

THE CHANGING ROLE OF JAPANESE NGOs:
A CASE STUDY OF A JAPANESE NGO IN TURKEY

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Melisa Gündüz, certify that

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ABSTRACT

The Changing Role of Japanese NGOs: A Case Study of a Japanese NGO in Turkey

The aim of this thesis is to present the late, yet steady development of Japanese humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the sector of global humanitarian aid by focusing on one international Japanese humanitarian aid NGO, the Association for Aid and Relief Japan, and its operation in the Syrian refugee response in Turkey. In this context, the study provides a general framework of the late development of the Japanese humanitarian aid through NGOs from the post-war period until the current day, highlighting the parallelism in their contemporary place both in overseas operations and government. Furthermore, the study will discuss the ongoing growth of their operations within the main matter in question and draw on the field operation of the AARJ within the scope of their steady and sturdy growth. Along with the desolate continuity of man-made crises, and the rise of unpredictable environmental crises, the visible growth of humanitarian aid through NGOs has gained a greater value and place within the global governance systems as one of the most practical and efficient response mechanisms. Therefore, by examining the real time field experience of the AARJ and its donor relations, this thesis offers the opportunity to thoroughly perceive the potential and possibilities in relation to the future of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs.

ÖZET

Japon Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Değişen Rolü:

Bir Japon STK'nin Türkiye'deki Çalışmaları

Bu tezin amacı, sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK) üzerinden insani yardım alanında geç bir başlangıç göstermiş olan Japonya'nın son zamanlarda gösterdiği ilerlemeyi, düzenli gelişme gösteren bir Japon STK olan Association for Aid and Relief (AARJ) ve bu kuruluşun Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mülteciler sorununa yaklaşımını üzerinden gözler önüne sermektir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma ile insani yardım alanında çalışan Japon sivil toplum kurumlarının savaş sonrası dönemden günümüze kadar hem denizaşırı operasyonlar hem de devletlerle ilişkiler açısından sağladıkları gelişmelerin genel bir çerçevesi sunulmaktadır. Bu çalışma ayrıca güçlü ve istikrarlı bir büyüme kaydeden AARJ'nin söz konusu alandaki çalışmasına ilişkin büyüme dinamiklerini de ele almaktadır. İnsan eliyle meydana getirilen harap edici krizlerin ve öngörülemeyen çevre krizlerinin süreğenliğiyle birlikte insani yardım faaliyetlerinin, STK'lar üzerinden artan gözle görülür büyümesi, küresel yönetim sistemleri açısından en pratik ve etkili çözüm yaklaşımları arasında belirgin bir değer ve konuma sahiptir. Bundan ötürü, AARJ'nin gerçek zamanlı alan deneyimleri ve bağışçı ilişkileri incelenmek suretiyle bu tezde, Japon insani yardım STK'larının geleceğine ilişkin potansiyel ve olasılıkların bütünlüklü olarak algılanabilmesi için bir olanak sunulmaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AARJ:	Association of Aid and Relief Japan
ASAM:	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
BPRM:	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
DGMM:	Directorate General of Migration Management
ERCA:	Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan
ECHO:	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
JCCP:	Japan Center for Conflict Prevention
JEN:	Japan Emergency NGO
JFGE:	Japan Fund for The Global Environment
JICA:	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JPF:	Japan Platform
LDP:	Liberal Democratic Party
MoFA:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoF:	Ministry of Finance
MoFLSS:	Ministry of Family Labor and Social Services
MITI:	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
NICCOD:	Nippon International Cooperation for Community Development
NGO:	Non-governmental Organization
INGO:	International Non-Governmental Organization
I/NGO:	Local and international non-governmental organization
OECD:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PARCIC:	Pacific Asia Resource Center Interpol's Cooperation
PDMM:	Provincial Directorate of Migration Management
POSIVA:	Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid

PWJ:	Peace Winds Japan
SASF:	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
SDPJ:	Social Democratic Party of Japan
SRR:	Syrian Refugee Response
SSC:	Social Service Center
STL:	Support to Life
TP:	Temporary Protection
WP:	Wakachiai Project
WFP:	World Food Program
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
3RP:	Regional Refugee Resilience Plan

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Japan is a well-known country appreciated for several things, for instance, the Japanese cuisine, Japanese dramas, its pop-culture, fashion, rapid economic growth, technological advancement, among others. Its nation is known as a strong peace advocate. However, it is rarely praised for its non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) overseas operations in humanitarian aid. Neither at home nor internationally is Japan acknowledged for its successful humanitarian aid NGOs. Ironically, while it is recognized for its generous donations by being one of the top donors to inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), i.e. UN agencies, to developing countries in order to balance global inequality as a respectful member of the global community, the invisibility of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs is saddening. As of April 2019, Japan is the fifth biggest donor of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).¹ As a non-western state, Japan has been one of the few countries playing the lead in world politics and economics next to other Western super powers. However, it has not always been that way for Japan. The country had started its journey to becoming one of the world's leading actors as a war-torn country. Prior to World War 1 (WW1) and World War 2 (WW2), Japan was a state with a rather high prestige on international grounds. However, its expansionary policies and ambitious military operations overseas and the aftermath of WW2 brought Japan back to square one.

Post-WW2 Japan was a war-torn state with a heavy baggage to clear its path and take its place next to other powerful states of the world. Following the war, in line with

¹ UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/5baa00b24/2018-unhcr-donor-ranking.html> (30.05.2019)

the Article 9 of its constitution, Japan renounced war, surrendered unconditionally and agreed to have a limited military force that is only available for its own self-defense.² In her book “The Rise of Japanese NGOs”, political scientist Reimann argues that for a state to be internationally acknowledged and appreciated, it is necessary that it follows the international practices and social patterns.³ It is only through adaptation, regardless of the social and political tension that new norms could create internally, some international prestige and validity is possible. This means that to become a powerful actor in the global community, states need to follow the global community’s social and material norms. These norms can be observed as international factors that allow global norms (i.e. the promotion of democracy, human rights, humanitarian responsibility, environmental protection) to take place where it would otherwise not be possible if they had not existed as some pusher mechanisms. Under these circumstances it is only natural for a developed state to be a respectful member of the global community, democracy comes in as a must. Consequently, civil society and pro-NGO norms come together with democracy. After all, democracy is a governing system that purely depends and counts on the voice of the society. In this regard, a state without a civil society can be observed as a semi-democratic or even non-democratic state. Western states play a significant role in the development of civil society globally, due to their long history of interwoven systems that have been pro-NGO ever since the WW2.

While Japan was becoming an economically powerful state by mid-1960s, as well as the top aid donor promoting world peace, alleviation of poverty and humanitarian assistance on a global basis by the 1990s, it was standing out as one of the laggard states with lowest numbers of humanitarian aid NGOs. From the 1950s until the

² Siddikoğlu, “Refugee and Asylum Seeking in Modern Japan: Analysis of Japan’s Humanitarian Commitments and Xenophobic Problems”, 42.

³ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above.*

1970s, under the developmental model, as a democratic state Japan had developed inclusive economic institutions which increased its prosperity in technology and education. Japan's sustainable economic growth enabled it to become more and more productive. As Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their book "Why Nations Fail", all economic institutions are the creation of societies, whereas politics is a system that controls and governs the institutions for the stability and prosperity of the society and its development.⁴ Hence, while economic institutions are the creation of societies, NGOs are the product of democracies and their growth and prosperity are heavily linked with pro-NGO political structures, policies, financial support mechanisms of states. On the one hand, in terms of economy Japan was a rising star in the post-war period. It was an extremely successful country due to its rapid economic growth.

On the other hand, Japan was not a successful country due to its weak presence of civil society. The need for rapid social development seems to have become more apparent to the Government of Japan (GoJ) from the 1970s onward. In addition to such obvious urgent need for a more proactive civil society, the Japanese aid policy was also going through some evolutionary changes. The change of the Japanese aid policy can be analyzed in three phases. In her book "Civil Society in Japan", Hirata divides these 3 parts as follows; "(1) Japan's economy-first policy (from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s); (2) promoting of broader foreign policy objectives (from the mid-1870s to the late 1980s); and (3) further politicization and diversification of aid (from the late 1980s until today)".⁵ In parallel with these structural changes Japanese NGOs started to gain more and more space within the country and their meaningful operations overseas gradually increased. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the Japanese government played an

⁴ Acemoglu, and Robinson, *Why Do Nations Fail*, 79.

⁵ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 164.

attentive role to the interests of the United States in Asia by maintaining good relations with its (U.S') allies through trade and foreign aid (ODA). The same period (1950-1970) was also an era when the Japanese government had its focus on war reparations as its main source of foreign aid. However, since the war reparations could not be the answer to all humanitarian issues that Asia and the world was struggling with, a structured change in its foreign aid was ahead of the GoJ to keep its reputation in step with other powerful world leaders.

The breakout of the Indochinese refugee crisis in the mid-1970s and the weak response of the Japanese Government to the outflow of the large number of refugees seeking support was going to enable the birth of the Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AARJ), a Japanese humanitarian aid non-governmental organization (NGO), which is also the case study of this research. Prior to the Indochinese refugee crisis, there was already a minor yet significant proliferation of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs operating overseas. However, the crisis had made the case of lack of and need for more Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs much stronger.⁶ The Indochinese refugee crisis was followed with the end of the Cold War era which opened the door of democracy for many undemocratic states. The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the development of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs as well, since the global community needed greater involvement on part of Japan along with other democratic states to support the process of democratization of world nations. It is generally not easy for governments to rapidly intervene in crisis from the field level due to barrier-like bureaucratic steps that need to be taken before any type of intervention. However, this is not necessarily the case for NGOs given their relatively un-bureaucratic and un-political nature as their comparative advantage when compared to governments. In other words,

⁶ UNHCR, "A Report on the Local Integration of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan", 20.

their high emphasis on impartiality, neutrality, transparency, and accountability and non-governmental structures, has generally enabled NGOs to intervene prior to the governments' official interventions to start implementing humanitarian aid to crises whether man-made or environmental. The Indochinese refugee crisis and the end of the Cold War have brought the weak side of Japan into light. Japan was severely behind the western states with its countable amount of civil society actors, NGOs.

In 1967, Japan only had 13 NGOs that were internationally active in humanitarian aid overseas.⁷ The number of 13 NGOs can be observed as the result of the negative image of the civil society organizations carried not specifically by the Japanese public alone but strongly by the Japanese government during the Cold War era due to their stance against the Japan-US Security Treaty. In 1960, Japanese government was facing with severe criticism over its new Japan-US Security Treaty from the students, left wing political parties as the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the Communist Party, student associations, and laborers, initiating domestic disorder.⁸ The Cold War era, globally, was not supportive of NGO proliferation due to the fear of its potentiality on being carried away towards the communist side from the Western bloc. As a result, globally, a greater emphasis and support on political stability and economic income in non-communist states was given more than any sort of civil society development by Western non-communist developed states. With this regard, developmental state model of Japan, first for its own development and later as a set example to Asian states gained critical importance both in Japan and Southeast Asia. By the end of Cold War with the need of greater democratic actors in the field globally the numbers of NGOs worldwide showed a significant increase. While the numbers of NGOs globally started to rise by the end of Cold War, the significant rise for Japanese

⁷ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 7.

⁸ Okabe, "Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers: Its Genesis and Development", 222-226.

NGOs took place after the catastrophic incident of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, also as known as Kobe earthquake, in 1995. The great earthquake in Kobe brought in approximate of 1.3 million volunteers across from all nation to support the victims of the natural disaster due to the insufficient support of the government.⁹ The Kobe earthquake in a way unintentionally erased the negative image of civil society organizations and pushed for structural changes towards more NGO friendly policies together with the grand support of public, media, political and business leaders.¹⁰ As Tadashi Yamamoto, the founder of Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), argues the tragedy in Kobe showed the prosperous power and ability of volunteer groups and NGOs and pushed to government to “recognize the potential of these civilian organizations to contribute to society”.¹¹

As a result of the Kobe earthquake in 1998 a much more supportive law on civil society organizations, the NPO law, was enacted. In 1998, Japan had 236 NGOs which were officially operational in overseas.¹² As for Japan’s case, proliferations of NGOs can be linked to the aftermath of the disastrous Kobe earthquake rather than the end of fear over spread of communism caused by the Cold War while in many other countries the rise of NGOs most generally can be observed as a result of the contrary.

In this regard, this study intends to primarily examine the development of Japanese NGOs and their changing role in Japan. As such, its focus is on studying the core reason behind the delay of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs. Why is Japan, as one of the world’s top donors in humanitarian aid, not one of the NGO leading countries in humanitarian aid? Furthermore, the thesis aims to demonstrate the progress that Japan has made from the 1950s until today as a late developed NGO state. Will Japan display

⁹ Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan*, 2.

¹⁰ Ogawa, *The Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan*, 3.

¹¹ Yamamoto, “The Growing Role of Non-State Actors in International Affairs”, 58.

¹² Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*. 7.

the same performance for its NGOs' development as it did for its rapid economic development? This is a question that will linger as one of the main questions of the thesis throughout all chapters.

This study is a qualitative research based on theoretical and empirical evidence from primary sources by utilizing sources such as official reports of the Japanese Government, documents and statistical graphics, surveys done by other researchers, UN country reports, donor (ECHO, UNHCR, BPRM, JPF)¹³ country reports, interviews and personal experience from the field in order to demonstrate the changing role of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs in contemporary Japan. Secondary sources such as academic journal articles, digital media platforms, and newspaper articles have also been referred to analyze the stated change as the subject of the thesis.

The second chapter of the study will mainly focus on the reasons behind the delay of the development of NGOs in Japan aiming to create a foundation to comprehend the changing role of the humanitarian aid NGOs in contemporary Japan. It will also help to understand who they are and where they come from in order to reason their current operations and presence. Thus, the second chapter's main focus will be the economy-first policy of the Japanese Government from the 1950s to the 1970s to address the questions on how the political and financial structures have impacted the formation of civil society and NGOs in Japan. The well-known Iron Triangle and its place in Japanese governance and public will also be studied in the second chapter to demonstrate the Japanese characteristics, culture and their reflection on humanitarian aid through NGOs. The second chapter aims to conclude with a clear vision on how for three decades Japan's model of aid has been distinct from the Western states' aid model

¹³ European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), Japan Platform (JPF).

as being criticized for lacking “a sufficiently strong poverty focus, that it is too focused on the hardware of development without due concern about its software (i.e. governance and institutions); that it is not programmatic enough; that it is poorly coordinated and harmonized”.¹⁴

Accordingly, the third chapter of the study will focus on the changes that the Japanese Government policies towards its humanitarian aid NGOs had gone through. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the Japanese Government played an attentive role to the interests of the United States in Asia by maintaining good relations with its (U.S’) allies through trade and foreign aid (ODA). The same period (1950-1970) was also a period when the Japanese Government had its focus on war reparations as its main source of foreign aid. However, it will be observed that from the 1980s onward, there has been a significant change related to the growing impact of globalization and its meaningful side effects as for instance a greater emphasis on global crises and inequalities. The growth of this consciousness between Japanese nationals and the push on for more pro-NGO policies by international super powers were to change the framework of humanitarian aid NGOs in Japan for good and for the better. Reimann’s “activism from the above” model will be taken as the base scheme to explain the political, financial and social structural pro-NGO policies that the Japanese Government has gone through to support the delayed growth of NGOs.¹⁵ The change of core political structures, i.e. NPO law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MoFA) growing support through a more horizontal communication line aiming to connect the public, private sector, NGOs and the state in addition to growing financial support mechanisms developed specifically for NGOs will be the core focus of the third chapter.

¹⁴ Menocal, Denney, and Geddes, “Informing the future of Japan’s ODA”, 6.

¹⁵ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above.*

The fourth chapter will study the AARJ's humanitarian aid operations in Turkey to demonstrate the current condition of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs. Regardless of all progressive changes, where does AARJ as a Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs stand in its area of operation? What are its current challenges? What are its future goals? The fourth chapter aims to draw a realistic picture of how far Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs has come since the 1950s up until today through AARJ's case study. In the fourth chapter the governmental funds of the Japanese government (introduced in chapter 3) to Japanese humanitarian aid will start to appear as a disabling factor for AARJ, as a Japanese humanitarian aid NGO, to implement more effective projects, increase human resource capacities as well as "organizational professionalization".¹⁶ Primary sources of the fourth chapter will be the country reports of various actors from the field such as World Food Program (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), Japan Platform (JPF), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and AARJ. In addition interviews conducted with AARJ staff and personal experience will be used to deliver their current operation and donor relation in Turkey.

The fifth chapter will provide an overview, delineate the limitations of the study and prospects for future research.

In this thesis the term non-governmental organization will be used as it is defined by Reimann as "nonprofit organizations, voluntary organizations that are autonomous from the state and work toward social and political change at the global level"¹⁷ and as it is defined by Japan's MoFA as both non-governmental and non-profit organizations that

¹⁶ Kuroda, and Imata, "Shifting Paradigms for International NGOs and Constituency Building Evolving Scene from Japan", 4.

¹⁷ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*. 3.

“address on a voluntary basis such global issues as development, poverty, peace, humanitarian issues and the environment”.¹⁸ The term NGOs in Japan though generally gets mixed with Nonprofit organizations (NPOs). To define the differences, NPOs are involved in domestic activities and are not involved in ODA, while NGOs demonstrate the opposite by being able to both operate domestically and internationally and by having an influential seat at ODA as well as foreign policy issues. The study will be focusing on the overseas activities of the Japanese NGOs as it will be seen in the fourth chapter through the case study of AARJ’s activities in Turkey. Therefore, the study will limit itself to NGOs under the international development and relief category. This category includes NGOs working in the protection (i.e. child protection), food security and agriculture, education, health, basic needs and livelihoods sectors. International development and relief NGOs offer technical, monetary, and personnel assistance to developing countries and/or damaged populations all around the world. For instance, Save the Children, Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, Concern Worldwide, CARE International and Medecins Sans Frontieres are some of the few that actively operate in the fields of international development and relief globally. In this thesis Japanese NGOs working in international development or emergency/relief support related activities abroad will be named as humanitarian aid NGOs.

¹⁸ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN

2.1 Developmental state model 1950-1970

The initial sparks of NGOs in Japan can be traced back to the late 1960s' frustrating local environmental issues (i.e. "Minamata disease in Kumamoto prefecture, caused by methylmercury poisoning, and Itai-itai disease, or "ouch-ouch disease" in Toyama prefecture, caused by cadmium poisoning")¹⁹ and the anti-Vietnam War activism. These instances can be observed as the initial sprouts of NGOs that created and empowered the sense of civil society in Japan. However, such rise of civil society movement in Japan was about to quickly fade out under the hurry of the developmental state. In 1960, Minamata disease effecting 2.882 people who had eaten fish from the Minamata Bay that was populated with methylmercury leaking from the chemical manufacturer Chisso Corp.'s Minamata plant.²⁰ The local environmental issues of the 1960s resulted in remarkable success due to civil society's involvement and efforts to take the problems onto national level and push for change of policies that were no longer in good support of the local environment, and instead were damaging it more and more each day. However, once the positive outcomes were reached, the activists groups were scattered and not to be retrieved again as Hirata argues.²¹ For instance, "The Beheiren", a Japanese activist group established by leftwing Japanese intellectuals and operating from 1965 to 1974, was also scattered just as the environmentalist civil society groups once the goals of "removing Japan from the US war effort, preserving Japan's national

¹⁹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 16.

²⁰ The Mainichi, "61 Years After Recognition of Minamata Disease, Kumamoto Patient Pays Tribute", May 2, 2017

²¹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.

security that seemed endangered by the war, and terminating Washington's involvement in Vietnam"²² were successfully achieved. In 1960s Japan had the spark of an efficient civil society against the "bureaucracy-based political power structure".²³ However, 1970s took it all back from the potentiality of a social balance provided by the Japanese civil society to bureaucracy. The question then, is why didn't these movements evolve into creation of more NGOs in Japan? What had prevented Japan from having a strong civil society? The frank answer to these questions lies in the developmental-state model that managed to keep citizens away from activism and rather move towards inactivism through various restrictive state policies over the formation of NGOs supported with a structure of political institutions that were closed to social actors and the public.²⁴ As the Secretary-General of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kato Koichi, has put it in his own words at his keynote speech given at the Global ThinkNet Tokyo Conference held in February 1998; "I have to admit that Japan's governance in the past quarter of a century has been dominated largely by the bureaucracy".²⁵ A bureaucracy that is heavily focused on to catch up with the West and opened the gate for the developmental state model to have its control not only over the political and economic structures but also on the public of Japan. Kato Koichi also links the late development of civil society to "the influence of Confucianism on the culture of Japan"²⁶ which allowed bureaucrats to be the regarded as the "men of letters"²⁷ and "wiser than other men, and the public".²⁸

To better understand such late development of NGOs and their changing roles in Japan, this section will first focus on the developmental state model, which was heavily

²² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 17.

²³ Vosse, "The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan", 31.

²⁴ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 1.

²⁵ Ibrahim, and Kato, "Key note speech", 12.

²⁶ Ibrahim, and Kato, "Key note speech", 12.

²⁷ Ibrahim, and Kato, "Key note speech", 12.

²⁸ Ibrahim, and Kato, "Key note speech", 12.

interwoven with the relations between bureaucracy, the private sector and politicians. This is also known as “The Iron Triangle”, which explains the narrow, yet powerful state policies that disabled the growth of NGOs but encouraged rapid industrialization during the developmental state process. The political and economic centralization of the Japanese state through the Iron Triangle allowed and encouraged it to regulate both politic and economic activities under its monopoly. As a second argument on the reason for the delay of NGO emergence in Japan, this section will analyze Japanese nationals’ wholehearted work on and loyalty to the given pattern of export-led industrialization and rapid economic growth goals of the Japanese government. Finally, the section will analyze the effects of political globalization hand in hand with economic globalization on the dissolution of the developmental state policies and the emergence of NGOs in Japan. The term developmental state in this section strictly focuses on rapid economic development and industrialization through sovereign bureaucratic management which discourages political, non-economic and civic issues.

The devastating WW2, followed by the stressors of the Cold War put Japan into a dire state where the potential stability and development of the state were not yet the reality, neither for the state itself nor for the Japanese people. Hence, Japan was destined to redevelop itself into a self-sufficient state as it used to be prior to the world wars. In addition, it had to work on its international reputation that was severely damaged during WW2, to regain its place and trust within the global community. The strict and ascetic life that the Japanese government designed was prioritizing economic development and industrialization over development of civil society and social rights of people. However, it was promising higher standards of living as a result. Regardless of the hardships they entailed, all these development steps were accepted and supported by the Japanese for a prosperous nation and country. From 1950 to 1970, under the roof of the developmental

state model, the government's focus was parochial to industrialization and rapid economic growth that did not coalesce into growth and development of a civil society. Post-war Japan's principal national goal was- economic growth. To better understand the success of the government's demanding policies on industrialization, the "economy-first-policy", it is necessary to take a look back on the history of bureaucracy and national politics in Japan.

2.2 A powerful bureaucratic tradition

The roots of a powerful bureaucracy and complex bureaucratic relations in Japan can be traced back to feudal Japan during the Tokugawa era (1603-1868).²⁹ At the time, the samurai class (warriors) was the highest class in social hierarchy followed by the peasants or farmers, who played an important role in the nation's economy. Then came the artisans who produced weaponry for the samurai, and finally, the merchants, of whom some were the wealthiest in society but still ranked the lowest in the social hierarchy.³⁰ It was during the Tokugawa period that the samurai class started to become responsible for clerical roles of the government.³¹ Regardless of their new tasks, administrative roles and bureaucratic work, the samurais were only getting a stipend for their samurai status.³² Nevertheless, with their unusual integration to clerical roles in the government, it was the samurai class that opened and shaped the way for the modern Japanese bureaucracy. After a two centuries long isolation, Japan opened its doors to the world. In 1853, immediate changes in the name of modernization started to take place in

²⁹ Columbia University, "Tokugawa Japan Transformation of the Samurai Class", <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/at/tokugawa/tj10.html>

³⁰ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 22,23.

³¹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 19.

