

THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FOOTBALL FANDOM SINCE THE 1970S

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FOOTBALL FANDOM IN TURKEY SINCE THE 1970S

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Title: “The Transformation of Football Fandom in Turkey since the 1970s”

This thesis explores the reactions of football fans in Turkey to social, political and football-related events starting from the 1970s. The objective of the thesis is to introduce the events that affected the public life and seek for their repercussions in football fan groups. England, where football was born as a working-class game, is chosen as a reference point for how football fans have reacted to the “hyper-commodification” process of football in four decades. The hypothesis is that the lack of a distinctive identity and political engagement prevented Turkish football fans from keeping their traditional position.

The commodification of football that started with the introduction of professionalism took a new turn with television broadcasts and the expansion of football to a wider public in the 1970s, finally reaching a climax of “hyper-commodification” with the neo-liberal economic tendencies of the post-Cold War 1990s. The hyper-commodification of football rendered the game economically unaffordable for most of the traditional football fans of the lower classes. These fans were torn between resistance and disillusionment. The lack of a distinctive fan identity in Turkey aggravated this confusion.

Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde yüksek lisans derecesi için

Dağhan Irak tarafından Ocak 2010'da teslim edilen tezin kısa özeti

Başlık: “1970'lerden itibaren Türkiye'de Futbol Taraftarlığının Geçirdiği Dönüşüm”

Bu yüksek lisans tezi, Türkiye'deki futbol taraftarlarının 1970'lerden itibaren yaşanan sosyal, siyasal ve futbolla alakalı olaylara verdiği tepkileri incelemektedir. Bu tezin amacı toplumsal hayatta yaşanan olayları sunarak, bunların futbol taraftar gruplarına yansımalarını aramaktır. Futbolun bir işçi sınıfı oyunu olarak doğduğu İngiltere son kırk yılda futbolun geçirdiği “aşırı metalaşma” sürecine taraftarların tepkisini ölçmek için bir referans noktası olarak seçilmiştir. Tezin ana iddiası, ayırt edici ve siyasal olarak aktif bir taraftar kimliğinin oluşmamasının Türkiye'deki futbol taraftarlarının geleneksel pozisyonlarını koruyamamasına neden olduğudur.

Profesyonellikle beraber başlayan futbolun metâlaşması, 1970'lerde televizyon yayınlarıyla futbolun daha geniş kitlelere ulaşmasıyla sürmüştür. 1990'larda ise, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin neo-liberal ekonomik anlayışına uygun olarak bir “aşırı metâlaşma” durumu ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu aşırı-metâlaşma, pek çoğu alt sınıflara mensup taraftarların ekonomik güçlerinin futbolu takip etmeye yetmemesine yol açmıştır. Bu taraftarlar direnç ile hayal kırıklığı arasında bir noktada kalmışlardır. Bu noktada belirgin bir ayırt edici taraftar kimliğinin olmaması bu krizi ağırlaştırıcı bir etkidir.

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I would like to dedicate this work to my grandmother, who passed away during the final redaction days of this thesis. Her existence meant my childhood to me and I will cherish her memory forever.

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ABBREVIATIONS

FIFA	International Federation of Association Football (<i>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</i>)
GSL	Galatasaray High School (<i>Galatasaray Lisesi</i>)
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (<i>İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti</i>)
TFF	Turkish Football Federation (<i>Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu</i>)
CHP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
TMTB	Turkish National Students' Union (<i>Türk Millî Talebe Birliği</i>)
BTGM	General Directorate of Physical Education (<i>Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğü</i>)
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
FA	(English) Football Association
FSA	Football Supporters' Association
ISA	Independent Supporters' Association
UVF	Ulster Voluntary Force
IRA	Irish Republican Army
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
PM	Prime Minister
MP	Member of Parliament
RPI	Retail Prices Index
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
AP	Justice Party (<i>Adalet Partisi</i>)
MDD	National Democratic Revolution (<i>Millî Demokratik Devrim</i>)
TİP	Workers' Party of Turkey (<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i>)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (<i>Millîyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
KDPI	Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq
DDKO	Revolutionary Culture Clubs of the East" (<i>Doğu Devrimci Kültür Ocakları</i>)
PKK	Workers' Party of Kurdistan (<i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</i>)
TRT	Turkish Radio-Television (<i>Türkiye Radyo Televizyonu</i>)
MC	Nationalist Front (<i>Millîyetçi Cephe</i>)
MDP	Nationalist Democracy Party (<i>Millîyetçi Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
HP	Populist Party (<i>Halkçı Party</i>)
ANAP	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
SODEP	Social Democracy Party (<i>Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
DYP	Right Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)
MSP	National Salvation Party (<i>Millî Selamet Partisi</i>)
RP	Welfare Party (<i>Refah Partisi</i>)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i>)
FP	Virtue Party (<i>Fazilet Partisi</i>)
SP	Felicity Party (<i>Saadet Partisi</i>)
AKP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation

ITV	Independent Television
DIY	Do-It-Yourself
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
GSGM	General Directorate of Sports and Youth (<i>Gençlik Spor Genel Müdürlüğü</i>)
FCUM	Football Club United of Manchester
NFFSC	National Federation of Football Supporter Clubs
IMUSA	Independent Manchester United Supporters' Association
MUFC	Manchester United Football Club

PREFACE

“A bloke once said, 'you can change your wife, change your politics, change your religion. But never, never can you change your favourite football team.’”¹ This line is taken from “Looking for Eric”, a film shown in cinemas during the final days of this thesis' redaction. It is one of the best examples of films about working-class football fans. That sentence, or that mentality, which is valid for the overwhelming majority of football fans brings out one question; “what if your favourite football team changed into something else, what would you do then?” What if you could not afford to pay for match tickets, or your usual stand became expensive box seats like in the example of Manchester United's Stretford End or Beşiktaş's Covered Stand (*Kapalı*)? What would a football fan do if he or she could not afford to follow the club any more?

Today, a minimum wage earning Manchester United fan has to work 88 hours to be able to afford the cheapest season ticket.² Equally, a minimum wage earning Beşiktaş fan has to work almost a full month to afford the cheapest season ticket of his or her team³. These are the teams known as the working-class football teams in England and in Turkey. Of course, the ticket is not only the sole expenditure in the modern football world. You have to be subscribed to digital television to be able to see the away games,

1 *Looking For Eric*, DVD, written by Paul Laverty, directed by Ken Loach, Icon Home Entertainment, 2009

2 The cheapest season ticket for Manchester United games is £513 (East and West Lower Stands) whereas the national minimum wage in the United Kingdom is £5.8 per hour.

3 The cheapest season ticket for Beşiktaş JK games is 500TL (Eski Açık Stand) while the national minimum wage in Turkey is 546TL per month.

which costs around 45 work days for the cheapest option in Turkey and 40 hours of work in the UK. Indeed, you may choose not to go to the stadium and not watch the games on TV either. Then, what kind of fandom experience would it be? The purpose of this thesis is to answer this question.

My relationship with football began at an early age, like most people. I grew up in a house full of female “die-hard” Beşiktaş fans. I attended my first games with my mother in the famous *Kapalı* when I was ten years old. A bit later, I started attending games in the *Kapalı* with my friends. In my university years, I could not afford *Kapalı* any more and made a transfer to the *Yeni Açık* (New Open Stand), which is the second cheapest stand in BJK İnönü Stadium. During the last year of my undergraduate studies, I started working as a sports commentator on TV, eventually as a sports columnist in Turkish Football Federation's monthly magazine. However, *Kapalı* was still too expensive for me. As a sports professional, I could not easily afford a ticket that I had when I was in junior high school. Probably, this experience, which distanced me from my fandom habits, led me to carry out a thesis about it.

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the world has been going through major changes. Indeed, most of these changes were already hinted at by the events that happened in the world, especially after the 1973 oil crisis. The era of economic globalization reshaped football dramatically, and also the coming of the new era of football was hinted at by the previous two decades. That is why it is essential to start telling the history of the “industrialized” or “hyper-commodified” football from the 1970s, when the gap between the social classes widened. If we have to discuss the domination of capital over football, we should identify the point at which capital started

to take over football from being everybody's game. For this reason, this work is an explanation of what happened in the 1970s and the 1980s as well as an analysis of football fandom in the 1990s.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

*“The people who live ordinary lives
without extraordinary talents.
That's them whom I defend on the pitch.
Politically, socially, whatever you name it.”⁴
Vikash Dhorasoo,
Former French international footballer*

Football is the most popular game in modern history for a single reason: it is easy. Its objectives are easy, as the legendary Polish coach Kazimierz Gorski said, “Football is a simple game. One team just needs to score more goals than the other.” Unlike many other games, it does not necessarily require equipment. A piece of small rock, a tin can or a rolled-up old pair of socks can become a ball. As long as you know where the goal is, you can play football. You do not need the ball to bounce like in basketball, you do not need sticks or rackets like in tennis, hockey or badminton. Even if you do not play, you can always talk about it. As its rules are easy to understand, it does not require training to comment about a football match. And it is enjoyable. You can feel like a competent coach or a star player while watching.

The simple fun of football makes it popular. Yet, for the same reason, this game is often underestimated. As everyone can speak about football, the usual case in the

⁴ Vikash Dhorasoo, *Substitute*, DVD. Directed by Fred Poulet. Wild Side Video, 2008.

academic world is that nobody really does. Of course, I do not like to overlook the wonderful works of many scholars, most of whom I had the opportunity to benefit from during this work; however, the academic literature on such a massive phenomenon remains scarce.

The modern game of football was invented by Britain's working-class in the early days of the Industrial Revolution by converting rural ball games into a new branch of sports. Since then, the game has always been a popular form of leisure among the lower classes as well as the upper classes of society. Wolfgang Kaschuba claims working-class sports are one of the cultural elements that shapes “worker's politics.” By playing games, the lower class makes an “appearance” on the public stage; and it is the prototype of the “political body language” later converted into protests and industrial actions.⁵

If we consider this hypothesis true, then also can it be true that the lower classes of society playing the same game with the upper classes are the subjects of a class struggle (whether they are class-conscious or not)? Furthermore, since the beginning, the codification and government of football has always been ruled by the elites. Then, could it also be true that a game invented and generally played by the lower classes, but codified and ruled by upper class, appears to be an arena of class struggle?

The aim of this MA thesis is to find answers to these questions by trying to make connections between political, social and football-related events and how the football fans react to those events. By doing this, this work will try to put the football fan into a historical and social context, from which it is often excluded and regarded as a

5 Wolfgang Kaschuba, “Popular Culture and Workers' Culture,” *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, edited by Alf Lüdtke. (Princeton-New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 186-187.

senselessly violent being. The principle objective of this work is to recognize the football fan as an actor of social history in a historical context.

Richard Giulianotti, one of the leading football sociologists, says that the history of football can be categorized as “pre-modern,” “modern,” and “post-modern”.⁶ The “pre-modern” era of football includes the folk game taken to the British cities, whereas the “modern” era denotes the codified football game played under institutions and organizations. By “post-modernity,” the hyper-commodification era of football, starting from the 1980s, is meant. If we may think about this useful classification, maybe we can reach further questions. The game was invented and brought to urban life by the lower classes and it was converted into a modern game by the upper classes. In the modern era, the vast majority of the football audience was working-class, but it was the upper classes who commodified it through football-related corporations. So, can the reactions of fans depend on how they are engaged in class struggle? In other words, does the fans' class-consciousness (or the lack of it) shape their position on the changes in the football world?

One of the major misconceptions about football is to diminish its course of events to the general political-social climate's consequences. Pierre Bourdieu was one of the first to notice this generalization, by saying “the history of sport is a relatively autonomous history which, even when marked by the major events of economic and social history, has its own tempo, its own evolutionary laws, its own crises, in short, its specific chronology.”⁷ Thus, the objective of this work is not to explain the football and

6 Richard Giulianotti, *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. xiii.

7 Pierre Bourdieu, “Sport and Social Class,” *Social Science Information* 17, no.6, (1978), p. 821.

fandom related events by the domination of social and political events. On the contrary, this work aims to give the social-political course of events first and discuss how football and football-fans reacted to them. If there is no correlation between the two sets of events, then it will be this work's duty to seek explanations to the football and fandom-related events that happened at any given time.

The first part of work includes a brief history of association football, commonly known as football. Examples of the pre-modern, even antique ball games will be given to clear up some common misunderstandings. Modern football was born in Britain; however, there were other games in history which also may have affected it, through geographical expeditions or other reasons. Nevertheless, these games obviously had major differences from modern football, even from the British folk games. These differences will be conveyed in order to prevent any confusion about the place of these games in football history. It is a popular belief in Turkey that football was a Turkish invention and later stolen by the British. Thus, the ball games in Turkic communities will be analyzed in order to show how they were different from football. Without distinguishing these games from football, it is virtually impossible to explain how football was first played by the British in the late Ottoman Empire.

Turkish football has a history that goes hand-in-hand with the history of modern Turkey. As the game was forbidden during the Abdulhamid II period to Muslim Turks (among many other activities), the Turks began to play football during the Constitutional period. However, the history of football in Turkey does not begin with that period. The British and the non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire have a rich but rather unanalysed history of football. Especially, the history of the Ottoman Greeks in Izmir

offers a great deal of information on football's humble beginnings in the imperial years. This part of Turkish football history has been widely ignored by Turkish scholars due to the nationalistic historiography tradition of the country and also because of the language barrier between the scholars and the Greek sources. This work seeks to fill this void as far as possible.

The politicians involvement in Turkish football clubs is a well-known fact. However, due to the unofficial nature of relations and the lack of documents, it has not been analyzed thoroughly until recent years. However, Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı's diligent attempt in 2008, to which I had the chance to contribute as editor, marked a milestone for this part of Turkish football history. Whereas the period between 1908 and 1975 does not fall under the scope of this work, I find it helpful to see the tradition of political pressure on Turkish football, especially in order to better understand the background of the changes that happened in the coup d'etat periods, namely between 1960-1971, 1971-1980 and 1980 to the present.

The first chapter of this work also includes some notes and criticisms about Turkish football historiography. Just as in the Ottoman Greeks case, most of Turkish historiography depends on selective classification and a nationalistic narrative. During the first readings, defining the real context of some football-related historical events was difficult. To a neutral reader, according to Turkish sports historiography, football may seem to have been a Turkish invention where Turks have been ever victorious. The nationalistic approach which takes events out of their context in order to magnify them not only presents a defective version of history, but also creates a burden for future scholars by creating a literature of inconsistencies. Before analysing some examples,

some of the major error categories encountered through readings, such as reconstruction of history, lack of knowledge and interest about the non-Turks' activities, inconsistencies related to nationalist historiography and also club-biased historiography which happens to be a micro-scale club nationalism were noted.

The second part of the work is based on a comparison between Turkey and England. England is not only the birth place of modern football, but also the birth place of the industrial revolution and class division. It is also the place where the first working-class football fan base emerged, so a work such as this, references to England would be inevitable. But, for some reasons related to Turkey, I found it useful not to be content with some references but to try a full scale comparison instead.

A scholar, especially working on football's economic side, faces major difficulties in finding meaningful data about some decades of Turkish sports history. For example, it is almost impossible to find even parts of credible data about ticket prices as most clubs had the habit of selling the tickets in exchange of unofficial extra donations and records of this extra monetary transaction were not kept. As a football fan, I remember paying ten times more than the real ticket price during the 1990s. Even today, when clubs are under the TFF and UEFA criteria and some of them are listed on the stock market, a football fan pays some extras while buying match tickets, such as a “service fee” applied by the ticket company that handles major clubs' ticket sales.

Also, the official transfer fees in an overwhelming number of player transactions were reported deliberately erroneous until a very recent date as most clubs signed contracts with players for a lower declared fee in order to pay lower taxes and players received unregistered payments later. After attempts of receiving economic data, I

reached the conclusion that the economic data that could be gathered would not be credible and any conclusion made from them would be illusive.

Instead of using those data, I decided to set England as a reference point and compare both countries on how they experienced the “modern” and “post-modern” or “hyper-commodified” eras of football. In doing that, I do not aim to fall into the “belatedness” trap into which any modern history work that includes England could fall. While England can be considered to be a reference point for the aforementioned reasons, the Turkish experience does not necessarily follow the English pattern. At some points some similarities inevitably will appear between the two countries, but Turkey and England are two different countries with different political, economic, social and apparently football histories. Hence, the aim of this comparison is not to show whether Turkish football is belated or not, but it is to point out the differences that they have in political and social history and to discuss the effects of these differences effects on football and fandom.

Besides the obvious reasons for selecting England as a reference point, such as the facts that football was born in England, it was imported to Turkey by the British, and it is the country where the first football and fan groups appeared, a comparison between England and Turkey regarding football fandom is necessary. The transformation of the English stadiums after the major two stadium disasters (Heysel in 1985 and Hillsborough in 1989), the transformation (or the modernization) of the English stadiums set example to many other countries about preventing crowd disorders and also profit maximization. The criminological aspect of this transformation is highly praised in Turkey by scholars, sports and security officials and the media. The assumption that “the

violence in football ends with the English system” also is considered to be a fact by the public opinion.⁸ While praising the English experience, the social and political conditions and the consequences of this transformation, and the adaptability of that experience to Turkey is questioned rarely.

A similar simplistic approach is also visible in area of economics. The product of the English football transformation, the Premier League, is often presented as an example to Turkey by leading Turkish football economy scholars such as Akşar. The liberalization of the English league system is presented as “an example that we [Turkey] should take lessons from.”⁹ However, the widening gap between top and lower divisions, the huge difference between the few top teams of the Premier League and the others in terms of competitive success are usually overlooked, as well as the dubious origins of the highly-praised “foreign capital” imported to the league.

Both solving social matters by criminological approaches and the neo-liberal economic tendency are trends that gained popularity in Turkey after the 1980 coup d'etat. Hence, we found it perfectly normal to witness praise of the social severity and the neo-liberalism of the Thatcher era. Furthermore, it makes our comparison between the consequences of the the Thatcher years in England and the Özal years in Turkey more meaningful. The primary objective while comparing these two periods will be once again to show how the football fans were affected by them.

The introduction of football into the academic world as an area of serious

8 Burak Özyurt, 6 November 2009, “*Futbolda şiddet İngiliz sistemiyle biter*” (Violence in football ends with the English system), available [online]: <http://www.t24.com.tr/haberdetay/60679.aspx> [24 December 2009].

9 Tuğrul Akşar, 27 April 2009, “*Premier Lig Değirmeninini Suyu Nerden Geliyor?*” (Where does the money come to the Premier League?), available [online] http://www.fesam.org/sur_makale.php?kod=2&url=uzman/ta070.htm [24 December 2009].

research happened thanks to the efforts of Norbert Elias, his colleague Eric Dunning and his Leicester School starting from the 1960s. Whereas Elias, Dunning and others contributed to football research diligently, they also set the tendency according to which these works would continue. As the era that they began working on football was marked by the rising hooliganism in English stadiums, their work was mostly concentrated on this area. While Elias and Dunning started working on the “permitted violence” phenomenon inside the game,¹⁰ Dunning and the Leicester School concentrated on the historical and sociological roots of football hooliganism by seeking a continuity between the violence inside game during the early years of football and the crowd. Apart from the Leicester School, Taylor and Clarke also made notable contributions to the football literature. Ian Taylor was one of the first scholars to draw attention to the changing nature of football in the 1960s and he brought the term “bourgeoisification” in order to describe these changes, which notably accelerated after the introduction of widespread television broadcasts. Taylor considered the rising hooliganism to be a reaction against the “bourgeoisification” by the male working-class football spectators.¹¹

Visibly, Taylor's approach is much more class division-based than Elias and the Leicester School, which I find more accurate as the latter tend to see the game as a continuity while the inventors and the rulers of the game (in the 1960s and later) were different people and they belonged to different classes. However, both academic schools have a common point while approaching the subject; they both restrict their focus to hooliganism whereas the football fandom is a broader area which involves many other

10 Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, “Dynamics of Group Sports with Special Reference to Football,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 17, No. 4 (December 1966), pp. 388-402.

11 Ian Taylor, “‘Football Mad’: a Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism,” *The Sociology of Sport: A Selection of Readings*, edited by Eric Dunning (London: Cass., 1971).

elements than hooligans.

Indeed, criticizing Elias or Taylor for not seeing the big picture is a little iniquitous, as they produced their most notable works in the 1960s and the 1970s, where the hooligans had not yet become marginalized groups with their own identities yet, as the appearance of the “casuals” (the hooligan groups) mostly happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the Leicester School continued this approach even in the early 1990s while having difficulties with distinguishing incidents of disorder from the organized violence of the marginalized groups.¹² Between the 1960-90 period, this was hardly possible as the football world was continuously struck with crowd disorders and even disasters. The advantage in this work is being written in the era when hooliganism is no longer the main focus in the football world. Thus, we will be able to consider the hooligans as a small part of the whole and treat them as such.

The 1970s was a decade of distress for most countries, including England and Turkey, because of the global oil crisis triggered by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, these years also saw the Northern Irish problem in Britain and the Kurdish issue in Turkey aggravated. I will try to find out the social consequences of these events and their probable repercussions in the football area. As these years witnessed a rise of football-related violence records in both countries, the relation of the social climate with the violence in the stands will be questioned.

While passage from the 1970s to the 1980s in the two countries happened very differently it caused similar results. In Turkey, the abolition of political parties by the 1980 coup and the rise of Turgut Özal as the sole civilian politician led to a strong,

¹² Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy and John Williams, *Football on Trial* (London: Routledge, 1990).

economically liberal, politically conservative one-party government. In England, the wave of strikes at the end of the 1970s caused the decline of the Labour Party in power and Margaret Thatcher took, who depended on similar principles as Özal. In both countries, left-wing politics went into major decline but for different reasons. This also accelerated the dissolution of social state and the economic liberalization.

This wave of liberalization overlapped the modernization of football. While both countries presented similar portraits in that area, the approaches of Thatcher and Özal towards football were very different from each other. Thatcher's negative stance towards football was summarized by her former minister David Mellor as “she would ban football if she thought she could.”¹³ Özal was aware of the opportunities that football could create politically while claiming “if the Turkish national team were one of the 5-6 teams who played in the European finals, the Motherland Party would win the elections landslide.”¹⁴ These two politicians followed similar economic policies, and both were close allies with Ronald Reagan's United States government. Then, why did they have completely opposite views on football? Was it simply a personal choice or was it because of the different political and social conditions of these two countries? This is a question that will be examined.

The early 1990s in English, Turkish and global football marked a wave of changes. The regulation of hooliganism by sometimes drastic measures (as in the Thatcherite practices of the 1980s), the introduction of the satellite television and the paid-global football broadcasts, the neo-liberal tendency reaching its climax in many

13 Diarmuid Lavery, interview with David Mellor, “*The Explosive 80s – How Heysel Changed the World*”, documentary aired on RTE1 (Ireland) and Channel 4 (UK), Double Band Films, 2005.

14 *Milliyet*, 1 February 1985.

countries (Thatcher and Özal were notable examples of politicians following this trend, as well as Ronald Reagan, who had an influence on both) shaped this period as the second wave in the “bourgeoisification” of football. Thus, the late 1970s and the 1980s as a whole constitute the main focus of this work. The political and social events of the era in England and Turkey and how they affected football will be discussed.

Consequently, the reactions of the football fans against the wave will be sought.

Coming back to the initial matter, it is evident that football is a sport embraced by the lower classes of society. If football fandom as an act (which requires labour, to jump and sing for ninety minutes under the rain in an open terrace), moreover, if it is an act that qualifies as a lower class “appearance” as Kaschuba says, then should the liberalization or hyper-commodification of football not cause a negative reaction from the fans? If it should or it does, would this qualify as a class struggle? Could a class with no consciousness pursue such a struggle? The answers to these questions will be sought in the post-1990 fandom experiences of Turkish and English football fans.

It requires a serious deal of background information to be able to comprehend football fans' behaviours. While the actions of fandom may seem chaotic and causeless to a neutral observer, most of them contain codes that are conveyed by the political and social histories of their clubs, their environments and themselves. Therefore, elaborate effort will be given to present sufficient information regarding the subject. To be able to understand the clubs' identities or the lack of identities, it is important to know how football clubs were born and how they became popular. In this case, it is crucial to know working-class or lower class involvement in the early years of the game. From the 1970s onwards, the socio-political climate was erratic and the lower classes were very mobile.

Thus, any social and political change could be effective on football fandom. For these decades, it is essential to provide such background information. Throughout this work, causality will be sought along with ways to understand how and why football fandom changed.

While this work does not aim to be an example of “history from below” per se, it may act as a socio-historical framework for any scholar who wishes to focus on fans' behaviours from the 1970s thoroughly. In Turkey, the academic works on football fandom generally consider it either as a criminal matter or a group of consumers. In either way, their fan identity often is discarded and their behaviours remain in focus. In the international academic world, especially in the United Kingdom, a similar tendency followed by the aforementioned scholars has recently been broken by the attempts of scholars, who are also football fans, such as long-time Liverpool FC supporter Rex Nash, Manchester United “home and away” fan Adam Brown, Northampton Town FC activist Brian Lomax and many others. The names of Tanıl Bora, Berkay Aydın, Duygu Hatipoğlu, Barış Karacasu (among others) also should be mentioned as they have contributed to the history of fandom in popular level, as people who come from the terraces. This MA work aims to contribute to these global and local scholars' efforts and help other football fan scholars who aim to write their own histories of the stands.

CHAPTER TWO

A CONCISE HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL IN THE WORLD AND IN TURKEY

The History of Pre-Football Ball Kicking Games

The Association football, commonly known as “football,” has dominated most of the world since the mid nineteenth century. However, the history of ball kicking-carrying games, named “football” or not, goes back to antique eras in various parts of the world.

One of the earliest examples of ball games in history dates the third century BC, the Greek and Roman antiquity. The passages that appear in Antique era plays about a game called *harpastum* (“interception” in Latin) or *phaininda* (“to pretend” in Greek) show that there was a game where the objective was carrying and intercepting a ball¹⁵; however the similarity of this game to association football or any other modern game called “football” is obscure. While Marindin cites Marquardt's claims that the ball may have been kicked in those games, he states there is no credible evidence on this matter.¹⁶ Equally, Guilianotti underlines that doubts remain on the proximity of those games to

15 George Eden Marindin, “The Game of 'Harpastum' or 'Pheninda',” *The Classical Review* 4, no. 4 (April 1890), pp. 145.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 146.

the football of today.¹⁷ However, this game was considered as an antecedent of football in the 1920s and the 1930s by some Greek-Roman researchers such as R.W. Moore.¹⁸ This sort of games, described as being played by players on horseback and on foot along with a golf ball-sized ball is obviously not what modern football was modelled on, but we may also accept that possession and interception of the ball is a very vital element of football games.

Another example of antique ball games was played in East Asia in the third century BC and requires much less divergence on its similarities with football. *Tsu chu* (literally “kick ball”) is a game played with a leather ball and bamboo goals, notably in Japan and China.¹⁹ FIFA, the governing body of association football today also recognizes this games as “the very earliest form of the game for which there is scientific evidence...”²⁰ The Turkic game *tepük* (meaning “kick” in Ancient Turkish) is quite probably a derivative of this game.

The closest games to the modern football may be the *soule* (the name is derived from the ball with which the game was played) in France and *calcio* (a word still used for football in Italian) in Italy. These games have affinities with the early folkloric forms of British football; however as Dunning and Sheard argue it would be far-fetched to claim that the association football (also rugby) was derived from soule or calcio. These games may have had an influence on British folk football, however colonial Britain also

17 Richard Guilianotti, *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 1.

18 R. W. Moore, “Correspondence,” *Greece & Rome* 1, no. 2 (February 1932), pp. 118-119.

19 Thomas Reilly, “Science and Football: A History and an Update,” *Science and Football V: The Proceedings of the 5th World Congress on Science and Football*, p. 3.

20 FIFA. np. *History of Football: the Origins*. Available [online]: <http://www.fifa.com/classicfootball/history/game/historygame1.html> [06 October 2009].

could have adapted elements of Asian games.²¹ It is impossible to determine to what extent the modern football was influenced by any of these games.

History of Pre-football Ball Games in Turkic Communities

Given that they were groups living in and migrating from Central Asia in the Antique era, it is possible to find the traces of ball games in early Turkic communities as much as in China, Taiwan or Korea. However, the connection between these games and association football is as questionable as its coevals. For now, it must suffice to give some examples of these games and see how these games are described and interpreted as predecessors of association football in the Turkish nationalist historiography in the following pages.

The earliest evidence of a ball game in Turkic communities can be found in *Divan-ı Lugat-it Turk* (the Great Turkish Dictionary), the encyclopedic work of Kaşgarlı Mahmut written in 1072-74. In this book, a game called *tepiik* is described as a game of juggling some sort of ball made of goat or lamb organs filled with air. However, the details of the game are unknown and it is claimed that this game might have been similar to modern badminton rather than football.²² Indeed, this game may also be a derivative of the Asian foot-volley game *sepak takraw* (kick volleyball), which is rather unknown to Turkish sports historians.

Equally, *Hitay-ı Nâme* (The Book of Hitay) by the Iranian traveller Seyyid Ali Ekber describes a ball game played in the region of Hitay, northern China of today. He

21 Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players: A Sociological Study of the Development of Rugby Football* (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 5.

22 Sebahattin Devecioğlu, *Futbolun Tarihsel Gelişimi*, available [online]: http://perweb.firat.edu.tr/personel/yayinlar/fua_9/9_31782.pdf [06 October 2009].

says:

...and the ball game is for beautiful and crowds play that frequently. They make a ball from neat intestines and they make men and women stand. And they hit the ball with their feet. You should not touch the ball with your hand and make it fall to the ground and touch the ball with gentle foot. It is forbidden to kick with thighs and illegally, make it fall and kick out of the circle.²³

Evidently, it is possible to read this passage as if it were an early form of football. However, the fact that Ali Ekber emphasizes that it is forbidden to make the ball bounce from the ground reinforces our estimation that this ball game is much closer to sepak takraw than it is to association football. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the similarities between this game (and other Middle-East Asian ball games) and football derivatives. Modern football was invented after the age of discoveries and it is strongly possible that it was inspired by some Asian ball game. But still, it is utterly far fetched to claim that football was invented by Asian communities. Association football, as it is, is an invention of modern times as we described previously.

Another quotation of tepük game can be found in *Tarih-i Timur* (Timur's History). In this book the game is described similarly as in Ali Ekber's. It is claimed that Timur (commonly known as Tamerlane in the West) made his soldiers play this game in fourteenth century to improve their agility²⁴. This may be more evidence of the estimation as agility in association football is an asset but not a necessity, unlike in sepak takraw where it is absolutely essential to have agility to keep the ball flying.

23 Atif Kahraman, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Spor* (Sports in Ottoman State), (Ankara: TC Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları Başvuru Kitapları Dizisi 27, 1995), pp.622 "... *Ve tob oyunun/Hıtay'da güzeller işidir ve dahi harabaniler çok oynar/ ve sığır kursağından tob düzmüşler, mahub ve mahubeler durdurmuşlar ve tobi ayaklarıyla ururlar. Şöyle ki; elini/ ol topa deđdirmeye ve ol tobu yere düşürmiye ve nazik // ayak ucuyle dürde saklarlar ve usulsüz vurmak ve tobu yere düşürmek ve dayireden taşra çıkarmak vaki' olmaz...*"

24 *Türk Futbol Tarihi 1-2* (Turkish Football History) (İstanbul: Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu Yayınları, 2003), pp.5-6.

In Turkish sports history resources, another ball game called *tomak* (wooden ball) is mentioned frequently. Whereas the roots of and the first time this game was played are unknown, the first trace of this game goes back to eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. This team game, which was supposedly a popular form of entertainment for the sultans, was played with mace-like clubs with a fist-sized ball made of felt attached to their tips.²⁵ The purpose of the game was to hit the opponents' backs with these clubs. From the written and graphical descriptions of *tomak*, one may easily assess that it can hardly qualify as a ball game and it has almost no meaning relevance to association football other than the fact that it was played between teams. Thus, it is hard to claim that there is an evidence of a ball game in Ottoman history until the British brought the first football to the Empire.

The broken link of centuries between *tepük* and association football in Turkish history leads us to the conclusion that even though Turkic communities may have played a derivative of the Chinese game *tsu chu* in the Hitay region, this game did not come to Anatolia along with the Turks who migrated from Middle Asia. Football-like games like *tepük* or *tsu chu* may have been popular in Central Asia throughout centuries among different Asian communities including Turkic one, but it was not a major part of Turkic leisure culture unlike other games, such as the horse game *cirit* or archery, which survived the migration and reached Anatolia. Evidence supporting this estimation is the fact that while *tepük* was being played in the era of Timur in Central Asia, there is no trace of a similar game in Anatolia in the same period.

25 Kahraman, p.618.

The Birth and Expansion of Association Football

Whereas the exact origins of the association football remain unknown, this obvious derivative of many other games played with a round or oval-shaped ball reached its actual status, distinguished from rugby football in 1863 with the foundation of the Football Association in England. Association football expanded to other parts of the British Isles in two decades; the Scottish Football Association, the Football Association of Wales and the Irish Football Association were found in seven years' time, respectively in 1873, 1875, 1880. International football fixtures between British nations began much earlier than these official bodies. The first international football game between England and Scotland in 1872 was played before Scottish Football Association was founded and Queen's Park team represented Scotland as a national team.²⁶ This shows that in most countries football has a history long before official organizations were founded.

The fact that association football reached its maturity in Britain, which was the heart of modernism and the industrial revolution in that era, ensured its rapid expansion all over the world, almost anywhere British merchants could reach. The first football associations to appear outside the British Isles were either founded directly by the British or by the local sports enthusiasts who had connections with the British Isles. The first football association outside Britain was founded in the Netherlands (1895); the first footballers of the country evidently were influenced by the sports culture in England

²⁶ Dr. Wilfried Gerhardt, 1979. *More Than 2000 Years of Football*. Available [online]:http://www.soccer-training-info.com/history_of_soccer.asp [07 May 2009].

where they had their studies.²⁷ Equally, the home of the second oldest European football association (founded in 1899), Denmark owed its first meeting with the game to the British residents in the country.²⁸ The colonial characteristics of Britain and its commercial activities overseas also helped football to expand throughout the world.

A Century of Association Football in Modern Turkey

(1875-1975)

Association Football in the Ottoman Empire

Non-Muslim Communities Playing Football in the Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman Empire, the expansion of association football had a similar process as those of the vast majority of other nations. The empire's port cities, such as Thessaloniki, Izmir and Alexandria, had commercial connections with the British. It was should be no a surprise that the first known football game in Ottoman territories was played in Thessaloniki in 1875 by some British residents of the city.²⁹

Even though the date of the first ever football match in Anatolia remains unknown, it can be said that football was being played in Western Anatolia, notably in Izmir, starting from the 1870s. Whereas football matches had been arranged in

27 Maarten van Bottenburg, "Het bruine monster en de 'king of sports' . De uiteenlopende populariteit van voetbal en cricket in Nederland, 1870-1930" (The Brown Monster and the 'King of Sports' The wide popularity of football and cricket in the Netherlands, 1870-1930), *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 9, no.2 (Amsterdam: 1992), p. 4.

28 Danish Football Federation Web Site. np. *Fodboldens Danmarks-historie*, available [online]: <http://www.dbu.dk/page.aspx?id=2301> [07 May 2009].

29 Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, *Bizim İçin Oyna: Türkiye'de Futbol ve Siyaset* (Play for Us: Football and politics in Turkey) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), p.23.

