SURPASSING WANTONNESS BY APPEALING TO EMOTIONS:

A Neo-Frankfurtian Approach to Freedom of the Will

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In memory of Çağla

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ABSTRACT

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In this thesis, I question whether certain kinds of emotions are necessary for one's realization of freedom. In searching an answer to this question, I focus on a specific approach to freedom, namely the Frankfurtian approach. I modify this approach and construct a Neo-Frankfurtian approach. First I single out the second order volitions necessary for one's realization of freedom because of an objection Harman makes. I call these necessary second-order volitions 'creative effective second-order volitions'. I also defend the position that one realizes freedom only if she takes steps in accordance with who she desires to become. I refer to that imaginary person by the term 'desired-self'. Critically exposing Watson's objection, I argue that the value judgment "my becoming my desired self is valuable" must underlie the formation of creative effective second-order volitions. Finally I detect a motivational problem. Even if one makes this value judgment, I argue that one may remain unmotivated in taking steps towards one's desired-self. Hence I conclude that certain kinds of emotions must generate this value judgment and constitute the motivation that is necessary for one's realization of freedom of volition. My suggestion as one of these emotions is a certain kind of discontentment that stems from realizing the gap between who one believes she is and her desired-self.

KISA ÖZET

DUYGULAR SAYESİNDE WANTONLUĞU AŞMAK:

Özgürlüğün Gerçekleştirilmesine Neo-Frankfurtçu bir Yaklaşım

Ayça Boylu

Kişinin özgürlüğünü gerçekleştirmesi için bazı tür duyguların gerekli olup olmadıkları sorusu bu tezin yola çıkış noktasını oluşturuyor. Bu soruya yanıt ararken, Harry G. Franfurt'un özgürlük anlayışına odaklanıyorum. Öncelikle Gilbert Harman'ın bu anlayışa getirdiği eleştirilerden yola çıkılarak özgürlüğün gerçekleştirilmesi için vazgeçilemez olan 'ikinci derece istençler' le ilgili sorunları tartışıp bu istençleri değişik özelliklerine göre ayırıyorum. İçlerinden yalnızca 'yaratıcı ikinci derece istençler' in gerekli olduğunu savunuyorum. Bu istençlerin belirli türden değer yargıları baz alınarak oluşturulabileceğini ekliyerek, hangi türden değer yargıların özgürlüğün gerçekleştirilmesinde rol oynadığını araştırıyorum. Gary Watson'ın önerisini eleştirerek, bu özel değer yargılarının 'öznenin istençsel değer yargıları' olmak zorunda olduğunu savunuyorum. Tüm bu yargıların, "Olmak istediğim kişi olmam değerlidir" yargısının birer örneklemesi olduğunu belirttikten sonra bu yargının özgürlüğün gerçekleştirilmesi için yeterli motivasyon içermeyeceğini, bu yüzden de bu yargıya neden olacak ve motivasyonel gücü olan bazı duyguların gerekli olduğunu savunuyorum. Bu duygulardan en temel olanının, hayal gücümüz sayesinde oluşturduğumuz 'istenen-ben'e duydğumuz aşk/sevgi sayesinde kendimizi sorguladığımızda, olduğumuza inandığımız kişiye karşı duyduğumuz belli bir tatminsizlik duygusu olduğunu savunuyorum.

Özgürlüğün gerçekleştirilmesinde başka duyguların da rol oynayabileceğini belirtiyorum ancak ilk kez wantonluktan özgür bir kişi olmaya doğru adım atarken bu tatminsizlik duygusunun gerekli olduğunu savunuyorum.

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INTRODUCTION

Most of the time what makes explicating what freedom of the will is or what it consists in -to some extent- appealing as well as unavoidable for many philosophers, is perhaps acknowledging that this enterprise partakes in conceptualizing other philosophically significant concepts such as the mind, moral responsibility or determinism of various kinds. By this means, the search for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for freedom of the will (granted that it exists in some form) is customarily motivated by an interest in philosophical questions like "Given that willing is one of the activities of the mind, are there certain restraints and/or constraints limiting the mind's activity of willing?", "What does determinism imply about freedom of the will?", "If freedom of the will and determinism are compatible, how shall we construe freedom of the will? ", "Which conceptions of freedom of the will allow us to be morally responsible for what we do?", "Does freedom of the will imply that we could have done otherwise?" etc.

Harry Frankfurt is one of the philosophers that has written a series of articles in light of these questions. His works have influenced many others due to the subtle distinctions incorporated. Of all these distinctions, the most tempting one has been the distinction between one's volitions and the desires she is capable of forming about these

volitions. Frankfurt's main attempt may be taken to capture the self-reflective element in freedom of the will by making use of the special desires that are about one's volitions. He mainly argues that what is necessary for one's realization of her freedom of the will is that she reflects on the volitions that take her to action and considers whether she really desires to have such volitions. This is why he requires that a person form *desires concerning her volitions* to realize her freedom of the will.

Frankfurt sets this stage to answer the questions listed above. For instance, he defends the position that even if determinism of some sort is true, we are still free with respect to our volitions since we have the potency to alter the volitions that lead us to action. We may omit a certain volition we have and create another by employing a desire to have it. This position has its problems. Yet, what interests me in this thesis is not the problems about determinism or moral responsibility that may occur within a Frankfurtian framework. Rather it concerns a special motivational problem. Frankfurt holds that to realize one's freedom one must form desires to have certain volitions. However, to form the special desires Frankfurt introduces, more clearly, to reflect on the volitions that we are moved by and create the volitions we desire to be moved by, we need a certain motivation. One of the best explanations regarding this motivation is perhaps to recognize its relation to how one conceives herself and also in what way she desires to change herself. One will be engaged in the pursuit of realization of her freedom only if she believes that she can change herself in certain ways and if she in fact has the power to become who she desires to become.

Then the search for certain necessary conditions for one's realization of freedom of the will in this thesis too is motivated by an underlying question, a question that has not attracted much interest: "What is freedom of the will or what does it consist in if it

enables us to change ourselves in a desired way?" Indeed, to enunciate an account of freedom of the will has import for us in order to establish a firm ground for moral responsibility in light of all scientific developments that may be taken to suggest some form of determinism. Yet, we must also recognize that this pursuit has import for us also in so far as our belief in changing ourselves in a desired way is well-entrenched. Being subject to so many various conditions that we may not control, might there still be a way to at least succeed to some degree in conducting our lives in accordance with the ideal of who we desire to become? If this is metaphysically possible, what might be the best way to conceptualize freedom of the will? I assume that our lives may be colored with meaning to the extent that we realize our freedom of the will, especially because we can change ourselves to some extent through such realization. Then we had better demand that our account of freedom of the will contains the explanatory components required to shed light on one's changing herself in a desired way.

In this thesis, I mainly aim at finding an answer to the question I mentioned above. Just like all other attempts to set down an account of freedom of the will, the necessary conditions that I will point out are inconclusive regarding what freedom of the will consists in or of. Rather, like all the other attempts, I concentrate only on the necessary conditions that are within the boundaries set by my question. In uncovering these necessary conditions, I will stay within a Frankfurtian framework though I will extend the boundaries of it. In order to achieve my aim, therefore, I will draw upon Frankfurt's account of freedom of the will to construct a Neo-Frankfurtian account that situates changing one's self in a desired way at its very core. As I will show, this Neo-Frankfurtian approach not only requires certain kinds of *value judgments* present in

instances of freedom of the will but also requires certain *emotions* at its very root to give rise to such value judgments.

I. The will and its freedom

> What are we talking about when we talk about "the freedom of the will"? Neither in common speech nor in the special vocabulary of philosophers does the term "free will" have an unequivocal standard use. ...Just what aspect or possibility of experience is it supposed to grasp? ...The notion is problematic, indeed, with respect to both of its elements. Not only is it as difficult in this context as it is in others to pin down the precise meaning of *freedom*. In addition, our idea of *the will* is itself rather vague. It is no wonder, then, that the discussions of the freedom of the will tend to be murky and inconclusive.[1]

Frankfurt notices that the question some philosophers address in discussions of freedom of the will is often not what in fact it should be. The question they tend to ask is "what can one's will do?"[2] Since what the will does is to will something, some philosophers' immediate attention is directed to searching whether there is anything that one's will cannot will. In such an approach, *the will* may be taken to be a faculty and thus 'freedom of the will' may be used to convey that this faculty is capable of willing anything. Descartes' writings seem to exemplify such a conception concerning the will and its freedom. He states,

> ...the perception of the intellect extends only to the few objects presented to it, and is always extremely limited. The will, on the other hand, can in a certain sense be called infinite, since we observe without exception that its scope

[1] Frankfurt, H. (1999) p.71
[2] ibid. p.73

> extends to anything that can possibly be an object of any other will –even the immeasurable will of God. …the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained.[3]

However, Frankfurt proposes that the question as to what the will can do pertains to the power of the will rather than its freedom. He holds that the distinction between the power of the will and its freedom is often neglected. For Frankfurt, freedom of the will pertains more to the question whether our wills are free from constraint or the extent to which *we are free to use* them.[4] One may wonder why Frankfurt emphasizes this distinction. Why does he take the question "To what extent are we free to use our wills?" as diverging from the question "Can our wills will anything?" What more does the former question express than the latter one? Before I begin to search for answers to these questions, let me briefly explicate what kind of freedom Frankfurt might have in mind to which he refers by 'freedom of the will'.

I.i. Freedom of volition

In one of his footnotes, Frankfurt concedes that some philosophers identify freedom of the will as a sort of power instead of a variety of freedom.[5] From this declaration it is possible to infer that Frankfurt focuses on what the will does and tries to understand freedom of the will through the performances of the will. Commonly, what one's will produces is also referred by the term 'will'. When one says, for instance, "my

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[3] Descartes, R. Trans. J.Cottingham, R.Stoothoff, D.Murdoch. (1985) p.205, 343
[4] Frankfurt, H. (1999) p.73
[5] ibid. p.73

will is to climb the highest mountain", she does not refer to a sort of power she has or a faculty of her mind; rather, she is reporting one of the performances that it accomplished. Apparently it has produced a will to climb the highest mountain. From now on, not to mislead the reader, let me call the *wills* that one's will generates 'volitions', following Frankfurt's terminology.

A volition is basically a desire according to Frankfurt. It is a special kind of desire. Acknowledging that there may be some desires that do not take a person all the way to action, Frankfurt claims that volitions, unlike those desires, do take a person all the way to action. If a person has a volition to travel to Sedna, her desire is such that it results in her traveling to Sedna unless the conditions of the world impede her action.