³² Howland, "Samurai Status, Class and Bureaucracy: A Historiographical Essay", 368.

the state. During the Meiji era (1868-1912), replacement of the feudal system with the imperial system offered official bureaucratic posts to the samurais as direct servants of the emperor. Thus, the samurai, or the new bureaucrats, were directly linked to the emperor unlike the politicians who were first linked to the parliament. Hirata underlines that such direct link to the emperor and bypass of the parliament of the samurais as the nouveau bureaucrats can be observed as one of the key reasons of bureaucracy's power in modern Japan.³³ It was also during the Meiji era that the contemporary iron triangle of bureaucracy, state and nation relations was strengthened through the vigorous propaganda of *Kokutai* (国体), the national polity, which emphasized “the importance of obedience and loyalty to authority, in particular to the emperor”.³⁴

The motto of the Meiji period, which supported the modernization of military, was “Save The Emperor, Expel The Barbarian”.³⁵ Under the light of “*bunmei kaika*” (文明開化), civilization and enlightenment, Japan's shift from a feudal society to a modern state was strengthened with the implementation of the new democratic constitution inspired by the Germanic and Austrian dedication to the state in 1889.³⁶ The new democratic constitution abolished all social classes and declared every individual equal in the eyes of the law which supported integration and coalition among the daimyo, merchant, and samurai classes. This enabled strong communication and coordination, that is, harmony, between the private sector and the state under the emperor. The austere state and private sector relations of this era and the strong industrial capital enabled Japan to be a successful player in the global textile sector prior to World War 1.

³³ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 19.

³⁴ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 178.

³⁵ Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 84.

³⁶ Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 85.

Moreover, there was a strong sense of national collectivity in Japan due to its Confucian values which enabled and guaranteed the public's loyalty to the emperor and/or any other ruling authority. The emperor-centered governing mixed with the notion of collectivity that merged together the private sector, bureaucrats, state, and public into a firm working group society visibly pushed Japan's development forward.

The following periods of Taisho (1912-1926) and Showa (1926-1989) also assumed this emperor-centered administration and, inevitably, allowed bureaucracy to have a powerful role in both economic and military developments.³⁷ When the samurais became official bureaucrats who bypassed the parliament and the politicians of the nation through direct relations with the emperor, in a way they became the Shogun ("the supreme military leader who made all decisions within the empire, from taxation to military issues"),³⁸ and the Daimyo ("the feudal lords who worked under the Shogun and supported the governing of the country")³⁹ of the Meiji era. Eventually, all this growth extended into excessive growth of military bureaucracy over civilian bureaucracy. Later, this resulted in the two world wars where Japan strongly took part.

The civilian bureaucracy, politicians of the parliament were to gain back their presence only after the World War 2 under the U.S. Occupation (1945-1952). In stopping the prewar military forces capacity to reconstruct Japan, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) re-opened the path to economic ministries which had once lost power against the military bureaucracy in Japan.⁴⁰ The comeback of the military forces has only been enabled through the establishment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954, which allowed Japan to never go beyond its borders. Japan was

³⁷Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 178.

³⁸ The Tokugawa Shogunate Empire, <https://japanempire3.weebly.com/social-hierarchy.html> (20.05.19)

³⁹ The Tokugawa Shogunate Empire, <https://japanempire3.weebly.com/social-hierarchy.html> (20.05.19)

⁴⁰ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 155.

now living under Article 9 of its constitution, which restricted the use of military interventions to self-defense purposes within Japan only. The full text of Article 9 is as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁴¹

The Article 9 has also been one of the reasons for Japan to act more internationally as a peace influencer and gain the trust of the international community through its various aid interventions to secure its security and prestige. During the 1950s and the 1960s, economic bureaucracy recovered its power and success through implementation of effective industrialization approaches that focused on crucial industries such as construction and infrastructure. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),⁴² which was founded in 1949 by the former Ministry of Commerce and Industry after the war as the main composer of state policies over industrialization, reinforced development of key capital-intensive heavy industries.⁴³ MITI's approach to economic bureaucracy, industrialization and rapid economic growth, while protecting the domestic industries, shaped the structure of a developmental state model that supported Japan in its goal to catch up with the West. The developmental state model was not orchestrated only by the MITI however, its strong guidance and connections with the private sector enlarged its role in it.⁴⁴ Other ministries also played their specific

⁴¹ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,

https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (20.05.19)

⁴² The name MITI was later in 2001 changed to Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). In this thesis the former name was preferred to be used due to its frequent usage in the resources used.

⁴³ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 20.

⁴⁴ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 173.

roles in the development of the nation. For instance, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was among the key ministries that greatly supported the MITI's approach to industrialization by building policies to offer Japanese businesses enough capital to speed up industrialization.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the success of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MoFA) in joining Japan to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the early 1960s was one of the examples that not only foreshadowed the powerful state of Japan in the international platform, but also strengthened its economic bureaucracy and development domestically. The policies on economic self-protection (i.e. high tariffs on imported products) and a firmly growing international visibility (i.e. Japan in OECD) were great accomplishments that showed and proved to the public that things were getting done.⁴⁶

Japanese state's international implementations had a dark side though. Ministries aligned working for a Japan that is respected domestically and internationally were bypassing the most basic noneconomic factors of aid in its foreign aid implementations. For instance, MoFA was the responsible ministry for the war reparations of Japan (as a part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952) to the Asian countries that were occupied by Japan during the WW2.⁴⁷ Japan's war reparations were directed as grant aids through the reparations division under the MoFA. Japan's war reparations together with many ODA implementations were later heavily criticized by the international community. This was due to the fact that Japan's strong focus on national economy enabling Japanese companies and the economy, to grow a great deal more than the

⁴⁵ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 20.

⁴⁶ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 20.

⁴⁷ Kato, "Japan's ODA 1954-2014: Changes and Continuities in a Central Instrument in Japan's Foreign Policy", 1.

economies of the war reparation receiving countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia.⁴⁸

Each ministry's arduous work on economic development and industrialization was integrated, becoming a sort of a chain. The MITI's efforts were encouraged and supported by the MoF and the private businesses. The link between the private industries and the government was never lost. In fact, the ties only became stronger than ever with ministries concentrating on selected key industries and with the key industry providers, private businesses staying loyal to given instructions. How was this loyalty created? The short answer to this question would be improved communication and coordination between the bureaucrats and politicians, which was not present before (since bureaucrats were linked to emperor directly), and its effective use. The long answer would be the work ethics and traditions of the Japanese (i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, business people and the public) who tirelessly supported the continuous efforts of the government in rapid economic development. For instance, to be a civil servant in Japan, one must first graduate from one of the top-ranking universities (surely with some impressive grades), and then pass the national exams of the National Personnel Authority.⁴⁹ Once these steps are accomplished and the successful civil servant candidates are hired, a series of pervasive trainings, according to registered ministries, welcome them. Being a civil servant in Japan might not be financially fulfilling, but it is certainly fulfilling in terms of the social status of an individual.⁵⁰ In other words, it is considered as prestigious as it was with samurais who were fulfilling extra bureaucratic responsibilities for low salaries. In Japan, bureaucrats can be found in political, governmental and business societies, since during the developmental state, Japanese bureaucracy had kept itself close to and

⁴⁸ Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions", 56.

⁴⁹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 21.

⁵⁰ Beeson, "Japan's Reluctant Reformers and the Legacy of the Developmental State", 8.

even blended to the above mentioned three strata. During the developmental state, close relation between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the private sector was actually not a new phenomenon for Japan.⁵¹ Namely, the country has been historically acknowledged as an administrative state where policy making has always been heavily influenced by the bureaucracy.⁵² The monitoring of the private sector could be best explained by the “*amakudari*” (天下り) system where a retired bureaucrat under MITI’s influence was getting hired (surely at the management level) at one of the key industry provider private companies.⁵³ The *amakudari* system was what allowed Japanese bureaucracy to supervise, guide, assist and influence the private sector. Bureaucracy was one of the main tools to structure and guide the developmental state.

The bureaucrats’ strong communication and connection with the LDP, the political party that ruled Japan from 1955 to 1993, enabled their power to not only implement, but also be the policy makers.⁵⁴ Furthermore, seeing retired civil servants becoming politicians mostly as members of the LDP (i.e. “Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Nobusuke Kishi, Ikeda and Eisaku Satō”)⁵⁵ was not an unusual phenomenon during the developmental state. For instance, it was the Yoshida’s doctrine in the 1950s which paved the way to a successful developmental state that managed to ameliorate Japan’s economy and stabilize its security in the post war era. Prime Minister Yoshida’s decision to not rearm against the communist bloc to disable the potential communist expansion in Asia in 1950 also showed the strength of the economy-first-policy that the

⁵¹ Ibrahim, and Kato, “Key note speech”, 13.

⁵² Ibrahim, and Kato, “Key note speech”, 13.

⁵³ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 172.

⁵⁴ Beeson, “Japan’s Reluctant Reformers and the Legacy of the Developmental State”, 7.

⁵⁵ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy*, 22.

Japanese state was into more clearly, not only regarding the international community, but also Japanese nationals.⁵⁶

Bureaucracy hand in hand with private key businesses and politics and topped with a great deal of public support were the main ingredients of the developmental state from the 1950s to the 1970s. A governance system that was increasingly focused on economic development was missing social values such as individuals' rights. Moreover, it was missing a civil society that could tackle fundamental issues related to individuals' rights (i.e. right to freedom, freedom of speech). The relation between the state and bureaucracy or private businesses did not exist between the civil society and state. In fact, even the incorporated civil society organizations at the time, were mainly connected with and influenced by the state. Up until the enactment of the NPO law in 1998, incorporated civil society organizations in Japan structured themselves under the Uniform Civil Code propagated in 1896. The 1896 Uniform Civil Code was a complicated process for NGO authorization due to its multi layered application and recognition procedures. In addition to such complicated application procedures, NGOs were obliged to have "an endowment of 300 million yen and an annual budget exceeding 30 million yen".⁵⁷ Such an amount made it very difficult for small scale NGOs to become officially recognized. This financial barrier alongside the difficulty of the political structure on application and recognition dragged many NGOs into the non-legal pool where they lost their official visibility. Prior to the 1980s, incorporated NGOs in Japan were mainly acting as a part of "state's social welfare policy".⁵⁸ Thus, they were not even close to having a legitimate voice on policy changing. In Statist

⁵⁶ Sugita, "The Yoshida Doctrine as a Myth", 123.

⁵⁷ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.14.

⁵⁸ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.23.

democracies such as Japan, where governments are the main actors that control both the economic and social policies, finding space for NGOs is not as easy as it is in the “pluralist liberal democracies such as the UK/USA”⁵⁹ and “corporalist/social democratic democracies such as the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Switzerland”.⁶⁰ This was especially true for NGOs that advocate human rights and play a major role in humanitarian aid with the aim of spreading political, global and western values as good governance models.

On the other hand, the Japanese state’s focus was not on non-economic development, i.e. the development of civil society, which it clearly tended to hamper by disabling the potential through multi-layered barrier-like procedures. Instead, it was on economic growth, and the Japanese state was reaching for its goals. The economic goals that were achieved created a strong tie between the public and state. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s “Income Doubling Plan”, for instance, worked better than the plan and the expectation, and allowed Japan to grow an average of 7.2 percent within six to seven years from 1960 onward.⁶¹ Japanese nationals were working in coordination with the state on policies that were shaped by the bureaucrats. This coordination and cooperation on one main goal, that is catching up with the West, was not something invisible for none of the parties that were a participant in the ongoing development model. Japan was developing rapidly, and the majority of the citizens were well aware of this fact. At the time of the developmental era they started to consider themselves to belong to the middle class as they were experiencing new economic opportunities. Thus, the

⁵⁹ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 149.

⁶⁰ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 149.

⁶¹ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 167.

admiration for the work of ministries that had succeeded to create this rapid development was held in high regard by the public.⁶²

The Japanese government is not the only responsible party for the late development of NGOs in Japan. Attention should also be paid to Japanese society's eastern cultural values, such as the Confucian traditions which bound the public to the state, in other words to authority, especially: "(1) respect for hierarchy and authority"⁶³ (i.e. key industries chosen by the state and national loyalty that works towards it), (2) "emphasis on conformity to group interests rather than individual needs"⁶⁴ (i.e. permanent employment), and (3) "emphasis on order and stability".⁶⁵ These values put one's individual rights and preferences behind the state authority and turned the state's vision into one's obligation to fulfill both for the society and for her/himself. Individuals in Japan from numerous social settings such as household/family (*ie/家*), and firm (*kaisha/会社*), are observed from a group centered view, rather than an individual centered one.⁶⁶ The Confucian values that promoted and implemented collectivity against individuality have partially been the reason for the delayed development of the civil society in Japan. Hirata argues that the word individualism, "*kojin-shugi*" (個人主義), itself obtains a negative implication in Japanese language since it "stresses selfishness and self-centeredness"⁶⁷ of an individual who is at this stage bound to live in

⁶² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*,23.

⁶³ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*,23.

⁶⁴ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*,23.

⁶⁵ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*,23.

⁶⁶ Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 76.

⁶⁷ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*,24.

a collective society. With an invisible pressure on collectivism from the Meiji era through the developmental era, the state was seen as the higher authority to both political and economic decision-making for Japan and its people. For instance, during the Cold War era, NGOs together with persons apart from any group or union that criticized the Japanese government in the sphere of civil rights, were being categorized as communist or left-wing organizations and/or individuals.

Confucian values are being used by many Asian states, as well as the Japanese state. The difference between Japan and other Asian states is that it successfully blends Confucian values as “respect for hierarchy and authority, emphasis on conformity to group interests rather than individual needs”⁶⁸ (i.e. permanent employment), “and emphasis on order and stability”⁶⁹ into the national philosophy of the developmental state model. It was during the developmental era that Japanese nationals were eagerly supporting and accepting to become a permanent employee of one firm (*kaisha*), from graduation from high-school and/or university until retirement. In addition, working more than 12 hours and 6 days a week without getting any extra financial compensation for overtime work eventually made Japan rich and powerful again. These were the fitting norms of the developmental state. Namely, corporate workers became modern-day warriors known in Japanese as *kigyō-senshi* (企業戦士), a corporate warrior, and *mouretsu-shain* (猛烈社員) an employee who gives her/his everything to work and company.⁷⁰ The high work discipline in Japan has been shaken by the *karōshi* (過労死), overwork death, which is a worldwide known Japanese issue caused as a result of long

⁶⁸ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.23.

⁶⁹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.23.

⁷⁰ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.24.

and stressful working hours. The Japanese cultural aspects of *uchi* (うち), inside and *soto* (外), outside also play a vital role in the work ethics of Japanese people. The concept of uchi-soto demoralizes people to speak up as individuals in a heavily group oriented work environment and society. This cultural aspect of uchi-soto was strengthened with the ideology of *ie*, family, which enabled the Japanese government, from the Meiji era until World War 2, to rely on Japanese families to take care of the elderly and their own vulnerable relatives and/or neighbors who were identified with care needs.⁷¹ Even after the post-World War 2, vulnerable individuals of the society were heavily relying first on their families, relatives, neighbors, that is, on the group considered as uchi. If this was not working, then reliance was on the government, the larger *ie*, rather than establishing grassroots groups themselves for a stronger civil society.⁷² The concept of *ie* also exists in corporate constitutes and affects the behavior of workers towards respecting authority and working in harmony. As Vij explains,

The sense that corporations constitute an intermediate form of *ie* between the actual familial unit (the original *ie*) and the collectivity as the overarching paternal *ie* is inscribed in the social practices of life within corporations.⁷³

Historically, Western states with Christian traditions based on volunteerism and charity have demonstrated more NGO activities through their “long historical relationship with today’s developing countries”.⁷⁴ Conversely, for Japan as a state with different traditional and cultural values (i.e. uchi-soto and *ie*, and Confucian values), the concept of support to the outsider, *soto*, has always been a case of discouragement. Volunteerism and charity values, as traditional aspects of Western societies, have been

⁷¹ Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 78.

⁷² Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 200.

⁷³ Vij, *Japanese Modernity and Welfare: State, Civil Society, and Self in Contemporary Japan*, 93.

⁷⁴ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html>

the triggering reasons for the development of civil society and NGOs in the Western states prior to Western states as Japan.⁷⁵ In Japan, individuals have been under the roof of familyism, ie, for decades, as the main responsible party of the vulnerable member of the family. The family, uchi, was the first to provide care, and if the support from uchi was not sufficient, then it was the state, ie. These cultural aspects, uchi-soto and ie, discouraged the emergence of civil society and NGOs in Japan until the end of the developmental state, when Japan started to become more global not only in terms of economy, but also politically and culturally.

2.3 The rise of civil society

The developmental state had reached its target of catching up with the West by the late 1970s. After three decades of constructive work on its economic progress, Japan was facing a maturation of industrialization which exhausted the need of a developmental model. Japan's global interaction was expanded alongside its developed industry. Unlike the industrial domestic development that kept the iron triangle ethics strong and alive (i.e. loyalty to authority, hard-work for the nation's development by bypassing non-economic issues as citizens right's expansion), global expansion came with its international ornaments.⁷⁶ These did not only intervene directly with Japanese nationals and brought changes socially and culturally, but also created external pressure on Japanese economy to follow the international patterns to become a fair international participant in the global economy and politics. The external push on Japan's economic activities, that is, globalization, has been the main reason for the breakup of the state-private sector. By pushing the market away from the government's protective policies

⁷⁵ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*.25.

⁷⁶ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 7.

and towards a liberalized market, the developmental state had reached to an end. The expanding role of the economic and political globalization can be observed as the main cause of the end of the developmental state and as the main reason for the rise of NGOs in Japan. Globalization had created a new political environment in which citizens obtained a larger space and part in shaping the new political structure in Japan.

Under the winds of globalization, the protective measures of the Japanese government over the country's economy, which consisted of turning Japan into an export-led industry to protect its own domestic market, were not appreciated by the international actors.⁷⁷ These measures turned Japan into the second largest economy of the world, yet as such, it was severely falling behind most of the developed Western states in its contribution to global economic interdependence. Japan simply needed to flex its borders for greater international economic cooperation and coordination.⁷⁸ There was a growing external pressure on Japan to open its doors to foreign goods, which was against its protective policies over the domestic economy. The world was asking Japan to be a good customer and a good supplier all at the same time. Japan was not alone on this journey. As integrated international economic activities were on the rise, states were bound to follow international standards to continue their existence on the global platform. The national economic goals of the country, which were heavily supported and promoted by the government and the private sector, were no longer going to create an efficient market to Japanese firms under the liberalized economy. With the liberalization of the market economy, Japan experienced a series of departures of Japanese firms, which had previously become both globally and domestically successful and

⁷⁷ Beeson, "Japan's Reluctant Reformers and the Legacy of the Developmental State", 17.

⁷⁸ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 175.

competitive.⁷⁹ In parallel with the migration of experienced Japanese firms, the 1985 Plaza Accord, which appreciated the yen against the U.S. dollar, sent more and more Japanese firms overseas.⁸⁰ All this caused the relations between the state and private sector which was a strong element of the developmental state model to lose the majority of power.

Globalization has also fashioned a wider space for people to interact on an international level and generate knowledge on all sorts of areas (i.e. environment crises, humanitarian crisis, poverty, sports, real estate, and other). Moreover, the Internet, as a product of technology, enabled people not only to be more conscious about ongoing crises over humanitarian and/or environmental issues, but also to reunite and act globally. Such major advancement of technology increased the consciousness of populations without the governments' hundred percent monitoring and supervision, and thus played an efficient role on structuring the presence of civil society and NGOs internationally. The new space that was made available by the Internet allowed people to orchestrate political activities for better causes at a global level. This enabled people to gain efficient skills for becoming strong contributors to, as well as creators of civil society. Globalization brought in a new form of unity and a new level of consciousness and made people focus more on (1) acquisition of global norms, such as humanitarian responsibility, respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy, freedom from conquest, and ecological protection; (2) change in normative orientations and behavioral change.⁸¹ The spread of knowledge and information together with the growing responsibility on humanitarian and environment issues have changed the way people

⁷⁹ Beeson, "Japan's Reluctant Reformers and the Legacy of the Developmental State", 9.

⁸⁰ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 52.

⁸¹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 61.

behave and communicate both on individual and collective levels. It also allowed people to look at things from a different perspective and to seek more horizontal relations (rather than vertical) with the governments.

The self-sacrificing characteristics of the post-war generation to reach the national goal of economic growth of the country was no longer a fit for many Japanese nationals, who were now living in a developed country with a secured and stable economy. The once welcomed heavy working ethics such as long working hours without receiving extra pay, being employed for a lifetime, and allowance of limited days off, in other words materialist values that prioritized the economic development, were no longer attracting the younger generation. The state-led developmental state model by the end of 1970s enabled the maturation of the once insecure economy. A change which took Japanese nationals to a different level, where they no longer had to worry about the economic and political insecurity of the state and nation both on domestic and international level. In the 1980s, for the first time in decades, Japanese people had the liberty to pay attention to something greater than themselves; global humanitarian and environment developments and crisis at the same time. Contrary to the materialist values which share a narrower and stricter perspective on development, post-materialist values express a greater interest in global norms such as equality and democracy.⁸² In order to be capable of caring and implementing global norms such as equal human rights, poverty reduction, environment rights, growing citizen involvement in decision-making both at government and community level in political and economic life, one needs to mature their own materialist values first.

As Inglehart argues, post-materialist values are an after-product of matured materialist values, which can only come alive after a state's stabilization of its own

⁸² Braithwaite, Makkai, and Pittelkow, "Inglehart's Materialism-Postmaterialism Concept: Clarifying the Dimensionality Debate Through Rokeach's Model of Social Values", 1536.

security and survival.⁸³ The younger generation oblivion of the pre-war conditions of the older generation such as poverty, insecurity over life and country's future, was born into a post-materialist state where political and economic insecurity was no longer the issue. Therefore, the emphasis on economic development was shifted to other human aspirations which enabled to open and widen the path for the emergence of civil society and NGOs in Japan. Today, the power of bureaucracy and government's social authority is no longer as strong as it used to be during the developmental state due to the expanding horizons with the interaction of globalization.

Worldwide, globalization created a greater interdependence of the international economies through an ever-growing international trade, which evidently changed the traditional meaning of national borders by enabling them to be more transparent (i.e. transnational trade and tariff rates) and changed the role of states in state control (i.e. liberalization of Japanese market from the protective policies). In addition, the evolution of international politics and the structure of global governance formed bridges between domestic and international politics and enabled the flow of new external political opportunities to non-state actors.⁸⁴ The ability of political globalization to influence domestic politics of states, also brought the pressure to align with leading global norms such as "participatory development, good governance and democratization".⁸⁵ Together with the global norms, the growing number of international participants and their interdependence on the global network created the need of international and impartial supervising and monitoring mechanisms to prevent any sort of conflict. Global governance, as the governing model of the international politics where governments exists individually and act collectively, has given space to Intergovernmental

⁸³ Braithwaite, Makkai, and Pittelkow, "Inglehart's Materialism-Postmaterialism Concept: Clarifying the Dimensionality Debate Through Rokeach's Model of Social Values", 1536.

⁸⁴ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 3.

⁸⁵ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 5.

organizations (IGOs) to promote, negotiate, implement and monitor global norms.⁸⁶

Hence, the role and presence of IGOs and NGOs became more essential and pragmatic.⁸⁷

Why would a state accept these global norms? The short and frank answer to this question is to become a world leading and successful state. In the case of Japan, unlike other developed countries of the world, international partners are needed to guarantee its security and make it a more trustworthy, reliable and fair member of the international community for additional economic growth. During the state-led developmental model, Japan managed to use its foreign aid as a diplomatic tool to strengthen its economic development rather selfishly, since the aim was to support receiver countries' economy not to rely more on Japanese products. As a result, Japan was being criticized by western states with powerful civil society nets and with more humanitarian focused foreign aid approaches. Japan's economic success as becoming the second largest economy in the world, and later in the 1990s, the top foreign aid donor, was not going to be welcomed with its closed doors to foreign aid with a strong civil society and NGOs. Thus, the realization of more NGO activities as the core government aid program supported by the MoFA and the ODA started to become visible by the late 1980s. It took more than three decades for the Japanese government to open its doors and to serve its own civil society with better legal structure (i.e. NPO law) and more state funding, and to build more coordination and collaboration mechanisms between the state and NGOs. The end of the state-led developmental model caused the Iron Triangle to shift its shape to more of a circle, where the public, the civil society, NGOs, the private sector and politicians found their own tune in harmony with each other as it will be studied in the following chapter.