Thessaloniki years before they were on the Anatolian peninsula, it is known that Bornova meadow in Izmir was probably the first place to host a football game in the region.³⁰ English residents of the city were the pioneers of the game, and Anatolian Greeks were the first indigenous community to play football by founding clubs. At the time, the Greek community of western Anatolia, inspired by the Hellenic Kingdom founded in Greece in 1826, were in the process of discovering their national identity. The main axes of the Hellenic enlightenment project were linguistics and antique Hellenic culture.³¹ In this context, cultural clubs for Greek community were founded in various cities of Anatolia, especially in Izmir³². *Ορφέας-Orfeas* (the Orpheus), founded in 1890, mainly focused on musical domain. Even though the functions of Orfeas were exclusive to cultural domains, this club gave birth to two sports clubs, *Apollon* and *Gymnasio* (later *Panionios*).³³

Apollon, the first sports exclusive club, was founded in 1891 by Smyranean Archbishop Chrysostomos and another important character of the city, businessman Emmanuel Samios.³⁴ Here, it should be noted that the first Greek sports club in Anatolia was formed within a cultural club which was a part of the Hellenic national movement, and also the initiative for founding this club came from the Orthodox Greek religious leader of the region. Bearing in mind that there had been long-lasting tension between the bourgeois-based national Hellenic movement and the church regarding the leadership

30 *Türkiye Futbol Tarihi 1-2*, p.8.

31 Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1994), pp. 46-47.

32 Gülbadi Alan, "Protestan Amerikan Misyonerleri, Anadolu'daki Rumlar ve Pontus Meselesi", *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 10, (2001), p. 199.

33 *Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού* (Hellenic World Encyclopaedia), s.v. "Σύλλογος "Απόλλων," Σμύρνη" (Apollon Izmir Club), "Σύλλογος "Πανιώνιος Γυμναστικός Σύλλογος," Σμύρνη" (Panionios Sports Club Izmir).

34 *Μεγάλη διαδικτυακή εγκυκλοπαίδεια της Μικράς Ασίας* (The Great Encyclopedia of Asia Minor), s.v. "Σύλλογος "Απόλλων" Σμύρνη" (Apollon Izmir Club).

of Greek nationalism since the early 1800s,³⁵ it is interesting that both parties showed interest in founding a football club. This may show that both parties, disregarding their conflict, agreed on the necessity of a sports club for gathering the masses at a popular event.

An important turning point in the sports history of Anatolia was the Panionian Games. Panionian Games, as the name shows, aimed to gather the Hellenic athletes of western Anatolia in an Olympic-like competition. These games were first organized in 1896 by the Gimnasio club, probably inspired by the Tinia games in which Smyranean athletes had competed a year ago³⁶. This club later changed its name to Panionios (Panionian in Greek) and had a great rivalry with Apollon in Izmir.

In 1898, newly-founded Panionios club took over the control of the Panionian Games. In 1904, the club published new regulations, adopted the international sports system for measuring distances and athletes from Greece started to enter competitions.³⁷ The same year, the Apollon club also started its own competition, called the Apollonian Games, in 6000-seated Apollo Stadium in Bornova (Izmir). This event included a parade from Basmane to Bella Vista (Belle Vue).³⁸ Both the Panionian and Apollonian Games attracted competitors from Istanbul, Anatolia and Greece.

The competitors included foreigners as well as Greek athletes; however, Turkish athletes never participated in any of the games.³⁹ This fact can be explained by two

35 Millas, p.154.

36 Ίδρυμα Μείζονος Ελληνισμού (Foundation of the Hellenic World), “Ελληνικός Αθλητισμός μέσα από τους πρωταγωνιστές του”, *Πανιώνιος και Απόλλωνας Σμύρνης*. (Greek Sports within the competitions of Panionios and Apollon Izmir) Available [online] <http://www2.fhw.gr/olympics/modern/gr/greek/g407.html> [07 May 2009].

37 *ibid.*

38 *Μεγάλη διαδικτυακή εγκυκλοπαίδεια της Μικράς Ασίας (The Great Encyclopedia of Asia Minor)*, s.v “Σύλλογος “Απόλλων” Σμύρνη” (*Apollon Izmir Club*)

39 Christos Solomonidis, *Της Σμύρνης* (About Izmir) (Athens 1957), p. 172.

arguments: both the Panionian and Apollonian Games enjoyed their most successful periods in the Hamidian era when Turkish athletes did sports in a clandestine manner (whereas the Panionian and Apollonian Games were organized under the supervision of Kamil Pasha, the governor of Izmir⁴⁰), and after the Second Constitution (*II. Meşrutiyet*) it took time for Turkish athletes to prepare for competitions. It is obvious that both the Panionian and Apollonian Games have Greek nationalist characteristics; however Turkish football teams played many times against Greek teams, so it is doubtful that the character of the competitions kept Turkish athletes away from these games.

The Apollonian and Panionian Games were organized on periodical base until the 1910s. With the start of Turkish-Greek clashes, especially the Panionian Games were repeatedly cancelled. The last games to be arranged by Greek foundations in western Anatolia were the Panionian Games of 1921. With the end of the Turkish Independence War with the Asia Minor disaster for the Greek army, the Lausanne Treaty urged a compulsory population exchange and the Greek-Orthodox population of Anatolia was forced to immigrate to Greece. Starting from 1923, the Panionian Games were held in Athens, but lacked popularity.⁴¹ The sportive activities of remaining Greeks in Turkey were muted, mainly confined to individual successes and minority clubs.

In 1894, English youth formed a sports club called the Bournabat Football and Rugby Club. During the Hamidian era, in Izmir and later in Istanbul, the English, along with non-Muslim communities of Anatolia such as Greeks and Armenians, hold the pioneership of football. Here, it should be remembered that England was the country

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ Ίδρυμα Μείζονος Ελληνισμού (Foundation of the Hellenic World), *Πανιώνιοι Αγώνες*, available [online]: <http://www2.fhw.gr/olympics/modern/gr/greek/g305.html> [10 May 2009].

which arranged the first football cup based on elimination in 1871. At that time, football was on the verge of institutionalization in England, and the football players who came to Anatolia from that country were far more advanced than indigenous footballers in terms of technical and tactical skills and also equipment. In the 1890s, English teams from Izmir competed against English teams from Bornova and also against teams of English battleships berthed in Izmir port.⁴²

Izmir, pioneering the sports activities -including football- in Anatolia, also influenced Istanbul in the last years of the nineteenth century. In 1897, a selection of Izmir footballers visited Istanbul to play a match against a selection from the capital; the following years these two teams played two more matches, this time in Izmir.⁴³ Both teams were selected from English residents and Greek football enthusiasts, neither had Turkish or other Muslim players. All matches were won by Smyrneans.

The First Involvement of the Ottoman Turks in Association Football

Whereas Izmir was the pioneer city of association football in Anatolian, the first contacts of Ottoman Turks with the game mostly happened in the capital city, Istanbul. At first glance, it seems illogical that Turks could play football in Istanbul, long before Izmir and other port cities considering that the Stambulite Turks were subject to the harsh restrictions of the Hamidian Era much more than the Smyrneans and football was not as widespread in Istanbul as it was in Izmir. However, when the fact that football was imported to Turkey and played first by British merchants is taken into account, it is clear

42 Günver Güneş, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 19. Yüzyıldan 20. Yüzyıla... Izmir'de Futbol" (Football in Ottoman Izmir from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century), *Toplumsal Tarih* no.142 (October 2005), p. 68.

43 Gökaçtı, p. 24.

that football could only reach a certain elite among Ottoman Turks as it required personal or professional contacts with the British and the knowledge of the English language. In that period, such Turkish elite was virtually non-existent in Izmir, as most Smyranean Turks dealt with agriculture and commercial activities were generally run by the Greeks and other non-Muslim communities in the city. Hence the contact of Turks in Izmir with the British was limited. Some Turks, notably the students of Izmir American College in the 1900s, attempted to play football for their school teams, but they were suspended from their schools owing to pressure from local officials⁴⁴.

In Istanbul, association football started much later than in Izmir and Thessaloniki; however, it evolved more rapidly in terms of organization. This can be explained by the fact that before football appeared Izmir and Thessaloniki had strong sports communities. Hence, when football came to these cities, it was included in local sports organizations (such as Panionian and Apollonian Games) and it was governed in the way the other sports branches were. This meant that although the British were the ones to bring football to those cities, they were unable to establish the system under which the football was played under in the British Isles. The local sports organization perception was competition-based, possibly carried over from very early Greek traditions, and the league concept was unknown. Nevertheless, James Lafontaine, one of the British pioneers of football in Izmir, still managed to set up a league system in Izmir before he left for Istanbul in 1899 and this league system remained in force until the Republican period.⁴⁵

44 Günver Güneş, *ibid.*

45 *Ibid.*

Lafontaine, along with Horace Armitage, succeeded in establishing a better-organized league in Istanbul. The conditions in Istanbul were more suitable for the British to set up a brand-new tournament scheme; thus, the first Constantinople Football League was begun just one year after the foundation of the first Istanbul football club *Cadi-Keu (Kadıköy)*, whereas it took almost two decades for a league to start in Izmir. Cadi-Keu was founded by these two men with the participation of the local Greek youth; it was followed by teams called Moda, Elpis, Imogene and others⁴⁶.

The Constantinople Football League started in 1903, with the participation of these four teams. The winner of the first league was Imogene, the team of the British Embassy's boat. The team was given a shield, imported from England by Armitage and funded by participation fees of 27 *kuruş* for each player⁴⁷. It was planned that the shield would be permanently awarded to the team that had the most titles in ten years.

The Hamidian *istibdat* (despotism) conditions in Istanbul at the era, kept Istanbul Turks off the football field officially. However, even though they were unable to join the league at first, the Turkish youth were aware of football. The first attempts to form a Turkish football team occurred to even before the start of the league.

As is in British and other non-Muslim clubs, the first plans for a Turkish football team came into reality in the Kadıköy-Moda area, on the Anatolian coast of Istanbul. Fuat Hüsnü Bey, the son of Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, managed to acquire a ball thanks to his relations with the British living in Moda.⁴⁸ Later, he suggested to his friend Reşat Bey that they form a team “to smoke out those Greeks and Brits in the fields.”⁴⁹

46 *Türk Futbol Tarihi* 1-2, pp.11.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı, p.27.

That was how the first Turkish team, the “Black Stocking,”⁵⁰ was established after a few clandestine meetings.

The Black Stocking was founded and started training sessions in 1901. On October 26, they arranged a game with a local Greek team. The line-up of the team was composed entirely of Turks, under the leadership of Fuat Hüsni and Reşat.⁵¹ The team lost the game 5-1, Fuat Hüsni scoring the only goal. After the game, the Sultan's detectives launched a raid on the field after the game and most players were taken into custody. Fuat Hüsni Bey was tried in military court (as he was in military school at the time), charged with “wearing the same outfit as Greeks and kicking balls.”⁵² He was given a minor penalty.⁵³ The fact that his father was an admiral no doubt played a role in why he was not more severely punished. He continued to play football later under the nickname “Bobby” and never drew the attention of Ottoman detectives again.⁵⁴ The Black Stocking, however, became history after one game.

Another and relatively less risky attempt to form a Turkish football team came from the *Sultani* (Sultans' school) of Galatasaray, the institute which was founded in 1868 to give modern formation to the palace elite. The school itself was an attempt to reform the Ottoman administration, especially by training a well-educated (mostly Muslim) elite.⁵⁵ For this, a secular school system was set up, mainly based on the French education system. The majority of the academic staff was also French. The students that

50 The name was originally chosen in English.

51 *Türk Futbol Tarihi*, p.10.

52 “...Karşılıklı kaleler kurup, Rumlar'la aynı kıyafetleri lâbis olduğu halde, top endahı ile talim icra etmekte olduklarından...”, *Türk Futbol Tarihi*, p.10.

53 Gökaçtı, pp.28-29.

54 *Türk Futbol Tarihi*, p.11.

55 Galatasaray High School Official Web Site “Galatasaray Lisesi Tarihçesi” (The History of Galatasaray High School). Available [online]: http://www.gsl.gsu.edu.tr/html_tr/000/002.html [01 June 2009].

Sultanî produced quickly learned about modern concepts, including liberty, nationalism and of course, sports. They took courses on modern sports and they were encouraged to practice them.

One of these students, Ali Sami (Yen) was the first one to be influenced by football. Whereas his first attempts to form teams within the school failed, he eventually managed to gather a group that had enough enthusiasm to follow through the principles to found a football club. The team initially avoided using a name, so as to avoid the same difficulties the Black Stocking had had, but they were quickly nicknamed as “the Gentlemen of Galatasaray”⁵⁶. With the participation of Kadıköy player Horace Armitage, they acquired the principles of the game. In 1905, they joined the league, as the first Muslim-Turkish team.

Although Galatasaray's participation in the league happened in the Hamidian era and much before the declaration of the Second Constitution, it should not be considered to have been a move against the Palace, or some attempt at civic resistance. The football team had no political agenda against the Ottoman administration at that time. On the other hand, it is also impossible to claim that the team was founded with the approval of the Ottoman administration. There is no evidence of such an approval; although it is quite probable that the administration simply turned a blind eye to the schoolboys' athletic endeavours. Given the fact that the Black Stocking players had not been approved, but had not been severely punished for playing football, it is logical to claim that the Galatasaray team was not supported by the regime, but rather overlooked. The reason why the Galatasaray players never had to face the enquiries that the Black

⁵⁶ “*Galatasaray Efendileri*”, Gökçağı, p.34.

Stocking players had, may have been the fact that Turkish nationalism was much more popular among Ottoman elite comparing to 1901, and the Hamidian era was reaching its end. Therefore, a team openly competing against non-Muslim teams might not have been viewed as suspicious as before. Of course, bearing in mind the mission and necessity of Galatasaray school at the time, prosecuting the prospective Ottoman elite for some harmless athletic activity might not have been considered a good idea as well.

Although Galatasaray was the first Turkish football club to play in the league, it was far from being public. It is certain that the team attracted a degree of sympathy among Turks with the rise of nationalism, the club mostly kept itself restricted to school members.⁵⁷

The closed-circuit nature of Galatasaray Sports Club, especially after the Second Constitutional Period, which created a relatively more liberal atmosphere, left space for competition. Although it was the first Turkish club to play against the *Gavur* (infidel), a more public team was still destined to come. This team was Fenerbahçe, founded in 1907, but could only become active in 1908, after the Second Constitution was declared. Yet, at this point, it should be noted that even though Fenerbahçe seems to have been more open to the public than Galatasaray, this publicness did not mean a participative structure like in the English football clubs that will be analysed thoroughly later in this thesis. Like Galatasaray, and also Beşiktaş which was founded as a gymnastics club and involved in football much later, Fenerbahçe was equally reserved to a certain elite.

⁵⁷ This situation still shows itself in Galatasaray Sports Club of our times, as the admission criteria for Galatasaray High School (GSL) graduates to the club are very different from those applied for non-graduates. As of June 2009, the membership fee for a GSL-graduate was 600 TL, whereas a regular member had to pay 10,000 TL, which is four times the membership fee of even the family members of GSL-graduates. The GSL principal is also a natural member of the Galatasaray Sports Club Council.

Former Fenerbahçe player and historian Rüştü Dağlaroğlu describes the club founders as, “St. Joseph graduate Nuri Zade Ziya, Ottoman Bank officer Ayetullah -equally a SJ graduate-, Necip (Okaner); a naval student and the nephew of Sami Paşazade Sezai Bey, Hassan Sami (Kocamemi); the son of Bassorah governor Hasan Bey and St. Joseph student “Indian” Asaf...”⁵⁸

As is clearly seen, none of these individuals could be considered to be “ordinary people.” However the difference between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe considering publicness was that Fenerbahçe was open to all elite whereas Galatasaray was more restricted to the Galatasaray school⁵⁹.

As the characteristics of Fenerbahçe allowed outsiders to get involved with the club relatively more easily, it became the centre of attraction for those who would manipulate football's popularity for their political ambitions. Since its appearance in the Ottoman Empire, football had never been out of political context in the first place. Football's competitive nature, combined with the *zeitgeist* of the era, could easily be transformed into ethno-national rivalries. Hence, football proved to be a handy tool with which to reinforce the newly-structured Turkish nationalism.

The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1923): The Football of the Nation

The Committee of Union of Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* - CUP) organization, which pioneered many of the modernist-positivist reforms in the Ottoman

58 Rüştü Dağlaroğlu, *Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü Tarihi: 1907-1957* (History of Fenerbahçe Sports Club: 1907-1957), (Istanbul: n.p, 1957), p. 15.

59 Today, the admission to Fenerbahçe requires 10,000 TL and the recommendation of two members, which renders the membership still restricted to the lower strata of society.

State, also could be considered to be the organization to have led the Turkish nationalism movement. Even though association football was itself a product of modern culture, at first, it did not catch the CUP's attention. The first involvement of the CUP with sports was through gymnastics and scouting. However, whereas these athletic activities that aimed to improve and perfect the human body complied undoubtedly with their positivist ideas, they lacked the vastly popular enthusiasm that football could create. The first attempt of the CUP to permeate a football club involved Galatasaray. Nevertheless, the principal of the time, Tevfik Fikret blocked this attempt as he previously had had a conflict with the organization when the CUP demanded *Tanin*, the newspaper that he ran to be the official CUP paper.⁶⁰ Later, Galatasaray maintained a distant, yet moderate relationship with the organization. Galatasaray probably owed this relationship to having ties with different political actors, which allowed it to avoid coming under patronage of any political entity.

Fenerbahçe, however, had no such insurance. Having joined the league in 1909, the team was unable to compete with Galatasaray at all. In its first season in the league, Fenerbahçe did not have a single win and conceded 11 goals against 4 scored. Galatasaray was the champion with conceding only two goals and scoring 25. The difference between two teams was immense. Galatasaray, indeed, had much more experience than its future rival; however, they also had better financial support. In 1910, Fenerbahçe was in such condition that the club was about to merge with Üsküdar Anadolu club, taking the latter's name.⁶¹ This plan was withdrawn at the last moment.

60 Gökaçtı, p.44.

61 Ibid., p.45.

The fate of the club took a twist with Mustafa Elkatipzade's presidency. The merchant from Kadıköy area, merged Kuşdili Club over which he presided with Fenerbahçe and became its president. During the years he was in power, the Fenerbahçe board, which had been virtually deserted before, underwent a notable change in profile. High-rank members of the CUP, such as Hulûsi Bey (later to be the Minister of Public Works), joined the club board, and Fenerbahçe started to find its way through the administration to obtain real estate. The first club headquarters and the famous boathouse later to be visited by Mustafa Kemal were acquired in this period. With this support, Fenerbahçe also managed to win the Istanbul League three times between 1911 and 1915. Equally, during the First World War, many commodities confiscated from foreigners in Istanbul became club property.⁶² As the CUP rose, so did Fenerbahçe.

However, Fenerbahçe was not the only club that benefited from the CUP reign. Even though the Fenerbahçe club board mainly consisted of high-ranking CUP members, it was not the official club of the party. Some Galatasaray members who disagreed with Tevfik Fikret, led by Aydınoğlu Raşit Bey, formed a club called “Progress” and joined the league in the 1910-11 football season. Eventually, this club was renamed as Altınordu (in accordance with CUP principles, even if Progress was a name representing the CUP, it was not Turkish) in 1914. Altınordu gradually became integrated with Union and Progress and it built a strong rivalry with Fenerbahçe. In the 1916-17 and 1917-18 seasons, Altınordu managed to win consecutively the Friday League and ended Fenerbahçe's reign thanks to seven players transferred from its rival.

While Fenerbahçe and Altınordu had a fierce competition on the field, the rivalry

⁶² Ibid., pp. 48-49.

between these two clubs was far away from being solely football-related. It was not even the support from the CUP to the clubs that was at stake, but the competition of two clubs' board members to be more powerful in the CUP against the other grasp that was based on the rival club. The Altınordu board initially won this battle. During the war, Altınordu players were excluded from military service and the club was not affected by economic difficulties.⁶³ Nevertheless, Altınordu's golden years, which it owed to its close relationship with the Union and Progress organization, was destined to fade. When the CUP had to step down, Altınordu vanished and was absorbed into its once rival, Fenerbahçe.

The reason behind Altınordu's disappearance and Fenerbahçe's ability to remain intact can be found in latter's more balanced relationship with the CUP. While Altınordu instantly had become the party club, Fenerbahçe had kept a guarded distance. It was not a secret that the club had close ties with the organization; however, it remained an independent entity. Thus, its destiny stayed apart from that of the CUP's. Indeed, it also should be taken into account that Fenerbahçe had a history and a certain level of popularity unlike newly-founded Altınordu. However, the main reason Fenerbahçe survived seems to have been the club's ability to follow and adapt itself to political tendencies, just like Galatasaray had done successfully before.

During the war years, the three presidents of the Fenerbahçe club were all high-ranking CUP members; Hulûsi Bey, the Minister of Public Works;; Mehmet Sabri Toprak, the General Secretary of the CUP; and Dr. Nazım Bey, the Minister of Education. However, when the Talat Paşa cabinet was about to resign, this trend ceased

⁶³ Ibid., p. 56.

abruptly and İbnürrefik Ahmet Nuri (Sekizinci) took over the presidency. Ahmet Nuri was a playwright known for his sympathy to the CUP (as he once directed “*Vatan Yahut Silistre*” (Homeland or Silistra) by Namık Kemal in benefit of the organization), his position in the party was incomparable to that of the previous presidents.

The president following Ahmet Nuri was even a more interesting choice: Ömer Faruk Efendi, the son of the last caliph Abdülmecid, who eventually was sent into exile with the Ottoman dynasty in 1924 and died in Cairo. While a new republic was being founded, Fenerbahçe's incumbent president was expelled from the country. This would not be the last problem that Fenerbahçe would have with the early Republican administration. Their imminent, almost organic relations with a certain group within the CUP, led them into a tense period with the founders of the republic, who happened to be on the other side of the inner-party rivalry which had resulted in a political purge within the CUP.

On the other hand, Fenerbahçe, evidently more than its inner city rivals, had an effect on reinforcing the national feelings in the Ottoman capital before and during Turkish Independence War, notably after the occupation of the city. The team played 50 matches against teams composed of occupation force soldiers and won 41 of them. This was more than the total of the matches played by Beşiktaş and Galatasaray against the same opponents at the time. In Turkish sports history writing, the athletic value of these games is either neglected or overrated. The Turkish Football Federation's publication describes these matches as:

Especially in Istanbul, the victories of Turkish teams against military teams associated with occupational forces rendered football a

“national cause” and helped restore the nation's injured pride. That is why football became so popular in our country. Our clubs such as Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray and Beşiktaş gained unforgettable places in the nation's heart thanks to their victories against occupational forces' teams and sewed the first seeds of love that would cover the whole country in the dark days of the Occupation.⁶⁴

This kind of nationalistic tone is no an exception in Turkish sports history writing. It is virtually impossible to find a piece which does not employ a similar discourse. This kind of language shows itself in its most apparent form when the General Harington Cup is narrated. This cup, played in Istanbul in June 1923, was organized by Sir Charles Harington Harington, the commander-in-Chief of the Allied occupation army. This cup, consisting of a single game, matched Fenerbahçe with a selection of men from occupational forces based in Istanbul, and included four professional players. Fenerbahçe won this game 1-0, thanks a goal from Zeki Rıza Sporel, one of the most influential football players of his time.

The nationalistic feeling created around the General Harington Cup and other games against occupational forces' teams cannot be denied. However, the narrative and the athletic value attributed to these games should be questioned. As in Cem Ertuğrul's article, these games are perceived as having been “activities against enemy”.⁶⁵ However, it should be noted that such matches against occupation teams had different political value than those played against local ethnic rival teams or other foreign football teams.

64 “Özellikle İstanbul'da, işgal kuvvetlerine mensup askeri takımlarla yapılan maçlarda Türk takımlarının kazandıkları galibiyetler futbolu bir “millî dava” haline getirmiş ve milletin kuruk gururunu okşayan olaylar olmuştur. İşte bu yüzden futbol ülkemizde çok geniş kitleler tarafından sevilmiş; Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, Beşiktaş gibi kulüplerimizin futbol takımları, işgal kuvvetleri takımları karşısında elde ettikleri zaferlerle milletin gönlünde unutulmaz yerler işgal etmişler ve bugün tüm yurdu kaplayan o büyük sevginin ilk tohumlarını işte Mütareke'nin o karanlık günlerinde atmışlardır.”, *Türk Futbol Tarihi*, p.13.

65 Cem Ertuğrul, “General Harrington Kupası” (General Harrington Cup). Available [online]: <http://www.fenerbahce.org/kurumsal/detay.asp?ContentID=3561> [19 August 2009].

Turkish teams, by accepting challenges from army teams, actually recognized the legitimacy of those forces' existence in Ottoman land. Whereas it is true that these games had an effect on growing national feelings among Istanbul Turks, it is equally valid to claim that the clubs accepted occupational forces as an agency or a counterpart.

In the athletic domain, these games usually are classified as regular football matches. For example, one of the most detailed works on Fenerbahçe, *Fenerbahçe Sports Club History* (Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü Tarihi) by Rüştü Dağlaroğlu, classifies these matches as “Matches of Fenerbahçe against foreign teams,” just like the friendly games played with foreign sports clubs invited to the Ottoman State or to Turkey.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, it is obvious that most of the players on the occupational forces' teams were not football players and only soldiers with some interest in the game. For instance, the General Harrington Cup was played in June 1923, during the Lausanne peace talks. The players of the occupation forces team were soldiers who were on the verge of being dismissed from a five-year long occupation during which they had been deprived of their homes and families. On the other hand, their opponents, Fenerbahçe, were composed of football players who had just clinched the title of Friday League in 1922-23. Before that game, they had played twelve competitive games of which they had won eleven. Thus, in athletic terms, it is impossible and unjust to compare the two opponents and qualify this game as a regular football game.

66 Rüştü Dağlaroğlu, p.115.

The Republican Amateur Era

The Early Republican Period (1923-1933): The First Steps

In one of the most remarkable works in the field of Turkish sports history, Yiğit Akın claims that sports policies in early Republican years present a continuity from the late Ottoman period as the perception of physical education of the CUP shows remarkable similarities with that of the Kemalists',⁶⁷ which was to centralize the sports organization and emphasize the notion of body health rather than competitiveness. This hypothesis can be considered to be true in many examples, however, in football, that may not have been the case. Whereas it is certain that the priority of the new state-controlled Union of Sports Associations was to improve Olympic sports branches other than football, the new republicans were far away from being unaware of how football could be used as a political tool. Inasmuch as football has a very distinctive political context that comes from its vast popularity, the approach towards football differed most of the times from other sports policies.

In early Republican case, the administrative cadre was aware of the unique characteristics of football and its probable political consequences to a great extent. Even if football was not the perfect candidate for the state to promote national body health through, it was destined to be used to announce the existence of the new republic to the world, even to the Turkish public. Thus, it was certainly not a coincidence that the Turkish national football team played its first international fixture (v. Romania) just three

⁶⁷ Yiğit Akın, *Gürbüz ve Yavuz Evlatlar* (Robust and Brave Sons) (Istanbul: İletişim 2004), p.55.

days before the republic was proclaimed on October 26, 1923. As Gökaçtı stresses, the initial reason why football became popular among the Turks was to confront the “foreigners,” and most of the times this popularity was this motivation contained within it.⁶⁸ This could not be negligible for any government. The opening of the first football field in Ankara, “Independence Field” (*İstiklâl Sahası*) and the foundation of the National Guards' Club Muhafızgücü in the first days of the new state proved that the administration did not aim to overlook football, but to control it by its own actors. Partly because of this control policy, but also for other reasons, the relationship between the republican cadre and the other actors of the football scene were about to become tense.

Fenerbahçe, known as a CUP-backed team, was the first football club to confront the new ruling elite. The source of the problem was an ordinary matter, a disputed penalty decision and dismissal of a player by the referee in a Fenerbahçe-Galatasaray match played on the August 15, 1924. However, when Fenerbahçe withdrew from the 1924-1925 football season and froze its affiliation with the newly-founded Turkish Football Federation (TFF), the conflict spilled off the field. The club also refused to give its players to the national team for a match against the Soviet Union. Fenerbahçe's strong protest threatened to put the new federation's legitimacy into jeopardy. This conflict was resolved one season later and Fenerbahçe rejoined the league and its players rejoined the national team; however, the club had to face some complications of its protest. The club was not officially sanctioned by the federation or the state. During the time Fenerbahçe abstained from the football scene, Galatasaray, which already had members among the republican cadre, improved its relationship with the state. The TFF president Yusuf Ziya

68 Gökaçtı, p.89.

Öniş was a Galatasaray High School graduate and during his reign, English trainer Billy Hunter who was invited to coach the national team for the 1924 Olympic Games, became the Galatasaray trainer.⁶⁹ This led Galatasaray to win four consecutive titles in the league between 1925-29.

Whereas the governing body of national football showed a certain sympathy towards Galatasaray through the second half of the 1920s, the administration generally chose not to lose impartiality for one of the teams. This had a simple logic: the actors of the football scene, including Galatasaray, which seemed to be the closest to the state, were still beyond the control of the football federation and other sports bodies. They were older than the Republic, they were more popular than any official in the federation could be and an open confrontation with these clubs could result in serious damage to the image of the unifying republic. Hence, the federation chose to control the clubs, instead of confronting them.

The most essential need of the clubs were stadiums, given the fact that the first fields in Istanbul belonged to foreigners. After the liberation of Istanbul from the occupation, Taksim Stadium was nationalized and eventually its administration was yielded to Galatasaray. Fenerbahçe acquired its own stadium, thanks to a motion given by Şükrü Saracoğlu (later to be the prime minister and the Fenerbahçe president) proposing “in case there are more than one football clubs in one neighbourhood, only the one with the most number of members could pursue its existence”⁷⁰ in 1929.

69 Cem Atabeyoğlu, *1453-1991 Türk Spor Tarihi Ansiklopedisi* (1453-1991 Turkish Sports History Encyclopedia), Istanbul (Fotospor 1991), p.95.

70 “Aynı semtte kurulmuş olan ve faaliyet gösteren spor kulüplerinin sayısı birden fazla ise, o semtte üye sayısı daha fazla olan kulüp faaliyetine devam eder”, available [online] <http://www.fenerbahce.org/kurumsaldetay.asp?ContentID=25>.

According to the accepted motion, İttihatspor, which was known as the club of the former CUP cadre, was closed down and its stadium was yielded to Fenerbahçe, and was renamed Fenerbahçe Stadium.⁷¹ The third biggest club, Beşiktaş, also had the chance to have its own stadium, when it acquired the burned down backyard of the Çırağan Palace in Ortaköy. These events established a close relationship between the state and the most popular football clubs. The state's support in the stadiums matter later led to the parliament members joining the high ranks of these clubs. The clubs realized that having politicians close to the government on their boards would help them gain certain advantages. Furthermore, not having those members would leave them short-handed against their rivals and this rendered politicians on club boards even more crucial. The popular clubs were under some sort of state protectorate and this would continue as a reality of the game in Turkey for decades.⁷²

Single-Party Ruling (1933-1945): State versus Football

Whereas the government started to acquire certain power over the clubs in the 1930s, it was still far from its final objective. The single-party regime, perhaps influenced by Nazi Germany, aimed to control and dictate all sports activities throughout the country. The motive behind this objective depended on the cultural agenda the state pursued throughout the 1930s. One of the major targets of the new republic was to prove that Turks was not inferior to Western civilizations, if not superior to them. In order to

⁷¹ Gökaçtı, pp.99-100.

⁷² By 1938, Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu was Fenerbahçe president and Beşiktaş was presided by one of the major ideologues of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP), Recep Peker. Galatasaray which did not have a high-rank CHP member president at the time was suffering from the breakaway of Güneş which contained many high ranking officials of the party.

reach this goal, two principal theories were constructed: the Turkish History Thesis which hypothesized that Turks were the ancestors of modern civilizations, and the Sun-Language Theory, which claimed that all languages were derivatives of one initial language, to which Turkish language is the closest. With these two theses, the new republic aimed to show that Turks were not outsiders to Western culture, but the creators of it. This obviously required taking hold of the modern sports. Turks, who were supposed to have created the entire modern culture according to those two pseudo-scientific theories, could not fail at modern sports. All sports organizations had to be restructured accordingly.

In order to reach its goals in sports domain, the Turkish state requested help from another state with a similar cultural agenda, which is Germany. To determine the structural, organizational and methodical paths to follow, Carl Diem, the German member of the International Olympic Committee (and later the sports minister of the Nazi government), and Hermann Altröck, a professor at Leipzig University were invited to Turkey in 1933.⁷³ These two invitees proposed a youth organization similar to the Youth (*Jugend*) in Germany and that a state-controlled sports authority be founded. The Turkish Sports Organization (*Türk Spor Kurumu*) directly affiliated with the single-party was founded in 1936 and all sports people and clubs in the country were members of this organization, hence of the party.⁷⁴

Football did not seem very compatible with this scheme, even when the clubs were relatively under state control. The state was planning a popular sports environment

73 Yiğit Akın (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute 2003), p.58.

74 Gökaçtı, p.111.

which aimed to reinforce national cohesion and citizens' attachment to the state itself. Any other deep sense of affiliation to another organization would disrupt this attempt. Besides, there was an immense rivalry between football teams, which was perceived to damage the national unity. Football teams were useful regarding international representation and rivalry when playing against foreign teams, but within the country they were quite problematic. Hence, the sports organization acted usually severely against the football clubs when their rivalries crossed the line. The punishments varied from open criticism (usually against the big clubs, which could not afford to be perceived as “the club against the state”) to abolition.

Here, it is useful to take a look at how Nazi Germany, the inspiration for the entire Turkish sports organization, dealt with the same threat. In the Nazi era, Schalke 04, a football club from Gelsenkirchen, also known as the “Miners' Club” was perceived to be the *de facto* state-supported club. The team contained most of the stars in the country and was already popular before it acquired Nazi support. It was the success symbol that the Nazis sought, and it could divert the fans' attention from the failing German national team. The fact that it was a labour team also could prove the Nazi regime supported German workers.⁷⁵ The state just took Schalke's popularity, combined it with its own populism and spread it throughout the country. However, even the Nazi support could not prevent the Austrian team Rapid Vienna, which was forced to play in the German League after the *Anschluss* from triumphing over Schalke in Berlin (the team played most of its matches in the capital during the Nazi years) and became the

⁷⁵ Wolfram Pyta, “German Football: A Cultural History,” *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, edited by Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (London-New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.8-9.

German champions in 1940-41. Football was too improbable to be employed as a fully effective propaganda tool, even for the Nazi propaganda machine.

Like Nazi Germany, also the Kemalist state attempted to give full support to a single club. The Ateş-Güneş club (literally Fire-Sun in English), which was named by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself referring to the Turkish cultural theories, was founded by former Galatasaray members led by Yusuf Ziya Öniş as a breakaway club from latter. The club gathered its first congress in the People's Party Beyoğlu Branch, and Cevat Abbas Gürer, who was a very close of friend of Mustafa Kemal was elected to the presidency.⁷⁶ Cevat Abbas Gürer was also known by his works attempting to prove the words like “sports,” “sportman,” “athlete” and “athleticism” were of Turkish-origin according to the Sun-Language Theory.⁷⁷ *Ateş-Güneş*, later to be renamed *Güneş*, was taken to the First Division of Istanbul in 1935. The club had a merger with Kumkapı Club which actually had relegated that season from the Second Division, however the merged club was given permission to play in the First Division whereas it was supposed to play in the lower division. The team managed to clinch the title in 1937-38 season thanks to a disputed goal difference rule declared after the matches were played. It could not, however, succeed in becoming a popular club and dissolved its football branch shortly before Mustafa Kemal died in 1938. The club abolished itself completely in 1940.

A comparison between short-lived *Güneş* and still-existing Schalke 04 can be fruitful in order to capture the unique characteristics of Turkish football. In Germany,

76 Gökaçtı, pp.126-127.

77 Yiğit Akın (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute 2003), p.60.

Schalke, founded in 1904, had a history as a labour club long before the Nazi party even existed. The German state took over an already popular and successful club, whereas the Kemalist founded one from scratch. Another major difference is that Schalke was hardly contested in Germany before Nazis gave support to this team, while Güneş was born in the middle of a fierce rivalry with Galatasaray. Güneş initially aimed to make Galatasaray collapse and become the new Galatasaray itself.⁷⁸ However, Galatasaray was still strong both on and off the field and posed serious problems to Güneş starting from the first day. Even if Güneş had succeeded to overcome these difficulties, they would have the same problems with Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş later.