Now, given that what the will does is to produce volitions, one may take 'freedom of the will' to express freedom of the volitions produced by the will. Frankfurt abides by this specific approach in his discussion of freedom of the will. He states,

> ...the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants [desires] to will or to have the will [volition] he wants [desires]. Just as the question about the freedom of an agent's action has to do with whether it is the action he wants [desires] to perform, so the question about the freedom of the will has to do with whether it is the will [volition] he wants [desires] to have.[6]

This may be taken to explain why he claims that freedom of the will is a variety of freedom. It is just one of those ways one can be free. Let me then replace 'freedom of the will' by 'freedom of volition' to capture Frankfurt's conception better.

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[6] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.20

I.ii. Power of the will and freedom of volition

Let me go back to my question, this time posing it in a different way: Why is it that what is expressed by the question "Can our wills will anything?" cannot capture what is expressed by the question "To what extent are we free in our volitions?"? Let us assume that one's will can in fact perform any given volition or that one's will is capable of willing any volition. Even when the power of one's will is assumed to be infinite in this way, all by itself, this power does not suffice to conclude that one is free in her volitions. The main reason is because the person must use this power and must use this power in a certain way to realize her freedom of volition. For instance, if the person is simply acting upon all the volitions produced by her will, the person cannot be said to have the volitions she desires to have.[7] The question whether the volitions she acts upon are the volitions she desires to have does not even arise. Let me appeal to an analogy to bring to the surface some of the reasons why the capacity to will anything falls short of encapsulating freedom of volition.

Take a computer to resemble one's faculty of will. The computer performing an assignment is analogous to the volitions of the will. Assume furthermore that the computer has such a power that it can perform any given assignment. This computer with infinite capacity corresponds to the will that can have any given volition. To realize how the computer's performance can be limited otherwise than by its own capacity, the user of the computer needs to be introduced as well. Similarly, to appreciate the ways

[7] My conception of volitions and their production will become clear in the following sections. For the time being the reader should keep in mind that what I want to emphasize is the difference between just having volitions (and being moved by those volitions) and desiring to have certain volitions (and acting upon those desired volitions).

one's freedom of volition may be limited otherwise than by the limits concerning the power of one's will, one must focus on the person that is supposed to use her will.

Let us assume that the computer one can use is infinitely powerful. Yet, it is possible that this user does not care about using her computer's power in any way. She may well get by without using the computer. For this reason she may never even desire to assign any tasks. She may simply be indifferent to whether the computer can or does execute certain tasks. This possibility is analogous to a person being indifferent concerning which volitions she is moved by. She may not care about her volitions. The question whether she desires to have the volitions she has does not come up to begin with.

Some people with an infinitely powerful will may never be realizing their freedom of volition due to not caring about their volitions. It is possible that they live in such a way that their strongest desires lead them to action. In having such volitions, they may never participate in acting upon them. This does not mean, as Frankfurt points out, that such a person remains without any volitions. She is still moved by certain volitions but they are neither the ones she desires to have nor the ones she desires not to have for she never reflects on them to figure out whether she desires them.[8] In fact, Frankfurt claims that those are just human beings, not persons. Human beings together with other creatures that do not care about which volitions they are moved by are 'wantons' in Frankfurt's terminology. Only if a human being adopts desires to have certain volitions does she become a person realizing her freedom of volition to some extent. It is worth noting that the emphasis here is not on whether one can *have* certain volitions, as in

[8] For further discussion see Frankfurt, H. (1988)

discussions of power of the will, instead, it is on whether one can *desire to have* certain volitions. Unless there is such a desire, possessing the capacity of having any given volition is of no use when freedom of volition is considered. Then the lack of realization of freedom of volition for such human beings does not concern how powerful their will is; rather, it concerns *them*, to be more precise, their desires about their volitions.

Going back to the analogy, it is also possible to pin down another way in which a person's freedom of volition may be limited. Once again let us assume that the computer resembling one's will can do any given assignment. Now, it may well be the case that someone, other than the user of the computer, conditions the user to assign certain tasks. He may be such a figure in the user's life that the user, without realizing that she is being conditioned, assigns the tasks that *he* desires her to assign. This is almost like him using her computer (perhaps knowing her user id and password!) to assign certain tasks to *her* computer. This case corresponds to a person being limited regarding her freedom of volitions due to a conditioning.

Assume that a father is conditioning his daughter in this way. He desires her to have certain volitions. So, the daughter may be acting upon the volitions that her father desires her to have. Yet, they may not be the volitions *she* desires to have. She may for instance realize that the volitions that the father is imposing upon her portray who her father desires her to become, not who she desires to become. In such a case, what limits the freedom of her volitions is not due to the power of her will, rather it is pertinent to the source of her volitions. The real source is not her. She is not the one who desires to have those volitions; her father is.

Moreover, her will may have all the power needed to have the volitions that her father desires her to have. However, she cannot be said to realize her freedom of volition

given that those volitions are not the ones *she* desires to have. The bottom line is that the power of the will is mute on the question whether one desires to have the volitions that her will generates. So, what limits one's freedom of volition may not be pertinent to the power of her will, instead it may pertain to other conditions about *her*. These examples show that an infinitely powerful will is not sufficient for explaining how freedom of volition is possible. However, whether it must be preserved as a *necessary condition* remains to be clarified. Now, if Frankfurt holds that an infinitely powerful will is not sufficient for freedom of volition, what other necessary condition does he propose? This question brings me to the critical exposition of the necessary condition Frankfurt highlights for freedom of volition: formation of second-order volitions.

II.Volition as an effective desire

To lay down an accurate depiction of Frankfurt's conception of freedom of volition, I will first examine how he characterizes a volition. As I have mentioned, not all desires are volitions. For a desire to be a volition, Frankfurt holds that it has to be *effective*. Let me then proceed by introducing Frankfurt's notion of effectiveness of a desire and pin down the possible features it might be taken to have. Of a volition, i.e. an effective desire, Frankfurt says:

> ...the notion of will [volition], as I am employing it, is not coextensive with the notion of first-order desires. It is not the notion of something that merely inclines an agent in some degree to act in a certain way. Rather, it is the notion of an

> effective desire -one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action.[9]

According to Frankfurt, a desire is an inclination to do something. While its effectiveness pertains to the question whether its motivational force is such that it takes an agent all the way to the action -provided that the conditions of the world cooperate-, its level of order pertains to the question what it is about.

Consider one's desire to pick strawberries for instance. Now, the motivational force of this desire may be such that it does not take the person to action even if there is no obstruction. It may be a very weak desire in that sense. Such desires are desires that are not effective for Frankfurt. The effectiveness of a desire is then determined by its closeness to action. If the person with the desire to pick strawberries in fact picks strawberries, she can be said to have an effective desire. It is also possible that her desire remains unsatisfied even though it is effective. For instance, she may be hit by a car just before she was about to pick strawberries. Frankfurt realizes that one may not always translate her effective desires into action due to some conditions that are not under her control. As he defines an effective desire, he inserts in parentheses that it is the sort of desire that *would* move a person all the way to the action. Going back to the last example, she *would* pick strawberries had she not been hit by a car. Her desire is effective despite the fact that she never actualizes it.[10]

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[9] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.14

[10] The effectiveness of a desire changes from one agent to another as well as from time to time. The desire to pick strawberries may be an effective desire for you at a given time but it may not be effective for me. It is also possible that your desire to pick strawberries two years ago was effective but today it is not. Note that this does not mean that you do not desire to pick strawberries today, it is only that its motivational force is not strong enough to take you to action today.

The level of order of the desire to pick strawberries, putting aside its effectiveness, just concerns the kind of object it has. More precisely, what is to be investigated is what this desire is about. Apparently, this desire conveys an inclination to pick strawberries. More generally, it is about doing something. However, this is not the case with all desires. There may be desires that are about other desires. One may for instance desire to have a desire to listen to people attentively realizing that she thinks of many other things as she listens to people. Although she may lack the desire to listen to them attentively, she may want to have it. In other words, she may want to be motivated by this desire. And again, one may desire not to have a certain desire. A person with the desire to say explicitly what she thinks of people as she gets to know them may desire to get rid of this desire of hers. It may be very difficult for her to stop herself concerning her explicit sincerity. She may believe that if she does not have such a desire, it will be much easier to manage her relationships. Thereby, she may desire not to have the desire to say explicitly what she thinks of people. Both the desire to have the desire to listen to people attentively and the desire not to have the desire to say explicitly what one thinks of people exemplify *second-order desires*. While the former is about the first-order desire to listen to people attentively, the latter is about the first-order desire to say explicitly what she thinks of people.

Consequently, while desires of the first order are only about doing something, higher-order desires are about desires of lower order. Thereby, one's desire to pick strawberries is a first-order desire, but her desire to have this desire is a second-order desire since it is about her first-order desire.

Having specified the effectiveness of a desire, it is no wonder that Frankfurt identifies a volition with first-order desires that are effective.[11] What the will does, as I have mentioned earlier, is to produce volitions. That is, it produces desires that take a person to action. When you have a volition to quit smoking, for instance, your desire to quit smoking is of a special kind. It has such a motivational force that if the conditions of the world cooperate with you, you do in fact quit smoking. Your desire to quit smoking, then, is an effective first-order desire. From now on, to avoid confusions in certain contexts, I will use 'volition' and 'effective desire' interchangeably.

At this point, one may wish to argue that Frankfurt's notion of an effective first-order desire is no different from an intention. Intuitively, when an agent intends to do something, she has a desire that she persistently keeps alive. She makes her mind up to actualize it and typically, she makes a plan concerning how to achieve what she intends to do. The inclination in an intention, therefore, does not seem to manifest merely a first-order desire. Rather, it seems to have features very similar to those of an effective first-order desire. For instance, one may argue that when one intends to do something she goes all the way to the action assuming that the conditions of the world cooperate with her. Nevertheless, Frankfurt prefers to distinguish intentions from effective first-order desires. He states:

> The notion of the will [effective desire] is not coextensive with the notion of what an agent intends to do. For even though someone may have a settled intention to do X, he may none the less do something else instead of doing X

[11] In fact for first-order effective desires he prefers the term 'will'; however as he defines second-order volitions, we understand that what he refers to by the term 'volition' is a first-order effective desire. For the sake of simplicity, I used the term 'volition' or 'first-order volition' throughout the thesis to refer to an effective first-order desire.

