the quantitative restrictions on the industrial imports coming from the European countries would be eliminated gradually.

The EC would abolish all the custom duties that were imposed on imports from Turkey with the exception of refined petroleum goods (which would be subject to a tariff quota) and textiles. On these bases, Turkey would have a free access to European markets for all its industrial products except textile and petroleum. In application, EC reduced the tariff levels on some cotton textile products by 75%. Furthermore, it reduced tariff levels on machine-made carpets, cotton yarn and other woven fabrics of cotton by 25%. Tariff quotas and duties on these last three items would be eliminated in 12 years period.

The first customs tariff reduction was put into effect on the 1st of January, 1973 with a 10% reductions of the current base duty and the second reduction was effected in January 1976 where Turkey further cut 10% from its custom duties in order to align itself with the consolidated liberalization list. Third tariff reduction was scheduled for January 1978. Nevertheless, Turkey refused to implement it on the grounds that European Community was not fulfilling its share of obligations under the Protocol.

Provisions concerning the *agricultural goods*; Turkey would realign its agricultural policies to the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC over a 22-year period. It would be a phased adjustment, which was to be completed by 1995 in the aim that at the end of the transitional period with the establishment of the Customs Union, free circulation of the agricultural crops would be realized; whilst EC would grant preferential treatment to the 80% of Turkey's agricultural exports. To illustrate, tobacco started to enter into the EC duty free where other agricultural products were granted tariff reductions ranging from 50 to 75%. (Balkır, 1993: 113)

However, according to William Hale, the advantages that Turkey benefited from the preferential treatment was much less than it was planned. In reality, EC

agreed to grant Turkey a zero-rate tariff on 37% of its agricultural exports to the Community in 1973. Furthermore, a preferential rate of tariff was granted to 23% of Turkey's total agricultural products. However, since 10% of Turkey's agricultural products were already subject to a zero-tariff rate under the policy of Common External Tariff (CET), in application only 17% of exports benefited from this provision. (Baysan, 1974: 21)

With respect to the first two provisions indicated above, in the long term, Turkey would align its policies in accordance with EEC's CET within 22 years time, which was also to be applied to its trade with third parties.

Provisions concerning the *free movement of labour and capital*; free movement of labour and capital between EC and Turkey was to be phased in 12th and 22nd year. Both parties would eliminate gradually the restrictions on the free movement of labour there between, which was scheduled to be completed by December 1, 1986.

Protocol concerning "*the closer alignment of economic policies*" in the fields of competition, taxation and commercial policies in relation to third parties. Basically, Turkey would adjust and harmonize its legislation governing taxation and competition with that of the EC.

Finally protocols concerning *the financial assistance* that would be provided to Turkey in the aim to accelerate the economic development of the country. EC agreed to a number of financial protocols to be granted to Turkey according to a timetable. First financial protocol dates back to 1964, as an annexation to the Ankara Agreement. EC agreed to provide Turkey with a loan of 175 million on special terms. Second Financial Protocol dated of 23 November 1970, as an annexation to the Additional Protocol provided a loan of u.a 220 million, 25 million of which were

to be granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) on market terms. Third Financial Protocol was signed on 12 May 1977 and entered into force on May 1, 1979 for a two-year period between 1979-1981. It provided loans of 310 million ECU, 90 million of which were credits from the EIB. Furthermore, in order to support economic and technical cooperation between Turkey and the EC, EC decided as of 30 June 1980, to grant 75 million ECU. These grants would be used only in projects approved by the European Commission for social and economic development of the country. These would comprise projects in the fields of education, training, health service, and the environment. In practice, only ECU 46 million of this grant was provided to Turkey upto the end of 1981, remainder was postponed until the resumption of the relations between the parties by the year 1987.

Fourth Financial protocol was agreed on 19 June 1981 with a commitment of 600 million ECU on the part of the EC. Of the total amount, 225 million ECU would be granted in the form of loans from the EIB. 325 million in the form of loans on special terms and 50 million would be transferred as pure grants. However, at the end of 1981, 4th Financial Protocol was suspended due to the military coup in Turkey. (Hale, 1981: 245) In the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Protocol, one important event occurred in the domestic arena; in December 1970, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the National Order party filed an interpellation against the ruling government on the grounds of the policies that were pursued towards the EEC. Underneath are the parts of the interpellation as originally abstracted from official newspapers of the Turkish National Assembly; In reference to the policies that were pursued by the government concerning the EEC;

Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı Yüksek Katına;

*Özü; (Müşterek Pazar ve geçiş
dönemine girişindeki usulsüz ve milli*

menfaatlere aykırı tutumundan dolayı Hükümet hakkında gensoru açılmasına dair önerge.)

“ ...Türkiye- Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Ortaklık Konseyinin Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığının da iştiraki ile yaptığı 22 Temmuz 1970 tarihli 13'üncü toplantısından sonra bir bildiri yayınlamış ve bu bildiri ile mezkur toplantıda Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazara girişi merhalelerinden en önemlisini teşkil eden geçiş dönemine ait “Katma Protokol” ile yeni bir “Mali Protokol”ün müzakerelerinin yapıldığı bildirilmiş, her iki Protokol hususunda taraflar arasında mutabakate varıldığı ilan edilmiş, adı geçen protokollerin esasları hakkında bilgi verilmiş ve her iki anlaşmanın yaz tatilini mütaakip imzalanacağı açıklanmıştır.

Bu vakıalar Hükümetin memleketimizi Yüce Meclisin malumatı ve muvafakati olmaksızın milli menfaatlerimize aykırı bir badireye sürüklemeye olduğunu apaçık göstermektedir ki zira:

1. Ortak Pazar bir Katolik birliğidir. Hedefi üye memleketleri tek bir devlet halinde birleştirmek ve kendine mahsus ideolojik maksatlara sahip bir konseyde yetkileri toplayarak her bir üye memleketin hükümranlığı hakkını elinden almak gayesini gütmektedir.

Büyük çoğunluğunu Hıristiyanların teşkil edeceği ve daha dün Kıbrıs konusu münasebetiyle içlerindeki haçlı zihniyetini yeniden ortaya koymuş bulunan bir topluluğa Müslüman Türkiye'yi bir vilayet gibi bağlamak Türkiye'yi onun büyük tarihini onun insanlık için çok mühim olan hüviyetini yok etmek demektir. ...Batı ile her türlü ticari münasebet kurulabilir. Fakat bu asil millet Hıristiyan potasında eritilemez, bir Hıristiyan topluluğu tarafından hükümranlık hakları elinden alınamaz.

Türkiye'nin maddi ve manevi menfaatleri aramızda kültürel tarihi bağlar bulunan ve iktisadi denge olan İslam memleketleri ile Müşterek Pazar kurulmasıdır. Türkiye bu memleketlerle müşterek Pazar kurduğunda süratle sanayileşecek ve güçlenecektir ...Buna mukabil Batı ile Müşterek Pazar Türkiye'yi sömürge yapacak mahiyettedir.

Bu açık hakikatler muvacehesinde Türkiye batı ile tek Devlet olmaya gidemez, gitmeye girişmesinde de hiçbir menfaat yoktur. Ancak sonu sömürülmeye gitmiyen karşılıklı menfaat ve denge esasına dayanan ticari ikli anlaşmalar yapabilir ve yapılmalıdır

Türkiye -Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Ortaklık Konseyinin 13 ncü toplantısından sonra yayınlanan mezkur bildiri de katma protokol bölümünün bililtizam ve en sonuna konulan ve mümkün olduğu kadar, milletin gözünden kaçırma gayret ve uslubu içerisinde aynen şu satırlar yer almakta ve “son olarak Protokolda, yerleşme hakkı, hizmetler ulaştırma ve ekonomik politikaların yaklaştırılması

(rekabet, vergileme ve mevzuatın yaklaştırılması, ticaret politikası, iktisat politikası) konularında da hükümler öngörülmüştür” denilmektedir. Bu hükümler nelerdir? ...bunların iki hususiyeti vardır.

1.Türkiye Devletinin hükümranlığını elinden almak,

2.Türkiye 'de yabancıların yerleşmesini iş edinmesini ve mülk edinmesini serbest hale getirmek.

Hemen büyük bir ehemmiyetle işaret etmeye mecburuz ki, Türkiye'yi Müşterek Pazara sokmak isteyen dirijan müstemlekeci güçler aslında bu ikinci maddedeki hususlar için Türkiye'yi Müşterek Pazara sokmayı arzu etmektedirler...

Katma Protokolde kabul edilen hususlar milli menfaatlerimizle bağdaşamaz. Basit bir iki taviz karşılığında Türkiye sanayiden bir müstemleke olmaya itilmekte ve Türkiye iktisadi yönden ve yerleşme yönünden yabancılara peşkeş çekilmektedir. Türk hükümranlığının ortadan kalkmasına gidilmektedir.¹⁰

Defining the EEC as a Zionist and Catholic institution, pursuing the Great European Ideal of Expansionism and Colonialism, Erbakan criticized the government policies on the basis that Turkey's integration with the EEC would not only destroy the Islamic identity of the Turkish society but it would also violate the national sovereignty of the country by turning it into a colony of the western countries. The charges that Erbakan put forth are based upon the fact that in the search for integration with the EEC, the current government had the false interpretation of secularization as irreligiosity and westernisation as the complete assimilation of western culture and religion. Engendering the resentments that rose among the Turkish society concerning the Cyprus Issue, which had revealed the real intentions of the European countries reminiscent of the first Christian Wars against the Islam World, he completely rejects any possible integration of Turkey to EEC. What he proposed instead, was establishing a Common Market with the Islamist countries where Turkey shared a common cultural historical heritage.

¹⁰ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D: 3, T:2, C: 9, 11.12.1970, ss.233-235

Furthermore, during the discussions among the parliamentary members concerning Erbakan's interpellation, Erbakan points out that EEC was not only an institution of economic integration but it was also a political integration.

"...birçok milletvekili arkadaşlarımızla yaptığımız hususi temaslarda bendeniz maalesef üzülerek şahidoldum ki, birçok milletvekili arkadaşımız Ortak Pazarı hala bir ticari anlaşma zannetmektedirler ve bunun Avrupa ile tek bir siyasi Devlet olmaya gidış hadisesi olduğunun farkında değiller...

...bugüne kadar Hükümet yetkilileri bu konuda açıklama yaptıkları zaman, daima bunu bir ticari anlaşma olarak göstermişler, Avrupa ile tek devlet olmaya mahsus ideolojik ve siyasi tarafını bütün gayretleriyle milletten saklamışlardır.

...şu noktaya dikkat buyurun arkadaşlarım: "geliri az satınalma gücü az aldığı mal pahalı. Böyle bir millet ekonomide ilerleme kaydedemez. Ekonomide, endüstride rekabet gücü şarttır. Yoksa bazılarının iddia ettikleri gibi Ortak Pazara girme kararı başkalarına Pazar olma kararı değildir

"Aziz kardeşlerim, Milli Nizam Partisinin Ortak Pazar hakkındaki görüşü açık ve kesindir. Biz Türkiye'nin Batı ile tek devlet olmasını gaye edinen ve asıl gayesi siyasi ve ideolojik olan Ortak Pazar'a kökünden hayır diyoruz; ne bugün ne yarın"¹¹

According to the above-mentioned speech one can infer that the radical nationalists led by Erbakan, criticizes the integration with the EEC on the basis of its ultimate aim to establish a political integration as a unified state, which does not comply the ideological and political structure of Turkey and in this respect it violates the national sovereignty rights of the country. Furthermore, he established that pro-EEC bureaucrats of the government were trying to hide the political aspect of the integration with the EEC under the disguise of an economic integration. Erbakan concludes his reasoning by criticizing the EEC on the basis of its economic aspects which would make Turkey the open market of the EEC in order to be exploited by the EEC countries for their economic benefits, these criticism against the Community

¹¹ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:3, T:2, C:9, 14.12.1970 pg.238

on economic grounds were very much in line with the criticism that were put forth socialist stance.

After the voting, the parliament rejected the request for interpellation's further consideration on the agenda of the parliament. (Çayhan, 1997: 35-254) On the 5th of July 1971, the National Assembly ratified the Additional Protocol with 149 pro-votes against the 69 con-votes. While the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party voted against the Protocol, the Justice Party and the National Reliance Party voted for the Protocol. However, it is necessary to note herewith that the interpellation that was filed against the government and the speeches that were given are important in the sense of both reflecting the views of a radical Islamist right wing party as the representatives of the religious segments of the society and also in the sense that it was a herald of the critical anti-western stance that would give its imprint to the forthcoming period of the 1970s.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE 1960S

This chapter aims to verify historically the formation of new ideological movements within the society and the state as the voices of the periphery, which had a very basic common characteristic that they defined the fundamentals of their existence in holding an opposite stance to the westernizing policies of the central bureaucratic elite. The chapter analyses the evolution of these radical ideological movements both at the state and the society level, specifically pinpointing the close relationship between these radical movements and the political parties and locate it in a related spatio-temporal context as framed by the conjunctural factors, namely the foreign policy factors, economic factors, political factor and ideological/cultural factors which were critical in exacerbating the anti-western sentiments. In this respect, it is basically argued that when the conjunctural factors point to an anti-western stance, it intersects with the structural factor, which connotes to a historically embedded centre-periphery polarity between the westernising central bureaucratic elite and the peripheral masses. In the event, it leads to the formation of anti-western policy choices concerning Turkey's relations with the EEC as illustrated

in the unfavourable policy choices that were adopted by the Turkish decisionmakers in 1976 and 1978 against the EEC.

Starting from the very beginning of the 1960s the Turkish Republic, became a stage to wide protests led by labour organizations, professional and student groups notably in reaction to the political authoritarianism dating back to the second half of the 1950s and which were tensioned due to the limitations of the Import-Substitution Industrialization Economy in overcoming the fundamental economic crises of the country in the second half of the 1950s. During the 1950s, the economic limitations of the decade, necessitated that the anti-Etatism discourse, which had been advocated by the Democrat Party until then, be left. The use of the available resources and powers of the state for the economic development and industrialization of the country became the main concern of the parties common to both RPP and the DP. The issues such as distribution of wealth, equality, equity, and social justice were no more on the agenda. In this respect, the economic growth had primacy over the distribution of wealth. After the consolidation of the Import Substitution Industrialization as the economic policy of the State, the two parties in terms of their economic programs did not propose any alternative policies. Such ideological commonality between the two major parties resulted in the 1960s and 1970s in an extreme degree of politicization and polarization. On the one hand, unions and syndicals began to mobilize under the leftist movement and on the other hand, the right-wing groups attempted to establish an "idealist" model that would be an alternative to the left. The rapid development of capitalism also had strengthened the social bases, which these social movements appealed to; in the first place an extensive number of working class was formed and secondly the traditional social structure began to dissolve. All these movements on the right and the left tried

further to increase their social bases by exploiting the historical heritage of Kemalism. These new movements also caused the main central parties to search for new ideologies in order to redefine themselves. (Keyder, 1999: 268-269)

It should also be noted that this polarization was also developing in parallel with the dynamics that were occurring with respect to Turkey's relations with the Western European countries and the United States. Under Menderes, Turkish foreign policy had been pro-US. After the military coup, the Army had also reasserted Turkey's "commitments to her western allies".¹² However, during the Cuban Missile Crises dated of October 1962, Turkey had learned that its existence within the western alliance system only had significance for the deterrence of the Soviet Communist expansionism and that Turkey's national interests could be overlooked at anytime as it had been observed during the negotiations for the Cuban Missile Crises. Together with the Cyprus Crises of 1963/1964 whereby the United States had supported the Greek government, public opinion started to be inflamed and aroused by anti-americanism, which would continue until the military coup of 12 March 1971. The Johnson's letter of 5 June further outraged the Turkish public opinion, which had the utmost belief in the righteousness of the Turkish cause on the island. It mainly prohibited Turkey's intervention to the island on the grounds that it was against the Guarantee Treaty (London Zurich Accords) and that Nato was not liable to defend Turkey in the intervention as Turkey did not search for the "consent and approval" of their allies and that Turkey did not have the right to use the arms that she had acquired from the United States as it had been given to her not for "intervention" but for "defence" purposes.¹³ This anti-Americanism was mainly

¹² as cited from Feroz Ahmad. (1993, 139)

¹³ <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.htm>

advocated and expressed by the nationalist and the leftist groups, which sought the solution in Turkey's "non-alignment".

Apart from its implications for foreign policy, in terms of domestic politics anti-americanism was also one of the main factors, which led to the polarization of the country into two camps; namely the pro-american right and the anti-american left. Anti-american camp had appeals both from the different segments of the neo Kemalists, nationalists and the leftists. The basic argument, which they advocated, was that Turkey's dependence and exploitation by the capitalist west were the main reasons for the current economic and political backwardness of the country and its underdeveloped status. Even the history of Turkey's War of Liberation was re-interpreted as a struggle against imperialism in the aim to establish an independent non-aligned state. Furthermore, the rules of both of the major parties were criticized on the basis that their pro-western policies in the pursuit of a strict commitment to the west through institutions such as NATO, Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan increased Turkey's dependence to the west. RPP as one of the two major parties of the decade was also influenced by these radical movements and sought to redefine its ideology in along with the leftist line. This new radical nationalism on the other hand of the political spectrum created its right wing opposition, which perceived the "other" as a communist movement. (Ahmad, 1993:141-143) New right-wing organizations like the "Association to Combat Communism was established basically in reaction to these radical nationalist movements.

A. The Liberal Atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution

These polarized camps found the liberal atmosphere for their expression and growth under the 1961 Constitution, which was basically formed in reaction to the authoritarianism of the prior period of 1923-1960. This constitution provided the

society with extensive civil rights whereby the universities had greater autonomy and the students had the freedom to mobilize and collaborate in associations, which they themselves formed independent from any state institution. In such an atmosphere with great degree of freedom, there was constant criticism of the status quo and the search for alternative solutions to that of the major two parties, namely the Justice party and the Republican People's Party. (Ahmad, 1993: 133-134) These protests were consolidated within alternative network of organizations uncontrolled by the centralized power of the state.

B. The Leftist movement

The leftist movement emerged as one of the active political movements in the 1960s, which was going to prevail in Turkish Politics for two decades. One major cause of the left-wing mobilization was the fact that as the industrialization took hold, Turkey witnessed an increasing number of urban working class and industrial proletariat formation, which created the social base for the socialist parties. (Hale, 1981; 245) As the Turkish Workers began to struggle for higher wages and better working conditions they began to mobilize in politicized unions. Two groups of unions emerged in result, namely Turk-iş and Disk (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers). Turk-iş was mainly a pro-government organization established on the American model and mainly struggled for economic demand and did not look for any political affiliation. Paradoxically, it was known to be in close relation with the governing Justice Party. On the other hand, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers was the major organization of the radical left. Founded on the European model of unions it not only struggled for economic demands but it also believed the same could only be guaranteed through political action. (Hale, 1981; 122) The union

was to lead the major workers strikes in the following decades as the voice of the urban industrial workforce.