⁸⁶ Betts, *Forced Migration and Global Politics*, 99,100.

⁸⁷ Betts, *Forced Migration and Global Politics*, 100.

CHAPTER 3

CHANGING ROLE OF JAPANESE NGOs

3.1 Development of Japanese NGOs

Economic and security conditions of societies and states, impact their existence on both domestic and international levels. If a state is both economically weak and substantially insecure, then it is very likely to observe a set of controlling state policies being implemented, followed by a biased distribution of political and economic power in order to strengthened that control.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in insecure states, strong state policy implementations that restrict democratic public life (i.e. freedom of speech, citizenry rights) cause rising levels of appreciation.⁸⁹ While strong state policies might support economic growth, they certainly disable the development of its civil society. On the other hand, as Inglehart argues, the contrary can be true when a society's survival is no longer at risk. Only then, it becomes possible for a state to incline towards openness to global democratic social norms. It is with this equation that the phenomenon of the rise of NGOs has been mainly experienced in between developed, post-materialist Western states rather than war-torn countries of the Middle East and eastern Asia. After World War 2, Japan's presence and existence was severely at risk of obliteration. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the Japanese state kept the state-private sector coordination and cooperation higher than state-civil society relations. The continuity of economic growth together with technological improvements, under strict guidance and statist policies of the government, paved the way for an economically and politically matured, secured state but a weak civil society. In the late 1970s, bypassing West Germany and following

⁸⁸ Inglehart, *Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World*, 10.

⁸⁹ Inglehart, *Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World*, 8.

US, Japan became the second biggest economic power globally.⁹⁰ However, at the same time, in 1967, Japan had 13 international development (humanitarian aid) NGOs.⁹¹ This is a fairly small number when compared to the United Kingdom with 120, Canada and Germany with 110 of such NGOs.⁹²

The insecurity of the Japanese government or rather, its anxiety over disappearance from the global platform as a tenacious international actor, has disabled the communication between the civil society, the Japanese nationals and the state itself for three decades. The fear of being a weak state, nonetheless, was not only shared by the government, but also by the Japanese society. Consequently, to live in a secure state, together with the strong guidance of the government, Japanese nationals showed a great deal of self-scarification by devoting themselves to work towards the national economic development of the state. As Inglehart argues, for a society to pay greater attention to humanitarian aspirations, a certain level of economic and political maturity, in other words security, is needed. In the late 1970s, Japan's economy was rapidly growing but with a lack of visible NGO presence within. Compared to the developed Western states, Japan was not getting richer in NGO development. In order to become a role model to the world (specifically to Asian countries and other non-Western states), and to be a durable state between the other (Western) developed states, Japan needed to become an open, liberal democracy with political structures and state policies supportive of the growth of NGOs because without these norms, a country could only be observed as an undemocratic state with closed political systems and state policies in the global community.⁹³ Japan's role in the emergence of NGOs and state-civil society relations is

⁹⁰ Ohno, *The Economic Development of Japan: The Path Traveled by Japan as a Developing Country*, 162.

⁹¹ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 7.

⁹² Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 7.

⁹³ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 24.

important because it stands as an alternative model to many other non-Western states and cultures. It is a clear-cut sample which shows what happens when a country focuses solely on its economic development and lacks in civil society development. Japan could have been a global norm leader rather than a norm follower. However, due to its state-led developmental state model and pacifist nature, it comes behind the developed Western states in the promotion of global values and NGO development.

It is the responsibility of states to have open doors for pro-NGO norms to support the development of society together with civil society. According to Reimann's "activism from above" model, NGO friendly political and financial policies, governmental support models through direct and indirect funds, and integrated state-civil society relations that give the civil groups access to the policy and decision-making stages as the voice of the public are core state policies that encourage the growth of NGOs in a state. Focusing on NGOs, this chapter will focus on the late development of NGOs in Japan through Japanese governments changing pro-NGO political structures and state policies. In order to do that, we will first briefly analyze the above-mentioned core political structures together with NPO law, to better understand Japan's weak stance on the emergence of NGOs as a statist state which held the total authority on economic and social policy making and gave not much of a space to proliferation of NGOs. Second, the MoFA's changing relationship together with the Japanese government's supportive policies that kicked off around mid-1990s towards Japanese NGOs' development will be examined. How did the MoFA and NGOs start to work together from the early 1990s? What changed the attitude of the MoFA towards NGOs? While answering these questions, Japanese NGOs' relations with ODA will also be analyzed to demonstrate the growing power of NGOs in foreign policy making in Japan. The chapter will end by describing the relationship of Japanese NGOs to other support

mechanisms such as the Japan Platform and JICA which empowered their existence in Japan not only on gaining grants to operate in overseas, but also on having an active place in foreign aid policy making domestically. As Schwarts argues, Japan “with its Western institutions but Eastern cultural background, Japan represents the perfect case”⁹⁴ of civil society development in non-Western states. This section will provide an overview of the evolution of Japanese NGOs and contribute to understanding the case study of AARJ’s Syria Refugee Response-Turkey operation, which will be presented in the subsequent chapter.

3.2 NGOs and state

Reimann explains that NGOs are products of democracies, and thus, they are destined to take shape according to the governmental structure and political policies that they exist under. Consequently, it is not surprising to be able to identify a state’s governing mechanism as narrow, conservative, open or liberal from its NGO presence. For instance, liberal states such as the United States and social democratic states such as Germany, demonstrate a visible and powerful type of citizen activism, whereas statist states (where economic and social policy are under the ultimate control of the government) such as Japan portray a vague civil society that roots for greater democratic rights. Japan’s political structures together with financial support mechanisms (while being open for Japanese firms) have been closed for the development of NGOs for more than three decades.

In contrast to Anglo law, common law, UK and US traditions, Japan follows civil law which implements stricter guidelines on governing and harsher application

⁹⁴ Schwarts, “Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered”, 197.

procedures to nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.⁹⁵ Common law states, on the other hand, deal with such institutions with more flexibility (since they operate as the means of democracy) through lesser requirements such as governmental endorsements. In order to clarify the difference between common and civil law, it is important to underline that in civil law implementing states, NGOs exist as much as the inflexible law that allows them to exist.⁹⁶ Together with Japan, Germany and Italy also lacked behind the other Western states in NGO development due to having unfriendly policies, ending up disabling the creation of a richer civil society. the Contrary to this, in common law states, NGOs share the ability to form and revise laws by virtue of their natural ability to criticize the actual for the better through the goal of greater and fairer implementation of human rights both locally and globally.⁹⁷ In other words, common law by being based on case law, contrast to civil law's codified system, does offer a wider and more flexible ground for NGOs.⁹⁸ States' legal codes, common and civil law, together with their financial regulations are significant policy tools that can either expand or shrink the formation of NGOs. London, highlights that how in states application procedures are more like a "mechanical application and a formal approval exercise"⁹⁹ and states that as long as the required documents are complemented the application gets approved. It is a visible fact that countries which offer more liberal tax breaks to NGOs on their revenue, or to the wealthy people who are eager to donate and contribute financially to substitute the growth of the NGO sector, end up having higher numbers of NGOs. Tax breaks increase the opportunities for NGOs to expand their capacities and activities in a source-full environment through the support of the government and public. In a way, liberal tax

⁹⁵ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 31.

⁹⁶ Pejovic, "Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal", 10.

⁹⁷ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 35.

⁹⁸ Pejovic, "Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal", 10.

⁹⁹ London, *Japanese Corporate Philanthropy*, 37.

breaks are inclusive tools that encourage the participation of public and private entities, and the government to the civil society. For instance, the US government offers tax deductions to individual donors' donations to NGOs. Such financial regulation not only empowers NGO presence, but also creates an opportunity for NGOs to be financially self-sufficient to operate on their own pace. Tax regulations can also be observed as tools which enable states to directly support NGOs. For a long time, tax deductions to support Japanese NGOs have not been favored and eased by the Japanese government. Namely, they have been channeled to corporate donors only. However, even corporate donors had their limitations by only being able to donate through the list of the Ministry of Finance's (MoF) "special public interest promoting corporation"¹⁰⁰ that were available both for individuals and for corporations. MoF had the ultimate control over the ability of an organization to have tax deductions by the donor or not.¹⁰¹ In addition to Japanese NGOs' unpopularity until the mid-1990s, the previously mentioned special category of the MoF was mainly focusing on "scientific and academic research".¹⁰² In a way, this was devoted to the industrial development of the state by being supportive of the scientific and technological advancements rather than non-economic and societal development of the nation. This motivation of the government discouraged the presence of NGOs and resulted in higher numbers of private institutions such as universities, "research institutions, hospitals and welfare centers"¹⁰³ that were admitted and recognized as "nonprofit or charitable"¹⁰⁴ regardless of their origins being far away from other independent civil society groups. The restricted fiscal approach of the government on tax deduction for donations was to be changed around mid to late 1980s with the

¹⁰⁰ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 38.

¹⁰¹ London, *Japanese Corporate Philanthropy*, 39.

¹⁰² Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 38.

¹⁰³ Vosse, "The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan", 36.

¹⁰⁴ Vosse, "The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan", 36.

expansion of its category on “environmental protection, and development assistance”.¹⁰⁵ This allowed the flow of private/individual donations to NGOs with tax deductions. Until the enactment of the Law to Promote Specific Nonprofit Activities (the NPO Law) in 1998, Japan severely lacked in liberal regulations under the civil law. In addition, the government’s strict financial regulations such as imposing no tax breaks to NGOs, left Japan with the least numbers of NGOs among developed OECD states.

3.3 The NPO law

Until 1998, the procedures to start a nonprofit establishment in Japan was through a comparatively complex set of steps in contrast to what developed Western nations had; a simple one step regulatory application with supportive tax deductions for private donations and tax exemptions designed specifically for NGOs. For instance, the Article 34 of the Japanese Civil Code of 1896, which was thoroughly modeled on the German Civil Code, tied the establishment of nonprofit organization in the hands of “the permission of the competent authorities”.¹⁰⁶ In modern Japan’s terms, these were its ministries. Article 34 of the Japanese Civil Code of 1896 states that “an association or foundation relating to worship, religion, charity, science, art or otherwise relating to public interests and not having for its object the acquisition of gain may be made a juristic person subject to the permission of the competent authorities”.¹⁰⁷ It was unique in the sense of its application being through the “permission of the competent authorities”,¹⁰⁸ which in this case were Japanese ministries with authority over the area that they were active in, in contrast to the western countries’ simple one step regulatory

¹⁰⁵ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 38.

¹⁰⁶ London, *Japanese Corporate Philanthropy*, 26.

¹⁰⁷ London, *Japanese Corporate Philanthropy*, 26.

¹⁰⁸ Pekkanen, “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law”, 117.

application procedures. This complex natured application and recognition model to form and operate a legal incorporation with nonprofit goals, in other words a NGO, required applicants to become a public interest corporation (PIC) destined to be closely managed and supervised by the competent authorities. In the case of Japan, these were the related ministries, but only if they first passed the rocky road to become an approved PIC.

Prior to 1998, as explained above, groups had to apply to the related ministries which shared all the freedom and authority to define their own criteria as the responsible party according to their specific area of operation without any standardized criteria designed by the government to control application and recognition regulations of the ministries.¹⁰⁹ If a NGO was to operate in different fields at the same time due the nature of its operation, then it needed to apply to several different, yet related ministries to its context.¹¹⁰ The multi-application pattern was a lengthy pattern, since each ministry had their own criteria which led to the preparation of a new application file for each application at each distinct ministry. For instance, it took seven years for the Amnesty International to get the approval of the Japanese government to operate legally.¹¹¹ As a result of the complex application procedures prior to the 1980s, there were only a few officially recognized NGOs coming mainly from faith based (mainly Christian) groups such as the Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service (JOCS) founded in 1960¹¹², and incorporated associations with firm connection to the government such as the “Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICEF) established and incorporated in 1968 under the authority of the MoFA and the Ministry

¹⁰⁹ Pekkanen, “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law”, 117.

¹¹⁰ London, *Japanese Corporate Philanthropy*, 38.

¹¹¹ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 37.

¹¹² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy*, 31.

of Health and Welfare (MoHW)”.¹¹³ In addition to time consuming multi layered application procedures, the obligatory 30-million-yen rule (NGOs were expected to have annual budget of minimum 30-million-yen/about USD 300.000) to guarantee their financial strength, “an activity plan, and a board consisting of publicly respected individuals”¹¹⁴ (if possible) as former bureaucrats under the amakudari system “to be eligible for incorporation”,¹¹⁵ eventually turned many groups away from applying to become an official NGO.

As a result, the official number of Japanese NGOs stood low, while the unincorporated grassroots organization numbers stayed invisible. The enactment of the 1998 NPO law, which opened the way to simpler application and recognition procedures supported with the three new laws in 2006 and followed with reforms in 2008, changed the “legal system for public interest corporations”¹¹⁶ and showed a significant and gradual evolution in formation of NGOs and visibility in their numbers in Japan. The new laws of 2006 created two new groups. One was the public interest incorporated associations and the other was the public interest incorporated foundations, in addition to the Specified Nonprofit Activities Corporation (SNC) category of the NPO law (1998). The two groups created in 2006 arrived with distinct tax freedoms. In 2008, the new reform on PIC “under the old Article 34 of the Civil Code 1896 moved their status to the new PIC or General Nonprofit Corporation”.¹¹⁷ Since 2008, to receive the utmost tax treatment, NGOs have been obliged to get their PIC status and in order to do so, NGOs need to get their General Nonprofit Corporation (GNC) or SNC first.¹¹⁸ Today, the new application regulation sends the applicants to the Public Interest Corporation

¹¹³ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 31.

¹¹⁴ Schwartz, “Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered”, 202.

¹¹⁵ Schwartz, “Civil Society in Japan Reconsidered,” 202.

¹¹⁶ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 38.

¹¹⁷ The Japan Association of Charitable Organizations, “Data Book 2017”, 5.

¹¹⁸ The Japan Association of Charitable Organizations, “Data Book 2017”, 3.

Commission located in the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office, or to the prefectural government where their eligibility gets checked prior to obtaining the "public interest" title.¹¹⁹ The decentralization of the process by also giving the authority to all 47 prefectures to "grant legal status to non-profit, public-interest corporations"¹²⁰ has also increased the speed of application and recognition of the NGOs in Japan. The positive result of the regulations can simply be monitored from the increasing numbers of the international development NGOs from 13 in 1967 to nearly 350 in 1998 that "were involved in overseas aid".¹²¹ However, even with such increased numbers, Japan fell behind major Western states including the United States which had 1007 international development NGOs in 1998.¹²²

Although NGOs are highly independent organizations from states by nature, their emergence and formation contrary to their existence, if not heavily then partially rely on state support. It is now evident that NGOs cannot exist under difficult political structures that eliminate the right of people to present their opinion through civil society to governments correct or wrong doings on human rights, citizen rights transparency, and anti-corruption. Together with the political structure, it is also apparent that NGOs need financial support of governments to strengthen their sustainability for their existence. When the 1998 NPO law was enacted, and later when tax deductions were flexed for NGO use as well, NGOs still struggled to receive donations from either private corporations or foundations. This was mainly due to the invisibility of the unincorporated Japanese NGOs before the 1998 NPO law. The close relations of the foundations with the government, together with their conservative views, was also

¹¹⁹ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 38.

¹²⁰ Osa, "The role of Japanese NGOs in the Pursuit of Human Security: Limits and Possibilities in the Field of Refugees", 257.

¹²¹ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (20.06.19)

¹²² Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 7.

another subsidiary reason keeping them away from NGOs. NGOs needed to change their leftist image to be able to communicate with and coordinate powerful private corporations and foundations while in 1998, MoFA was relating the financial constraints of NGOs to their recent visibility, in other words, “short history”.¹²³ Direct and indirect funding backing of states through flexible tax opportunities, grants, and subsidies have been one of the main indicators of the increased number of NGOs, globally as stated above MoFA’s identification of this issue of lack financial support towards NGOs could be observed as a positive aspect that has pushed the Japanese government to open more windows for Japanese NGOs to financially receive support.

During the developmental era (1950-1970), the Japanese government lacked in being generous to its own NGOs, but ironically, it managed to grow to be the leading foreign aid donor, globally. For instance, from 1998 till 2000 Japan was the largest aid donor reporting to the OECD DAC.¹²⁴ How a state could manage to be so generous on foreign aid, but so ungenerous to its own NGOs, especially to the ones that worked in overseas on humanitarian aid, is a dilemma in itself. Also, it is what makes Japan a unique case in the development of NGOs. The Japanese state was aware of the fact that by taking its place next to other developed nations of the global community due to its successful economic development rapidly achieved during the post war era, it needed to materially support other governments in need through official and direct foreign aid channels in order to stabilize its place and image as a global power. However, with this focus, it missed the importance of civil society and its crucial place in a secure democracy. Nevertheless, as Pekkanen notes, the NPO law “legitimizes a new kind of social group and, by implication, a shift in the state-society power balance”.¹²⁵

¹²³ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (20.06.19)

¹²⁴ Development Initiatives, <http://devinit.org/post/profile-japan/#> (15.06.19)

¹²⁵ Pekkanen, “Japan’s New Politics: The Case of The NPO Law”, 112.

3.4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)

Japan's former foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, highlights the importance of NGO coordination between private companies, local governments and government of Japan for the prosperity of the global society in his introduction to the White Paper of 2016.¹²⁶ From invisibility to high visibility in foreign aid and policies, together with the MoFA, Japanese NGOs have come a long way. Prior to the late 1980s, Japan's restriction over its international military actions under Article 9 of its Constitution, has been the main ingredient for Japan's foreign aid and its most generous international contributions to stabilize its security. The image of post WW2 Japan was not only that of a rapidly industrialized and developed non-Western state, but also a state that was a great donor aligned with the global norms of the international community. Japan's national security depending on the rest of the global community, as a consequence of Article 9, has always been a concern of the Japanese government. Therefore, from the start, one of the MoFA's main goals has been to mitigate the security risks of the country by obtaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.¹²⁷ Although the MoFA has not been succeeded at this (yet), its economic commitments to the global community to gain its trust have worked well until Japanese firms' overseas activities visibly surpassed its NGOs presence. In the 1990s, Japan was the second biggest donor to the UN, and today it is the fifth.¹²⁸ Also, in the 1990s, Japan was the second biggest economy of the world following the USA, while today it is the third biggest economy following China and the

¹²⁶ MOFA, "White Paper 2016", 3.

¹²⁷ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq5.html (27.06.19)

¹²⁸ UNHCR, "Contributions to UNHCR 2019", 1.

USA.¹²⁹ Regardless of its economic success and contribution to world economics on development, as argued previously in this section, Japan lacked the presence of a strong NGO community. Moreover, its foreign aid policies were under heavy criticism due to their old-fashioned structures (i.e. ODA's loan aids which mainly supported Japanese firms) still being largely influenced by the state-led developmental model that continued to strengthen its bureaucracy and big businesses, while weakening its own civil society. In a way, a country's foreign policy can be observed as the reflection of its own domestic political, economic, social and cultural self. If a country gave no space for its own public, in other words civil society's active participation to economic and political arenas, then it is questionable how much democracy and liberty one could observe. In this regard, in the late 1980s, the MoFA, as the responsible party in the NGO relations and foreign aid, started to implement a new model called sustainable human development which focused on poverty mitigation and human resource development to overcome the international criticism that Japan was under on its foreign aid and NGO presence. The new model was more focused on NGO activities concerning "human resource development, and improvement of health and living conditions"¹³⁰ than on the usual economic development projects having construction and infrastructure projects at the center. The construction and infrastructure projects were supported by ODA's loan aids that the Japanese government and the private sector, with the exception of Japanese NGOs, were accustomed to for decades. With this regard, Japanese NGOs activities and power on to (1) "directly implement humanitarian development projects at the grass-

¹²⁹ The World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?end=2018&locations=JP-CN-US&name_desc=true&start=1990&view=chart (27.06.19)

¹³⁰ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 65.

roots level”¹³¹ and (2) “provide a well-tailored response to small-scale projects”¹³² and, (3) “implement projects at relatively low cost”.¹³³ were also acknowledged officially by MoFA. This very change of the MoFA was not only empowering the presence and work of Japanese NGOs, but also enabling Japan to catch up with global norms on human development in health, education and poverty alleviation together with the international community.

Between ministries, the MoFA was and still is the focal point in charge of ODA and NGOs, as well as the relationship between the two. In addition, following the Basic Act on the Central Government Reform in 1988, the MoFA officially became the responsible party to coordinate between all government units on tasks and planning associated with ODA.¹³⁴ While the MITI plays a firm role in relation with the Japanese business sector with a fixed interest in large scale capital projects overseas, and the MoF as the main ministry in charge of international loan aids, the MoFA’s position with the growing power of NGOs gave more influence to acknowledge the international criticism over Japan’s foreign aid implementations.¹³⁵ Japan was being criticized over its hard aid focused loan aids, topped with the lack of NGO presence in the majority of its foreign aid activities by the global community that it severely relied on. Hence, the 1990s have been a significant decade in terms of NGO, government partnership and discourse in Japan. The establishment of the Non-Governmental Organizations Assistance Office (NGO Assistance Office) within the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MoFA in 1994, opened a new window for NGO and government partnership relations. The main responsibilities of the NGO Assistance Office are (1) to supervise and manage

¹³¹ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (27.06.19)

¹³² MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (27.06.19)

¹³³ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (27.06.19)

¹³⁴ MoFA, “Annual Report on Japan's ODA Evaluation 2014”, 14.

¹³⁵ Jain, “Japan’s Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions”, 58.

partnerships with Japanese NGOs involved in international cooperation, (2) to extend subsidy support to “Japanese NGOs’ high quality international cooperation that harnesses the know-how and expertise of the NGOs”,¹³⁶ (3) to generate a reproductive communication environment between NGOs and state to sustainably continue Japanese NGOs’ visibility in Japanese aid and ODA.¹³⁷ By the late 1980s, the MoFA was aware of the advantages that NGOs could bring into Japan’s foreign aid due to their local level experiences directly from the field. For instance, it was visible for the MoFA that Japanese NGOs were welcomed more than the government officials in the field due to their experience and relations at a grassroots level. It also became more apparent that Japanese NGOs could operate in an efficient manner, both cost and time wise, to implement small-scale grassroots aid while reaching the people in need faster than the government itself.¹³⁸ Japanese NGOs were a perfect fit to implement soft aid supportive of health, education and basic needs of people under the roof of the sustainable human development model that the Japanese government had accepted as a model for its foreign aid in order to be a remarkable and democratic member of the global community. Furthermore, the Japanese government was also a good match for the Japanese NGOs, which had for decades suffered from lack of financial and political support to evolve and strengthen themselves technically and financially to continue their meaningful operations overseas. As discussed above, the enactment of the NPO law in 1998 opened more possibilities for Japanese NGOs not only to operate legally, but also to have the support of the government to acknowledge their needs. In short, the Japanese government became a successful financial and political source that could support

¹³⁶ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

¹³⁷ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

¹³⁸ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html>

Japanese NGO activities through grant aids, technical capacity building, human resources, and to influence the foreign policy of the country through its ODA. It is acknowledged by the Japanese NGOs that ODA will significantly continue to be the core focal point in shaping the Japanese foreign policy, and thus, have an opinion and voice over Japan's foreign policy in order to identify and highlight not only the good practices, but also the not-so-good ones. It is also their (Japanese NGOs') responsibility to be able to take a fair part in decision-making in ODA policies. Countries with improved pro-NGO domestic politics and political structures that offer more political space and opportunities encouraging NGO presence domestically tend to have foreign policies that promote global values more vigorously.¹³⁹ Japanese NGOs aim to carry their field experience into ODA policies for better changes. This process has already been observed in the 1990s, through a shift from hard aid focused loan aid to soft aid focused grant aid with strong involvement of NGOs rather than the private sector. MoFA publicly announced opinion on the improvement of ODA and NGO relations as "ODA and NGO activities are not antithetical, but rather complement each other".¹⁴⁰

Together with the establishment of the NGO Assistance Office in the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MoFA, the year 1994 has been a remarkable year for NGO visibility in Japan as well.¹⁴¹ For the first time in Japanese NGO history, 3 NGO representatives were included to the delegation joining the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in 1994.¹⁴² This was a remarkable step forward to increase the visibility and influence of the Japanese NGOs both domestically and internationally. Followed with the establishment of the still ongoing (1) official

¹³⁹ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 151.