> because despite his intention, his desire to do X proves to be weaker or less effective than some conflicting desire.[12]

What strikes one immediately in this quotation is Frankfurt's attribution of *degree* to effectiveness. One may wonder whether this degree of effectiveness is an independent property of desires or whether it is a relational property. For instance, when one has a desire to do X does it have an independent degree of effectiveness, say, 78%? If so, when one has more than one desire, either the desire with the highest degree of effectiveness or the desire with 100% will lead one to action if the conditions of the world cooperate.

On the other hand, one may claim that degree of effectiveness is not such an independent property of desires. Rather, it may be a relational property. Then, it is only when one has more than one desire, the question whether one is more effective than the other may arise. For instance, assume that I have both the desire to listen to Bach and the desire to listen to Beethoven. In such cases of conflict, it is the relatively more effective desire that is translated into action given that the conditions of the world cooperate. Assuming that my desire to listen to Beethoven is more effective than my desire to listen to Bach, I, then, listen to Beethoven given that the conditions of the world do not prevent me from listening to Beethoven.

Going back to Frankfurt's example concerning the conflict between an

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[12] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.14

intention and an effective desire, one may explicate several possibilities as to how Frankfurt conceptualizes the effectiveness of intentions and of effective desires:[13]

1) For a person to translate a desire into action, it is necessary that the degree of effectiveness of a desire is 100%. It is only effective desires that have such an independent property. The degree of effectiveness of intentions is less than 100 % (but perhaps they have quite a high degree of effectiveness). So, unless intentions become effective desires in some way, they do not lead a person to action.
2) For a person to translate a desire into action, it is necessary that the degree of effectiveness is higher than all other conflicting desires (and perhaps it should not be below a certain level either). The degree of effectiveness of desires including intentions is an independent property. The degree of effectiveness of intentions is always less than the degree of effectiveness of effective desires. So, an intention takes a person to action only if it does not conflict with an effective desire.
3) For a person to translate a desire into action, it is necessary that the degree of effectiveness is higher than all other conflicting desires (and perhaps it should not be below a certain level either). The degree of effectiveness of desires including intentions is a relational property. So, an intention is translated into action provided that it does not conflict with a desire with more effectiveness.

All this brings out that when Frankfurt says "the notion of the will [effective desire] is not coextensive with the notion of what an agent intends to do", he may have implicit assumptions especially regarding the effectiveness of intentions and of effective desires. No matter how effectiveness and its degree is construed, setting intentions and

[13] I am thankful to Stephen Voss for pointing out the fact that there are many ways to understand the degree of effectiveness of a desire.

effective desires apart becomes a very complex matter. After all, both intentions and effective desires contain some effectiveness when effectiveness is taken to be a matter of degree. At this point, I do not intend to draw any conclusions regarding the superiority of any conception of effectiveness. All I wish to convey is that there are possible ways of conceptualizing it within Frankfurt's theory of freedom of volition. Yet, for the sake of simplicity let me take the first conceptualization above. The reader from now on should assume that a desire leads a person to action given that the conditions of the world cooperate iff its effectiveness is 100%. Intentions, by definition do not have 100% effectiveness so unless they become effective desires, they do not lead the person to action since a person translates a desire into action only if its effectiveness is 100%. Let me then begin to portray how Frankfurt characterizes freedom of effective first-order desires, i.e. freedom of volition.

III. Freedom of effective first-order desires, i.e. freedom of volition

III.i. Second-order volitions as a subset of second-order desires

Presumably, some creatures have only first-order desires. They are not capable of forming second-order desires. Most likely, a whale, for instance, acts upon certain first-order desires. It is inclined to do certain things such as communicating with other whales. There may be a dispute about whether its inclination is sufficient to attribute to it a desire to communicate; however, let us assume that is so. In a sense, it has these motivational forces within, that pull it in certain ways and as a result, it acts. What a

whale perhaps cannot have, speculatively, is a desire to have or not to have the desire to communicate with others. It cannot have desires about its desires, namely, second-order desires.

Unlike a whale, a human being can have second-order desires. A psychiatrist, for instance, may desire not to have the desire to tell her patients' life stories to her husband. Knowing that she is responsible for keeping the private lives of her patients secret and yet having a desire to tell the interesting ones to her husband, she may come to have a desire not to have this desire anymore. She may feel guilty for having such a desire and attempt to get rid of it. So, one may have a second-order desire to get rid of a first-order desire.

Another significant kind of second-order desire is a desire to have a first-order desire. Typically, such second-order desires are formed when a person realizes that she in fact lacks the first-order desire. Consider the case of a student who wishes to become a lawyer for instance. Assume that although she aims at becoming a lawyer, she realizes that she has no motivational force within her to study for the examination of a certain course she takes in her law school. Then, reminding herself of her goal, she may desire to have the desire to study for the exam. What she wants is to be motivated to study.

Frankfurt seems to be an advocate of the view that a person may create new first-order desires by forming second-order desires of this sort. As he provides an example to serve another purpose, he considers the case of a psychiatrist who desires to understand his drug addict patient better. At the beginning, the psychiatrist wants to understand his patient. Since the patient is a drug addict, the psychiatrist decides that he can understand his patient best by having a desire similar to the desire of the patient. Thereby, he forms a desire to have a desire to use drugs. However, he does not wish to take drugs like the

addict. He only wants to know the state of the patient before she uses drugs. Since he lacks a desire to take drugs to begin with, in order to initiate this desire, he begins to desire to have the desire. Frankfurt claims that what the psychiatrist has is a second-order desire.

Now, just as one may have a desire to have or not to have certain first-order desires, one may also desire to *actualize* some first-order desires. When one desires to actualize a first-order desire, she has a second-order desire of a special kind. What one specifically desires about her first-order desire is that she desires to be moved by it. She desires that it becomes her volition.

Frankfurt distinguishes the desires to actualize first-order desires from other second-order desires and calls them 'second-order volitions'. Going back to the psychiatrist who wants to understand his patient better, the psychiatrist may be said to have formed a second-order desire to have the desire to use drugs. Yet, the kind of second-order desire he forms is not a second-order volition for Frankfurt since the psychiatrist does not want to act upon the desire to use drugs. He has no desire to make his desire to take drugs effective.

Only if the psychiatrist had also desired to actualize his desire to use drugs, would he have formed a second-order volition. On this assumption, he would not merely desire to be motivated by the desire to use drugs but he would also desire that this desire motivates him in his action.

Now, Frankfurt's main emphasis is on second-order volitions. They are singled out from other second-order desires by their special status in freedom of volition. It is not sufficient that a creature only desires to have certain desires to realize freedom of volition. Freedom of volition is the freedom of one's effective desires, not merely her

desires. To be free in one's effective desires, one must be desiring to make certain desires effective, not just desiring to have them.

III.ii. Person: A creature that exercises freedom of volition by forming second-order volitions

Frankfurt, in his classical article "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" searches for an essential characteristic pertinent only to persons. He sets persons apart from all other creatures due to their stance concerning freedom of volition. According to him, it is not reasoning but a certain kind of freedom that requires reasoning that is essential to a person. This freedom that only persons realize is freedom of volition for Frankfurt. More clearly, persons as opposed to other creatures are free –to some extent-to have the volitions they want to have. Of freedom of volition, Frankfurt claims:

> Now freedom of action is (roughly at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person enjoys freedom of will [volition] means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means he is free to will what he desires to will [he is free to have the volition he desires to have]...so the question about the freedom of will [volition] has to do with whether it is the will [volition] he wants to have.[14]

Now, Frankfurt focuses on the persons' capacity to form desires to have certain

[14] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.20

volitions as he demarcates them by appealing to their realization of freedom of volition. Persons are concerned with their volitions. Having such a concern, they desire to have certain volitions and desire not to have certain other volitions. They do not merely have effective first-desires that take them all the way to action. Rather, characteristically, they form desires to make certain desires effective (or more effective) and certain others non-effective (or less effective). In a sense only a person may say, "I want to be moved by my desire X not Y". Such desires to make one's first-order desires effective are 'second-order volitions' in Frankfurt's terminology. To put the same point in terms of volitions, a desire to have a certain volition is a 'second-order volition'.

What is clear is that Frankfurt requires a capacity to form second-order volitions for a creature to be a person. What is not clear on the other hand is whether he also requires that the creature in question must in fact be exercising this capacity. Just because a creature can form second-order volitions does not imply that it in fact does. If he only requires the capacity, not its realization, one may conclude then that some persons may not be realizing freedom of volition since they never use their capacity to form second-order volitions. In that sense, a person is a creature that has the *capacity* to realize freedom of volition. It does not have to in fact be realizing any freedom of this kind.

Alternatively, Frankfurt may wish to abide by the view that what is necessary for a creature to be a person is not just having the capacity to form second-order volitions but in fact forming second-order volitions to some extent. The essential characteristic of persons from this perspective is not just the *potency* to realize freedom of volition due to the capacity to form second-order volitions. Rather, it is the *realization* of freedom of volition due to in fact forming second-order volitions. What underlies the divergence

between persons and other creatures would then be that they do realize freedom of volition to some extent. The following lines of Frankfurt may be taken to hint at his position regarding the essential characteristics of persons. He claims, "When a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is either the will [volition] he wants or a will [volition] he wants to be without. When a wanton acts, it is neither."[15] Relying on these lines, one may assume that Frankfurt also holds that a person is a creature that realizes her freedom of volition to some extent by forming second-order volitions. Whatever Frankfurt's position may be concerning the essential characteristics of persons, he explicitly claims that forming second-order volitions is necessary for one's realization of freedom of volition.

Frankfurt's account of freedom does not conclusively explain what freedom of volition is or what it consists in. It does not encompass all the conditions necessary for one's realization of such freedom either. Yet, it has an enduring significance and an influential posture among other accounts. What underlies the worth of the account is the necessary condition that Frankfurt proposes for freedom of volition: forming second-order volitions. Frankfurt mainly highlights that only if one considers whether she really desires to be moved by a certain desire, may she be said to be realizing her freedom of volition. This condition, as I will explain, primarily emphasizes a certain kind of activity that involves self-participation in determining by which desires one is to be moved. I will discuss just what this activity may consist in, in the following sections. My intent is to modify and use this necessary condition put forward by Frankfurt to construct a Neo-Frankfurtian account of freedom of volition. In doing this, I will search for further

[15] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.19

necessary conditions, those that are implied by this condition, especially considering their explanatory power in relation to changing one's self in a desired way. Let me begin my investigation by asking whether it is sufficient that one forms second-order volitions to realize her freedom of volition.