It is within the same period that the right of the workers to strike and organize under their own syndicals, led to the establishment of the Turkey's Workers' Party (as of 13 February, 1961) by leading trade unionists and the intellectuals in order to represent the interests of the workers and peasants. The TWP began to be represented in the parliament and the leftist policy discourse started to be formulated both within the parliament and within intellectual groups. Although the eldest leftist party was the Turkish Communist Party for 50 years, it had basically lost its appeal due to its strict pro-Moscow ideology and dogmatic emphasis upon the industrial proletariat as the main moving force of the Revolution. In this respect, the main legal leftist party, Worker's Party of Turkey had its appeal both from the proletariat primarily the ones mobilized under the unions as well as the intellectuals. (Ahmad, 1993: 143) Furthermore, high degree of debates and criticisms on various social and political issues began to be declared by the intelligentsia, students and university professors. These criticisms found expression in various magazines that were published in the period. One major example of such magazine was the *Yön* magazine, which had appeals from various leftist groups from radical Marxist to the moderate left movements. The basic significance of these magazines was that they prepared the ground for the formation of different factions and parties within the left. (Zürcher, 2000: 370-373)

The intellectuals and the students also mobilized around the leftist ideology through the organizations such as the "Ideas Clubs", which were the first attempts of a civil society formation in Turkey. These clubs were established in all of the major universities and later in the second half of the 1960 were dominated and ruled by the

activist student branches of the WPT (Workers' Party of Turkey) under the name of the "Revolutionary Ideas Clubs". In the 1968, a faction of the WPT named as the National Democratic Revolution under the leadership of Mihri Belli took the administration of the Revolutionary Ideas Clubs and transformed it into Revolutionary Youth Federation, known as "Dev-Genç". The youth movement in 1968 was under the influence of the worldwide youth movement that was sweeping the whole globe, but specifically under the influence of the youth movement in France. However, starting from the 1970s the radicals from the National Democratic Revolution began to propagate for armed guerrilla struggle, which they believed to be the only way for revolution. Hence, different factions of the left, namely Turkish Communist Party- Marxist/Leninist faction forming the Turkey's Workers Peasants Liberation Movement (TIKKO), under the leadership of the National Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu) and National Liberation Party-Front (THKP-C Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi- Cephesi) started the *guerillas war* which would continue throughout the 1960s and 1970s as scenes of murders, bombings and kidnappings.

C. The Transformation of the RPP as a "Left of the Centre" Party

Since the very beginning of the Republican Era, RPP represented the ideals of the Republican Era as a leading party, which paved the way for the Turkish Modernity. In this respect, it had extensive appeals from the bureaucrats, intelligentsia and the private entrepreneurs in the society. It was the party of an alliance between the national elite, namely the military and civil bureaucrats and the provincial notables, landowners and leading local families. Especially its representative status as the party of provincial notables had provided it with a strong electoral appeal in the eastern regions of the country, which were under the control of

the local notables in political, social and economic terms. (Tachau, 1980: 657) RPP perceived politics as an instrument to actualize the ideal of Modern Turkish Society. In this sense, it had always assumed its initial role as the guarantor of the Kemalist reform. However, having failed to win an overall majority in all the elections held since 1950, RPP had passed through radical transformation both in its ideology and leadership for pragmatic reasons (Turan, 1995:464; Tachau, 1980: 657). As one of the two major central parties in the 1960s, it was influenced by these radical trends that were developing under the atmosphere of freedom provided by the 1961 Constitution. It responded by turning to left.

However, it should be noted that the major ideological and structural change of the RPP in the 1960s was the result of the deliberations that had initially started in 1957 under the *Declaration of Primary Goals*. This declaration was significant in the sense that it established the basic fundamentals of the 1961 Constitution and in the early years of the 1960s with the establishment of the new constitution, İnönü government had the opportunity to consolidate those ideological deliberations through institutional reforms such as collective bargaining and striking rights, associational freedoms, and planned economy. The search for new ideology was developed by intellectual circles of the party, which had the magazines *Yön*, *Özgür İnsan*, and *Forum* as the discussion ground for further deliberation. The main debating issues were the extent of state control on the economy, individual freedoms, associational rights, democratization of the political regime in terms of equality and equity, social justice and class conflicts. In this respect, the party aimed at the establishment of a Welfare State, which was similarly proposed by the many social democratic/socialist parties of the Western Europe. (Zürcher, 2000: 370-373)

Bülent Ecevit as the Secretary-General of the party played a significant role for the formation of this new ideology. The new interpretation of the Republican People's Party's ideology was summarized under the rhetoric of the "Left of the Center" by Bülent Ecevit, which had been crystallized as he had started to publish the Devrim Newspaper of the Yön Movement. It embraced the idea of the multi-party democracy with a specific emphasis upon the parliamentary democracy as a necessity for the consolidation of democracy against the former ideology of the party, which had perceived the multiparty system as a threat to the domestic security of the Turkish Republic. Under İnönü, this ideology in terms of its economic implications was interpreted as being equal to Etatism. It was a "muted leftism" which was still opposed to the radical Marxists interpretation of leftism and tried to constrain the sectors of state ownership to defense, heavy industries, coal and strategic mineral, public utilities and oil industry. It aimed to represent all social classes- peasants, entrepreneurs, professional people and industrial workers. (Güneş-Ayata, 2002: 103)

In the late 1960s, RPP distanced itself from its bureaucratic-elitist character and pursued more of an egalitarian socialist policy for pragmatic reasons. Especially in the general elections of 1969, the RPP started to emphasize its socialist (left of the center) policy much more assertively. This was basically due to the fact that an oppositionary group of local notables, who had until then reacted against party's leftist discourse, disaffiliated from the party. Hence, the party started to advocate policies such as nationalization of oil industry, and establishment of state control over primary industries, tax and land reforms, public housing and social insurance policies based upon the principles of equality and social justice. (Tachau, 1980: 656) This was in fact contrasted with the liberal economy that was envisaged by the EEC.

İsmet İnönü's resignation from the party leadership symbolizes this transition of the party from political elitism towards representing the masses at large. In this respect, one of the reasons for such a change of discourse might be the necessity that was felt by the party's leading circles to appeal to the masses as the only condition for coming to power. The weakening of the political elitism can also be attributed to the fact that especially towards the late 1960s, which culminated in the 1971, military Coup there had been a differentiation among the elites to a large extent. In the 1960 Coup D'etat the bureaucrats, university, academia and the military forces were one unified entity as the modernist and progressivist elites. However, starting from the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, this alliance was dissolved for the fact that the military forces began to blame university as the main reason for the political instability within the country where on the other hand bureaucrats were divided in line with the polarised camps in the society. (Turan, 1995: 461)

D. The Right wing Movements

1. The Revival of the Traditional Sentiments and the Rise of Islam

During the 1960s, as the Neo-Kemalists adopted nationalism as one of the main tenets of their ideology, the right as an alternative began to use Islam as a distinctive principle. New right-wing organizations were established with the propaganda of Islam as a solution to the growing zeal of "communism" as they named it. (Hale, 1981: 123) The centre-right parties since the end of the single party reign of the Kemalist regime tried to incorporate Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics. In this respect, Turkish politics was opened to the social forces of periphery, which had been excluded by the kemalist elite. (Ahmad, 1993: 142) Until then, the religion did continue to survive in private lives especially in families and in the small communities. This was not only the solid

expression of people's cultural identity but it also turned into a kind of *diffuse ideology* that represented the dissatisfaction of certain segments of the society with the elite values and institutions. (Ayata, 1980) However, since the 1950s it had great appeals within lower and middle class "bazaar groups" which were populated in small towns and provincial cities (Mardin, 1989). However, the nascent of Islamism had a climax point during the 1970s and 80s due to the rise of a new social group namely the "moyen bourgeoisie". This new social group consisting of merchants, businessmen and petty industrialists was formed as a result of the developments that were led in the national market. Ayata argues that the very same group had in their world-outlook formed a synthesis of the Islamic religiosity of the traditional bazaar community with the attitudes of the modern bourgeoisie. (Ayata, 1980)

2. The Links between Religious Orders and Political Parties

On the political arena, 1960s foresaw a significant degree of intimacy between political and religious organizations. This was partly due to the fact that the fragmented party system, which was the result of the new electoral system of proportional representation and the consistent change in electorate's party affiliation, had caused the party leaders to establish tight relations with the religious orders as part of their political propaganda. (Kramer, 2000: 63-64) Starting from the early 1950s most Nurculuk groups had already established long lasting relations with the major centre-right parties such as the Democrat Party and its successors. Its successor, Justice Party in the 1960s owed its political success to its affinity with the leading Islamic orders. It mainly began to appeal to the democratic Islamists in Turkey. Especially the followers of the Nurcu movement supported the party due to the fact that the founder, Said-i Nursi predicted that a child born in İslamköy would rise to political leadership. And the followers of the movement believed that this

person was Süleyman Demirel. However, it should be noted that both the leadership of Democrat Party (1950-1960) and the leadership of Justice Party rejected religious fanaticism as all these personalities were coming from young republican and democratic tradition. According to David Barchard, religion whether in the form of official religion of the republic or in the form as represented by different sects and brotherhoods was adaptable to the ideas of progress. Especially, Nurcus portrayed a modernist image receptive of all kinds of new ideas and scientific development (Barchard, 1993) While Demirel was trying to mobilize the system-oriented Islamists, an influential religious figure, Sheikh Mehmet Zait Kotku, whom was the leader of the Nakshibendi Order, was trying to form the political agenda of the far-right Islamists...

3. The Birth of the first Islamist Party- National Order Party

While the members of the Naksibendi order were trying to infiltrate the bureaucratic organizations such as the State Planning Organisation, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kotku played a crucial role in the establishment of an Islamist party. It was with the support and encouragement of Kotku that Necmettin Erbakan, who would be an influential political figure starting from the late 1960s representing the radical Islamists entered into political scene. Following his removal from office as the elected chairman of the Turkish Union of Chambers, which was ordered by Demirel due to accusation of voting irregularities, Erbakan and Demirel began to confront with each other. This confrontation in the political scene initiated a confrontation with the far-right Islamists in Turkey. After Demirel's veto to Erbakan's candidacy to election committee of the Justice Party, with the blessing of Sheik Kotku, Erbakan entered into political life as an independent member of Parliament from Konya district. Immediately after his

election Erbakan with the support of the key figures of both the Nakshibendi Order and the Nurcu movement established the National Order Party.

According to Heinz Kramer, with the establishment of National Order Party, the Turkish Islamic movement was "no longer limited to providing a value system for organising and guiding the personal and social life of the more traditional parts of the Turkish society. It now also became an ideology for gaining power." (Kramer, 2000: 62-64) In this respect, it would inevitably clash with the official secularist doctrine of the Republic. Accordingly, after the military intervention in 1971, the party was closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was trying to spread anti-secularism in violation of the Law on the organization of political parties, which forbade the exploitation of religion for political purposes.

It is to be noted herewith that the rise of Islamic movement in the 1960s is significant in the sense that Islam was the only powerful ideology against the Republican westernization ideas, which had also a strong appeal among the Turkish society. Until the 1960s, the integrationist rhetoric of the single party regime was never questioned or criticized by the Turkish intellectuals. This rhetoric is mainly based upon the rejection of any kind of divisions among the Turkish public primarily the existence of ethnic or class differences. Hence, the basic division had been the division between the secularists and the anti-secularist sections of the society, which were also identified respectively as progressive and the conservative. (Toprak, 1995; 387) However, the ideal of the Kemalist elite to recreate a Westernized Turkey had little place in the value systems of the masses of people living in Turkey. Hence, the Secularization policy of the Republic had jolted the value system of a traditional Islamic society. As the religious segments in the society were pushed to the margins of the political system, they evolved into anti-system movements later in the 1960s.

In this respect, the electoral base upon which the NOP and its hereditary NSP were based, was those segments of the Turkish society which was pushed away from the Kemalist centre. (Toprak, 1995; 390-395)

In the 1970s the NOP would be replaced by the National Salvation Party, which was to be established by Erbakan after the Constitutional Court dismissed his case. (Yeşilada, 2002; 62-81) However, it would experience the same fate after the next military intervention in 1980. In analysis of the ideology behind the two parties that were established during the late 1960 and the 1970s on the basis of the speeches given by its leader Erbakan, it can be inferred that the party aims "to create a nationalist and sacredist Turkey" depending on "Turkey's great and broad nationalist public opinion". Erbakan's main slogan was Islamic nationalism "with a specific emphasis upon the national consciousness which he believed to be based upon the existence of common religion, history, social, economic and cultural elements". Furthermore, the condition for the economic, social and cultural developments of Turkey was evaluated through this understanding of national outlook, which also justified his complete rejection of the Common Market on the grounds that it will destroy Turkish nationalism. (Çetinsaya, 1999; 373)

The ideology that was set forth by the party was defined as "national" by Erbakan. The understanding of "national" originates from the party's own interpretation of history and the Islam civilisation. According to this interpretation, Turkey's close relations with the western countries were conceived as the main reason for Turkey's backwardness despite its long history of powerful empire. The Turkish society lost its historically rooted power due to the fact that it had completely rejected its own cultural heritage and as a result failed to industrialize. It is at this point that the party clashed with the secular intellectuals of the Republic in

the sense that while the republican intellectuals saw the conservative characteristic of Islam which had a full existence in the Ottoman social and political structure as the main reason for the backwardness of the country, NSP saw the reason for the decline of the Empire as to be the adoption of the Western civilisation in lieu of the Islamic civilisation. The NSP's "Revival of great Turkey" was going to be an industrial society which was seen as the only condition to become a strong society and country. However, Turkey could only realize this ideal of industrialization by going back to its own historical heritages and culture. (Toprak, 1995: 395)

As the new Islamic organizations started to enter into the Turkish political system they played their own part in further polarization of the Turkish society. The establishment of the Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectual's Hearth) in the 1970s, which had integrated the Islamists and the nationalists within its embodiment, is one of the developments along these lines. Their main aim was to create a united front within the right, which could curtail the growing socialism in the 1970s. (Toprak, 1990: 10-15) Such a united front was formed of centre right parties, Islamist groups and the military leadership against the leftist -communist groups who were considered to be the main enemies of the Republic during 1960s and 1970s. (Kramer, 2000: 64)

4. The Nationalist Action Party

Nationalist Action Party was another rightwing party, which had integrated the Islamist and Nationalistic aspirations under its umbrella. The party was a successor and inheritor of the first extreme right-wing party of Turkey, *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Peasant Nation Party) that was established by General Fevzi Çakmak. At the start of its establishment the party, convened the fascist and the proto-fascist segments of the society. After Osman Bölükbaşı became the party chair, it began to advocate a more populist conservative nationalist stance

appealing to the peasants and the middle classes as its support base and adopted a corporatist, developmental-modernist ideology with a Kemalist standpoint, which would prevail until the 1960s. However, with the election of Alparslan Türkeş to the party chair in 1965, Turkist and anti-Communist elements were started to be used under the party rhetoric. This Turkism basically entailed the convergence of Turkish nationalism with Islamic characteristics.

In the second half of the 1960s the party, had close connections with extreme right-wing organisations, which were fascists in the sense that they advocate extreme nationalism, stand in opposition to liberalism, capitalism and communism. To name some of the organizations; Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği (Turkish Nationalist Unions), Aydınlar Kulübü (Intellectuals Club), Vatansever Türk Teşkilatı (Patriotic Turkish Organisations), and Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri (Struggle Against Communism Clubs) In 1967, under the influences of these organisations the party redefined its ideology under the name of "Communitarian Nationalism" and the "Nine Lights Doctrine" combining the main tenets of nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, positivisim, ruralism, freedom and character building, development and industrialism. The new ideology used Islam as a political tool in order to mobilise the conservative-religious segments of the society in its struggle against the Marxist-Communist adversaries. This new nationalism that was invented by the NAP and its affiliated organizations namely the "Youth Hearts" was to be named as "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". It basically conceived Islam as the indispensable element of the Turkish identity. (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 25-40)

NAP's understanding of Islam is intertwined with its understanding of state-centric Turkish nationalism whereby the Turkish identity is defined by shared religion namely Islam and the shared historical heritage of Ottoman culture (Yavuz,

2002: 6). During the 1970s, Party turned into a pseudo-fascist party trying to instigate the Russian xenophobia in the Turkish culture as well as imposing enormous violence against the left. The ideology of the NAP basically evolved into an anti-individual, anti-intellectual, communitarian and statist model. The model completely rejected the existence of diverse sub-entities for the sake of monolithic Turkish nationalism. In line with this model, the party despises capitalism and globalism, which are believed to incite individualism against the patriarchal values. Between 1973-1980, the party declared the Soviet Union and the Turkish left and the left-leaning Alevi Community as the clear enemies of the Turkish State. Although the electoral support for the NAP was very little during this period, it had infiltrated into the state bureaucracy and the education system through its dynamic grass-roots networks. (Yavuz, 2002: 3-7)

It is necessary to note herewith that not until the 1970s that these Islamist and nationalist right wing and leftist parties, which had an anti western stance, had a solid existence within the incumbency governments. Hence, anti-system parties, which had a much critical outlook to the traditional policies of the central bureaucracy, were unable to influence the policy-making in the prior period. While on the other hand, starting from the 1970s with the formation of coalition governments where the parties such as, NAP and the NSP had strongholds in the coalitions that were established, the voices of the periphery began to be critical in the policymaking.

With the re-establishment of the civilian Government in 1961, JP emerged as one of the leading parties, replacing the place that was vacated by the disbanded DP. In reaction to the unilateral majority of the Menderes Period, the Military changed the electoral system to a proportional representation, which was going to be the main reason for the formation of diverse minority parties. (Rustow, 1989: 102) In the

general elections of 1961 as none of the parties had the parliamentary majority; RPP formed 3 coalitions under the leadership of İnönü, which was to last until the next election in 1965. In this next general election, which was held on October 1965, JP, as it gained the overall majority of votes, established a government that would provide a kind of stability within the country for 6 years (Hale, 1981: 117). For Demirel, it was mainly successful years both in economic terms and political terms. There was a swift economic growth propping up with a surge in the foreign currencies of the Turkish workers abroad combined with a double effect of an increase in Tourism revenues. Both of these developments had alleviated the importance of foreign aid on Turkey's economic growth. (Keyder, 1999: 250-260) In political terms the relations with the USSR were highly improved and negotiations with the EEC were intensified for further integration. Demirel government confirmed its strength in the general election of 1969 whereby it increased its parliamentary majority to 256 out of 450.