¹⁴⁰ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html>

¹⁴¹ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html>

¹⁴² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 133.

quarterly meetings between the MoFA and NGOs to exchange information and opinions on foreign aid and Japanese NGOs' activities since 1996, (2) NGO-JICA regular meeting, (3) NGO-JICA Reciprocal Training Program since 1998 and (4) Subcommittee to Achieve the Objectives of the ODA Reform Council's Final Report where NGOs together with MoFA members discuss ODA reform measures taken by the MoFA six times a year since 1999.¹⁴³ These are a few examples to show the progress on NGO and government dialogues in Japan from the mid-1990s to present.

In addition to continuing dialogue efforts through periodic coordination meetings and conferences, the MoFA started to work with NGOs more directly. The MoFA currently has 7 direct grant aid projects open for Japanese NGOs under its grant assistance for Japanese NGOs projects. These include the Development Cooperation Project; NGO Partnership Project; Transport of Recycled Materials Project; Emergency Humanitarian Aid Project; Mine Clearance-related Project; Microcredit Capital Project; and Peace-building Project.¹⁴⁴ As long as applicant NGOs meet the requirements of (1) having its headquarter located in Japan, (2) being registered as an incorporated corporation (specified non-profit/ public interest corporation, or general incorporated association/foundation), (3) being a NGO that is actively involved in global assistance activities, (4) being active for minimum of two years (which allows the inclusion of the years spent as an unincorporated association, if any), (5) obtaining no financial threatening factors (i.e. cumulative deficit) and finally, (6) by not obtaining either political or religious agenda, they can freely enjoy one of the most suited 7 grant aid projects mentioned above, for their activities.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ JICA, "Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices", 6.

¹⁴⁴ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, "International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs", 8.

¹⁴⁵ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, "International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs", 7.

As the key ministry, the MoFA was aware of its own flows in foreign aid and most importantly was eager to cooperate with NGOs through various channels to fix past's errors. Below, ODA as one of the MoFA's direct communication and cooperation channels with NGOs will be analyzed.

3.5 The Official Development Assistance (ODA)

In order to support developing states' socioeconomic growth, states and various other groups such as NGOs, private corporations, and international organizations implement economic assistances at a global level. The governmental economic assistance, as in monetary and technical assistance, to developing countries is called Official Development Assistance (ODA).¹⁴⁶ ODA allows the flow of aid to countries that are enlisted in the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) of the OECD as developing countries through its wealthy OECD states channeled 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI).¹⁴⁷ ODA is not for "military aid and promotion of donor's security interests"¹⁴⁸ and principally commercial purposes. Japan's ODA consists of two main parts; (1) Bilateral aid, and (2) Multilateral Aid.¹⁴⁹ The latter mainly entails donations to international organizations and inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, the former obtains a richer participation pool due to its layered structure. Bilateral aid can be best explained through two aid categories, that is, (1) grant aid and (2) loan aid. Since the 1980s, the MoFA has strived to make grant and loan aids transparent and open to international rivalry. Today, 99 percent of loan aids are

¹⁴⁶ Japan International Cooperation Agency, "Japan International Cooperation Annual Report 2015", 12.

¹⁴⁷ OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm> (25.06.19)

¹⁴⁸ OECD, "Official Development Assistance, April 2018", 1.

¹⁴⁹ JICA, "JICA Annual Report 2015: Japan's ODA", 12.

¹⁵⁰ JICA, "JICA Annual Report 2015: Japan's ODA", 13.

untied, and thus, open to international participation, while grant aid is lacking behind by not being fully untied yet.¹⁵¹

Japan's ODA, as the main foreign policy issue fronting both the government and public, has gone through significant changes from the 1950s until today. From the 1950s to the late 1970s, Japan's ODA has operated under the influence of Japanese firms due to its supportive structure which mainly focused on three main types of channels for economic assistance to developing states through loan and grant aids; "(1) trading companies, (2) general construction firms, (3) consulting firms".¹⁵² In fact, the term of economic cooperation was being used more than ODA by the Japanese government in relation to Japanese firms' overseas activities.¹⁵³ With the approach of "economic cooperation" style, Japanese domestic products gained more space in overseas.¹⁵⁴ The inability of the Japanese firms to receive international aid bids has probably been one of the main reasons for their reliance on Japanese ODA for loan and grant aid to operate overseas. As a result, the evolving changes on turning grant and loan aids to untied aid by opening them to all international applicants and by putting the force into being more transparent at ODA were not warmly welcomed by Japanese firms, which under the roof of foreign aid have been conducting construction and/or infrastructure projects to their own benefit overseas.¹⁵⁵ By nature, loan aids were not supported globally, since they were structured to provide loans rather than supportive grants. Loan aids were also more time-consuming projects compared to grant aid projects which were not only formed with a shorter time frame but were also found to be more practical in field. Furthermore,

¹⁵¹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 53-54.

¹⁵² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 55.

¹⁵³ Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions", 56.

¹⁵⁴ Sato, "The Benefits of Unification Failure: Re-examining the Evolution of Economic Cooperation in Japan", 92.

¹⁵⁵ Manning, "OECD-DAC and Japan: Its Past, Present, and Future", 285.

international loan aids of Japan through its ODA were heavily criticized as self-serving, environmentally unsafe and unsustainable foreign aid that lacked in principle caring for global norms.¹⁵⁶ These self-image damaging criticisms were worrying the Japanese government, since it relied heavily on foreign aid to demonstrate its good will to the global community. First, because of its own safety and security, which relied heavily on its allies from the international community, and second, because of the stability of peace globally that it strongly cared for. Therefore, Japanese firms' heavy reliance on "closed grant aid market"¹⁵⁷ was about to change in the 1980s with ODA's move from more economic to more political and humanitarian assistance due to global trends focused more on soft aid approaches in global norms of human rights, peace, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance. For instance, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy became the key element of international relations. In order to follow the West, one needed to promote "democracy, human rights and market economy",¹⁵⁸ just as the West was promoting them. The wave of democratization and liberation of markets together with human rights was heavily felt in Japan's ODA policy as well. Through its 1992 ODA Charter, Japan acknowledged environmental deliberations and promotion of human rights, market principles and certainly democracy as its main principles for the first time.¹⁵⁹ For instance, Japan's leading role in adding Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan to the DAC's developing countries list and opening the path for them to receive support through ODA, and for Japan itself to support them through its ODA, was one of the significant moves that was conducted under the wave of democracy. Also, around the same period, Japan's

¹⁵⁶ Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions", 62.

¹⁵⁷ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 55.

¹⁵⁸ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 172.

¹⁵⁹ Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions", 62.

membership to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1991 as “its No.2 shareholder”,¹⁶⁰ marked a first for Japanese government on “accepting political conditions for giving aid”¹⁶¹ by accepting to “ (1) adhere to the rule of law, (2) respect human rights, (3) introduce a multiparty political system, (4) hold free and fair elections, and (5) develop market-oriented economies”.¹⁶²

From 1998 to 2000, Japan ranked the top contributor to ODA between the DAC of the OECD.¹⁶³ Currently, it ranks as the fourth contributor in ODA with its USD 14.2 billion contribution in 2018, which equals to 28 percent of its GNI.¹⁶⁴ From being pro-state, as a result of its support to the Japanese-economy-first policy of the state-led developmental state model and promoting foreign aid through Japanese firms rather than NGOs by implementing hard aid (i.e. infrastructure projects, construction projects, capital intensive), to NGO inclusive and humanitarian assistance oriented by applying soft aid (i.e. education, health care, labor intensive), Japan’s ODA has come a long way. Yet, there is still more to go. The inclusion of Japanese NGOs has been a great deal of support on the soft aid policy structure of ODA’s policy since many Japanese firms, including the governmental institutions’ lack of knowledge and skills of NGOs in soft aid. For ODA not only to be more humanitarian, but also more efficient and professional in soft aid, NGO inclusion was, and still is, visibly a must. The enactment of the 1998 NPO law has played a vital role in the involvement of Japanese NGOs to ODA and to Japanese aid policy simply by opening the path for Japanese NGOs to become legal, and thus, visible in the eye of the government. Even after the enactment of the NPO law,

¹⁶⁰ Kodera, “Japan’s Engagement with Multilateral Development Banks: Do Their Professional Paths Really Cross?”, 25.

¹⁶¹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy*, 173.

¹⁶² Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy*, 173.

¹⁶³ Development Initiatives, <http://devinit.org/post/profile-japan/#> (30.05.2019)

¹⁶⁴ Donor Tracker, <https://donortracker.org/country/japan> (30.05.2019)

Japanese NGOs' involvement with ODA fell behind the Western states' NGO involvement with ODA. According to the latest OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review of Japan conducted in 2014, Japan still needs to develop a strategy to have an efficient cooperation and dialogue with its NGOs. The report also mentions the need for inclusion of (1) "harmonized and simplified NGO funding schemes"¹⁶⁵ and (2) a set of clear guidance on "dialogue and engagement with both Japanese and partner country NGOs"¹⁶⁶ for the future of ODA's implementations worldwide. For instance, in 2017, only 2 percent of ODA was directed to NGOs, while the average rates as 17 percent between the other DAC countries of OECD.¹⁶⁷ In an effort to increase ODA channeling to Japanese NGOs, the arduous funding structure of ODA has been simplified and does no longer ask for submission of daily activity reports. Instead, it is open for more long-term projects by providing up to nearly USD 3.8 million per projects that are designed to be over three years.¹⁶⁸

It is a clear fact that ODA activities need to be more transparent in the eye of the public in Japan. As a result, ODA gets monitored and receives evaluations by third parties to keep its activities quality on accountability and transparency safe.¹⁶⁹ The MoFA publishes a yearly report and shares the findings of the ODA evaluation conducted by the Japanese government. Moreover, the MoFA shows a high emphasis on this by developing more efficient evaluation mechanisms coordinated with the civil society, private sector, and academia through its routine coordination meetings and publicly open reports.¹⁷⁰ The institutionalization of NGO participation to regular meetings also allowed the entry of Japanese public's voice, which historically had no

¹⁶⁵ OECD, "OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014", 91.

¹⁶⁶ OECD, "OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014", 91.

¹⁶⁷ Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation: JANIC, "JANIC Issue Paper No.1", 22.

¹⁶⁸ OECD, "OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014", 64.

¹⁶⁹ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/html/honbun/b2/s3_3.html (27.06.2019)

¹⁷⁰ MoFA, "Annual Report on Japan's ODA Evaluation 2017", 4.

line in between the private sector and the state before. NGOs have now allowed for Japanese citizens to have their say in foreign policy and ODA as well.

3.6 Government supported NGO funding programs

Until the late 1990s, Japan had the least NGO support among the OECD countries. Consequently, prior to 1989 and the early 1990s, there were no transparent systems that were publicly open for NGOs to apply to receive either direct or indirect support mechanisms of the government, since the majority of the present official NGO support programs were built in 1989 and the early 1990s as seen from the chronological order of the developments mentioned in the previous pages. At this stage, Japanese government was no longer oblivion to financial needs of Japanese NGOs operating in overseas. For instance, in 1999 Japanese government officially states that there is a visible gap between European, American and Japanese NGOs in terms of experience and stable financial conditions.¹⁷¹ As a result of this acknowledgment, to increase the capacity of Japanese NGOs in international aid, Japanese government announced the NGO subsidy framework in 1989.¹⁷² The rise of programs that were in favor of NGOs by the government started to take place in 1989 and continues until today. The two pioneering programs that were designed and implemented in 1989 were (1) the Grassroots Grant Program, and (2) the NGO Subsidies Scheme directly by the MoFA. While the Grassroots Grant Program was designed to be open for Japanese NGOs operating overseas, together with foreign NGOs working in the area of development of developing countries, as well as “hospitals primary schools,, research institutes and other non-profit

¹⁷¹ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/box_01.html (25.05.2019)

¹⁷² MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/box_01.html (25.05.2019)

associations”¹⁷³ correspondingly, the NGO Subsidies Scheme, which was designed and started its operation under the MoFA’s NGO Assistance Division in 1989, was only available for Japanese NGOs operating overseas.¹⁷⁴ The Grassroots Grants Program has moved its fund budget to USD 127 million in 2005 from USD 2.7 million in 1989, while the NGO Subsidies Scheme fund budget moved up to USD 10.9 million in 1997 from USD 1 million in 1990.¹⁷⁵ Towards the 2000s, there has been a significant increase in indirect government supported funds and grants toward Japanese NGOs, i.e. the 2000 establishment of Japan Platform (JPF) for emergency relief funds (which will be explained in detail later in this chapter), and many more fund mechanisms that support administrative costs, research and internship models of Japanese NGOs (especially the ones operating overseas) to increase their capacity on human resources. Compared with the above mentioned direct support of the government (i.e. (1) the Grassroots Grant Program, and (2) the NGO Subsidies Scheme), there were also other indirect support mechanisms that gained popularity.

3.6.1 Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA)

These two funding instruments include the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications’ (MoPT) Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA) and the Japan Fund for The Global Environment (JFGE) formed by the division of the quasi-governmental Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan (ERCA). POSIVA was established in 1991, and, among other, it created the opportunity for Japanese NGOs that were working overseas on development to obtain less limiting and more relaxed patterns to use the funds over the MoFA’s more restrictive and complex patterns, by its source

¹⁷³ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/g_roots/index.html#3 (25.05.2019)

¹⁷⁴ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/box_01.html (25.05.2019)

¹⁷⁵ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 89.

being the 20 percent (after tax) of the special postal savings accounts.¹⁷⁶ The account holders of ordinary post office accounts have the liberty to state their will to donate 20 % of their interest to “international cooperation purposes”.¹⁷⁷ The collected donations get distributed mainly to Japanese NGOs to increase their capacity in the field of operations on health assistance, refugee response and environmental response. The POSIVA funds were designed to create a much more liberated ground for NGOs to receive financial support and spend the received support without many bureaucratic procedures since funds were not directly from Japanese government’s annual budget.¹⁷⁸ In addition, it was a fund system that was only dedicated to international cooperation and development of NGOs of Japan. According to the calculations made by the ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications for the fiscal year of 2012 on POSIVA, the data from NGO Data Book of 1994 shows that “NGOs’ income from the POSIVA comprised 6.4%”,¹⁷⁹ as “compared with private grants (6.1%) or those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2.3%), is higher than the two sources”.¹⁸⁰ By the end of September 2007, with Postal Privatization, the Management Organization for Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance thrived to the enduring donations and is responsible for allocating donations.¹⁸¹ POSIVA’s contribution is unique and important as its main source is ordinary people rather than government and/or private sector.

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, “Posts and Telecommunications in Japan 2000 Annual Report”, 49.

¹⁷⁷ MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/guide/1998/5-2.html> (26.05.19)

¹⁷⁸ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 90.

¹⁷⁹ Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Evaluation of the System of Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid”, 2.

¹⁸⁰ Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Evaluation of the System of Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid”, 2.

¹⁸¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, “Evaluation of the System of Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid”, 1.

3.6.2 The Japan Fund for The Global Environment (JFGE)

The JFGE was established in 1993, to create an efficient fund pool for environmental NGOs. Followed with the revision of the Japan Environment Corporation Law, JFGE was established as a result of the aftermath of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) held in 1992 at Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. JFGE's competent ministers are; The Minister of the Environment, The Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.¹⁸² In addition to its fund support, JFGE was also designed to support NGOs' needs on project development, and management through trainings.¹⁸³ JFGE's funding is available for NGOs and NPOs in 9 areas as follows; “(1) Nature protection, conservation and restoration, (2) Forest conservation and tree/grass planting, (3) Anti-desertification, (4) Agriculture of environmental conservation type, (5) Mitigation and Adaptation to the Climate Change, (6) Building of a recycle- oriented society, (7) Air, water and soil conservation, (8) Comprehensive environmental education, (9) Other environmental conservation activities”.¹⁸⁴

3.6.3 The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established as a governmental agency in 1974.¹⁸⁵ However, its relationship with NGOs was only structured and activated in the late half of the 1990s.¹⁸⁶ With the JICA Partnership Program (JPP), which was launched in 2000, the JICA officially opened its doors to cooperate mainly

¹⁸² ERCA, “Environmental Restoration and Conversation Agency”, 1.

¹⁸³ ERCA, <https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/about/background.html> (25.06.2019)

¹⁸⁴ ERCA, “Environmental Restoration and Conversation Agency”, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Jain, “Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions”, 59.

¹⁸⁶ JICA, “Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices”, 6.

with NGOs, in addition to universities and local governments. Prior to the JPP, the JICA launched “the Community Empowerment Program in 1997 and the Development Partnership Program in 1999”.¹⁸⁷ These programs enabled it to prepare itself for a much more efficient communication model with NGOs. In addition to its financial support to NGOs, the JICA also provided (and still continues to provide) upon NGOs’ requests capacity building trainings on project management, organizational development, technical support provided by its experts to ensure the quality of the work of the NGOs.¹⁸⁸ The JICA’s ability to be supportive both technically and financially is due to its inclusive budget plan which allows promotion of international cooperation at the non-governmental levels, increasing public awareness on international cooperation and human resources support to parties engaged in international cooperation. As a result of its multi-tasking character on support to various actors from universities, local governments, local grassroots to Japanese NGOs, JICA currently operates in “over 150 countries and regions”¹⁸⁹ and obtains 25 “Japan Desk” offices worldwide. These “Japan Desk” offices are entitled to deliver tailored services according to the needs of the area that they are located in as follows:

1. Support for local actives of Japanese NGOs and Japanese nationals (promotion of collaboration with JICA operations, etc.)
2. Promotion of collaboration between Japanese NGOs and local NGOs
3. Promotion of collaboration between local NGOs and JICA programs (JICA-NGO Report 2008).¹⁹⁰

The JICA is also the responsible agency for administering Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA).¹⁹¹ Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the JICA, towards the mid 2000s, became a convincingly firm state partner of NGOs in both

¹⁸⁷ JICA, “Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices”, 6.

¹⁸⁸ JICA, IFIC, “Analysis of Experience in NGO-JICA Collaboration Programs with Focus on Grassroots-Type Projects”, 6.

¹⁸⁹ JICA, “JICA Profile”, 5.

¹⁹⁰ JICA, IFIC, “Analysis of Experience in NGO-JICA Collaboration Programs with Focus on Grassroots-Type Projects”, 37.

¹⁹¹ JICA, “JICA Profile”, 4.

technical capacity raising and funding areas. The Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer program (JOCV) enables young Japanese nationals to volunteer abroad in local economic and social development projects. It is also run by the JICA.¹⁹² The JOCV program allows the JICA to raise an experienced human resource pool from which governmental and non-governmental organizations can benefit. The JICA's expertise in "human resources, technology transfer, and infrastructure development"¹⁹³ followed by "technical cooperation, finance and investment cooperation, grants based on bilateral assistance",¹⁹⁴ as the main and most firm ODA implementing agency, has turned itself into a strong bridge in NGO-state relations. In addition, the JICA's emergency disaster relief capacity, public-private partnership coordination and cooperation skills and its inclusion of citizen participation, have been creating an inclusive environment to both international and Japanese organizations to work on sustainable economic and social development of many countries worldwide. Since 1998, the JICA has been actively organizing JICA-NGO Quarterly Meetings to further discuss NGO and JICA cooperation and policy.¹⁹⁵ With its given power, JICA stands as the world's biggest bilateral aid institution.¹⁹⁶

3.7 Independent funding? : The Japan Platform (JPF)

The JPF was established in 2000 as a result of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when Japanese NGOs felt the need for stronger support, both financially and technically, in the field.¹⁹⁷

The lack of a faster response mechanism, as well as the lack of communication between NGOs and Japanese government and the private sector, drew the line for a new start.

¹⁹² MoFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1998/14.html>

¹⁹³ JICA, "JICA Profile", 4.

¹⁹⁴ JICA, "JICA Profile", 4.

¹⁹⁵ JICA, "Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices", 36.

¹⁹⁶ Jain, "Japan's Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions", 60.

¹⁹⁷ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/background.html> (26.05.19)

Thus, in 2000, the JPF was built by NGOs, the private sector and the MoFA “as equal partners”¹⁹⁸ to provide a quicker and more efficient funding response mechanism to its partner NGOs working in emergency contexts such as refugee crisis and natural disasters. The JPF currently holds 43 NGO partners, one of which is AAR Japan that will be examined in the next chapter.¹⁹⁹ JPF has designed “emergency aid plans and stocked emergency aid goods, using the know-how and the resources of the NGOs and private corporations”²⁰⁰ to be able to achieve success by being an efficient emergency response mechanism which could allocate private and governmental funds directly to its partner NGOs. For instance, the JPF has a shorter access mechanism to rapid response funds than “MOFA’s standard NGO grant process”.²⁰¹ In time, through various JPF emergency funds, NGOs gained the liberty to show how they could respond faster than the Japanese government itself, since bureaucratic barriers were not as embodied for NGOs as they were for the governments. By having the MoFA as one of its strong and equal allies, the JPF has become one of the most trustable fund pools for private sectors’ donations in support of NGOs in Japan.²⁰² In addition to the MoFA and private entities, the JPF accepts personal donations as well. The collected donations get allocated to chosen partner NGOs that apply for emergency funds. The Figure 1, portrays how the JPF model receives its donations from governmental, private and individual donors and allocates them to its partner NGOs in its simplest form. During an emergency outbreak either in natural or manmade crisis, NGOs present their proposals to experts in related fields and the JPF secretariat at the Project Examination Committee (PEC) of the JPF, to receive sound feedback on their projects and to take funding recommendations to

¹⁹⁸ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/background.html> (26.05.19)

¹⁹⁹ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/NGO-units.html> (26.05.19)

²⁰⁰ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/background.html> (26.05.19)

²⁰¹ OECD, “OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014”, 82.

²⁰² JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/jpf.html> (26.05.19)

prepare for the next stage of the Standing Committee (SC).²⁰³ The SC is made out of members from the MoFA, the corporate sector and NGOs, and acts as the decision-making mechanism on JPF funded emergency projects.²⁰⁴ The projects that go through PEC, at SC receive their final marks on project decisions as pass or not pass, and later on, grant amounts for the projects that passed. The chosen NGOs get accountable from the emergency response and have the responsibility to provide weekly, monthly and final reports to the JPF secretariat to demonstrate the progress of the project that they have submitted to the PEC.²⁰⁵




Figure 1. Japan platform model
Source: Japan Platform, 26.05.19

As a donor, the JPF often organizes regular field monitoring visits with external experts to examine and support the accountability of the projects that are taking place under its roof. In a way, the JPF's structure acts as a supportive initiative which allows the civil society to have firm communication lines with the government, the private sector and the public. Until today, the JPF together with its partner NGOs has operated

²⁰³ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/flow.html> (26.05.19)
²⁰⁴ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/flow.html> (26.05.19)
²⁰⁵ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/flow.html> (26.05.19)

in 43 countries and conducted over 1400 projects with an expenditure of 54 billion yen (approximate of USD 500 million).²⁰⁶ While it manages to offer a more flexible ground to Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs than the Japanese government, its structure also gets criticized by its members due to being narrower and more traditional than western fund pools.²⁰⁷ JPF's funding structure has been through a slight yet a meaningful change in 2018 as a result of its fruitful yet limited activities in Syrian refugee response.²⁰⁸ The change of JPF funding system will be discussed with further details in the next chapter through the case study of the thesis.