IV. The insufficiency of formation of second-order volitions for realization of freedom of volition

Even if one assumes that a creature desires to have certain volitions from time to time, it may well be the case that every time she forms desires to have certain volitions, she cannot bring herself to in fact *have* those volitions that she desires to have. It is not hard to imagine, in other words, a person who keeps failing to make some of her first-order desires effective even though she desires to make them effective. Consider the following scenario:

> Colonel Smith desires to resign from the army and start a whole new life. He is not happy with himself at all because he understands that who he has become is shaped by the values of the army he belongs to. He comes to believe that most of his effective desires could be a result of a deeply rooted loyalty to the values of the army. Thereupon, he decides to make a new start. He settles on an intention to resign from the army and begin his new life by getting rid of his old effective desires. He desires other desires to be effective and hence constitute his volitions. The first effective desire he desires to have, consequently, is to resign from the

army. Getting away from the environment, he believes, will help him in having the new volitions he desires to have. Yet, Colonel Smith, being intensely exposed to the life of the army, cannot bring himself to make his desire to resign from the army effective. Likewise, he cannot bring himself to have any of the volitions he desires to have. He does realize that he is acting upon the desires that he does not wish to be motivated by. However, he cannot change himself, not a bit, in the way he desires to.

Now, Colonel Smith, being able to form second-order volitions, cannot realize any freedom of volition due to lacking the volitions he desires to *have*. In short, he does not *have* the volitions he desires to have. To the contrary, he has the volitions he desires not to have. Now, just as merely desiring to do something, say, desiring to make a speech, is not sufficient for in fact realizing freedom of action, merely desiring to have a volition, say, desiring to have the volition to quit the army, is not sufficient for realizing freedom of volition. Just as one must also make the speech she wants to, to realize her freedom of action, one must also have the volition to quit the army, to realize his freedom of volition. Thus, Colonel Smith will realize his freedom of volition when he adopts the volition to quit the army. Whether Frankfurt sticks to this position is questionable. It seems he only hints at it by saying " It is securing the conformity of his will [volition] to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will."[16] No matter what Frankfurt's position may be, due to the reasons above, I shall construe the realization of one's freedom of volition to require both a

[16] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.20

second-order volition and a first-order volition that is in agreement with the second-order one.

V. The conformity of first-order volitions with second-order volitions

V.i. Coincidental agreements and reason related agreements

In addition to desiring to have certain volitions of the first order, as I have explained, one must in fact have the volitions of the first order that she desires if she is to realize any freedom of volition. What I have brought to the surface is that one's second-order volitions and first-order volitions must be in agreement. However, what I have not yet shed light on is whether it matters *how* this agreement is accomplished. Perhaps, there are more ways than I will introduce here. Yet, for the purpose of this thesis, I will consider only three. Let me begin by exemplifying *coincidental agreements*.

Let us assume that Wendy has a genuine desire to have the volition to eat healthy food. One afternoon, she is invited to meet her high-school friends at a restaurant. Having a desire to have the volition to eat healthy food,
she desires to have the volition to order a vegetable plate. Entirely by coincidence, the volition she acts upon is to order the vegetable plate. The reason why she has such a volition of the first-order though, has nothing to with her desire to have this volition. It may for instance be because she is attracted to the way the vegetable plate is depicted in the menu, or because her body has not enjoyed vegetables for a long time etc. As a

result, Wendy orders a plate of vegetables. Now, the first-order volition and the second-order volition she has are in agreement. However, it is in virtue of a happy coincidence that they conform. I believe these cases justify the demand for building a relationship between first-order volitions and second-order volitions such that forming one is the reason for forming the other. If they are not linked this way, a person with effective first-order desires will be acting upon them just like a wanton that is not free in its volitions. Even if she forms second-order volitions, she still acts upon her first-order volitions independently of her second-order volitions. In other words, in making her first-order desires effective, second-order volitions play no role. Therefore, Wendy cannot be said to realize any freedom of volition. This gives rise to another way in which one's second-order volitions and first-order volitions conform. By contrast with coincidental agreements, this time the two are in conformity because they are, unlike in coincidental agreements, reason related.

Reason related agreements may take place in two further ways. Either the reason why one forms a second-order volition is because she has a first-order desire to be satisfied or the reason why one makes a first-order desire effective is because she has a second-order volition. Let me call the agreements that correspond to the former way, 'down-to-up reason related agreements' and the ones that correspond to the latter way. 'up-to-down reason related agreements'. Harman may be viewed as depicting down-to-up reason related agreements by appealing to intentions. Briefly, he holds that all creatures that manifest purposeful actions may be taken to adopt intentions. He concedes that as a creature forms an intention to do something, it also intends to make its intention effective because it believes that only if its intention is effective can it do what it intends

to do. So, for Harman, it also intends to make its intention effective.[17] Now, since all intentions are first-order desires, though not vice versa, in order to make certain first-order desires effective, according to Harman, one forms second-order volitions. Let me clarify Harman's point by using one of the characters in a famous classic, The Little Prince: the boa constrictor.

As you might remember, the boa constrictor swallows an elephant. Let us assume then that before it swallows the elephant, it in fact intends to do so. To intend to do something, for Harman, is a kind of desire that guides one in bringing about an event of a certain sort; in short, it guides one in making an event one's action. So, the boa constrictor does not merely desire to swallow the elephant if it intends to swallow it. It also sets itself a goal, that is, swallowing the elephant, and it thinks of a plan to achieve this goal. For Harman, part of this plan is to intend to make this intention effective because it is not rational for the person to adopt an intention to do X without adopting an intention to make that intention effective.[18] In a sense, once one intends to do something, one also intends to make one's intention effective. Accordingly the boa constrictor that intends to swallow an elephant in The Little Prince may be said to adopt a desire to make its intention to swallow the elephant effective.

For Harman, an intention both implies and is implied by a second-order volition. So, it may not be appropriate to claim that what he depicts is in fact a down-to-up reason related agreement. It is not just that the boa constrictor forms a second-order volition because it has an intention to swallow the elephant. More strongly, its forming a second-order volition is implied by its intention to swallow the elephant. I do not wish to argue

[17] Harman, G. (2000) pp.125-126.
[18] ibid.p.123

in favor of Harman's defense of this implication here. Yet, I believe, it is plausible to assume, relying on the example above, that some animals' as well as some human beings' second-order volitions and first-order volitions may conform in a down-to-up reason related way. However, this kind of an agreement is not the kind of agreement required for one's realization of freedom of volition. Though Frankfurt ignores such Harmanian cases he states,

> Nothing in the concept of a wanton [such as the boa constrictor] implies that he cannot reason or that he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do. What distinguishes the rational wanton [that lacks freedom of volition] from other rational agents [that realize freedom of volition to some extent] is that he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires themselves.[19]

Now, when a creature reflects on her first-order desires just to seek the ways to make them effective and forms second-order volitions as a means to make those first-order desires effective, it is a wanton being moved by the desires it has. There is no difference between a creature using its feet to make its desire to hunt a prey effective and using its mind to form a second-order volition to make its desire effective. In this process, the question whether it desires to be moved by this desire or not does not even arise. On the other hand, if it had realized its freedom to some extent, its desire to have a certain volition would be prior. That is, first it would desire to be moved by a certain desire, based on certain reasons as I will explain in the following sections, and this would be why it would make its desire effective or create the desire it desires to be

[19] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.17

moved by. In the above story, the boa constrictor does not make its desire to swallow the elephant effective *because* it reflects on it and considers that desire to be one of those desires that it desires to be moved by. It makes the desire effective, without caring about which volitions it acts upon, and just to make it effective it forms a desire to make it effective. Consequently, down-to-up reason related agreements must be eliminated and second-order volitions formed in this way must be rendered necessary for realization of freedom of volition. This brings us to another kind of agreements that may take place between one's second-order volitions and first-order volitions. *Up-to-down reason related agreements,* unlike the down-to-up reason related ones, as I shall show, are necessary for one's realization of freedom of volition. Harman ignores this possibility and hence undervalues the role of second-order volitions in Frankfurt's account of freedom. Indeed, one may agree with Harman concerning the dispute on the necessity of *all kinds of second-order volitions* but, the necessity of certain kinds of second-order volitions, namely, those that take place in *up-to-down reason related agreements,* is still indisputable. Let me then focus attention on these special second-order volitions by modifying Frankfurt's theory. Consider how Joaquin makes a first-order desire of his effective.

> Joaquin is an experienced nature photographer. He takes extreme pleasure in being in dangerous positions as he takes photographs. He is attracted, therefore, to take photographs of wild animals. For him this desire is irresistible. Whenever he is off for a trip, he is motivated especially by the desire to capture a pose of wild animals such as pythons. He does not take any time off before he launches himself to a hazardous location from which he can seize the perfect pose with a

perfect angle. However, one day he learns that he is going to be a father. He begins to reflect on the ways he is moved. Especially he comes to realize that his effective desire to be face to face with wild animals causes him to take huge risks concerning his survival. Since he desires to live as long as he can, to protect and love his child that will be born, he decides that he should not let himself be dragged by the force of this desire. He imagines himself as a caring father and hence forms a desire to get rid of this effective desire. Instead, he desires to be moved by the desire to watch over his own safety especially at work. Finally, he succeeds in making this new desire effective.

In the scenario above, Joaquin is not like the boa constrictor that did not care about the desirability of his first-order desire. Unlike the boa constrictor, he questioned whether it is the desire to have the pleasure of taking photographs of wild animals by which he desires to be moved. Learning that he will have a life-long responsibility due to his immanent fatherhood, he decided that he does not want to be moved by this desire any more. First, he formed a desire to watch over his own safety at work and then he desired to be moved by this new desire. Thereby, he formed a second-order volition. The reason why he made this new first-order desire effective was because he desired to make it effective and realized his freedom of volition to some extent. To be sure, Joaquin's second-order volition is why he makes his first-order desire effective because his second-order volition stems from a value judgment, namely his judgment that caring for his child is valuable. However, for the time being let the second-order volition count as part of the reason why he makes his desire to watch over his own safety effective. I shall return to the source of these special second-order volitions later on.

Provided that one in fact makes a first-order desire effective, one may form a second-order volition to conform to that first-order volition in two ways. While the former way is down-to-up reason related, the latter is up-to down reason related. As I have argued, only if the agreement between one's second-order volitions and first-order volitions is made by appealing to the latter way, can one realize her freedom of volition. Before I single out the second-order volitions that are necessary for one's freedom of volition using up-to-down reason related agreement, I need to point out a difficulty that stems from acknowledging the fact that merely desiring to make a first-order desire effective is insufficient to make it effective. If so, there is no agreement since one of the parties is absent. To be clear, there will be no first-order volition to agree with the second-order volition. What kind of a desire then should one have so that she can make her first-order desire effective?