In the following general election, which was held in 1969, JP again won the parliamentary majority but right after the election, the party split apart as a result of the desertions from the party, which had been a severe blow to party's majority control over the parliament. The desertion was led by the conservative faction within the party, which was constituted of 46 deputies that used to have controlled the party machinery. Accompanied with the political terrorism that flared in the universities and among the labour unions, the political stability of the country deteriorated which in the event led to the declaration of *Coup by Memorandum* by the military. (Tachau, 1980: 639-658)

1970s is the period when polarisation of the country reached its climax where anti-western discourse was much more assertively declared by the society at large

affecting and being affected by the ideology discourses of the political parties in the parliament. As the radical voices had the opportunity to be heard in the government through the representation particularly of the radical minority parties and to a certain extent by the centre right and centre left parties in the government coalitions, the anti-western rhetoric consolidated in the unfavorable policy choices concerning Turkey's relations with the EEC.

CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARDS THE FREEZING OF RELATIONS IN 1978

This chapter focuses upon two periods namely the “Period of Interim Governments” and the “Period of Coalitionary Governments”. The former period was characterized by much more of a stable environment due to the rule of Supra-Party Governments that were tied to the Military commanders in decision making whom were the advocators of the fundamental tenets of the Republican ideology, and in this respect it was more of a quasi military rule. Whereas the latter period of the Coalition Governments, which shall be the case study of the thesis, was characterized by extreme levels of political instability due to the increasing political polarization paralleled by political violence and terrorism and also due to the inability of the coalition partners to reach upon a consensus in any political, economic and social issues of the country as a result of the deep ideological cleavages between them. The period after the general election of 1973 is important in the sense that first time in the Republican history the minority parties which were the advocators of the nationalist and islamist worldviews defining themselves in opposition to the westernization policy of the Republic, had the chance to partipate in different coalition governments that ruled until the Second Military Coup in 1980. In this respect, first time in the Turkish political life, the voices of the periphery would be critical in the formation of a certain policy choice concerning Turkey’s westernization policy.

This subchapter will focus upon the discourse analysis of the speeches that were given by the decision-makers in the Turkish National Assembly, and in the books and pamphlets written by the decision-makers themselves in representative of their perceptions concerning the EEC. It is aimed that in this way, the basic arguments underlying the unfavorable policy decisions that were taken by most of the politicians during the period could be detected. The analysis of the speeches shall be located in a related spatio-temporal context as framed by the developments both in the domestic political economy and foreign politics. In this respect, the conjunctural factors were aimed to be detected and analyzed to the extent that they were critical in exacerbating the anti-western sentiments at the state and the society level. This chapter aims to illuminate through the discourse analysis of the policymakers of the time to what extent these new ideology formations within the society and in the parliament, which commonly held an anti-western stance, were influential in the unfavorable policy choices that were adopted by the policy makers concerning the EEC.

A. The Military Intervention of 12 March 1971

In the beginning of the 1970, Demirel's power was begun to shake as a result of two important factors. Firstly, within the party, personal rivalries came about and eventually it led to the formation of a Democrat Party under the leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyli. Together with another oppositionary group within the party they had the potential to endanger the majority of the governing party within the parliament. Secondly, Demirel's leadership of right-wing of Turkish politics was challenged by neo-Islamic National Order Party led by Necmettin Erbakan and the fascist Nationalist Action Party under Alparslan Türkeş. (Hale, 1981: 118-119; Zürcher, 1993, 374)

On the other hand, Turkish Worker's Party, which had competed for electoral support in the general elections of 1965 and 1969, was divided into rival factions. In the general election of 1965, national remainder system had allowed the Worker's Party to gain 14 parliamentary seats. However, the government in order to get rid of the party amended the law. There began a conviction on part of the left wing groups that the parliamentary road was completely closed to them as expressed by the leader of the party, Mehmet Ali Aybar that in the case that the law was amended the unrest in the country would rise to another level. One group saw that the only way for the leftist groups to come to power was through a military coup in alliance with the radical military officers, which, they named as the National Democratic Revolution. Whereas one extremist guerrilla group, strident advocates of Maoism, believed that the solution was in urban guerilla strategy. (Ahmad, 1993: 146)

It was almost for certain that the terrorism that was to characterize the whole period of the 1970s was initiated by this extremist guerilla movement in the late 1960s. Especially during the visit of the United States 6th Squadron of Army to Turkey there had been severe clashes with the police force and the military. However by the end of 1968, through the 1970s it was responded with much harsher violence by the young military squads of the Nationalist Action Party and other extreme right wing groups. (Zurcher, 2000: 375) At the very same time, the JP government as part of their political precautions to destroy the leftist existence both in the government and the society, decided to abolish the political unionism led by the DISK in favor of the pro-government Türk-iş. In response, the workers initiated a vast demonstration on the 15th and the 16th of June 1970 in Istanbul, which had eventually led to the formation of Nationalist Workers Syndical Confederation on the 24th of June 1970. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 40)

Turkey entered into 1971 with vehement scenes of turbulence. Similar to the Latin American urban guerilla movements, the university students robbed banks, kidnapped US officers and bureaucrats and attacked the American targets. Also, the fascist militants launched a campaign of murders, and bombings, which mostly targeted the homes of the university professors. Universities were time to time under occupation of these polarized groups and factories were on a consistent strike. Also, Islamist movement became much more aggressive with the open declaration of the leadership of the Nationalist Order Party's rejection of Atatürk and Kemalism. On the other hand, due to the resignations within the government, JP had lost the parliamentary majority and there was a serious expectation on the part of the politicians of a military intervention.

Eventually, on the 12th of March, 1971 Chief of the General Staff Tağmaç together with the chiefs of the three other Forces; Gürler, Eyicioğlu and Batur submitted a memorandum to the prime minister, Demirel which had carried the implications of some kind of an ultimatum demanding the formation of a "strong and credible government" that would end all the anarchy in the country and carry out the reforms as envisaged in the constitution in accordance with the Atatürk Principles. In the case that such demands were not fulfilled, Army would use its constitutional right to seize the governmental power. (Zurcher, 2000: 375) Accordingly, Demirel was forced to resign. As he resigned all the revolutionary officers within the Armed Forces were discharged and subsequently 5 generals and 8 colonels were forced to retire. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 40-41) David Barchard argues that with the military intervention of 1971 the hierarchical and nationalist values of the military asserted themselves. As all the attempts to make a leftist military coup were warded off, the

conservative nature of the military was revealed as the basic tenet of the military. (Barchard, 1985: 15-20)

The Military Coup mainly targeted the leftist groups in the society. In the aim to fight against "Communism" the coup leaders violating all due legal procedures, imprisoned the members of the Turkish Workers Party, the Confederation of Revolutionary workers and all the youth organizations. The new constitution imposed many restrictions on individual liberties and it provided the Arms Force with the power and the duty to oversee the governing of the country through the National Security Council. It should be noted herewith that controversially despite the strong state control, at the very same time the populist nationalism and religious revivalism reached its zenith via different tarikats and sufi orders. They had mainly two functions firstly they turned into a solidarity club for the disadvantaged people faced with the problems of modernization. Secondly, in a period of Cold war where Turkey was fighting against the "red belt" of Communism the religious project was further reinforced with the integration of nationalism and religion, which would also be the main tenet of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the Nationalist Action Party. Such an ideology had appeals from the low and middle class people (Ergil, 2000: 49)

B. The Period of the Non-Party Governments: March 1971- January 1974

From 26th of March 1971 to 25th of January 1974, Turkey was governed by supra-party governments, which were completely tied to the Military Chiefs in decision-making. This was due to the fact that in the aftermath of the "Coups by Memorandum" the military had a direct access to the political authority through an institutional change which had authorized the National Security Council with the competence to "advise" the Council of Minister". (Heper, 1985: 96)

The first supra-party government was formed by Nihat Erim and it was mainly ministered by the leading technocrats. The government program aimed at subsequent social and economic reforms based upon Import Substitution Industry (ISI) which were comprised of land and tax reforms, agricultural taxation, nationalization of the mine industry, and the protection of the Turkish Industry whereby Turkish companies were guaranteed at least 51% ownership of the joint ventures that would be established in partnership with Foreign companies. However, the reforms were intermittently precluded by terrorist activities, which were to be followed by the Declaration of Martial Law on the 27th of April 1971.

In the free atmosphere provided by the supra-party government of the period, Military started an operation to brush away the entire leftist and the revolutionary liberals in the country. In along with these developments the two parties namely; Turkish Worker's Party and the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan were closed. Closing of the National Salvation Party were used by the Military as a manifestation of the impartiality of the anti-terrorist operation launched by the Military (Zurcher, 2000: 377) In the meanwhile, Nihat Erim Cabinet submitted a bill draft in order to make an amendment within the constitution, which was passed by the Parliament with majority votes of the right wing parties within the government. The new law basically aims to restrict fundamental freedoms within the constitution by ending the autonomy of the universities, the radio and television as well as by restricting freedom of the Press, and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Cabinet was reformed as of December upon the resignation of 11 Cabinet members and eventually resigned from the government when the Parliamentary refused to authorize it with extraordinary powers in April 1972. (Rustow, 1987: 106)

On the 22nd of May 1972 Ferit Melen of the Reliance Party formed the third supra party Government, which lasted until April 1973. Melen had established close affinity with Demirel and the Justice Party. During this period martial law was declared in 11 of the Turkish cities and many left wing and revolutionary liberals were arrested by the Military. In the meanwhile, RPP was going through major structural changes. While General-Secretary of the Party, Bülent Ecevit had strongly attacked the *Coup by Memorandum* and the supra-party governments that were established thereafter, İnönü had given significant support to the Military intervention and the quasi-military rule. Ecevit's democratic attitude was finally appreciated by the Party members and the delegates in the General Meeting of the Party that was convened in May 1972. As Ecevit replaced the chairmanship that had been vacated with the resignation of İnönü in May 1972, very important support for the military's hold in the government had been removed. This prepared the ground for the free election that was to be held on October 1973. (Hale, 1981: 118-119) The fourth supra-party government was formed under the leadership of Naim Talu in order to supervise the election of 1973.

In the parliamentary election that was held on the 14th of October 1973, there were eight parties competing for electoral support. Assessing the ideological orientations of the parties, two parties were on the extreme ends of the political spectrum namely, the national socialist National Action Party on the right end and the Unity Party on the left end. In between were the Justice Party, a right center group, Democrat Party constituted by the conservative faction of the former JP, the RPP as the "left of the centre", the centre party of Republican Reliance Party and the Nation Party under the leadership of Osman Bölükbaşı. NSP was competing for the first time in the general elections as the last party advocating the establishment of

traditional Islamic society on the basis of social and economic justice. None of the parties had the governing majority. On the left RPP was the only major party, which had the ground to compete for the parliamentary election as the Turkish Worker's Party was closed never to be represented in the parliament. Due to the new social democratic discourse of the party and to the charismatic leadership of Ecevit it emerged as the largest party. Especially the new ideology was formed in the aim to change image as the representatives of the central bureaucratic elites and the traditional landed interests. It had succeeded in pushing JP as the second party with third of the popular votes and %41 of the parliamentary votes (185 seats vs. 149 seats). After the victory in the 1973 elections, RPP for the first time in twenty years, had the opportunity to establish a government as the major party, which would inevitably led the party to be dependent upon political power throughout the 1970s as the leading party in the government. (Turan, 1995: 465)

The Unity Party of Turkey (TUP) which was the only party to the left of the RPP gained 1,1% of the parliamentary votes and represented with only one seat in the National Assembly. On the right JP was the major party accompanied by the smaller parties namely; Democrat Party, which was the splinter group of the JP, National Salvation Party, Nationalist Action Party and the Republican Reliance Party. JP had won the %30 of the votes against the votes of the Democrat Party and The National Salvation Party each of which won under the % 12 of the votes. (Özbudun, 1988; 21). Still the election had been a catastrophic defeat for the Justice Party. Party's votes had declined approximately 16% as from the previous election that was held in 1969. This was mainly caused by the increase of fragmentation as a result of the electoral system and due to the existence of alternative right-wing

minority parties, which had challenged JP by competing for similar electoral base. (Sayarı, 1980: 624)

NSP, which had appeals mostly from the Sunnite elements in different parts of the country, had stressed the fundamentalist Islamist issues. It placed 48 deputies in the parliament. Nationalist Action Party (NAP) obtained solely % 3, 4 of the votes and 3 of the parliamentary seats. The Party although insignificant at the time was to grow into an important political force as a result of its strictly disciplined, hierarchically organized and militant party organization. The Party was the ardent defender of nationalism (which can also be termed as racism), anticommunism, and interventionist economic policies. (Ergüder, 1988: 121) The results of the parliamentary election heralded that the "predominant" party system in Turkey had come to an end as non of the political parties had received the majority of votes and moderate pluralism emerged as the party system. It opened a new period of coalitionary governments due to the fact that after the 1973 election neither RPP nor JP was able to control the absolute majority in the parliament. (Sayarı, 1980: 626) Considering the amount of the votes that were won by the minority parties such as NAP and the NSP, after the 1973 election the political system inevitably forced the necessity of establishing coalitionary governments. In order to enforce their visibility and their different identities and ideologies, the two parties acted as if they were oppositionary parties even during the incumbency periods when they were in the government as partners to the coalition. (Turan, 1995: 464)

C. The Period of the Coalition Governments 1974-1979

1. Coalition Government of RPP and NSP:

January 1974- September 1974

The first coalition government was established as of January 1974 under the premiership of Ecevit between Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. Due to deep ideological cleavages, this coalition was based upon tenuous grounds and was doomed to collapse. It was mainly formed out of the xenophobia and insecurity that was felt against the European countries and the United States as well as against the large capitalist owners (Hale, 2000: 380) The party program of the coalition government declares that;

"Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki gelişmeler ve petrol sorununun ortaya çıkardığı gerçekler, Türkiye'nin dış iktisadi ilişkiler politikasının ve dış ödemeler dengesine ilişkin kararlarının ciddi ve köklü bir biçimde gözden geçirilmesi gereğini açıkça göstermiştir. Bu açıdan bakılınca dış ekonomik ve ticari ilişkilerimizi çok unsurlu denge kavramına uygun biçimde yöneltme gereği vardır.

Bu nedenle ihracatımızın değişik pazarlara yöneltilmesi ilkesinden hareket edilerek, Ortadoğu, Afrika ve Asya ülkeleri ile karşılıklı ticari ve iktisadi ilişkilerin geliştirilmesine önem verilecektir. Öte yandan AET ile ilişkilerin esas anlaşmalar doğrultusunda yürütülmesine devam edilmekle birlikte geçiş dönemi koşullarını düzenleyen protokoller yeniden ele alınacak....Türkiye'ye en uygun şartların tanınması için gerekenler yapılacaktır. (CHP ve MSP sıralarından alıntılar)"¹⁴

In the section for the Foreign Policy;

"Dış politikada amacımız, Atatürk'ün kurduğu temeller üzerinde barışçı, Devletler hukuku kurallarına saygılı, Türkiye'nin bağımsızlığını gözetten bir politika izlemektir.

Bütün ülkelerle dostluk ilişkileri sürdürmek azminde olan hükümetimiz, özellikle müttefiklerimizle, komşu ülkelerle ve aramızda tarihsel, geleneksel ve manevi bağlar bulunan ülkelerle iyi ilişkilerin geliştirilmesine büyük önem vermektedir.

Türk milleti ulusların özgürlüğü ve sömürgeciliğin tasfiyesi hareketine öncülük etmiş bir millet olarak, bağımsızlığına yeni kavuşmuş veya kavuşma çabasında olan ülkelere özel bir yakanlık duymaktadır.

„15

¹⁴ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:4, T:1, C:1, 1.2. 1974 pg.358

¹⁵ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:4, T:1, C:1, 1.2. 1974 pg.363

As can be understood by the party program of the government, there was an intention by the government to search for other alternative economic integrations with the Middle Eastern, African and the Asian countries on the basis of the principle of Multi-dimensional balance. The insecurity of the government concerning the relations with the EEC as a result of the developments occurring in the international arena might have led to the first crystallization of the policy of the Turkish governments to search for an independent path from the west. Also, the integration with the EEC was not considered under the section of the foreign policy but under the section of the economic issues as different from the prior government programs (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 181) In this respect, the program was the eventual consequence of the compromise by the two parties, RPP and NSP, one of which specifically the NSP, declared its criticisms against the EEC as an institution of political integration as one of the fundamental tenets of the party ideology since the very beginning of the party's establishment;

“Ortak Pazar nedir? Ortak Pazar; Almanya, İtalya, Fransa, Hollanda, Belçika, Lüksemburg devletleri arasında...Roma anlaşması ile aralarında kurdukları ekonomik, kültürel, sosyal ve siyasi bir ortaklıktır...Ortak Pazar, İkinci Dünya Harbinden sonra yıkılan Avrupa'nın yeniden dünya hakimiyeti kurma projesidir. İş-aksiyon, halkının ekseriyeti Katolik olan altı Avrupa memleketi arasında kurulmuştur.

Ortak Pazar asırlar boyu sömürgeci olmuş emperyalist Batı Avrupa memleketlerinin çağımızın şartlarına uygun olarak yeni bir sömürgecilik geliştirme sistemidir. Birçok Afrika memleketlerinin ve bu arada Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazara alınması isteği, bu sömürgeciliğin yeni metodlarının tatbik edilmesi içindir....Bilhassa üye devletler arzilerinin yabancıların satın almalarına açık tutmaları maddesi, Türkiye'nin birçok topraklarının art ve ileri maksatlı kapitalist dünya siyonistleri tarafından rahatça ve çok ucuz fiyatla satın alınmasını da imkan dahiline sokabilir. Bu durum, Türkiye'nin İsrail'e bir vilayet olarak hazırlanması neticesini intac edebilir. Bu bakımdan

*bir sömürge olarak faydalanmak için Batı, Türkiye'nin müşterek Pazara girmesini istemekte, dünya siyonistleri de bu girişi arkadan arkaya desteklemektedirler.*¹⁶

Again, in the same book, under the title “Türkiye Batı ile Ortak Pazara girerse Batının sömürgesi olur”, it was established that in the case of Turkey’s full integration with the EEC, it would turn into a colony of the western countries, which would be exploited for their own best national interests.