Furthermore, Schalke was a labour club in a country with a history of class consciousness. In Turkey, there were not such definite classes and clubs founded by bureaucrats did not differ from each other regarding identity. A factory worker in Berlin had a reason to support Schalke even though it was from another city, but a Galatasaray fan in Istanbul had no reason to change his/her affiliation. Decades later, İstanbulspor in the 1990s had a similar problem about gaining popularity. The blurred identities of football clubs in Turkey have always left the choice of the favourite club to random factors, which may at most slightly affected by the others members in the family or the place of residence/birth. The identities of Turkish football clubs will be examined thoroughly later in comparison with English football clubs below.

In the 1940s, Turkish football, just like the country itself, loosed its ties with Germany and adopted a more liberal approach. Turkey, having passed the Second World War period as a transition period between Republican People's Party's unquestionable

⁷⁸ Gökaçtı, pp.122-124.

governance and multi-party democracy, found itself in a different international conjuncture right after the war. It can be claimed that this conjuncture even forced Turkey to end its internal crisis and take a position in the new world order. Even in the very last days of the war, the Turkish state could not position itself in regard to the upcoming balance of powers. Up to that point, Turkey had the agenda of survival, while it struggled to be present, it could not have a stance on how and where to be present. On the other hand, as Zürcher states, the new Turkish regime during the World War failed to popularize itself, moreover the post-Mustafa Kemal administration was rather greeted with resentment.⁷⁹ The feeling of survival left its place to a regime crisis regarding both administration and masses.

The major axes of this crisis can be summarized as the elite administration and the masses. However, it should be underlined that war-time regulations such as "*Varlık Vergisi*" (Wealth Tax) and "*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*" (Land Reform Law) caused a rupture with the state bureaucracy, the Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie and the rural land owners, who had been in a coalition of Turkish modernization up to that point.⁸⁰ The single-party administration was deprived of public support, more than ever.

In the international domain, Turkey had to choose its side in the new world order. The first years of the new Turkish Republic witnessed a balanced foreign policy, however the conjuncture on which this policy was committed no longer existed. The German state, which had loosely inspired the Republican administration in the post-Kemal period, was doomed with the defeat of the Nazi regime. The Soviet Union, with

⁷⁹ Eric Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: IB Tauris, 2005), p.206.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 207-208.

whom Turkey had always had good relations, left out its internationalist foreign policy with the Stalin administration and rejected the renewal of Ribbentrop-Molotov security pact with Turkey. Internally chaotic Turkey did not dare to stay out of the new world order on the international domain. It needed American aid in economic and military fields. To benefit from the Marshall Plan, democratization was of paramount importance.

These factors had an effect on the football realm as well. Actually, football was having its own transitional period in the 1930's. The game was discovered to have commercial value, so it became a part of the economical system. Besides, this factor also encouraged football clubs to expand their visions to international field, to make more money, clubs were eager to have international fixtures as much as possible. We should underline that this was not a trend unique to Turkey, but rather a worldwide phenomenon. However, the transition of Turkish football clubs in the era solely stayed in the international and economic domain. The fact that almost all of the big Istanbul clubs were administrated by high ranking officials of the Republican People's Party prevented this transition to lead to an internal revolution in the 1930s.

In the first years of the new republic, despite the state's will, football gained popularity in the cities. In Istanbul, especially Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe succeeded in having loyal fan bases. Latecomer Beşiktaş joined them in the 1930s.

Starting from the 1930s, the gate receipts became an immense revenue for the clubs. The need to have the best team in order to achieve the maximum attendance was considered to be essential. Football had surpassed the amateur level and now had an economic value. Thus, like many other sectors in Turkey, it had to meet free market principles. To be able to achieve the maximum revenue possible, clubs had to offer the

best product, in other words, they had to form the best team possible. Indeed, this was where professionalism in football became inevitable. To able to form the best team, a club had to offer the best players more than its rivals offer. However, clubs were not entitled to offer any transfer fee to the players in amateurship. Thus, in the late 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, Turkish football passed through years of "hidden professionalism."

In this epoch, the players were paid secretly and the source of this payment was generally provided by a rich fan of the club. Cem Atabeyođlu describes this period in Fenerbahçe as follows: "Ali Bey (Muhittin Hacı Bekir, Fenerbahçe president in 1950-51)) used to come to the training field earlier than all the players in the first training day of the month ...open the lockers one by one, ...and put envelopes in them."⁸¹

From this, it is understood that, Ali Muhittin Hacı Bekir oversaw some sort of equity among the players in order to preserve the harmony of the team. On the other hand, not only does this not prove that all of the clubs had the equal payment principle, but also it points to an evident violation of amateurship.

In order to overcome "hidden professionalism," General Directorate of Physical Education (*Beden Terbiyesi Genel Müdürlüğü - BTGM*) promulgated the Code of Amateurship in 1941. According to this code, amateur athletes were not able to receive more than 30 liras per month as monthly payment, allowance or award. It is obvious however, that this code was breached by methods like the one noted above.

In the 1940s supposedly "amateur" Turkish football consisted of the following tournaments:

⁸¹ "Ali Bey... ayın ilk antrenmanına erken gelir, ...tek tek dolapları açar, ...elindeki zarfları dolaplara koyardı", Cem Atabeyođlu, interview by author, digital audio recording, Istanbul, Turkey, 19 March 2007.

- a. Local-regional amateur leagues
- b. Maarif Vekaleti Kupası (Ministry of National Education Cup)
- c. Millî Lig (national championship, with the participants of Istanbul (four participants), Ankara and Izmir (two participants each))
- d. Başbakanlık Kupası (Prime Minister's Cup, played between the champions of Maarif Vekaleti Kupası and Başbakanlık Kupası)

The status of these regional and national leagues and cups brought about several encounters between the same teams, notably between the big Istanbul clubs. Along with league, cup games and some private cups (such as Fenerbahçe-Galatasaray fest, which first took place in 1948) two Istanbul clubs might have played three-four times a year. Whereas these "derbies" were always anticipated games, in the long term repeatedly playing with the same teams would reduce the number of spectators. In addition, domestic matches did not earn the clubs the gate receipts they sought. The remedy to this problem was to invite foreign teams to Turkey.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, in Turkey, football was born as a battle against foreigners. Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray owed their popularity to the matches they played against the occupation forces. Football was seen as a public display of perseverance, challenge and equivalence against the foreigners who controlled the Ottoman capital at that moment. Fenerbahçe's first encounter with a foreign team dates to the beginning of the Turkish national movement. On 23 March 1913, Fenerbahçe played New Zealand of Britain at Fenerbahçe field. A year later, the club made its first trip to Odessa and played five matches in Ukraine. During the Turkish Independence

War, the team had many matches against the occupation forces.

In the new republic, the international fixtures went hand in hand with economic and political aspects. In the first years, the economic aspect was about affording the expenses of an international fixture rather than making profit out of it. For example, the first Czech club to play in Turkey, Slavia was invited jointly by three clubs in 1923, Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray and Altınordu. These three clubs were only able to pay to the Czech club 1500 liras for four matches, despite their demand of 4000 liras. The problem was solved by the monetary aid of the Czech Ministry of Propaganda.⁸²

Under these conditions. Turkish clubs could not afford to invite clubs with better reputation from Western Europe. The majority of the clubs that came to Turkey in the first ten years were from Central and Eastern Europe, notably from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The only other option, Greek teams, could not be invited until the 1930s when Turkey and Greece solved their issues coming from the 1920s. However, after the first match in 1930, Greek teams were the first choice for Turkish clubs.

The first match between the Greek champion Olympiakos and Fenerbahçe was organized in 1931 (during the visit of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos) and broke both attendance and gate receipt records.⁸³ Here, it should be noted that a change in the political climate was necessary to invite the first Greek team; however the constantly raising number of Turkish-Greek encounters in the 1930s and 1940s should be also analysed according to economic and social factors. In the first years of Turkish football,

82 Dağlaroğlu, pp.132-133.

83 ibid, pp.147-148.

playing the Greeks was always at the centre, probably more than anything. It should be also remembered that the first Turkish team, Black Stocking, had been gathered to beat the Greeks of Istanbul. Even when the political relations were much healthier between the two countries, the encounters between Turkish and Greek teams was always welcomed in a different manner by the spectators. Thus, for an organizer, a tie between teams of these two countries was a guaranteed sell-out. Moreover, Greek teams were much easier to bring to Turkey thanks to geographical proximity .

The Professional Era

The Multi-Party Period (1945-1960): The Shift to the “Liberal” World

After 1945, the number of international fixtures continued to grow. The political climate as well as the football trends of the time was very suitable for this growth. Turkey was willing to break its shell in order to be a part of the new world order and international fixtures was a must for organizers who wanted to make profits and clubs that had to provide resources for "hidden professionalism." The amateur football administration was not against the international encounters, nor was the state. However, the teams to be played remained a delicate issue.

In 1945, the first international encounter after the Second World War was a significant event. On 16 September, in other words, one week after the last Japanese troop in China surrendered and the war ended, Fenerbahçe played against the crew of Ajax battle cruiser of the British Naval Forces. The visitors were welcomed warmly in

Istanbul, and the only issue, according to Eşref Şefik who wrote the match critique was "the scuffle between the stadium gatekeepers and people who could not enter the stadium, unfortunately going on under our British guests' noses."⁸⁴ It is noteworthy that Fenerbahçe club's president at that time was Şükrü Saracoğlu, the Turkish Prime Minister. In addition to football, swimming races were scheduled between Ajax crew and Turkish clubs. Two weeks later, an American track&field team was invited to Turkey.

Another notable point about the international athletic relations of Turkey after the war is the relations with Egypt. For the first time, Fenerbahçe played an Egyptian team, Al-Ahly, on its 40th anniversary in June 1946. The political value of this game should be considered to be very high as Al-Ahly was under the protection of King Fouad and this game was played between the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the 1952 Revolution in Egypt when the country was basically under British control. Equally the same year, in December, Turkey sent Egypt a multi-sports team which would join competitions with their Egyptian colleagues. This crew was presided over by Zeki Rıza Sporel, former Fenerbahçe player and president of the club in the upcoming years.

English teams also started to visit Turkey after 1945. Before the Second World War the only encounters with the British had been the ones against the occupation forces in Turkish Independence War period. In the first years of the Republic, the lack of matches with English teams can be explained by financial difficulties. However, it is possible to claim that amateur Turkish clubs were not wealthy enough to afford English clubs. For example, in 1949. Beşiktaş and Galatasaray invited the English side Charlton

⁸⁴ *Akşam*, 17 September 1945.

to Turkey at a cost of 90000 Turkish Liras.⁸⁵ Even if these two clubs were able to afford this sum, the exchange of such an amount into English Pounds certainly required the state's approval.

In 1946 and 1947, Hungarian and Czech teams frequently visited Turkey. These games had athletic and economic value, rather than political importance as these teams were rather stronger than the Greek teams or the teams of other nearby countries, and Turkish spectators were accustomed to seeing those teams in Turkey. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia had not joined the communist pact yet. Equally, Austria, which was a neutral country in that period sent many teams to Turkey. These countries had the most affordable clubs among strong football teams in Europe, besides these countries almost had the same moment of choice as Turkey about taking sides in the new world order.

The frequency of games against Greek teams continued to accelerate after the war as well. After the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Greece, AEK (founded by Istanbul Greeks immigrated to Greece after the Turkish War of Independence) was the first team to visit Turkey in the post-WWII era. After that visit, several encounters took place between Turkish and Greek teams. In addition to the Turkish national team, even rather lower profile clubs like Göztepe Izmir, Aydınspor and Beykozspor travelled to Greece. Especially after the Greek Civil War, the number of Turkish-Greek matches increased. This phenomenon can be explained with two things; first, playing with Greek teams either in Turkey or Greece was very affordable. A Turkish team could easily go for a tour in Greece instead of inviting one low profile English team. The second reason was

⁸⁵ *Akşam*, 3 April 1949.

definitely political. Turkey and Greece, both aiming to join the Western pact, in other words NATO, needed to overcome the war images, in order to be publicly accepted allies. Both countries welcomed each other's team with delicacy and more than courtesy.

However, there is one incident which proved the fragility of relations between the two countries. On 15 May 1949, Turkish national team played against Greece in Athens. After Turkey's 2-1 victory, some players of the team were verbally harassed by some Greek supporters. This incident, in Turkey, was widely protested by the Turkish National Students' Union (*Türk Millî Talebe Birliği* - TMTB) and banners reading "We want no more athletic relations with Greeks" were carried.⁸⁶ This was followed by protests in İzmir⁸⁷ and Ankara.⁸⁸ Moreover, the Foreign Minister, Necmeddin Sadak faced a motion in the National Assembly about the incident. Sadak explained the situation had been nothing but some overexcited supporters and that this kind of incidents could occur at domestic matches as well.⁸⁹ After these statements, the protests calmed down; however this incident is noteworthy as it was the first public appearance of the TMTB, which would be a major actor in nationalist-conservative student action and notably in the Cyprus issue. It is also interesting that the protest started days after the match and suddenly ended after the speech of the minister. Here, it is possible to claim that the TMTB, which cooperated with Panturkists in the Cyprus issue, was seeking for a pretext to launch such an anti-Greek protest, because no article narrating grave incidents about this match actually appeared in the press before the demonstration. It can be said that it was the TMTB's reaction which pushed the press and the public to classify this match as

86 *Akşam*, 24 May 1949.

87 *Akşam*, 27 May 1949.

88 *Akşam*, 28 May 1949.

89 *Akşam*, 31 May 1949.

a grave incident.

Another important incident in this period was the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. On 28 March 1949, Turkey officially recognized Israel despite the protests of Arab countries. The following year, Fenerbahçe made a trip to Israel and played against Hapoel Tel Aviv. Here, it should be noted that this trip was made under Şükrü Saracoğlu's presidency and before the elections in which the CHP would lose the power to the Democratic Party (DP). Equally, Beşiktaş's trip to the United States was decided just before the elections and took place right after the CHP lost power. Thus, it is important to note that, contrary to the general belief Turkey's move to the western pact started much before the DP reign.

Apart from foreign policy engagements, clubs preferred international fixtures to domestic ones, mainly with economic concerns and also because of the monotonous character of domestic encounters. One striking example of this fact happened in 1947. On 16 February, Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe were scheduled to play the Istanbul Cup final. However, neither team attended the final and both played against the Hungarian MTK team instead. Therefore, the BTGM declared both teams to have withdrawn and the cup was not handed to either of them.⁹⁰ This was also the end of the Istanbul Cup. In the following years, until full professionalism arrived, this tendency continued.

The Democratic Party governments in the 1950s had been a period in which Turkey's expansion to the West and closeness to the United States continued with further acceleration. This attitude also showed its effects on the football field. In the first years

⁹⁰ *Akşam*, 22 February 1947.

of the DP government, international sports contacts carried on with high frequency. Good relations with Israel were preserved and the first Israeli team, Hapoel Tel Aviv, visited Turkey in March 1950. In June 1950, Lebanese football champion Racing also came to Turkey. This encounter was made possible by the Lebanon-Israel armistice in March 1949. Before this date, there had been no athletic contacts with this country.

The matches with the Lebanon team raised question of the frequency of international fixtures in Turkey. These games were played in June, the off-season of football, after a very busy season with many international encounters, cup and league matches. Also clubs could not have satisfactory gate receipts from these hardly appealing matches.⁹¹ Indeed, it seems clear that these Lebanese matches were not arranged by clubs or organizers, but were rather a diplomatic move.

An interesting incident in 1950 was the request for asylum by two Albanian footballers. These players, Bahri Kavaya and Süleyman Vafi, escaped from the Soviet boat *Babet* in Arnavutköy, Istanbul, on the way to Konstanta, Romania and asked for asylum. These two men played in Fenerbahçe for a brief period. At that period, United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees had not been promulgated yet, however as this incident happened months before this convention, it is possible to say that the common principle of refugee was to be "a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." Thus, it can be claimed that Turkey's acceptance of these two players had political meanings.

Another important incident in 1950 was the first sports contact with the Federal

⁹¹ *Akşam*, 2 July 1950.

Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. On 26 December, the Sarajevo team arrived in Istanbul to play matches with Istanbul teams. As in the other examples, the date of the first encounter was no coincidence. In June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Stalin's Cominform, the successor of the Communist International. In 1950, Yugoslavian president, Josip Broz Tito, declared his famous "self-management" (*samoupravljanje*) principle and strictly diverted his country from Soviet communism.

Meanwhile, the football trends of the world sometimes transcended the foreign policy trends of Turkey. Teams from Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, which had no visible ties to the Western pact but were very strong in football, were invited to Turkey during their European tours. Especially, the Lanus team from Argentina made a great impact. Eva Peron, the wife of Argentine leader Juan Peron was terminally ill in that period, and her tragedy touched many people in Turkey as well. Even a *mevlit* (Islamic prayer) was staged in Şişli Mosque on the 8 December, 1951.⁹² After this incident, Lanus came to Turkey in January 1952 with a silver cup called the Eva Peron Cup to be awarded to the winner of the Lanus's last match. Argentine team played Fenerbahçe twice. In the first match teams entered the pitch with each other's country flags.⁹³ In the second match, Fenerbahçe defeated Lanus and won the unique Eva Peron Cup.⁹⁴ Lanus also played with Beşiktaş and Galatasaray.

The end of the civil war in Greece by the victory of the right-wing and the victory of the liberal DP in Turkey put the two countries in the same, western direction. In this context, past issues were buried and both governments put communism as the

92 *Hürriyet*, 26 January 2007.

93 *Akşam*, 27 January 1952.

94 *Akşam*, 28 January 1952.

biggest threat on their agendas. Hence, until the Cyprus problem emerged as a big issue, both countries continued their sports contacts. In 1951, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray athletics teams went to Greece and the AEK football team came to Istanbul. This is followed by Beykozspor's Thessaloniki trip and Ethnikos, Apollon and Panathinaikos's Istanbul visits. Fenerbahçe visited Athens and AEK along with Olympiakos came to Istanbul later in 1953. Greek teams coming to Istanbul also played with Beyoğluspor. the team of the remaining Istanbul Greeks.

The frequency of foreign teams coming to Turkey caused the newly-founded professional Istanbul League to remain incomplete in the 1953-54 season. Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray rejected the Football Federation's offer to play the remaining matches in summer and yielded the championship title to Beşiktaş.⁹⁵ Bearing in mind that Brazilian teams played the highest number of matches in Turkey that year, probably it was because of the clubs trying to raise funds for the upcoming professional transfer season. After that incomplete season, the number of international friendly games were reduced to a handful of matches and only strong football nations, such as Brazil and Hungary were invited. The sportive relations with Greece were suspended at the end of the year with the rise of the Cyprus issue and 6-7 September events in Istanbul and Izmir.

After 1955, the majority of international matches that Turkish clubs played were with Hungarian and Yugoslavian clubs. This choice was a reflection of club's coach choices. In this period, many clubs in Turkey were coached by trainers of these countries. One important reason for the scale down in international friendly matches was the foundation of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). This

⁹⁵ *Akşam*, 4 August 1954.

international body of European football finally reshaped the international club matches and organized the first pan-European club championship, the European Cup of Champion Clubs, starting from 1955. The leading teams of Europe attended this cup and stopped their European tours. Turkey joined this competition with Beşiktaş in the 1958-59 season. Hence, the period of international friendlies was over.

The constantly increasing popularity of football and the hidden professionalism quickly turned football into a business. Clubs were constantly arranging international fixtures in order to raise funds and finance their teams. Furthermore, as transfer fees and monthly wages were forbidden by amateurship regulations put into effect in 1941, some teams developed other ways to persuade players to join their ranks. Some board members promised the footballers stable jobs where they could earn satisfactory money and some arranged their military affairs in order to keep them in Istanbul during their obligatory military service. Adalet, the team of Adalet textile company's owner Süreyya İlmen was notorious for his tempting offers, which included high-paying administrative jobs in the textile factory.

A regulated professionalism was not only bound to happen, but it also became a necessity in those conditions. On 21 September 1951, the TFF published a set of regulations about professionalism gradually permitting clubs to switch to professional status. According to the new rules, the clubs remained amateur, nevertheless they could form professional teams. Even today, this principal is in force in a way as non-corporate clubs are officially associations which can make professional contracts. The regulations also defined the players' contracts and the minimum and maximum wage that they could

be paid.⁹⁶

The second half of the 1950s also triggered a second wave of Turkish nationalism in football. Regarding foreign policy, the first thirty years of the republic was fairly peaceful as the state did not pursue conflicts with its former enemies and tried to establish stable diplomacy with them instead. This foreign policy, which can be described as realistic and careful, was quite understandable as Turkey had nothing to gain more, but much to suffer from any revisionism attempt. That is why even during the years when Turkey had very close relations with Germany, the İnönü government did not approve any revisionist policy. This attitude obviously reflected well on the general opinion as well as the football fans. Except for a couple of minor incidents, teams from countries like Greece or Britain with which Turkey had once been enemies were generally welcomed amicably and the encounters were received within athletic terms.

This peaceful environment, in terms of diplomacy and public opinion, was interrupted in the second half of the 1950s by the Cyprus issue. Before 1955, the rising ethnic tension between the Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks was not perceived as a matter that should have concerned Turkey. For instance, in a meeting between a Cypriot Turk commission and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü in 1952, rejected Cypriot Turk delegation's intervention demand as “Now there's peace with Greeks. The friendships are essential. But we will not lose our interest in you.”⁹⁷ One year before Turkey had seen violent acts in September 1955 against Turkish citizen Greeks, the

⁹⁶ *Milliyet*, 23 September 1951.

⁹⁷ “*Şimdi Yunan dostluğu vardır. Dostluklar zarurîdir. Fakat sizinle alakamızı kesmeyeceğiz.*” Niyazi Kızılyürek, “Birinci Cumhuriyet'ten Yeni Kıbrıs'a” (From the First Republic to the New Cyprus), *Kıbrıs: Dün ve Bugün* (Cyprus: Yesterday and Today), compiled by Masis Kürkçügil (Istanbul: İthaki, 2003), p.20.

Cyprus issue was still considered to be a “matter concerning only Britain and Greece” and *Enosis*, the Greek nationalist movement defending the merger of the island by Greece, was presented as a communist scheme trying to create tension between Turks and Greeks⁹⁸.

During the summer of 1955, especially with the protests organized by the Cyprus Is Turkish Association (*Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*), a group supported by Turkish Nationalists in Cyprus, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish Secret Service, this matter became *sine qua non* and the first post-war major twist in Turkish foreign policy eventuated. The DP government tried to use Cyprus Is Turkish and the public protests in order to manipulate the British-Greek-Turkish diplomatic talks that were scheduled to take place in London, in September. However, the events, intentionally or not, went beyond control and massive attacks against almost all the non-Muslim minorities took place on the 6-7 September. Even though a probable massive immigration of the Greek minority to Greece was blocked by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, this incident marked a major social turning point in cosmopolitan cities like Istanbul and Izmir.

The political climate of 1955 reflected on football as much as it affected the social life. Whereas Cypriot football had been virtually unknown in Turkey before, in the summer of 1955, a specific interest in this subject mushroomed almost instantly. In June 1955, the coach of Çetinkaya, the only Turkish champions of the Cypriot Football League, travelled to Istanbul in order to “resolve the sports matters of Cyprus.”⁹⁹ The same week, Çetinkaya invited the Istanbul University football team to Cyprus via the

98 *Milliyet*, 22 August 1954.

99 *Milliyet*, 14 June 1955.

TMTB, one of the nationalist political organizations that arranged most of the Cyprus protests.¹⁰⁰ These visits became more frequent over the next five years whereas the games against Greek teams were removed from the agenda.

The Cyprus issue and the tense relations between Turkey and Greece continued to affect the daily lives of the Greek minority in Turkey for another decade. It was no coincidence that Beyoğluspor, the team of Istanbul Greeks was relegated from the First Division and Lefter Küçükandonyadis, the most famous Turkish-Greek footballer decided to retire in 1964, the same year when Greek citizens residing in Turkey were expelled from the country. Most people subjected to deportation left the country along with their families (most of them were married to Turkish citizens) and it was the biggest immigration from Turkey to another country since the forced population exchange in 1923. Most of the minority football clubs vanished in this period.

The Sixties (1960-1975): The National Expansion of Football

Whereas the minority clubs disappeared because of emigration and the other minor clubs of Istanbul sank into the lower divisions as they could not keep up with professionalism, the void was filled by the provincial clubs. The National Football League started in 1959 and it was made up of the biggest clubs of three major cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The real expansion of football throughout whole country was made possible with the foundation of the Second Division in the 1963-64 season.

Initially, the Second Division was geographically diversified and most teams competing in this league were the former participants of the First Division in major cities. However,

¹⁰⁰Milliyet, 22 June 1955.

especially due to considerable support from the TFF President Orhan Şeref Apak and the State Secretary responsible for sports, Kâmil Ocak, many clubs in Anatolia mushroomed and quickly took over the majority in the Second Division.

In the first ever season of the division, ten of the 13 clubs competing were from one of three major cities,¹⁰¹ whereas in the 1965-66 season nine of the 21 competing teams were from Anatolia. In the fifth season of the division, the number of teams increased to 36, only 11 of which were from Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir. It should also be noted that 9 of the 10 Anatolian teams competing in the 2009-10 season of Turkish Superleague were founded in this era.¹⁰² Evidently, as well as the efforts of official governing sports about unifying and founding city clubs, the newly-accumulated capital in the provinces thanks to the development plans and the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, were the major contributors to this process. With professionalism, the criteria of existence in top-class football changed dramatically. The clubs with tradition and small but loyal fan bases rapidly vanished. Popular metropolitan clubs cashed in on their popularity through gate receipts and survived, while other clubs started from scratch thanks to the capital invested in them.

The characteristics of the surviving professional clubs also defined the pathway to success. From then on, the success depended more or less on how much money could be doled out. This would certainly change how football would be perceived by any actors involved, including fans.

101Adana Demirspor (Adana), Bursaspor (Bursa) and Çukurova İdman Yurdu (Mersin) were the sole three provincial clubs in the Second Division of 1963-64 the season.

102These clubs are Antalyaspor (1966), Bursaspor (1963), Denizlispor (1966), Diyarbakırspor (1968), Eskişehirspor (1965), Gaziantepspor (1969), Kayserispor (1966), Sivasspor (1967) and Trabzonspor (1967).

One of the reasons the major clubs of Istanbul were able to survive the restructuring of football without damage was once again the support they received from the political forces, or in other words their ability to keep up with the political trends. Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş, which kept a certain closeness to the CHP during the single-party period, quickly adapted themselves to the new conditions and yielded the president's chair to the DP parliamentarians, Osman Kavrakoğlu and Nuri Togay. Galatasaray, which had a little more space thanks to its own bureaucratic network within the state, did not elect a DP member to the presidency, but they were careful to ask the president Suphi Batur to step down as he had resigned from the DP after a conflict. Among these three clubs, the closest to the DP government was Fenerbahçe. This was not a direct result of club's pragmatic choices, but rather it was because many high-ranking members of the club at the time were liberal entrepreneurs and eventually they did well in the DP which defended their points of view.

This relationship of Fenerbahçe board members with the DP gave them major advantages during the 1950s (especially about the ownership of Fenerbahçe Stadium); however, it also caused huge problems to the club after the 1960 coup d'etat. Especially, after a controversial match versus Gençlerbirliği, the tension between the club and federation was intervened by the military officials and the club was threatened by a colonel of “facing a huge hatred and pressure of responsibility and eventually being dissolved because of punishments.”¹⁰³ The fact that club's general secretary Faruk Ilgaz's (also a member of the DP and later of its successor the Justice Party) huge effort on

103 “...çok daha ağır bir nefret ve sorumluluğun baskısı altında ezilecek ve uygulayacağımız ceza yöntemleriyle mutlaka yıkılacaktır.” Gökaçtı, pp.215-216.

arranging the Balkan Cup, as well as the probable effect of high-ranking military Fenerbahçe fans, may have been a factor in why Fenerbahçe did not face more severe punishment at that time. The Balkan Cup was an initiative that Faruk Ilgaz started thanks to his business ties throughout the Balkans and not only it was one of the most remarkable organizations of Turkish football, but also it helped restore athletic relations with Greece. Faruk Ilgaz later presided over the club and he was one of the longest serving presidents of club's history.

Football in the 1950s and 1960s generally overlapped with the political events of these two decades. The passage to professionalism and the relegation of minor clubs completely complied with the liberal economic policies of the Democratic Party. Their nationalistic conservatism resulted in the disappearance of the minority clubs and the Turkization of football. In the 1960s, the geographically diversified football environment may have been the result of more planned and reserved economic policies aiming at a more equitable allocation of resources. However, it should not be ignored that the provincial clubs born in the 1960s were also a result of the Anatolian conservative bourgeoisie and their accumulated capital created during the DP years. These trends also endured during the first half of the seventies, until the global oil crisis and the international isolation caused by the Cyprus invasion shook the country up.

Criticisms on Turkish Football Historiography

At first glance, it may seem that a rich literature about the history of football in Turkey exists. However, most of these works are superficial, and they usually lack

adequate content and context, hence most of them repeat each other. One reason for this situation is the lack of qualified sports historians working in this domain. Most of the detailed works about Turkish football history have been produced by either former footballers such as Rüştü Dağlaroğlu and Ergün Hiçyılmaz or journalists like Erdoğan Arıpınar and Doğan Yıldız. The lack of any historical context usually results in a mixture of myths, rumours, dubious factual information and statistics.

Another reason for the low credibility of Turkish football literature is the shortage of first-hand documents. The early documents of most football clubs are either lost or not well-recorded, or accidentally burned, as in the Fenerbahçe example. Thus, a historian or an enthusiast who wants to work in this field has mostly two options; scanning the press or conducting interviews with people who lived in earlier periods. The latter option not only presents the entire disadvantages of oral history, but also poses another problem. The people who witnessed the earliest years of Turkish football are no longer alive. So the only alternative is to talk either with their relatives or the interviewers who first interviewed those people. In either way, the number of people that can speak about those periods competently is low. In addition, people tend to mix up stories, facts, myths along with the time line. The fact that they have been interviewed too many times by too many people, unintentionally have made them construct an unhealthily compact and reconstructed version of the actual story. My personal experience with interviewees when I was writing the Fenerbahçe history book *Asr-1 Fener* showed me that a very small portion of people kept any documents, but there are many photos with unknown dates and unknown backgrounds. Most of the times I and other interviewers had to remind them of some information we had gathered from

newspaper scanning in order to help them recall to what the photos they kept were related. These difficulties can occur in any attempt of collecting information about the period between 1920-50. For earlier years, the process is even harder and more fruitless.

One other major problem in Turkish football historiography is the language barrier. Especially the first quarter of Turkish football history requires the knowledge of Ottoman, French, Greek, Armenian and English. As most people who work in this field do not understand more than one of these languages, the number of overlooked documents is immense. For example, the archives of one of the oldest sports club in Istanbul, Pera Club, are virtually untouched, waiting for a historian with interest in the field and competence in Greek language. Even the Ottoman newspapers have not been completely treated as far as football history is concerned.

However, the main reason for the early years of football in Turkey being mistreated is the perception of history writing. The dominant history writing perspective in Turkey is nationalistic. Thus football historians, either intentionally or because of they lack the competence to employ a specific historiography school other than the dominant one, are almost unanimously biased towards the Turks playing this game. Most football history works consider the first Turkish football team Black Stocking to be the starting point of football history and they tend to neglect the rich football history of English, Greeks, Armenians and other non-Muslim communities before that date. The title of the four-volume history work of the Turkish Football Federation is Turkish Football History (*Türk Futbol Tarihi*), rather than The Football History of Turkey (*Türkiye Futbol Tarihi*). Actually, this title choice acts like a confession. It is not the football history of Turkey that is being worked on, it is rather the football history of Turks. The fact that non-Turk

football history in this country occupies only two pages in this massive set of books reveals this attitude. As the TFF president of the time, Haluk Ulusoy said in the foreword, “the foundations which do not cherish their their past and give importance to written history are bound to lose their memory, however successful they may be in other fields.”¹⁰⁴

The Turkish Football Federation and its history writing attempt is just an example among many others. Almost each football book written in Turkey about football history is biased towards Turks and reconstructs the history accordingly. The History of Sports in Izmir (*İzmir Spor Tarihi*), written by Erdoğan Sungur and published by the Governorship of İzmir, gives out typical examples of nationalistic history writing on football by claiming that it was written in Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk that Turks played football for centuries.”¹⁰⁵

Previously, the documents about the ball games in Turkic communities were discussed and their proximity with association football was analysed. Even if Tepük game may qualify as a sort of “football” as it is a ball kicking game, using the word “futbol” for this game which directly refers to association football in the Turkish language is an attempt to tweak the facts in order to prove that Turks have a longer history of football even than the British, who are supposed to have invented the game. It is also not surprising that in this book, as well as in many others, it is rather overlooked that the history of Chinese ball games goes back much older than tepük's history. The tendency is to somehow present that the Turks played football much earlier than anyone

104“Geçmişine sahip çıkmayan ve yazılı tarihe önem vermeyen kurumlar ne kadar başarılı olurlarsa olsunlar hafızalarını kaybetmeye mahkumdurlar.” *Türk Futbol Tarihi* 1, p. 3.

105 Erdoğan Sungur, *İzmir Spor Tarihi* (Sports History of Izmir) (İzmir: İzmir İl Özel İdare Yayınları, 2002), p.25.

else and to make no mention of the other communities who played almost the same game centuries earlier. Thus, a neutral observer who reads this work can easily jump into the conclusion that football is a game that was invented by Turks. Equally, the same narrative can also imply that not only football was invented by Turks, but it was also stolen from them by the British. For example, a well-known Turkish historian, Tuncer Gülensoy, claims that football was the game of the Turks' ancestors and taken over by the British during the invasion of India.¹⁰⁶ Mehmet Niyazi, in his article, also poses this claim and explains why it is crucial to possess the game's invention: “It can be said 'what difference does it make whether we or the British invented football?' ...we are fallen down by giving everything away.”¹⁰⁷

Another common stance of nationalist football historiography is, as mentioned before, to overlook the non-Turk or non-Muslim football history of the country. This stance is quite often accompanied and/or reinforced by the lack of knowledge of and interest in these parts of football history. A nationalist football historian is usually not genuinely interested in Greeks, Armenians or other communities playing football in this country, hence he/she does not feel the need to have any competence on that matter. Usually the Greeks, the Armenians or even the British are hastily presented in a couple of introductory paragraphs and are never mentioned again. Even in those couple of short phrases, it is not uncommon to find serious factual mistakes. In Sungur, it is claimed that there was a club called “Apolion [*sic*]” in Izmir founded by the Armenians.¹⁰⁸

106 *Hürriyet*, 27 September 2009.

107 “*Efendim, futbolu biz icat etsek, İngiltere icat etse ne değişir, denebilir. ...Vere vere bu hale düştük ya...*” *Haber 7*, 24 July 2006. “*Futbolu Türkler mi İcat Etti?*” (Was football invented by Turks?), available online at <http://www.haber7.com/haber/20060724/Futbolu-Turkler-mi-icat-etti.php> [13 October 2009].

108 Sungur, p.26.

Here, the “Apolion” club mentioned by the author as having had been founded by Armenians, is nothing but the “Apollon Smyrnis” club discussed in this work previously, which still exists in Athens, Greece. Seeing as all the documents about this club were practically held by the Greek clergy in Izmir and they were entirely written in Greek, it is unknown how the author could reach the conclusion that Apollon was an Armenian club. Such misinformation about a still existing club whose information is accessible, shows how much labour is actually paid to the non-Turk elements of sports history in Turkey. The fact that this grave mistake is spotted in a monograph about Izmir, where Anatolian Greeks had lived as a majority for years, is even more worrying. The same nationalistic approach continues throughout the book, which was financed by the highest state authority of the city. The author calls Sultanî and Karşıyaka Training House (*Karşıyaka İdman Yurdu*) as the first official clubs in the city.¹⁰⁹

The clubs mentioned in Sungur's work were founded in the 1910s. However, as previously mentioned, Greek clubs organized tournaments in Izmir in the early 1900s under the supervision of the governor. It is really impossible to understand how these clubs do not fall into the category of even “unofficial clubs” according to the author, unless one sees the nationalistic agenda to construct a history without unwanted “foreign” elements. The aim here is indeed not to scapegoat any work or author, but to show even in relatively detailed monographs these elements can intentionally be overlooked.