The inclusive approach of the JICA and JPF to NGOs has changed the negative image of NGOs from anti-governmental leftist groups to efficient aid providers and advocates of democracy for world peace not only in the private sector and government, but also in the government oriented public eye. It was with these initiatives and the changing supportive regime of the government as pro-NGO in the 1990s, that Japanese NGOs started to gradually gain power, visibility and voice not only in their operations in humanitarian assistance, but also in state policies.

The ODA Charter of 2003 stating more cooperation with Japanese NGOs as one of its basic policies and implementation principle, together with the growing will on direct and indirect financial and technical support from the government and the private sector, and a better understanding on who and what Japanese NGOs are in the public since the late 1980s, have gradually been turning Japan into a more NGO friendly democratic state. As Reimann argues for NGOs to emerge in a state the following measures are the most necessary to be accomplished; (1) a certain level of supportive legal structures (i.e. supportive application and recognition mechanisms for NGOs), (2)

²⁰⁶ JPF, <https://www.japanplatform.org/E/about/jpf.html> (26.05.19)

²⁰⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

accessibility of state and corporate funding (as in direct and indirect financial support mechanisms), and (3) access to political institutions (i.e. state-private sector-NGO coordination meetings on regular basis). In Japan's case, it is apparent that together with the above-mentioned steps the presence of NGOs gained a significant pace in growth. However, it still lags behind the developed OECD countries that are rich in NGO numbers and activities globally. Japan's delayed demise of the iron triangle, which kept the relations between the private sector and the government through bureaucratic channels strong and as the only communication line as Japan's foreign aid policy for nearly four decades, should be observed as the main reason of the slow development of its own NGOs. Japan's NGO development stood and continues to stay behind developed OECD countries, but with major differences now. Since the late 1980s, Japanese NGOs have not only started to receive the support of the Japanese government, but also the Japanese nationals and the international pro-NGO support mechanisms (i.e. NGOs involvement in international conferences on humanitarian aid, international funds to NGOs, IGO-NGO partnerships, financial support from various private and quasi-governmental foundations).

In addition to the strengthened ties between governmental intuitions, private sectors and NGOs due to changing internal political and fiscal structures, globalization came in as an outsider source that created an irresistible and irreversible impact on the Japanese public on global issues. With the growth of technology and advancement of communication tools, people gained the ability to be more aware on what was occurring not only in their own zone, but also outside their zone. This very global consciousness pulled Japanese nationals out of their uchi-soto values and pushed them into the *chikyu-jin* (地球人), global person value, which allowed individuals to work for global norms

that support a peaceful dignified life for all.²⁰⁹ In other words, globalization managed not only to intervene into the Japanese values, but also to change them permanently in a positive way. Increased levels of global consciousness in the Japanese society encouraged and supported the visibility and work of the Japanese NGOs in overseas humanitarian aid. While the MoFA was working on sustainable human development paradigm by keeping Japanese NGOs' work inclusive in all levels to government, the public and the private sector to be a responsible and respected party of the international community, Japanese nationals were becoming more aware of international human-made crisis (i.e. refugee crisis) and environmental crisis that were threatening the environment, democracy, and world peace.

The 1980s have been a progressive era not only for Japanese NGOs to grow domestically, but also as with other NGOs to grow globally. During the 1980s, the liberal, social democratic and corporatists democracies such as the UK, the USA, Germany and the Nordic countries were not only playing the leading role in NGO development and their involvement in foreign affairs as states' service providers and advocates, but were also leading the way for other states' NGOs to move along with them by becoming the main support and source provider to all NGOs globally to rise under the same roof of internationalized Western political and social norms. Thus, the late 1980s witnessed an increase in variable resources from intergovernmental organizations, private and quasi-governmental foundations, and bilateral aid agencies to NGOs globally.²¹⁰ For instance, IGOs' NGO inclusive approach to global politics and economics by turning NGOs into strong members and allies of IGOs, had provided space for NGOs to be visible both globally and domestically, and continue their

²⁰⁹ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 155.

²¹⁰ Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*, 152.

activities for the highly valued global norms of human rights, peace, sustainable development, women in development, people participation and humanitarian aid. Creating international NGO partners as the service providers and advocates, in other words, supporting the rise of NGOs globally, could only work through the government's acceptance of socio-political global norms.²¹¹ If a state does not act supportive of the international demand on pro-NGO work in favor of global norms through its political structures, then it is highly unlikely to find a rise of NGOs either domestically or internationally within that state. As discussed above, for NGOs to exist, states must have political structures in support of NGOs and not against. As seen in Japan's case, with the strict barrier like procedures over NGOs' application and recognition until the enactment of the NPO law in 1998, Japan severely lagged the presence of a civil society.

Would the growth of NGOs happen if there was no global pressure on Japan to provide more space for its NGOs to evolve? Probably, it would eventually happen, since it is a democratic country but not as rapidly as it did from the late 1980s onwards. The international pressure on Japan to open its doors to its own NGOs paved the way for powerful NGOs, such as AARJ which is the case study of the thesis, to emerge in Japan and act on new global issues such as the environment and the refugee crisis today in the most efficient way. The end of Cold War created a wave of democracy that needed to be guided and governed by the powerful members of the global community to have a balanced and healthy global governance. In this regard, politically the concept of civil society had gained more importance and responsibilities to structure the political development of newly democratizing states.²¹² This new wave also opened a new door for established democracies as Japan with a rather narrower civil society span to develop

²¹¹ Kuroda, and Imata, "Shifting Paradigms for International NGOs and Constituency Building Evolving Scene from Japan", 3.

²¹² Vosse, "The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan", 31.

their weaknesses on their civil society. The Gulf War and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991, followed with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 Japanese NGOs work in overseas became more apparent in the eye of the Japanese public.²¹³ In 1999, Japanese government openly stated the issue of how Japanese NGOs lack financial support from both government and private institution by explaining how “compared to the European and American NGOs, which have abundant experience and stable financial bases, Japanese NGOs, in general less experienced in the international aid field and have weak finances with which to achieve satisfactory aid activities”.²¹⁴ In 2014 the continuity of the same problem can be observed from MoFA’s statement in its report on “International Cooperation and NGOs” as “international cooperation activities of Japanese NGOs still have significant room for expansion and strengthening” in comparison with “NGOs in the United States and Europe”.²¹⁵ Furthermore the report acknowledges the financial constraints of Japanese NGOs and urges them to gain skills if they would like to conduct “independent activities which do not rely solely on government funding”.²¹⁶ The case study in the following chapter will demonstrate the progress built on development of Japanese NGOs through AARJ’s field activities in Turkey. AARJ’s experience from Turkey will lay out the above-mentioned funding struggle from an individual level.

²¹³ JICA, “Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices”, 5.

²¹⁴ MoFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/box_01.html

²¹⁵ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 4.

²¹⁶ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 4.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY: AARJ'S REFUGEE RESPONSE OPERATIONS IN TURKEY

4.1 Times of crisis and the rise of NGOs

Historically, there have been two major incidents that regardless of their unfortunate circumstances positively impacted the rise of NGOs in Japan. The first is the Indochinese refugee crisis (1975), and the second is the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995). Since the former is directly related to the case study of this thesis, the latter incident and its relation to NGO development in Japan will be discussed first, and the former will follow next. On January 17, 1995, Japan experienced one of the biggest and most disastrous earthquakes after the 1923 Great Kanto disaster. This was the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake with a magnitude of 7.3. The earthquake reportedly killed nearly 6500 people, destroyed or damaged more than 75.000 buildings, and severely damaged the infrastructure in the Hyogo Prefecture.²¹⁷ The amateur-like response of the Japanese government to the crisis was heavily criticized by the public, since the government's weak leadership and bureaucratic negligence caused delayed response and ended up in more casualties. Regardless of the muddled dark side of the terrible disaster, the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake became a significant turning point for Japanese NGOs and volunteerism in Japan. To fill the gap of the insufficient and delayed government support, nearly 1.3 million Japanese nationals together with a number of local NGOs worked on the damaged site.²¹⁸ Even though the local NGOs' role was vital to the relief activities conducted right after the earthquake, many were not officially registered (due to the complex procedures that the government of Japan had

²¹⁷ Leng, "Japan's Civil Society from Kobe to Tohoku", 1.

²¹⁸ Leng, "Japan's Civil Society from Kobe to Tohoku", 1.

been imposing on NGO registration as explained in the previous chapter) and lacked the capacity and competency to continue long-standing projects. This mega-disaster made it apparent that Japan had great civil society potential (i.e. nearly 1.3 million volunteers responding to the crisis in Kobe) but lacked strong local NGOs. The lessons learned from this mega-disaster showed that the Japanese government needed to provide pro-NGO political structures, policies and involve in a greater collaboration with its NGOs, while improving its crisis management skills. Accordingly, in 1998, the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activity was enacted. The 1998 NPO law opened the door for many NGOs to become legal, and this came together with sound financial support directly and/or indirectly from the government of Japan, the private sectors and the Japanese public. In addition, the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake can also be observed as a major turning point in NGO and public relations as well. During the Cold War era, the image of Japanese NGOs was misinterpreted by Japanese nationals as groups of left-wing intellectuals who were mainly anti-government. The close interaction between the public and the Japanese NGOs during the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake crisis has been a milestone in the scope of the public's perspective on Japanese NGOs.

As mentioned above, prior to the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, Japan had gone through a human-made crisis. This was the Indochinese refugee crisis that allowed Japanese NGOs to gain some visibility with some power which made way for the rise of NGOs in foreign aid in Japan historically. The unfortunate events that had taken place in the former French colonies of Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) with the establishment of the communist states in 1975 was strongly felt globally and regionally due to its alarming exodus of refugees that the world had not experienced since the end of WW2. The Vietnamese refugees were the majority ethnic group among the rest of the Indochinese groups from Laos and Cambodia. They were referred to as the "boat

people” because of their main route of escape, which was by sea, and the boats that they used for transport.²¹⁹ On the other hand, the people fleeing from Laos and Cambodia were referred to as “land people” because they escaped by land to seek refuge in surrounding countries.²²⁰ In 1975, when the Indochina crisis started, none of the surrounding countries were a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.²²¹ Surrounding states caused greater chaos on refugee arrivals by not recognizing at least the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Namely, there were technically no international protection mechanisms, neither from above nor below, which could push neighbor states to open their doors. The unfortunate incidents of the Indochinese refugee crisis came with its own unique lessons both on the international level and domestic level for Japan. From 1975 until 1995, during the Indochina crisis, the Japanese government allowed the resettlement of 8.803 Indochinese refugees into Japan.²²² In addition, together with Cambodia (in 1992), China (in 1982), South Korea (in 1992), Papua New Guinea (1986) and the Philippines (in 1981), Japan (in 1981) became one of the state parties to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and to the 1967 Protocol.²²³ The Indochinese refugee crisis had also evoked a powerful stage for Japanese NGOs not only to exist, but also to become visible both in the eye of the state and the public with their groundbreaking actions on protecting lives and advocating for human rights in Southeast Asia and in Japan. For instance, the emergence of the Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC), the Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee (JSRC), and the Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AARJ), which is this thesis’ case study, was

²¹⁹ UNHCR, “A Report on the Local Integration of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan”, 10.

²²⁰ UNHCR, “A Report on the Local Integration of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan”, 19.

²²¹ UNHCR, “The State of the World’s Refugees”, 83.

²²² UNHCR, “The State of the World’s Refugees”, 99.

²²³ UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html> (23.06.19)

altogether a positive outcome of the catastrophic events of the Indochinese refugee crisis. Since the Indochina crisis, these NGOs' scope has expanded from emergency relief only to developmental support in environmental protection, social welfare, education and agricultural development.²²⁴ Originally, the AARJ was founded by Yukika Sooma in 1979 under the name of "Association to Help Indochinese Refugees"²²⁵ as "the first Japanese relief organization specializing in assistance to refugees".²²⁶

The Indochinese refugee crisis, a human made crisis, brought an international perspective on the poor condition of Japanese NGOs in humanitarian aid, while the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, an environmental crisis, explored and showed the domestic potential of NGOs and civil society within Japan. Both catastrophic incidents, regardless of the hardship that they had caused, opened major doors for Japanese NGOs to become what they are today. In a way, as the Black Ships that triggered the Meiji Restoration and the start of the internationalization of Japan, the international pressure that the Indochinese refugee crisis created on burden sharing and acting as a global community, and the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake's impact on changing the image of Japanese NGOs in the eye of the public and the government (i.e. they were no longer observed as communists), changed the place and form of Japanese NGOs for better and for good.

4.2 Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AARJ)

As one of the fruits of Indochinese crisis, AARJ was founded in 1979 as the first non-affiliated Japanese private relief organization in response to the then ongoing

²²⁴ Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy*, 32.

²²⁵ UNHCR, "A Report on the Local Integration of Indo-Chinese Refugees and Displaced Persons in Japan", 22.

²²⁶ Hirata, "Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Influence of NGOs in Tokyo's Aid and Development Policy", 32.

Indochinese refugee crisis, under the name of “Association to Aid Indochinese Refugees”²²⁷ and under the leadership of Yukika Sooma who also became its first Chairperson. The name was first changed to “Association to Aid Refugees”²²⁸ in 1984, and later, to its current name Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AARJ). The last change of the name was explained as a need which had occurred during the AARJ’s response to the Great Hanshin- Awaji Earthquake where the term refugee did not match with the Japanese nationals. In order to prevent any sort of negativity between the NGO itself and the Japanese public, the word refugee was switched to relief and in 1999 the name took its official form; Association for Aid and Relief Japan. The name change also allowed a greater space for AARJ to operate on other issues such as anti-mining projects, domestic relief response, besides its main aim of refugee assistance world-wide.²²⁹ Today, the AARJ is an authorized Specified Non-profit Corporation, in other words an official NGO recognized by the government of Japan with its headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. The objective of AARJ, as stated in Article 3 of its “Articles of Incorporation” document, is as follows:

AAR shall carry out various international cooperation activities, including relief and assistance to promote self-reliance of vulnerable people such as refugees, taking an impartial stand in terms of political principles, beliefs, religions or ideologies. Through its activities, AAR shall aim to promote prosperity of all human beings, and to play a role for Japan to contribute to the international community.²³⁰

In order to achieve these targets that are set in Article 3, Article 4 states its area of activities as follows: “(1) Promotion of peace and human rights protection; (2)

²²⁷ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/who_we_are/history.html (23.06.19)

²²⁸ AAR, Prospectus of the Establishment of AAR in 1984

²²⁹ Osa, “The role of Japanese NGOs in the pursuit of human security: limits and possibilities in the field of refugees”, 253.

²³⁰ AAR, “The Articles of Incorporation AAR”, 1.

International cooperation; (3) Relief assistance”²³¹ which are also globally followed by many other humanitarian agencies. The AARJ’s prioritized fields are shaped around the following five activities; (1) Emergence Assistance; (2) Assistance to Persons with Disabilities; (3) Mine/UXO Action; (4) Action against Infectious Diseases; (5) Public Awareness Raising. Under these activities, the AARJ currently operates in 15 countries, one of which is Turkey.²³² The main financial source of AARJ has been its generous donors, all of whom are “ordinary citizens”²³³ from all around Japan. Together with the donations from Japanese citizens, the AARJ preserves “its independence and impartiality in the field”.²³⁴ Regardless of the year of its establishment, the AARJ received its NPO corporation (Specified Nonprofit Activities Corporation) in 2000, two years after the enactment of the NPO law (1998). Prior to its recognition from the Japanese government AARJ received special consultative status for the UN Economic and Social Council.²³⁵ The AARJ also has a sister organization, named Support 21, which has taken over the AARJ’s main domestic activities such as providing scholarships, legal and psychological counseling services to refugees living in Japan since its focus is mainly in overseas operations.

4.3 AARJ’s entry to Turkey, 2012

Unlike many other international NGOs (INGOS), the AARJ’s operation in Turkey had started prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. The AARJ first entered in Turkey to support the survived victims of the October 23, 2011 Van earthquake with a magnitude of 7.2. Right

²³¹ AAR, “The articles of Incorporation AAR”, 1.

²³² AARJ, <http://aarjapan.blogspot.com/> (23.06.19)

²³³ Osa, “The role of Japanese NGOs in the pursuit of human security: limits and possibilities in the field of refugees”, 254.

²³⁴ Osa, “The role of Japanese NGOs in the pursuit of human security: limits and possibilities in the field of refugees”, 254.

²³⁵ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/who_we_are/history.html (23.06.19)

after the earthquake, on October 26, the AARJ's teams were sent on field to conduct a needs-based assessment to proceed with an emergency assistance tailored according to the needs of the field.²³⁶ In a short time, the team managed to support 161 households that were affected by the earthquake with food and basic necessities.²³⁷ While the AARJ's team continued to conduct its emergency assistance, on November 9, 2011, another strong earthquake hit Van. With this second quake, the AARJ lost one its honorable team members, Atsushi Miyazaki.²³⁸ Together with the unfortunate loss of Atsushi Miyazaki, the two earthquakes left 644 deaths and 1,966 casualties behind.²³⁹ Due to the tragic loss of Atsushi Miyazaki in November 2011, the AARJ's activities stopped for a short period and got reactivated by mid-December 2012.²⁴⁰ During the Van mission, AARJ supported 1,052 school children with winter clothing, boots and school bags, 1575 damaged households with daily commodities and delivered "24 co-op, small scale bakery houses with bakery pots"²⁴¹ to families in rural areas to enable them to continue producing their stable food.²⁴² Unfortunately, the Van earthquake was followed by the break out of the biggest refugee crisis of the world since the WW2 - the Syrian refugee crisis. As already being in Turkey and having a special connection with it now, the AARJ decided to stay and respond to the Syrian refugee crisis from Turkey field. Besides the AARJ, the Pacific Asia Resource Center Interpol's Cooperation (PARCIC) and the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) have been the other two Japanese INGOs which took part in the Syrian Refugee Response (SRR) from Turkey field. Currently, the AARJ operates in Sanliurfa, Mardin, Gaziantep and Istanbul in Turkey. It

²³⁶ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

²³⁷ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

²³⁸ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

²³⁹ AFAD, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2605/About-Van-Earthquake> (23.06.19)

²⁴⁰ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

²⁴¹ AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

²⁴² AARJ, https://www.aarjapan.gr.jp/english/where_we_work/turkey/ (23.06.19)

operates two community centers in Mardin and Sanliurfa and conducts case management and outreach activities in all operation areas.²⁴³

The AARJ's strong connections with the Japanese Embassy, JICA, and JETRO and these entities positive relation with the Turkish state both on the national and local levels (i.e. municipalities, Provincial Directorate of Family Labor and Social Services) have been a special added value for its operations to productively continue in Turkey. In 2012, the AARJ was in Turkey as an experienced INGO in refugee response due to its history and progressive work gained since the Indochinese crisis. Also, the government of Japan was at a stage where it had stronger, practical and effective ties with its INGOs. The unity of Japanese INGOs in the Middle East on Syrian refugee crisis under the JPF's lead demonstrate a taste of Japan in a sense of collectivity, discipline and sustainability. Before going deeper into the JPF and the Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs web in Syrian refugee crisis and focusing on the AARJ's operation in Turkey as a case study, a brief introduction to the Syrian crisis and its response mechanisms in Turkey will be first summarized. After the brief introduction to Turkey field, the AARJ's role and development within the Syrian refugee response will be explained to reflect the evolutionary changes that Japanese humanitarian NGOs are going through. The Syrian refugee crisis together with its disadvantages has opened a field of opportunities for humanitarian aid NGOs to develop themselves for the better. Under this perspective, the AARJ's shift from a government depended humanitarian aid NGO to an independent humanitarian aid NGO will be discussed to reflect the potential change of the Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs.

²⁴³ For AARJ's detailed Turkey operation information, see Appendices A, B, C and D.

4.4 The Syrian refugee crisis - Turkey field

As it is stated in the most recent Global Humanitarian Assistance report, 2018, that there are “an estimated 201 million people in 134 countries needed international humanitarian assistance in 2017, a fifth of whom were in just three countries – Syria, Yemen and Turkey”.²⁴⁴ Currently Turkey operates as the country with the highest refugee numbers in the world. It has been eight years since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, and the situation is still ongoing, leaving over 5 million people fleeing Syria in search of security and protection in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and elsewhere.²⁴⁵ The Syrian refugee crisis is noted as the largest refugee crisis after WW2. As Turkey shares its longest border with Syria, it has been one of the main and first countries that got affected by the mass exodus of Syrians fleeing for their lives to the surrounding countries. Currently, Turkey is the host country of the 3.6 million, largest Syrian refugee population in the world, while Lebanon hosts 935.454 and Jordan 664.330.²⁴⁶ While Turkey is the host of the highest number of Syrian refugees, the other two main burden sharing countries Lebanon and Jordan carry the “highest concentration of refugees per capita in the world”.²⁴⁷ As Table 1 from the official website of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) shows, nearly half of the 3.6 million Syrians living in Turkey are children.

²⁴⁴ Development Initiatives, “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018”, 10.

²⁴⁵ UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/syria-emergency>, (26.05.19)

²⁴⁶ UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/syria-emergency>, (26.05.19)

²⁴⁷ 3RP, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/> (26.05.19)

Table 1. Distribution by Age and Gender of Registered Syrian Refugees Recorded by Taking Biometric Data

DISTRIBUTION BY AGE AND GENDER OF REGISTERED SYRIAN REFUGEES RECORDED BY TAKING BIOMETRIC DATA			
AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
TOTAL	1.954.720	1.655.678	3.610.398
0-4	267.661	249.959	517.620
5-9	254.783	239.814	494.597
10-14	199.379	184.926	384.305
15-18	148.717	122.621	271.338
19-24	315.794	228.109	543.903
25-29	204.639	146.171	350.810
30-34	169.257	124.307	293.564
35-39	119.836	94.594	214.430
40-44	79.168	69.921	149.089
45-49	58.684	55.774	114.458
50-54	47.458	45.356	92.814
55-59	32.985	33.317	66.302
60-64	23.062	23.740	46.802
65-69	15.161	15.774	30.935
70-74	8.542	9.179	17.721
75-79	4.755	5.967	10.722
80-84	2.636	3.289	5.925
85-89	1.439	1.894	3.333
90+	764	966	1.730

by the date of 30.05.2019



REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT
This data belongs to Directorate
General of Migration Management

Source: Directorate of General Migration Management, website ²⁴⁸

Istanbul obtains the highest number of Syrian refugees, i.e. 545,992, while the rest of them are mainly spread in Turkey's border cities to Syria (Hatay, Gazinatep, Kilis, Sanliurfa), as well as other metropolitan cities such as Adana, Mersin, Konya, Bursa and Izmir, as seen in Figure 2.

Currently, only around four percent of Syrians are reported to be living in Temporary Accommodation Centers, while the rest, 96%, reside in cities and rural areas.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ DGMM, https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (26.05.19)

²⁴⁹ 3RP, "Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020", 5.

Distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces




Figure 2. Distribution of Syrians under temporary protection by top 10 provinces
Source: Directorate of General Migration Management website ²⁵⁰

Turkey became a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1962 and to the 1967 Protocol in 1968, with a geographic limitation of accepting only those fleeing for their lives from Europe.²⁵¹ With a mass influx of Syrian people to Turkey, residing in urban, peri-urban and rural areas, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection got adopted on April 10, 2013 and the system of Temporary Protection Regulation (TP) started to get implemented by the Government of Turkey (GoT) not only regarding Syrian people, but also Iraqi, Palestinian and other stateless people who were (and still are) coming from Syria to Turkey. As officially defined by the Ministry of Interior DGMM TP is as follows;

Temporary protections are granted to foreigners who have been forced to leave their countries, are unable to return to the countries they left, and who have arrived at or

²⁵⁰ DGMM, https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (26.05.19)

²⁵¹ UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/474ac8e60.pdf> (26.05.19)

crossed our borders in masses to seek urgent and temporary protection and whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual assessment.²⁵²

The TP is loyal to non-refoulement, which disables governments to send people back to their countries that are still in conflict. TP provides legal residence to those registered (3.6 million Syrians are currently registered under TP) and legal access to “fundamental rights and entitlements, including health care services, education, social assistance, and interpretation”.²⁵³ Furthermore, as of July 2018, Turkey as a transit country to Europe also hosts a total of 361,692 people who are mainly protected under the International Protection Law and are from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and other non-European states.²⁵⁴ The DGMM and its provincial units, the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM), are the main responsible party from the application of Turkey’s refuge system in accordance with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, and the Temporary Protection Regulation. While border control between Syria and Turkey has become stricter due to security reasons, especially with the construction of the wall, the Government of Turkey retains its open-door policy to Syrians.