*“Bugün merkezi hükümet bir valiye nasıl hükmederse Ortak Pazar Konseyi de Türkiye’ye öyle hükmedecektir...Konsey büyük devletlerin hakimiyeti altındadır. Bugün için 200 milyonluk, yarın protestanlar da girerse 400 milyonluk bir Hıristiyan kütlenin içerisinde 35 milyonluk Türkiye, Konseyde bir üyelikle bulunacak ve sadece büyüklerin emirlerine itaat edecek....”*¹⁷

In this respect, bound by the decisions of the European Council where the decision-making was dominated by the major countries such as Germany, France and Italy whose votes had greater weight with respect to the smaller countries, Turkey would loose its national sovereignty and turn into a colony of the west.

“Ortak Pazar, Müslüman Türkiye’yi Hıristiyan Avrupa içinde eritme planıdır. Türk milletinin, hakiki manası bir kültürel ve inanç sistemi içerisinde erimek olan Ortak Pazar’a girmesi mümkün değildir. Türkiye’nin tarihi, sosyal, kültürel yapısı ve inanç sistemi manidir. Bu müslüman milletin, bir hıristiyan topluluğu içerisinde erimesine imkan verilemez...Türk milleti ancak kendi inançlarıyla bağdaşan memleketlerde Ortak Pazar kurma yoluna gidebilir...

Burada çok önemli bir noktaya işaret etmek isterim. Bugün Türkiye’de bir zümre Ortak Pazara girilmesini arzu etmektedir. Bazı kimseler de Ortak Pazarın siyasi ve sosyal cephesini hiç düşünmediği için bunu gafilane bir şekilde müdafaa etmektedirler. Müşterek Pazara girilmesini militan birşekilde müdafaa edenler, dikkat edilirse, laikliği dinsizlik veya dine karşı lakaydı şeklinde tefsir edenler ve batılılaşmayı, batının maddi medeniyet ve tekniğinin çok ilerisinde, Batı Hıristiyan dünyasının inanç ve kültürel sistemini benimsemek şeklinde anlayanlar, İslamiyeti gelişmemizin engeli

¹⁶ cited from Necmettin Erbakan (1975, 235-238).

¹⁷ As cited from Necmettin Erbakan (1975, 240-241)

*telakki eden ve fakat bu fikir ve kanaatlerini açıkça ifadeden çekinen kozmopolit zümreler, Türkiye'nin biran evvel Ortak Pazara girmesini, bu gayelerin gerçekleşmesi yolunda hararetle savunmaktadırlar. Bu zümrelere mensup bazı kimseler, vaktiyle bazı konferanslarında "Ortak Pazara girme Türk sanayiini batırabilir, iktisadi bakımdan zararlı olabilir" şeklinde yöneltilen soruya, şöyle cevap vermişlerdir :< Arkadaş şimdi sanayi ile uğraşacak vaktimiz yok, Türkiye'nin Tanzimattan beri batılılaşmak yönünde ede ettiği en müsait fırsatı kaçıramayız> demişlerdir. Bu sözler, Türkiye'yi biran evvel Ortak Pazara sokmak isteyenlerin asıl düşüncelerinin ne olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Kaldı ki, aşağıda sırası geldiğinde belirtileceği gibi, Ortak Pazar Türkiye'yi iktisadi yönden toplam olarak fayda değil, büyük zararlar getirecek bir teşekküldür."*¹⁸

Erbakan, by basing upon the traditional sentiments of the Turkish society the majority of which was constituted by pious islamic people, points out to the dangers posed to social, cultural and belief-systems of an islamic Turkey by integrating with a western institution the members of which were constituted by the catholic countries.

Furthermore, by drawing the attention to the basic disagreements between western and anti-western segments of society, he reveals the main discrepancy between the modernization and westernization project of the Republican Turkey. As Erbakan establishes, the pro-EEC segments of the society saw the membership as the culmination of the westernization project that was being pursued since Tanzimat Charter, and by interpreting secularism as irreligiosity on the basis that Islam is the main impediment for Turkey's westernization and modernization mission, they envisage (as Erbakan evaluates) complete assimilation of the cultural and belief systems of the western countries to that of the Turkish society. Whereas, according to Erbakan Turkish society was historically different from the Western societies in terms of belief system and cultural aspects. He further establishes that even an

¹⁸ Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş İstanbul, Dergah Yayınları, 1975 pgs.241-242

economic integration with the Community was unthinkable, as it would endanger the industrialization and economic development of the country.

“Türkiye için Ortak Pazara girmek, iktisadi, siyasi, ideolojik ve inanç yönünden önemlidir....Bu hususta Devlete ait yegane neşriyat, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının neşriyatıdır. Bu neşriyatta, hepsi girmenin aleyhindedir, “derhal girilmenin” leyhinde Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı neşriyatı içerisinde bir tek numune gösterilemez.”¹⁹

The above-mentioned speech was crucial in the sense of pointing out to one basic criticism against the SPO brought by the pro-western segments of the society particularly by the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as holding an anti-western stance due to being infiltrated by two different factions of bureaucrats one holding a radical Islamist and the other a leftist line. These accusations were made in the other literatures such as Mehmed Ali Birand (1985), Rıdvan Karluk (1985) and in the other researches made by Tekeli and İlkin (1993). According to İlkin and Tekeli, since the initial establishment of the SPO, there were two ideological factions or two different ideological orientations within the SPO. The first faction was the secular faction, which saw the industrialization of the country as the necessary condition for Turkey’s development. This very same faction was also sensitive towards the socialist criticisms that were voiced by the intelligentsia against the EEC. The latter faction was constituted by the people with an Islamic ideological orientation as they were called the “mukaddesatçı” cadres. They were for the national industrialization of the country in accordance with the traditional ISI policies and they were completely against any integration with the EEC. These two ideologically different factions were able to easily compromise on any specific issues that would delay Turkey’s relations with the EEC.

¹⁹ as cited from Necmettin Erbakan (1975, 246)

Given as an anecdote to illustrate the view, İlkin and Tekeli (1993) establishes that, the report on the Common Market, which was prepared by the Ministry of the Industry as of May 1976, signed underneath by the Minister of the NSP, Abdülkerim Doğru was advocating the views that were already established by the report of the SPO which was prepared during the coalitionary government of the RPP and NSP. Accordingly it was opposing any kind of foreign financial flows to the country on the basis that it was against the national interests of the country; (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 60, 196)

The similar view that was put forth by the following speeches given by Gian Paola Papa, whom was the representative of the EEC in the platform for the relations between Turkey and the EEC between 1974-1979, confirms the existing literature on the matter;

*"I could confirm that Personnel of the Planning Organization...were firmly against the Common Market...Seen as a kind of capitalist block who could harm the possibility of Turkey's developing in a certain as a regional power with a special relation with other countries...Getting too near to the Common Market was not initiated..."*²⁰

The ratification of the anti-western stance of SPO by Erbakan, as one of the leaders of the radical islamist movement in this respect validates the existing literature on the matter.

In brief, by defining the EEC as a union of Catholic religion, Erbakan believes that the institution in the aim to actualize the ideals of its own ideology had the purpose to violate the national sovereignty rights of each country that becomes a member. The integration of Turkey with the Community the majority of which would be dominated by the Christian countries, -those, which had already revealed

²⁰ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview which was made by the author with Gian Paolo Papa in May, 2003.

their Christian ideals in their approach towards the Cyprus issue reminiscent of the ideals of the First Christian Warriors- would destroy the Great history and the Islamic Identity of Turkey²¹. According to Erbakan, such an intention was the violation of the National Will, and accordingly he completely rejected integration with the Community in the belief that it would eradicate the Turkish Identity and history. At this point, he repeats his alternative integration project with the Muslim World as he perceived to be beneficial for Turkey's industrialization mission.

In fact, the following speeches that was given by the parliamentary members of the NSP during the declaration of the government program is illustrative in the sense of demonstrating that the party, politically did not give any concession in his line concerning the EEC.

"Milli Selamet Partisi olarak Ortak Pazar hakkındaki görüşlerimiz bellidir ve açıktır. Bu görüşlerimizde bir değişiklik mevzu bahis değildir.....(MSP sıralarından bravo sesleri alkışlar.)

...biz de Ortak Pazar konusunda bazı fedakarlıklarda bulunuyoruz. Yalnız, bu tavizler ve fedakarlıklar neden ibarettir, onu açıklamakta fayda ve zaruret vardır.

Ortak Pazar konusunda, muhterem Genel Başkanımızın bundan önce yaptığı açıklamalardaki endişe verici hususların hepsinin, bu münasebetle, iyi sevk ve idare edilmezse bütün şiddetiyle varit olabileceğini yine büyük bir ehemmiyetle belirtmeye mecburuz...

Milli Selamet Partisi olarak biz, Avrupa ile tek bir devlet olmayı asla kabul etmeyiz. Bunun milletimizin hükümlerine haklarına veya Anayasamızın amir hükümlerine aykırı olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Tarihi ve milli yapımız da esasen buna izin vermez. Yabancıların istediği yeri satınalmalarına, istedikleri yerlere yerleşmelerine müsaade edilmesine taraftar değiliz....Ara yerde imzalanan Katma Protokollerin ise, ekonomik yönden milli menfaatlerimize aykırı, kalkınmamızı ve sanayileşmemize engel yönlerinin bulunduğu da kaniyiz.

²¹ The interpretation was made on the basis of the interpellation that was filed by Erbakan in the year 1970 as given in the thesis on page. 82

Bu meselelerde, milli menfaatlerimizi son derece titizlikle gözetecek olan yeni Hükümetin memleketimiz aleyhine olan bu maddeleri değiştirme karar ve azmini işte bu sebepten dolayı büyük bir memnuniyetle karşılıyoruz."²²

In the same line with the argument set above, speeches given by the Presidency of the NSP in the Milliyet Newspaper, reflects the anti-western and anti-EEC perspectives of the party and its resolution to prevent any integration with the Community while they were in office.

*"MSP, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun nihai hedefi olan Avrupa ile tek bir devlet olmayı asla kabul edemez. Yeni hükümetimiz, Ortak Pazar hakkındaki genel tutumunda AET'nin bir ticari anlaşma şeklinde devamına çalışacak, Türkiye'nin Avrupa'yla tek devlet olma yönüne mani olmaya büyük dikkat atfedecektir. Ortak Pazarın siyasi yönünün tahakkukuna mutlaka mani olacaktır. Görüşlerimizde herhangi bir değişiklik yoktur ve sözkonusu değildir."*²³

It is noteworthy that while the RPP did not share the arguments put forth by its coalitionary partner, as shall be understood by the speeches given by the party leadership, Bülent Ecevit during a parliamentary meeting that was held on the 3rd of July, the party started to adopt a much critical outlook on the basis of the devastating effects of the provisions of the protocol on the Turkish political economy.

"...Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Komisyon Başkanı sayın Ortoli ile ...iki görüşme yaptım. Orada da, Türkiye'nin Katma Protokol'den duyduğu huzursuzluğu, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile ortaklık ilişkisi bile bulunmayan bazı Akdeniz ülkelerine son zamanlarda tanınan tavizlerden sonra, Türkiye'ye tanınmış tavizlerin, teknik deyim ile, erozyona, değer kaybına uğradığını;Akdeniz ülkelerine tanınan tavizlerin, Türkiye'ye tanınmış tavizleri bile aştığını; üstelik bunların karşılıksız tavizler olduğunu, yalnız tarım alanında değil, sanayi alanında da bazı sıkıntılarımız bulunduğunu; aramızdaki Ortaklık Konseyinin uzun zamandır toplanmadığını; Katma Protokol'ün, işçi haklarıyla, sosyal meseleleriyle ilgili 39'uncu maddesinin bir türlü uygulanmaya konmadığını anlatmaya çalışıyordum. Şunu sevinerek gördüm ki, konuştuğum bütün devlet adamları, o arada Sayın

²² Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 4.2.1974, pgs.457-458.

²³ Milliyet, 10.2.1974

Ortoli, Hükümetimizin bu konudaki görüşlerini, şikayetlerini ve isteklerini büyük bir anlayışla karşılamaktadırlar.

...Türkiye için, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun ekonomik koşullarına ayak uydurabilmek elbette daha uzun zaman istemektedir. Onun için şimdilik Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun Türkiye için önemi ikinci plandadır. Başlangıcından beri Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun siyasal önemi, Türkiye için bir bakıma daha çok ağırlık taşımıştır. Fakat bu, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu üyeleri için böyle değildi; onlar için Topluluğun ekonomik yönü ağırlık taşıyordu. Ne var ki, dünyada son zamanlarda yeralan gelişmeler, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu üyesi ülkelerin gözünde bu topluluğun siyasi anlamına büyük ağırlık kazandırmıştır....ⁿ²⁴

As can be detected from the speech, RPP still considers the integration of Turkey with the EEC both in political and economic terms as a necessary condition for Turkey's development. But it demanded for a revision in order to compensate for the devastating effects of the Protocol in the aim to adjust the Protocol to the requirements of the Turkish economy. Ecevit confirms that the resentments of the Turkish government increased as a result of the erosion of preferential treatments to Turkey, due to the extension of such treatments to the Mediterranean countries and the Less Developed Countries and also in the face of unfulfilled commitments of the EEC countries concerning the social security rights of the Turkish expatriate workers working in the Community countries. Ecevit concludes by pointing out to the political aspect of the Community, which he believed, had the ultimate aim of political integration- a new policy outlook that was adopted by the Community countries in the face of the recent political developments in the World.

In response to Ecevit's speech, Demirel, at the very same parliamentary meeting reflected the perception of its party completely rejecting the prior argument of Ecevit, which had defined the EEC as an institution with the ultimate aim of political integration transcending national boundaries. By contrast, Demirel considers

it solely as an institution of economic integration. In fact, he establishes that the sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state particularly cannot be subordinated to a supra national political organisation.

“Ortak Pazar meselesinde ben sayın Başbakan gibi düşünmüyorum, kendisinden farklı düşünüyorum. Ortak Pazar meselesi bizim için bir siyasi mesele değil, bir iktisadi meseledir. Avrupa için bir iktisadi bir mesele idi, iktisadi meselenin sonunda bir siyasi entegrasyona gidebilir mi, gidemez mi meselesiydi. Hudutları kaldırdıktan sonra, paraları birleştirdikten sonra, endüstride ahengi sağladıktan sonra ayrı ayrı devletler olmuş, ayrı ayrı milletler, hiçkimse millet olmaktan vazgeçmez, bir supranasyonel idareye hiçkimsenin Avrupa’da razı olması mümkün değildir. Bunlar birtakım Avrupa hayalcilerinin ütopyik düşünceleridir. Ama ondan evvel Ortak Pazar bizim için bir kamçıdır. 22 sene zarfında çağdaş uygarlık seviyesi denen bu çizgiye ulaşacaksınız,bizim için kendimizi, kendi üretim seviyemizi, kendi eğitim seviyemizi, kendi enfastrüktümüzü, kendi imarımızı, kendi refahımızı Avrupa seviyesine çıkarabilmek için bir zorlamadır.

Biaenaleyh, bu hususu böyle anlamak lazımdır ve önemli meselesi de zaten budur. Yoksa Türkiye’nin Batı camiası içinde bir siyasi kaynaşmaya dahil olması meselesi değildir... ”²⁵

As can be analyzed by the above-mentioned speech, Demirel while evaluating the EEC is looking at it from much more of a nationalist stance, and praising the organization on the basis of the economic benefits that it would bring to Turkey. Whereas any possible political integration with the Community was denounced on the basis that it violates the national sovereignty rights of the country.

These two different approaches that were revealed in the speeches of Ecevit and Demirel were illustrative of the two dominant views that were adopted by the two major parties, RPP and the JP, both as a government policy and also as party politics, since the initial formation of the relations with the EEC. According to Zima Müezzinoğlu, whom was involved in the policy making process in Turkey’s relations

²⁴ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D: 4, T:1, C:6, 3.7.1974, pg.376-377

²⁵ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D: 4, T:1, C:6, 3.7.1974, pg. 413-415

with the EEC since the very beginning of its crystallization, first as the undersecretary of the SPO, then as an ambassador of Turkey in Brussels before the EEC and finally as the Minister of Finance in the coalition government led by RPP in 1978, discusses that;

“Türkiye’de öteden beri hükümetler ve siyasal partiler düzeyinde düşüncecek olursak, iki görüş hakim olmuştur. Bunlardan birisi Adalet Partisi’nin temsil ettiği görüştür. Ötekisi de CHP’nin temsil ettiği görüştür. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin temsil ettiği görüş şuydu, ki bunu o zaman Başbakan Bülent Ecevit ondan evvel ve ondan sonra oldukça yakın bulunmuş bir kimse olarak ifade edebilirim. Başbakan, AET ile ilişkilerde demokratikleşme açısından büyük yarar görüyordu. Ne kadar yaklaşırsak demokrasimizi o kadar geliştireceğimiz anlayışı içinde. Buna karşılık ekonomik ilişkilerde çok dikkatli olmak gerektiğini düşünüyordu. Türkiye ekonomisi henüz gelişme yolunda bir ekonomi olduğu için ve kalkınma planı çerçevesinde iddialı bir büyüme gelişme olduğu için bu aşamada dış rekabete ekonominin açılmasının bu gelişmeyi olumsuz yönde etkileyeceğini düşünüyordu...

Buna karşılık Süleyman Bey’in ve onun partisinin temsil ettiği görüş dış rekabete gerekirse razı olmak fakat mümkün olduğu kadar dış kaynak sağlamak. Yani iktisadi bakımdan daha açık buna karşılık onlar Anayasada yapılan değişiklikleri mesela 1960’dan sonra fazla yapılmış olarak görüyorlardı ve Anayasa’nın Türkiye’ye bol geldiğini söylüyorlardı. Siyasi alanda yani Demokratik alanda bir açılımdan çok mümkün olduğu kadar karşı taraftan ne sağlayabilirsek ekonomik kolaylık olarak onu sağlayalım. Bu iki değişik görüş sonuna kadar hep devam etmiştir, böyle.²⁶

In this respect, according to Müezzinoğlu, RPP advocates the integration with the EEC on the basis of the political developments that such integration with the EEC would bring to Turkey, which was necessary for Turkey’s democratization. However, in terms of economic considerations, the party held certain reservations due to the possible damages that integration with the developed countries of the EEC would bring to Turkey as a developing country, which is in the initial phase of its industrial development. Hence they feared that it would block its economic

²⁶ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview, which was made by the author with Ziya Müezzinoğlu in November, 2002.

development. Whereas JP advocates the integration with the EEC on the basis of the economic benefits that it would bring to Turkey such as flow of foreign financial aid and in this respect the party supports the opening of the Turkish economy if that was a necessary condition for Turkey's possible receipt of financial assistance. However, in terms of political considerations, they feared that the political developments in the form of further democratization of the political system might be detrimental to the political stability of the country.