V.ii. Second-order volitions and effective second-order volitions

As I have put forward by the help of a scenario involving Colonel Smith (in section IV), the fact that a person has a second-order volition does not imply that he has a first-order volition. Now, there may be at least two reasons why a person may lack the first-order volition: either one may not have the first-order desire to begin with or one may have the first-order desire but that desire may not be effective. Consider another scenario for these two possibilities:

> Camille desires to have the volition to move to another city. She believes that environments that a person may be surrounded by imprison the person after a

while. She believes that whenever she stays at a place longer than approximately two years, she begins to adopt the values of the institutions she works at and of the people she is in relation with. She believes that then she cannot question herself, her relations and her values objectively. Instead, she observes herself to be making decisions in accordance with their values, and trying to be recognized by them etc. Thus she decides that she will change her environment even if she seems to lack such a desire at the time of change. Now that the time of change has come, having spent two years in the city in which she has been living, she desires to have the volition to move to another city. However, she does not even have the desire to move. This depicts one of the ways why and how a person may desire to have a volition but lack the first-order volition that would conform to it. Camille has a second-order volition to move to another city but does not even have the first-order desire to do so.

Another way to lack the first-order volition, as in Colonel Smith's case, is to have the first-order desire that will be in agreement with the second-order volition but be unsuccessful in making it effective, i.e. a volition. Suppose that Camille does in fact desire to move to another city. She also desires to make this desire of hers effective on the basis of her earlier decision. However, being affected by the people around her that urge her to stay, she just cannot make her desire to leave effective. Briefly, she has the second-order volition but lacks the first-order volition although she has the first-order desire.

Let us assume that the second-order volition Camille had was an effective one. This would imply that her desire to have the volition to leave is effective. Unlike her

second-order volition, her effective second-order volition implies that she has an effective first-order desire provided that the conditions of the world do not hinder her. Just as a first-order desire is effective when one *acts upon it* provided that the conditions of the world cooperate, a second-order volition is then effective when *one acts upon* it provided that the conditions of the world cooperate. Acting upon a second-order volition is nothing but adopting the first-order volition given that nothing hinders one.

It is clear that the conditions of the world that could prevent one from *acting upon* a first-order volition may not be the same kinds of conditions that could prevent one from *adopting* a certain volition. One's bumping into me may interfere with my acting upon my volition to walk on a straight line. However, it is unlikely that it interferes with my adopting a volition to walk on a straight line. Moreover, it looks like the impediments to having a volition often concern other desires, beliefs, emotions of the person that do not count as conditions of the world at all.

A good example of an obstruction that one may face in adopting a certain volition would perhaps be some limitations of time. One may agree that if we do not find enough time to adopt a certain volition, even if we effectively desire to adopt it, we may fail. For instance, let us assume that a person merely desires to choose another profession. However, she is so busy with her current profession that she hardly finds time to think about herself and her future. When everyone is quiet just for a moment at work, she remembers that she has such a desire and she effectively desires to make herself have the volition, not just the desire, to change her profession. However to do that, she needs time to really understand the worth of changing her profession. Lacking the time to work on herself, she fails to bring herself to effectively desire to pursue

another profession. Had she had enough time, she would make her desire her volition in virtue of effectively desiring to make it so.

Let me now distinguish the second-order volitions that are necessary for freedom of volition from all others. Up until now, I attempted to establish the fact that these second-order volitions should conform to first-order volitions in an up-to-down reason related way. I argued that unless they are effective, such an agreement does not take place. Since merely desiring to have a volition is not sufficient to have it, one then lacks the first-order volition that is supposed to agree with the second-order volition. So, first, the second-order volition in one's realization of freedom of volition must be *effective*. However, second-order volitions that are involved in down-to-up reason related agreements may be effective too given that they help cause the first-order volition. Recall the boa constrictor for instance. Unless it effectively desires to make its intention to swallow the elephant, its intention cannot become effective. To simplify things, let me call the effective second-order volitions that are necessary for one's realization of freedom of volition 'creative effective second-order volitions' and others like the boa's 'impulsive effective second-order volitions'. Furthermore, since this distinction has not been made earlier, it should be understood that whenever I speak of second-order volitions in characterizing freedom of volition, I have in mind creative effective second-order volitions. Lastly, since creative effective second-order volitions imply that the person adopts the first-order volition given that the conditions of the world cooperate, the reader may assume that whenever I mention someone's adoption of a creative effective second-order volition, there will also be a first-order volition that is in conformity with it.

VI.Deeper into creative effective second-order volitions

VI.i. Identifying with first-order desires

In highlighting the necessity of creative effective second-order volitions for freedom of volition, Frankfurt introduces a new notion that has influenced both his followers and his critics. He appeals to this notion, namely, *identification,* to attribute a special status to creative effective second-order volitions in freedom of volition. At the outset, he proposes that what one does through creative effective second-order volitions is to *identify* with certain first-order desires. As he gives the example of an unwilling addict that actualizes his freedom of volition due to his success in refraining from taking drugs in virtue of forming a creative effective second-order volition (to actualize his desire to refrain from taking drugs), Frankfurt concedes, "The unwilling addict identifies himself,.., through the formation of a second-order volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-order desires."[20]

Watson, complaining that this notion is unexplained and just presupposed in Frankfurt's theory of freedom of volition, associates the notion with one of the fundamental elements he declares to be inevitable for any theory of freedom. He declares this element to be the 'self-determination' element.[21] At the outset, Watson may seem right in associating the notion of identification with self-determination, since Frankfurt mentions that it is in virtue of identifying with a certain desire that one makes it more truly his own. Then, first let me lay down Frankfurt's view concerning self-

[20] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.18
[21] Watson, G. (1987) pp.145-149

determination and then explain why Watson's assumption that Frankfurt's notion of identification is invoked to capture the self-determination element does not completely capture what Frankfurt seems to have in mind. What is this self-determination element that needs to be present in all kinds of freedom?

Take a person that actualizes her freedom of action. Whatever one's theory of freedom of action may be, it must grant us that the action performed by the person is something *she* does. She must actively be involved in acting the way she does. Certainly, it must be an action she desires to perform but also a condition must ensure that the action performed in part result from her active participation. This element that grants that the action is done by the person's active participation is 'self-determination' in Watson's terminology. To exemplify, if I desire to raise my hand but someone else raises my hand, I cannot be said to actualize any freedom of action. It is true that my hand is raised and that is the event that I wanted to come about but I did not merely want an event to happen, namely, my hand to rise, rather I wanted *myself* to be *the one* who made the difference, that is, I wanted that it is *me* who raised my hand.

Similarly, this self-determination element must take its place in freedom of volition, too. Diverging from freedom of action, what are to be free in this case are not one's actions but one's effective desires, i.e. the desires that will or would take one to action if the conditions of the world cooperate. Then, an effective desire that I effectively desire to have, due to the self-determination element, must result from my active participation. *I* must be doing something more with my first-order desire than merely making it effective that manifests my participation. So some condition must ensure that I am the one who makes the difference. It must ensure that I am actively involved in making a first-order desire effective. So, according to Watson, the

identification condition is the one that assures the person's active involvement. If and only if one identifies with a certain first-order desire, she may be said to be actively participating in its actualization when she makes it effective. From Watson's perspective, one may claim, that this is why Frankfurt employs identification. Yet, as he concedes, nothing sheds light on what it is about identifying with a desire that exactly manifests the person's active participation. To clarify this, I believe, we must first elaborate and develop Frankfurt's notion of active participation.

Now, I would like to remind the reader of formation of impulsive effective second-order volitions in Harmanian cases. A human being that intends to do something, say, to earn more money, may also actively participate by making a plan concerning how to achieve his goal. He is not immediately drawn to the satisfaction of his desire as he would be drawn to quench his thirst. He takes his time, makes a plan to figure out the best ways to actualize his intention. As Harman argues, as he intends to earn money, he also intends to make this intention of his effective. Recall that I called such second-order volitions *impulsive effective second-order volitions* and argued that they are not the effective second-order volitions necessary for surpassing wantonness. This man was not concerned with the desirability of his intention to earn more money; he has not made his intention effective because he effectively desired to make it effective. Hence, the way he acted upon his volition still exemplifies wantonness. However, one may point out how he made his volition his action and defend the position that he *actively participated* in bringing about his action. If Frankfurt had just construed active participation as becoming conscious of a desire and reflecting on it to seek the efficient ways for its satisfaction, he would not have introduced the notion of identification. As a matter of fact, as he concedes that "nothing in the concept of a wanton implies that he cannot

reason or that he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what he wants to do", he seems to hint at a different kind of participation that is required in becoming a person, a creature that exercises freedom of volition to some extent. Apparently, the *kind* of active participation involved in identification must then be more than what I have described above. Then let me proceed to investigate what kind of an active participation Frankfurt may have in mind as he introduces his notion of identification.

VI.ii. Identifying with certain desires: acknowledging that their actualization manifests who one desires to become

According to Frankfurt, some first-order desires are just 'found' within and some others are created by the person. He explains that this is analogous to having thoughts. He claims that some thoughts do not occur by our own active doing. Of these thoughts he states "It is tempting, indeed, to suggest that they are not thoughts that we think at all, but rather thoughts that we find within us…we do not participate actively in their occurrence."[22] How can one participate actively in the *occurrence* of a desire then? I assume by creating it based on a prior reason. Furthermore, for one's realization of freedom of volition, what must be created through creative effective second-order volitions is not certain desires; rather it is certain volitions. So, from now on I will assume that what one identifies with are volitions, not desires. In one of his recent replies to his critics Frankfurt too highlights the act of creating a desire as the main component of identifying with a desire:

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[22] Frankfurt, H. (1988) p.59

> ...many of our desires [including volitions], far from being urges or impulses to which we are passively subject, are actually created by us: we decide that this or that appeals to us; we make up our minds that we want it. In such cases, our identification with the desire [volition] is built into the very creation of the desire [volition].[23]

What is it to create a volition then? What does it involve? Let me attempt to answer these questions first and then let me investigate where identifying with certain volitions may be located in this picture.