While systems were being built and implemented to respond to the Syrian crisis in the most efficient way by the government of Turkey, a visible gap in services became apparent with the unpredictably growing numbers of Syrians by each day and month. This rapidly emerging refugee population growth had opened the gate for local and international NGOs (I/NGOs) to integrate and fill in the gaps and share the burden for the best interest of everyone. For instance, in December 2012, there were 144.755 Syrians and 72 INGOs, whereas the following year, December 2013, there were 560.428

²⁵² DGMM, https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection-in-turkey_917_1064_4768_icerik (26.05.19)

²⁵³ MHD, <https://www.mhd.org.tr/images/yayinlar/MHM-2.pdf> (26.05.19)

²⁵⁴ UNHRC, “Turkey Fact Sheet August 2018”, 1.

Syrians and 96 INGOs.²⁵⁵ The number of registered INGOs shows a visible and parallel increase to the growth of refugee numbers in Turkey. What were the gaps that the GoT failed to respond to and that brought in more INGO and local NGO support? To better understand the field with its bottlenecks and to explain the need for local and international NGO involvement, some major issues from the field will be explained first.

In order to benefit from TP, one needs to apply for a Temporary Protection Identification card (TP ID) at the nearest Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM) center. The process for obtaining a TP ID has also come a long way. For instance, in 2016, Syrian applicants were waiting for weeks to register themselves only to the pre-registration of TP ID. Back then, the TP ID system was multi-layered. Thus, first came the pre-registration and later, the official registration.

From April 2016 until late August 2016, TP ID registrations in Sanliurfa, the third city with the highest Syrian refugee numbers, were stopped. During that period, the PDMM of Sanliurfa was only accepting emergency cases (i.e. medical cases with need of urgent implementation). As of November 2017, Istanbul has officially closed its doors to newcomers to control the migration towards Istanbul.²⁵⁶ Istanbul continues its closed-door policy even today. As a result, ever since, it has been almost impossible for Syrians to apply for TP ID in Istanbul. The general advice that is given to potential applicants has always been to move to a different city which is more open to receiving newcomers. Unlike the International Protection regulation which allows the government to allocate the applicant to a certain location, TP regulation is based on the location of the applicant. In other words, the TP ID is given according to the location of the applicant. For instance, if the applicant is applying from Sivas-PDMM, her/his location will be granted

²⁵⁵ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 78.

²⁵⁶ Istanbul PDMM focal points had verbally announced the closure of Istanbul registrations at local level coordinatization meetings. An official written document has not been shared since October 2017.

for Sivas, and nowhere else. To travel within Turkey, Syrians need to obtain a travel permit (an official round-trip document that permits the person to travel, with detailed information on arrival and departure, time and location frame) from the PDMM. Due to this, the majority of Syrian refugees are mainly staying in areas close to the border. TP ID is the first main step to gain access to basic rights such as health, education and even a work permit and this basic step has come from a rather rocky road. However, currently, it is being operated through a better and more settled system. The constant changes of the procedures are no longer happening as they used to 5 years ago. The staff working at PDMMs nation-wide is now more experienced and stronger. Similar advancements can be seen in the health and education sectors as well. The development of migrant health centers and units not only allowed the integration of Syrian health personnel into the Turkish system, but also eased the burden of public hospitals, especially in the cities with high number of Syrian refugees, by providing primary health care services since 2016. Nation-wide, there are currently 151 migrant health centers operating and another 28 are planned to be opened in the near future.²⁵⁷ In addition to advancements in the health sector, the education sector has also gone through a rapid development. Over a 646,000 school-aged (5-17) Syrian children are currently enrolled into formal education in Turkey.²⁵⁸ In January 2016, the implementation of the Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees under Temporary Protection granted the right to work for all Syrians living under it.²⁵⁹ Syrians living under temporary protection can apply for their work permit 6 months after the date they get registered with a temporary protection status. Together with the 6-month rule, there are also other criteria such as that the employers need to apply for the employee through E-Devlet, foreign employees cannot surpass 10 percent

²⁵⁷ 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 5.

²⁵⁸ 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 5.

²⁵⁹ 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 6.

of the employed Turkish citizens, and the salary of the employee cannot be under the minimum wage. From January 2016 until October 2018, 32.199 Syrians under TP have been granted work permits in Turkey.²⁶⁰ Given the number of Syrian population under temporary protection, the numbers on Syrians with permit stand low. Due to administrative and other barriers such as language and the existing issue of unemployment in Turkey, it is more common to find Syrians engaging with the informal sector of the economy than the formal.

In addition to health, education and employment services to alleviate the vulnerability and protection needs of the Syrians under TP, two essential and one additional cash assistance schemes have been designed; (1) the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN); (2) Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE); (3) disability allowance. The ESSN is established to support the basic needs (i.e. food, rent, clothes and many other utilities) of the most vulnerable Syrians under TP, through a monthly cash support of 120 TL (approximate of USD 22.6) per person.²⁶¹ However, the ESSN is only for those who fit its vulnerability criteria. These criteria are set according to Turkish social assistance vulnerability criteria to create a common language and ground for all partners from Turkish governmental entities, INGOs to international donors, and create an alignment between the Turkish national social assistance programs to prevent any type of potential imbalance between the already existing national safety net structures. Since 2016, the ESSN has reached 1.6 million beneficiaries.²⁶² Through these monthly payments it is aimed at keeping the most vulnerable beneficiaries away from negative coping mechanisms such as sending children to work or marrying school aged girls rather than sending them to school. As the Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution of

²⁶⁰ 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 6.

²⁶¹ Reliefweb, <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/wfp-turkey-country-brief-april-2019>

²⁶² Reliefweb, <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/wfp-turkey-country-brief-april-2019>

ESSN allowance nation-wide, the great majority comes from the top 5 highly Syrian populated cities as Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep and Konya.




Figure 3. Eligibility breakdown of all ESSN applicants
Source: June 2019 ESSN Task Force Gaziantep Meeting ²⁶³

To further strengthen school attendance and increase the interest in schools, a parallel system to the Turkish national CCTE has been in place since 2017 for children living under TP. As of March 2019, 404.610 students were entitled for the payment of March. Following the national CCTE model (from which 1.5 million Turkish children benefit), CCTE for children under TP is based on bi-monthly payments. The majority of CCTE beneficiaries are also ESSN beneficiaries. As the Figure 4 demonstrates the current numbers of CCTE from May 2017 till March 2019, there has been an immense increase in the numbers of Syrian CCTE beneficiaries.

²⁶³ Taken directly from June 2019 ESSN Task Force Gaziantep Meeting




Figure 4. CCTE breakdown of beneficiaries since March 2017
 Source: June 2019 ESSN Task Force Gaziantep Meeting²⁶⁴

At last, disability allowance is also created as a parallel social assistance service to the already existing national service. It got activated in 2018, and it is available for people under TP with a severe disability rate of 50 percent and above. Application procedures and criteria for both CCTE and the disability allowance have been kept exactly the same as those for Turkish nationals.

None of the above-mentioned developments has occurred by one specific actor only. All are the result of fruitful state, IGO, and local and international NGOs (I/NGOs) collaboration. The Government of Turkey providing space for its ministries to collaborate with IGO, I/NGOs to coordinate the biggest refugee crisis that world has experienced so far has turned Turkey into a field of examples in humanitarian assistance and aid. Although international NGOs are not shown in the Table 2 below, their gap filling roles in between the development of each individual project have been immense.

²⁶⁴ Taken directly from June 2019 ESSN Task Force Gaziantep Meeting

Table 2. List of Social Assistance and Health Services Available for People Registered Under Temporary Protection

Program	Sector	Donor	Ministry	IGO	NGO	Time Line
ESSN	Protection/Basic Needs	ECHO	MoFLSS	WFP	TRC	October 2016-ongoing
Disability Allowance	Protection/Basic Needs	ECHO	MoFLSS	WFP	TRC	2018 ongoing
CCTE	Child Protection/Education	ECHO	MoFLSS, MoNE	UNICEF	TRC	June 2017-ongoing
Women and Girls Safe Space (WGSS)	Health	ECHO	MoH	UNFPA	ASAM, Harran University, HUWRIC ²⁶⁵	March, 2015

Source: Self-made by the author

The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) in a simple definition is the humanitarian aid department of European Union (EU) member states. In other words, it is a multi-governmental institution established in 1992, to “provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The aid is intended to go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion or political convictions”.²⁶⁶ ECHO has been one of the key donors both directly of the GoT and operating I/NGOs in the field from the first day of the Syrian refugee crisis.

As seen in the Table 2 above, ECHO, has been the main source of fund for the leading cash based social assistance and health programs together with various IGOs, the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), local NGOs Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), and academia such as the Harran University, and Hacettepe University Women’s Research and

²⁶⁵ Hacettepe University Women’s Research and Implementation Center

²⁶⁶ Devex, <https://www.devex.com/organizations/ec-directorate-general-for-european-civil-protection-and-humanitarian-aid-operations-echo-45985> (26.05.19)

Implementation Center from 2016 onward. For instance, the ESSN is a first for ECHO on being its largest ever grant implementation in humanitarian aid.

Prior to existence of these programs, it was local authorities, and I/NGOs' mission to provide services to fill in the most visible gaps to mitigate the protection risks and compensate the growing vulnerability in the field. The year 2014 reached to its end with 1.6 million Syrian refugees legally residing in Turkey without any of the above-mentioned support mechanisms.²⁶⁷ From 2014 until 2016, together with big donors such as ECHO, many other OECD countries have donated money directly to various field actors (IGOs, local and international NGOs, municipalities) in Turkey for the Syrian refugee response. With the growing refugee numbers, gaps on services such as access to health, education and shelter were also getting bigger. As a result, in 2014, there were 109 INGOs in the field supporting Syrians living outside of the camps with basic needs, educational services, protection, health and various other services tailored to the identified needs of the field.²⁶⁸ Surely, the growing numbers of INGOs together with local NGOs and the refugee numbers highlighted the need for a more efficient coordination scheme, which became tremendously necessary to shape the field and have a competent response mechanism to the Syrian refugee crisis. With this in mind, in December 2014, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) was established by the United Nations.²⁶⁹

The 3RP was developed as a comprehensive model to deliver inclusive and wide-ranging coordination among UN agencies, states and their partners (i.e. I/NGOs). The 3RP studies national plans and assesses vulnerabilities with the goal of capacitating

²⁶⁷ UNHCR, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113> (26.05.19)

²⁶⁸ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 77.

²⁶⁹ United Nations Turkey Newsletter, <http://www.bmdergi.org/en/the-regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-launched-in-ankara/> (26.05.19)

communities, enhancing social cohesion and building resilience through durable solutions. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are the areas which the 3RP covers. It is a country driven, regionally comprehensible planning development model.²⁷⁰ The model has been designed to provide a steady and sustainable regional strategy, reflecting the needs and accomplishments, as in best practices, outlined in each country plan. The intervention within the 3RP model is a first for the UN.²⁷¹

Since its establishment in 2014, the 3RP has mobilized USD 53 million to its partners to support municipalities only due to their vital role in refugee response.²⁷² The sudden rise of the population in the southeast region, since 2014, has also increased the consumption of water and garbage per year. The last 3RP report states that with the rapid increase of the population, there has been an extra usage of “70bn liters of water and one million tons of solid waste per year”.²⁷³ Independent from the 3RP, the sudden case load on municipalities was also identified by the GoJ and JICA’s Turkey office.

Just as the AARJ, the history of JICA in Turkey started more than five decades prior to the Syrian refugee crisis with its technical cooperation activities in 1959; first the ODA loan “Hasan Ugurlu Dam and HEPP” in 1979, and then the overture of its first official office in Ankara, in 1995.²⁷⁴ As a result of its decades long presence in Turkey, the JICA has built a respected reputation which is acknowledged and admired both on local level (i.e municipalities and line ministries) and on top level (i.e. the leading ministries with the government of Turkey). Hence, its support on the Syrian refugee response was welcomed with great excitement by Turkish authorities. Under the Syrian

²⁷⁰ United Nations Turkey Newsletter, <http://www.bmdergi.org/en/the-regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-launched-in-ankara/> (26.05.19)

²⁷¹ United Nations Turkey Newsletter, <http://www.bmdergi.org/en/the-regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-launched-in-ankara/> (26.05.19)

²⁷² 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 6.

²⁷³ 3RP, “Turkey| Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020”, 8.

²⁷⁴ Dündar, “Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone”, 83.

response, the JICA operated two projects. The first was an ODA Loan and the second was a Technical Cooperation. Through its ODA Loan, launched in 2015, the JICA reached 10 municipalities which were mainly located in the southeast region due to higher Syrian refugee presence, to provide support on infrastructure improvement (i.e. water, waste disposal and sewerage).²⁷⁵ The ODA loan project titled “Local Authorities Infrastructure Improvement Project” has had the budget of 45 billion yen (approximately USD 420 million).²⁷⁶ As for its technical cooperation in 2017, the JICA has implemented a pilot project aiming to increase the capacity of the Social Service Center (SSC) staff located in Gungoren Istanbul, Akdeniz Mersin SSCs. The SSCs have been one of the most affected governmental services by the Syrian refugee influx due to their main role in care management services under the Ministry of Family Labor and Social Services (MoFLSS). In addition, through its technical cooperation project, the JICA has coordinated its activities with those of UN WOMEN and supported the development of the SADA Women Center located in Gaziantep.²⁷⁷ The overall technical cooperation focusing on capacity building of the already existing protection actors from SSCs in Mersin and Istanbul to improvement of social cohesion in Gaziantep under the budget of 110 million yen (USD 1 million) is stated as the pilot projects that are assumed to open the way for future long-term technical cooperation projects by the JICA officials in Turkey.²⁷⁸ While this was all taking shape as a direct support of the GoJ to the GoT, the gaps in the field level were, and still are, ongoing.

²⁷⁵ Dündar, “Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone”, 83.

²⁷⁶ Dündar, “Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone”, 83.

²⁷⁷ Dündar, “Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone”, 83.

²⁷⁸ Dündar, “Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone”, 84.

As the host of the highest refugee population in the world, Turkey is relatively a different case due to being an upper middle-income state with “significant geopolitical leverage”.²⁷⁹ As a result, the integration of I/NGOs into the Syrian refugee response has been welcoming yet biased at the same time. To support the civil society engagement and work of humanitarian aid I/NGOs, the 3RP under the lead of UN agencies has been very useful for all parties involved in the response mechanisms of the Syrian refugee crisis from the Turkey field. Both on regional and country level, the 3RP focuses on eight strategic directions which include (1) protection, (2) food security, (3) education, (4) health, (5) basic needs, (6) shelter, (7) WASH and (8) livelihoods & social cohesion.²⁸⁰ Under these eight strategic directions, the 3RP aims to promote and support division of work, prevention of potential duplications, gaps, and source competition between any of the actors in the field. Regionally and at country level coordination meetings under 3RP United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acts as the responsible agency from guidance of the refugee response while United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the responsible party from the coordination of the resilience component.²⁸¹ In short, the 3RP aims to bring a harmonized order into the region and its direct responder countries of the Syrian refugee crisis. In the Turkey field, under the roof of the 3RP, coordination meetings are being conducted on two different yet parallel levels; (1) national and; (2) provincial. The coordination meetings (also known as the sector working groups) that are being held under the lead and guidance of the 3RP, address the previously mentioned eight key sections (i.e. protection, education, etc.) of the 3RP. Throughout these coordination meetings, the identified needs of the field to alleviate the vulnerability created by the Syrian crisis on Turkish and refugee

²⁷⁹ UNHCR, “Evaluation of UNHCR’s Emergency Response to the Influx of Syrian Refugees into Turkey, January 2014- June 2015”, 1.

²⁸⁰ 3RP, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/>

²⁸¹ UNDP, <http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/ourwork/SyriaCrisis/projects/3rp.html>

communities residing in Turkey gets reported to top levels to create grounds for necessary funds and response mechanisms. The 3RP coordination meetings in Turkey have opened the way for a communication line between both I/NGOs and the state, to communicate and work together. In a way, they have been the warm up rounds for state led coordination meetings to be inclusive of I/NGOs. Currently, most of the provincial level state led coordination meetings over the Syrian refugee crisis are inclusive of I/NGOs. One of the major differences between the two coordination meetings (governmental and non-governmental 3RP led) would be that the 3RP led coordination meetings work towards fund appeals through generated evidence from its partner I/NGOs to continue or end their activities in the related fields. The 3RP coordination meetings have no direct impact on government bodies to have an immediate change on policies related to needs of Syrians living under temporary protection. However, they serve as a bridge model where 3RP partners work in support of the government on burden sharing and reducing the weight, while also voicing the most urgent needs of the Syrians living under temporary protection to state. From 2014 until today (2019), the 3RP has supported Turkey with a total of USD 2.4 billion.²⁸² As the Figure 5 below shows, the yearly division of the received appeals is only for Turkey. According to the analyzed needs each year, the received funds get allocated between I/NGOs, IGOs and government bodies that work as partners to the 3RP.

²⁸² According to collected data from OCHA's official Financial Tracking Service website from 2014 till 2019 under 3RP 2.4 billion USD has been raised. <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/229/summary/2018>




Figure 5. 3RP Turkey received funds
 Source: OCHA's official Financial Tracking Service website ²⁸³

4.5 AARJ's Syrian refugee response – Turkey operation

With the increased influx of Syrian refugees, the international response together with I/NGOs has also grown. Since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Japanese government has been one of the main donors to UNHCR after the United States, the European Union (EU), Germany, and Sweden. Japan is also one of the top donors of WFP by donating a total of USD 959 million since 2014.²⁸⁴ While direct donations from the government itself manage to keep Japan among the top responsible global members of the community, its lack of support to NGOs has taken a different shift through the Syrian refugee crisis. The Japanese government directing its money mainly to IGOs such as UNHCR, WFP or JICA rather than its NGOs to carry out its global responsibilities is a paradox that has somewhat arrived at a state of change with the Syrian refugee response. Japan still hasn't got a funding pool that is as developed as the EU's ECHO or the United States' Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) which

²⁸³ Official source on 3RP Turkey from 2014 till 2019 gathered from the Financial Tracking Service of OCHA

²⁸⁴ WFP, <https://www1.wfp.org/news/japan-provides-us69-million-save-lives-and-change-lives-28-countries> (17.06.19)

closely follows the global trends in humanitarian aid. However, its (Japan's) JPF model has grown with great strength since 2000 and has especially shown a significant development in support of its member NGOs with the Syrian refugee crisis. Compared to ECHO and BPRM, which are the two main fund pools for NGOs to operate in various areas from basic needs, education to health, protection, and advocacy, JPF is mainly limited to emergency response. Due to its emergency act nature, JPF is also a fund that is difficult to hold when the subject of emergency starts to fade out of the picture. For Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs to receive funds from JPF, there needs to be a state of emergency. Since 2016, Japanese government observers the Syrian refugee crisis Turkey operation as a field which has exceeded the humanitarian aid stage, as it is getting closer to the developmental stage where acute needs, life threatening needs are no longer observed as the case.²⁸⁵ It is with this regard that the AARJ has gone through a shrinking JPF budget since the beginning of its activities until today. Although there has been a shrink in the JPF fund, there has also been a progressive change in the funding structure of JPF as a result of the experiences gained from the Syrian refugee crisis which will be addressed in the following pages. This can be observed as a positive outcome of one of the most devastating humanitarian crisis in the recorded history so far.

In 2012, the AARJ has started its operation in Sanliurfa, Turkey through its JPF fund.²⁸⁶ Sanliurfa was and still is one of the main Syrian refugee receiving cities in Turkey due to its geographic, historical and cultural connection with Syria and its people. In 2013, the AARJ opened its first country office in Sanliurfa due to the growing influx of Syrian refugees and visible gaps and needs of the field.²⁸⁷ It became apparent that their stay was not going to be a short-term one. From 2012 until 2015, the AARJ

²⁸⁵ Ministry of Family and Social Policies Japan International Cooperation Agency, "Pilot Project for Strengthening the Social Services for Syrian Under Temporary Protection in Turkey, Final Report", 5.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁸⁷ AARJ, "Annual Report 2013", 12.

continued its activities through a partnership with a local NGO called Support to Life (STL).²⁸⁸ At the time, both I/NGOs, AARJ and STL, were small-scale NGOs whose names were not ringing a bell to most key actors in the field. However, today, both I/NGOs are not only well-known, but also among the most important actors in the Turkey field, one as international, and the other one as local in the protection sector. In 2015, with the end of the partnership agreement with STL, the AARJ decided to continue its operations as AARJ alone.²⁸⁹ This separation was explained as a need that was born due to having different ideas on the production and implementation of projects by the focal point of the AARJ.²⁹⁰ From 2012 until 2016, the activities of the AARJ mainly revolved around distribution of food items, daily necessities, winter materials (blankets, clothes, heaters), stationery, textbooks, uniforms, and assistive devices to people with special needs (mainly people with disabilities).²⁹¹ This is a rather traditional form of humanitarian aid that is applicable in emergency settings and also is what AARJ conducting as a humanitarian aid NGO.

From 2012 until 2016, together with the AARJ, the majority of I/NGOs were conducting similar activities to fill in the gap of the Turkish government which lacked the capacity to support the newcomers to Turkey with their basic needs. However, in time, the nature and the needs of the field changed due to the unresolved conflict in Syria. The newcomers became the residents and their acute short-term needs switched. 2016 was the fourth year of the crisis. While there were 182.621 Syrian refugees in 2013 (February), in 2016 (February), there were 2.620.553.²⁹² This number indicates an increase of 2.437.932 in the number of Syrian refugees from the 2013 registration figure.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁸⁹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁹⁰ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁹¹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁹² UNHCR, *Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response*, (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>)

As the numbers were growing rapidly, so were the needs of the people. As noted above, the majority of the Syrian refugee population was located outside of the camps, in urban, semi-urban and rural areas where control over living standards of the refugee community was a challenge itself. The humanitarian assistance in response to the needs of the Syrian refugees was moving towards a deeper protection area which required stronger linkages to governmental services such as case management services of the MoFLSS, social support services of both the MoFLSS and the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF). Greater support was also necessary in the health and education sectors. Therefore, under the country strategy of the 3RP, AARJ together with various international and local actors started to provide protection assistance to people of concern. As for the AARJ, from the very beginning, its target group has been people and children with disabilities. As the right holders, the refugee population living under TP were facing difficulties to have access to their basic rights of access to services. As explained in the previous pages, in 2016, at one point even the registration for Temporary Protection identification card was problematic, and since having no TP ID causes a severe chain reaction of deprivation from one's basic rights such as access to health services and/or education, the need for more protection-based, specifically case management related programs became apparent. As a result of these developments, many humanitarian aid actors shifted their programs towards more long-term protection-based projects from the general short-term distribution of non-food-items (NFI) based, acute and somewhat traditional humanitarian aid projects.

The 3RP 2015-2016 report on Turkey highlighted the greater need for the protection sector and the important role of first the government and then the civil society in support of the government to reduce the identified inequities and risks. The 2015-2016 3RP report followed a parallel strategy and focused on two main sources: (1)

governmental bodies, and (2) active I/NGO partners from the field. The 2015-2016 3RP report was stating the need for “quality child protection interventions”,²⁹³ the need for increased capacity of “psychosocial support, and the prevention and response to child protection concerns”,²⁹⁴ “promotion of rights and information on access to services and protection under the legal framework for girls, boys, women and men”,²⁹⁵ and creation of stronger identification and referrals mechanisms to government services. The second group, due to its less bureaucratic nature, had the capacity to act faster than the first. The 3RP platform was also a great stage for donor aid policies to be re-formed according to the needs of the field and be distributed to I/NGO member partners. Thus, there has been a wave of case management projects including the affected people at the center of the response between I/NGOs in the Turkey field from 2016 onward.