Likewise, as established by Bilsay Kuruç, the undersecretary to the SPO in the year 1977-1978, what Ecevit advocated was the idea of "national independence/national development" both in economic and political terms which was an ideological stream that was swamping the world especially in the 1970s particularly the developing and the less developed countries.

"CHP'nin görüşü daha çok ulusal bağımsızlık görüşü bu noktada keskinleşti...70'lerde bu Ulusal Bağımsızlık öncelikle ekonomik anlama geliyor....Bu yönde bir heyecanlanma...1950'lerde zenginleşmiş özel sektörün de kendi başına varolabilmesinin ifadesi sayılabilir. Yani özel sektör, devlet başka değil de, hepsinin birlikte ifade edilmesi. Bütün bunlar özel sektör için şeydi; hiçbir maliyete katlanmaksızın alt yapısı hazır vaziyette...çiftçiye işte ürününün maliyetinin üstünde fiyatlar veriliyor filan devlet bu zararları karşılıyor, böyle bir anlayıştı. Bunlar hep ulusal kalkınma düşüncesine yakın. Populizm tarafı olan zaman zaman olan birşey, mesele bu ortamda çıktı..." ²⁷

All the speeches given in the parliament were made in the initial periods of the coalitionary government when the adverse effects of the OPEC oil crises had not hit the country yet. The workers' remittances had amounted to 1 billion dollar, the dollar reserves were approximately 2 billion and the export capacity of the country

²⁷ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview, which was made by the author with Prof. Dr. Bilsay Kuruç in April, 2002.

had reached to its highest levels in the decade. It was completely a stable economic environment (Birand, 2000, 300)

Meanwhile, there were anti-EEC outcries rising from certain segments of the society under the slogan of “Onlar ortak, biz pazar” which had the implication that in the case of Turkey’s full integration to the EEC, Turkey would be a market to be exploited by the EEC countries for their own economic interests reminiscent of the *Capitulations* of the Ottoman Period. The article that was published in the *Hürriyet* Newspaper as of 24th of October, 1974 are informative of the critical stance that was adopted by certain segments of the society; It should be noted herewith that in the article both the RPP and the SPO were specified as holding the critical stance.

9 Aralık 1968 tarihinde görüşmeleri başlayan “Katma Protokol” dönemi büyük eleştirilere yol açtı. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı’nın bazı üyeleri karşı çıktılar ve görevlerini terk ettiler. Buna rağmen, 23 Kasım 1970 tarihinde katma Protokol İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil tarafından imzalandı....Demokrat Parti zamanından beri bir grup aydın ve politikacıya göre, Türkiye 200 yıla yaklaşan bağlarından dolayı Batı dünyasının temelini attığı Ortak Pazar girişiminde mutlaka var olmalıydı. Sokak gösterilerine kadar uzanan karşı görüştekiler ise konunun yeni bir 1838 Ticaret Anlaşması niteliği taşıdığını iddia ettiler. “Onlar ortak, biz Pazar” gibi yaygınlaşan sloganlar atıldılar. Ortak Pazar konusu bugün için de tartışmaları ve eleştirileri içermektedir. CHP “Ortak Pazar içindeki yerimizin yeniden değerlendirilmesi” görüşünü savunmaktadır. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı görevlileri her geçen gün Katma Protokolün bir başka yanına karşı çıkmaktadır.”²⁸

The critical stance that was adopted both by the the coalitionary government of RPP and the NSP and also the SPO on the basis of the economic considerations were also revealed in the following words of Bilsay Kuruç while explaining his observations in a meeting attended by the government leaders, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turhan Güneş, the bureaucrats from the SPO and the MFA.

²⁸ *Hürriyet* Newspaper, 24.10.1974 as abstracted from the compilation of articles from *Hürriyet* by Ercan Kumcu and Şevket Pamuk (2001).

“...1974'te Ecevit'in başbakanlığı zamanında benim de katıldığım bir toplantı olmuştu, başbakanlıkta. Daha Kıbrıs şeyi yapılmamıştı. ..Ve genel tavır, Planlamanın tavrına yakın bir tavidir, başbakanlıkta...Yani bu handicapli olabilir ekonomik olarak. Onun için bizim birinci meselemiz ekonomik olarak gelişmedir. Avrupa buna yardımcı olabildiği ölçüde biz Avrupa'yla ilişkilerimizi götürelim. Yardımcı olmuyorsa da bunu bilelim, yaklaşımı hakim oldu, o toplantıya. Yani o toplantıdan birşey çıkmadı. Avrupa'yla duvarları keselim şeyi de çıkmadı aman Avrupa'ya biran önce girelim şeyi de çıkmadı.”²⁹

The interview which was made by Mehmed Ali Birand with the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the incumbency government, Turan Güneş is illustrative in the sense of reflecting the arguments underlying the pro and anti-EEC perceptions both within the government and bureaucracy and also within the society;

“AET konusu, belli bir siyasi ekonomik felsefeye dayanmakla birlikte, bir ülkenin kendi ekonomik sorunlarını ayrıntılarıyla bilmeye dayanır....Veri yok, doğru dürüst istatistik yok. Maliyet hesabı yok. Avrupa'daki gelişmeleri izlemek yok. Gümrük indirimlerinin getireceği zarar ne olacak, hesap edebilen yok. Yani AET'nin bize getirip götürebileceklerini sağlam ve inandırıcı verilerle ortaya koyan yok...

Beş yıllık kalkınma planlarında AET dikkate alınmamış. Ama ikiye ayrılmış. Tek ortak nokta da Anayasa'ya aykırı lafi. Bir bölümü biz getirdik ve Batı'yla ilişki kurduk diyor ve Katma Protokol'ün kılına dokundurmuyor. Öteki bölüm de bunu Türkiye'nin kapitülasyonu ve idamı olarak görüyor. Saatlerce anayasaya aykırılığı, bağımsızlığımızın elden gittiği söyleniyor...İşadamları da başlamışlar, “Yandık battık” diye bağışmaya...Kimse ekonomiden yana değil sanki. Oysa ben ülkemin çıkarına bakarım...Dünyayla ilişkisi kopuk, tamamen çağdışı ve içe kapanık yaşayamayız. Bu nedenle, ben AET'ye karşı değilim. Ancak, Katma Protokol'ün bugünkü haliyle de benim istediğim....açılmayı gerçekleştiremeyeceğine inanıyordum. Üstelik, demokratik rejim açısından da AET'yle ilişki kurmak yararlıdır. Ancak beylere, bu ilişkinin ne olacağını ortaya çıkarttıramadık. Zaten hükümette yedi ay kaldık ve bunun 5 ayı Kıbrıs'la geçti...”³⁰

²⁹ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview, which was made by the author with Prof. Dr. Bilsay Kuruç in April, 2002.

³⁰ Interview of Mehmed Ali Brand with Turan Güneş as cited from Mehmet Ali Birand (2000).

Furthermore, Güneş points out to the lack of competency of the Turkish bureaucrats in the estimation of the advantages and disadvantages that the provisions of the Protocol might have brought to the Turkish economy. The main disagreement between the pro and anti-EEC arguments of the society was based upon the ideology differences of the two groups one holding a pro-western line and the other a nationalist. Even, the entrepreneurs whom were for integration, started to voice their resentments concerning the Additional Protocol.

The coalition began to deteriorate as a result of the inability of the two coalitionary partners on reaching a consensus concerning Turkey's policy towards the 1974 Cyprus Operation. In the aftermath of the Second Cyprus Operation that was held on the 13th of August 1974, as Turkey was faced with the disapproval and reaction of the international public opinion, Ecevit was defending a quick solution, where Turkey might give certain concessions concerning the Cyprus Issue. Such a quick resolution would increase Turkey's political reputation internationally as well as it would provide Turkey with the financial assistance that was necessary for its economic development. On the other hand, National Salvation Party was defending the Complete Occupation of Cyprus, which would inevitably strained Turkey's relations with Europe and the United States (İlkin, Tekeli, 1993: 170)

Having consolidated a great reputation among the Turkish Public as the national hero of the Cyprus Operations, and unable to resist and tolerate the populist policies of the NSP anymore in order to satisfy the demands of the religious circles, Ecevit saw this as an opportunity to gain a governing majority in an early election. Thus he dissolved the Coalition by 16th of September 1974 and resigned from the office. However, the call for an early election was rejected by all the other parties competing for political power and in the event, a transitional supra-party government

was formed under the premiership of Professor Sadi Irmak on the 17th of November 1974. The first coalitionary government that was formed after the 1973 election was unique in the sense that for the first time in the Republican history an islamist minority party had the opportunity to occupy a dominant position in the central bureaucratic institutions. (Kalaycıođlu, 1995: 481)

2. First Nationalist Front Government of JP, NSP, NAP, and RRP:

March 1975-June 1977

On the 21th of March 1975 under the premiership of Süleyman Demirel, a right wing coalitionary government namely the "First Nationalist Front Government" was formed with the participation of JP, NSP, NAP, and the Republican Reliance Party. Although the coalition was able to gain the "Vote of confidence" with a very small difference between pro and con votes (222-218), it still managed to retain an uncertain hold on power between 1975-1977. (Rustow, 1989: 106; Hale, 1981: 119)

In the declaration of the government program that was red by Süleyman Demirel, it was established that,

"AET ile aramızda ekonomik işbirliğinin milli yararlarımıza uygun birşekilde yürütülmesine çalışılacaktır.

Türkiye'nin AET'nin kendisine sağladığı imkanları iç piyasaya dönük bir sanayileşmenin ortaya çıkaracağı sakıncaları gidermek ve dışa, büyük bir tüketici kitlesine dönük ve dış rekabet gücü olan bir sanayileşmeyi geliştirme amacıyla değerlendirmesi, milli önem taşır. ...ortaklığımızın ekonomik kalkınmamıza ve sanayileşmemize en uygun şartlar içinde yürütülmesi için gereken yapılacak, bu arada topluluğun üçüncü ülkelerle kurduğu ilişkiler sebebiyle daralan avantaj marjımızın genişletilmesi yolunda gayret sarfedilecektir.

*AET üyesi ülkelerde çalışan işçilerimizin ekonomik katkılarının önemi üzerinde hassasiyetle durulacak, bu katkının daha da artırılması ve işçilerimizin sosyal güvenlik haklarının topluluk düzeyinde gerçekleştirilmesi için gerekli teşebbüslerde bulunulacaktır."*³¹

³¹ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:4, T:2, C:11, 6.4.1975, pg.322

Turkey's relations with the EEC shall be pursued in accordance with the national interests of the country, which would not deteriorate Turkey's industrialization and growth and guarantee the establishment of a Turkish industry that would be able to compete in the international market on equal terms with the EEC countries. Furthermore, the erosion of the preferential treatments as a result of the similar concessions that were given to the Less Developed Countries needed to be compensated in compromise with the EEC. Social security rights of the Turkish expatriate workers in the EEC should be guaranteed as specified in Additional Protocols.³² Government program with a specific emphasis upon the national interests of the country was illustrative of the protectionist policies that were being pursued by most of the Turkish governments as part of the tradition of Etatism. These revision requirements in the face of the erosion of Turkey's preferential treatments and the unfulfilled commitments of the EEC, concerning the Turkish expatriate workers in the EEC together with the devastating effects of the certain restrictions that were imposed on Turkey's agricultural and textile exports, were declared by all the coalition governments that were established in the aftermath of the *Coup by Memorandum*. (Çayhan, 1997; 177)

The existence of the radical nationalist and islamist right wing parties, NAP and NSP in the coalition governments had grown certain suspicions concerning the policies that would be pursued with respect to Turkey's relations with the EEC on the basis of ideological differences. As expressed by the parliamentary member of the DP from Niğde district, Mehmet Altınsoy;

"...Ortak Pazar ilişkilerimizde de, koalisyon içi tutarsızlığın mahsurları bir kaygı olarak belirtilmektedir. Programda Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile ilişkilerin milli önem taşıdığı

³² Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:4, T:2, C:11, 6.4.1975, pg. 322

belirtilmektedir. Halbuki iki ve dört numaralı koalisyon ortaklarının bu konudaki kesin ve keskin görüşleri bellidir...Milli Selamet Partisi, bu kuruluşu bir Yahudi ve Siyonist düzeni olarak ilan etmekte; ancak, bir hükümet ortaklığı söz konusu oldu mu bu beyanlarını unutmaktadır. Sanırız bu unutkanlık Sayın Türkeş'e de intikal etmiş. Biz bunun en bariz örneğini, Cumhuriyet HalkPartisi-Milli Selamet Partisi ortaklığı zamanında yaşamıştık ve artık bitti sanyorduk...İşte misal ortadadır: Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile ilişkilerimizde, ne Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Milli Selamet Partisi Ortak Hükümeti zamanında, ne de ondan sonra hiçbir ilerleme kaydedilmemiştir. Statüko bile korunamamış, gerilemeler olmuştur..."³³

The perceptions of the NSP concerning the matter was already analysed in the above-mentioned speeches and in fact the following speech given by the parliamentary member of the NSP from Manisa district, Gündüz Sevilgen reflects that the party did not give any concessions from its line for the sake of the coalition.

*"Ortak Pazarın sadece ekonomik yönü; o da menfaatlerimizi haleldar etmediği, sanayimizin inkişafına mani olmadığı müddetçe kabulümüz olabilir. Bunun dışında hiçbir yönünü, hele hele ilerde siyasi bir entegrasyona giriş hedefini, Türk milletinin benimsemesi katiyen söz konusu olamaz. Bugün için Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun büyük menfaatler sağladığını iddia etmek mümkün değildir... AET ile ilişkilerimizin son iki yıldır sıkıntılı bir dönem geçirdiğinin bir gerçek olarak kabul edilmesi ve bu hususta ciddi olarak düşünölmeye başlanılmasını, münasebetlerdeki dengesizliğin görölerek bu dengesizliğin düzeltilmeye ve giderilmeye çalışılmasını müspet adımlar olarak mütalaa ediyor ve fakat kafi görmüyoruz."*³⁴

The perceptions of the NAP can be analysed on the basis of the speeches that were given by the party leadership, namely Alparslan Türkeş in the "Temel Görüşler".

"Yıllar yıldır üstüste gelen felaketler, darlıklar ve sıkıntılar, çelimsiz ruhlarda yılgınlıklara sebep olmuştur. Bunun yanı sıra düşman milletlerin kültür ve ideoloji saldırıları ve manevi istilaları bizde sözde "gerçekçilik" veya "akılcılık" perdesi arkasında kendimizi hor görmek ve küçüklüğü

³³ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D: 4, T:2,C:11, 9.4.1975, pg.360

³⁴ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, D:4, T:4, C:25, 25.2.1977, pg. 340

kabullenmek, küçük düşünmeyi bir hüner saymak bataklığına yuvarlamıştır. Büyük düşünmek, millet olarak büyümeyi istemek ve yüceliğe ulaşmayı dilemek tehlikeli ve zararlı görülür olmuştur. İşte, yeni sömürgeciliğin 'neo-kolonilizm' gizli metodu budur. Sömürmek istediği, yıkmak istediği milletleri aşağılık görüşlere inandırmak, kölelik zincirine vurmaktır. Türk milliyetçileri olarak Türk milletini her çeşit kölelikten, esirlikten kurtarmak ve korumak mücadelesindeyiz.

Türk milleti için kurtuluş ve yükseliş çaresi, kendi dini inançlarıyla, milliyetçilik ülküsüne sarılmaktır....Kendi varlığıyla hızlı bir şekilde kalkınan; yabancılardan yardım beklemekten ve başkalarına sığınmaktan kurtulmuş bir Türkiye ancak büyük Türk Doktrini Dokuz Işık'la mümkün olacaktır.³⁵

"...Türkiyemiz iki yüzyıldan beri geri kalmışlığın acısını çekmekte, kalkınma çağının özlemini duymaktadır. Bu uğurda her şeye katlanmış, hatta tarihi geleneğimize aykırı düşen bir vaziyete bile girmişizdir. Öyle ki Türk milleti çöküntüyü önlemek uğruna, öncülüğünü yaptığı bir dünyayı bir dünyayı bırakmakta ve yabancı bir dünyanın takipçi, hatta taklitçisi olmakta tereddüt etmemiştir. İdarecilerimiz, siyasetçilerimiz ve münevvelerimiz kalkınmanın yegane çaresini batılılaşmada görmüşlerdir. İkiyüz yıllık bir tecrübenin sonunda elimizde kalan nedir? ...Koca bir imparatorluk elimizden çıkmış, muazzam yeraltı ve yerüstü zenginliklerimiz başka milletlerin hizmetine girmiştir. Daha kötüsü, milli benliğimizden uzaklaşmağa, manevi üstünlüklerimizi yitirmeye başladık. ...gelişmiş ülkelerle aramızdaki mesafe azalacağı yerde çoğalmıştır..."³⁶

This speech reflects the ideas of a nationalist stance that was cultivated by xenophobia towards the other countries particularly the western countries which were assaulting Turkey with their cultural and ideological indoctrinations under the disguise of "Realism" and "Rationalism". This was perceived as the secret method of the neo-colonisation policy of the western countries, which were in the aim to colonise and enslave the countries, through the indoctrination of their ideology, denounced any nationalist voices coming from those countries and made them believe that they were in an inferior status. As the advocators of Turkish nationalism,

³⁵ as cited from Aplanslan Türkes (1976, 10)

³⁶ as cited from Aplanslan Türkes (1976, 175-176)

Türkeş establishes that they were fighting for the aim to rescue and protect Turkey from slavery and colonialism. Turkey could only liberate from the slavery and accordingly rise as first among the nations, by holding tight to the national ideal with the power of its religious beliefs. Accordingly, he sets forth that Turkey's national development and its emancipation from the aid and assistance of other countries could only be realized by the Turkish Doctrine of *Nine Lights*, which combines the main tenets of nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, positivism, ruralism, freedom and character building, development and industrialism.