As Frankfurt sets persons apart from wantons, he does not merely emphasize the fact that persons are the ones that form creative effective second-order volitions. He also notes that persons engage in this activity precisely because they are concerned about which desires they are moved by. Now, perhaps a better way to put this is, that persons when compared to other creatures have an *effective desire to change* themselves. They do not merely accept themselves the way they experience themselves. They do not simply act upon their strongest inclinations. Instead, they believe that they can change themselves in certain ways. One of these ways is pertinent to the volitions they are moved by. A person, by contrast with other creatures, creates new volitions to make sure that they *manifest who she desires to become.* Identification comes into the picture at this point. *In order to change one's self in a desired way*, one *actively participates* in the occurrence of new volitions. First, she has this concern about which desires she is moved by. Then, having such a concern, she imagines herself as having various volitions to figure out which ones manifest who she desires to become. *Only if she believes that what she imagines in fact manifests the person she desires to become* does she *identify*

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[23] Frankfurt, H. edit. Buss S. and Overton L. (2002) p.185

with those volitions as she creates them by forming creative effective second-order volitions. Let me provide an example.

> Consider for instance a teacher, say Anna, who finds a desire to be romantically involved with many of her male students. Frankfurt's approach does not extend as far as to declare that this desire does not belong to the teacher. As far as the subject experiencing the desire is concerned, this desire is Anna's. However, in another sense, it is not hers because she *does not want to be a person who either has this desire or who actualizes* it. When she *imagines* having made this desire effective she realizes that the Anna who actualizes this desire is not the person she desires to be.[24] Instead, she imagines herself as having a volition to quit being romantically involved with her students. Unlike the former volition, this volition does manifest who she desires to become and hence she *identifies* with it. *Effectively desiring to change,* Anna withdraws from the desire she has and creates a new volition she identifies with, that is, the volition to quit being romantically involved with her students.

This scenario demonstrates the significance of the kind of active participation the person makes to realize her freedom of volition. Anna is not just concerned with the

[24] In fact Velleman disagrees with Frankfurt's contention that the object of one's identification is a desire. He holds that in ordinary parlance we take the object of identification to be a person, not an aspect of a person. In doing this, he argues that we imagine being that person. So, perhaps Frankfurt may wish to defend the position that in fact what we imagine is not just making that desire effective but rather being a person who has such a volition. Then, the object of our identification would be perhaps the person we would like to become. Just as we may identify with certain fictitious characters as Velleman concedes, one may agree that we may create a self-conception that differs from who we believe we are now and we may imagine what it is to be like that person. For further discussion see Velleman, D. edit. Buss S. and Overton L. (2002) pp.91-124.

satisfaction of certain desires. She is concerned with what to do with herself by being concerned with which volitions she is moved by. As Frankfurt notes, for a wanton, a desire is a problem regarding how to satisfy it, for a person, a desire is a problem regarding what to do with it. But why? I believe, because only a person has a concern about changing herself. I will have suggestive remarks about the source of this concern later. But for now, let me content myself with proclaiming that the kind of active participation and thereby identifying with certain volitions, that may either be taken as overflowing the boundaries of the self-determination element or as drawing them, must be construed as *being actively involved in creating new volitions due to acknowledging that they manifest who one desires to become.*

Now, a satisfactory account of identification and thereby freedom of volition must also spell out the role of certain value judgments that one needs to appeal to as she identifies with new volitions. After all, one needs reasons to identify with certain volitions. One must, in some way, judge that creating a certain volition is valuable. In virtue of this value judgement she identifies with a certain volition. Her identification moreover involves her active participation since she creates it due to her value judgment. Let me continue then by providing a critical exposition of Watson's suggestion for invoking these value judgments.

VII. The relationship between freedom of volition and value judgments:

Non-agental value judgments and agental value judgments

Watson maintains,

> The explanatorily prior notion, then, is that of evaluation…Only evaluations can give one *reasons* to oppose first-order desires [and identify with certain other first-order desires] and only agents' behaviour expresses their evaluations are they sources and 'authors' of (because they are authorized) their behaviour.[25]

He depicts how this evaluation is involved as follows:

> …they [persons] do not (or need not usually) ask themselves which of their desires they want to be effective in action; they ask themselves which course of action is most worth pursuing[26].

To provide a clearer characterization of the kind of evaluation Watson proposes let us consider the following example.

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[25] Watson, G. (1987) p.149
[26] Watson, G. (1982) p.109

> Theodore has grown up in a family that puts being powerful above all. The family construes power to be emergent when one is in possession of loads of money and property. Watching commercials all the time, Theodore learns that there is this adventurous film displayed nearby: "Star Wars". His enthusiasm leads him to go and watch it. However, as Theodore watches the scenes involving the character 'Yoda', he realizes that power may be conceptualized in a totally different way. Theodore understands that Yoda has a different power, one that may be experienced only by someone who incessantly watches himself. He makes the judgment that searching for the kind of power that Yoda experiences is valuable.

Since Theodore values this search, Watson assumes, Theodore will identify with the volition to search for this kind of a power. If Theodore had not employed any value judgments about searching for Yoda's power, why would he identify with the desire to search for that power? For Watson, only Theodore's evaluating the action in question can provide him a reason to oppose the volition to search for the kind of power imposed by his family and identify with the volition to search for the kind of power Yoda possesses. I believe Watson's proposal is deficient in two ways.

First of all, Theodore's value judgment must not merely be about an action; rather, it must be about *his* possible action. More clearly, he must not just value *searching* for a power like Yoda's, but he must value *his* searching for a power like Yoda's. After all, *Theodore* is the one who needs an effective desire to change *himself* to realize *his* freedom of volition. It is not sufficient for him to ask whether pursuing this

action is valuable. What he must ask himself is whether *his* pursuing this action is valuable.

Then we may distinguish two kinds of value judgments depending on the kinds of objects they take. On the one hand, what one may value may not make any reference to one's self, such as an action, a painting, a person, a principle etc. In evaluating these objects one need not consider the relationship she has or she may have with the object. All one needs to do is to consider the worth of an object. For instance, one may judge that pursuing physics is valuable because she may believe that pursuing physics is an activity that may contribute to the articulation of scientific knowledge that humankind is after. Similarly, one may judge that classical music is valuable on the grounds that it reflects the period during which it was composed. Let me call such value judgments 'non-agental value judgments'.

On the other hand, what one may value may be one's personal relation to these objects. To employ the same examples, one may value *her pursuing* physics and *her listening to* classical music. To make such value judgments, unlike non-agental value judgments, one does not merely focus on the worth of the object independently of one's life but rather she reflects on the relationship between her and the object within the framework of her life. Let me call these kinds of value judgments 'agental value judgments'. One kind of agental value judgment is surely pertinent to one's relation to her volitions. One may for instance value her adopting a certain volition, or value her getting rid of another volition, just as Theodore may value his adopting the volition to search for a new kind of power.

Having differentiated non-agental value judgments from agental value judgments, why Watson's suggestion about value judgments is seriously impaired

becomes clear. If we wish to search for a value judgment upon which one identifies with certain volitions, that is, upon which one is actively involved in creating them due to acknowledging that they manifest who one desires to become, certainly we should not seek it among non-agental value judgments. The first reason is that, since identification involves a reflection on the volition with respect to its relation to who one desires to become, the value judgment that awaits being found cannot be just a value judgment about a volition. Theodore must not just judge that searching for Yoda's power is valuable. Rather, he must judge that *his having the volition* is valuable. He must consider whether *his having the volition* manifests who *he* desires to become. One need not consider the worth of his having the volition with respect to who one desires to become when he only considers the worth of *a* volition. Insofar as he considers the worth of *his having the volition* with respect to who *he desires to become*, he has a reason, in Watson's terms, to identify with that volition.

The second deficiency is pertinent to the motivation needed to actively participate in creating the volition in question. This is the other constituent of identification after all. Then the value judgment upon which one identifies with that volition must contain some motivational force to lead the person to create that volition. Watson realizes this deficiency in a more recent article and consequently admits,

> ...it now seems to me that the picture presented here is too rationalistic. For one thing, it conflates valuing with judging good. Notoriously judging good has no invariable connection with motivation...one can in an important sense fail to value what one judges valuable.[27]

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[27] Watson, G. (1987) p.150

It is not at all clear why judging a volition to be valuable should motivate the person to in fact create and adopt it. First of all, one must relate that volition to who he desires to become as indicated above. So, instead of judging it to be valuable, he must judge his having the volition to be valuable. However, this kind of an agental value judgment still does not explain the person's motivation to in fact create that volition. It may only explain his acknowledgment that it manifests who he desires to become. What he need furthermore is an effective desire to change that results in being actively involved by creating the volition that manifests who he desires to become. From now on let me call all those agental value judgments that are about creating certain volitions that manifest who one desires to become 'agental volition value judgments'. What awaits being found then is an answer to the question "What is it that gives agental volition value judgments their motivational force that is required by identification and hence by realization of freedom of volition?"

VIII.Surpassing wantonness by appealing to emotions:

Love for one's desired-self and discontentment due to the gap between the person and her desired-self

I believe all agental volition value judgments may be accommodated by one agental value judgment. More explicitly, it would be plausible to assume that the agental volition value judgments such as "I value my creating the volition to do X", "I value my creating the volition to do Y" etc. to be instantiations of the agental value judgment "I value my becoming the person I desire to become". Since the volition to do X and the

volition to do Y must be manifestations of who I desire to become for me to be realizing my freedom of volition upon creating them, we may take my valuing creating each of those volitions as an exemplification of my valuing becoming the person I desire to become. Then the question that I am seeking an answer to becomes "What is it that underlies my making the judgment that I value my becoming the person I desire to become?" Whatever it is, it should also contain the motivational force required for me to be actively involved in becoming the person I desire to become. That is, it must be in virtue of this motivation that I do not merely judge that my creating them is valuable but also take steps in creating those volitions. Only then is my identification with those volitions and hence my freedom of volition realized. I believe one of the best suggestions would be emotions, due to their embodiment of motivation as well as their close relation to persons' value judgments. Let me spell out which emotion I have in mind and then continue by its depiction: A *discontentment* that arises from one's *loving* her *desired-self* and realizing the gap between her and her beloved desired-self. What is then this beloved object I have called the 'desired-self'?

