KANTIAN EMPIRICAL COGNITION AND SINGULAR CONCEPTS

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Thesis Abstract

Cenk Özdağ, “Kantian Empirical Cognition and Singular Concepts”

The subject-matter of this thesis is the distinction between empirical intuitions and empirical concepts in terms of two criteria, namely the singularity criterion and the immediacy criterion. The goal of the thesis on this issue is to show that these two criteria are distinct and independent from each other and one of them cannot be reduced to other. For reaching this goal and to provide a clearer account of these criteria, the two criteria are redefined to solve the problems that emerge in various interpretations of them in literature. It is argued that intuitions too are mediate but their mediacy is different from that of concepts.

It is claimed that the difference between empirical intuitions and empirical concepts depend on the analysis of empirical cognition by abstracting concepts from empirical cognition in order to find an element that provide the conditions of existence of logically possible objects.

The distinction between concepts and intuitions is related with the contemporary debate on nonconceptual content. In this thesis, it is argued that there is nonconceptual content in empirical cognition, but it is possible to think that the nonconceptual content other than spatiotemporal relations could be provided by sensations with the collaboration of concepts.

Another fundamental goal of this thesis is to find a way to speak of singular concepts within the Kantian corpus that is compatible with the central tenets of Kantian philosophy and to provide a ground to give examples of the singular use of concepts. In the thesis, it is shown that both the singular use of concepts and singular concepts are compatible with the Kantian account of concepts.

Tez Özeti

Cenk Özdağ, “Kantçı Deneysel Bilme ve Tekil Kavramlar”

Bu tezin konusu deneysel sezgilerle deneysel kavramlar arasında tekillik ve dolaysızlık ölçütleri üzerinden yapılan ayrımdır. Bu konuda tezin amacı bu iki ölçütün birbirinden farklı, bağımsız olduğunu ve birinin diğerine indirgenemeyeceğini göstermektir. Bu amacı gerçekleştirebilmek ve söz konusu ölçütlere ilişkin daha açık bir yorum getirebilmek için ölçütlerin literatürdeki çeşitli yorumlarında beliren sorunların çözülebilmesi için ölçütler yeniden tanımlanmıştır. Sezgilerin de dolaylı olduğu fakat bu dolaylılığın kavramların dolaylılığından farklı olduğu savunulmuştur.

Deneysel sezgiler ve deneysel kavramlar arasındaki ayrımın mantıksal olarak olanaklı nesnelerin varolma koşullarını sağlayan bir öğe bulabilmek için deneysel bilmeden kavramların soyutlanması yoluyla çözümlenmesine dayandığı iddia edilmiştir.

Kavramlar ve sezgiler arasındaki ayrım kavramdışı içerik üzerine yapılan çağdaş tartışmayla ilgilidir. Bu tezde, deneysel bilmede kavramdışı içerik olduğu ancak uzayzamansal ilişkiler dışındaki kavramdışı içeriğin kavramların katılımıyla birlikte duyumlar aracılığıyla sağlanabileceğini düşünmenin olanaklı olduğu savunulmuştur.

Tezin bir diğer temel amacı Kant külliyatında Kantçı felsefenin temel ilkeleriyle uyumlu olan tekil kavramlardan söz etmenin bir yolunu bulmak ve kavramların tekil kullanımına örnekler verebilmek için bir zemin sağlamaktır. Bu tezde, hem kavramların tekil kullanımlarının hem de tekil kavramların kavramların Kantçı bir yorumuyla uyumlu olduğu gösterilmektedir.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

In this thesis, my aim is to focus on the distinction between empirical intuitions and empirical concepts. In literature, this distinction is discussed in terms of the two criteria that separate one from the other, namely the singularity criterion and the immediacy criterion. Through considering these criteria in detail, first, by appealing to the original textual evidences and the second, by appealing to the literature on these criteria, I attempt to provide a clearer account of them. In doing that, I found the chance to go into deeper in the use of empirical intuitions and to question the existence of empirical intuitions and their role in empirical cognition.