According to Millas, nationalists consider themselves to be very similar to those who lived thousands of years ago in a completely different world while rejecting the

109 Sungur, p.29.

diversity of “foreign” elements and constructing a version of history without them.¹¹⁰ In other words, the aim of nationalist historiography is to reinvent history as of an entity that has lived through centuries without any foreign effect and without change of character. The characteristics attributed to the nation are ever present in any given period of time. Hence, according to nationalist Turkish football historiography, the Turks have played football for centuries, and it was taken over from them and spread to the entire world. Therefore, it is completely normal to overlook some Greeks or Armenians playing football in the Ottoman state in the 1800s as the Turks had centuries of football past compared to a couple of decades for these communities. This historical perception which is present in any topic related to Turkey and Turks, also shapes the popular nationalistic approach to football from the 1970s to today. The roots of the “football revanchism” feeling towards international fixtures in Turkey in the last four decades can be sought in this manner of perceiving the past and the others. This feeling will be examined in the upcoming chapters.

A similar kind of inclination towards proving superiority in every possible way also can be found in the clubs' histories. Especially, the works about the major clubs of Istanbul, due to the fact that they mostly have been written by long-time members and fans, generally aim to prove that their club is unique and superior than others.

In Turkey, where 89.2% of all football fans is estimated to support one of the three major clubs,¹¹¹ an overwhelming tendency of football enthusiasts towards

110 Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu* (Birth of the Greek Nation) (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999) pp.55-56.

111 Galatasaray Official Web Site. 17 March 2009. “AGB Nielsen'e göre en çok Taraftar Galatasaray'da” (Galatasaray has the most fans according to AGB Nielsen), available online at <http://www.galatasaray.org/kulup/haber/3444.php> [16 October 2009].

successful clubs is undeniable. As all three teams have had considerable domestic success, club history writers have chosen either to emphasize their own clubs' rather unique achievements or to define some other criteria to prove their clubs' superiority over others.

In a country like Turkey, where the success in football is concentrated in such a small elite group of clubs (only four clubs have won the league throughout its history), it is difficult to define which club is actually the most successful. The number of league titles are really close, especially among the three major Istanbul clubs (Fenerbahçe 17, Galatasaray 17, Beşiktaş 13 titles). Galatasaray is the only Turkish team that has won the UEFA Cup as well as the only team to win four league titles in a row. Fenerbahçe is the only team that has scored more than 100 goals in a season and Beşiktaş is the only team that has won the league without losing a single match. Hence, the successes of these three clubs are more or less even and defining the ultimate successful team usually depends on from what angle these data are treated. In addition, all teams have some other criteria of success in case they cannot beat their rivals in athletic terms. Some of these criteria are unique to certain clubs while some others are shared commonly. For example, Galatasaray's UEFA Cup success in 2000 is an achievement that the club officially chooses to emphasize, as they are the only Turkish team to have won a European competition¹¹². Beşiktaş, having fewer titles and supporters than other two major clubs, emphasizes being the oldest and the first registered Turkish club.¹¹³ This claim has been contested by Fenerbahçe which claims the first Turkish football team

112 Galatasaray Official Web Site. np. “*En'ler ve ilk'ler*” (The mosts and the firsts), available [online]: <http://www.galatasaray.org/tarih/pages/tarihenlerilkler.php> [16 October 2009].

113 Beşiktaş Official Web Site. np. “*İlkler*” (the firsts) available [online]: http://www.bjk.com.tr/tr/haberler.php?xl=tarihce&l=h&h_no=3351 [16 October 2009].

Black Stocking was founded in 1899 by mostly the same people who later founded Fenerbahçe, so this date is given as the unofficial foundation date of the club.¹¹⁴

Whereas the clubs define their own set of criteria to prove their superiority, some other criteria are shared by all three clubs, and in some cases, also by some other clubs which do not have as many titles as they do. These widely-accepted criteria are all related to the nationalist perspective of Turkish historiography. Clubs compete to be the most nationalist team by documenting their contribution to the national struggle, their “martyrs”, their victories over foreigners and ethnic rivals. Especially Fenerbahçe, having played the most number games against the occupation forces during the occupation of Istanbul, gives a special importance to those games. Equally, Smyranean clubs Karşıyaka and Altay, natural born rivals of the Greek teams founded in the city, emphasize their contribution to Turkish nationalism. Karşıyaka defines its colours (red and green) as “nationalistic and religious,”¹¹⁵ while Altay states that “the nationalism and Turkism movements first started in the club in 1914.”¹¹⁶

The most controversial issue on which the major three clubs probably will never agree is which team Mustafa Kemal Atatürk supported. Whereas there is no proof to specify the founder of Turkey's team of choice, especially Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe

114 Fenerbahçe Official Web Site. np. “*Tarihçe*” (History) available [online] <http://www.fenerbahce.org.tr/kurumsal/detay.asp?ContentID=3> [16 October 2009].

115 It is noteworthy that the Karşıyaka web site employs the word “*ulusalçı*” (the nationalist-Kemalist movement born after the 1997 military intervention) in its history, instead of “*ulusçu*” (nationalist). It may be considered to be a slip of the tongue as “*ulusalçı*” has become a very popular word in recent years, but it may also show Karşıyaka board is not uncomfortable with this word/movement. Karşıyaka Official Web Site. np. “*Tarihçe*” (History) available [online]: <http://www.ksk.org.tr/sayfa.php?id=7> [16 October 2009].

116 “*1914 yılında milliyetçilik cereyanı ve Türkçülük hareketi, Altay Kulübü’nde başladı.*” Altay Official Web Site. np. “*Milliyetçilik Ruhu*” (The Spirit of Nationalism), available [online] : <http://www.altay.org.tr/genel/kulubumuz/tarihce/tarihce3.html> [16 October 2009].

officially declare he was their “greatest fan.”¹¹⁷¹¹⁸ Galatasaray does not claim Atatürk was their fan, but they condemn their rivals for their attempts to prove his fandom.¹¹⁹ Actually, Galatasaray also could link Atatürk to themselves as Ateş-Güneş, founded by the Kemalist cadre, originally was separated from Galatasaray and it was the club that Mustafa Kemal visited the most.

On the discussion on which team Mustafa Kemal supported, a memoir by Gündüz Kılıç can be helpful. Kılıç tells that after a Soviet tour when the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) squad had many defeats, Atatürk asked him to teach him the rules and basics of the game.¹²⁰ This Soviet tour Kılıç talks about took place in 1934, in other words thirty-five years after the first Turkish football team and four years before Mustafa Kemal's death. This means that Mustafa Kemal did not have the slightest interest in football until his final years. This lack of interest obviously renders the ongoing discussions moot. However, it should be noted that the clubs' objective is not necessarily to prove Atatürk's fandom, but rather to convince and beat the others.

117 Fenerbahçe Official Web Site. np. “*Atatürk ve Fenerbahçe*” (Atatürk and Fenerbahçe) available [online]: <http://www.fenerbahce.org/kurumsal/detay.asp?ContentID=10> [16 October 2009].

118 Beşiktaş Official Web Site. np. “*Beşiktaş ve Atatürk – En Büyük Beşiktaşlı*” (Beşiktaş and Atatürk – The Greatest Fan of Beşiktaş) available [online]: http://www.bjk.com.tr/tr/haberler.php?h_no=10689&l=h&xl=yazi [16 October 2009].

119 Galatasaray Official Web Site. np. “*Atatürk ve Galatasaray*” (Atatürk and Galatasaray) available [online]: http://www.galatasaray.org/tarih/pages/tarih_ataturk.php [16 October 2009].

120 Ataturk.net Web Site. “*Atatürk ve Spor*” (Atatürk and Sports) available [online]: <http://www.ataturk.net/spor/2.html> [16 October 2009].

CHAPTER THREE

A STUDY OF FOOTBALL FANDOM IN IN TURKEY (IN COMPARISON WITH ENGLAND)

The Social Structure during the Emergence and Expansion of Football
in England and in Turkey: The Background of Modern Fandom

Emergence and expansion of football in England

Through previous pages, it was stated that the history of ball kicking/carrying games dates further back than the emergence of association football and its contemporaries like American football or rugby football. These latter games, although derivatives of ancient ball games, all appeared in modern times. Certain similarities between ancient and modern games urge the presumption that there is a -at least vague- historical continuity between these games. In addition, no evidence exists to claim that modern football games were created from scratch in the eighteenth century. Thus, it is logical to claim such a continuity between pre-modern and modern football games.

Nevertheless, modern football games should not be considered as a natural result of a time line coming from ancient cultures to rural pastime activities and finally to modern games. The modern games, even if they have their roots in rural games, were recreated as “modern games” or “modern sports,” in compliance with the conditions and the needs of the modern, industrialized, urban world. Without these conditions and

needs, there would quite probably be ball kicking/carrying games as in the past, however their rules of play would be entirely different from those of football as we know it. This is valid for association football as well as other football games such as rugby, Australian, Gaelic or American football.

As commonly known, association football as a modern game was born in Britain in the eighteenth century. The reason why this game emerged in Britain and not somewhere else where ball kicking games were played can be explained by some socio-economic facts. Britain of the eighteenth century was in the aftermath of the Third English Civil War and with the Acts of Union signed in 1707, the monarchy finally ensured a stable political entity after fifty years of consecutive civil wars. Furthermore, the war accelerated the dissolution of feudalism and the transition to capitalism on the island. With the emergence of an entrepreneurial initiative, the resumption of the expeditions and the scientific discoveries, Britain set foot into the industrial era. As modes of production changed both in rural and urban areas with the new scientific discoveries, the social life also transformed dramatically. The agriculture became less human-intensive, thus a surplus of workforce appeared in the rural areas, especially in the south of England, the most densely populated region of the island, whereas industrial north experience a labour shortage.¹²¹ This triggered a massive migration from rural to urban areas. This was how rural pastime activities were transferred to cities.

While the rural migrants rapidly constituted the new working-class, both their working and living conditions were preventing them from pursuing their customary leisure activities. For the workers to have leisure activities such as ball games, both their working conditions and the games themselves had to be revised. Indeed, the working

¹²¹ George Douglas Howard Cole, *A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement 1789-1947* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952), p.16.

conditions would not have been altered *per se*, an organized workers' movement was required.

The Radicalism movement which followed in the footsteps of the French Revolution in the last years of the eighteenth century filled this void. The London Corresponding Society emerged as the first working-class political entity and was followed by many others in different regions such as Scotland and Ireland.¹²² The movement and the corresponding societies faced instant repression from the government and most of them were short-lived. However, this brief and somewhat extreme attempt to unite workers to fight for better conditions led to a more popular wave of trade unions. Especially, the economic distress caused by the Napoleonic wars resulted in a bitter sense of disappointment and revolt after the Peace of 1815 as well as the rejuvenation of the Radicalism which gave birth to English socialism.¹²³

The English workers' movement, which organized in trade unions and socialist political bodies, managed to have working conditions readjusted by the second half of the eighteenth century. Starting with the Nine Hours Movement organized by the London Building Trades in 1858, these bodies fought for more agreeable working hours. Eventually, between 1872-75 the working hours were generally fixed to 54 hours per week and Saturdays had shorter working shifts.¹²⁴ This adjustment, especially the shorter Saturdays, provoked a great change in workers' leisure time. The labourers now had both the time and energy for athletic pursuits like football. However, as mentioned above, the games still needed to be revised, because even in a 54-hour working week, a worker had

122 Ibid., pp.29-30.

123 Ibid. pp. 44-45.

124 Paul Blyton, *Changes in Working Time: an International Review* (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985), pp. 18-19.

limited time to consume for games.¹²⁵ The factory yards which usually hosted these games provided limited space in contrast with rural fields where these games had been played. These restrictions obligated these games to be brought under certain regulations. The regulations of the modern games, such as association football or rugby were born under these conditions.

While the games were converted into regulated sports in order to comply with the working and living conditions of the working-class, it was still difficult for the workers to participate in these events regularly. The lack of regular participation held back the standardization and institutionalization of sports in most cases, like in the like case of Northumberland miners documented by Taranter, who could not codify their football until 1882 and make their teams join the leagues until as late as 1914.¹²⁶ Hence, the standards and governing bodies of most games, including association football, were introduced by who could play these games regularly, the students of public schools and universities, as in the case of the English Football Association (the FA).¹²⁷ Of course, it was not only the students who showed enthusiasm for these appealing recreational activities but also the upper-class elites.

While association football was codified and standardized, it eventually was commercialized. Between 1875-1914, the FA Cup finals' average attendance rose by 1618 percent in England and 596 percent in Scotland. The league matches in England attracted five times more spectators in 1914 than they had in 1889.¹²⁸ Apart from gate

125 Neil Tranter, *Sport, Economy and Society in Britain 1750-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.19.

126 Ibid., p.15.

127 Ibid., p.26.

128 Ibid., p.17.

receipts which constituted a massive income, bookmaking was another branch of the newly-born football industry. The involvement of the former schoolboys or elites were not enough to survive in commercial competitiveness. Hence, the professional sportsmen, in other words paid sports workers, appeared as the sports were commercialized. Professionalism in sports ensured the participation of the working-class and also caused a visible class distinction between professionals and the middle or upper-middle class amateurs.

Here, the long-lasting rule against professional participation in Olympic Games should be recalled. This rule, which has been in force since the first modern Olympics (even though it is loosened now), is usually presented as the guarantor of equal chances among participants. However, when we observe the class division-based hostility towards professional athletes in the early days of professionalism in some cases,¹²⁹ it is easier to see the International Olympic Committee's motive in forcing such a restriction. It should also be noted that professional athletes, such as American NBA basketball players, were allowed in Olympic Games for the first time in 1992, right after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, at a time where professional athletes would hardly qualify as working class, considering most players had multimillion dollar contracts. The professionalism-amateurship discussion continues today, within an almost inverse context, as most amateur players are now usually working class and professionals are economically the *crème de la crème*.

The common acceptance of professionalism in association football in England, accelerated the involvement of the working class not only in terms of professional

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.18.

players, but also of football clubs. At the end of the nineteenth century, many working class organizations, such as trade unions and Conformist churches. Most of these clubs still exist today in top divisions of English football. For example, Arsenal FC was founded by the workers of the Royal Arsenal in 1886, Aston Villa by the members of the Villa Cross Wesleyan Chapel in 1874 and Everton from St Domingo Church Sunday School in 1878.¹³⁰ Equally, Manchester United was founded by the workers in the railway yard at Newton Heath.¹³¹ Indeed, these clubs were not founded only due to the professionalism, but also to the organizational capabilities the working class developed throughout the decades of syndical movements. In other words, professionalism was a capacitor for the working class to take over the sports they had created at first place, but the essential reason which made their gathering under the roof of their own sports clubs possible was their ability to be organized which they had acquired during their struggle to work and live in better conditions. Bearing in mind that even a well-paid worker could not afford the subscription fee to a middle class sports club at the time,¹³² it was crucial for the workers to found their own clubs. Today, these clubs constitute the vast majority of the Premier League clubs as well as the former champions of the league; therefore these working class clubs have marked the last century of English football.

130 Richard Slack and Philip Shrides, "Social Disclosure and Legitimacy in Premier League Football Clubs: the First Ten Years", *Journal of Applied Accounting Research* 9, (2008), p.18.

131 Manchester United Official Web Site. np. "History by Decade 1878-1899" available [online]: <http://www.manutd.com/default.sps?pageid={E0DB31FD-0C0E-49D7-98B7AA7B75FF0E21}§ion=decadeDetails§ionid=944&customPageID=944> [26 November 2009].

132 Tranter, *ibid.*, p.42.

The Emergence and Expansion of Football in Turkey

The first thing to take into account while comparing Turkey and Britain in any subject related to modernity may be the fact that in Britain the modernity is a consequence of social changes such as the civil wars and the scientific discoveries that have changed the modes of productions, which influenced all layers of society differently but all at once; whereas in Turkey, the notions of modernity were imported by a small elite who sought to impose them to the other strata of society mostly without questioning whether the social infrastructure was ready to absorb the changes that modernity would bring along. Therefore, in Britain the shift from traditional structure to modernity took place in a much more homogeneous and fluid manner while in Turkey, there has always been the clash of traditions and modernity.

In Turkey, modernism appeared to be a project of the elites and it has not been backed with a participative democracy where the citizens had their share in decision-making process. While the structure of the state was shifting towards modernity, the lifestyle of the people remained mostly traditional. Indeed, at this point, it should once again be remembered that the modernity in Turkey is imported and it is usually aimed to overthrow the old system entirely instead of reconciling with it. The modernists in Turkey, starting with the CUP in late Ottoman era, aimed to make a clean break with the traditional period. In the early years of the republic, this approach was reinforced by revolutions which even attempted to change the way the citizens dressed, spoke and behaved. However, the state rarely gave a reason to the citizens to change the ways in

which they lived. Briefly, most of the times, the modernity in Turkey has happened in a sphere which has not included the people. The Turkish people have mostly struggled to position themselves somewhere between the modern and traditional spheres. Thus, while comparing Britain and Turkey in a topic related to modernity like the one at hand, it should be recalled always that the modernities in these two countries emerged and took place in different conditions and gave different results.

One of the complex tasks while comparing the football fans in both countries is how to classify these fans. When one is talking about the British public, it is convenient to classify them according to the social classes in which they appear. For instance, some English football clubs were described previously as “working class clubs” as they were founded by trade unions or religious organizations which were frequented by groups of people with same working and living conditions. However, in Turkey it is difficult to talk about social classes in the same way as is done for Britain. Here, it should be stressed that the reason for that is not the lack of social classes themselves but rather of class consciousness. Even if it seems possible to classify the lower strata of society as the “Turkish working class,” it is not possible to support this nomination with the evidence which proves these strata acted together to defend their common interests.

A similar dilemma also exists for the upper classes. In Turkey, the “elites” is a complex group of people which includes military and civil bureaucracy as well as the bourgeoisie. It is also difficult to say that these groups necessarily share the same goals and interests all the time. On the contrary, the clash between traditionalism and modernism appears here as well. So, even though it is possible to talk vaguely about “elites” and “lower classes,” they do not refer to the classic definition of social classes as

they do not usually have a common agenda and they have long-lasting internal conflicts. Hence, whereas there is the conflict of interests between social layers, it is difficult to consider this to be a real class struggle as both parties more or less lack class consciousness. This blurred picture also can be explained by the fact that the clash between traditionalism and modernity frequently overshadows the clash of social classes. In Turkey, the intensity of the conflict between modernist bureaucracy and traditional bourgeoisie or the Turkish and Kurdish lower classes can easily surpass the class agendas.

Regarding the emergence of association football in Turkey, this complicated picture of social classes appears to be clearer. Just like modernity, football as a modern game was imported to Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire) by the elites of the country. The port cities of Thessaloniki, Istanbul and Izmir were the first cities where football was played and the British living and working there (mostly as merchants) were the first to play it. So, the first locals to play football in these regions were the ones who had interaction with the British. In addition, during *İstibdat* conditions, it was virtually impossible for regular Muslim-Turkish men to get involved in sports. As described in the foundation of the first football (or sports) clubs, one had to be quite privileged to avoid investigation by the Hamidian administration. Therefore, the first local footballers in Turkey were either non-Muslim merchants or the Muslim elites who were powerful enough to face pressure from the administration. The first football clubs in the late Ottoman period were founded under these circumstances. A working class football club was hardly possible.

During the constitutional period many sports clubs were founded simultaneously

and some of them, like Fenerbahçe, succeeded to attract a large popularity from all kinds of people. However, even though they were popular clubs, they hardly belonged to the people. Most club boards were composed of elites and some of them, like Fenerbahçe, Karşıyaka and Altay, went directly under the CUP protection during the Constitutional period. As previously described, similar political inclinations also happened in the republican CHP and DP governments. Until 1960, the popular sports clubs always had close relations with the political power. This also explains how club boards were socially different from club's supporters. Politics and sports belonged to the same sphere where the people did not. The lack of access to the high ranks of the political bodies was parallel to the lack of access to club boards.

The lack of the Turkish equivalents of the mushroomed British working-class football clubs does not depend solely on the fact that football was an elite sport. The working-class football clubs were just as absent in the country as trade unions and working-class associations. It would be unfair to say that during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods there was no labour movement. However, these movements did not have an organizational interconnection. Most of the labour unrest or strikes were not organized by the trade unions, even so, the labour unions were mostly constituted for a particular strike and did not have an enduring existence.¹³³ Even the most lasting ones did not represent a meaningful number of the Ottoman-Turkish workers. As the Ottoman (later Turkish) labour was unable to form strong organizations in the most crucial topics for years, a working-class organization for recreation would have been hardly realistic.

¹³³Yavuz Selim Karakışla, "The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial Working Class," *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic: 1839-1950* (London-New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), p.29.

Also, differences between religious practices in Turkey and in Britain affected the way that the sports clubs were founded. In Britain especially, the Conformist churches acted as a gathering point for the working-class, and most of them produced football or sports teams. The majority of the English football clubs of today that have blue colour on their chests had affiliation with a religious organization in their founding years (and the reds had a similar relationship with trade unions). In Islam, the clergy is by definition less visible and the social functions of the mosques are less apparent than those of the churches. In addition, the religion and secularism has always been a delicate subject in modern Turkey, so probably even if a religious football club were to have existed, it would not have received a good reaction from the state. To sum up, in Turkey the lower classes did not have the same organizations as in Britain that would create “blue” or “red” football clubs. The ironic part is that the only club founded by the working-class in the early years of Turkish modernity was founded the British. The “Telephone Club,” founded by the English technicians and the workers of the Istanbul Telephone Company in 1914, was shut down by the Ottoman government shortly later.¹³⁴

Nationalism is another subject which distinguishes Turkish football experience from that of the British. The most popular Turkish football clubs were founded by modernist elites who were also nationalists. As in almost all topics, the Turkish modernists aimed to employ football in order to overcome foreigners with their own modern tools. The strong notion of rivalry and competition in football helped them to create a popular way to convey their envy of and hostility towards foreigners. By playing football, they would prove equality with their European counterparts, and

¹³⁴ *Türk Futbol Tarihi*, p.19.

superiority by winning. The famous quote of Galatasaray founder Ali Sami Yen is the perfect expression of this mentality: “our objective is to play football like the English, to have a colour and a name and overcome the non-Turkish teams.”¹³⁵ Football clubs like Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray mostly became popular during the occupation period thanks to the matches that they played with the “enemy,” so since from the very beginning they have had a homogeneous fan base.

The fans of Turkish clubs were defined solely by fandom and by no other affiliation. Today, the well-known habit of a regular Turkish football fan to support the rival team when it plays in international tournaments shows that this nationalist notion in Turkish football is still very important. It should be remembered that the strong nationalist tendency in Turkey has always been a factor which has prevented the emergence of class consciousness. Probably the biggest success of the Turkish modernist elite was to make nationalism a primary concept for the Turkish people. The threat that could supposedly come for the nation usually united the different strata of Turkish society, surpassing their own agendas, especially in the last half-century of the republic.

This perception of threat also can be seen as an extension of the nation-building agenda of the early republic. It is no coincidence that the discourse of Turkish nationalists today usually refer to the early days of the nation when there actually was a threat. As Vamık Volkan underlines in his famous tent allegory, the nation is perceived as a tent covering all citizens, if the citizens fear that the tent would fall apart, they tend to move closer to the central pole in order to secure it.¹³⁶ The -even aggressive- nationalist

135 “Maksadımız, İngilizler gibi toplu bir halde oynamak, bir renge ve isme malik olmak ve Türk olmayan takımları yenmekti.” *Radikal*, 10 October 2002.

136 Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Türkler ve Yunanlılar: Çatışan Komşular* (Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in conflict), translated by Banu Büyükkal, (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2002), pp. 25-26.

tendency in Turkish football can be considered to be a popular expression of the people who are fearfully stuck to the pole. In these conditions where a very strong nationalist agenda is present, it is almost impossible that a football club with a class agenda would appear.

The major difference between the British and the Turkish examples concerning the emergence and the expansion of the association football is in Britain football became popular in an upwards direction, whereas in Turkey the expansion happened downwards. In Britain, football emerged from the lower classes, codified and institutionalized by the middle and upper classes, and eventually was taken over by lower classes again following the acceptance of professionalism. However, in Turkey, football was imported from Britain by the upper-middle classes and despite its eventual mass popularity among the lower class, administratively it has remained an “elites' sport.” The lack of well-structured social classes and the nationalism reinforcing this blurry picture has prevented lower classes of taking over football as in Britain. Therefore, a dual relationship between the few ones who run the clubs and the massive number of lower-class supporters appeared.

The fact that the supporters have not been able access the administration and the decision-making process in football clubs in Turkish football has decreased the importance of locality. As mentioned, in Britain, the clubs were founded and regarded as local gathering points, and they were built upon principles such as participation, commitment, and localism.¹³⁷ As will be discussed thoroughly later, even when working-

¹³⁷ Rex Nash, “Contestation in modern English professional football: the Independent Supporters Association movement”, *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 35, no.4, (2000), p.469.

class fans had to yield the administration to the upper class executives who brought capital to the club in Premier League years, they preserved these values and formed bodies, like the Football Supporters' Association (FSA) and Independent Supporters' Associations (ISAs) in order to be included in the decision-making processes. One of the main reasons that the British football fans could be organized this way was that they were physically close to each other, they had the same backgrounds and the same experiences. In Turkey, the fandom is not based on such values, and solely on their affection towards the same club. This situation brings out two major consequences; firstly, the fans do not need to be close to the clubs' home town, they can enjoy the same fandom experience even if they live very far away or even abroad. In addition, the most popular clubs do not have their premises near the neighbourhoods in which they were founded. Galatasaray, the first Turkish club to have its own training complex (built in the early 1980s), is based in Florya, which is miles away from the Galatasaray High School and the Beyoğlu area. Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş moved away from their home towns more recently, in the late 1990s. Fenerbahçe is now in Samandıra and Beşiktaş is in Ümraniye (on the Anatolian [Asian] side of the city). Beşiktaş's base is not even on the same continent as the club's birth place and actually the training complex is closer to Kadıköy (Fenerbahçe's home place) than it is to Beşiktaş area. As a result, a Beşiktaş fan living in Beşiktaş does not have a different experience from that of a fan living in Germany, for instance.

The second consequence of the fact that Turkish football fandom is not based on common background but on club affection is that the fan groups do not generally belong to a distinctive social class. Therefore, the Turkish football fans are homogeneous

socially and the fan groups of all clubs more or less present the same characteristics. Thus, due to the low importance of locality and social background, the choice of the favourite club is entirely subjective, just like the choice of the favourite colour or pet. The fact that the fans do not have a distinctive common identity also makes it difficult to reach a common ground to act towards club matters.

The lack of distinctive identity in Turkish football clubs equally brings out success as a very strong factor to gain popularity. Therefore, 89% of the football fans is estimated to support the three big Istanbul clubs¹³⁸ while only 7% of the fans support other Anatolian clubs. Considering that 17.8% of the total population resides in Istanbul, it can be estimated that only around one fifth of the Istanbul clubs' fans actually reside in Istanbul. Another survey reports that the only city where a local club has more fans than the Istanbul clubs is Trabzon, the home of the only Anatolian club that has ever won the league champions.¹³⁹ Indeed, one of the main reasons that Anatolian football fans massively shifted to the Istanbul clubs is the fact that the national league was founded in 1959 and until that year, the Istanbul championship had five decades of history with semi-professional and professional top class football. Most cities could have instant participation even after the emergence of the national league and had to wait until the 1970s to have their own professional clubs as noted earlier. This belated expansion also

138 Galatasaray Official Web Site. 5 May 2009. "*En Çok Taraftar Galatasaray'da*" (Galatasaray has the most number of fans), available [online]: <http://www.galatasaray.org/kulup/haber/3838.php> [10 December 2009].

139 Radikal Internet. 26 June 2009. "*Türkiye'nin Renkleri Belli Oldu*" (*Turkey's colours are defined*) available [online]: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=942351&Date=26.06.2009&CategoryID=84> [10 October 2009]. Even though the results of the survey seems reasonable, it should be noted the sampling method of this survey is discussable. The survey was taken by one million subscribers of the online betting site Bilyoner.com. As subscription to this site (thus participation to this survey) requires internet access and bank accounts, the sample may not have accurate representation.

reinforced the centralist character of Turkish football and football turned out to be one of the most unequally diversified fields in the country where equal allocation in other fields are also rare. This picture shows that the football fans of major clubs in Turkey are geographically and socially diverse and they do not have a meaningful connection other than supporting the same club. The major clubs are some kind of national clubs which gather popularity from all regions and strata of the country, whereas the other clubs do not have the popularity to compete with major clubs even in their own home towns. The consequences of this situation will be discussed later in a detailed way, in comparison with England.

The Football Fandom in England and in Turkey beginning from the 1970s

Political Events Affecting Football and Football Fandom in England:

The 1970s signify a distinctive era in British history regarding the country's inner conflicts, international issues and the effects of the global political climate. These years, where the conflict between Loyalist Protestants and Republican Catholics reached a new and violent level in Northern Ireland, caused several crucial shifts in British political life, which also affected the country's stance on many other matters, such as social life and the international agenda. The social change starting from the 1970s in British life can be traced in many areas, football among them being one of the most significant. However, to be able to comprehend the change in British football fandom in the last forty years, it is essential to seize the context that the 1970s created and in which

this social change took place.

The Irish conflict, or “the Troubles” as it has been designated recently by the Northern Irish parliament,¹⁴⁰ marked the beginning of this era. Indeed, the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, which later became also a conflict between Loyalists and Republicans, dates way further back, even to the migration of British settlers to Ireland in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the 1970s occupy a distinctive place due to the severity and intensity of the conflict in this era.

The Troubles is usually considered to be a conflict of identities. However, assessing this conflict to be an issue of claims seems to be more accurate. The Loyalist Catholics who defend the British rule in Northern Ireland and Republican Protestants who demand union with Ireland in order to form an island republic, have conflicting claims which usually make a reconciliation very difficult as both parties demand annexation with a different entity. Nevertheless, the identity problem in this area can not be overseen. Marc Mulholland claims that the identity crises of both parties are caused by the fear that one side will eventually submerge the other.¹⁴¹ In other words, the main reason both parties cling onto their identities even in the expense of their lives is that they fear to vanish as a community.

The first sparks of the Troubles actually appeared a little earlier than the 1970s. The fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising, the seven-day revolt of Republicans in Ulster in 1916 which eventually led to the foundation of the Sinn Fein and the declaration of the Irish Republic, marked the extreme bi-polarization of Northern

140 BBC News, 18 February 2008. “*Troubles 'Not war' Motion Passed*” available [online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7249681.stm [09 December 2009].

141 Marc Mulholland, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland's Troubled History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.vi.

Ireland. In Ulster, the Ulster Voluntary Force (UVF), a Loyalist paramilitary organization, was founded in 1966. The Force's primary objective was to aggravate the sectarianism in order to keep the Nationalist Catholics from depicting themselves as a civil rights movement.¹⁴² As long as the conflict remained sectarian, the Loyalists could hope for support from the British government and also justify their minority nationalism. The conversion of Irish nationalism into an anti-sectarian civil rights movements could be a serious threat to the Unionists, who were also a minority in terms of population. The UVF's routine attacks against civil rights demonstrations eventually revived the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and later the Provisional IRA emerged in 1969. The UVF attacks succeeded in diverting the nationalists from civil rights defence back to sectarian conflict.¹⁴³

After they managed to re-engage the IRA to the sectarian clashes, the UVF co-operated with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force of Ulster on many occasions and they managed to provoke a confrontation between the IRA and the RUC. Finally, the rising tension between these latter two resulted in three-day riots in Bogside in August 1969 and the intervention of the British Army was requested by the Northern Ireland government. Simultaneously, the IRA divided into two factions, the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA. The Provisional IRA defended a more offensive approach against the Loyalist violence and eventually they took hold of a massive nationalist support, notably after the Bloody Sunday in 1971, where in a demonstration the British army killed 13 unarmed civilians, none of whom were IRA members. The rising

142 Ibid., pp.67-68.

143 Ibid., p.70

violence in Northern Ireland also led to the abolition of the “Home Rule” system, substituted by the “Direct Rule” meaning the government of the Ireland from the British capital. In 1973, the British government attempted to give Northern Ireland its own administration with the Sunningdale Agreement, which also involved the Republic of Ireland. This deal offered a shared-powered system which required the participation of both sections.¹⁴⁴ However, this system was perceived by the Unionists as a scheme trying to annex the region to the Republic of Ireland and later with the pressure of the Protestant workers' strike in Ulster, the Unionists withdrew from the shared-power system. The Sunningdale experience failed and the violence continued throughout the 1970s.

The discontent that the Sunningdale Agreement created among the Unionists also affected the British politics. In the February 1974 elections, the Conservative Party led by the Prime Minister Edward Heath lost to the Labour Party led by former PM Harold Wilson due to the lack of support from the United Ulster Unionists, even though they were the party winning the popular vote.¹⁴⁵ Of course, the oil crisis in 1973, which affected Britain like almost every country, and the economic crisis into which the country was sinking were major factors causing this defeat; however this incident was still important as it showed how crucial this issue could be for British politics.

The unexpected take over of the government by the Labour Party in 1974 actually left the party in a difficult position. The government had to face the post-1973 economic climate and the Retail Prices Index (RPI) peaked in 1975, showing an all-time

144 Ibid., p.116.

145 *The Times*, 15 March 1974.

high 26.9 per cent inflation in August.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the sudden resignation of PM Harold Wilson on 16 March 1976 during the discussions of public expenditure cuts for upcoming two years threw the party and the government into further turmoil.¹⁴⁷ Wilson's successor James Callaghan soon after faced a “motion of no confidence” in March 1977 as some Labour MP's rebelled against his government in Scotland and Wales devolution bill.¹⁴⁸ Callaghan was forced to made a pact with the Liberals to continue his term in office. Through these hard times, the government still managed to lower the inflation rate back to single figures (7.7 per cent by September 1978¹⁴⁹) and an early election decision to reclaim the government with majority by the Labour was expected by the public¹⁵⁰ and even the Conservatives.¹⁵¹ However, Callaghan ruled out an early election to carry on the final year of his term and this led Conservatives to launch a campaign against the minority government.¹⁵² This combined with the disagreement of the government with the Trade Union Congress over the 5% pay rise curb that the government wanted to impose in 1978-79 in order to lower inflation and the course of events resulted in the period of two months between December 1978 and January 1979 which is called “the Winter of Discontent.”

The Winter of Discontent was a series of strikes organized by the trade unions in different sectors such as transportation and the public sector which did not accept the 5% curb. However, the real of effect of this period over British politics is its perception in

146 Jim O'Donoghue, “Consumer Price Inflation: 1947 to 2004”, *Economic Trends*, no.626, pp 38-54.

147 *The Times*, 17 March 1976.

148 *The Times*, 23 February 1977.

149 Jim O'Donoghue, “Harmonised index of consumer prices: historical estimates”, *Economic Trends*, no. 541, p.53.

150 *The Times*, 4 September 1978.

151 *The Times*, 5 September 1978.

152 *The Times*, 8 September 1978.

public rather than its reality. Through this period, the Labour government was represented widely by the right-wing media as completely unaware of and indifferent to the demands of the public. *The Sun's* famous headline “Crisis? What Crisis?” of 11 January 1979 was the most striking example of disinformation, as these words attributed to PM Jim Callaghan were nothing but a paraphrase of his actual words; “I don't think other people in the world would share the view there is mounting chaos.”¹⁵³ As a matter of fact, this phrase was originally used by another right-wing newspaper, the *Daily Mail* three days before PM's statement.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the newspapers such as the *Daily Mirror* and the *Daily Mail* portrayed the public sector strikes (especially of hospital workers and gravediggers) as an instant and immense threat to public health despite such risk.¹⁵⁵

As a result of the Winter of Discontent, the government was once again forced to a vote of no confidence and this time the motion was passed on 28 March 1979, leading the country to the general election. The Conservatives, who were down by 5% against the Labour according to the polls in November 1978,¹⁵⁶ massively profited from political climate of the winter and recorded a landslide victory gaining 8% more votes and 62 more seats comparing to the 1974 elections. Margaret Thatcher became the first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

During the first term of Thatcher, the economic and social policies of the United Kingdom altered sharply. In July 1979, the government decided to cut income taxes and

153 BBC News World Edition. 12 September 2000. “Crisis? What Crisis?”, available [online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/921524.stm [10 December 2009].