Furthermore, in the second paragraph, he puts forth the party's basic criticism against the westernization policy, which was being pursued by the Turkish bureaucrats for 200 years in order to emancipate the country from its underdeveloped status for the realization of its national development. However, this policy ended up in the "Fall of the Ottoman Empire", whereby all the natural resources of the country started to be exploited in the service of the western countries. The most tragic consequence of among was the loss of the Turkish national identity. In further speeches, he specifies the necessary conditions for the national development of a country;

"Bir milletin nasıl kalkanacağı öz şartlarının incelenmesi, memleket imkanlarının doğru bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi, maddi ve manevi yapısının özelliklerine uygun çarelerin araştırılması ile ortaya çıkar. Yabancıların hazırladığı reçetelerden medet ummak çok defa hastalığın artmasına, hatta Allah korusun ölüme sebebiyet verir. Türkiyemiz, iktisadi kalkınmayı sağlamak için, kapitalist sistemi uygulamaya çalışıyor. Kapitalizm, Avrupa medeniyetinin yapısına ve Avrupalı milletlerinin şartlarına göre düşünülmüş bir sistemdir. O Avrupa ki, bize benzemeyen ölçüleri bizim ölçülerimize uymayan, değerlerimize aykırı yabancı bir dünyadır. O Avrupa ki, içtimai geleneği sınıf düşmalıklarına dayanır....O Avrupa ki zenginliğinin büyük payını, başkalarını insafsızca sömürmesine borçludur. Biz sömürülmemizi kolaylaştırmak için telkin edilen bir sistemle nasıl kalkanabiliriz? İşte bu yüzden, sadece fertlerimizi değil, milletimizi de fakirliğe mahkum etmek isteyen kapitalizmi red ediyoruz.

.....Kalkınmanın manevi temellerine de dokunmak isterim. Kalkınmanın manevi temelleri milliyetçilik, iman ve ahlaklıdır. ..Türklük gurur ve şuuru ile İslam ahlak ve fazileti, milletimizi meydana getiren manevi unsurların tam bir ahenk içinde birleşmesidir. Maddi kalkınmamız ancak böyle bir yüce temel üzerinde yükselirse bir mana taşır, değer kazanır. Milliyetsiz bir yükselmenin, ahlaksız bir kalkınmanın hem imkanı yoktur...

Türk milleti, Müslüman olmakla içtimai nizamın ve dini hayatın en yüce değerlerini kazanmış, ve Müslümanlık, Türk Milleti ile, emsalsiz yiğitlik ve iman aşkına sahip bir mücahit bulmuştur. Milliyetçiliği reddeden bir dincilik anlayışı ve İslamiyete düşman bir milliyetçilik anlayışı bize yabancıdır, bizim dışımızdadır. Millet olarak yaşamak istiyorsak, Müslümanlığımızı da Türklüğümüzü de korumak istiyorsak, birbirimizi sevmek, aslında hiçbir manası olmayan uydurma ayrılıklar peşinde çekişmemek, münafıkların sözüne kanmamak zorundayız.”³⁷

According to Türkeş, the way for the national development of any country could only be determined on the basis of the material and spiritual structures and conditions that were specific to that country. Turkish policy makers for the purpose of economic development had adopted the Capitalist economic system, which had been imposed from the western countries under the disguise of a recipe for economic development, for the ultimate aim of exploiting and colonialising Turkey. In this respect, Türkeş completely rejects capitalism, as one of the policy instruments of the western countries that was being utilized for the realization of their ideal of colonisation and exploitation. Furthermore, Türkeş specifies the spiritual fundamentals of development, namely nationalism, piety, and moralism where he emphasizes the importance of the Islam religion and Turkish Nationalism as the inseparable parts of the Turkish national identity.

“Ortak Pazara girişimiz sanayileşmemiz açısından ciddi bir engel teşkil edecektir...Sanayileşmeye çalışan memleketimizin ileri birer sanayi memleketi olan Ortak Pazar devletleriyle rekabet etmesi mümkün değildir.

³⁷ as cited from Aylarslan Türkeş (1976, 178-180)

Yabancıların ülkenin istediği yerinde istediği ölçüde arazi ve imkan edinmelerine fırsat vererek Sevr anlaşmasının dolaylı uygulanmasına sebep olacağı, kültürel ve sosyal deformasyona yol açacağı ve milli sanayinin gelişmesini engelleyeceği için ortak pazarın açıkça ve kesinlikle karşısındayız.

...Üçüncü Dünya ülkeleri, özellikle Ortadoğu ve Afrika'nın müslüman ülkeleri ile ve Kıta Çin'iyle ticari ilişkileri geliştirmenin büyük yararlar sağlanacağına inanıyoruz.”³⁸

In the final speech, Türkeş specifies the adverse effects of Turkey's integration with the EEC on Turkey's industrialization mission where the infant industry would not be able to compete with the industries of the Common Market. Accordingly, he declares its anti-EEC stance on the grounds that not only it would lead to the occupation of the Turkish territory by the western countries as an indirect application of the Sevr Agreement but it would also pave the way for social and cultural degeneration. Furthermore, it would prevent the development of the Turkish national industry. Instead, he proposed to intensify Turkey's relations with the Muslim Countries of the Middle East and the Africa as well as China.

Complementing the views expressed by Türkeş in representative of the basic perceptions of the NAP, the below-mentioned article written in the Hergün News paper further reflects the nationalist rightwing stance in line with the NAP.

“150 yıllık Batılılaşma ideolojisi ve siyaseti nasıl Osmanlı toplumunu bir ‘yarı-sömürge’ haline getirmişse, Cumhuriyet dönemindeki Batıcılık siyaseti de kalkınmamızı geciktirmiş, kapitalist metodlar ekonomik yapımızı çarpıklaştırmıştır. Ortak Pazarla olan münasebetlerimizin statüsü de bugün bizi bir dar boğaza sürüklemiştir.”³⁹

In summary, the speeches gave the basic reasoning that underlines the nationalist right wing stance concerning the EEC. Firstly, the integration with the Community was perceived as the extension of the westernization policy of the

³⁸ as cited from Alparslan Türkeş (1976 , 215)

³⁹ Taha Akyol, “AET ve Türkiye”, Hergün, 22.10.1976 as cited from Esra Çayhan (1997).

Ottoman Empire, which was declared to be the main factor for the decline of the Empire. In the same line, the westernization policy of the Republican elite was criticized on the basis that such attempts for full integration were seen as the main reasons for the economic crises that Turkey found itself being an impediment for Turkey's political and economic development. As EEC aims to build a political integration transcending national boundaries, it was considered as a negation of the national sovereignty. Instead what was proposed was integration with the Islamist Middle Eastern countries for the eventual establishment of an "Islam Common Market." As can be evaluated by the speeches given, the nationalist islamist sentiments of the NAP could even be heard and felt in the perceptions that were specifically declared on the EEC issue.

In fact, in the following speech given by Demirel, one can detect the perception change of the leader who had personally initiated the negotiations for Turkey's application for associate membership.

*"Bundan 10 ay evveline nazaran, 12 ay evveline nazaran şartlar deęişmiştir. Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluęunun da şartları deęişmiştir. Aslında bu protokoller imzalandığı zaman Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluęu bir iktisadi güçtü, büyük iktisadi güçtü. Bu büyük güç Europe dolar diye, Avrupa Doları diye bir dolar yapılmasına sebep oldu, dolar ortaya çıkmasına. Europe dolar silindi petrol dolara döndü. Avrupa endüstrisinin dünyadan topladığı dolarlar, bu defa petrol parası olarak Ortadoęu memleketlerine kaydı, senede 80 milyar dolar. Ekonominin tepeleri deęiştirdi. Bir tarafta Japonya, bir tarafta Ortak Pazar büyük ekonomik güçler iken, Birleşik Amerika ve Rusya bu büyük güçleri çok büyük sıkıntıya soktular. Petrol fiyatlarının 4-5 misli birden yükseltilmesi hem Ortak Pazar memleketlerini, hem Japonya'yı bu krizin içine sokmuştur, önemli bir kriz içine 10 ile 12 sene zarfında Ortadoęu ülkelerinin Avrupa'daki bütün sanayii satın alabilecek kadar parası olacaktır, bütün sanayii...Şartlar deęişince, tabii ki ona göre Türkiye de Ortak Pazar ile olan ilişkilerinde yeni birtakım şeyler aramaya mecburdur."*⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 9.4.1975, pg.420-421

In this respect, within the current world conjecture where Oil Opec Crises had stroke the former financial centers located in Japan and the EEC countries transferring the Euro dollars from the European countries to the Middle Eastern countries as a result of the extreme increase in oil prices, he foresees that within 10-12 years the Middle Eastern countries would emerge as the main financial centers. In line with the arguments put forth by Erbakan and Türkeş, Demirel definitely not on the basis of ideological considerations but on the basis of the economic developments that occurred as a result of the Opec Oil Crises, sees the Middle Eastern countries as the prospective financial centers in the near decade. Furthermore, he establishes the need for revision of the terms of Turkey's economic relations with the EEC.

Yıldırım Keskin, as one of the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had actively worked on Turkey's relations with the EEC and personally lived through these political processes that were ongoing at the bureuratic level, while evaluating the policies of the 1st Nationalist Front Government concerning the EEC, points out to the efforts of Necmettin Erbakan to prevent the implementation of the provisions as specified in the Additional Protocols. As expressed in the following words;

"Erbakan, 1976 yılı boyunca, AT işlerini Dışişlerinden koparıp DPT'ye bağlamak gayreti içine girmişti. O sırada bir de İslam Ortak Pazarı kurmaya çalışmış ama becerememişti. AT'ye karşı olan tutumunu sertleştiriyor ve olmayacak istekler ileri sürüyordu. Erbakan, Türkiye'nin dış satımının önündeki tüm engellerin kalkmasını, Türk işçilerine AT işçileriyle aynı hakların verilmesini, yükümlülüklerimizin de yeni esaslara bağlanmasını ve daha çok hiçbir yükümlülüğümüz olmamasını istiyordu. Bunlar, AT'nin kabul edebileceği koşullar değildi. Ashında istediği, AT ile ilişkilerin tüm olarak kopmasıydı.⁴¹

⁴¹ as cited from Yıldırım Keskin (2001, 172)

Briefly, Erbakan was trying to put all kinds of obstacles in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could thwart the intensifying of relations with the EEC. In the event, he had the ultimate aim that Turkey's relations with the EEC were completely cut off.

The existence of the NSP as a coalitionary partner was also critical in the formation of government's policy choice, when Greece applied to EEC for full membership as of 12th of June 1975. As has been specified under the section analyzing the reasons for Turkey's application for associate membership in 1959,- following the Greek application in order to prevent Greek's utilization of the European platform where Turkey remains the outsider, for policy manipulation concerning the conflictual issues between Turkey and Greece,- had always been a major consideration for the policy makers in Turkey. However, when it comes to the period when Greece this time applied for full membership, Turkish government was very hesitant in following the Greek application. (İlkin and Tekeli, 1993: 240; Birand, 2000: 316; Karluk, 1996: 396-397) The Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil, in a public speech dated of 15th of June 1975 expressed the necessity of following the Greek application as uttered in the following lines;

*"Türkiye kenarda bırakılarak Yunanistan'ın Ortak Pazara alınması birçok problemler yaratır. Topluluk yönetimi, Türkiyesiz bir Yunan üyeliğini düşünmemelidir."*⁴²

According to Mehmed Ali Birand such a policy choice was not feasible for the incumbency government the two partners of which held an extremely anti-EEC stance. As for Demirel, he would not allow for the dissolution of the coalition just for the sake of an earlier application to the EEC. (Birand, 2000: 316-317) Likewise, Emile Noel whom had led the presidency of the European Commission

approximately for 30 years points out to the failure of the governments to apply for the full application in the 1970s due to the existence of the NSP as a coalition partner which prevented Turkey's application to the Community in the late 1970s under the pressures of Islamist circles;

*"Yunanistan tam üyelik talep ettiğinde, Türkiye aynı Ortaklık Anlaşması için yapmış olduğu gibi tam üyelik talebini masanın üzerine koymalıydı. Erbakan, Türkiye'nin AET'ye katılmasına hep karşı olmuştu. Ecevit'i kendinden başka bir de Erbakan frenlemiş oldu. İslamcı güçler, 70'li yılların sonunda Türkiye'ye Avrupa'nın yolunu böylece tıkamış oldular."*⁴³

The unfavorable stance that was adopted in the initial periods of the Coalitionary government concerning the EEC had also influenced the bureaucrats that were specifically working on the issue, such as the bureaucrats of the SPO, and the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Finance. As expressed by Yıldırım Keskin, as one of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom was specifically working on the relations between Turkey and the EEC during the same period; (Keskin, 2001: 172-175)

"DPT ve Ticaret Bakanlığı'nın ve bunlara katılan Maliye Bakanlığının, AT'ye tanıdığımız gümrük indirimlerinin neden olduğu ileri sürülen vergi kaybı hesapları doğru değildi. Bu hesaplar, hangi tarafa yaranacağını bilemeyen bazı zavallı bürokratların, Hükümetteki genel eğilim olumsuz olduğundan, durumu-kendi bakanlarına bile-kötü gösterip, işin içinden çıkmak için yaptıkları hesapları. Biz ise yabancı kaynaklardan aldığımız bilgilerle, tamamen ayrı rakamlara ulaşıyorduk."

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However, on the part of the EEC, it was not clear whether in the case of Turkey's application; Turkey's integration process would have gained momentum. In fact, according to the Turkish side, at the very same period in order to prevent

⁴² Cumhuriyet, 15th of June 1975 as cited from Selim İlkin and İlhan Tekeli (1993, 240).

⁴³ Nilgün Cerrahoğlu, Milliyet, 14.12.1995

⁴⁴ as cited from Yıldırım Keskin (2001, 175)

Turkey's application for full membership in pursuit of the Greek application, EEC started to make the process much more difficult for Turkey, especially by enforcing the restrictions on its agricultural exports which led to a halt in the negotiations on the agricultural goods for an interim period.⁴⁵

In fact, the government both due to its lack of competence concerning the implementation of the Protocol and also under the pressures of the anti-EEC sentiments within the society and in the parliament led by Türkeş and Erbakan, at the end of 1976, decided to freeze unilaterally its commitments as specified in the Protocol. Thus, the government announced that Turkey would postpone fulfilling its commitments for the third and fourth phase of tariff reductions to an uncertain period, which were to be put into force in 1977 and 1978 respectively. (Karluk, 1996; 395-396)

During the rule of the Nationalist Front governments, the "Cyprus Issue" was the critical factor determining Turkey's relations with the United States and the EEC. Already after *the Second Cyprus Operation*, Turkey was left alone on the international arena. It has been established by the political circles in Turkey that both the arms embargo that was imposed by the US and the existing relations with the EEC were affected by the developments concerning the Cyprus Issue and Turkey. As of 6th of March 1974 Ecevit had abrogated the rule, which had banished the hashash cultivation during the premiership of Nihat Erim under the pressure of the United States, and as a result a wide anti-Turkish campaign was launched in the US Senate. But it was when the United States imposed the arms embargo that Turkey started to pursue a more active and open foreign policy towards the issue. On the 13th of February 1975, Turkey officially declared the establishment of the Turkish

⁴⁵ Milliyet, 30th of June, 1975.

Federal State of Cyprus. It was responded with wide protests on the part of Greece and Makarios (Firat, 2001; 764) Makarios brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which had decided that the parties should start the negotiations under the supervision of the UN's General Secretary. The negotiations started between Denktaş and Klerides on the 28th of April 1975 in Vienna.

It was at the same time that Turkish economy was caught in the ravaging storm of the Opec Oil Crises that had already ruined the economic situation in the European Countries with the consequences of high inflation and unemployment. With the transition to the second phase of the Import Substitution Industrialization which was based upon the production of consumer durables and intermediate goods, Turkey became much more dependent on the imported goods and the advanced technology that could only be financed with the increase in foreign-exchange reserves. However, the worsening of the international terms of trade against the producers of agricultural goods accompanied with the lessening of the workers remittances, which was the main source of foreign exchange reserves in the face of the Oil crises, led the country to a difficult economic situation.

The deterioration of the situation of Turkish expatriate workers in Europe was the inevitable consequence of the 1973 Oil Crises, which had led to the deep economic crises within European countries characterized by high levels of unemployment and inflation. Consequently, the high levels of inflation and unemployment caused the governments to send back most of the expatriate workers to their home countries and to take precautions against new immigration of work. In confrontation with the increasing foreign deficit, which was the consequence of the economic policies of the successive coalitionary governments in the 1970s that pursued policies extremely dependent upon foreign debt, Turkey faced with a

balance of payment crises in the mid 1977. The Payment was tried to be compensated especially by the "Nationalist Front" governments by obtaining short-term loans, which increased Turkey's dependence on the West. (Balkır, 1993: 100-140) The economic situation of the country was reflected in the newspapers that were published during the period. One example was the article published in the Hürriyet Newspaper as of 17th of June 1976 pointing out to the insufficiency of the foreign currency reserves of Turkey;

"Uluslararası Ödemeler Bankası (BIS), Türkiye'nin toplam rezerv mevcudunun ...eksi 1 milyar 290 milyon dolara düştüğünü açıklamıştır...Rezervleri sıfırın altında bulunan Türkiye'nin hızlı bir artış içinde görünen dış borçlarının da 'ülkenin kaldıramayacağı' ölçüde ağırlaştığını bildirilmektedir. Uluslararası finansman çevrelerinde, Türkiye'nin düşük faizli ve uzun vadeli yeni borç anlaşmaları yapamaması halinde, ...moratoryumla (iflasla) karşı karşıya kalabileceği düşüncesi yaygınlaşmaktadır." ⁴⁶

Likewise, as published in the Hürriyet Newspaper as of 10th of November 1977; Demirel establishes that they spared 70 million dollars to their hadjis in a period where Turkey is in extreme need of a 70 cent. Not only does the speech reflect the extremely difficult economic situation that Turkey found herself, but it also is illustrative of the populist discourse of the leader whom pursued the interests of the religious segments of the society in a period of extreme economic difficulties.

"Millet Meclisi AP grubunun dünkü toplantısında bir kısım hacıların hacca gidemeyişleri, ODTÜ mütevelli heyetine yapılması gereken atamalar ve meclis başkanlığı sorunu ele alındı. Başbakan Demirel, hacılarla ilgili bir soruyu yanıtlarken "70 cent'e muhtaç olduğumuz bir devirde 70 milyon dolar ayırdık, daha ne yapalım" dedi." ⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Hürriyet, 17.6.1976 as abstracted from the compilation of Hürriyet articles by Ercan Kumcu and Şevket Pamuk (2001).

⁴⁷ Hürriyet, Ankara, 10.11.1977 as abstracted from the compilation of Hürriyet articles in the book by Ercan Kumcu and Şevket Pamuk (2001).

Turkey had to go through all these difficulties together with the devastating effects of the 1973 oil crises, and economic problems that came about as a result of the embargoes she had faced with, under a coalition government that had already split up within itself. As a result of the polarised political environment there were strong pressures of demand on the part of the public for early election. These developments were mainly caused by the fact that in the late 1970s the legitimacy of the political system was decreased to a great extent. One major factor as mentioned above was the growing political violence and terrorism between 1975 and 1980, which could not have been contained eventhough the martial law, was declared. During the period even the police force was infiltrated with the right wing and left wing extremists because of the general erosion of the state authority.