Just as one may have a certain self-image that reflects who she believes she is, one may create a self-image that reflects who she desires to become. Imagination surely plays one of the major roles in creating such a possible self-image. For instance one may imagine herself as a philosopher. What she imagines is what it is for *her* to become such a person. In order to imagine this, depending on the boundaries of her creativity as well as her former knowledge about philosophers, she may imagine various details of *her* as a philosopher. She imagines herself for instance, acting upon desires such as the desire to ask new philosophical questions, the desire to teach people how to ask the right questions at the right time. Her imagination may also work on other details such as not

wearing the suits she does as she goes to work, not having friends that talk about their careers all the time, not spending her time just to earn money etc. In a sense, she imagines herself conducting her life as she would if she were a philosopher from now on. She imagines seeing her world in the eyes of another self-conception, one that she does not have at the moment. She may of course entertain many possible self-conceptions in this way. Moreover, these possible self-images will not be complete since she cannot imagine every little detail about that image. Some of them may not even count as self-conceptions if the person imagines herself as having just one insignificant attribute. For instance, merely imagining that she eats ice cream by the seashore will not be sufficient for her to create a new self-conception. Perhaps we may require that she imagine conducting her life in light of new values or in light of a different ranking among her values. The image she entertains must be such that she must be prepared to say "I would be a different person if I had lived that way". Of course if she has a significant ice-cream phobia that she cannot get rid of, perhaps imagining her eating ice cream by the seashore may work as a different self-conception.

In any case, as one creates possible self-conceptions this way, one may come to love one of them. Now, one may be so affected by that self-image that she may develop a concern for it just as she may develop a concern for a physically existent person in her life. In other words, she may come to value a certain self-conception in such a way that it prompts a desire to be interested in its flourishing by modifying it, a desire to develop her relationship with it by being with it. Let that self-image be one's 'desired-self'. In fact what she loves may be said to be the fictitious person depicted by a self-conception to be more precise. Yet, for the sake of simplicity, let me refer to that fictitious person by the term 'desired-self'.

Some philosophers such as the Stoics and neo-Stoics like Martha Nussbaum find the fact that one invests the object of love with some worth so tempting that they claim that love is nothing but one's judging that the object (of love) is valuable for her.[28] Some others like Descartes claim that love is generated in part by that judgment. He states, "Love is an excitation [emotion] of the soul caused by the movement of the spirits which incites it to join itself in volition to objects which appear to be suitable [valuable] to it."[29] Whatever the relationship between one's value judgment about the object at hand and her love for it may be, there is some kind of valuing or concern for the object embodied in love.

Furthermore, commonly love has a different status among other emotions. It is attributed a fundamental status among other emotions since many other emotions are derived from it. For instance, when you judge that something threatens what you love dearly you have fear, when you judge that what you love has died, you have grief, when she flourishes you have joy, when she is insulted you have indignation, when she is benefited you have gratitude etc.[30] This is why some philosophers like Robert Roberts defend the unique position that love is not an emotion but a "disposition to a range of emotions"[31]. For the purpose of this thesis, all I have to assume is that love presupposes, is caused by, results in or is, a special kind of *concern for* or a special kind of ascribing *worth to* the object.

In brief, when and if a person comes to love the desired-self that she created, she develops a deep concern for it just as she develops a deep concern for other objects of

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[28] See Seneca trans. Cooper, Procope. (2000) and Nussbaum, M.C. (2001) pp.19-89.
[29] Descartes, R. trans. S. Voss (1985) p.62
[30] See Roberts, R.C. (1988) p.203
[31] ibid. p.191

her love. Just as she values developing her relationships with the other objects of her love, she values developing her relationship with her desired-self. Just as she concerns herself with what happens to the other objects of her love, she concerns herself with what happens to her desired-self. Especially, she concerns herself with the flourishing of her object of love. I assume that the flourishing of the desired-self consists in its actualization and its continuous modification. So, the person that loves her desired-self will concern herself with the actualization of her desired-self. But actualization of her desired-self is in fact her becoming the person portrayed by her desired-self. Thereby, her love for her desired-self may be said to give rise to her valuing her becoming the person she desires to become. This love relation then explains the agental value judgment "I value becoming the person that I desire to become" that is instantiated in realizations of freedom of volition. In fact all the agental volition value judgments that take part in instances of one's realization of freedom of volition may be seen as the instantiations of the agental value judgment "I value becoming the person that I desire to become". For instance one's value judgment that her having the volition to become a philosopher is valuable is an instantiation of her valuing becoming a person who is a philosopher. One may agree that all such valued volitions manifest who one desires to become. However, all by itself this love relation does not shed light on the motivation needed to be in fact actively involved in becoming the person that I desire to become.

One of the best sources of motivation to change in a desired way is perhaps a kind of suffering that emerges upon realizing who one believes she is. The person that loves her desired-self and thereby values having those volitions that manifest it reflects on who she believes she is, the volitions she has and she lacks, to estimate the gap between her and the object she loves, namely, her desired-self. This realization of

freedom together with her love generates or is, a certain kind of emotion that I will call 'discontentment'. My preference for discontentment over mere sorrow (sadness) or grief has a point.

Both in sadness and in grief, the beliefs that are involved are similar. Basically, one values an object but the valued object is harmed in some way. Typically, grief occurs when a beloved person dies. This may suggest two things about the difference between grief and sadness. First, it may be that the person who has grief as opposed to a person who is just sad, judges that what has happened to the object of her love is irrevocable. She believes, in other words, that her loss will last forever. Second, one may also suggest that the person who has grief values the object that is harmed in some way a lot more or with more intensity compared to the person who is merely sad. Solomon states that grief is experienced over a traumatic loss whereas sadness is experienced over just a loss.[32] What makes a loss traumatic, I believe, may be either or both of the suggestions above. If one's beloved mother catches cold and has fever for several weeks, it is plausible to assume that she will be only sad. On the other hand, if a pianist that does not value or love playing the piano to the extent, say, she loves her child loses her right hand, she may not experience grief, her loss may not be traumatic for her.

However these two emotions may be differentiated, what seems crucial to both of their natures is that they require that the person believes that the object in question is harmed by certain conditions that are not seemingly under her control. For if she believes that she could have prevented that harm, she suffers from remorse or repentance or the like. Now, going back to the love a person may have for her desired-self, what she

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[32] Solomon, R.C. (1993) p.297

believes is not that some conditions that are not seemingly under her control have harmed her beloved desired-self.[33] So the kind of suffering cannot be the kind of suffering she has when her beloved mother is sick or when she dies. Rather, what she believes is that the way she believes she is right now is far away -to some extent- from the way depicted by her beloved desired-self. More clearly, she is not who she desires to become.

A tinge of this suffering may be found at those moments when one realizes that she is not writing the way she desires to write. She is not expressing herself the way she would like to. Or, one may imagine how a pianist that is devoted to playing the piano with love suffers when she realizes that she is not conveying her imaginary story involving various emotions at a concert. For the writer and the pianist such a suffering may be momentary and situational. A suffering that has a wider scope with a deeper intensity may occur, when someone realizes that she is not translating who she desires to become into her life. Once she realizes that she is not living in accordance with who she desires to become, she suffers from being stuck in a meaningless life. This is why, I believe, discontentment captures the emotion that I would like to capture much better than just sadness or grief. Let us then turn to this kind of discontentment.

Although the emotion contentment has been appreciated to a great deal by those philosophers who attempt to portray the nature of emotions, the emotion that is in the opposite direction, namely, discontentment, has not received much attention. So, let me provide Solomon's exposition of contentment to infer a rough sketch about discontentment. Of contentment Solomon states,

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[33] One may of course have grief if she believes that she has done everything to become the way depicted by her desired-self but the conditions of the world keep preventing her to become that way.

> As an emotion, contentment is an affirmation of a state of affairs, an acceptance of oneself or some aspect of oneself. It is as if to say "Now my world is as it ought to be" or "I am satisfied with myself". In the revolutionary sense, such emotions [as contentment] have no ideology (in the dubious sense that you might say that a reactionary politician has no ideology); there is no desire to change.[34]

Now then, discontentment must involve making the judgment "Now my world is not as it ought to be" or "I am not satisfied with myself" and it must prompt an effective desire to change.

Relying on these assumptions, one may agree that when one reflects on herself and realizes that there is a gap between her and her desired-self, she comes to realize that her beloved object is not actualized to the extent she desires it to be actualized. In fact, if it were, she could not have created a desired-self. Suffering from discontentment, she judges "I am not satisfied with who I am" and she effectively desires to change herself in accordance with her desired-self. Now that she realizes it is herself that stands in the way of the actualization of her beloved desired-self, she suffers deeply and is motivated to do anything to make her desired-self flourish in this way. Now, she does not only value becoming the person she desires to become but she also is motivated to actively participate in creating the volitions that manifest who she desires to become. I believe it is by means of such a discontentment, that one may surpass her wantonness in becoming a person who in fact realizes her freedom of volition.

There may be a significant objection that is worth considering about invoking emotions in a theory of freedom of volition. Now, recall that the kind of freedom that

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[34] Solomon, R.C. (1993) p.235

Frankfurt attempts to capture is a kind of freedom that only persons as opposed to wantons realize. A wanton, as Frankfurt portrays it, is a creature that is simply drawn to act upon its strongest inclinations without questioning whether they manifest who she desires to become. It is not concerned with changing itself; rather, it obeys the demands of its desires. It is a passive bystander, not an active participant, regarding its volitions. The way wantonness is construed may suggest that a person that acts upon her emotions may be a wanton as well. This is a wanton that is a passive bystander concerning its emotions this time, not its desires. In fact, Bennett Helm uses the term 'emotional wanton' as he depicts it in the following way:

> Although emotional wantons can care about [love] things in the world, they do not concern themselves with what they care about [with what they love]- about where their hearts lie. Persons, on the other hand, because they can concern themselves with their hearts [their love] and can deliberate about what hearts to have [what to love], have the potential for a difference between the heart they think worth having and the heart they in fact have...[35]

Relying on the reasons above, one may argue that requiring a certain kind of love for freedom of volition is to require being an emotional wanton. Although a wanton that is a passive bystander with respect to its desires differs from a wanton that is a passive bystander with respect to its emotions, still, suggesting one kind of wantonness to surpass another kind of wantonness does not seem credible. However, my proposal is not to require all emotions or even all kinds of love. The emotion that I claim to be necessary is a specific kind of love. As I called it, it is a desired-self love.

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[35] Helm, B. W. (2001) p.246

Now, it is true that we may not participate actively in the occurrence of many emotions. For instance, we do not actively participate in the occurrence of our anger at someone. On the contrary, most of the time we wish we had not experienced it.[36] However, there are other emotions that are exceptional in this way. We may actively participate in the occurrence of certain emotions such as the emotion I put forward, desired-self love. As I have mentioned, we imagine various self-conceptions and then develop a concern for the person depicted by our conception of desired-self. So, we even actively participate in the occurrence of our object of love. Furthermore, we are continually concerned with modifying it since we value its flourishing. Then, unlike an emotional wanton, we do concern ourselves with what we love. We do not create our desired-self once for all and then become enslaved by its demands. Rather, we keep on modifying it relying on the incoming experience and knowledge.