154 James Thomas, “‘Bound in by History’: The Winter of Discontent in British politics, 1979-2004”, *Media Culture Society* 29, (2007), p. 269.

155 *Ibid*, pp. 270-271.

156 *The Times*, 2 November 1978.

raised the indirect Value Added Tax, which resulted in a rapid but brief increase in inflation through the last half of 1979 and the first half of 1980.¹⁵⁷ However, it was the unemployment figures which pushed Britain to crisis. During Thatcher's first term between 1979 and 1983, the unemployment number doubled, reaching 3 million people.¹⁵⁸ These numbers prevented the government from applying major market reforms.

Even though the economic figures signalled a stronger social crisis than previous Labour governments had ever faced, the international agenda helped Margaret Thatcher to continue her reign. On April 2, 1982, the military in junta in Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, which had been subjected to a dispute between Britain and Argentina for decades. In return, Britain launched a naval offensive to retake the islands and it succeeded in June. During the Falklands War, the support for military action rose up to 80%¹⁵⁹ and the polls for a prospective election showed the Conservatives could easily win against the Labour.¹⁶⁰ The June 1983 elections gave the Tories a second term by a popular vote of 43.9%. Despite the hunger strikes of the Republicans in Northern Ireland in 1981 and the devastating unemployment numbers, the patriotism created around the war helped Thatcher to pursue her policies.

In the beginning of the second term, Thatcher launched a battle against trade unions which unintentionally helped her to gain power during the Winter of Discontent. The aim was briefly to dissolve the organizational capabilities of trade unions in

157 Jim O'Donoghue, "Harmonised index of consumer prices: historical estimates", p. 53.

158 Office for National Statistics, *Labour Force Surveys 1979-1991: Regressed Figures for Economic Activity* (London: Office for National Statistics, np.)

159 *The Times*, 28 April 1982.

160 *The Times*, 25 May 1982.

workplaces and diminish their political power. The trade union reform, which was finalized by the Trade Union Act of 1984, restricted the trade unions to form political funds to secret balloting every ten years.¹⁶¹ The new political funding requirements were also supported by the newly-founded Social Democratic Party as one-third of their supporters were members of unions contributing to the Labour Party and 3-3.5 million union members did not actually vote for the Labour.¹⁶² Here it should be also taken into account that the major trade union leaders asked their members to vote for the Labour before 1983 elections.¹⁶³

The act also required trade unions to vote industrial actions (such as strikes) by postal ballot, instead of workplace voting.¹⁶⁴ It also required the abolition of closed shops, in other words non-union members could be employed in workplaces. The Conservatives defended that these changes were to democratize the unions; however it was also clear that it would diminish the power of workers' unions coming from workplace collectivity as well as it would prevent unions from instant action (such as secondary industrial actions, like picketing). The act practically aimed to estrange the workplace from industrial and political action by rendering trade union membership personal and distant from the workplace. This aim overlapped with the individualist approach of Thatcherite politics as well as the Hayekian roots of Conservative stance against trade unions which saw them as bodies that stifled economic growth.¹⁶⁵

161 Mairi Steele, Kenneth Miller, John Gennard, "The Trade Union Act, 1984: Political Fund Ballots", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 24, no.3, (1986), p.444.

162 Ibid., p.447.

163 *The Times*, 4 June 1983.

164 Stephen Dunn and David Metcalf, "Trade Union Law since 1979", *Contemporary Industrial Relations: A Critical Analysis*, edited by Ian Beardwell (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 72-73.

165 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

The discussions of the Trade Union Act coincided with one of the biggest strikes in British history. The miners, led by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), went on strike on a national basis and many clashes between picketing miners and the police took place during the one year of strike. During the strike, the miners were deprived of social benefits and they tried to get by on their lives by donations. In March 1985, the NUM had to vote for the end of the strike which was a major blow for the power of trade unions in Britain.

Apart from the battle against trade unions, Thatcher's neo-liberal economic approach also showed itself in privatizations. During the second term of her reign, many public sector companies such as British Gas, British Steel and British Airways were privatized. As most privatized companies had no rivals in market, the private improvements resulted in more profitability. In 1987 where the general elections took place, the inflation rate was around 3% (lowest of the decade)¹⁶⁶ and the unemployment numbers were below 3 million for the first time since 1983.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the opposition was divided between the Labour and the Alliance (SDP and Liberals). Thatcher and the Conservatives reclaimed the government comfortably despite losing 21 seats. The third term of Thatcher suffered from weariness and she began to lose support. Especially, the Community Charge, the per-capita tax which shifted the tax burden from rich to poor caused a major unrest called “the Poll Tax Rebellion,”¹⁶⁸ and eventually she had to step down from the office as well as the Conservative presidency. John Major was appointed as her successor.

166 Jim Donaghue, “Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: Historical Estimates”, p.53.

167 Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Surveys 1979-1991: Regressed Figures for Economic Activity (London: Office for National Statistics, np.)

168 Danny Burns, *Poll Tax Rebellion* (Stirling-London: AK Press-Attack International, 1992), pp. 85-86.

One of the most striking consequences of the Thatcher period is the permanent change in British political balance. The fact that the Labour lost to Thatcher for the first time due to strikes and the discontent of the working-class caused a major crisis in left radicalism within the Labour Party. During her period, the Labour Party was divided into two and the non-conservative options increased in number whereas the Conservative Party remained intact. Thatcher and eventually the Conservatives had to step down from Downing Street; however, the Labour governments following that period did not follow the same policies as pre-Thatcher Labour governments had. Especially Tony Blair's close alliance with the neo-conservative Bush government in the USA can be considered to be a continuation of the Thatcherite foreign policy, if not more extreme. In addition, the weakening of the trade unions and their affiliation to the party also took class consciousness out of the Labour and generally the British political agenda. Hence, it can be said that the Thatcher period not only presented a politically conservative and economically liberal picture, but also it shifted the mainstream politics into those axes.

Political Events Affecting Football and Football Fandom in Turkey:

The start and end points of three decades in Turkish history can be found easily in a series of coups d'etat that took place in 1960, 1971 and 1980. These coups created a tradition of military perturbation in Turkish democracy and became decisive in the course of social and political history. Among those three coups, the 12 March 1971 coup was probably the most permeable regarding the political climate before and after it. In the late 1960s, the right-wing Demirel government of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* –

AP) took an anti-leftist stance against the rising left influenced by the global political atmosphere and found a chance to grow under the relatively more libertarian conditions of the 1960 Constitution. Left-thought became popular notably in the universities through “Thought Clubs” (*Fikir Kulüpleri*) and the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP*) became the first legal socialist party to be represented in the national assembly thanks to the 3% vote they received in the 1965 general elections. However, the Turkish socialists were divided into factions a couple of years later due to ideological differences mainly based on how the revolution should be made.

The National Democratic Revolution (*Millî Demokratik Devrim – MDD*) faction of the TİP believed in a coalition of progressive military officers and socialist in order to lead the proletariat to the revolution, which was let down later by the severe reaction of the army against the 15-16 June 1970 workers' protests.¹⁶⁹ The MDD also led to many communist organizations which adopted urban guerilla warfare tactics, such as the kidnapping of the American officials in Turkey, bank robberies and bombings. The leftist violence at the end of the 1960s gave the much-awaited chance to the right-wing militants to respond in a far more destructive manner. Especially, the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP*) of the 1960 coup's Colonel Türkeş and its paramilitary youth organization the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*) escalated the violence climb to higher levels. The Demirel government was not impartial between the two parties of the violence, and even it had been, it was not capable of stopping it as the government was weakened by the defections to minor right-wing parties.

In these conditions, the 12 March 1971 ultimatum came. The memorandum was

169 Zürcher, pp. 255-256.

addressed to the whole assembly and briefly saying “a military intervention would be compulsory in case a government that could stop the anarchy and make reforms in a Kemalist insight.”¹⁷⁰ Demirel immediately responded to the memorandum by resigning with his entire cabinet and called the military declaration “incompatible with the constitutional principles and the state of law.”¹⁷¹ The CHP, in opposition, initially protested against the military memorandum, however when it became clear that the military had selected CHP member Nihat Erim as the next prime minister, the party president İsmet İnönü gave support to the new government.¹⁷² Nihat Erim was a conservative PM who represented the centre-right wing of the CHP. He somehow had a political rivalry with the CHP general secretary Bülent Ecevit, who was the leader of the centre-left wing of the party. Days before the military ultimatum, two wings opposed each other over a motion of constitutional change about the treasure aid to the political parties, proposed by Ecevit himself.¹⁷³ The appointment of Erim to the new government as prime minister and the CHP's support led the party to a major break and Ecevit-wing resigned from party posts one week later to pursue an inner-party opposition against İnönü.

In May 1972, Ecevit took over the power in the CHP and reshaped the party. While Ecevit was pushing the CHP to the centre-left, the government and the army was carrying out a massive hunt against the left. Starting from the National Security Council meeting in 27 April 1971, thousands of union members, left intellectuals and TİP

170 *Milliyet*, 13 March 1971.

171 *Ibid.*

172 Zürcher, pp. 258.

173 *Milliyet*, 26 February 1971.

members were arrested and most faced torture and inhumane behaviour.¹⁷⁴ During this offensive, many right-wing militants were employed. This violent attitude of the army against the socialists humbled the left, however it also helped the centre-left CHP to become a new source of attraction. With the abolition of the TİP on 20 July 1971, the CHP remained as the sole legal left party. While the Turkish left was forced to shift to centre, the right quickly gave up its initial reaction against the military intervention and supported the Erim and later Melen governments. It was clear that the army, its government and the right-wing had a common agenda against the “communism threat.” The right's support to unpopular governments also helped Ecevit and the CHP became the first party on popular vote in the 14 October 1973 general elections by 33.3% against the 29.8% of Demirel's AP. However, this vote and 185 MP's were insufficient for the CHP to form a government, so the country went into another period of crisis.

Ecevit had to enter into a coalition with Islamist Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (*Millî Nizam Partisi*) in January 1974. In the first months of the government, the attacks against the Cypriot Turks by Greek Cypriot paramilitary organization EOKA-B reached a climax in Cyprus, so the government decided to intervene according to Turkey's guarantor status given by the 1960 Treaty of Cyprus Republic. The first intervention to Cyprus in June 1974 was later followed by a second and unlawful intervention in August (during the Geneva talks which were supposed to find a solution to the issue), which led to an illegal occupation of the Turkish army in Cyprus, which still remains today. Ecevit benefited from the nationalistic climate sourced by the interventions in Turkey. He decided to push the national assembly into

174 Zürcher, pp. 259.

the elections in order to cash the popularity into votes and form a strong single-party government, thus he declared his intention to resign on 16 September 1974, claiming that he could not convince Necmettin Erbakan not to make speeches that could put Turkey into a difficult position.¹⁷⁵ However, his plan backfired as the other parties were aware that they could not handle the CHP and Ecevit in an early election and they decided to form a coalition. After long negotiations which involved unethical tactics, Demirel convinced the small right-wing parties to form a “Nationalist Front” government. However, this government, which was based solely on avoiding an early election and an Ecevit government, failed to act against the global economic crisis and the Kurdish issue which aggravated with the 1970 coup.

The Kurdish issue in Turkey can be traced back to the early years of the modern Turkey, even before the War of Independence. The issues which emerged from the clash of two late nationalisms built decades of mistrust and brought a torment to the late 1960s. The 1960s witnessed some major changes in both parties. After the 1960 coup, especially the Kurdish bourgeoisie was widely punished by the military. The bank that the Kurdish bourgeoisie had founded, Doğu Bank, was liquidated by military decree, their tribal leaders were forced to migrate to Western Turkey and the body of the religious Kurdish nationalist Said-i Nursi was interred by the army.¹⁷⁶

Despite the harshness of the army, the 1960s still became a period of enlightenment for the Kurds. This enlightenment had two sources; the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDPI) and the general left intellectual current in Turkey. The

¹⁷⁵ *Milliyet*, 17 September 1974.

¹⁷⁶ Hamit Bozarslan, “Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in contemporary Turkey,” *The Kurds: a Contemporary Overview*, edited by Philip K. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl. (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 103.

actions of the army against the cleric and tribal leaders which either deported and destabilize them resulted in a more liberal and intellectual Kurdish nationalism. On one hand, the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan was founded clandestinely as a branch or equivalent of KDPI in 1964 which brought together intellectual, craftsmen and clerics.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, Marxist Kurdish fractions emerged inside and outside of the Marxist political entities. TİP was one of the parties which gave special importance to the subject and it was one of the reason of the closing verdict against them.

In the early 1970s, Revolutionary Culture Clubs of the East (*Doğu Devrimci Kültür Ocakları* – DDKO) also played an important role in the Kurdish movement. This network of Kurdish intellectuals were influenced by the uprisings in the world, notably in Latin America. The DDKOs helped the Kurdish intellectuals of Turkey distinguish themselves both from the Kurdish movement in Iraq and the Turkish left movement.¹⁷⁸ The DDKOs were short-lived, but they managed to draw the frame of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey.

1977 was an important year in the Kurdish movement as a result of two events. First, in the general elections of June, four Kurdish independent candidates were elected to the National Assembly. The other event was the foundation of the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK*), the militant organization led by Abdullah Öcalan. The Kurdish nationalists were trying to find ways of political struggle both in legal and illegal means. However, the constant military interventions in region and the political turmoil of Turkey in general, pushed the Kurdish movement into further

177 Ibid, pp. 76-77.

178 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

radicalization through the late 1970s and 1980s.

In the late 1970s, Turkey went through a violent phase apart from the Kurdish issue as well. This violence depended on different reasons: the employment of right-wing radicals by the state, the unstable political climate, the disillusioned radical left and the appalling economic figures being the major ones. After the 1977 elections, both the AP and the CHP formed short-lived coalitions with minor political powers, and in November 1979, the AP formed a minority government. None of these government could resolve the problems that the country faced.

Probably the most crucial problem was the economic figures. By the end of the 1970s, the unemployment rate was estimated as 20% whereas the inflation rate found 100%, and Turkey's international debt reached 2.6 billion US dollars.¹⁷⁹ In these years, the economic crisis manifested itself as a foreign exchange shortage. Pamuk lists the reasons behind the foreign exchange crisis as the clientalist agricultural support policies, the expansion of market for consumer goods as unionization in the 1960s brought high wages and the remittances sent to Turkey by the workers emigrated to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁸⁰ The import-substitution model applied to Turkey for the past two decades were no longer sufficient due to the rising demands of the public any more, so the intermediate and consumer goods as well as technology had to be imported which caused the rapid liquidation of the foreign exchange reserves.

The demand for more advanced consumer goods also depended on -generally ignored- cultural reasons. The 1970s was the era where the television was introduced to

179 Şevket Pamuk, "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey," *MERIP Reports*, 1981, pp. 26-27.

180 *Ibid.*, pp. 28.

Turkey. The state television TRT (Turkish Radio and Television – *Türkiye Radyo Televizyonu*) initially gave the priority to the domestic productions and foreign films, however the American production soap operas rapidly took over both in terms of broadcasting hours and popularity. In 1970, 30.73% of the broadcasts were imported, among which 6.09% were the serials (none of them were American productions).¹⁸¹ As an important change, the TV started to broadcast commercials in 1972 and the broadcasts' popularity became more crucial. The next year, the serials occupied 8.58% of total broadcasting time, of which 60% were American productions.¹⁸² In 1977, the serials occupied one-eighth of the total broadcasting time and 27 American serials were broadcasted.¹⁸³ The contents of these serials were criticized even by government officials in TRT General Council Meetings for “showing the lives of rotten capitalist families” and “nibbling moral values.”¹⁸⁴

The domination of the American serials on television was, in fact, another facet of the failing import-substitution model. On one hand, the increasing television audience were demanding for high-quality production. On the other hand, the domestic producers did not have the experience and technical capabilities to produce programmes that could match American productions. Even a slightly lower quality could have been reached, the costs for production would have surpassed the import costs.¹⁸⁵ Hence, the TRT was obliged to import these productions. The figures that former senior TRT official Özden Cankaya diligently gathered shows the trend towards American production changed

181 Özden Cankaya, *Türk Televizyonun Program Yapısı* (The Programming Structure of the Turkish Television 1968-1985), author's own publication, np., p.22.

182 Ibid., pp.29-30.

183 Ibid., pp. 46-47.

184 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

185 Ibid., pp. 100.

neither during intellectual Ismail Cem's presidency nor during conservative Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe – MC*) reigns. The commercialized television was simply following the viewers' demand.

The cultural codes that these serials contained and their effects can be discussed. It is widely believed that especially productions like “Dallas” and “Dynasty” were tools of cultural imperialism and they promoted American values. We think that these productions' real cultural effect was not entirely direct like the government official quoted believed. However, these serials set the standards for the television production worldwide. In Turkey and in many other countries, hundreds of local productions modelled after “Dallas” were made. It is more important to focus on what Dallas was, rather than what “Dallas” tried to say. “Dallas” (like many others) was a show which solely targeted entertainment and created a complex fictional world of almost surreal relationships that almost stupefies the viewer. It was probably the first popular example of this kind of entertainment. Today, “Dallas” is no longer shown in Turkey; however, there are dozens of Turkish serials which include similar fictional worlds that have no value in the real world. This can be considered as the real “Dallas effect.”

While the Turkish public were discovering America through television, the country was isolated from the rest of the world. The second Cyprus intervention and the occupation following the invasion put the Turkish foreign policy on a steep road. The second intervention was condemned unanimously by the United Nations Security Council Resolution No.367 on 12 March 1975 and this was followed by an arms embargo by the USA.¹⁸⁶ This reaction pushed Turkish foreign policy onto new paths.

186 Zürcher, pp.276.

Both the Ecevit and Nationalist Front governments sought to create close ties with the Arab world. Ecevit's pro-Third World approach and the MC's conservatism close to Islamism shifted Turkey to a policy which was more sympathetic to the Arab world, especially during the tense periods of the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁸⁷ Yet, this particular Third-World tendency of the 1970s ended in 1980 with the pro-American coup d'etat.

The 1980 coup d'etat was different than the previous two in many aspects. First of all, the 1971 coup d'etat was actually a memorandum after which the government took the threat seriously. The structure of the assembly did not change after the coup, the governments were formed by independent and technocrat ministers. In 1980, all the actors of the Turkish politics were wiped out, on a scale which even the 1960 coup had not reached. The objective of the 1980 coup was to remove all the actors from the table and reshape the political scene from scratch. Its difference from the 1960 coup was it did not aim at a single group. If the 1960 coup d'etat took over the government, the 1980 coup confiscated the entire political life. It also affected almost anyone involved in any political activity. In one year 122,600 arrests was made, one-quarter of which had to wait more than one year for trial.¹⁸⁸ 171 people died because of torture,¹⁸⁹ although the real number is believed to exceed thousands, bearing in mind the unreported cases and “natural cause” and “suicide” death reports given by state officials.

The 1980 coup is widely believed to have been orchestrated by the CIA. This claim has not been proven yet; however, there is strong evidence that it was at least

187 Mehmet Hasgüler, *Kıbrıs'ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu* (The end of “Enosis” and “Taksim” policies in Cyprus), (Istanbul: İletişim 2002), p. 186.

188 Zürcher, p.279.

189 Hüsni Öndül and Yavuz Önen. “*Basına ve Kamuoyuna*”, available [online]: http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32:basina-ve-kamuoyuna&catid=30:ortak-baslamalar&Itemid=80 [12 December 2009].

staged under USA acknowledgement. General Tahsin Şahinkaya was in Washington DC just nine days before the coup. Also, the communications systems of Turkish military were operated by the US Army at the time.¹⁹⁰

Whether it is true that the 1980 coup was performed under US commands or not, the junta in 1980 only had the USA as an international ally after the coup. The second biggest arms supplier of Turkey after the USA, West Germany gave “political refugee” status to those who fled after the coup and blocked the financial aid planned under the 1981 OECD Consortium.¹⁹¹ The Council of Europe, of which Turkey was a founding member, suspended Turkey's presence in the assembly between 1980-84 while a probable expulsion from the Council was prevented by the US lobbies.¹⁹² The military junta also created outrage in the Third World. Turkey's sole international contacts except the USA were either junta leaders like Ziya Ul-Hak in Pakistan or dictators such as Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria or Nicolai Ceaucescu in Romania.¹⁹³ The country was completely isolated regarding foreign policy.

The 1983 general elections was the initial but unhealthy attempt to switch back to democracy. The Political Parties Law that lifted the ban on political activities but connecting them entirely to the permission of the National Security Council came into effect in April 1983. The elections were scheduled to be in November. Six months was an extremely short period to form new political entities. To be able to succeed in such a short term, one should have either somehow affiliated to state organizations or should

190 Jim Paul, “The Coup”, *MERIP Reports*, no.4, 1993, p.4.

191 İhsan D. Dağı, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no.2, April 1996, p. 126.

192 *Ibid.*, p. 127.

193 Hasgüler, pp. 186-187.

have been the successor of one of the banned parties. Twelve of the fifteen newly-founded parties were vetoed by the National Security Council (because of having ties with the banned organizations) and only three parties qualified to join the elections. These were the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* – MDP), founded by former military officials, the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti* – HP), close to CHP-style Kemalism and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* – ANAP), founded by pre-1980 economics bureaucrat Turgut Özal. Among these parties, the MDP had the closest ties to the junta. The program of the party was referring to the coup, declaring that it will work “according to the spirit and philosophy of September 12 which had saved the nation from being divided”¹⁹⁴. The HP considered itself to be on the centre-left. ANAP's political tendency was the mixture of economic liberalism, conservatism, Islamism and nationalism.

While founding the MDP, the initial idea was to form a political entity that could receive support from both the former CHP and AP supporters¹⁹⁵. Instead, the MDP turned out to be a party that could not attract votes from either sides. The MDP's politics, based on the continuity of the September 12 spirit, faced a widespread rejection from the voters and came last in the elections by 23%. The word “nationalist” in its name and the rumours that the party was close to the former MHP that created the most of the pre-1980 right-wing violence could have also been a factor on this defeat.¹⁹⁶

The second party in the elections, the Populist Party was the sole alternative on the left, however, it could not get pass over 30% in this three-party race. The HP aimed

194 “...Türk milletini bölünmekten kurtaran 12 Eylül ruh ve felsefesine inanır ve siyasi faaliyetini bu yönde yürütür.” *Milliyet*, 16 May 1983.

195 Feroz Ahmad, “The 1983 Elections,” *MERIP Reports*, March/April 1984, p.4.

196 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

to appeal to the former CHP voters, but it was closer to İnönü's CHP rather than Ecevit's. If Social Democracy Party (SODEP) had not been barred from the elections, probably the party could have never reached the amount of votes that it received. The HP was the choice of those who did not want to vote for Sunalp or Özal.

Özal's ANAP's victory in the elections by 45% (which was sufficient to form a new government due to the new system specially designed to prevent coalitions) can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, among Sunalp and Calp, Özal might have seemed to be the “genuine” civilian candidate.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, both Sunalp and Calp defended some sort of statism whereas Özal represented liberalism. Even economic statism might have been avoided because it was related to the state, in other words the junta. It is hard to make assumptions on the reasons for the ANAP victory as it was a very short election campaign after which the public voted for parties that the programmes and leaders of which they did not know.¹⁹⁸ One thing is clear, the winner of these elections would obtain great political power, as he would form a one-party government due to the new system and the opposition would be weak as the real serious opponents were banned outside. Özal managed to get this power and used it to reshape the country.

The main focus in the Özal years was the economy. In fact, Özal's economic policies came into effect much before the 1983 elections. Özal was the “super-minister” to regulate the economy in compliance with the IMF stand-by agreement. He stayed in this post during the junta reign as well. The transformation from import substitution to

197 Zürcher, p. 282.

198 Ahmad, pp. 8-9.

liberalism started with the 24 January 1980 decisions, passed through the junta years and came back to Özal in 1983. That was probably why Turgut Özal and his party were not vetoed by the junta and allowed as the third party whereas it was known that the real aim was a two-party system (both founded by the state figures). The junta may have erased everything in the country but Turkey still depended on IMF agreements and probably on Özal, too. The key elements of economic transformations were; the devaluation of the Lira and flexible exchange rate, subsidiarity of exports and import liberalization.¹⁹⁹

While carrying out the economic transformation, Özal had to deal with high inflation figures. In order to slow down the inflation, the junta government froze public wages and removed any restrictions on rates, so people would invest instead of spending and the inflation would fall down.²⁰⁰ However, this resulted in the brokerage scandal, as most independent brokers, “Banker Kastelli” Cevher Özden being the most famous, touched risky funds in order to compete with the rising interest rates of the regular banks and lost their clients' money who invested on them in order to survive the high inflation. Furthermore, these measures failed to resolve the inflation problem in long-term, but brought very short-term relief.

Apart from the inflation problem, Özal reached his goals in economic transformation. He created a competitive market where domestic producers were expected to grow by exporting and to compete with the foreign goods which were easy to import. In the background of this picture, consumers were encouraged to buy luxury items. The new goods acted as the propaganda of the economic policies. The imported

199 Ali Bayar, “The Developmental State and Economic Policy in Turkey,” *Third World Quarterly* 17, No. 4, (December 1996), p. 779.

200 Zürcher, p. 307.

consumer goods appealed to public curiosity after years of import substitution. One interesting example of this curiosity was the “Chiquita” crisis in 1984. That year, the government allowed the import of Chiquita brand bananas, claiming domestic banana production had been lower than expected. The imported bananas caused a political crisis as the Motherland Party MPs of the major banana producing city, Antalya, threatened to resign. However, Chiquita bananas were sold in Antalya on the day Özal visited the city at a higher rate than the domestic product.²⁰¹ It was striking that bananas were sold out in a city where bananas were one of the major products.

Özal's import-export policy widened the gap between the companies. The big holdings that were capable of exporting abroad and competing domestically grew in that era as many smaller others were wiped out. Equally, many entrepreneurs who could afford to invest became rich whereas the regular paid workers and officers struggled. The high competition and the widening economic gap between rich and poor also triggered a wave of corruption.

During Özal's reign, the political liberalization was rather slow comparing to the economic one. However, still important steps towards a more civil democracy were taken. The most crucial one among those was the lifting of the ban on some political parties and figures. In 1984, the National Assembly freed some of the banned parties of 1983, such as the SODEP and the Right Path Party (DYP). These parties were obvious successors of the CHP and AP, respectively, and became serious opponents to ANAP. The second step was on lifting the ban on political leaders, such as Ecevit, Demirel and Erbakan.

²⁰¹ *Milliyet*, 12 February 1984.

After the first step worked against the government, Özal tried to prevent their comeback by yielding the issue to public voting. Second gamble of Özal on this subject was once again against him. He lost the referendum by 50.26 to 49.76. As a response, Özal changed the elective system before the 1987 elections and brought a system which gave more MPs to the party with most public votes. Thanks to this system, the ANAP managed to have 292 MPs despite having one-third of the votes. The SHP won only 99 MPs in exchange for 25% of votes. The DYP gained 59 MPs. One important result of these elections was İnönü and the SHP were by far the biggest party on the left against Ecevit's 8%. The SHP was awarded for being a strong opposition during the previous term. The party surpassed the Motherland Party in the municipal elections two years later.

The lifting of the ban hurt Özal in three ways. The Motherland Party was a party of different factions. The return of Erbakan, Demirel and Türkeş caused the dissolution of these factions. Most Islamists, conservatives and nationalists went back to their original entities as the Motherland Party was losing power. The 1980s wore out the Özal government while the others were refreshed during the ban. In 1989, Özal replaced Kenan Evren as the President of the Republic and this probably marked the end of an era. Demirel became the PM after the 1991 elections.

On the left, things were quite different. Until 1991, Erdal İnönü and the SHP pursued an uncontested leadership of the left. However, the low-key performance of the SHP municipalities between 1989-91, especially the wave of strikes and water breakouts in Istanbul cost the party an 8% of votes in the 1991 elections. In 1992, a faction of the party led by Deniz Baykal fled the party to re-form the Republican People's Party.

By 1994, the SHP votes were as low as 19.68% while the Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Ecevit reached 11.23%. The CHP was at 2.93%. After the elections, the heavy defeat of the SHP triggered the discussions of a unified social democrat party as the total vote of the three parties could have signified a victory. Ecevit responded negatively to this proposal, mainly due to his feud with Baykal. However, İnönü responded positively and the SHP and the CHP were merged in February 1995 under the name of the CHP. By the end of the year, Baykal took over the presidency from Çetin, which led to many resignations from the party. The new CHP, especially with the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party and the 28 February 1997 military intervention, followed a more nationalistic and militantly secular style of politics. The focus of the former SHP was rather economics and it had a more liberal stance on the Kurdish issue. The CHP gave priority to the defence of Kemalism and secularism instead of labour politics, so it was from time to time accused of not being a social democratic party any longer. Interestingly, this shift of Baykal to Kemalism resulted in the biggest election defeat of party's history as in 1999 the CHP was left out of the assembly as the party failed to pass 10% electoral barrage. Ecevit won those elections by 22% of votes. Baykal and the CHP could bounce back only when Ecevit suffered a heavy economic crisis in 2001 when the DSP was in power.

One of the key factors that had led the social-democratic SHP become the Kemalist CHP was the rise of the Islamists throughout the 1990s. The Islamist movement had been more or less a target of the 12 September coup as their party National Salvation (*Millî Selamet Partisi – MSP*) had also been banned. Its continuity Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi – RP*) was formed but vetoed from the 1983 elections.

However, some former MSP members formed a group within the ANAP and managed to survive the ban orders against the continuity parties before the 1983 elections. Turgut Özal was himself a former MSP member and his elder brother Korkut had also been one of the leading figures of the party. Also Mehmet Keçeciler had been the former MSP mayor of Konya where the famous anti-Kemalist “Jerusalem Rally” was organized in 6 September 1980. Most of the ANAP members with Islamist backgrounds managed to pass the military veto and became MPs after the 1983 elections. Some others, like Keçeciler, joined them one term later with the ANAP's motion to lift some of the bans in 1984. The Islamists in the ANAP both profited from and contributed to the party's success. After the referendum for lifting the political ban of the former party leaders resulted in favour and Özal's death, a number of these people such as Abdülkadir Aksu and Cemil Çiçek resigned from the ANAP and joined the RP, presided by Necmettin Erbakan, the former MSP leader. The RP benefited from the decline of the ANAP in the 1991 elections. Whereas the ANAP had kept the Islamist current alive for years, the RP managed to take over when it stalled. It should be noted that the ANAP had a similar effect on the MHP as well. While Alparslan Türkeş was banned and the continuity party was struggling, the nationalist current was alive within ANAP ranks. With the return of the old leaders and the fall of the ANAP, both parties regained their former positions and for some period they exceeded where they had been before.

The RP succeeded in joining the National Assembly after the 1991 elections by raising its votes to around 9% and largely profiting (along with DYP) from the 12% loss of ANAP. The second and big leap of the party came with the 1994 municipal elections. This time the RP not only managed to gather the right-wing votes lost by the Özal-less

ANAP and the Demirel-less DYP (Demirel became the president of the Republic after Özal's death), but also profited from the poor performance of the SHP mayors, especially in Istanbul, where the municipal workers' strikes and the water outages created Istanbul's own "period of discontent." The SHP lost all three big cities to the RP (Istanbul, Ankara) and the DYP (Izmir). The future Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, one of the young "innovators" of the RP, became Istanbul mayor. One year later, with the fall of the DYP-SHP coalition, the early elections took place and Erbakan's RP claimed victory against unexperienced rivals Çiller, Yılmaz and Karayalçın. However, its 21% was not enough for a single-party government, and the short-lived ANAP-DYP coalition (also known as Anayol) was founded.

The early 1990s also witnessed the assassinations of major Kemalist and left-wing thinkers, such as Turan Dursun, Bahriye Üçok, Çetin Emeç and Uğur Mumcu. During this period, both Islamists and Kemalists began to radicalize. For instance, Hasan Mezarıcı, the RP MP, who had already been controversial by criticizing the secular state and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, claimed those who attended Uğur Mumcu's mass funeral "disrespected Islam."²⁰² Mezarıcı continued his criticisms of Mustafa Kemal, and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller invited all party leaders (except those of the RP and pro-Kurdish Democracy Party - DEP) and citizens to a "Respect Atatürk" rally.²⁰³ The SHP leader Murat Karayalçın, MHP leader Alparslan Türkeş, as well as the army officials responded positively. Students from high schools were invited and brought by buses to join the rally in Taksim Square. This rally was probably the first instance of the Kemalist mass

²⁰² *Milliyet*, 4 April 1993.

²⁰³ *Milliyet*, 27 February 1994.

politics in the 1990s that positioned itself as secular and nationalist; in other words anti-Islamist and anti-Kurdish. This rally also marked the end of the left-right wing distinction in Turkish politics for the first time after the 1960 coup. The political lines were redrawn over ethnicity and religion.

The ethnicity axis of the new politics evidently was drawn over the Kurdish issue. In the early 1990s, the ANAP tried to make some reforms about the cultural rights of the Kurdish minority who struggled under Martial Law. The ban on the Kurdish language in private life was lifted in 1991. Also Adnan Kahveci prepared a report about the resolution of the issue through democratization; however, he was killed in a car crash after this report. In 1992, he had claimed his party's reform attempts to solve the issue were blocked by Kenan Evren, including a Kurdish language state TV station.²⁰⁴ This was probably true as the SHP report which also proposed Kurdish broadcasts in 1990 was investigated by the State Security Court.²⁰⁵ However, it would be incorrect to say the ANAP had a strong will to resolve this issue after Özal resigned from the party to become the president of the Republic. The Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut, the successor of Özal in ANAP responded the SHP report saying “There is no such thing as a Kurd, there is only Turks. Everyone living in this land is obliged to be Turk.”²⁰⁶ Of course, this nationalistic tone also can be associated by ANAP's willingness to benefit from nationalism to strengthen up its struggling position against the SHP and the DYP at that period; however, it should also be taken into account that the ANAP was a party that also had strong nationalist roots.

204 *Milliyet*, 16 May 1992.

205 *Milliyet*, 26 June 1990.

206 “Kürt yoktur, Türk vardır. Bu topraklar üzerinde yaşayan herkes Türk olmak mecburiyetindedir.” *Milliyet*, 31 July 1990.

One important twist in the Kurdish issue in the early 1990s was the foundation of Kurdish political parties. The September 1980 coup and the torture and killings that Kurdish intellectuals suffered in Diyarbakır Prison during the junta years had a big impact on Kurdish nationalism. While the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) was conducting armed battle by attacking military and also civilian targets, prominent Kurdish nationalists sought a legal political battle. In 1990, the People's Labour Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*) was founded. The party made an alliance with the SHP in the 1991 elections and its ten candidates were elected to the Assembly. However, these MP's attempt on reading the Parliament vow in Kurdish created an uproar. The MPs were expelled from the Assembly by police force. The party was banned. Many continuity parties were founded after the first experience, all of them were eventually banned. By the time this thesis was written, the Constitutional Court had abolished the Democratic Society Party, the sixth Kurdish party. Another party called the Peace and Democracy Party founded during the court case.

During the 1990s, both legal and illegal attempts at Kurdish liberation received negative reactions from the Turkish public. The Kurdish parties were associated with the PKK by public, media and also by the Constitutional Court. Also, the politicians in these parties did not have a compromising stance in most cases due to the reactionary radicalization through the 1970s and notably after the 1980 coup. It should also be noted that as the visibility of Kurdish nationalism increased in the 1990s, the Turkish nationalism benefited from it to a great extent. Tansu Çiller's allegations against the DEP (the second successor of HEP) in the famous “Respect Atatürk” rally (Çiller was greeted

by “nationalist Prime Minister” slogans while making a speech directed against the DEP²⁰⁷), the MHP's constant appearances in military funerals were examples of Turkish nationalism seeking public support on the Kurdish issue.