In 2016, under its JPF fund, the AARJ also became one of the I/NGOs which followed the analysis of the 3RP and started to operate a pilot case management project that mimicked the role of the social welfare services of Turkey for the people with disabilities and other most vulnerable families from the refugee communities in Sanliurfa, Turkey.²⁹⁶ Conducting a case management project was one of the AARJ’s first activities of such kind in its history.²⁹⁷ Such services under such programs had never before been conducted in any of its operation areas around the world. With the success of the pilot case management project under the JPF fund, the AARJ gained the experience and confidence to convince its main donor, JPF, to support it with more funds to expand its protection activities in Turkey.²⁹⁸ In October 2016, the AARJ opened

²⁹³ UNHCR, “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-16 Turkey”, 16.

²⁹⁴ UNHCR, “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-16 Turkey”, 16.

²⁹⁵ UN UNHCR, “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-16 Turkey”, 16.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

²⁹⁸ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

its Esenyurt, Istanbul office and became the only INGO operating in the area.²⁹⁹ At the time, there were neither local nor any international NGOs operating in Esenyurt, Istanbul. While the experience of the AARJ was growing in the field of protection, it was also going through a difficult stage by not officially being one of the 3RP partners and benefiting from its funds available for I/NGOs. AARJ's was disadvantaged due to not fitting into ECHO's criteria to become one its implementing partners by neither not being an EU based non-profit organization, nor having a work experience within any EU member states.³⁰⁰

4.6 Towards independence? A major swift in donor relations

Prior to its geographic (i.e. Esenyurt, Istanbul Office) and programmatic (i.e. implementation of case management project) expansion, in 2014, the AARJ applied to the UNHCR and in 2015 to BPRM to expand its operations in Turkey.³⁰¹ Unfortunately, it was found not eligible for both of its applications by two of the donors. The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) as one of the main donors in humanitarian assistance and protection fields in Syrian refugee response operation in Turkey is, a direct governmental fund mechanism. BPRM's high emphasis on NGO participation in solving crisis, opens a door to many NGOs to operate and make the issues from the field heard at all levels, from bottom to top.

As the main financial source for AARJ, JPF was providing a narrow space to Western donors' horizontal and wider space in protection. In other words, JPF was staying much more traditional compared to Western donors which were following the global trends with an increased awareness on the issue of growing numbers of global

²⁹⁹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁰⁰ ECHO, "Notice for the Attention of Possible Applicants", 2.

³⁰¹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

refugees, internally displaced people (IDP), asylum seekers and stateless persons, as well as the international regimes (i.e. Guiding Principles of IDPs, regional treaties, 1951 Refugee Convention) by including political dialogue with Turkish government directly.

While AARJ continued to closely follow humanitarian aid developments by actively attending the national and provincial level 3RP and various other state-led coordination meetings, it stayed in line with JPF's collective act on the Syrian refugee response in the region. From November 2012 until today, JPF has been active in the region of the 3RP (except the Egypt field) through its own implementation partners' emergency humanitarian assistance providing projects in 6 sectors including the (1) food sector, (2) NFI/Shelter sector, (3) WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) sector, (4) Education sector, (5) Protection sector, and (6) Health sector.³⁰² The most recent official report of JPF states that from 2012 until 2017, an approximate of USD 80 million have been spent through a total of 92 projects conducted by JPF's 14 NGO members in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.³⁰³ Geographical and approximate budget separation of these NGOs are 4 NGOs in Lebanon with a total of 12 percent of the budget, 6 NGOs in Jordan with 25 percent of the budget, 3 NGOs in Iraq with 35 percent of the budget, and 3 NGOs in Turkey with 10 percent of the total budget.³⁰⁴ The Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs preference for country of operation was reported to be the consequence of their prior activities in the region during the Iraq crisis in 1990.³⁰⁵ For instance, Peace Wings of Japan (PWJ) was operating from Iraq because it was already there prior to the Syrian crisis in 2011. Besides the AARJ, PARCIC and JCCP have been the two other active Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs operating in Turkey. Under JPF fund, JCCP has

³⁰² Japan Platform, "Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018", 6.

³⁰³ Japan Platform, "Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018", 5.

³⁰⁴ Japan Platform, "Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018", 5, 21.

³⁰⁵ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

been responsible for “distribution of goods to satisfy basic needs”³⁰⁶ in Mersin, Turkey, where agricultural workers from both Syrian and Turkish communities temporary reside. The, PARCIC for “distribution of food vouchers, distributions of winter goods and daily goods, livelihood assistance”³⁰⁷ in Sanliurfa (mainly the rural parts of Sanliurfa, where agricultural workers from both communities reside). And, the AARJ for “goods distribution, operation of community centers and assistance for disabled persons”³⁰⁸ in Sanliurfa, Mardin, Gaziantep, and Istanbul in Turkey.³⁰⁹

What’s unique about JPF is that it is a collective Japanese humanitarian aid act that is heavily dependent on financial sources directed from the Japanese government. The heavy dependence on government’s monetary support can easily be observed as the government’s use of NGOs as its tool in implementing its own political framework in foreign aid which in this case traditional humanitarian aid that focuses on distribution of goods, and construction (i.e. school construction). The Government’s hegemony over the donor culture of the humanitarian aid sector in Japan has caused a visible dependency on Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs that are mainly accustomed to applying to Japanese funds rather than international funds of the UN, other governmental funds such as BPRM, or multi-governmental sources as ECHO.³¹⁰ In effect, this has created not only a limited operation zone, but also a limited space for the existing humanitarian aid NGOs to increase their capacities on their specific services and skills on implementing projects without the direct and indirect support of the government. However, while criticizing this fact, that is, Japanese humanitarian aid’s dependence to Japanese government, it should not be forgotten that there has been a historical delay on

³⁰⁶ Japan Platform, “Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018”, 21.

³⁰⁷ Japan Platform, “Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018”, 21.

³⁰⁸ Japan Platform, “Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018”, 21.

³⁰⁹ For JPF’s partners Syria-Iraq response, see Appendix E

³¹⁰ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

civil society development in Japan compared to other developed nations with richer and greater NGO networks. The question here should be whether Japan is going to be able to understand the needs of humanitarian aid NGOs and act accordingly or not.

According to Reimann, activism is mainly shaped from above through a vertical top-down line of communication, not the other way around. Reimann argues that proliferation of NGOs can only take place as long as governments and global super powers allow it to. The first and second chapters have shown a pattern that in a way proved the accuracy of Reimann's argument through the increasing NGO development in Japan. While Reimann focuses on state and global powers' top-down and sometimes rather pushy pro-NGO approach as the core of NGOs development and existence, it is also important to study the ongoing events occupying the minds and conscious of the society. In other words, events also do have a certain power to shape the structure of governments and the formation of NGOs. For instance, the Indochinese refugee crisis has opened the way for Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs to become visible in the eye of the government. Through the Indochinese refugee crisis, a rather vertical line of communication was developed between the state and the NGOs. Such verticality includes higher level policies promoting the development and competency of NGOs.

The development of JPF in 2000 has created a more horizontal line of communication inclusive of the state and the private sector as a first in Japan. The JPF's collective act on the Syrian refugee response can be observed as a best practice which enabled 14 humanitarian aid NGOs not only to respond at the same time, but also to be collective and structured in five different countries Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. While JPF offers funds and a type of structure for its implementing partners to act in harmony, the Syrian refugee crisis has brought into light for further discussion and improvement the question of whether JPF acts as an inclusive platform which functions

primarily to strengthen and capacitate the people in need or it acts as a platform working to serve its donors' requirements?

JPF's transparency in its operations via constant monitoring and evaluation field trips to implementing partners and publicly open activity reports clearly demonstrates its accountability.³¹¹ In addition to its accountability, as the main financial support to Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs in the Syrian refugee response, JPF has gone through a structural change on its fund allocation procedures in 2018.³¹² The change of the structure has been an outcome of the experiences gained from the Syrian refugee response field.³¹³ Prior to 2018, JPF's NGO partners, regardless of their experience, had to share the allocated budget to the Syria-Iraq response pool equally between themselves.³¹⁴ On the one hand, this method was supporting the inexperienced humanitarian aid NGOs to capacitate themselves. However, on the other hand, it was disabling the experienced ones' capacity to operate.³¹⁵ The equal allocation of the budget was a method developed by JPF's NGO partners to maintain harmony and support within as it was explained by the Turkey Country Director of AARJ who also acts as the chairman of the Syria-Iraq JPF Task Force in Japan. In addition to this change, it was also explained that due to unrest of the Syrian refugee crisis in the region, government's supplementary budget was directed to JPF directly to be able expand the limited fund pool of JPF. Prior to this development, the inefficient use of the supplementary budget was raised as an issue in the most recent OECD peer review report of 2014 as "much funding for complex crises comes from the supplementary budget which is highlight political with conditions that result in tight project earmarking, unpredictability, and

³¹¹ Japan Platform, "Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018", 11.

³¹² Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³¹³ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³¹⁴ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³¹⁵ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

short-term timeframes”.³¹⁶ However, regardless of this shift of the Japanese government (directing the supplementary budget directly to JPF for Syria- Iraq response) the JPF budget was still not enough to small scale humanitarian aid as AARJ to operate outside of box of the traditional humanitarian aid. As a result, to cope with the extra budget and the shrinking budgets and smaller funds coming towards the Syria response, the structure was advocated to change and to be more structured and skill-based to have stronger project implementations.³¹⁷ While the consequences of the recent change in 2018 can be only observed in the future, the shrinking JPF funds have already started to show their results. In 2019, PARCIC left the Turkey field, while JCCP and AARJ continue their work.

The shirking funds from JPF have always been a topic of discussion among AARJ expats. The evidence generated from the field reporting on the needs of service delivery, and capacity strengthening reached a point where it was no longer heard due to lack of availability of the funds to a region where emergency was no longer acknowledged by the government of Japan. JPF’s approach to the Syrian refugee crisis - Turkey operation was, more or less, closer to the GoJ’s approach, by identifying it not as an emergency stage, but rather a developmental stage operation regardless of the criticality of the national challenges, inequities and risks in Turkey. The other disabling factor of JPF was that compared to other funding sources, it stood more traditional and old fashioned due to its limited donations being from the private sector, while the majority were directly from the government. JPF was also a model that was disabling humanitarian aid NGOs to focus on rights for refugees, since its approach to humanitarian aid heavily focused on material assistance. In other words, JPF’s response method stands more on the side of humanitarian assistance which takes aid to primarily

³¹⁶ OECD, “Japan Peer Review 2014”, 82.

³¹⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

save lives and reduce risks causing harm and vulnerability. Conversely, western fund pools are more inclusive of protection which comes in with a more inclusive approach working on to ensure full respect for the rights of the “refugee population that is in accordance with the international human rights law and refugee law”.³¹⁸ Therefore, considering such circumstances, how was the AARJ continuing to expand its operations in Turkey with the given limited funds and vision of JPF?

Together with the influx of Syrian refugees, there has also been an influx of international funds, as well as international NGOs coming into Turkey. As mentioned above, the AARJ’s fund to continue its operations was entirely from JPF. The AARJ was a small-scale INGO with staff of less than 10 people in 2015.³¹⁹ Its project proposals to UNHCR (in 2014) and BPRM (in 2015) were found not eligible.³²⁰ In this regard, the AARJ was not so different than the other local NGOs struggling against the presence of bigger and well-known western INGOs such as Save the Children, Care International, Danish Refugee Council, International Medical Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, Handicap International, Relief International, Concern Worldwide, World Vision, GOAL International, and RET International. It can be seen that the presence of INGOs in the Turkey operation together with the intensified conflict of the Syrian crisis has created a market where local and international NGOs had to compete to receive the bigger funds to respond to the needs of the field.³²¹ The 3RP’s leading role on orchestrating this market, including competition on available funds through its country level coordination meetings has been a great source and platform for I/NGOs active in the field to follow the trends and, eventually, present themselves for the available donor funding. While conducting its activities under JPF in Sanliurfa and

³¹⁸ Mackreath, Sagnic, “Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey”, 39.

³¹⁹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²⁰ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²¹ Mackreath, Sagnic, “Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey”, 39.

Istanbul, the AARJ became an active participant in these local and national level coordination meetings of the 3RP. At the local level coordination meetings in 2016, it became one of the leading actors coordinating the meetings with UN agencies. For instance, the Case Management Group (CMG) meetings in Sanliurfa and Mardin were managed by AARJ under the lead of UNHCR from 2016 till 2018. The current, CMG Gaziantep meetings are also coordinated by the AARJ. While there was an external growing visibility of the AARJ, internally there was also the expanding capacity of the AARJ's response mechanism and vision in the field of protection. By 2016, the AARJ had its own rich data from which it could pull out valuable analysis on the needs of the field.³²² The AARJ's rich data also meant solid experience from the field. In 2016, the AARJ was at a stage where it became the only and main actor working with people with disabilities (PWD) inclusive of children with disabilities (CWD). At the time when JPF's fund was shrinking together with its changing vision of the Syrian refugee response Turkey operation not being an emergency operation, the AARJ's expats were struggling to convince JPF to see the high risks of the field.³²³ In 2016, conditions for the Syrian refugees with disabilities for both children and adults were further exacerbated due to the protracted timeframe of the Syrian crisis and limited available services provided by the Turkish government.³²⁴ Contrary to JPF's view on the Turkey operation which no longer observed Turkey as an emergency field, it was not the same for donors such as UNCHR and BPRM who were actively working in Turkey through various partners, both governmental and non-governmental.³²⁵ The two donors' close relation with governmental bodies to advocate for service delivery and rights of refugees was also a value added for I/NGOs such as the AARJ to make their case clear. Since JPF

³²² Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²³ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²⁴ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²⁵ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

had no part in advocacy within its operation countries, it was not an easy task to convince them on the fragility and vulnerability of the state.³²⁶

In 2016, the AARJ was an INGO that had the capacity to respond and support the requests of the donors on the subject of PWDs. By the time the AARJ applied to the UNHCR and BPRM in 2016, both for the second time, Handicap International and IMC, two of the leading INGOs, were out of Turkey due to various conflicting reasons.³²⁷ The departure of the INGOs due to political instability and the government's biased approach to NGOs in general had caused distraction in the field operation of I/NGOs. For instance, whenever any national or international NGO was picked on by the Ministry of Interior, all was getting affected on the provincial level regardless of being the targeted NGO or not. However, these waves of distraction never touched AARJ and its operations nationwide. In Turkey operation, AARJ did not have an official coordination line with JICA (which also had a country office in Turkey). However, visibly JICA's reputation between the local authorities has always opened a door for AARJ to intervene. In Turkey as stated above JICA and AARJ has no official coordination but frequently both entities update each other on their activities and events. As a result of this rather organic coordination, AARJ gets invited to many of the event related to Syrian refugees organized by JICA. In a way, JICA's good reputation in Turkey has been AARJ's comparative advantage for its visibility and permits to operate. Under this political unrest, the AARJ's application first to the UNHCR and later to BPRM in 2017 was accepted.³²⁸

What did these two funds mean for the AARJ? First, the two funds stabilized and strengthened the AARJ's presence and capacity in Turkey. Since 2012, the AARJ has

³²⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³²⁸ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

been showing a gradual growth, regardless of the challenges faced by the scale down of JPF funds, within the Turkey field. Thus, it has been available to support the developed systems and coordination mechanisms under the roof of protection with a great deal of stability unlike many other small scale I/NGOs which either left the country or stopped working in the Syrian response due to various reasons.³²⁹ With the UNHCR fund, the AARJ expanded its case management and outreach operations to Mardin, a province which severely lacked protection support. In addition, under the UNHCR project, the AARJ opened its second community center in Mardin, February 2017.³³⁰ The first community center of AARJ was opened in Sanliurfa with the fund of JPF which is currently still active and strengthened with the additional fund of the UNCHR.³³¹ Moreover, in 2018, through the UNHCR project, AARJ expanded its operations to Gaziantep.³³² While the UNHCR project allowed AARJ to focus on the child protection component of protection, the BPRM project, which also started in 2017, allowed the AARJ to continue its work on supporting people with disabilities in the Istanbul, Sanliurfa, and Mardin provinces of Turkey.³³³ With the BPRM project, AARJ managed to expand its operation on reducing vulnerability of refugees with disabilities to health and protection risks through the provision of disability-focused Case Management services. The disability focused Case Management services targeted 2,300 refugees in Sanliurfa, 1, 700 refugees in Mardin and 1110 refugees Istanbul of which 95 percent Syrian and 5 percent refugees of other origins. Through the child protection project with UNHCR, AARJ targeted 775 children to provide with child protection response services and another 22.255 individuals were targeted to improve access to

³²⁹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³⁰ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³¹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³² Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³³ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

protection information services (i.e. child rights, access to education, access to health services) in Sanliurfa and Mardin provinces.³³⁴

Second, they supported the changing vision of the AARJ by allowing it into their fund pools and becoming partners with it.³³⁵ As it was reported by the Turkey Country Director of the AARJ's Turkey operation, both donors were a first for the AARJ in its history. Prior to these funds, the activities of AARJ were limited to JPF's regulations and requirements which, in a way, was disabling the AARJ to move on to the protection side of the humanitarian aid phase. In other words, JPF's approach stood traditional compared to other donor's contemporary approaches to the crisis. The liberty gained with these two external funds was also highlighted by the Turkey country director of AARJ as an indirect message to JPF and its main donor, the GoJ, which no longer observed the Turkey field as an emergency state field that needs humanitarian aid support. Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs being accustomed to Japanese funds more than any other foreign funds was observed as an unhealthy habit by the AARJ staff due to its limiting and narrow nature.³³⁶

The AARJ has become a well-known and appreciated protection member of the Turkey field due to its active role since 2012. Its provincial level relations with people, I/NGOs, IGO and governmental bodies have enabled it to solve many difficult, vulnerable cases with great success through its projects. Its successful coordination with PDMMs in all operation areas has supported refugees in issuing TP ID when TP ID registrations were problematic. Its strong coordination with its donor, i.e. BPRM, allowed the implementation of disability allowance prior to WFP's nationwide cash-based intervention to its most vulnerable beneficiaries. From day one of its operations in

³³⁴ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³⁵ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

Turkey, the AARJ has been filling in the gap of distribution of assistive devices from wheelchairs to hearing aid devices to people with disabilities.³³⁷ Currently, the assistive device gap is not covered by the GoT yet and so, the AARJ is continuing as the lead actor to fill in this immense gap.³³⁸

In 2015, the AARJ had less than 10 staff to direct its operation in Turkey and today, as of 2019, it has 140 staff working with great devotion to reach the most vulnerable refugees to meet them with their rights.³³⁹ Unlike many other local and international NGOs' unstable human resource performances, the AARJ obtains a stable one where no frequent circulations take place. The competition over funds and the marketization of the humanitarian aid in the field have also been driving NGOs and NGO workers from voluntarism to professionalism.³⁴⁰ New job opportunities with high salaries created by the international organizations have certainly negatively affected the potential of the small-scale local NGOs.³⁴¹ In between all the competition, the AARJ demonstrated a stable and powerful rise as a small-scale international humanitarian aid NGO. The closure and/or downscaling of some humanitarian actors left an immense gap in the humanitarian response in 2017. Fortunately, the AARJ's presence has been a great support to filling in an important gap by providing comprehensive, dedicated and specialized protection services to refugees in its protracted operation areas. While JPF's downscaling funds and the Japanese government's approach to humanitarian aid NGOs have been shifting towards more direct support to the government of Turkey (i.e. JICA supporting municipalities in southeast Turkey, SSCs in Istanbul and Mersin, and funding a woman center in Gaziantep), the AARJ has also been expanding its vision by going

³³⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³⁸ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³³⁹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁴⁰ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 45.

³⁴¹ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 45.

towards the protection side of the story to take its place next to various other powerful small-scale humanitarian aid NGOs of the world.³⁴²

Currently, the Turkey operation is the AARJ's biggest operation worldwide.³⁴³ It has never operated an operation as big as this one in its history.³⁴⁴ The AARJ was built in response to one of the biggest refugee crisis, the Indochinese refugee crisis, and ironically, this time around it has developed itself according to international standards again through a major refugee crisis, the Syrian refugee crisis. The AARJ receiving two major funds from two major international donors, UNHCR and BPRM, might be contagious between Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs that are stuck with old fashion support of humanitarian aid.³⁴⁵ JPF's governmental vision might also be broken down by the end of the Syrian refugee response by observing the progress of the activities of the AARJ in Turkey.³⁴⁶ The AARJ's endurance in the Turkey field and support from other sources to expand its activities with bigger funds can be used as a best practice to change the vision of JPF as well as the Japanese government on protection in a wider scope in humanitarian crises all around world. The supply driven humanitarian system is on the verge of a change due to the ongoing long-term crises that are taking place all around the world. The Syrian refugee crisis has shown a great deal of firsts (i.e. WFP's cash-based intervention ESSN) to many organizations in their operations. It is now deeply argued and advocated to have a greater focus on the affected people at the center of the response rather than going other way around and shaping projects and programs according to donors, and states' will and aims.

³⁴² Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁴³ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁴⁵ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁴⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Iron Triangle studied in chapter two demonstrates a pattern in how things used to work in terms of politics, economy and government in Japan from the 1950s until the 1970s. The iron triangle structure could be defined as a reflection of Japan's way of democracy, a statist democracy which allowed the government to have ultimate control over economy and social policy. As a result, the iron triangle formula had allowed and encouraged an economy-first policy over social development (i.e. civil society) for nearly four decades. However, as chapter 2 demonstrates, in the case of Japan, it was not only the government's doing. There was rather a harmony between the Japanese public and the government on the goal of rebuilding Japan and catching up with the West. Furthermore, chapter 2 relates the wholehearted work of the Japanese public and the economy-first policy of the Japanese government to Japan's historical and cultural background. Considering the growing sense of nationalism in Japan that could be traced back to the Meiji era through the vigorous propaganda of Kokutai, the national polity, which emphasized the utter importance of compliance to authority, to the emperor, it was not a miracle to find a nation working at its hardest to become a successful country, under the ultimate authority of the government after the WW2. Bureaucracy, the private sector (especially the key sectors such as construction), politics, together with the public will have been the main ingredient that had made it possible for the developmental state model to work successfully in Japan. As the second chapter underlines, while Japan was showing a great deal of success in rapid economic development, it was failing in the development of its own civil society. The need for an alternative voice from the public has been close to non-existent due to its sturdy contemporary Kokutai emphasis for three

long decades. However, things were about to rapidly change because of the trend of political and economic globalization that was taking place on a global governance level.

The second chapter explains how the new political environment supported by the influence of globalization through technology, as one of its main tools, has enabled access to wider global platforms and increased people's awareness about poverty, injustice and various other global issues affecting the lives of millions. Japanese citizens became aware about their lack of voice in state related matters by the time when a certain satisfying degree of prosperity was reached both by the state and the public. As the Figure 6 below demonstrates a pattern towards a global community, by the end of the 1970s, Japan was at a stage where its society was under the heavy influence of the economic and political globalization which enabled it to open its closed doors to its own civil society and humanitarian aid NGOs.




Figure 6. Pattern towards a global community
Source: Self-made by the author

The Iron Triangle, which enabled rapid economic development, was also at a stage where it was limiting success in overseas humanitarian aid actions. As the third chapter demonstrates, Japan's relatively closed approach to NGO proliferation was severely becoming a self-damaging aspect of its foreign affairs, and eventually its international reputation. From the 1980s, Japan needed to catch up with the West not only in terms of economy, but also in terms of society. Japan's weak stance on its NGO presence and its harmful operations overseas conducted under the roof of foreign aid

were heavily criticized by the West. Such criticism of Japan's nearly non-existent NGO presence has become an important push factor for the Japanese state to relax its policies towards NGO development. The effects of political globalization and the push on countries such as Japan with a weak NGO presence, allowed for more supportive policies. In the case of Japan, this was the NPO law. With the enactment of the NPO law in 1998, Japan moved from a closed-door state for NGOs to an opened door state. The MoFA's active role in supporting Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs through various direct and indirect donations has also been one of the main reasons for NGO development in Japan. After all, as Reimann argues, government systems should be in line with supportive regulations for NGOs to exist.