The ideological polarization of the country was mainly between the NAP, and the NSP on the right and the many radical groups on the left. The minor coalition partners of the government were utilizing the benefits of the governmental power for the organization and mobilization of the society along their ideological lines. Especially NAP was of one of the visible benefitors which had diversified its civil organizations that had initially started with the organization of Youth Hearts with further establishment of "Türk İntigam Tugayı" (TİT) that was operating in the cities and of "Eski Türkleri Kurtarma Ordusu" (ETKO) and "Türkiye Ülkücü Şeriatçı Komando Ordusu" (TÜPKO) that were basically operating in the villages. On the left, the other parties and political movements at the left of RPP which had lost their representation in the parliament in the aftermath of the 1971 *Coup by Memorandum*, started to re-emerge between 1975-1977 due to the governmental decision which gave back the political rights of the former parliamentary members of DP and the

TWP. Accordingly, the Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was established as of 30th of April, 1975, under the leadership of Behice Boran, Turkey's Party of Proletariat (Türkiye Emekçi Partisi) as of 13th of February, 1975 under the leadership of Mihri Belli, Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti) as of 30th of May, 1975 under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, Turkey's Party of Workers and Peasants (Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Partisi) as of 30th of January, 1978 under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek.

At the society level, leftist youth groups were mobilizing around the leftist movement, which was communicated to the public through the magazine of Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci Gençlik Dergisi). The movement mainly bound the fundamentals of its existence to THKP-C led by Mahir Çayan. On the 7th of August 1976 it formed the *Federation of the Revolutionary Youth* (Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu) gathering 70 civil society organizations under its umbrella. In 1978, the movement was divided into two factions, namely, Revolutionary Way and Revolutionary Left, which would continue its existence throughout the decade. (İlkin, Tekeli, 1991: 172) All these movements on the left and the right, which were paralleled by their militant groups and organizations clashing with their counterparts, were the source of anarchy in the society.

After the parliamentary election of 1973, the inability and the unwillingness of the two major parties to form a grand coalition provided the two minority parties with enormous bargaining and blackmailing power whereby they managed to obtain the ministries of importance. One illustrative event, which reflects how the minority coalitionary partner did manage to blackmail even the relations with the EEC, occurred during the second phase of the tariff reductions, which were to be put into effect as of 1976. This would be in a period when Turkey's trade deficit visavis the

Community countries reached enormous levels. On these bases, the Ministry of Industry and Technology under the control of NSP, with the support of the 7 Chambers of Industry prepared a bill draft for the postponement of these concessions to a later period. This attempt was prevented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which managed to put the decision for tariff reduction into effect by persuading Demirel on the matter.⁴⁸ (İlkin and Tekeli, 1994)

One other important factor that led to the decreasing legitimacy of the political system was the immobilisme of the government and the parliament. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions, the government was completely unable to take courageous decisions against the increasing economic problems; high inflation, deficits in the international trade balance, shortages of investment and unemployment as well as against the foreign policy issues such as Cyprus issue and the American imposed arms embargo. (Özbudun, 2000: 34- 37)

Furthermore, the Nationalist Front governments, which were established in the late 1970s all together, precipitated the disintegration of the Center. Since coming to power in 1975, these governments initiated a rigorous fight with the civil bureaucracy. Many civil servants were reshuffled specifically by NAP and the NSP, which had exploited their status as the coalition partners with the full consciousness that their existence and participation were inevitable for the major coalitionary partner, JP for the continuation of the government. (Heper, 1980: 438)

3. Second Nationalist Front Government JP, NAP, NSP:

July-December 1977

⁴⁸ T. Gungör Uras: "AET'ye Yeni Ödünler", Cumhuriyet, 19 Ocak 1976 as cited from Selim İlkin and İlhan Tekeli (1993).

The following parliamentary election was held on the 5th of June 1977 in an environment where the political violence between extreme groups was reaching enormous levels together with the devastating effects of the new economic crisis that was hitting the country. The First Nationalist Front government led the country to a political stalemate where no practical political decision could be taken by the government faced with the urgent domestic and foreign policy problems due to extreme level of disagreements between the 4 coalitionary partners. Under the pressing demands of the society for early election in the aim to establish an effective majority-party government, both the JP and the RPP saw the early election as the only option that could hopefully bring forth a kind of stability within the country. The results of the election signaled a victory for the RPP with 41.4% of the parliamentary votes visavis the 36.9% of the votes that was won by the JP. Also, it revealed that the three parties namely, RPP, JP, NAP which were instrumental in the polarization of the country in along with the left-right cleavage, had gained electoral benefits as demonstrated by the results of the election. (Sayarı, 1980: 630) Nevertheless, neither JPP nor RPP was able to form a parliamentary majority. As the winning party, Ecevit was given the right to form a government, which was doomed to be a full failure solely supported with the 11 independents in the parliament. Hence, Ecevit had transferred his right to Demirel whom would establish the “Second Nationalist Front Government” in coalition with the NSP and the NAP whose weight as coalition partners would be much greater than the First Nationalist Front government.

In the government program of the ‘Second Nationalist Front’ it was declared that;

“Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile oluşan ilişkilerimizin oluşan yeni şartlarla ahenkleştirilmesi için girişilmiş olan faaliyetler azim ve kararlılıkla devam olunacaktır. Biz toplulukla münasebetlerimizde Topluluğun ekonomik kalkınmamıza hız kazandıracak, dış rekabet gücü olan bir

sanayi kurmamıza yardımcı olması gereğini tabii görmekteyiz. Ortaklığımızın, giriştiğimiz yaygın sanayileşme hamlesini, ihracatımızın gelişmesini sekteye uğratmaması bu hayati sahalardaki gelişmemize yardımcı olması esastır. Bu zaruret ortaklıkla ilişkilerimizin bu neticeyi doğuracak şekilde düzenlenmesi için gereken yapılacaktır.”⁴⁹

This government could only last until December 1977, and as of January 1978 it was replaced by another coalition government that was formed by the participation of RPP as the major partner, Democrat Party and the Republican Reliance Party as well as some of the dissident parliamentary members who have left JP.

4. Coalition Government of RPP, DP, RRP, and Independents:

January 1978- October 1979

In the government program of the coalition, it was declared that;

“Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile düğümlenen ilişkilerimizi, ulusumuzun, sınaileşmemizin ve ekonomimizin yararına bir çözüme ulaştırmak için gereken girişimleri derhal yapacaktır.

Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile bugünkü ilişkilerimiz ve özellikle ortaklığın “geçiş dönemi’ni düzenleyen potokollerde yer almış bazı kurallar, gelişme ve sınaileşme çabamıza ciddi engeller getirmektedir. Türkiye’nin gelişmiş ülkeler karşısında ekonomik ve siyasal çıkarlarına uygun bir dış ticaret politikası izlemesini, hatta tarım ve sanayi alanlarında gelişmesini güçleştirmektedir. Hükümetimiz, Toplulukla ilişkilerimizi ülkemiz ve ekonomimiz yararına yeniden düzenlemekte ısrarlı ve kararlı olacaktır. Fakat, onun da üstünde, Türk ekonomisini Ortak Pazarla ilişkilerinde ezilmeyecek, Türkiye’nin bağımsızlığını güçlendirecek bir yapıya kavuşturmaya çalışacaktır.”⁵⁰

In the aftermath of the 1973 general election, the revision of the Additional Protocol was demanded and declared in all the programs of the incumbency coalition governments. These demands were eventually finalized in October 1978 when Ecevit announced the freezing of relations with the EEC for 5-year period.

⁴⁹ Millet Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, D:5, T:1, C:1, 27.7.1977, pg. 131-132

⁵⁰ Millet Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, D:5, T:1, C:2, 12.1.1978, pg. 276

The following speech given by the parliamentary member of RPP, Selami Gürgüç from Aydın district evaluates in the name of the party group the reasons underlying the decision of freezing;

“Bir donukluk dönemine giren Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ile ilişkilerimiz Türk ekonomisine, Türkiye'nin sınılaşmasına ve hatta tarımda gelişmesine zarar verebilecek bir noktaya dönüşmüştü. Plan, topluluk ile ilişkileri, Türkiye'nin kalkınma ve sanayileşmesini destekleyecek bir biçimde düzenlemeyi hedeflemektedir...Onların ortak, bizim Pazar olduğumuz bir Ortak Pazar (bir ölçüde bugüne değin ilişkiler böyle gelişmişti) değil artık bugünkü hedef...Biz ülkemizin ihtiyaçları neyse onu yaparız. Zaten bu, bizim parti olarak milliyetçilik anlayışımızın da bir gereğidir...

...Hükümet ortaklığın nihai amacı olan tam üyeliği gözden uzak tutmadığını belirtmiştir...Türkiye'nin Topluluğa tam üye olabilmesi için, her şeyden önce, gelişmiş ülkelere benzer bir ekonomik yapıya sahip olması, sanayiinin ve sanayi içinde temel sanayilerin belirli bir düzeye ulaşması gerekmektedir. Aksi halde, Topluluk ile aramızdaki ilişkilerin Türkiye yararına işlemesi mümkün değildir.”⁵¹

The speech is illustrative of the fact that the similar slogans, which were used by the NSP in the prior period in the expression of the harsh criticisms against the EEC, were being utilized by the RPP. (Çayhan, 1997: 201) The weight of a nationalist rhetoric is also built upon the inward oriented, protectionist policies of the country against the EEC. Also, reminiscent of the socialist discourse of the less developed countries, the dangers of a regional economic integration was emphasized where a developing country such as Turkey might turn into a market to be exploited by the EEC countries in the case of Turkey's early entry to the EEC when the economic and industrial development of the country was nascent.

Furthermore, in evaluation of the year 1978, specifying the reasons for the unfavorable choice of the Ecevit government to freeze its commitments for tariff reductions, Ziya Müezzinoğlu, whom was the Ministre of Finance in the coalitionary government led by Ecevit, points out to the extreme economic difficulties that the

⁵¹ Millet Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, D:5, T:2, C:7, 25.11.1978, pg.430-431

country was going through. Starting from 1975 as a result of the Opec Oil Crises, the country was in extremely difficult economic situation characterized by high inflation, balance of deficit problems, and the increasing debt problem, which was tried to be compensated by the Nationalist Front governments by obtaining short-term loans and in fact exacerbated its debt problem. The adverse effects of the OPEC Oil Crises upon the economies of both the EEC countries and upon Turkey had also tensioned the relations between the two parties. Turkey eventually hit the bottom line in the year 1978.

"1970'li yıllarda Petrol bunalımı ortaya çıktı. Bundan en çok etkilenen, olumsuz yönde etkilenen ülkeler de petrolü olmayan gelişme yolundaki ülkelerdi. Türkiye de onlardan biriydi. Bir taraftan dış ödemelerde güçlüklerle karşılaşırken, petrol fiyatlarındaki hızlı artış nedeniyle bütçe açığı da daha çok arttı. Türkiye ekonomisi 1975 yılından itibaren bir güç döneme girdi. ..Bahsettiğim güç dönem, 1978'de bütün çıplaklığıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. 1973 yılından beri artan petrol fiyatları nedeniyle ya AP hükümeti geçici ve sağlıklı olmayan tedbirlerle bunları aşmaya çalışmışlardı. Büyük alanda borçlanmalar vardı. DÇM denilen Döviz Çevrilir Mevduat denilen bir mekanizma oluşmuştu. Bunların hepsi aslında sağlıklı ekonomik tedbirler değildi. Bu nedenle, bir taraftan dış ödeme güçlükleri üzerinden diğer yandan enflasyon nedeniyle Türk ekonomisi bir çıkmaza gidiyordu. İşte Sayın Demirel'in 70 cente muhtaçtır demesi bunu yansıtan birşeydir. 1978 yıllarında Türkiye'nin Dünya Petrol bunalımı ve AET'nin karşılaştığı güçlükler nedeniyle AET Türkiye nezdinde de bir güç dönemi beraberinde getirdi. Biz o sırada IMF ile bir niyet mektubu çerçevesinde bir isikrar programı uygulamaya başlamıştık. O program çerçevesinde hükümet AET'den de önemli ölçüde bir yardım sağlama yoluna gitti...Bu beklenti gerçekleşmedi. Bu AET ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerde zaman zaman ortaya çıkan olumsuzluğu biran ek bir olumsuzluk olarak etkilemeye başlamıştı. O sırada Yunanistan'da cunta rejimi geride kalmış AET ile tam üyelik müzakerelerine başlamıştı. ..Türkiye Yunanistan girerken ilişkilerini geliştirmek yerine bu AET'nin mali yardım konusundaki olumlu olmayan davranışını daha önemli görerek zaten ...AET'ye karşı uyguladığı gümrük indirimlerini dondurmaya yoluna gitti. Daha açık olarak söylemek lazım gerekirse bahsettiğim güçlükler nedeniyle 1976 yılından itibaren yani AP hükümeti zamanında Türkiye AET'ye uyguladığı indirimleri dondurmaya yoluna gitmişti. Ama bu fiilen resmi bir durum almamıştı. bahsettiğim bu CHP hükümeti zamanında bu

açıkça ifade edilme yoluna gitmişti. Böyle yani beklenen yardım görülmeyince bir tarafta böylece Türkiye AET ilişkilerinde bir daralma dönemi uygulaması söz konusu oldu. Bunun Yunanistan'ın tam üyelik zamanına rastlaması ayrıca bir talihsizlik olarak söylenebilir...⁵²

Furthermore, in answer to the accusations that were made against Ecevit by the pro-EEC segments of the bureaucracy and the society on the basis that Ecevit failed to apply to the EEC for full membership in pursuit of the Greek application particularly in a period where Turkey was most receptive by the EEC, Müezzinoğlu discusses that Turkey's unfavourable policy towards the EEC had started much before the formal declaration of Ecevit of freezing Turkey's commitments concerning the third and fourth phase of tariff reduction, as a result of the economic crises that the country was going through in the face of increasing debt problem. In fact, the first practical decision concerning the freezing of Turkey's commitments on tariff reduction was taken during the Nationalist Front governments. However, in confrontation with the extreme debt problem which could not be financed due to the lack of any financial assistance by the international financial institutions, when Turkey's demand from the EEC, for an additional financial aid package was rejected, Turkey formally froze its commitments as envisaged in the Additional Protocol.

"Evvvela Türkiye'nin mükellefiyetlerini daraltarak AET ile ilişkileri aşağı seviyeye indirmesi Ecevit Hükümetinden önce başladı. Petrol bunalımı ile birlikte ki o sırada hükümet arkasında AP ve 1. ve 2. Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri vardı...fakat fiilen böyle bir durum vardı. 1978'de CHP Hükümeti iş başına geçtikten sonra çok söylenebilir bir enkaz edebiyatı o zaman başlar. Öyle ki dış ödemelerde tümüyle bir tıkanma vardı. Dış borçları artmış, kredibilitesi kaybolmuş. Bu yüzden Türk ekonomisi en zorunlu ihtiyaç maddelerini dahi ithal edemez duruma gelmiş ki bu nedenle ben şahsen IMF ile bir niyet mektubu çerçevesinde bir istikrar programı hazırlamak yoluna gitmiştim. Bu çerçevede de hükümet AET'den bir ek katkı bekliyordu. Bunun içindir ki... bir önemli yardım paketi beklemişti. Bu

⁵² The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview that was made by the author with

yardım paketi gelmedi. Buna karşılık Türkiye o halde mükellefiyetlerini yerine getiremeyeceğini, indirimlerini yapamayacağını bildirdi. Ona da anlayış gösterildi. Yani sonuçta Türkiye zaten indirimleri yapmıyordu gümrük birliğinden....Türkiye kendi talebi yani mali kaynak talebi karşılanmadığı için Türkiye AB ilişkileri bir soğukluk dönemine girdi.⁵³

In fact, in all the governments that were established in the aftermath of the 1973 election, there occurred a tendency to search for an independent path from the western allies of the country. This tendency started to materialize and turn into concrete policy choices especially after the Cyprus Issue, which was responded with American-imposed embargo, which turned into some kind of an economic-embargo with the full attempts of US to prevent the flow of any financial credits from the international financial institutions. Furthermore, the lack of any kind of support to the Turkish case by the EEC countries concerning the Cyprus Issue was perceived by the Turkish policy makers and the society at large in terms of a certain kind of bias towards the Greek side as their Christian counterparts. Combined with the possible danger of moratorium in the absence of financial credits from the western financial institutions which imposed the IMF standby agreement as a necessary condition for Turkey's possible receipt of financial assistance, Turkish policy makers' western orientation lost its zeal as a result of the growing suspicion and insecurity towards the western countries. Hence, this feeling of insecurity led to the adoption of a much assertive nationalist stance by most of the parliamentarians in the assembly both from the right and the left. The speech that was given by Bülent Ecevit in the parliament as of 4th of 1978 in the extraordinary party meeting reflects the similar sentiment;

"...Bir ulus mali bakımdan böylesine bir bunalım dönemine sürüklendiği vakit onun bu durumunu istismar etmek isteyecekler çıkabilir dünyada. Bizim için böyle kimseler, devletler,

⁵³ The above-mentioned speech was abstracted from the interview that was made by the author with Ziya Müezzinoğlu in November, 2002.

kuruluşlar var mıdır? Yok mudur? ...Kimse hakkında bir önyargı taşımaksızın bir varsayım üzerine konuşuyorum. Evet, Cumhuriyet tarihimizin en sıkışık en bunalımlı dönemindeyiz....kimse bu durumumuzdan yararlanmak suretiyle Türkiye'yi bu hükümet başındayken sıkıştıramayacaktır. Çünkü bizi sıkıştırdıkları, sırtımızı dayadıklarını sandıkları duvarda bütün dünyaya kapılar açmıştır bu hükümet. Eğer, biz buna rağmen bu duvarın ötelere geçemiyorsak, arkamızda bir duvar olduğu için değil kendi sorumluluk duygumuz onu gerektirdiği için, kendi takdirimiz öyle olduğu için geçmiyoruz.

...

Onun için öyle bir niyet besleyenler var mıdır, yok mudur, bilemem kimsenin günahına girmek istemem ama, kimse bizi zorlamaya kalkışmasın. Kimse bizi fazla zorlamaya kalkışmasın.