The anti-Islamist and anti-Kurdish climate of the early 1990s seemed to work for Tansu Çiller and the DYP at first. However, the secular voters of the DYP experienced a shock when the party made a coalition with the RP in June 1996. This coalition brought Islamists to power as the major party for the first time in Turkish history. This government was later thrown away by the 28 February 1997 de facto coup. Tansu Çiller, who once rallied the public against RP, lost her popularity among secular Kemalists with this decision.

The 28 February military intervention, which consisted of an ultimatum given to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in a National Security Council meeting, reshaped the political balance in Turkey. Bülent Ecevit's DSP, the minor partner of the post-intervention government, benefited from both the Kemalist-secular political climate and the transformation from the SHP to the CHP. Also taking part in the post-crisis government reassured the voters who carried the DSP to the leading party position in the 1999 elections. The major party of the coalition the ANAP of Mesut Yılmaz also profited from the fall of both the RP and the DYP; however, the inner-party balance was seriously damaged after Özal's death and some issues such as giving too many seats to the DSP in the government and appointing the former DYP members to ministries led to major differences within the party.

Even with those problems, the ANAP managed to surpass the DYP and was very

²⁰⁷ *Milliyet*, 1 March 1994.

close to the newly-founded Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi – FP*, the continuity of RP banned by Constitutional Court order in 1997) in the 1999 elections. The DYP could come in only fifth and Tansu Çiller resigned from party presidency. The Nationalist MHP was another party that took advantage of the post-February 28 climate. In the six-party and rather diverse assembly, the DSP made a coalition with the MHP and the ANAP to form the government. However, all three parties received severe damage during this term. The performance of the MHP's health and public works ministers after the 1999 earthquake disaster, the major 2001 economic crisis and the DSP leaders' divergence with the president of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer affected these two parties very negatively. Also the ANAP could not overcome its own crisis. As a result, all three parties were left out of the assembly in the 2002 elections. The sum of three parties' votes did not exceed 15%. Especially the DSP, losing 21% of votes in three years, had the biggest damage.

The February 28 intervention led to major changes on the Islamist side of Turkish politics. The intervention and the closing orders against the RP and the FP accelerated the separation of party's two wings. With the closing order against the continuity party the FP acted as a decree absolute. The pro-innovation side led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went on to founding the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP*) while the traditionalists stayed with the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi – SP*), led by Recai Kutan, a close ally of Necmettin Erbakan. Whereas the intervention affected both wings and shifted their politics towards a less radical direction, it was the AKP that took it to next level and redefined Islamist conservatism.

Erdoğan's cadre combined economic liberalism and some sort of conservative

modernism with family and religious values and produced an entity which resembled the neo-conservative Republican Party of the USA.²⁰⁸ As Bush's Republicans had connections with the Reagan era, the AKP had with the Özal period. The AKP was like a more religious-oriented version of Özal's ANAP. Just like the ANAP, it appeared in a destabilized post-coup era and managed to gather popularity. However, what the ANAP did not have to face was the radicalized Kemalists and the army. The AKP and its new conservatism, along with the newly-emerged upper class modern conservatives pushed the Kemalist middle-class to a climate of fear. This climate also reshaped the CHP, and the party rapidly shifted to a much more nationalistic, Kemalist and secularist approach. İnel claims this shift was because the party saw that there was a nationalistic reaction against the problems of globalization and Turkey's essential issues.²⁰⁹ While İnel's claim seems reasonable at some points, it should also be added that the CHP also adapted itself to the new definition of post-February 28 politics. Whereas the former SHP had contested the ANAP in the 1980s through economic policies, the CHP contested the AKP's religious aspirations as well as its pro-EU and pro-solution approach in issues like the Cyprus and the Kurdish issue. The major political line of the 1980s in Turkey was the economic transformation, whereas in the 2000s it was rather the religious and national questions. Today, Turkish politics seems to be divided between the AKP and the nationalist CHP-MHP bloc acting on many issues (such as the Kurdish issue and the European Union matters) together.

208 Ahmet İnel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, No. 2/3 (Spring/Summer2003), p.301.

209 Ahmet İnel, "CHP Nedir?" (What is CHP?), 6 September 2008, available [online]: <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/makale.aspx?mid=424&makale=CHP%20Nedir?> [12 December 2009].

Football-related events affecting football fandom

Football-related events affecting football fandom in England

English football, which had its golden era in the 1960s by winning the World Cup in 1966 and its first European Club with Manchester United in 1967, had a decade of disillusionment in the 1970s, just like the country itself. The 1970 World Cup in Mexico, where England aimed to defend its crown, ended prematurely due to a revenge-style overtime victory by the West Germans in the quarter final (in 1966, England had won the World Cup against Germany with a controversial goal in extra time). It was the end of an era for English football and also for the country.

Just three days after the quarter final game, British voters ended the six-year Labour reign by electing Conservative Edward Heath as prime minister in the general elections. Whereas the simultaneity of the fall of Labour and the national team in 1970 may be purely coincidental, the rise of English football was somehow connected to the Labour. The Labour government paid a special interest in football and hosting the World Cup (later in which England would become world champions) after the 1964 election and appointed its Birmingham MP and Football League referee Dennis Howell as Department of Education and Science Minister with Special Responsibility for Sport allocating half a million pounds for World Cup organization.²¹⁰ The six-year term of

²¹⁰ Martin Polley, "The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 Football World Cup," *The Sports Historian* 18, no. 2, (1998), p. 4.

Harold Wilson witnessed the major successes of English football; however both the Labour government and English football started the new decade poorly.

The 1970s was a decade in which English football was influenced deeply by the political mood of the country. Almost every single issue that Britain had to pass through had an effect on the football scene as well. One of these issues was obviously the Troubles in the Northern Ireland. The rising nationalism in Northern Ireland and also in Scotland and Wales (in lower magnitudes) affected the sports domain, rugby and football in particular. The fact that all nations in the United Kingdom have their own football and rugby national teams combined with this nationalistic trend and the rivalries between these teams gained a more intense meaning.

Sports had been a tool of inner-Britain nationalisms since the 1880s when the “national” federations and teams for different sports such as football and rugby, however the atmosphere was not as intense as in the late 1960s and 1970s. The reason for that was before the Second World War, most sports did not have fully global tournaments, even football failed to gather a worldwide representation in the pre-1945 World Cups. For example, the first World Cup in Uruguay in 1930 had only four European teams as most countries could not afford the trip and did not want to send their best players overseas.²¹¹ In these conditions, the Olympic Games was the sole global gathering of world sports in which Britain participated as a whole. Thus, even the emergence of inner-Britain nationalisms dated much earlier than the 1960s, the conditions for intense sports rivalries had not been matured yet. The 1950 British Home Football

211 FIFA. np., “History of FIFA – The First FIFA World Cup”, available [online] <http://www.fifa.com/classicfootball/history/fifa/historyfifa4.html> [10 December 2009].

Championship, after which Scotland refused to participate in the World Cup because “they weren't the British champions”²¹² was probably the first serious tournaments which involved British sides. However, these post-World War years was rather a calm period for ethnic rivalries, so the inner-Britain nationalism through sports was postponed until the late 1960s.

The rise of Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalisms in Britain had different effects in sports. Here, Welsh nationalism will be left out as Wales has predominantly been a rugby nation and they founded their rivalry between England through that branch (also today most Welsh football teams compete in English leagues, unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland).

In Ireland, the governing bodies of sports have a complicated structure. In hockey, tennis, golf and rugby as well as in traditional Gaelic sports, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have a joint governing body and a joint national team, unlike football where separate federations and national teams exist. This situation creates a complex picture as a Republican Northern Irish football player may have to play against the Republic of Ireland like a Unionist rugby player who may play on a united Ireland outfit against England.²¹³ Also, in some cases the pragmatism of football may contradict with the personal positions of people. The views of probably the best two Northern Irish footballers ever, both Ulster Protestants George Best and Derek Dougan on the necessity of a united Irish national team (as Northern Irish squad is not strong

212 BBC, November 2005, “Scotland and the 1950 World Cup”, available [online]: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/sportscotland/asportingnation/article/0001/page03.shtml> [10 Dec. 2009]

213 Alan Bairner, “Sport, Intellectuals and Public Sociology: Obstacles and Opportunities,” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 44, no. 2-3, 2009, pp.120-121.

enough) is a good example of this.²¹⁴ However, it is also true that football in Northern Ireland is more appealing to the Unionists than it is to Republicans as national team's home stadium Windsor Park is the home of Linfield FC, the club infamous with its Protestant sectarian employment practices²¹⁵ and the British anthem "God Save the Queen" is played before every national team game.²¹⁶ More solid evidence of the Protestant-exclusive character of Northern Irish football is the league. Except for Cliftonville, Omagh Town and Newry Town, the vast majority of the teams in Northern Irish league have Protestant followers²¹⁷. One of the two biggest Catholic teams ever, Belfast Celtic, withdrew from the league in 1949 and the other one, Derry City, joined the League of Ireland (in the Republic of Ireland) with special permission.²¹⁸ Derry City also do not use Britain-based RUC security and steward their own home games.²¹⁹

In Scotland, sectarianism and inter-religious tension are present, but in a different context and scale than they are in Northern Ireland. First of all, the Catholic population in Scotland is a small minority and the football history of Scotland is tied closely to England. Nevertheless, the Catholic representation in Scottish football is very strong thanks to internationally famous Celtic Glasgow, the first British team ever to win a European cup. The city of Glasgow also has an equally famous Protestant team,

214 Ibid., p. 122.

215 Alan Bairner and Peter Shirlow, "Real and Imagined: Reflections on Football Rivalry in Northern Ireland", *Fear and Loathing in World Football*, edited by Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti, (Oxford-New York: Berg Publishers, 2001), p. 44.

216 Bairner, p.123.

217 Northern Ireland Assembly, "*Sectarianism and Sport in Northern Ireland*," Northern Ireland Assembly Research Paper 26/01, (Belfast: Research and Library Services Northern Ireland Assembly, 2001), p. 7.

218 Daniel Burdsey and Robert Chappell, "*Soldiers, Sashes and Shamrocks: Football and Social Identity in Scotland and Northern Ireland*," available [online]: http://www.physed.otago.ac.nz/sosol/v6i1/v6i1_1.html#_ednref19 [10 December 2009].

219 Northern Ireland Assembly. *Official Report - 3 July 2000*, (Belfast: Research and Library Services Northern Ireland Assembly, 2000).

Rangers. The clashes of these two clubs (called “the Old Firm”) are usually tense if not violent, and they represent the sectarian division in Glasgow. According to surveys, 54% of the Celtic fans do not watch Scottish national team games and 52% support the Republic of Ireland team while 75% of Rangers fans claim Northern Ireland should remain British.²²⁰ The fans of both teams and the Old Firms in stadiums decorated with British (in Ibrox, home of the Rangers) or Irish flags (in Celtic Park) present one of most crystallized rivalries of football. The Rangers-Celtic rivalry is a solid example of how clubs may define themselves and the “other” via non-football related matters. However, in the football world of today, such well-defined identities are rare and most rivalries do not have such clear distinctive characteristics even though they are often misperceived to do so.

Whereas Northern Ireland has been suffering from a feeling of “in-betweenness” between Ireland and Britain, Scotland has a clearer national identity mainly due to the more homogeneous profile of the people in terms of ethnicity and religion. This national identity also shows itself in sporting events. As international football fixtures are one of the rare occasions where Scotland is represented separately, this identity usually is expressed enthusiastically at Scotland games. Two famous examples of this is the pitch invasions and the Tartan Army.

Pitch invasion is a phenomenon often associated with football, where the fans pour out onto and interrupt the game. The origins of pitch invasion are unclear; however due to its nature, it is quite likely that it is a practice coming from the rural past of the game where the game field had no barrier between players and spectators. The earliest

²²⁰ Burdsey and Chappell, *ibid.*

pitch invasions known are the Everton-Liverpool FA Cup game in 1882 in England,²²¹ and the 1909 Scottish Cup final between Celtic and Rangers, where six thousand angry spectators who expected extra-time because of a false press report invaded the pitch and damaged the game equipment such as the goal posts and the nets in Scotland.²²² Since these incidents, dozens of pitch invasions took place in England and Scotland over the decades. However, it was in the late 1960s, the years in which the Scottish nationalism took off, where the pitch invasions of Scottish fans in England games became a tradition. In April 1967, in the British Home Championship game, Scotland managed to overcome the world champions England at Wembley by 3-2 and visiting fans invaded the pitch to grab pieces of the turf to keep as souvenir.²²³ Ten years later, a bigger pitch invasion occurred and Scottish fans did Wembley a £15000 damage²²⁴ by taking off pieces of turf and breaking a goal post. Especially the 1977 match became a part of the popular culture and was associated with Scottish football fans in many occasions.

The rising Scottish nationalism and the cheerful but uncontrolled behaviour of the Scottish football fans led to a new fans' organization in the early 1980s. One of the first national team fan groups in the world, the "Tartan Army" was founded to form a unified, uniformed and "behaving" fan entity²²⁵ by bringing out some "self-policies" such as the ban on club colours (obviously in order to prevent the Rangers-Celtic

221 Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy and John M. Williams, *The Roots of Football Hooliganism: A Historical and Sociological Study* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1988), p. 59.

222 Wray Vamplew, "Sports Crowd Disorder in Britain, 1870-1914: Causes and Controls", *Journal of Sport History* 7, No. 1, (Spring 1980), p.5.

223 Iain Burnside, "A Game of Two Halves and One Nation--Football, Scotland and Identity," *Critical Quarterly* 12, no.4, (1996), p. 33.

224 *The Times*, 6 June 1977.

225 Gerry Finn and Richard Giulianotti, "Scots, Scottishness and Scottish Football," *Fanatics!: Power, Identity, and Fandom in Football* (London-New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 192.

tension). The Tartan Army has been present at every international fixture that Scotland is involved in since its foundation. It should be underlined here that this group was founded just when English fans were becoming notorious for their violent behaviour. In other words, the Tartan Army and its “positive Scottish image” was also rooted to the Scots' rivalry with the English.

While nationalism was taking its course in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in different scales, contexts and forms, England was entering into a decade of “low-morale” by the 1970s. The single-term Conservative government of Heath managed to put Britain into the European Economic Community; however it failed largely while dealing with the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The government also had to face the oil crisis in 1973. During this period, the English national football team failed to qualify for the 1972 European Championship and the 1974 World Cup. The only major success in this period was the Cup Winners Cup victory of Chelsea in the 1970-71 season.

The second half of the 1970s witnessed the rise of Liverpool FC. The Merseyside team, which had been known for its working-class fan base as well as its hunger for success for decades, had a successful return to the top division in the 1960s with the arrival of the Scottish manager Bill Shankly. The team went on to win the First Division in 1964 right after the promotion and the FA Cup for the first time in 1965. However, the real domination in English and European football for Liverpool started right after Shankly's retirement in 1974. His long-time assistant Bob Paisley, who spent his entire footballer career in Liverpool, managed to win six league titles and five European cups in his nine years as the LFC manager.

Shankly and Paisley, who brought an innovative approach to football coaching

and created the most successful English club ever, were both from miners' families. Their team was built upon the socialist way of life (Shankly was a life-long socialist), hard-work and equality.²²⁶ These characteristics, which they imposed on the team also matched the general way of thinking in the city. Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, Liverpool built a strong identity through music and football. The Beatles and “the Reds” were the cultural elements that made that humble city famous worldwide.

The Kop stand in Anfield Stadium was certainly one of the key elements while building this identity. The standing terrace, which had existed since the 1900s, became a fashionable phenomenon with the second half of the 1960s as Liverpool began to dominate both the culture and football worlds. Especially during the Labour government of Harold Wilson, the attempts to modernize the life in Britain received their best response from this Northern city. Liverpool quickly became the capital of new British culture, notably thanks to Mersey-sound, the first British music current associated to a specific region and obviously the Beatles.²²⁷ 1964 was the year that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) started to broadcast football highlights and Anfield was the major attraction for the TV as Liverpool both had the champion team and a singing fan group who also adapted popular songs to their chants.²²⁸ The Kopites, as they were called, were especially keen on converting the Beatles songs into Liverpoolian chants, such as “Liverpool, Yeah Yeah Yeah” (originally “She loves you, yeah yeah yeah”), “We all live in a red and white kop” adapted from “We all live in a yellow

226 John Williams, Cathy Long and Stephen Hopkins, *Passing Rhythms: Liverpool FC and the Transformation of Football* (Oxford-New York, Berg Publishers, 2001), p. 62.

227 John Williams, Cathy Long, “Football and Music Cultures in Liverpool”, *Esporte e Sociedade* 11, (2005).

228 John Williams, Cathy Long and Stephen Hopkins, pp.102-103.

submarine”²²⁹English actor Laurence Kitchin praised Kop's “performances” in 1967 as follows: “It is Soccer which usurps the drama with an international idiom. Instead of Artaud it would be better for theatre managers to have studied the Liverpool Kop”.²³⁰

The late 1960s and the 1970s not only witnessed a new fashion of football fandom, but also the spread of its magnitude nationwide. The main reason for this expansion was television broadcasts. The BBC (and also the Independent Television - ITV) was well aware of the popularity of the football broadcasts as well as their show value. It was under these new conditions that the public broadcasters made a £800,000 offer to televise football matches in 1967, the biggest bid the BBC had ever made to single sports organization up to that date.²³¹

On one hand, the new style of fandom that the Liverpool Kop had created and propagated offered viewers more than a sports encounter. The television broadcasts helped fans all over Britain to adopt the Kop style in their own terraces. Hence, the new style singing-jumping fandom nurtured the television and the television helped this style to become a norm for fandom. In Britain, football had been a professional sport since the very early days, but it was the late 1960s and the 1970s when it was discovered to be a show on very large scale. The norms of this show were set by Liverpool, both in and off the field. The team left very little room for competition in England (and eventually in Europe) and the fans created a whole new manner of supporting their teams. One decade was marked by Liverpoolian culture at all sorts, in music, football, the way of combining both with life.

229 Williams, Long.

230 *The Times*, 1 April 1967.

231 *The Times*, 14 March 1967.

However, the Kop could not cope with the post-1973 conditions of England as successfully as Liverpool FC did. By the second half of the 1970s, Britain was pushed into a period of despair due to the economic difficulties and the media pressure that the Labour government had to face. The Liverpool Kop, as well as almost any other terrace modelled after it, went through an era of senseless violence, which came to be called hooliganism. As a matter of fact, the violence among football spectators was not originally from the 1970s. Before it was taken over by the public schools and modernized, in the 1880s and the 1890s, the violence in football (both in and off the field) was very frequent and at high levels.²³² The violence of football spectators in modern times did not emerge in the 1970s either. For example, the rival clubs of Liverpool, Liverpool FC and Everton FC had a violent fan feud in the 1950s, which involved wrecking the trains in which the rival fans travelled to away games.²³³

The violence culture in British football may have taken its origins from its earliest days and from the working-class culture which involved heavy drinking as much as football and thus presented a continuation, however it had never dominated the general climate. In other words, football always had some degree of violence in itself, although it was not driven by violence. The second half of the 1970s and the whole 1980s was a period of violence both in football and in daily life. The Winter of Discontent during which people already felt a degree of despair, resulted in the roughest government of modern British history against the working-class. The Labour government of the late 1970s already faced the rising anger of the working-class against

232 Tranter, p. 48.

233 Dunning, Murphy and Williams, p. 142.

the economic crisis, through the Winter of Discontent and the wave of strikes. In the Thatcher government following the Wilson years, this became an open clash between the lowest strata of British society and the government. The working-class under the Thatcher government opposed its policies; however it could not resist the climate that the government imposed.

Some early assessments by scholars such as O'Leary and King argue that Thatcher's policies cannot be accurately understood within class analysis as those policies did not have the aim of fostering the long-term interests of capital. As such, they were not applied according to a class division logic. However, when the previous thirty years of Britain are studied, it is clear that the disorganization that the working-class was pushed into by the debilitation of strong workers' unions and cutting their political and financial ties with the Labour notably after the 1984 Act not only led to consequences against the British working-class, but also pushed the Labour Party to shift to a more central political axis which distanced it from the class consciousness that it had, especially during Tony Blair's presidency. Thus, if the policies of a certain government resulted in the dissolution of the class-based industrial and political representation, those policies can be rendered comprehensible not preferably but necessarily with class analysis. In addition, the de-unionization of the 1980s did not occur solely in Britain but in most advanced capitalist countries at a simultaneous time period due to the recession; however, in Britain the percentage of decline in density was second biggest (after Ireland) by 11.2% between 1980-89.²³⁴ In other words, the de-unionization in Britain did

²³⁴ Bruce Western, "A Comparative Study of Working-class Disorganization: Union Decline in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries," *American Sociological Review* 60, no.2, (1995), p. 181.

not happen due to the global conditions but due to the policies that aimed debilitation of unions.

The working-class, struck by the global recession and the high unemployment rates, also were deprived of politically and industrially powerful unions. In the lack of workers' unions, the sole gathering point in working-class towns were the football clubs, which had been founded more or less at the same time and by the same people as the trade union branches. However, while the football industry was growing, the distance between clubs and fans was widening as well. As said previously, in the beginning the fans, the club boards and the players were either the same people, or they were from the same roots. Yet, especially with the 1970s when football became a serious commodity, the clubs started to grow into big businesses and start to regard fans as customers. This created a gap between fans and clubs which required another organization in between, an entity of which a fan could feel a part. That was how the “casual” firms (fan groups) were born.

The firm identity in most cases surpassed the club identity and pursued its own rivalries and its own vendettas. One of the most striking aspects that shows how “casuals” distinguished themselves from the “regular fan” was their unique clothing styles; most firms created their own fashion which did not include the classical items of the “fan wear” (scarves, jerseys etc.) but casual wear and trainers influenced by the subcultures of the era such as punk and skinhead subcultures.²³⁵ They also used different vehicles to travel to away games than the trains and coaches reserved for travelling fans.

²³⁵ Ramon Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism: A Comparison of Six Western European Football Clubs*, (Amsterdam: Universteit van Amsterdam, 2006), p.81.

West Ham's famous Inter City Firm was named after Inter City trains that they took for away games.

The miners' strike and the way it was ended (by the defeat of unions) accelerated the alienation process of the working-class youth. Already having been struck by high unemployment figures and the failure of the welfare state, with the miners' strike, the working-class lost its agency to get involved in British politics. The strike was crucial in British working-class history, not because it worsened the conditions in which the working-class lived, but its duration and defeat alienated the class to its own agencies, the union and the industrial action. The working-class youth of the 1980s witnessed the crushing of their families' identities. Hence, they did not have a learned way of expression and self-fulfilment of any sort. The pressure that they went through rebounded in aggressive ways.

Two subcultures born within the English working-class youth, the punk and skinhead subcultures, reveal this aggressiveness and the anger towards any harmony in society. Punk was a movement born in the second half of the 1970s in London around an avant-garde clothing shop called "Sex" in Kings' Road, during and in the conditions of the economic crisis which later led to the Winter of Discontent.²³⁶ The Sex Pistols, the first punk band ever, expressed the anger and the destructiveness both in their lyrics and their actions. They used Nazi symbols for their shock-value, they used obscene language in BBC live broadcasts, they "managed to offend all the people they were fucking fed up with."²³⁷ The band's instinctive social critics and destructive nihilism revealed itself in

236 *The Filth and the Fury*, DVD. Directed by Julian Temple, 1999, CA: Warner Home Video: 2000
237 *Ibid.*

the lyrics of “God Save the Queen” (the same title as the national anthem), which they released on the Queen's Silver Jubilee Weekend by performing the song live passing along the Thames River on a boat:

*God save the Queen
Her fascist regime
They made you a moron
Potential h-bomb*

*God save the Queen
She ain't no human being
There's no future
In England's dreaming²³⁸*

Despite the huge censure levied by almost any media, the album became a best-seller,²³⁹ however the charts were fixed in order to prevent the band from being number one.²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the Sex Pistols led to a huge wave of people releasing their own material. These materials were not only records but fanzines, leaflets, badges, stencils, any media that could convey message. The Do-It-Yourself ethics (DIY) had one simple message; “make your own culture and stop consuming what is made for you”.²⁴¹ The Punk movement later in the 1980s combined with another working-class subculture, skinhead subculture, and received a different political context. The original punk movement, despite all the social critics it had inside, had no political agenda, it was rather situationist. When the extremity of punk combined with the skinhead subculture which was already appealed by the National Front,²⁴² the second wave of punk appeared

238 The Sex Pistols, “*Never Mind the Bollocks*,” Virgin Records, 1977.

239 Dave Laing, “Interpreting Punk Rock”, *Marxism Today* 22, no.4, (1978), p. 124.

240 *The Independent*, 20 February 1988.

241 Teal Triggs, “Scissors and Glue: Punk Fanzines and the Creation of a DIY Aesthetic”, *Journal of Design History* 19, No.1, (2006), p. 69.

242 Timothy S. Brown, “Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and 'Nazi Rock' in England and Germany,” *Journal of Social History* 38, No.1 (Fall 2004), p.162.

as a politicized 1980s version of the original punk movement. pEven though the politization of the current started from the extreme right, it was responded by Marxist bands such as Angelic Upstarts or anarchist acts like the Crass. The right-wing politization of the working-class youth was also a result of the political and social climate. The Falklands War triggered a sense of extreme nationalism and also the immigration that Britain received, notably from Asian countries resulted in xenophobia and racism. These all influenced fan groups as well.²⁴³ Actually, skinhead and punk subcultures came from the same upbringing as football fans, and they were somehow connected to each other some points, such as the football fan punk bands, or punk football fans.²⁴⁴ Also, the football fan groups were influenced by the DIY ethics, notably the fanzines.²⁴⁵

The nationalist context of the first half of the 1980s, also showed its effects on the international fixtures. As English clubs gained success on European fields, the English travelling fans became notorious for the troubles they caused. The first major example English hooliganism abroad was probably the 1982 World Cup in Spain. The tournament was scheduled to be played in June and the British teams (England, Northern Ireland and Scotland) prepared for this tournament while the Falklands issue escalated into a war.

The Falklands War immediately had its complications in the sports domain. In cricket, Argentine was requested to pull out from the World Cup qualifying series to be

243 Richard Guilianotti, "Social Identity and Public Order: Political and Academic Discourses on Football Violence", *Football, Violence and Social Identity*, (London-New York: Taylor&Francis, 2005), p.20.

244 Williams, Long.

245 Richard Green, "Football Information Services: Fanzines, 'Match of the Day' and the Modem", *Aslib Proceedings* 51, No.1, (January 1999).

played in the Midlands days after the war started.²⁴⁶ In the same days, Conservative and Labour MPs agreed to demand the removal of Argentina from the football World Cup.²⁴⁷ Equally, boycotting the cup was on the agenda; however it was quickly dismissed by the government²⁴⁸. The host nation Spain was also a part of the problem, at least a part of the media and the public perceived that “Spain aligned by blood, language and its schoolroom history books to the cause of Argentina”.²⁴⁹ As expected, Spanish flags and banners with the phrase “*Malvinas son Argentinas*” (“the Falklands are Argentine”) were present at the games.²⁵⁰ English fans responded that demonstration by sporting Basque flags in the matches that the team played in Bilbao, chanting “*Malvinas Inglaterra*” and clashed with the police.²⁵¹ The songs with imperial implications such as “Rule Britannia” became popular in the stands.²⁵² The tournament quickly became a microcosmos of the Falklands rivalry. This climate was not unexpected. Before the tournament, the England manager Ron Greenwood had compared their mission in the World Cup with the mission of the British Task Force in the Falklands²⁵³.

After 1982, British fans' incidents abroad continued until the Heysel disaster of the 1985 European Cup Final. On 29 May 1985, in the Heysel Stadium in Brussels, Belgium, the Liverpool fans, located in the Y section and the Italian Juventus fans, who

246 *The Times*, 16 April 1982.

247 *The Times*, 22 April 1982.

248 *The Times*, 22 April 1982.

249 John Williams, Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy, *Hooligans Abroad: the Behaviour and Control of English Fans in Continental Europe* (London-Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul plc., 1984), p. 37.

250 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

251 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

252 Joseph M. Bradley, “We shall not be moved’! Mere sport, mere songs? a Tale of Scottish Football,” *Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football*, (London-New York: Taylor&Routledge, 2002), p.205.

253 Roman Horak and Tanıl Bora, “Önsöz” (Preface), *Futbol ve Kültürü* (Football and its culture), compiled by Roman Horak, Wolfgang Reiter and Tanıl Bora (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), p.20.

had bought tickets for the neutral Z section, started a fight by throwing stones and seats at each other. It turned into a physical confrontation after the Liverpool fans broke through the chain-link wire separating two sections. Whereas the Y section Liverpool fans were the hardcore fans, the Juve “firm” was installed on the other side of the stadium as a group and the Z section fans were mostly Italians living in Belgium or some individuals. Therefore, the attack of the Liverpool fans caused a major panic in the Z section and the Italian fans tried to avoid physical contact. However, the wall over which the Italian fans tried to climb to escape collapsed and 39 fans died and around 600 were injured. This was the biggest football disaster ever to have happened up to that date.

The immediate reaction of Thatcher herself after the disaster was to ask the FA to withdraw the English teams from European competitions.²⁵⁴ The withdrawal did not take place. However, four days later, the UEFA brought an indefinite ban to English clubs, which lasted five year. The Heysel disaster also brought the membership card system and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitoring to football stadiums. As a matter fact, these two practices, which were controversial for privacy issues, were proposed by the shock of the disaster. In August 1984, the government tried to impose both methods on stadiums, however they received negative reaction.²⁵⁵ CCTV had already been used in 1984 during the Miners' Strike and in August 1985, two months after Heysel, the first street-based cameras were installed.²⁵⁶ Evidently, the government was waiting for an opportunity to impose these contested practices in football, like almost in other subject

254 *The Times*, 31 May 1985.

255 *The Times*, 17 August 1984.

256 BJ Goold, *CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain*, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 16.

regarding society and Heysel created a climate in which no one could oppose any measure that the government wanted to take in order to prevent stadium troubles. Probably, that was why the report about Heysel's security deficiencies prepared by Gerry Clarkson from the London Fire Brigade was dismissed. Clarkson, who investigated the stadium reached the conclusion that there were severe construction and security weaknesses in Heysel and those weaknesses had turned a controllable situation into a deadly disaster.²⁵⁷

The controlling approach of the Thatcher government on English stadiums solidified after another disaster in 1989. On 15 April, Nottingham Forest – Liverpool FA Cup Semi-Final match was scheduled to take place at Hillsborough Stadium, Sheffield. The Liverpoolian fans were given the lower capacity Lapping Lane End of the stadium despite having a bigger crowd than Nottingham's. The three gates and seven turnstiles at that end were not capable of handling the approximately 10,000 Liverpool fans, so the Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield ordered the Gate C, one of the exit gates to be opened for entries. However, the entry of the fans took place without adequate supervision, and without police and stewards redirecting them to alternative pens, many fans got crushed in the central pens. 96 fans lost their lives.

In order to investigate the disaster, a commission presided by Lord Justice Taylor was founded. Taylor's commission listened to hundreds of witnesses and reached the conclusion that the disaster occurred because of three main reasons in its Interim Report: the layout at the Leppings Lane end, the lack of fixed capacities for the pens and the lack

²⁵⁷ Diarmuid Lavery, interview with David Mellor, *“The Explosive 80s – How Heysel Changed the World,”* documentary aired on RTE1 (Ireland) and Channel 4 (UK), Double Band Films, 2005.

of effective monitoring of the terraces.²⁵⁸ The report also noted that David Duckenfield had misinformed the public and the authorities by claiming the Gate C had not been opened by the police but forced by the Liverpool fans.²⁵⁹ Whereas the Interim Report openly pointed to the lack of effective safety mechanisms and the poor handling of the crisis as the cause of the disaster, the Final Report that was presented to the Parliament in January 1990 did not include a single chapter about the causes of the incident, but about the general problems regarding fans and stadiums. The age of stadiums, poor facilities, hooliganism, segregation, alcohol and poor leadership were counted as the source of problems,²⁶⁰ however the failure of the security measures and the poor handling of the event before, during and after the crisis were not mentioned, on the contrary of the Interim Report. The second chapter of the Final Report, entitled “A Better Future for Football” concentrated on new or upgraded all-seater stadiums as a solution. The Final Report acted as a framework for the future of English football and failed to define the responsables of the biggest disaster English football ever lived. The report's and the government's neglect to find out the responsible parties and taking them to court led to discontent among football fans, especially in Liverpool. Many initiatives and campaigns were organized by survivors, victims' families and fans, including the Hillsborough Justice Campaign and Hillsborough Family Support Group still lobbying for a new investigation.

Another important incident regarding Hillsborough is the infamous headline

258 Peter Taylor, *The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Interim Report* (London: The Home Office, 1989), p.20.

259 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

260 Peter Taylor, *The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Final Report* (London: The Home Office, 1990), pp. 5-11.

“The Truth” of the *Sun* on 19 April 1989. The tabloid newspaper accused Liverpool fans who had lived through the disaster of “pickpocketing the victims, urinating on the brave cops [sic]; beating up PC giving kiss of life.”²⁶¹ The story also quoted Graham Kelly, the Chief Executive of the FA, who claimed Liverpool fans had broken the gate and forced themselves in. It was later discovered in the Interim Report that Kelly had been deliberately misinformed by David Duckenfield. The *Sun's* article caused a major outrage in Merseyside and lost the majority of its readers in the area. On the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, out of 3 millions nationwide only 8,000 copies of the paper (which is still popularly called as “*The Scum*” in Liverpool) were sold in that region.²⁶²

As in the Winter of Discontent, the context of the Hillsborough disaster was altered by the Conservative Party and the tabloid media to something which originally it had not been. It was true that Britain was suffering from hooliganism, however the Hillsborough disaster occurred because the authorities gave priority to control any misbehaviour (by putting fans in cage-like stands) rather than maintaining public safety at first hand.²⁶³ Whereas this was clearly stated in the Interim Report of Taylor, the main focus of the government was hooliganism. The reason behind that stance was mainly the rising opposition to the football security scheme that the government had tried to apply before the disaster. This proposed scheme required that all spectators attending English football matches would have to apply to the Football Membership Authority which had the right to refuse any spectator without the possibility of appeal to its decisions.²⁶⁴ This

261 The Sun, 19 April 1989.

262 The Guardian, 18 September 2009.

263 Martin Johnes, “‘Heads in the Sand’: Football, Politics and Crowd Disasters in Twentieth-Century Britain,” *Soccer&Society* 5, no.2, (2004), p.145.

264 Richard Guilianotti, “Social Identity and Public Order: Political and Academic Discourses on Football Violence,” *Football, Violence and Social Identity* (London-New York: Taylor&Francis, 2005), p.22.

scheme later renamed as the Football Supporters Bill, declared all football supporters as potential hooligans. The logic behind the public safety errors at Hillsborough was similar. Priority to security over safety cost 96 lives.

The Thatcher government perceived that hooliganism that had permeated all of football and treated it as a phenomenon which had emerged within football and because of football. The famous conversation between Ted Croker, the FA General Secretary of the time and Margaret Thatcher is a striking example of the divergence between the FA and the government about the problem. When Thatcher asked the FA General Secretary 'What are you going to do about your hooliganism?' the response she received was 'Not our hooligans, Prime Minister, but yours. The products of your society.'²⁶⁵ Many witnesses of the era claim that the negative attitude of the Thatcher government about football was because of the Prime Minister's personal dislike of the sport.

David Mellor, former minister in the Thatcher and Major governments, also later the president of the Football Task Force founded by the Labour government, states "...in the eyes people like Mrs. Thatcher [football] summed up everything the most awful about the English nation" and "I think Mrs. Thatcher would have banned football if she thought that she could."²⁶⁶ Equally Graham Kelly, the chief executive of the FA in the era confirms Mellor by writing "[he thought that Thatcher] despised football, had little or no interest in sport and drove those around her who were interested in the national sport underground."²⁶⁷ Notwithstanding it is unclear whether these commentaries were accurate or biased, it is clear that the Thatcher government approached this issue as a

²⁶⁵ *The Independent*, 27 December 1992.