My study depends heavily on Kant's works that belong to his critical period, but I have also read, and used in my thesis, other works of his pre-critical period. Seeing the formation of Kantian thought was quite exciting both for providing fruitful insights on the issue and for conceiving his central thoughts in order to understand minute changes in the Kantian corpus through time.

In the first chapter of my thesis, I try to be loyal to Kant's own account of the two criteria and to sketch his account of empirical cognition. In this part of the thesis, I try not to add my own approach on the subject-matter.

In the second chapter, I appeal to the works in literature on Kant's conception of empirical cognitions. Through taking these into consideration, I try to explain and justify my position. Here, against Hintikka, I argue that these two criteria are distinct from one another. In addition to that I claimed that if there is such a representation like empirical intuitions, then they are meant to be the way through which experiential sensory intake is provided for the processing of understanding to form empirical cognition and through the analysis of empirical cognition these sensory intake are thought to be objective and thus they are distinguished from mere sensations for being objective. Thus, it seems that there is not any real difference between empirical intuitions and sensations. The idea that there is a difference between them depend on the analysis of empirical cognition by

abstracting concepts from empirical cognition in order to find an element that provide the conditions of existence of logically possible objects, which can only be thought. I also claim in this part that, though the two criteria are distinct and are interdependent from each other, none of them can be reduced to the other.

In the third chapter, I try to give a brief account of the discussions on nonconceptual content in the literature, and I defend my position that there is nonconceptual content in empirical cognition, but it is possible to think that the nonconceptual content other than spatiotemporal relations could be provided by sensations with the collaboration of concepts. As I argue, in this part, without concepts, sensations (and/or empirical intuitions) cannot contribute to empirical cognition. According to my reading Kant, he seems to be a weak conceptualist, that is, he accepts the nonconceptual experiential intake yet even for such an intake concepts (either empirical concepts or categories) are needed.

In the fourth chapter, I try to show that there is a possibility of singular concepts, which are concepts of a special sort, within Kantian philosophy. In addition to that, considering Kant's remark that says concepts are general by nature but their uses can be universal, particular, or singular, I try to make a distinction between singular use of concepts and singular concepts. In order to make such a distinction, I mention the referential use of indefinite descriptions as an instance of singular use of concepts and claim that when used referentially one can see that definite descriptions are singular concepts. My claim depends on the form of examples that are given by Kant in *The Blomberg Logic* for singular concepts and general concepts. In this part of the thesis, I claim that intuitions cannot be represented or referred through linguistic entities, even by the terms that fill the subject position of singular judgments.

CHAPTER I

KANT'S ACCOUNT OF CONCEPTS AND INTUITION

One of the names by which Kant's philosophy is widely known is *critical philosophy*. The adjective *critical* refers to Kant's project to determine the limit and the scope of knowledge. In this project, Kant already agrees that we have knowledge in some way or another. Furthermore, we do have knowledge about the world, or about the world which appears to us. Despite this agreement with common sense, Kant seeks to find a way to determine critically the limits and the scope of our knowledge and the way through which we know what we already know.

As Kant puts it, such a critique looks for the sources and limits of reason (of pure reason):

> We can regard a science of the mere examination of pure reason, of its sources and its limits, as the *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason. As such, it should be called a critique, not a doctrine of pure reason. Its utility in regard to speculation would really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free from errors – which is already a very great gain. (*CPR*,[1] A11/B25)

His critical standpoint is addressed both to empiricist and to rationalists[2]. For the scope of this thesis, his critical standpoint towards the latter is more crucial, which is against Leibnizian conception of the relation between concepts and objects. The idea that

[1] *CPR* for *The Critique of Pure Reason*

[2] As a clear and brief comment of Kant on the failures of empiricist and rationalist traditions, I appeal to his words "on the amphiboly of concepts of reflection": "In a word, Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivized the concepts of understanding in accordance with his system of noogony (if I am permitted this expression), i.e., interpreted them as nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does nothing but confuse or order the representations of the first." (*CPR*, A271/B327).

concepts can alone provide empirical cognition is an underlying element for Leibnizian conception of concepts to which Kant's critique addressed. That is the reason why Kant's focus on the limits and the source of our knowledge is so important. To this point, I will come back when I discuss the reasons for Kant to make distinction between concepts and intuitions and between understanding and sensibility, which I believe depends on the former distinction.