There are two major objections concerning the kind of motivation I have proposed for the realization of one's freedom in this thesis. The first one revolves around the desired-self I introduced. Suppose that one reports that she is satisfied with who she believes she is and all she is concerned with is helping other people. One may argue that such a person may still realize her freedom since she is creating volitions that are in conformity with her desired volitions. This kind of objection stems from taking one's desired-self to convey an egoistic picture of how one desires to live. One's desired-self need not just portray what one can become by using what the conditions of the world offer her. One may desire to become a person who helps other people, one may desire to

[36] According to Spinoza, the more we learn the causes that underlie our actions the more such emotions are diminished. See further discussion Spinoza, B. (1985).

devote her life to someone or some profession, one may even desire to become a person who satisfies other's needs and desires. Each of these aspects may be constituent of one's desired-self. To go back to the person that reports that she is content with herself but concerned with helping other people, it would be plausible to suggest that she still realizes the gap between who she believes she is and who she desires to become. She desires to become a person who helps people. Her desired-self depicts her as creating new volitions to help as many people as possible. So, her discontentment is still present because she still is not the person who she desires to become. To get closer to become who she desires to become, she has to keep on creating new and more volitions to realize such a desired-self.

The other objection concerns the strength of the motivational force that is derived from the discontentment. It is clear that the strength or the power changes in accordance with the distance between who one believes she is and who one desires to become. If this distance it too long, in other words, if one believes that who she desires to become is too far away from who she believes she is, the motivation that this gap would have created may be outweighed by the force of hopelessness. She may even be driven to suicide by despairing over a perceived inability to change. On the other hand, if the distance between who one believes she is and who one desires to become is very short, the motivation that this gap would have given rise to may be outweighed by a pleasure of success or by pride.

It is not just the distance between who one believes she is and the person depicted by one's desired-self that has an effect on one's motivation to change herself. For instance one's fear of attempting a change may screen out the motivation needed to change herself. Even if all one has to do is to create just one new volition to become who

she desires to become, her fear may prevent her from using that motivation to create that volition to change. Then, it is not just how many steps one has to take to get to her desired-self that plays a role in the sort of motivation required by freedom; it is also one's beliefs and emotions related to those steps that are to be taken to become who one desires to become. These beliefs and emotions that have a great impact on the strength of the motivation to change one's self need further elaboration.[37] Perhaps, due to such elaboration, one may argue for the necessity of further conditions. However, unfortunately, I have to leave those conditions out of the scope of this thesis.

For the last time let me take advantage of an imaginary story to convey the fact that it is necessary that a person uses the motivational force that certain emotions conceal in order to change her self in a desired way in virtue of realizing her freedom of volition:

> Ever since she has known herself Alyeska has been a patient in a hospital due to certain complications at her birth. She even needs help for her very basic needs. All she can do is to take a walk in the beautiful garden of the hospital with an accompanying nurse. During one of these walks she sees another girl of her age outside the fences of the hospital. The girl outside looks perfectly healthy yet there is sadness in her eyes. Alyeska begins to wonder why such a healthy young person may be sad. Alyeska wondering about the girl begins to take walks every day. As days go by, Alyeska notices that the girl too takes a walk every day. Every day she comes near the fences and watches the garden for long hours.

[37] I am thankful to Tomis Kapitan for making me realize the intricate relations between one's beliefs, emotions and the discontentment motivation I have proposed as a necessity for one's freedom.

Alyeska finally decides that the girl outside has lost someone she loves very much at that hospital. She imagines that this girl has taken walks in the garden with this unknown beloved person just as she takes walks with an accompanying nurse. She realizes that if she had loved someone as the girl outside the fences did, her life would have some meaning despite the possibility of losing the person she loves. She imagines herself as a loving person. She imagines herself taking walks with someone she loves, watching the beautiful garden with that person, having long conversations about anything and everything. All in all, she imagines herself devoting her life for someone else just as the girl outside the fences has done. In time she begins to love this imaginary person depicted by this self-conception. Loving that person, she is deeply concerned about what happens to it. Thereby, she reflects on herself to figure out whether her life is in accordance with that desired-self conception. She realizes that in fact she is not doing anything to be with other people, to give them the chance to share anything with her. Now that she would like to be a loving person, she suffers from not being one. She judges that her life is meaningless as long as she stays this way, she judges that her world is not the way it should be. She suffers, therefore, from a special discontentment. This discontentment motivates her to effectively desire to change herself. Moreover, since she loves herself as depicted by her desired-self, she values having those volitions that are in accordance with that desired-Alyeska. For instance, she values her having the volition to greet people as she walks, values her having the volition to pick a flower for the nurse that takes her for a walk every day etc. Having realized she lacks such volitions and being motivated by the suffering of the discontentment she has, she actively

participates in creating these new volitions that she believes manifest who she desires to become. Assuming that Alyeska has never been motivated to change herself before, now Alyeska may be said to realize her freedom of volition, surpassing her wantonness by the motivation and the reason-providing value judgments embedded in these emotions.

CONCLUSION

What has been overstated about emotions is that they thwart one's realization of freedom. According to a curtailed story, emotions are blind forces that pull or push us in many ways as we strive to act in light of our reason. Most of the time, we are just enslaved by such forces. This is why they outweigh our determination to change ourselves through realizing our freedom. However, our concepts of emotions have begun to be refined. Only very recently, instead of disregarding emotions altogether, unbiased attempts to clarify their nature and to recognize their content have accordingly taken their place in philosophical research. Without a doubt, the improvements of such research will provide us with a better understanding of emotions and will enable us to make our lives better lives.

There is a lot to investigate about the nature of emotions and maybe more to investigate about the relationship between certain kinds of emotions and other philosophically significant concepts. In this thesis, I only began to depict their relationship with freedom realization. My portrayal is indeed incomplete. There are many ways in which one may study this relationship. For instance, back in 1962, Peter

Strawson hinted at the fact that certain emotions that he called 'self-reactive attitudes' such as remorse presuppose the presence of one's realization of freedom to some extent.[38] One may also wish to investigate, for instance, whether emotions such as compassion and love for others enhance one's realization of freedom. It would also be tempting to investigate arch what role wonder plays in one's freedom. It would not be surprising to find out for example that the more appropriate or true emotions one has the more she can realize her freedom. One may wish to investigate whether there are such emotions that emerge together with the instances of freedom realization. Studies waiting to be undertaken are plenty. Yet, within the scope of this thesis, I have only attempted to show the necessity of certain emotions for one's realization of freedom. My proposal was a special kind of discontentment due to the Neo-Frankfurtian approach I maintained in this thesis.

In closing let me revisit all the discussed theoretical consequences of this thesis. At the outset, I began by laying down Frankfurt's distinction between the *power of the will and its freedom*. Discussing why an infinitely powerful will is not sufficient for one's freedom of volition helped to show the impact of the necessary condition Frankfurt specifies for freedom of this kind. Even if anything can be the object of one's will, unless one is capable of forming any desires about her volitions, namely, second-order volitions in Frankfurtian terms, one will not have the potency to realize any freedom of volition. Indeed, being able to form second-order volitions and as a matter of fact forming second-order volitions differ. Therefore, we need to distinguish the *potency to realize freedom of volition* that requires the capacity to form such desires and the

[38] Strawson, P. (1962) pp.1-25

realization of freedom of volition that requires forming second-order volitions as well.

When we search for the necessary conditions of the realization of freedom of volition, furthermore, we may agree that it is not merely in virtue of forming desires to have certain volitions but *also in virtue of having the volitions* one desires to have that one realizes her freedom of volition. Recognizing the necessity of such conformity, the kind of conformity involved in instances of freedom of volition may be clarified too. For *coincidental agreements* or *down-to-up reason related agreements* are not the agreements that a person employs as she realizes her freedom; rather they are the sort of agreements that manifest wantonness. It is only *up-to-down reason related agreements* that are involved in one's realization of freedom of volition.

Furthermore, since the presence of a second-order volition does not imply the presence of a first-order volition, *effective second-order volitions* that do imply the presence of first-order volitions must be recognized. So, it is not just a second-order volition that must be involved in an *up-to-down reason related agreement;* it must be an effective second-order volition. To be sure, this does not mean that effective second-order volitions are only involved in up-to-down reason related agreements. They may also partake in down-to-up reason related agreements that do not manifest any freedom realization. Therefore, the effective second-order volitions that are necessary for one's freedom must be singled out. I called these special volitions "creative effective second-order volitions".

The activity of creating volitions carried out by the formation of creative effective second-order volitions is part of the active self-participation requirement of freedom of volition. When this kind of freedom is granted to enable a person to change herself in a desired way, this active self-participation element may be held to consist in

creating new volitions due to acknowledging their manifestation of who one desires to become. Thereby, Frankfurt's unexplained notion of *identifying* may be modified to capture such active self-participation.

Moreover, what enables one to acknowledge a volition's manifestation of who one desires to become is one's prior value judgment that she *values becoming a person who has such a volition.* This primary value judgment is instantiated in instances of realization of freedom of volition as *agental volition value judgments* such as 'I value my having/creating the volition to compose a sonata'. So, the underlying value judgment is the value judgment that I value becoming a certain person. I referred to that person by the term 'desired-self'. Just as one may have a conception of who she believes she is, one may also have a conception of who she desires to become. Valuing this desired-self however does not possess the motivational force needed to change one's self in accordance with that desired-self by actively creating new volitions. This is why certain kinds of emotions are necessary for a person to change herself in a desired way by realizing her freedom of volition. Although there may be others, in this thesis, to fulfill this necessity, I proposed a special kind of *discontentment that emerges upon loving the person depicted by one's desired-self conception and realizing the gap between herself and that person.*

The *love* for one's desired-self explains one's *valuing becoming the person she desires to become* and the motivation generated by this *discontentment* enables her to *effectively desire to change* in compliance with her desired-self. This establishes a ground on which the necessary agental volition value judgments and creative effective second-order volitions can be built. In the light of all I have said, what is indispensable for our account of freedom of volition, granted that its realization is what enables us to

change in the ways we desire to change, is certain kinds of emotions, one of which is the kind of love-based discontentment portrayed in this Neo-Frankfurtian approach.

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