²⁶⁶ Diarmuid Lavery, interview with David Mellor, "*The Explosive 80s – How Heysel Changed the World*," documentary aired on RTE1 (Ireland) and Channel 4 (UK), Double Band Films, 2005.

²⁶⁷ Martin Johnes, p. 144.

criminal matter and overlooked its athletic and social aspects.

The aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster led to major changes in English football regarding crowd control and the modernization of English football. Both of these aspects are somehow inter-connected.

The Thatcher government and its successors gradually brought more restrictive measures to crowd control in stadiums and other public areas. After the Football Spectators Bill bringing the ID card scheme in 1989, the Football Offences Act in 1991 brought three new offence types: throwing of missiles, indecent or racist chanting and going onto the playing area.²⁶⁸ The Act considered these three violations to be “arrestable offences,” and the offenders also would be subject to the “restriction orders” brought by the 1989 Bill.²⁶⁹ However, those three offences were already covered by the Public Order Act 1985, therefore this act contained political and public relations value, rather than juridical validity.²⁷⁰ Later, with the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act in 1994, “ticket touting,” in other words, the “unauthorized sale of tickets” was designated as a criminal act.²⁷¹ Also, while not being completely focused on football, the Article 154 of the same act, amended the previous Public Order Act by adding threatening, abusive or insulting words, signs and behaviours to the offences list.²⁷² While the list of offences increased, the level of surveillance inside and outside the stadiums was increasing. Even a regular football fan with no hooligan activity had a record in the police, he/she faced the fenced police vans (nicknamed “Hoolivans”) and the escorts, and he/she was constantly

268 Football (Offences) Act (London: The Home Office, 1991), Chapter 19, articles 2, 3, 4.

269 Ibid., article 5.

270 Gary Armstrong and Dick Hobbs, “Tackled from Behind,” *Football, Violence and Social Identity* (London-New York: Taylor&Francis, 2005), p.218.

271 Criminal, Justice and Public Order Act (London: The Home Office, 1997), article 166.

272 Ibid, article 154.

surveyed by the CCTV and handheld cameras as well as plain-clothes undercover police officers.²⁷³ The whole system in the 1990s was based on the probability of any fan to commit an offence, most of the times at the expense of personal privacy.

While the Conservative governments and their successors New Labour governments acted as restrictively as possible regarding crowd control, the football economy was taking steps in the opposite direction. Up to the 1990s, the English Football League system depended on a cross-subsidiary system, meaning the clubs at the top divisions provided income for the lower divisions.²⁷⁴ However, in the 1990s, the top clubs of the country were not content entirely with the system and their revenues. Their discontent forced the FA to recreate the league system, in which the English Premier League emerged. This new league was also an attempt to re-popularize the English football, which had lost its magic due to Heysel, Hillsborough, crowd troubles and the five-year European ban. The creation of the new league system could be considered to be the FA's attempt to comply with the Taylor Report.²⁷⁵ Yet, the Premier League also complied with the economic climate of the era.

The centrepiece of the Final Taylor Report was the all-seater stands in stadiums. Lord Justice Taylor claimed that “when a spectator is seated he has his own small piece of territory in which he can feel reasonably secure. He will not be in close physical contact with those around him. He will not be jostled or moved about by swaying or surging,” also proposing covered stands as “sitting in the rain is worse than standing

273 Richard Giulianotti, “Taking Liberties: Hibs Casuals and Scottish Law,” *Football, Violence and Social Identity*, pp. 232-233.

274 Simon Lee, “Grey Shirts to Grey Suits: The Political Economy of English Football in the 1990s,” *Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football*, pp. 34-35.

275 *Ibid.*, pp. 35.

under the rain.”²⁷⁶ By 1994, all First and Second Division stadiums in England became all-seating. Whereas the construction costs were mostly covered by the Football Trust, the new all-seater stadiums meant lower capacity and high maintenance costs comparing to the terraces. So, a rise in ticket prices could be expectable. However, the general tendency was to increase the ticket price more than needed, like in the case of Manchester United where the price for the cheapest season tickets doubled in two seasons.²⁷⁷ Most modernized stadiums had facilities, such as restaurants, club merchandise stores, even a club museum. Hence, the clubs aimed to attract a fan base with higher purchasing power, in order to generate further income from these facilities. In other words, the rise in ticket prices did not aim at the old fans to pay more than they had but to bring fans who could afford to spend more than they spent for tickets. The characteristics of the new stand that Manchester United built instead of its cheapest standing terrace Stretford End was a remarkable example of this tendency; “a 4,000-seat McDonald’s Family Stand, 864 Executive seats, several thousand expensive Club Class seats, a purpose built TV studio and a few thousand ‘ordinary’ seats at inflated prices.”²⁷⁸

While the owners of the cheapest tickets were being bought out inside the stadiums, outside match viewing became marketable as well. One of the key features that rendered the Premier League different was the introduction of the new £304 million satellite broadcasting deal by BskyB Broadcasting Company, which took the football broadcasts out of terrestrial and free-to-air reach for an initial five years.

The 1990s globally marked an era of change as the cold war ended with the

²⁷⁶ Taylor, *The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Final Report*, p. 12.

²⁷⁷ Adam Brown, “United We Stand: Some problems with fan democracy,” *Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football*, p. 59.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 61.

collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the entire world apart from a few exceptions belonged to the same global market economy. Another phenomenon simultaneous with this process of globalization was satellite television. In fact, satellite TV signified nothing but the globalization of information. It meant that any viewer with a satellite dish and a receiver would get the same signals with another viewer no matter where they were located. It also meant national borders or sovereignty on broadcasting were no longer meaningful or valid. These characteristic of satellite TV was a key factor on how the Cold War ended. Even as early as 1983, the United States of America was aware that it had the advantage over the Soviet Union in this battle as the Warsaw Pact had more to lose if both parties could receive each other's broadcasts.²⁷⁹ The reason why satellite television worked for capitalism was simple; capitalism would grow by offering more, and satellite television was a great platform for that as it could contain thousands of different channels. It was the most effective way of propagating consumerism. In addition, satellite TV signals were encryptable, so it was possible to encrypt a signal and sell its decoder. That technology entirely changed the scope and the marketing of football all over the world, but especially in England.

The BSkyB deal ended the dual-terrestrial (BBC-ITV) football broadcasting system and also put an end to the cross-subsidiary economic system of the English football. The income system based on success and popularity (audience) widened the gap between the top teams and the others as well as between the top divisions and the lower divisions. The new system also had dramatic effects on football fans, as it

279 Donald Harlacher, "On Direct Satellite Broadcasting," *Air University Review*, September-October 1983, Available [online]: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/sep-oct/harlacher.html> [13 December 2009].

completely changed the match-viewing habits. As lower income fans (who initially and traditionally composed the hard core fan base of most clubs) could not afford to buy tickets or BSkyB subscription, an alternative match-viewing realm was created. The traditional English public houses, pubs, became the places where people gathered to watch the games. The pubs had already been the traditional meeting points for football fans before going to stadiums; however starting from the 1990s, they surpassed the stadiums as the leading match-viewing venue by attracting the 9% of the population.²⁸⁰ This rising popularity of pubs is ironic as it emerged as a result of football's modernization triggered by the Taylor Report, which called alcohol consumption one of the leading causes of hooliganism.²⁸¹

As seen, in England, the traditional football fans, who were generally from working-class and struck by the social and economic distresses of 1980s, were gradually pushed out of the stadiums and deprived of access to live football in the 1990s, mostly played by the clubs founded by the working-class. Nevertheless, football remains to be leading entertainment for the lower strata of the English society after the transformation of the football system. So, it is crucial to observe how traditional fan bases of English clubs reacted to the course of events.

Football-related Events Affecting Football Fandom in Turkey:

The 1970s marked very important changes in Turkish football. One of these,

280 Mike Weed, "The Pub as a Virtual Football Fandom Venue: An Alternative to 'Being there'?" *Soccer&Society* 8, no. 2-3, (April/July 2007), p.400.

281 Taylor, *The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Final Report*, p.9.

which probably accelerated others, was the introduction of television broadcasts. TRT, which started its broadcasts in 1968, included its first major football event in its programming in the summer of 1970 with the World Cup played in Mexico; however, due to technical incapacities, matches were only shown as short highlights the day after.²⁸² Even so, the broadcasting of this world-class event caused excitement, as the Turkish football scene got the chance to know how the game was played elsewhere, which was a new experience except for a couple of teams who played up to four European matches per year. The papers quoted club board members, who said they “would like to sign Pele or Beckenbauer if the government allowed big transfers,”²⁸³ and the Turkish Cup finalists Eskişehirspor and Göztepe gathered at newspaper headquarters to watch the final game together.²⁸⁴ The first broadcast also motivated TRT and Istanbul Technical University (that had handled the test broadcasting of Istanbul TV) to film games played in Turkey. After a press campaign, on 25 April 1971, Turkey-West Germany was broadcasted live.²⁸⁵ The new technology equally introduced video analysis to Turkish football.²⁸⁶ Here, it should be noted that the domestic live TV broadcasts started right after the 12 March 1971 coup d'etat, the timing of the broadcasts suggests that these broadcasts were made under military approval, if not encouragement.

After 1972, it became regular that national team games, European cup ties or important domestic fixtures such as the President's Cup were shown live on TV, and the league games were shown as short highlights on weekly basis. With the television

282 *Milliyet*, 21 May 1970.

283 *Milliyet*, 20 June 1970.

284 *Milliyet*, 23 June 1970.

285 *Milliyet*, 26 April 1971.

286 *Milliyet*, 4 August 1971.

transmissions, the football games started to reach a wider audience, however this audience was not entirely happy of what it saw. What television showed was the poor state of Turkish football against foreign opponents. At the beginning of the 1970s, the national team was really in an unpleasant state. The 1972 European Championship qualifiers against Poland, Albania and West Germany was not completely a disaster as Turkey managed to take at a least one point from each opponent while finishing the four-team group as third. However, the 1974 World Cup qualification games started with a shock as Luxembourg overcame Turkey by 2-0 in October 1972. Two weeks later, the national team won the return game at home by 3-0, nevertheless failed at the rest of the games. The situation was not so much different than the second half of the 1950s and the entire 1960s as the national team had failed to qualify for any major tournament after the 1954 World Cup. The difference in the 1970s was; now everybody could see why. The TV broadcasts not only showed the defeats of the national team, but also gave the football fans a point of reference with which to compare Turkish football with the world standards.

Whereas the national team was failing expectations, the general situation of Turkish football regarding institutionalization was not bad at all. In the late 1960s, the league became fully nationwide, almost all the cities in the province had their own professional teams and the lower leagues started. By the 1970s, the football scene presented a more balanced, more decentralized and more competitive profile. Anatolian teams could not succeed in clinching the league title; however, in the 1969-70 season the only Istanbul team in top five of the league table was Fenerbahçe, the champions. Eskişehirspor (of Eskişehir), a unique phenomenon of the era with its university-based

fan group and their innovative terrace acts, finished both the league and the cup in second place despite having only five years of history. Eskişehirspor, along with other Anatolian teams such as Mersin İdman Yurdu, Boluspor and Bursaspor had stayed in the title race for the entire first half of the 1970s; however, the title always stayed in Istanbul until Trabzonspor completed the Anatolian revolution at the end of the decade.

The failure in the international fixtures probably depended on this transition. The Istanbul teams, maybe except Galatasaray, stalled in this period. The major powers of Turkish football had more difficulty in attracting talented players from Anatolia as there were quality teams there as well. As well as some provincial teams that aimed to dominate the top flight, some went into regional rivalries which overshadowed the title race, starting from the late 1960s.

The infamous Kayseri-Sivas second division game which resulted in deaths and casualties was the most striking example of this. This rivalry also included the Alevi-Sunite religious tension as well as the class differences between two cities as Sivas was an agricultural city and its economic activities were dominated by the rising Kayseri bourgeoisie.²⁸⁷ The Kayseri-Sivas incident might have created some kind of prejudice against football and distanced certain strata of society from the game,²⁸⁸ however it probably just hinted the climate of instability, unrest and violence that the country was heading into in the 1970s. That climate would also affected football.

In this era, violent clashes involving footballers, referees and fans could be witnessed in any division. Diyarbakırspor-Hatayspor game (2.Division) on 22 February

287 Gökaçtı, *ibid.*, p. 236.

288 Yiğit Akın, "Not Just A Game: The Kayseri vs. Sivas Football Disaster'," *Soccer & Society* 5, no.2, (2004), p. 230.

1970 and Siirt-Adana Mensucat game (Amateur championship) on 3 May 1970 both resulted in deaths or casualties. Violence also could be seen in the First Division. Karşıyaka-Galatasaray match, where players got into fight during the match and the Galatasaray wanted to raid the Karşıyaka camp after the game on 8 November 1970 was an example of how top level football was had fallen into violence. After the 12 March coup, such open acts of violence were limited to some degree; however, the general climate of football was very tense and physical violence was integrated as a routine figure in Turkish football.

This violence included players as well as fans, and the security forces. In April 1972, after the Beşiktaş-Ankaragücü Turkish Cup tie, the tension between losing Beşiktaş board members, footballers and the police resulted in Beşiktaş player Zekeriya Alp fainting because of a bludgeon hit he received in his head.²⁸⁹ The violence that was becoming ordinary contributed to the disillusionment of Turkish football as much as the poor results in international fixtures. Thus, whilst the game expanded through the nation, its prestige decreased.

Also in the 1970s, the club boards faced the transition between political figures and wealthy businessmen. In major Istanbul clubs, for decades, the presidents had been the members of the leading party, the CHP or the DP. After the 1960 coup, as clubs were caught with the DP member presidents who were declared criminals in most cases, this tradition started to fade. Political power was still important for the clubs, but the coup showed that the political profile of the country could be changed in one day. With the introduction of the professionalism and the national leagues, economic power started to

²⁸⁹ *Milliyet*, 20 April 1972.

replace political power. Fenerbahçe was the leading club of this trend, and Faruk Ilgaz, a successful businessman and the Justice Party Istanbul branch chief, symbolized this transition. During his presidency between 1966-74 and 1976-80, Ilgaz used both his political power and business skills in order to contribute to the club. The crucial point in Ilgaz's term was that the benefits of his economic power and entrepreneurship exceeded what his political power could bring.

The Balkan Cup was an example of this. Ilgaz brought up the idea of a regional cup between Balkan teams right after the 1960 coup, before he became the president. The state replied that the relations with different countries (most belonging to the Warsaw Pact) would be difficult, so Ilgaz organized the cup himself with his business contacts in all those countries.²⁹⁰ The Balkan Cup was organized during the CHP, the AP and the coup years. Equally Ilgaz's presidency did not depend on who had the political power, unlike in the examples of Şükrü Saracoğlu, Recep Peker (from the CHP) and Osman Kavrakoğlu (from the DP).

This created a new model, a wealthy president who did not rely on political power. Galatasaray and Beşiktaş also adapted this trend. Selahattin Beyazıt was the transition figure as he was both a wealthy businessman and a prestigious member of the Galatasaray High School tradition. Beyazıt served two terms of presidency through the 1970s just like Faruk Ilgaz. Beşiktaş was the last of the three teams to follow the fashion. The 1970s for Beşiktaş was a period of confusion after the legendary player, coach and president of the club, Hakkı Yeten left the presidency. Until the election of Mehmet Üstünkaya in 1973, no president managed to serve more than two years in the

²⁹⁰ Faruk Ilgaz, interview with the author, 18 October 2007, Istanbul, Turkey.

club. Even Mehmet Üstünkaya, who symbolized the wealthy businessman trend in Beşiktaş, had to compete with Gazi Akınal, the leader of the traditionalist opposition during his reign. As the club failed to find itself a wealthy businessman president unlike the others and also could not succeed to form another model as Trabzonspor would do by end of the decade, the club went into the biggest period of failures and failed to win the championship between 1966-81. Beşiktaş emerged from its crisis at the second half of the 1980s, only after it developed a youth system that did not depend on economic power.

The wealthy businessmen presidents secured the success of the Istanbul clubs through the first half of the 1970s. However, the global economic crisis initiated by the oil crisis in 1973 also struck Turkey heavily. This obviously affected the club boards, and the power of money in Turkish football gradually was diminished. Moreover, Beşiktaş and Galatasaray went into a state of economic crisis.²⁹¹ This helped a new model to emerge and arise.

Trabzon was a northern city where football had been played popularly for decades. In 1967, when most cities had professional teams, the city had managed to unify the rival teams within the city and created Trabzonspor. The club presented a unique example of locality in Turkish football. The board, the technical staff and the footballers were all born in the region and formed a team based on the Black Sea identity. Before Trabzonspor, Eskişehirspor was a team to had come close to forming the same kind of an identity club. However, Eskişehir lacked the football tradition in Trabzon and despite the popularity the club received it failed to convert it into a football

291 Gökaçtı, p.255.

dynasty. It also should be noted Trabzonspor benefited hugely from the ban on foreign players between 1979-84 and also the economic difficulties of the Istanbul clubs, conditions which had not existed when Eskişehirspor was in the title race.

The 1980 coup d'etat did not affect football instantly as club boards mostly were composed of non-politics related businessmen. The football competitions also resumed without any interruption. The 12 September junta claimed that it could instantly stop the turmoil and “normalize” the country. The new government and the National Security Council started their duty just one week after the coup. Also, the factories and other businesses resumed their work in a couple of days. While thousands of people were detained, arrested and tortured, the country seemed to be as normal as possible. Football was a part of this normal life. During the 1970s, even though the football climate was sometimes violent, this violence was caused either by the general atmosphere of discontent or by the local rivalries and it rarely had a political agenda. In fact, football of the 1970s had very little to do with the politics. The clubs were mostly run by non-political people unlike any decade before, and the club identities were mostly founded on locality and not any other social identity. Football seemed to be the perfect apolitical, harmless social gathering for the post-1980 period. Moreover, it could be used as a manipulative tool to discharge the emotions of the people or recharge them with other emotions, if required.

But there was one problem, Turkish football and football clubs hit rock bottom by the 1980s. In order to render football a meaningful tool, it had to be better than it was then. The government appointed by the junta rapidly started to work on rehabilitating football. The first step was to stabilize the Turkish Football Federation. In the previous

four years, the federation had had eight different executive boards; some of these did not last more than two months. After an interim period of Doğan Andaç as president in October-November 1980, Yılmaz Tokatlı was appointed to be the new TFF president. Tokatlı was a retired general who had also presided Muhafızgücü, the sports club of the Presidents' Guards that he commanded at the same time. This choice evidently showed how football was taken seriously by the junta. One of the first dealings of Tokatlı was to demote the national team coach Fethi Demircan to the Under-21 national team due to his disciplinary record.

One of the most controversial issues in Turkish football in the 1980s was the ban on foreign players and coaches. This ban, which had come into effect in 1979, was protested by the major Istanbul clubs whereas Trabzonspor openly supported it. The new TFF board declared in January 1981 that the ban would be revoked;²⁹² however, in May 1981 it was decided that the ban would remain and domestic transfers were also restricted to five players per year.²⁹³ The same year, in September, the controversial Law No. 2527 on Facilitating Foreigners of Turkish Ancestry to Perform their Occupations and Crafts Freely in Turkey and Their Employment in Public and Private Establishments or Businesses was accepted in the National Assembly. This law, which did not bring any clarification to the definition of “Turkish ancestry”, was open to any interpretation, including the racist ones.²⁹⁴ The authority to define who was of the “Turkish ancestry” was the Cabinet of Ministers.

The football clubs, especially the major three clubs who advocated the foreign

292 *Milliyet*, 13 January 1981.

293 *Milliyet*, 9 May 1981.

294 This law has still been in effect, with a couple of changes.

players, claimed Bosniac Yugoslav players were of “Turkish ancestry” and they were granted permission for these players. Hence, in a couple years, many Yugoslavian players were signed by clubs. In 1982, the TFF revoked the foreign coach ban. By 1982-83, the big teams were with “Turkish” foreign players and Yugoslavian coaches. Turkish football was Yugoslavized unintentionally due to the arbitrariness of the junta government. A minority of these Yugoslavian coaches and players had had notable careers before coming to Turkey and contributed to Turkish football successfully as many others faded without leaving a trace. However, even this situation was not close to the biggest example of the arbitrary decisions taken by the junta-driven TFF of Yılmaz Tokatlı.

By 1980-81 football season, there was not an Ankara representative in the First Division. The football in the Turkish capital, as well as many other subjects, were belated comparing to the historical port cities Istanbul or Izmir, and the Ankara teams were generally pushed away as much as football became a sector.²⁹⁵ That year (which was also Mustafa Kemal's 100th birthday), Ankaragücü managed to reach the quarter-finals of the Turkish Cup. Despite losing the first leg against Beşiktaş, the capital team won the second match on extra-time by 3-0 and became the semi-finalist.

At that match, the banners hung at the stadium were interesting: “We want to see Ankaragücü of Atatürk's capital in the First Division”, “The headquarters of revolution Ankara cannot be without the First Division” and “Ankaragücü is a First Division side”.²⁹⁶ These slogans, which could be interpreted as the wishes of Ankara fans, quickly

295 Gökaçtı, p.265.

296 “Atatürk'ün başkentinde Ankaragücü'nü 1.Ligde görmek isteriz,” “İnkılâpların karargahı Ankara 1. Ligsiz olmaz!” “Ankaragücü 1. Lig takımıdır...” *Milliyet*, 9 April 1981.

turned into the arguments of a campaign which aimed that Ankaragücü be taken to the First Division. The club president Sabri Nermutlu claimed that the club should have been promoted because it was Atatürk's 100th birthday.²⁹⁷ When Ankaragücü eliminated Fenerbahçe and reached the cup final against Boluspor, the ultimate support came from the junta leader, Kenan Evren.

Evren ordered the sports authorities to promote Ankaragücü, which would also play the President's Cup game despite the objections of the undersecretary İsmail Güngör about a 20-team league with prolonged schedule.²⁹⁸ Ankaragücü won the Turkish Cup and the President's Cup with that motivation. When the team was playing the President's Cup game, “Long live Evren Pasha” chants rose from Ankaragücü stands.²⁹⁹ Evren later became a honorary member of the club.³⁰⁰ The promotion of Ankaragücü recreated the tradition of political pressure and arbitrariness in Turkish football through the 1980s, and it would to be Özal who used this power to reshape Turkish football.

The Özal years in football shared the same characteristics with many other areas in social life. The Özal philosophy was based on two things: liberalization at all costs and reducing any possible discontent by giving public things that they had not enjoyed before. Football was one of the areas in which these two principles were the most visible. Özal knew that any progress in this field would bring him instant popularity. He was not eager to disguise this thought either, as he once said, “if Turkish national team were one of the 5-6 teams who played in the European finals, the Motherland Party

297 Gökaçtı, p.266.

298 *Milliyet*, 22 May 1981.

299 “*Evren Paşa, çok yaşa.*” *Milliyet*, 4 June 1981.

300 *Milliyet*, 8 June 1981.

would win the elections landslide.”³⁰¹

The Özal government started dealing with football matters radically by undoing all the steps that the junta had taken. ANAP member Kemal Uluşu was appointed as the TFF president instead of Yılmaz Tokatlı, who was forced to resignation. The financial accounts of the Tokatlı federation were taken into investigation. Coşkun Özarı, the national team coach that Tokatlı had hired, was replaced by Candan Tarhan. The transfer restrictions were completely lifted and a new taxation regime based on players qualities was brought. The Third Division was reopened. The match observer licences were cancelled and this position was entirely reshaped.

Uluşu's appointment to the presidency received some negative reaction as he was accused of having had a role in a brokerage scandal that Beşiktaş was involved in when he was a board member of the club. The new president also attracted attention by dismissing his resignation from the ANAP; however, he had to resign later as he became a state officer by being the TFF president and the state officers were banned from politics at the time. Even though he had to resign, his contacts with the party remained. It was rumoured that the reopening of the Third Division and the teams that could play in that league were entirely defined by Vehbi Dinçerler and the Motherland Party MP Ata Aksu, bypassing General Director of Sports and Youth (*Gençlik Spor Genel Müdürlüğü - GSGM*) Yücel Seçkiner and even the TFF president himself.³⁰² The Third Division had obviously a great political importance as more than 100 teams would compete in this league and it would boost the government's popularity in many regions

301 “Şu anda Türk Milli Takımı Avrupa Futbol Şampiyonası'nda finali oynayan 5-6 takımdan biri olsa ve bir de genel seçim yapılırsa, ANAP silme götürür.” *Milliyet*, 1 February 1985.

302 *Milliyet*, 8 July 1984.

where the football teams were not represented in professional leagues before. Also the TFF was regionalized by the foundation of region and city branches. It should be remembered that the post-1980 parties did not have the chance to establish strong regional branches before the elections as there was very little time. So, football was a short cut for the party to reach small residential areas. Thus, it is notable that the expansion of lower-division football was a priority for the ANAP-driven TFF.

The government aimed to modernize the top-class football, while expanding the lower half. It was certain that successful and modern Turkish teams at the national and club levels would bring a propaganda boost to the government. The economic policies that Özal applied, such as attracting foreign exchange by higher interest rates, flexible exchange and subsidizing exporters made an immediate impact to the major Istanbul clubs. The rich businessmen presidents now had the foreign exchange capital and they were free from the transfer restrictions of the former era. The gates to the world were opened both in monetary and athletic terms. Galatasaray and its dynamic board followed this opportunity. They hired the world-class German coach Jupp Derwall days after his glory in the European Championships of 1984. He also worked for the TFF as counsellor. Derwall made great contributions to Turkish football, especially to the physical conditions. For example, grass training pitches were introduced for the first time after his insistence on this matter.³⁰³ His team captain at Galatasaray, Fatih Terim later became the most successful Turkish coach of all times and his apprentice, Mustafa Denizli, became the first Turkish coach to play in a semi-final in European cups.

In the hard days of the national team, Derwall gave the recipe to success to sports

303 Gökaçtı, p. 280.

writer Turgay Şeren as “opening football schools, educating 10 year-olds as first sportspeople then footballers, building facilities like the ones in Germany”.³⁰⁴ These recommendations were criticized by Şeren as being long-term responses to urgent needs; however, Turkey followed those steps and became successful in the upcoming years. The conversation between Şeren and Derwall also portrayed the mentality difference between Turkish football and world-class football. The next two decades of Turkish football passed with closing this gap. However, by 1984, that gap was still wide open and 8-0 defeat against England ended the Derwall-Tarhan era. Derwall continued contributing to Galatasaray after the national team days. That was probably why Galatasaray reached its goals much quicker than the national team.

The political ties that Uluşu had helped him in speeding up many steps. He also faced difficulties because of them. In December 1984, the TFF's disciplinary measures against some clubs were vetoed by the National Education, Sports and Youth Minister Vehbi Dinçerler. This decision created a crisis which led three TFF board members to resign. Uluşu gave up resignation at the eleventh hour. After this crisis, Uluşu gradually lost the ANAP support and went into an open clash with Dinçerler throughout 1985. In July, the regulatory change which gives three points per win in the leagues was made by the TFF but vetoed by deputy GSGM Şahap Sayın. This veto ended the era of Uluşu as the president, and the board resigned.

The brief but troublesome Uluşu era was an interesting example of how the TFF depended on politics and how a ultra-liberal party like the ANAP also could be bundled with bureaucracy. The failure of the first TFF of the Özal era also initiated the autonomy

³⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, 2 November 1984.

discussions about the federation. A motion of law was proposed by Ata Aksu about the TFF in May 1985, but the matter was merged into a new sports regulation motion which passed one year later. The delay of the autonomy caused trouble in the federation. The TFF went into another period of unstable boards. Efforts were made to resolved the problem by Law No. 3461 (passed in May 1988) and No. 3524 (passed in March 1989). While the first law separated the TFF from the central sports body, the second law stated the TFF president would be appointed by the Prime Minister initially and would be elected four years after the law had come into effect.³⁰⁵ Law No. 3813, which passed in June 1992, defined the statute and the mission of the TFF and the federation officially became autonomous.

Another major change in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was the ticket prices began to be fixed by clubs, instead of GSGM. This change resulted in a massive and instant increase of 400% in ticket prices.³⁰⁶ The autonomy of the clubs on tickets also brought back season tickets, which had been issued in the 1950s by the GSGM. This time, clubs started to sell their own season tickets. From then on, the modernization of the clubs was funded not only by rich presidents, but also by the fans.

In the 1990s, the products of the investment and the modernization made in the 1980s were harvested as international success. The liberalization of the previous decade was an unintentional preparation to the new era of the global football. The neo-liberal Özal government lifted virtually all the restrictions in football and also created the free market economy that could invest in the sport. In this context, Turkey was more

305 Sebahattin Devecioğlu, “Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu'nun Özerkliği” (The autonomy of the Turkish Football Federation), *Gazi Beden Eğitimi ve Spor Bilimleri Dergisi* (Gazi Physical Education and Sports Sciences Journal) 8, no.3, (2003), p.53.

306 *Milliyet*, 2 September 1989.

prepared to enter the hyper-commodified global football of the 1990s than the former Warsaw Pact countries. Whereas the Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian football stars fled the country the moment they were free to make a transfer to a European club, Turkish players did not. For a fair comparison, we may take the Golden Shoe winners (European top scorers) of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 1986-87 winner Rodion Camataru of Romania made a transfer to Belgium in the 1989-90 season, right after the fall of the Ceausescu regime. Equally, the 1988-89 winner, another Romanian Dorin Mateut was transferred to Real Zaragoza of Spain the same season. The 1989-90 winner Bulgarian Hristo Stoichkov was hired by Barcelona FC in 1990 as well. The 1990-91 winner Darko Pancev of Yugoslavia waited for 1992 as that country changed regime that year and went to Internazionale right after. Among all those winners, there was one single Eastern European footballer that did not make a transfer. The 1987-88 winner, Tanju Çolak of Turkey never made a transfer to Europe and spent his entire career in Turkey.

Another striking example is the two teams that confronted each other in 1988-89 European Cup semi final, Galatasaray and Steaua Bucharest of Romania. Among 13 players (including two substitutes later entering the match) eleven players played abroad in the post-1990 period. At Galatasaray, none of the playing squad made a transfer to Europe after that match, including the foreign players, Zoran Simovic and Cevat Prekazi, and the Germany-born players, Uğur Tütüneker and İlyas Tüfekçi. This huge difference between two sides reveals the different conditions in Turkey and in Romania in the early 1990s. Even foreign-born players did not leave Galatasaray as their conditions in Turkey were satisfying for them.

Furthermore, the taxation regime regarding football transfers were very liberal in

Turkey. Football transactions were excluded from the value-added tax. Besides, almost all the contracts were signed for lower figures than the real fees paid in order to pay lesser income tax. For instance, in 1985, the transfer fees paid could go up to 80 million Liras while the average number declared was 2-3 million Liras.³⁰⁷ Footballers in Turkey may have earned slightly less than they could have earned abroad, but they paid much less in taxes. In those conditions, nobody risked a European adventure.

The major change in global football in the 1990s was the hyper-commodification. Turkey also followed this trend and the Özal government took the lead on this. For football to be profitable for the clubs, football broadcasts needed to be included in competitive free-market economy. However, the TV broadcasting was under state monopoly. In 1990, this monopoly was broken illegally by Magic Box (Star 1) TV channel, owned by Ahmet Özal, Prime Minister Turgut Özal's son. This channel started its broadcasts from Ludwigshafen, Germany via satellite. Their signals were usually retransmitted by ANAP member municipalities and they could be watched by regular antennas as well as satellite dishes. This channel, considered to be pirate by Turkish laws, made an offer to the TFF and the clubs to broadcast the league matches in February 1990. In exchange, Magic Box would pay at least 5 billion liras (plus 15 per cent of advertising revenues) to the big clubs and 1,5 billion liras to the other clubs.³⁰⁸

The pirate station also reached an agreement with the state postal company to transmit the matches through their uplink channels and with the GSGM for entering the stadiums. The TV network announced the agreements with full-page advertisements in

307 *Milliyet*, 12 January 1985.

308 *Milliyet*, 20 February 1990

newspapers. The broadcasts started without problems. The Prime Minister's son was broadcasting illegally with the help of state companies and the municipalities. Other holdings also founded TV networks and their legal status could not be defined for years. With the introduction of the first encrypted terrestrial channel Cine5 in 1993, the football market enlarged even further. However, the allocation of money paid to football clubs were rationed per popularity, so the economic gap between the Istanbul big three and the others constantly widened. It was virtually impossible to repeat the success of Trabzonspor in the 1980s for Anatolian teams, even for Trabzonspor itself. It is striking that the last non-Istanbul championship victory was in 1984, when junta-driven Tokatlı federation was in charge. Since the Özal years, the title has been shared among Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe. The Turkish league is still the European league with the least number of different champions. This picture indeed overlaps the widening economic gap between the rich and poor since the same years in Turkey. Also, the global football economy aggravates this gap in football as the UEFA pays millions of Euros per success to those who participate in the European club competitions and also additional TV rights are paid. Hence, the successful teams in Turkey receive more revenue from domestic TV rights and also from *İddaa*, the state betting company; equally they receive money from the UEFA. This economic power helps the successful teams buy better players from abroad and also the best players from the other teams, so they can have more success. Both in global and domestic football, success generates money that generates success, and the ones who stay outside this circle have little chance to succeed. In Turkey, this was a wave created by the Özal government; however it has been continued by the global “industrial” football.

The three-team monopoly over the domestic title eventually rendered European success more crucial. The 1989 European Cup semi-final of Galatasaray was beyond imagination for many and it helped raise the stakes. This success was later followed by the 1996 European Championship qualification of the national team for the first time, Galatasaray's 2000 UEFA Cup victory, third-place of the Turkish team in 2002 World Cup and semi-final 2008 European Championships. All these successes created a sense of national pride which manifested itself unhealthily on several occasions, such as the stabbing of two Leeds fans in Taksim Square in 2000 and the *Star* newspaper comment “they made the Leeds hooligans kiss the homeland soil by hitting their heads” the next day.³⁰⁹ Succeeding in international football also revealed a two-faced regard of Europe in which belonging to Europe and despising it went hand in hand.³¹⁰ Obviously, the fact that these successes in European football overlapped in the period Turkey was waiting indefinitely to join the European Union is a factor in this complicated feeling. The joy of being successful at joining Europe (even though it is only in football) usually brings along the hatred of waiting for too long and knowing that nothing will change outside the football field. The successes in international football actually show how deep and expanded this feeling is in Turkish society. However, it should also be born in mind that while a part of this feeling comes from the earliest days of the belated Turkish modernism, another big part of it is nourished by the nationalist/revanchist feeling which was manufactured to compensate for Turkey's deceptions in international politics. The rising Turkish nationalism regarding the Kurdish issue in the 1990s also changed the

309 “Leeds’li holiganlara kafasına vura vura vatan toprağını öptürdüler.” *Star*, 7 April 2000.

310 Tamil Bora, “Dur Tarih, Vur Türkiye” (Stop History, Shoot Turkey), *Futbol ve Kültürü*, p.231.

fans' reactions both in domestic and international games. MHP militants appearing in the stands in this period also played a major role on this change. Anti-PKK slogans and the official singing of the national anthem before each domestic game were introduced to the stands in that period.

The importance of football success was perceived by Özal in the early 1980s. The other politicians and political parties also realized how strong the hype could be after a major football success. On the national level, the common understanding of this fact created a continuity in football policies. Even though, different leaders have become Prime Minister since Özal, the football's path almost has never changed. Even in the economic crisis periods of 1994 and 2001, the politicians did not risk cutting the football budgets. The clubs also have always enjoyed a constant privilege in taxation and tax amnesties, which actually started in the 1960s. One of the key factors behind this privileged situation is that the major clubs usually act together in state-related monetary issues, such as the tax amnesties.

On the local level, the municipalities have become major actors in football since the 1980s. In that era, the revenues of municipalities were raised and the ANAP member municipalities invested this money in local football clubs in order to seize popularity; the reopening of the Third Division helped a lot in this matter.³¹¹ These clubs were either already existing local clubs or they were founded within municipal ventures. The existing clubs needed this support in order to battle the widening gap between the major clubs. The new clubs were founded where an agreement with the local clubs could not be reached. Ankara and Istanbul were the most visible examples of this latter situation.