*Eğer sabrımız, tahammülümüz tükenip kendi yararımızı dünyanın yararından bir adım fazla düşünmeye karar verecek olursak bundan çok pişmanlık duyanlar çıkacaktır dünyada.*⁵⁴

The coalition was dissolved as of November 1979 in the aftermath of the local elections, which had been a complete electoral failure for the government due to its inability to cope with the severe economic crises, and the serious political polarization that was accompanied by extreme violence and terrorist activities in the country. Subsequently, Süleyman Demirel formed the Third Nationalist Front government this time without the participation of the minority parties namely NAP and the NSP but solely in coalition with the independents in the parliament, which was to govern the country until the 1980 military coup...(Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 482)

⁵³As cited from Cüneyt Arcayürek (1985, 528-529)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In the quest for the reasons underlying the question why Turkey after coming from this long tradition of westernisation policy which culminated in Turkey's application to the EEC for associate membership in 1959, chose to freeze its relations in 1978; the thesis mainly focused upon the anti-westernization sentiments that exacerbated in the late 1970s both at the society and the state level as a result of the political polarization that came about starting from the 1960s, as the main reason for the formation of unfavorable policy choices against the EEC. It basically attempted to explain the rise of anti-western stance in the period between 1961-1980 on the basis of two major factors namely; the structural factor and the conjunctural factors. The thesis by focusing upon the structural factor, that is the historically embedded center/periphery polarity firstly verified historically how these radical ideological movements rose in reaction to the westernizing policies of the central bureaucratic elite dating back to the Ottoman Era, and secondly demonstrated the close relationship between those movements and the political parties both the radical left-wing and the right-wing parties which were established under the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s and throughout the 70s and the major political parties at the left and the right of the centre which started to adopt much more of a radical stance swayed by the strident voices coming from the periphery.

In fact, in the chapter, entitled “ Political Polarization in the 1960s” which focused upon the historical evolution of the ideological movements within the Turkish politics starting from the 1960s under the relatively liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution, the intimacy between the ideological movements coming from the society and the political parties was historically verified; both with respect to the two major parties at the center, RPP and the JP which in parallel with these developments started to adopt more of a radical line swayed by these sentiments and also the minority parties such as the TWP, NAP, NOP (later called the NSP). These intimacies demonstrated itself in the close relationships between the religious orders and the radical right and center right parties, such as between Naksibendi Order and the NOP and between Nurcu movement and the JP and between the socialist movements, the workers syndicals, the academia, and the newly emerging radical left parties such as TWP and certainly the RPP, as the center left party with its new formulation of the left of the center policy. The verification of such close intimacy is crucial in the sense to reflect the state society interaction that was critical in the formulation of new ideologies in the parliament and in the society affecting the decision making process as depicted in the forthcoming period. Especially after the 1973 free election which heralded the period of the coalitionary governments with the participation of the radical minority parties, the state society interaction and the extent of society’s assertiveness led to the formation of the unfavorable policy choices that were adopted by the decision makers in the second half of the 1970s concerning Turkey’s relations with the EEC.

The discourse analysis of the decision-makers during the period of the coalition governments between 1974-1979-as this is the period when the voices of the periphery were critical in the decision-making process with the participation of

the radical minority parties namely the NSP and the NAP in the coalition governments that were established during the period-, the thesis demonstrated how these new ideological formations characterized by anti-western stance both as represented by the radical parties, and as reformulated by the center right and the center left parties in the government, were critical in the formation of the unfavorable policy choices towards the EEC. In fact, the discourse analysis of the speeches, that were given by the leaders during the period of the coalition governments, as part of the research of the thesis, also confirmed with the new ideology formations in the society and in the parliament, which depict themselves in an anti-western rhetoric and materialized in the unfavorable policy choices in Turkey's relations with the Community. The analysis of the speech of Erbakan as the leader of the radical Islamist party revealed that the party perceives full integration as the colonialisation of Turkey by the western countries in order to be exploited for their own best national interests.

Furthermore, by basing upon the traditional sentiments of the Turkish society the majority of which was constituted by pious Islamic people, Erbakan points out to the dangers posed to social, cultural and belief-systems of an Islamic Turkey by integrating with a western institution the members of which were constituted by the Christian countries. Erbakan also established its opposite stance to the westernization policy of the central bureaucratic elite which starting from the Tanzimat period pursued a policy of westernization based upon a complete assimilation of the cultural and belief systems of the western countries to that of the Turkish society in the ultimate aim to create a western identity out of the Islamic Turkish people. In this respect, as the culmination point of this westernization policy, the integration with the EEC was completely rejected.

According to Türkeş, in line with the argument put forth by Erbakan, the integration with the Community was perceived as the extension of the westernization policy of the central bureaucratic elite dating back to the Ottoman Era. The policy was firstly criticized on the basis that the capitalist economic system, which was adopted by the bureaucratic elite for the economic development of the country in pursuit of the westernization policy, had the aim of exploiting and colonising Turkey. In this respect, Türkeş criticized Capitalism, and hence the EEC, on the basis that both were the policy instruments of the western countries that were being utilized for the realization of their ideal of neo-colonialisation. Furthermore, emphasizing the importance of the Islam religion and Turkish Nationalism as the inseparable elements of the Turkish national identity, he rejected the integration with the Christian countries of the EEC on the basis that it would lead to the social and cultural degeneration of the Great Turkish society. Furthermore, in economic terms both of the leaders rejected the integration on the basis that it would be the main impediment for Turkey's industrialization and economic development.

The discourse analysis of Türkeş and Erbakan demonstrated that the anti-western stance of these leaders were extremely bred by their own radical nationalist and islamist ideologies, which was further cultivated on the grounds of a certain xenophobia towards the west. In these discourses the cultural incompatibility of Turkey with the Community was emphasized on the basis of the Turkish national identity, which was characterized by Turkish nationalism to a great extent and Islamism to a lesser extent in the former and by Islamism in the latter. Both of these leaders define the fundamentals of their ideological existence on the basis of their opposite stance towards the westernization policy of the central bureaucracy. In this respect, the search for a new identity and ideology definition in reaction to the

traditional westernization policy of the Republican elite, which had given its imprint to the period of 1960s and 1970s, could also be detected in the speeches of the leaders of the radical minority leaders. Within this framework, where these new ideology and identity definitions of the Turkish society had a solid existence within the coalition governments that were established during the period of 1974-1979, it would inevitably materialize in unfavourable policy choices concerning Turkey's relations with the Community as exemplified by Erbakan's attempts to blackmail the implementation of certain provisions of the Protocol.

As for Demirel, whom had initiated the negotiations for Turkey's associate membership, he himself, started to adopt a much critical outlook towards Turkey's relations with the EEC repeating the demands for Revision of the Protocol that had been declared by all the government leaders in the aftermath of the 1973 election. He mainly appreciates the necessity of integrating with the EEC on the basis of the economic benefits that it would eventually bring to Turkey, whereas a political integration with the Community was denounced and even rejected it to be a consideration for the Community itself on the grounds that such an integration would violate the national sovereignty rights of a country. In this respect, it can be established that JP as represented in the speeches of its leader, Demirel during the same period adopted a much critical outlook towards the EEC that depicted itself in anti-western nationalist rhetoric.

As for Ecevit, during the coalition government between NSP and RPP, one can detect the first crystallization of the policy of following an independent path from the western countries. One basic example was the policy of multidimensional balance, which was declared in the government program red by Ecevit and it mainly envisaged the establishment of an economic integration with the other regions such as Middle

Eastern countries and Africa. Furthermore, it was established that certain provisions of the Protocol, which were detrimental to the industrialization, and the economic development of the country should be revised. These were the policy choices that were opted out of the growing insecurity that was born among the society as a result of the adverse developments that were occurring in foreign policy. In this initial period, Ecevit though he was critical of the relations with the EEC on the basis of the economic considerations born out of the *National Development* understanding, he was still committed to the pro-EEC stance. However, such criticisms declared by the Party became much more assertive strengthened with the socialist rhetoric reminiscent of the “*Dependency Movement*” that was voiced by the intelligentsia of the less developed countries which perceive the integration with the western institutions as a new policy instrument for the western developed countries in order to exploit the markets of the undeveloped and underdeveloped countries for their own interest, where in this case it would be the exploitation of the Turkish market. In fact the use of slogans such as “Onlar Ortak, biz Pazar” the similar slogans, which were used by the NSP in the prior period in the expression of the harsh criticisms against the EEC, and shared by the socialist critiques during the same period, and a certain emphasis upon the nationalism of the party as one of the reasons for the freezing of relations were indicative of a much more assertive anti-western and nationalist line. This nationalist rhetoric was materialized in the formation of inward oriented, protectionist policies against the EEC, which eventually led to the freezing of relations.

The two-fold methodological analysis of the domestic politics of the country was located in a related spatio-temporal context as framed by the developments in the international political economy, and the foreign policy together with the evaluation of their effects on the domestic politics and the political economy of the country. In

this way, it is aimed to demonstrate how the conjunctural factors were critical in exacerbating the anti-western stance both at the state and the society level. On this basis, conjunctural factors were taken into consideration to the extent of how these factors created at the state and the society level a certain kind of resentment towards the western countries consolidating in the unfavorable decisions in 1976 and 1978. As it was analyzed specifically under the section, "Towards the Freezing of Relations in 1978", which was the case study of the thesis, the anti-western stance of the leaders could not be thought independent from the adverse developments that were occurring in the international political economy and their devastating effects upon the Turkish economy and domestic politics, which all in all led to the growing resentments of the Turkish people towards the west affecting the formation of unfavorable policy choices. Therefore, the prior arguments that were put forth by the other theoreticians that have analyzed the reasons underlying Turkey's decision of freezing its relations were also critical in exacerbating the antiwestern stance in the society. The two conjunctural factors; - firstly the foreign policy factors; the Cyprus issue and the American-imposed Embargo, and secondly the economic factors; Opec Oil Crises and its adverse effects upon Turkish economy, the balance of payment deficit occurring due to the change of international terms of trade against the producers of agricultural goods further deteriorating Turkey's debt problem and the critical provisions of the Additional Protocol which imposed certain restrictions on Turkey's agricultural and textile exports together with the erosion of preferential treatments to Turkey in the face of the extension of such treatments to the less developed countries and other Mediterranean countries; and the deterioration of the situation of the Turkish expatriate workers as a result of the Opec Oil Crises,- all in all had cultivated a certain resentment among the Turkish society and the

policymakers of the time, whom were coming from the state tradition of Etatism, hence exacerbating the anti-western sentiments.

In this respect, in all the governments that were established in the aftermath of the 1973 election, there occurred two main tendencies by the incumbency governments; firstly a tendency to search for an independent path from the western allies of the country and secondly, in the face of the adverse effects of the Additional Protocol, a tendency to demand the revision of the protocols that had determined the terms of Turkey's economic relations with the Community. As established by the existing literature, these tendencies materialized and turned into concrete policy choices especially after the Cyprus Issue, which was responded with American-imposed embargo, followed by an economic-embargo with the full attempts of US to prevent the flow of any financial credits to the country from any of the international financial institutions.

Furthermore, the lack of any kind of support to the Turkish case by the EEC countries concerning the Cyprus Issue was perceived by the Turkish policy makers and the society at large in terms of a certain kind of bias towards the Greek side as their Christian counterparts. Combined with the possible danger of moratorium in the absence of financial credits from western financial institutions which imposed the IMF standby agreement as a necessary condition for Turkey's possible receipt of financial assistance, Turkish policy makers' western orientation lost its zeal as a result of the growing suspicion and insecurity towards the Western allies. Hence, the feeling of insecurity led to the adoption of a much assertive nationalist stance by the parliamentarians in the assembly both from the right and the left consolidating in the formation of unfavorable policy choices concerning Turkey's relations with the Community.

On the basis of the historical facts that had verified the intimacy between the ideological movements and the political parties in the parliaments and of the discourse analysis of the speeches given by the leaders of the major and the minority parties, it can be concluded that the resentments of the Turkish society that grew in the face of adverse economic and social effects of the modernization and westernization project of the Turkish Republic and in the face of the unfavorable developments in the foreign policy, all in all bred by the traditional and cultural sentiments of the society, led to the reformulation of radical ideologies both on the right in the form of radical islamist and nationalist stances and on the left in different forms of socialist stances. In result, the radical ideologies that were mainly formulated in reaction to the westernization policy, which was the fundamental tenet of the unifying nationalist ideology of the central bureaucratic elite, led to the adoption of an anti-western rhetoric by the politicians of the time, swayed by the strident voices coming from the periphery.

Starting from the period of the coalition governments, for the first time in the Republican history the minority parties which were the advocators of the nationalist and Islamist worldviews defining themselves in opposition to the westernization of the Republican Turkey, had the chance to participate in different coalitionary governments that ruled until the Second Military Coup in 1980. In this respect, it was at the very same period that this anti-western rhetoric consolidated in unfavorable policy choices of the Turkish decision-makers concerning Turkey's relations with the EEC, integration to which would eventually seal Turkey's western identity. Hence, the voices of the periphery was started to be critical in the policy making process leading upto the formation of unfavorable policy choices as exemplified by the postponement of Turkey's commitments concerning the third and fourth phase of

tariff reduction in the year 1976 during the 1st Nationalist Front Government and the eventual decision of Ecevit to freeze the relations with the EEC in 1978 for 5 year period.

In consideration of the theoretical framework, one crucial weakness of the thesis is the fact that by focusing upon the effect of the society's assertiveness in the formation of a certain policy choice by the government, the thesis does not ignore but in fact does not give a prior consideration to the completely different logic that might be operating at the state level independent from the society's demands that were voiced to the decision-makers. The thesis basically had the assumption of a direct relationship between the society's assertiveness in the expression of a certain demand and of the policy choices that are formulated by the decision-makers at the state level. Whereas, it might not always be a direct relationship where in some cases, the decision makers form policies on the basis of other political, economic, social and foreign policy considerations that are perceived as indispensable for the interests of the state, completely independent of the demands voiced by the society.

Another criticism that could be brought forth against the existing arguments in the thesis is that as the radical nationalist and islamist discourses were started to be expressed starting from the 1950s especially with the establishment of the DP government as representative of the periphery, it could alternatively be criticized why a government under the leadership of DP in 1959 initiated Turkey's application to the EEC, whereas the coalitionary governments formed with the participation of the radical nationalist and islamist minority parties in the 1970s led to the freezing of the relations with the EEC. It is certain that the international dynamics that were critical in the foreign policy and the economic situation of the country were completely different in the two periods. One important difference stems from the fact

that Turkey's relations with Greece and with the other western countries were very favorable as there was a complete harmony concerning the Cyprus issue. However, as Turkey entered into the 1960s and 70s, the Cyprus issue became very much critical in Turkey's relations with the west especially in the aftermath of the Second Cyprus Operation in 1974 with unfavorable repercussions in its economic and political situation. The perceived partiality of the European allies towards the Cyprus issue in favor of the Greek side as its Christian counterparts caused the Turkish government to feel very much insecure in the international arena. Together with the subsequent American imposed arms embargo and the economic embargo in the face of the increasing foreign debt, the resentments against the west exacerbated. However, in consideration of the prior period when the Turkish government took the application decision, the international environment was very much favorable for Turkey. Cyprus Issue was perceived to be resolved through the newly accorded London and Zurich Agreements, which recognized the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus as of 1960 and Turkey had already established good relations both with its neighbors and the main western allies receiving political, economic assistance in return for military aid.

Secondly, in terms of domestic politics it can be established that the radical stances as representatives of the voices of the counter-centre, and counter-western periphery within DP was a fraction within a center majority party and hence they could be controlled under the umbrella of a majority party. However when those ideologies are expressed and voiced by the radical minority parties, which participated in the governments that were established in the aftermath of the 1973 election, as coalitionary partners, these ideological stances had the chance to assert themselves without the perceived pressures of a majority party. In this respect, these

radical stances could not be controlled like the way that they were controlled as a radical fraction under a majority party.

One other factor that was critical in the formation of two different policies in the two critical periods of application and rejection was that in the initial phases of the application, the DP government perceived the integration with the EEC in terms of the economic benefits that it would bring to Turkey. In economic terms, Turkey was faced with extreme debt problem as a result of the prior economic policies that were mainly based upon the receipt of extensive financial credits from the international financial institutions. The balance of payment problem exacerbated due to the increasing inflation, combined with a change in the International political economy where the terms of trade turned against the agricultural producers one of the major producers being Turkey, in favor of the producers of the industrial goods. Hence, the DP government saw the membership to EEC as a new source of financial aid and credit. The political integration was not even a consideration for the DP government.

However, in the 1960s and the 1970s as a result of the extreme level of ideological polarization in Turkish politics, the integration with the EEC was begun to be considered not only with its economic implications but also with its political and cultural implications and that was when the integration with the Community begun to be criticized. As the heir of DP, the JP did not deviate from the general policy of the DP with respect to the relations with the EEC considering it solely in terms of its economic benefits. Even the criticisms that were put forth by the party leader Demirel against the EEC were merely based upon economic grounds. Eventual expectation of a political and cultural integration which was the ultimate ideal underlining the traditional westernization policy was not a concern for the two

parties and in this respect, the nationalist line always had a priority for the DP even in the initial phases of the application and for the JP in the latter period praising the integration solely for the economic benefits that it would bring to Turkey.

In conclusion, the period of the 1960s and the 70s with the exception of the Military interventions and the interim Quasi military rules, was the period for the Turkish society to redefine the ideology and the identity of the country not as imposed from above by the central bureaucratic elite, but as it was coming from below as outcries from the society bred with the traditional and cultural heritages of the country. They were in reaction to the westernization policy of the central bureaucracy, cultivated and formulated, defined and redefined in interaction with the social and economic consequences of the political and economic modernization. It was a struggle of a society that aspired to establish its own democracy not as it was imposed from the west but as it was coming from inside bred with the political, social and economic traditions of the society. It was a struggle of a society to redefine its own identity not as it was imposed from the center but as it was coming from the deepest sentiments of the society bred with the traditional, cultural and spiritual heritages of a heterogeneous society.

It was a reaction against westernization as it was imposed from the center, and from the west but not a reaction to the complete modernization mission of the Turkish Republic. There was an aspiration on the part of the Turkish society to assert its own identity in the way it freely chose to define, in the modern Turkish man. At this point, is it really necessary to annihilate the differences, identities and assimilate with a dominant identity, in the formation of a nation state or in the formation of a regional and international integration and are really identities an impediment for national, regional and international integration? As the heir of an Ottoman Empire

which was constituted by a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-sectarian heterogeneous society, the very existence of the Republic of Turkey proves that it is not. And, in this respect, it would not be an impediment for the integration of Turkey with the EEC/EU, as long as these differences in culture, religion, and national identities were not considered as a point for conversion but as richness to absorb the different cultural, religious, national heritages into the very heart of the West and the East.

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