The second chapter shows how Japan was falling behind the Western states when the matter came down to the existence of NGOs. This was mainly due to its not so NGO friendly regulations such as having complicated financial and bureaucratic barriers, including application procedures for NGOs to gain legality. The complicated application procedures were followed with limited financial mechanisms that were in support of NGOs' development, not only to emerge, but also to sustainably continue their work. The late development of funds, tax relaxations and donations in support of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs had put Japan behind the Western states for so long that it has a long way to go to reach the activity level of western humanitarian aid NGOs worldwide. The MoFA's role in support of the development of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs grew bigger with its operations under the sustainable development model. As Hirata underlines, such model was developed due to the high criticism of the Japanese government's foreign aid policies without the presence of NGOs. With the sustainable human development model, the MoFA's aim was to fight world crisis from poverty mitigation to environmental issues, through more soft aid focused activities. This can be

observed as a historical change of perspective of the Japanese government. Prior to this change, the majority of ODA grants and loans were being allocated to construction related projects which, in return, were heavily in support of Japanese companies and economy rather than local companies and local economies. While Japanese companies' familiarity with hard aid related projects stood higher, Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs were losing the game from the start in receiving funds to operate overseas. The shift towards NGOs was supporting the Japanese government to create a positive image of the country that was comprehensive of global norms on human development in health, education and poverty mitigation together with the international community. By the late 1980s, the MoFA was aware of the potential value added that Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs could bring with their soft aid skills and knowledge in global norms such as human rights, peace, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance. For instance, it was visible for the MoFA that Japanese NGOs were welcomed more than the government officials in the field due to their experience and relations at a grassroots level. It also became more apparent that Japanese NGOs could operate in an efficient manner, both cost and time wise, to implement small-scale grassroots aid, while reaching the people in need faster than the government itself. Government sources such as funds also became a reliable provenance for Japanese humanitarian NGOs.

The establishment of the Non-Governmental Organizations Assistance Office (NGO Assistance Office) within the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MoFA in 1994 opened a new window for NGO and government partnership relations.³⁴⁷ The main responsibilities of the NGO Assistance Office (also listed in chapter 3) are (1) to supervise and manage partnerships with Japanese NGOs involved in international cooperation, (2) to extend subsidy support to “Japanese NGOs’ high quality

³⁴⁷ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

international cooperation that harnesses the know-how and expertise of the NGOs”,³⁴⁸
(3) to generate a reproductive communication environment between NGOs and state to sustainably continue Japanese NGOs’ visibility in Japanese aid and ODA.³⁴⁹

The 1980s and 1990s have been two productive decades for NGOs emergence in Japan. The emergence of NGOs has also changed the vertical communication and coordination line between the state, the private sector, civil society and the public to a more horizontal, equal lane of collaboration. As such, the establishment of still ongoing coordination meetings that hit back to those two decades are; MoFA-NGO Quarterly Meetings, MoF-NGO Quarterly Meetings, JICA-NGO Quarterly Meetings, NGO- JICA Reciprocal Training Program, Subcommittee to Achieve the Objectives of the ODA Reform Council’s Final Report and Japan Bank for International Cooperation- NGO Quarterly Meetings.³⁵⁰ In addition to continuing dialogue efforts through periodic coordination meetings and conferences, the MoFA started to work with NGOs more directly. The MoFA currently acts as the direct source of 7 grant aid projects open for Japanese NGOs. These include the Development Cooperation Project; NGO Partnership Project; Transport of Recycled Materials Project; Emergency Humanitarian Aid Project; Mine Clearance-related Project; Microcredit Capital Project; and Peace-building Project.³⁵¹ By the end of the Cold War, there was a dramatic increase in the number of NGOs worldwide. The end of the Cold War opened the door for undemocratic countries to democratize themselves. In addition, the end of the Cold War came with the need for

³⁴⁸ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

³⁴⁹ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 1.

³⁵⁰ JICA, “Understanding Japanese NGOs from Facts and Practices”, 6. & Reimann, *The Rise of Japanese NGOs. Activism from Above*. 94,95.

³⁵¹ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, “International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs”, 8.

more service providers and advocates of democracy to spread it all around globe in a most meaningful way.

The need for NGO support as service providers and advocates by the global community and international institutions has been one of the strongest pressure points on states such as Japan with a weak civil society to fix themselves up and catch up with the West in development of civil society grounds. Post-Cold War Japan was becoming a more “citizen-centred society based on a pluralistic and independent citizenry”.³⁵² The development of NGOs in Japan is a product of the political social environment that the country wanted to settle in. In other words, to take its place next to Western nations with strong civil societies, Japan needed to have its own strong civil society. According to Reimann, external economic and political factors were urging Japan to become a state with a stronger civil society. Internationally, the paradigm was shifting towards democracy with more civil society interventions to which Japan was luckily willing to follow.

In the light of the abovementioned developments, the fourth chapter studied the current situation of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs through the case study of the AARJ and its operation in the Syrian refugee response from the Turkey field. The collective act of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs under the roof of JPF in the Middle East on one of the biggest man-made crises since the WW2, the Syrian refugee crisis, has shown a great deal of improvement for Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs. As explained in the fourth chapter, long before the SRR, Japanese NGOs had gained experience from two major crises. One is the man-made Indochinese refugee crisis (1975) and the other one is the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995). The experience from these crises and domestic developments in NGO emergence allowed for a

³⁵² Vosse, “The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan”, 32.

collective and successful act of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs in the SRR. The AARJ's active role in Turkey since 2012, contrary to other actors in the field, shows a different pattern. Since the outbreak of the Syrian refugee crisis, together with the influx of Syrian refugees, there has also been an influx of international NGOs (INGOs).³⁵³ Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, hundreds of INGOs have rushed into Turkey to respond.³⁵⁴ In the period between 2012 and 2019, some of the major INGOs such as International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps and Save the Children either left Turkey or scaled down their projects mainly due to the political instability. Contrary to the shrinking INGO presence, the AARJ managed to stay and increase its activities within Turkey.

As a Japanese humanitarian aid NGO, the AARJ opened its first office in Sanliurfa Turkey, in 2013.³⁵⁵ From 2012 until 2015, it worked with a local NGO called Support to Life (STL) as its main partner in conducting humanitarian aid operations first to victims of the Van earthquake and then to Syrian refugees who have been fleeing to Turkey ever since the break out of the Syrian crisis.³⁵⁶ From the very beginning, JPF has been the main source of the AARJ and its operation in Turkey.³⁵⁷ As the key donor to 13 other Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs in the region (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey), JPF allows a collective act of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs conducting activities harmoniously under the same roof.³⁵⁸ However, since it's a fund pool that is mainly funded by the MoFA, it demonstrates a rather governmental approach to the SRR. For instance, as seen in chapter four, in 2016, when the field was filled with bottle necks, JPF started to observe the Turkey field as no longer an emergency field. This change of

³⁵³ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 29.

³⁵⁴ Mackreath, Sagnic, "Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 29.

³⁵⁵ AARJ, "Annual Report 2013", 12.

³⁵⁶ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁵⁷ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁵⁸ Japan Platform, "Iraq-Syria Humanitarian Response Plan March 2017-February 2018", 21

view from emergency to developmental was at the time, and still is, the approach of the Japanese government. For instance, JICA's coordination with local authorities in southeast Turkey, rather than the AARJ was a preference made since as a partner of the GoJ it viewed the Turkey operation as no longer an emergency state operation.³⁵⁹ Not being independent from the Japanese government, JPF created a shrinking budget for the activities of AARJ in Turkey.³⁶⁰ While donor aid policies can be great enablers, they can also be great disablers. In the case of the AARJ, JPF's shrinking budget was at first a great disadvantage because the AARJ solely depended on it. However, JPF's funds and the government's preference over the GoT rather than any of its humanitarian aid have brought in positive acquisitions to the AARJ. In 2017, the AARJ became the implementing partner of BPRM and UNHCR, two major donors of the Syrian refugee response Turkey operation in the protection section. As a result, the AARJ's response to the crisis managed to grow in a healthy way to mitigate the still existing issues that Syrian refugees are facing daily. The AARJ's stability in the response also allowed it to develop itself in many aspects. For instance, its Turkey operation is its biggest ever operation in its history.³⁶¹ In addition, its new funds besides the JPF fund have allowed it to operate on deeper levels in the protection sector.³⁶² As explained in chapter four, JPF's approach to humanitarian aid stands traditional to contemporary approaches of the Western donors and NGOs.

As every other crisis comes with its own recipe, lessons learned and best practices, the Syrian refugee crisis has also led to many valuable lessons for all field actors including government institutions, donors, and I/NGOs. The Syrian refugee crisis

³⁵⁹ Dündar, "Exchange of Experiences for the Future: Japanese and Turkish Humanitarian Aid and Support Activities in Conflict Zone", 83.

³⁶⁰ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁶¹ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

³⁶² Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

has been challenging the donors' approach to the subject of humanitarian aid due to its continuity in a very conflicted geopolitical area. The Syrian refugee crisis' geographical coverage in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria, has pushed mega donors such as ECHO, BPRM, UNHCR and various other UN agencies to better coordinate to reach and solve not only the most acute needs, but also to create sustainability to their actions. As a result, 3RP was created to orchestrate the crisis through a regional coordination tool. 3RP can be observed as an international platform which builds bridges for assistance, advocacy, indirect policy making, peace building, donor and I/NGO relations led by UNHCR and UNDP. The AARJ's active role in the field has managed it to become an official member of the 3RP by 2017 through its partnership with UNHCR. Will AARJ's steady growth in the Turkey operation by expanding its area of operation from traditional to more contemporary humanitarian assistance through two international funds, BPRM and UNHCR, be a snowball effect? When this question was directed to the Turkey country director of the AARJ, the response was "maybe".³⁶³ Later, it was explained that applications to UN agencies for the AARJ's Bangladesh operation were on the table and, surely, this was due to the lessons learned from the Syrian refugee response Turkey operation. The structural change of JPF on its fund allocation and the Japanese government's additional supplementary budget allocation directly to JPF can also be observed as a starting point of a change in donor relations between state, donor agencies, and NGOs in Japan. According to the Turkey Country Director of the AARJ, the Japanese government's funds were too traditional with the main focus on construction of schools or development of WASH activities. This approach could be linked to the Japanese government's approach to foreign aid through its previous ODA loan aids to developing states focusing on hard aid rather than soft aid. The international

³⁶³ Interview with Country Director of AARJ, on June 23, 2019, in Istanbul.

critics of Japan's ODA loans once pushed the MoFA towards Japanese NGOs. Thus, as seen in chapter 3, pro-NGO policies bloomed in Japan to liberate its once chained civil society actors by strict, barrier-like procedures. Before ending the interview with the Turkey Country Director of the AARJ, it was made clear that the AARJ was ready to focus on the new way humanitarian assistance together with other Western NGOs, and maybe with this change the government could see its ways for a better change. As of 2014, it is projected that there are more than 400 NGOs by MoFA, compared to 13 NGOs in 1967.³⁶⁴

The main purpose of this thesis was initially planned to demonstrate the progress of Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs in both domestic and international grounds through official interviews conducted with the AARJ's staff. However, due to the busy schedules of the AARJ's headquarter office in Tokyo and its field operation office in Turkey, only one official and two unofficial interviews were conducted. The conducted interviews with the Turkey operation staff could not be linked to the AARJ's domestic relations with ODA and its overall domestic advocacy strategy on the global refugee crisis. As a result, the information gathered from the three interviews has been strictly about the AARJ's Turkey operation and its relations with its donors (UNHCR, BPRM and JPF). In this regard, a greater emphasis on the AARJ's field operation and donor relations has been given in the fourth, case study chapter. How much of an advocacy do Japanese humanitarian aid NGOs make when they return back to Japan on issues such as refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people? If no advocacy is made, why is it so? Japan is a country that is most of the time heavily criticized for its refugee policy. What motivates Japanese humanitarian NGOs working on refugee issues globally? As for the prospects for future research, it should be aimed at internationally active Japanese NGOs

³⁶⁴ The Non-Governmental Organizations Cooperation Division, "International Cooperation and NGOs: Partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Japan and Japanese NGOs", 3.

domestic efforts on creating larger “social movements with strong domestic roots”³⁶⁵ regarding the refugee policy of Japan to be able to see the big picture.

³⁶⁵ Kuroda, and Imata, “Shifting Paradigms for International NGOs and Constituency Building Evolving Scene from Japan”, 3.

APPENDIX A

OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORTS OF AARJ ON ITS TURKEY OPERATION FROM 2013

Republic of Turkey

Sanliurfa Office

In response to the magnitude 7.2-earthquake that struck eastern Turkey on October 23, 2011 resulting in more than 1,200 casualties, AAR Japan carried out emergency assistance for the disaster survivors. Since 2012, AAR Japan has been assisting Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey due to the internal conflict in Syria.



2013 fiscal year final settlement: 101,045,136 JPY

1 Support to Schools for Children with Disabilities

Target Area: Van Province, Republic of Turkey

Objective: To support schools for children with disabilities that have fallen into administrative difficulties due to the earthquake and create an environment where children with disabilities can safely learn.

Achievement: AAR Japan strengthened rehabilitation support for and promoted social participation of children with disabilities by supplying walkers, balance boards, a bed for rehabilitation, educational materials, and toys to a school for children with disabilities in Van City.

Beneficiaries: Approximately 200 children with disabilities



AAR Japan's Tokyo Headquarters staff member Takako Oda (right) reads a book with a girl at the Şehriyan Rehabilitation Center, where AAR provided educational materials (November 2013)

2 Assistance to Syrian Refugees

Target Area: Phase 1: Hatay Region, Kilis Region, and Sanliurfa Region, Republic of Turkey; **Phase 2:** Sanliurfa Region, Republic of Turkey

Objective: To improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees living in the southeastern region of Turkey by distributing relief items assisting persons with disabilities, and providing educational support to children

Achievement: AAR Japan distributed food items, daily necessities, and other items to overcome the harsh winter to Syrian refugees living in the southeastern region. As for educational support, AAR Japan distributed stationery, textbooks, and uniforms to students of Syrian school. Lastly, for persons with disabilities living both inside and out of refugee camps, AAR Japan distributed assistive devices and provided rehabilitation trainings.

Beneficiaries: (Phase 1) Distribution of food items and daily necessities: 3,600 households (approximately 18,000 individuals), Assistance to persons with disabilities: 180 individuals, Educational support: 2,187 Syrian schoolchildren (Phase 2) Distribution of winter necessities: 1,570 households (approximately 7,850 individuals), Assistance to persons with disabilities: 102 individuals, Educational support: 1,000 Syrian schoolchildren



AAR Japan's Headquarters staff member Hironori Hara hands daily necessities to a Syrian family living in Turkey (April 2013)

APPENDIX B

OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORTS OF AARJ ON ITS TURKEY OPERATION FROM 2015

Republic of Turkey

Sanliurfa Office

In response to the large scale earthquake that struck eastern Turkey in 2011, AAR Japan carried out emergency assistance for the disaster survivors. Since 2012, AAR Japan has also been assisting Syrian refugees who fled to the south-east region of Turkey due to the internal conflict in Syria. The following year in 2013, AAR Japan opened an office in Sanliurfa Province. Through this office AAR Japan is continuing to assist Syrian refugees in the region.



2015 fiscal year final settlement: 85,640,882 JPY

1 Comprehensive Assistance to Syrian Refugees in the South-East Region of Turkey

Target Area: Sanliurfa Province, Republic of Turkey

Objective: To improve the living standards of Syrian refugees by providing aid that address the various needs of refugees new to the Turkey and those who have resided in Turkey for an extended period of time.

Achievement: In collaboration with a local cooperation organization, AAR Japan distributed food item packages to 1,244 Syrian refugee households (7,344 persons) in the villages of the Suruç District. AAR Japan also distributed personal hygiene product packages to 939 households (5,634 persons) in the same district. Furthermore, AAR Japan distributed fruit to approximately 400 households (approximately 4,000 persons) at Syrian refugee camps operated by regional government bodies.

In Sanliurfa, AAR Japan established a community center that offered Turkish, English, and computer classes to equip the Syrian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and the local Turkish persons with new skills and knowledge. In addition, AAR Japan regularly hosted events to encourage community building amongst the Syrian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and the local Turkish persons.

AAR Japan also provided assistive devices and offered physical therapy rehabilitation programs for Syrian refugee PWDs and Turkish PWDs.

Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries of aid distribution: 1,644 Syrian refugee households in the Suruç district. (approximately 16,978 persons)

Community center beneficiaries: 319 Syrian refugees and local Turkish persons attending classes and 1,570 Syrian refugees and local Turkish persons attending the events.

Beneficiaries of assistance for PWDs: 658 persons.



Syrian refugees and local Turkish children visiting the community center and Yukie OSA, AAR Japan president (center). (September 2015)

APPENDIX C

OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORTS OF AARJ ON ITS TURKEY OPERATION FROM 2016

Republic of Turkey

Sanliurfa Office, Istanbul Office, Mardin Office

In response to the large scale earthquake that struck eastern Turkey in 2011, AAR Japan carried out emergency assistance for the disaster survivors. Since 2012, AAR Japan has also been assisting Syrian refugees who fled to the south-east region of Turkey due to the internal conflict in Syria. The following year in 2013, AAR Japan opened an office in Sanliurfa Province, then Istanbul Office in October 2016 and Mardin Office in February 2017. Through these offices AAR Japan is continuing to assist Syrian refugees in the region.



2016 fiscal year final settlement: 217,258,558 JPY

1 Comprehensive Assistance to Syrian Refugees in the South-East Region of Turkey

Target Area: Sanliurfa Province and Mardin Province, Republic of Turkey

Objective: To improve the living standards of Syrian refugees by providing assistance to the most vulnerable Syrian refugees, such as those who have recently escaped the crisis, those who do not have the opportunity to obtain new skills, those who live in isolation, and those who have disabilities.

Achievement: In collaboration with a local cooperation organization, AAR Japan delivered winter items to Syrian refugees through the e-money system, in Kızıltepe District, Nusaybin District and Midyat District of Mardin Province (adjacent to Sanliurfa Province). In Sanliurfa, AAR Japan continued managing the community center, providing Turkish, Arabic, English, and computer classes to equip the Syrian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and the local Turkish persons with new skills and knowledge. In addition, AAR Japan regularly hosted events to encourage community building amongst the Syrian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and the local Turkish persons. To especially vulnerable refugees including persons with disabilities (PWDs) and orphans, AAR Japan extended individual assistance such as provision of food and temporary asylums. AAR Japan also provided PWDs in Sanliurfa Province and Mardin Province with assistive devices and in-home physical therapy rehabilitation programs and gave technical guidance on simple rehabilitation to their family members

Direct Beneficiaries: 2,661 households (approx.13,800 persons) of Syrian refugees and others in Mardin Province who received winter items; 566 persons (Syrian refugees, Iraqi refugees and local Turkish) who attended the classes; 2,421 persons (Syrian and Iraqi refugees) and 710 local Turkish who attended the events at the community center; 3,113 persons who received the individual assistance



Syrian child refugees participating "origami" art workshop at the community center, Saori GOMI, AAR Japan (left front). (February 2017)

APPENDIX D

OFFICIAL ANNUAL REPORTS OF AARJ ON ITS TURKEY OPERATION FROM 2017

Republic of Turkey

Sanliurfa Office, Istanbul Office, Mardin Office

In response to the large scale earthquake that struck eastern Turkey in 2011, AAR Japan carried out emergency assistance for the disaster survivors. Since 2012, AAR Japan has also been assisting Syrian refugees who fled to the south-east region of Turkey due to the internal conflict in Syria. The following year in 2013, AAR Japan opened an office in Sanliurfa Province, then Istanbul Office in October 2016 and Mardin Office in February 2017. Through these offices AAR Japan is continuing to assist Syrian refugees in the region.



2017 fiscal year final settlement: 318,946,012 JPY

1 Comprehensive Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Target Area: Sanliurfa Province, Mardin Province and Istanbul City, Republic of Turkey

Objective: To improve the living standards of Syrian refugees by providing assistance to the most vulnerable refugees in poverty such as those who have recently escaped the crisis, children and those who have disabilities, as well as by promoting community and capacity building.

Achievement: Through house visits and group sessions, AAR Japan provided valuable information to refugees for living, including information concerning legal and administrative services in Turkey. After identifying individual needs of the most vulnerable refugees such as children without guardians, victims of domestic violence and sexual violence, persons with disabilities, we offered each the assistance they need including food and translation services, legal and medical services, assistive devices and in home rehabilitation services. In Sanliurfa, AAR Japan continued managing the community center, regularly hosting events to strive for mutual understanding between refugees and local residents, such as sports, music and cooking classes. Also, in Mardin, we continued managing the children's center, where we provided them with opportunities to learn. The methods included systematic program incorporating studying and recreation sessions such as arts and crafts, and drama. We also hosted events such as picnics and visit to museum for children and their parents.

Beneficiaries: 61,514 persons who received information and awareness raising services; 2,477 persons who received individual assistance; 4,325 persons (3,623 Syrian refugees and 702 Turkish) who participated in events; 3,868 persons who received services from the children's center.



Children participate in arts and crafts workshop held at the community center in Sanliurfa. (November 2017)

APPENDIX E

JPF PARTNERS- SYRIA-IRAQ RESPONSE

NGO	Country	Content of Projects
AAR	Turkey	Good distribution, operation of community centers, assistance for disabled persons, etc.
ADRA	Lebanon	Educational support for vulnerable children, psychological care through provision of child-friendly spaces, assistance in promoting harmony within communities, etc.
CCP	Lebanon	Non-formal education such as preschools and supplementary classes as well as school buses for Syrian refugee children; medical assistance in psychiatry, dentistry and gynecology; distribution of meals and food; etc.
IVY	Iraq	Basic goods to vulnerable IDPs, supplementary schools for IDP children, construction of elementary school buildings for IDP children, , etc.
JCCP	Turkey	Distribution of goods to satisfy basic needs, etc.
JARC	Jordan	Education assistance, etc.
JEN	Iraq	Operation and improvement of WASH facilities and WASH related services at IDP camps; provision of WASH related services and repair of WASH related facilities in newly liberated areas; restoration and repair of schools in newly liberated areas; shelters and distribution of NFI kits to returnees; distribution of food and livelihood recovery assistance to returnees; etc.
	Jordan	Installation and repair of public WASH facilities in Districts 3, 4 and 5 at Za'atari Refugee Camp; hygiene promotion activities and community enhancement in Districts 3, 4 and 5 at Za'atari Refugee Camp; livelihood assistance to vulnerable households in Districts 3, 4 and 5 at Za'atari Refugee Camp; repair of public schools in host communities; hygiene education at public schools in host communities; etc.
KnK	Jordan	Provision of classes to supplement school education, assistance in organizational capability building at the Ministry of Education, teacher training, etc.
NICCO	Jordan	Good distribution, psychosocial workshops and informal education, counseling, etc.

NGO	Country	Content of Projects
PARCIC	Turkey	Distribution of food vouchers, distribution of winterization goods and daily goods, livelihood assistance, etc.
	Lebanon	Emergency food distribution, etc.
PWJ	Iraq	Renovation and extension of clinics that IDPs living outside camps and host communities use; building schools in IDP camps; WASH facilities in IDP camps and host communities; building community centers in IDP camps; distribution of basic goods to IDPs; renovation, extension and construction of schools and preschools in Syrian refugee camps and their host communities; WASH facilities in refugee camps; distribution of basic goods to Syrian refugees; medical checkup program for Syrian refugee children; etc.
SCJ	Lebanon	Lectures for youth, educational activities for local residents, projects contributing to the local community, provision of youth-friendly spaces, capacity building related to child protection in local communities, etc.
WVJ	Jordan	Operation of supplementary classes, creating safe environments where children can learn, distribution of winter clothing, etc.
WP	Jordan	Distribution of hygiene kits
JPF Secretariat	Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey	Monitoring and evaluation, etc.
Undisclosed organization	Syria	Food assistance, protection, education assistance, psychosocial care, WASH assistance, etc.

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