311 Gökaçtı, pp. 319-320.

As it was impossible to cooperate with the major clubs of the city, both municipalities founded their own clubs. In Ankara, a merger between the municipality team Ankaraspor and Ankaragücü, the most popular Ankara team, came into reality in 2009. As a result of this merger, the mayor's son, Ahmet Gökçek, became the Ankaragücü president, while many Ankaraspor players were transferred to Ankaragücü after formality transactions. The TFF noted the irregularities in the transactions between these two Super Lig sides and relegated Ankaraspor to the First League (second division). The team that benefited from this merger, Ankaragücü did not face any punishment. This incident which happened in the top division and in the capital city shows the level of political involvement in local clubs as well.

The Football Fandom in England and in Turkey

Fandom is relative. It is a personal choice that may depend on different factors. Sandvoss's fruitful work on Chelsea fans and the reasons why they support the club clearly shows this personal element. According to Sandvoss's interviews with the fans, some fans support Chelsea because it is successful whereas some other fans claim nobody can support the club because it is successful as it has never been successful.³¹² Furthermore, the way the fan relate his/her identity with the club identity can be a key factor. For example, several Chelsea fans state that they love Chelsea because of its cosmopolitan character and the diversity of different nationalities on the squad; however

312 Cornel Sandvoss, *A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television and Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 27-28.

another Chelsea fan may love the club because it was the last London team to have an all-white squad.³¹³ These conflicting interviews evidently show that in fandom, the club identity is rather less important than how this identity is interpreted by the fan and how this identity can coexist with the fan's own identity. Indeed, this personal choice also may not depend on any logic. Everyone is entitled to support a team just because he/she loves its colours, the way they play, a particular player, etc., or just because it is the family team.

While accepting that any generalization about the reason of fandom can be misleading, we think the effect of common denominators of fan and club identity should not be overlooked. The clubs with strong identities may share this identity with its fans. We previously mentioned clubs like Celtic and Rangers in Scotland, and Derry City in Ireland which had a huge deal of sectarianism in their identity. Obviously, the fact that Celtic has more Catholic and Rangers has more Protestants fans is not a coincidence. Equally, the minority teams may present strong identities. For example, Sydney United of Croatian-immigrants and Bonnyrigg White Eagles of Serbian-immigrants can import the ethnic tension in Balkans to Australia.³¹⁴ Also, political engagements of a club may attract a specific fan type to that club. AS Livorno of Italy and FC St. Pauli are known as left-wing/anarcho-communist clubs and they have fans worldwide even though they do not have any notable success in their history. Athletic Bilbao, the team of the Basque country in Spain, still refuses to include any non-Basque player on its squad. Nevertheless, the number of clubs with such strong identities is rather low and most

313 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

314 Roy Hay, "Our Wicked Foreign Game': Why has Association Football (Soccer) not Become the Main Code of Football in Australia?," *Soccer & Society* 7, no. 2, (2006), p.176.

clubs give up pursuing their identity and concentrate on surviving and succeeding in the globalized football market. This creates an identity crisis between the objectives and the traditional identity of the club. This crisis is more visible especially in world-class clubs. The market-driven club needs to be more mainstream, attract more customers, gain more income and convert it to sportive success. This process may disillusion the traditional fan base, and provoke a cross-club separation.³¹⁵ The Manchester United fans who founded their own breakaway club FC United of Manchester (FCUM) after disapproving the commercialization of the club are a good example of this tension. We will analyse the FCUM phenomenon later in this chapter.

The dissolution of club identities due to the market conditions pushing clubs to a common ground also converts football fandom to a more personal experience. As the club can address to fans from different backgrounds with different identities, the affection for the club can be the sole common denominator of fans of the same club. Previously, it was described how the post-1990 fan is more distanced to the club, in some cases like the Premier League they may be also be distanced to the stadiums, they rarely have a part in decision-making process of the club, they live completely different lives with the players and so on. Hence, the fan distanced to the club and the other fans usually enjoy a 90-minute shared experience (if they are in the stadium) on the weekend and they got separated. Obviously, traditional fan groups do not fit to this picture. The more industrialized the football organization is, the more they struggle to exist. The fan groups in the selected countries, in England and in Turkey, face this struggle. So, it is

315 Richard Giulianotti and Gary Armstrong, "Constructing Social Identities: Exploring the Structured Relations of Football Rivalries," *Fear and Loathing in World Football*, p. 272.

essential to analyse how these fans experience the transformation of football in their countries. Their experience depends on their common identity as well as the conditions of their country and clubs.

In Britain, most of the clubs playing in the top divisions have a history of working-class affiliation, such as the factories, trade unions and the Conformist churches. These clubs were founded by groups of people who shared a common identity. The clubs were born as the local gathering points of people who shared the same identity, such as the workers of the same factory as in Arsenal and Manchester United, or the followers of the same church as in Aston Villa and Everton FC examples. Thus, the fan bases of the clubs were created around these long-lasting organizations. Clubs like Manchester United, West Ham or Liverpool preserved their working-class identities even in the 1970s where English football started to be commodified. Equally, conservative clubs such as Chelsea and Everton managed to continue their identity through decades. The key reason for being able to preserve their identities was locality. In England, between 1859 and 1919, 110 football teams were founded, most of which emerged 1880-1900 period.³¹⁶ Many local clubs all appearing at once prevented one club or few clubs of dominating others in terms of popularity. In other words, every local organization or every neighbourhood could have its own club in that period, so they did not have a reason to support another. This kept English football in a balanced profile for decades. The less successful clubs managed to preserve their fan bases too as they had a local affiliation with their fans. Even today, where the gap between the top and the

³¹⁶ For the foundation dates of the English football clubs: <http://www.rsssf.com/tablese/engfound.html> [10 December 2009].

bottom of English football is wider than ever, the attendance rates are still high in the lower divisions. In the 2006-2007 football season, the average attendance of a match in Championship (second division) was 18,200 in League One (third division) it was 7,500,³¹⁷ whereas Turkish Süper Lig (first division) could attract 14,000 viewers per match in the same season.³¹⁸

In Turkey, the time gap between the emergence and the expansion of association football to the national level was almost seventy years. While football was imported to Turkey in the late 1890s, the professional clubs in Anatolia only mushroomed at the end of the 1960s. Through these decades, football was played at the local level in most cities, with the exception of Istanbul and Izmir. Ankara and Trabzon could also have a football tradition thanks to the local rivalries. However, in big picture the domination of three big Istanbul clubs could not be contested until the late 1970s when those clubs were weakened by economic crisis and foreign player restrictions. Even then, only one non-Istanbul club has won the championship. By the 1970s, when football started to be commodified, there was already an utter domination of Istanbul clubs, in terms of both success and popularity. Besides, football in Turkey emerged in a nationalistic context and later continued in that manner. The Istanbul clubs acted as a Turkish national team against the other ethnic groups, the occupation forces and eventually the foreign teams. After the 1960s, this national representation context revived by the foundation of European clubs as Turkey was mostly represented by these clubs due to their domestic success. As state above, the three Istanbul teams hold the majority of football fans in

317 Available online at <http://www.european-football-statistics.co.uk/attn/2007/aveeng.htm> [10 December 2009].

318 Available online at <http://www.european-football-statistics.co.uk/attn/2000/avetur.htm> [10 December 2009].

every Turkish city except Trabzon where the fourth champion, Trabzonspor, is from.

Hence, unlike in England, in Turkey the locality in football fandom does not exist except for minor examples. The majority of football fans support the major clubs and the majority of these clubs' fans live far away from Istanbul.

In England, political engagement and class affiliation were factors in fans' choices of favourite clubs until the late 1980s, when both working-class and the clubs started their own alienation to their identities. The defeat of the unions in Miners' Strike, the conversion of the Labour Party to the New Labour, which was not engaged in the class struggle and even the end of the Cold War, triggered the dissolution of class-consciousness in England. At the same period, the football clubs started to surrender to the market conditions. Today, it is hard to claim that class affiliation is a factor in English football fandom as even the most “red” clubs of the past did not stay as entities based on labour identity like Livorno or St. Pauli in other countries. However, some traditional fan bases still preserve their political engagements, which usually cause their “disenfranchisement” from the actual condition of their clubs.

In Turkey, it is not possible to talk about a continuous class consciousness as the politicization of the Turkish public was interrupted several times by military interventions. The most politicized eras of Turkish history usually have led to coup d'etats. In addition, Turkish football clubs did not have a political engagement except leaning towards the political entity in power in some eras. In major Istanbul clubs that had the majority of the fans, this inclination happened almost simultaneously. For example, in the 1940s, all three clubs had CHP-member board members, in the 1950s, they all had DP-member presidents. After coup d'etats, they acted more reserved in

appointing political figures; however, their businessmen presidents also had political ties to different political powers. Besides, the political parties in power usually did not have conflicts with the business elite and mostly shared common visions. As all three clubs usually shared the same political tendency, it did not become a part of the club identity. Except obvious and short-lived attempts such as İttihatspor (of CUP) or Güneş (of Kemalists), Turkish clubs did not have consistent political engagements.

Equally, when Turkish public was politicized in the late 60s and the 70s, football was not affected too much by those currents. Unlike in England, in Turkey the left-wing tried to keep a distance from football especially during the late 1970s when the left politics radicalized. The general perception of football by Turkish socialists was that it was a tool used for manipulating and stupefying the people, an “opium for the masses.”³¹⁹ Bostancıoğlu claims the relationship between football and the socialists warmed when all political activities were suspended and most leftist activists were convicted after the 1980 coup.³²⁰ However, in that period, these people were deprived of their ability to politicize football.

The right-wing political groups in the 1970s were equally distant to football. For the militant Turkish nationalists of this era, football was considered to be “an event that degenerated national conscience.”³²¹ However, after the liberation of the MHP-based extreme nationalism after a decade of suspension (brought by the 1980 coup), the nationalists of the late 1980s began to seek ground to justify themselves and regain popularity. The nationalists had a similar period suspension in the 1940s with the trial of

319 Adnan Bostancıoğlu, “Taraftar ve Solcu Olmak” (Being a Fan and a Leftist), *Futbol ve Kültürü*, p. 242.

320 Ibid., p. 244.

321 Tamil Bora, p. 237.

the Panturkists. At the period, the Cyprus issue was considered to be a probable popular case for the nationalists to re-engage themselves into political life.³²²

In the 1990s, the anti-PKK climate and popularity of Turkish football appeared to be a generous opportunity and the MÇP-MHP based extreme nationalists started to politicize mainstream football fans.³²³ This tendency reached its climax with the election of Güven Sazak, one of the key figures of the MHP, to the Fenerbahçe presidency in 1993. The congress of the club were also guarded by MHP militants, in case some party members intervene the elections to make sure Sazak won against the other candidate Ali Şen (who was also known as a MHP sympathizer).³²⁴ In this period, MHP militant groups began to appear at games in order to prevent any protest against the president. At the same period, Galatasaray's rising profile in European fixtures also attracted nationalists' attention. Alpaslan Dikmen, the leader of Galatasaray's biggest fan group Ultraslan was the columnist of the ultra-nationalist *Yeniçağ* newspaper, which had very close ties with the MHP. Beşiktaş stands remained rather resistant to the emergence of ultra-nationalist fans as the leader of the famous Çarşı group, Alen Markaryan was a Turkish-Armenian with left-wing tendencies. However, even Çarşı absorbed a degree of popular nationalism in this era. This fan group which appears to be more politically-engaged than others will be analysed later, thoroughly.

The nationalism in Turkish stands that reached its peak in the late 1990s declined in the 2000s, as the MHP faced a major economic crisis in 2001 as the coalition partner and left of the assembly in the next elections. The 2000s marked the rise of conservative

322 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçiliğin Kıskaçında Kıbrıs* (Cyprus in the Grip of Nationalism) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 207.

323 Tanıl Bora, p. 237.

324 *Milliyet*, 28 August 1996.

(former Islamist) AKP, which tried to found more organizational bonds with football through the TFF boards. Up to now, an AKP-militant supporter group has not been visible in football stands.

The 1990s can be considered to be the only era in which football fans were visibly politicized. However, this politicization mainly depended on the popular nationalism's rise and it ended with this current's decline. Even in that era, the politics could not succeed in altering the club's identity permanently as the fans were too diverse both socially and physically.

One of the major differences between English and Turkish fans are their involvement in club matters. In England, most football clubs emerged as working-class people clubs and later taken over by upper class executives as the founders of the clubs could not handle the management of financial matters when capital gradually turned out as a major necessity in the professionalized football as early as the 1900s. For example, the typical example of English working-class clubs, Manchester United was taken over by Manchester Breweries' owner John Henry Davies when the original club Newton Heath was heading bankruptcy in 1902.³²⁵ Similarly, another wealthy businessmen Henry Norris, took over Arsenal FC in 1910.

A similar kind of takeover trend also appeared in Turkey after the introduction of professionalism in the late 1950s. The difference between Turkish and English experiences was that in England the clubs were founded by the classes who also constituted their fan bases. In Turkey, the clubs were founded by state elites. Thus, until

³²⁵ Stefan Szymanski, "Why is Manchester United so Successful?" *Business Strategy Review* 9, no. 4, (Winter 1998), p. 50.

the takeover by businessmen, the military-civil bureaucracy dominated the boards in Turkish clubs, whereas in English example it was the working-class which governed the clubs until they had to yield the power to the businessmen. Hence, in English clubs, a brief period of self-governance was experienced by the fan base. In Turkey, football has rapidly popularized after the emergence of the clubs, however the club boards have always been in the members of upper classes, such as military-civil elites, high-ranking politicians and wealthy businessmen.

In England, the self-governance experience of the fan base was quickly converted into another fashion of involvement in the decision-making processes. The fans, who no longer appeared on club boards, founded supporters' clubs in as early as the 1910s and started organizing sports-related events, like in the example of Luton Town Football Supporters Club arranging athletics meetings in cooperation with local clubs.³²⁶ The supporters' clubs also formed a national organization in 1927, called the National Federation of Football Supporters Clubs (NFFSC). These supporter clubs had rather an “official” image and they aimed to facilitate the relations between the supporters and the clubs, rather than ensure fans' involvement in club matters.³²⁷ The NFFSC is criticized by scholars like Rogan Taylor, Rex Nash and Adam Brown for its non-involvement in club matters. However, while accepting this criticisms are accurate, it should also be noted that the supporters' clubs and the NFSSC provided a channel for fans to somehow communicate with the club and contributed to the emergence of an organizational tradition of fans involvement. The more engaged fans' organizations like the Football

³²⁶ *The Times*, 3 June 1914.

³²⁷ Brown, pp. 51-52.

Supporters Association (FSA) and the Independent Supporter Associations (ISA's) also profited from this tradition. The NFFSC may be considered to be ineffective when it is compared to the ISAs and the FSA, however it, more or less, filled the void between the fans and the clubs in national level by appearing as an agency. The NFFSC was also involved in rare political actions such as the protest against the High Entertainment Tax in 1953.³²⁸

In Turkey, the fans have not had the habit of being involved in club matters since the beginning. Their general contribution to the clubs' benefits has been to support the team in the games or protesting the referees or the federation when they feel an injustice. Obviously, these behaviours have been rather spontaneous than organized. Probably the first -relatively- organized action of Turkish fans took place in 1963, during the transfer talks of Birol Peker from Beşiktaş to Fenerbahçe. Twenty Beşiktaş fans, self-proclaimed the “*amigos*,” (literally “friends” in Spanish) took Peker from his house to the Beşiktaş headquarters to convince him not to go to Fenerbahçe.³²⁹ While this group failed their objective, the “amigo” became the general name for fan leaders in Turkey, from then on. The “Amigos” in different clubs constituted the origins of the organized fan groups in the 1960s, creating the first mass shows in the stands. Eskişehirspor's amigo Orhan was particularly renowned for his creative chants and shows and contributed to the popularity of the club in its golden era.³³⁰ While the “amigos” became a part of the fan culture in the 1970s, many of them formed relations with club boards based on personal interest³³¹. It should be noted that the “amigos” and their followers constituted self-

328 The Times, 17 August 1953.

329 *Milliyet*, 19 July 1963.

330 Gökaçtı, p. 250.

331 *Ibid.*, p. 310.

proclaimed organizations with no legal statute whatsoever. Therefore, even in their strongest eras, they did not act as an agency between clubs and supporters, and their personal and group interests usually surpassed the general fans' interests in their contacts with the clubs.

In the 1980s and the 1990s, where football reached a wider popularity, the “amigos” turned their followers into “casual” style fan groups. Their relations with the wealthy businessmen presidents were so solidified that it could affect board elections' results. Especially former Fenerbahçe president Ali Şen established such a relationship with the fan groups to be re-elected in 1994 by the help of the famous chant “*Ali Şen Başkan, Fenerbahçe Şampiyon*” (Ali Şen president, Fenerbahçe champions). In most clubs, facilities like stadium car parks, public toilets and cafeterias were run by fan groups' leading members, and the match tickets and buses to away games were organized by board members, or people who wanted to climb the steps of club politics. Therefore, the fan groups had more than enough economic power to finance their banners, however this economic power depended on their relations with club's political figures. They were not independent. Moreover, this dependent relationship of fan groups with the club boards became more essential as the football scene was commodified rapidly. The season ticket prices were getting out of reach for a minimum wage earner as were the television subscription fees. By 2003-2004 season, the minimum wage in Turkey was 216.95 US Dollars per month and the subscription fee for Lig TV, the league broadcaster was annually 471.37 US Dollars minimum. The same season, the major Istanbul clubs sold match tickets up to twenty times more than they reported to the TFF

and allied against a possible ban on selling overpriced tickets.³³² The single match ticket prices were around 25-30 US Dollars at the time, more than one tenth of the monthly minimum wage. For those who could not afford these fees, joining a fan group was a way out as most fan groups received free tickets and other benefits from club boards. Therefore, through the 1990s and the 2000s, more crowded and more self-interest based fan groups appeared.

The Beşiktaş's Çarşı group founded in 1982 was the closest to the “casuals” culture among others. The group managed to create its own identity independent from the club as a left-wing oriented, anti-racist, environmentalist fan group that appeared in social protests and Labour Day celebrations. With their logo with the anarchy symbol, they also appealed to the left-wing football fans and intellectuals who had been distanced from football during the right-wing dominated 1980s and 1990s. However, also Çarşı had its inconsistencies. The first major breakpoint came over in 2000. That year, it was Süleyman Seba's sixteenth year as the Beşiktaş chairman. During his reign, the club completely concentrated on its youth system and tackled its economic crisis while also winning five league and four cup titles. In the first ten years of his term, Beşiktaş had been the most successful team in domestic competitions despite the low budgets it had compared to its rivals. However, Seba was a conservative president and had difficulties in modernizing the club during the late 1990s. As a result, Serdar Bilgili, his former general secretary, challenged him for presidency. Bilgili had a board of wealthy businessmen, and promised to compete with the rival clubs. Çarşı gave full support to Bilgili while protesting and insulting Seba. It was like Liverpool fans

³³² *Milliyet*, 20 August 2003.

insulting Bill Shankly and caused a unresolvable chagrin for Seba, who was soon to become the honorary president of the club. He left presidency and Bilgili was elected. Çarşı's choice of Bilgili over Seba and his allies was interesting as they defined themselves as “the last fortress against the industrial [commodified] football.” Serdar Bilgili was aiming at a market-driven club by listing the club shares on the Istanbul Stock Market, whereas Seba and his candidate Hasan Arat wanted to preserve the club's identity. Ironically, one of the prominent actions of Serdar Bilgili was to replace Çarşı from its usual terrace the “Covered Stand” and build expensive box seats there. One season later, Çarşı was given limited space in the same terrace. After this incident, Çarşı diverted its support to Bilgili's vice-president Yıldırım Demirören and led to the president's resignation. During Demirören reign, Beşiktaş's debts constantly increased. By 2009, the club had 161 million Liras of debt, 60 million of which was due to be paid to the president himself.³³³ This debt was mainly because of expensive and excessive player transfers. However, the championship and cup victory in 2008-09 season silenced protesters including Çarşı who was already criticized of overlooking club's current status. The bad start to the 2009-10 season triggered Çarşı's protests, however Yıldırım Demirören supporters sent to the Covered Stand opened a banner reading “Don't forget the two cups, don't be disloyal” right next to the Çarşı fans. The protests continued while Demirören declared “he would clean up the stands.” The clash between Demirören and Çarşı resulted in group's leader Alen Markaryan being banned from stadiums for one year due to crowd disorder.

333 NTV Spor, 17 November 2009, “*Beşiktaş'ın Borcu 181 Milyon TL!*” (The debts of Beşiktaş reached 181 Million TL!) Available online at <http://www.ntv.com.tr/id/25021367/> [13 December 2009].

In Çarşı experience, it is crucial to see that the group, despite its discourse in opposite direction, failed to become independent from the club board. The “disloyalty” banner was obviously an allusion to Çarşı once being “loyal” to the president. Interestingly, Çarşı actually had a chance to establish some sort of economic independence thanks to the popularity of its own merchandise products. The results of a survey made by Beşiktaş club board showed that only 8% of the buyers of club's official merchandise were attending games whereas the Çarşı products' buyers were generally match day regulars.³³⁴ This result was mainly due to the popularity of Çarşı and the discontent of fans against the board. However, Çarşı, instead of using this advantage to gain economic independence, sought a deal with the club board to sell the products in club's official shops. This deal created interesting consequences. In the early 2000s, the group had launched a campaign against Cola Turka, the cola brand of Ülker known with its conservative-Islamist ties, that became the sponsor of the basketball team. As the name of the team would become “Beşiktaş Cola Turka”, the slogan of the campaign was “three syllables, eight letters, it's only Beşiktaş”. However, the slogan of the campaign was adopted by another club sponsor Avea. The anti-commodification slogans of Çarşı were commodified and sold to corporations. Equally, the scarf with the picture of one of the Çarşı leaders Optik began to be sold in the official club store along with the sponsors' merchandise that the so-called anarchist Çarşı once soundly protested.

The Çarşı experience shows that even the most engaged fan group of the country can find itself in inconsistencies and complicated relations with club boards and

334 Beşiktaş Postası, 29 October 2009, “*Kartal Yuvası'nda Çarşı telaşı*” (Çarşı panic at Kartal Yuvası). Available online at <http://www.besiktaspostasi.com/kartal-yuvasinda-carsi-telasi.htm> [13 December 2009].

sponsors. The commodification of the most anti-commodification front of Turkish football reveals the weaknesses in the “last fortress.” Whereas Çarşı was strongly influenced by its English and Italian counterparts about appearing as an independent and militant fans' entity, they lacked the common identity among fans and the tradition to form a durable opposition to the current trends. Despite their left-wing oriented stances about social issues, such as racism, Palestine issue or climate warming, they could not entirely manage to shift the ordinary fan to their point of view, as most Beşiktaş fans did not share the same identities and experiences. Also their choice of Bilgili over Seba started their defeat against the commodification of football. Another weak point of Çarşı's battle was their failure in cooperating with the fans of other clubs sharing the same tendencies. Even though they presented themselves a group based on a distinctive point of view and identity, they ignored their equivalents in other clubs and they cooperated with their counterparts within Beşiktaş, such as the club board, instead. The Çarşı experience is a proof of how difficult to form a class-based or identity-based entity in an environment where the class or identity consciousness rarely appear as a key factor.

While the Turkish example shows the confusion and the lack of orientation that Turkish fan groups suffer from, in England of the late 1980s where liberalization and government pressure begin to change the profile of the stands, the cast out traditional fans clung to their identity against the direction that their clubs were heading.

The traditionalist fan groups of the late 1980s were not content with the situation of English football. The football scene was dominated by the clash between the minority “casual” hooligans and the government, which turned into a media circus. The NFSSC lacked the ability to defend supporters' interests and the officials' approach was

ineffective to define and solve the real problem. The National Football Supporters' Association was born as a reaction and an resolution attempt to this problematic picture after the Heysel disaster.³³⁵ Unlike the NFFSC, the FSA was an identity-based, politically-engaged organization founded in order to express about and act on issues regarding football supporters. The organization campaigned against the Identity-card scheme of Margaret Thatcher successfully.³³⁶ The FSA and its local successors, the Independent Supporters' Associations adopted the Do-It-Yourself ethics created by the working-class Punk movement in the late 1970s, also used some of its methods such as the fanzines. The fanzine also helped these organizations in delivering an alternative approach and reaching a wider audience about tackling the racism problem in football which the Conservative governments considered solely and utterly to be a criminal issue and tried to deal with by the most controversial surveillance technique and the most severe punishment possible. For example, the Leeds Fans United Against Racism and Fascism organization began publishing *Marching Altogether* fanzine, entirely focused on the racism problem, which was followed by many others in different clubs and finally by FSA's nationwide United Colours of Football Campaign.³³⁷ The fanzines, just like in the Punk Movement, helped its publishers to create a broad “cultural contestation” against the regnant tendency.³³⁸

The Independent Supporters' Associations founded after the FSA, represented a more local and flexible approach in supporters' mobilization. Whereas the FSA could

335 Brown, p.51.

336 Brian Lomax, “Democracy and fandom: Developing a Supporters' Trust at Northampton Town FC,” *Soccer & Society* 1, no. 1, (2006), p. 79

337 Les Back, Tim Crabbe and John Solomos, *The Changing Face of Football: Racism, Identity and Multiculture in the English Game* (Oxford-New York: Berg Publishers, 2001), pp. 187-188.

338 Brown, *ibid.*, p.52.

carry out high profile national campaigns, it struggled in ensuring mass participation which caused representation and financial issues for the organization.³³⁹ Independent Supporters' Associations all over the country brought a less bureaucratic and wider participation and could focus on local issues. The success in establishing local organizations helped supporters to get involved in their clubs' matters. This became very helpful especially in the Premier League era as the abandonment of the cross-subsidiary league system pushed many clubs to the verge of bankruptcy.

Northampton Town was one of those clubs. In 1992, the editor of the club fanzine *What a Load of Cobblers*, Rob Marshall and club supporter Brian Lomax, called a fan meeting in order to help out the club to save it from bankruptcy, and the Northampton Supporters' Trust was born after a series of meetings.³⁴⁰ The trust organized fund-raising events, received support from the local council, bought 8% of club's shares and sent a director to the club board. It was also involved in the combat against racism and the problems of disabled fans. Northampton Supporters' Trust set an example to other struggling clubs. After Northampton, clubs like Port Vale and Lincoln were also saved by their supporters' contributions. The successful attempts of fan democracy in clubs also attracted the Labour government's attention. The Labour Party unlike the Conservatives, accepted the mutual dialogue (between fans and officials), the Football Task Force gathered in 1999 to tackle fan-related issues in football included representatives from the FSA, NFSSC and the Disabled Supporters Association (DSA). The report that the Task Force presented to the Minister of Sport included proposals

339 Ibid., p. 51-52.

340 Phil Frampton, Jonathan Michie and Andy Walsh, "Fresh Players, New Tactics: Lessons from the Northampton Town Supporters' Trust" (London: Football Governance Research Centre, 2001), pp. 8-9.

regarding a more equitable and democratic football environment, such as the establishment of a Football Audit Commission and a “Ombudsfan” regulating clubs' compliance with the principles, the measures for the fair trade of club merchandise, the establishment of democratic fan forums and their representation in club boards in annual meetings.³⁴¹ The government responded positively to the report. The Independent Football Commission was founded to regulate English football, following the proposals of the Football Task Force.³⁴² Equally, Supporters Direct, an organization “dedicated to providing legal and practical advice to supporters’ groups in forming trusts that allow them a greater say in how their clubs are run”³⁴³ was founded.

It is noteworthy that the FSA, ISAs and other independent fan organizations managed to stage successful campaigns in order to reclaim fans' involvement in national football and club matters in a period when working-class political involvement sustained a massive damage with the failure of the Miners' Strike. In a decade where working-class were disillusioned with the unions and the Labour Party, the supporter organizations created an alternative political engagement through football clubs. As one Northampton Town fan expressed, “the fact that the supporters of Northampton Town were willing to come out to public meetings to talk about how they might save their club reveals a real depth of feeling, which you don’t get for many other organizations. Certainly not for a political party.”³⁴⁴

341 “Football: Commercial Issues: A Submission by the Football Task Force to the Minister for Sport”, (London: Stationery Office, 1999), pp. 8-11.

342 “Response to the Football Task Force Report: ‘Football: Commercial Issues’”, Statement by Rt Hon Chris Smith MP, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (London: Stationery Office, 1999), p. 4.

343 Frampton, Michie, Walsh, p. 8.

344 Ibid., p. 7.

Another notable example of fans' political engagement through football is the case of Football Club United of Manchester (shortly FCUM, derived from *Fuck'em*). The Independent Manchester United Supporters' Association (IMUSA), one of the most effective ISA's in England, has conducted a very active campaign against club's commodification and sale to investors since the 1990s. The first action of the IMUSA took place against the rise of season ticket prices in 1992. This was followed by the campaign against the sale of club's shares to BSkyB broadcasting corporation. Through the process where the shares of the clubs were finally taken over by American investor Malcolm Glazer, the possibility of "a breakaway club" was hinted at in the Manchester United fanzine the *Red Issue* in February 2005.³⁴⁵ Later that year, the FCUM was founded.

Obviously, a breakaway organization from one of the world's successful football clubs triggered dissidences between the FCUM and MUFC supporters, even among FCUM fans themselves, about supporting or not supporting Manchester United. Brown, while depicting the differences between the FCUM and MUFC, refers to the innovative hypothesis of Giulianotti that claims the tradition football clubs represented Tönnies' pre-modern *Gemeinschaft* with its face-to-face relationships.³⁴⁶ Accordingly, the post-1990 hyper-commodified football clubs in England represent modern, *Gesellschaft* version of football whereas pre-1990 football tradition represents *Gemeinschaft*. Considering football was a heritage taken from the pre-modern rural communities to the urban England, it is noteworthy to think football fandom in England was a channel that

345 Adam Brown, "Our Club, Our Rules': Fan Communities at FC United of Manchester," *Soccer & Society* 9, no. 3, November 2008, p. 347.

346 *Ibid.*, p. 350.

the working-class conveyed its *Gemeinschaft* roots through. However, the organizational capacity of English football fans, which obviously show *Gesellschaft* characteristics as well cannot be overlooked. In the same context, we may associate Turkish football fans lack of orientation with the country's problematic relationship with the modernity. While English football fans combined its traditions with modern organizational models, Turkish fans both lacked the late rural or early working-class football tradition and the organizational habits of modern working-class that English fans enjoyed.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Football is a modern game invented under the conditions of the modern, urban life in England. It was derived from the folkloric games of the rural England to the industrial cities in the late eighteenth century and played massively by the newly-emerged English working-class. However, the transformation from the violent folk football to the codified modern game took place in English public schools where middle class students attended. While football transformed from a folkloric game to an amateur sport, the involvement of the working-class in the game ceased, as the severe working conditions in the early industrial age did not allow the workers to have such pastime activities. However, with the emergence of workers' struggle, the working hours were reduced and the working-class reclaimed its own game. As workers could then attend the games as sports people and spectators, the popularity of football reached a level that it could be qualified as a commodity for the first time. The worker players' physical advantage over public school students make them a priority for match organizers and they paid for these workers to play. Thus, the football became professional.

This brief history of early English football shows that the moment football became a commodity, it also became a business that created its own bosses and workers. After a short experience of self-governed working-class football clubs in the 1890s, they

were taken over by businessmen as the clubs could not afford the necessities of professionalism. In the industrial Britain where class division and consciousness was at a high level, football was also defined over class struggle. Hundreds of clubs founded by working-class football fans then had upper-class boards and chairmen. Thus, the rulers and the followers of football were also subjects of the class division. This created the still unresolved tension in professional football; the tension between the business interests of upper class and the way of expression of lower classes through football fandom.

In Turkey, football was imported by the upper-middle classes or the elites for the first time. While football was introduced to the country in the late 1880s, professionalism did not begin fully until the 1950s. This also created the upper class boards and lower class fans dichotomy. However, in Turkey football was an upper class game, just watched by the the lower classes. They did not have their clubs, they were not involved in club matters. Also, the football fans did not define their relationship according to class division, as class consciousness was not widespread. Also, the top-class football was not local in Turkey and concentrated in Istanbul. Until the 1960s, they were no professional clubs in Anatolia except Ankara and Izmir. Thus, the football fans overwhelmingly supported Istanbul clubs. While English fans were local and organized profiting from the class identity and the physical affinity, Turkish fans were deprived of both. Therefore, in England the upper class rulers of football faced a reaction from the lower classes each time they altered the game. In Turkey, there was no such reaction except when the team was unsuccessful.

Through the 1970s, both countries faced major political and social issues, such as

the economic crisis and the ethnic issues. In both countries, working-class struggle reached a higher level than before. The football fans in England were also the actors of this struggle not as football fans, but union member workers. In Turkey, football was considered to be apolitical both by the football fans and the working-class political movements. The game was considered to be harmful to the cause, the opiate of the masses and was not utilized as a struggle area.

In the 1980s, both England and Turkey witnessed major political changes. In England, the Labour government was overthrown by the strongest Conservative government of the post-Second World War era. In Turkey, the 1980 coup d'etat made a real “tabula rasa” in political life. However, interestingly, these events very different from each other resulted in a similar political climate. Both Thatcher and post-junta Özal governments aimed the liberalization of the economy and the dissolution of the welfare state. They also both believed in the modernization of football, but for different reasons. For Thatcher, football had to transform because it was unsupportable as the way it was. For Özal, football had to change because it could be used a political tool when it was transformed. In their era, football was unleashed from the restrictions which prevented it from being a hyper-commodified business sector.

In England, the modernization project of football also aimed at the working-class, as other working-class organizations such as the trade unions were also overcome by the Thatcherite government. The hyper-commodification of the game, the abolition of the cross-subsidiary system and the public TV broadcasts left the working-class traditional football fans out of football's public sphere. In Turkey, similar steps also distanced the lower class football fans. Nevertheless, the fans' reactions against the new

rules were different in two countries. In England, the traditional working-class football fans stayed organized and tried to re-engage themselves in the football world through Supporters' Associations. These associations inherited the passive trade unions' political background and converted it into a battle against the “bourgeoisification” of the game. Deliberately or instinctively, they created an alternative class struggle in an era where other class struggle agencies in England failed. Finally, they managed to get involved in football matters both in club and national levels.

In Turkey, the lack of club and class identity pushed the lower class football fans into confusion. As they had no organizational or political engagement as a group before, their reaction against the new conditions remained self-interest based. There were fan groups, but they were dependent on the club boards in order to afford their existence in the football arena. While they were discontent with the new football as much as the English fans were, they tried to coexist with it as they could not exist against it.

The difference between the reactions of Turkish and English football fans against the hyper-commodification of football in the post-1990 era, was caused by two major reasons: the difference between fan identities, the difference on locality. Politically engaged, local and organized football fan groups in England perceived the new era of football as a battle against themselves and reacted as a party of this battle. The Turkish fans did not have a distinctive fan identity as most clubs did not an identity themselves, their homogeneity was solely based on the club that they supported and nothing else. Also they were diverse geographically, and they lacked the organizational advantages of being close to each other. For these reasons, the football fans could not create their own fan identities and they did not have their own agenda. The common tendencies such as

the nationalism were absorbed easily also because of this lack of identity and self agenda.

To conclude, the reactions of football fans on the hyper-commodification of football in the post-1990 era mostly depended on the way that their identity was built. Fan groups with distinctive political and social identities responded more actively and tried to reclaim their positions. The fan groups without distinctive identities lacked this organizational capability and they had to surrender to the position that they were pushed into. In Turkey, the football fans suffer from disillusionment and confusion as they really do not know how to resist. Their existence in football never happened as the “appearance” that Kaschuba attributed to the lower classes. They still lack the class consciousness in an era where the positions in football are defined upon the purchasing power. As they cannot resist the power that dominates football, they seek desperate ways to be included in it. This explains the frustration and the confusion of Turkish football fans since the 1990s.

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