Throughout Kant's project, there is one fundamental question that also gives its form to Kant's first critique *The Critique of Pure Reason*, that is, how it is possible that we have synthetic a priori judgments. In Kant's own words, the question is: "Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?"(*CPR*, B19)

There are two important outcomes of this question if it can be answered appropriately. First, one can find out how it is possible to have universally true judgments on what appear to us prior to any particular sense experience. Second, how it is possible that we can cognize and assert these judgments. For instance, when we see an object having a surface that resembles the shape of a triangle, we know that there is no entity in our experience that can be called as triangle but we also know that what we know through a discursive study of the geometry what we know about triangles would also be true for that surface having a triangular shape. What we know about triangles is necessarily true for both the object of geometry and the surface of that object. Furthermore, what we know about the surface of that object is cognizable by us and we can make a link between the surface of that object and a typical geometrical figure, triangle.

In the example above, what appears to us as the surface of that object and a typical geometrical figure are both mental entities. Kant calls these mental entities *representations*[3], some sort of which is the subject matter of this thesis. According to

[3] There may be several meanings of representations. Kirk Dallas Wilson says that "Kant rarely used 'representation' to mean the act of representing. While such acts are necessarily tied to our representations, representations themselves are objects of consciousness (mental entities). Our representations are the content of our acts of apprehending; they are the what of what is apprehended." (Wilson, 1975, p. 248). Thus, by using the phrase 'representation', Kant (may) want(s) to address the act of representing (1), the outcome of this act (2) and the object of consciousness (3).
From what Wilson says in this quote, I believe that one can understand representations as mental entities. As for the claim that representations are mental entities, Kant says that "I understand by the

this, what one perceives as the object having that triangular surface and what one cognizes triangle as a geometrical figure and thus one can conceive that surface as having a triangular surface are representations.

In Kant's terminology *representation* has a wider extension than I described here. In order to understand what Kant has in his mind, I will appeal to the first critique, to a famous passage, *Stufenleiter* (step-ladder) passage, where Kant gives a brief summary of the classification of representations.

> The genus is representation in general. Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or a concept of reason. Anyone who has familiarized himself with these distinctions must find it intolerable to hear the representation of the colour, red, called an idea. It ought not even to be called a concept of understanding, a notion. (*CPR*, A320/B377)

In this thesis, I will focus on *objective representations*, namely intuitions and concepts. Since according to Kant "an objective representation is knowledge (cognitio)", the underlying question of the first critique can also be read as how *objective representations* are possible for it is to ask that how knowledge is possible. Moreover, the question that how synthetic a priori judgments possible can be rendered as how a priori objective representations function in knowing and perceiving real objects.

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transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves." (*CPR*, A 369). In saying this Kant does not believe that these representations are not real: "Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of outer intuition are real too, just as they are intuited in space, along with all alterations in time, just as inner sense represents them. For since space is already a form of that intuition that we call outer, and without objects in it there would be no empirical representation at all, we can and must assume extended beings in space as real; and it is precisely the same with time. Space itself, however, together with time, and, with both, all appearances, are not things, but rather nothing but representations, and they cannot exist at all outside our mind; and even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as an object of consciousness), the determination of which through the succession of different states is represented in time, is not the real self as it exists in itself, or the transcendental subject, but only an appearance of this to us unknown being, which was given to sensibility." (*CPR*, A491-2/B520-1).

Objective Representations: Intuitions and Concepts

As seen in the *Stufenleiter* passage, objective representations have two subclass, intuitions and concepts. The differences between the two are presented in the following way:

- An intuition "relates immediately to the object and is single"
- A concept "refers to it [to the object] mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common."

As it is seen from this brief analysis of objective representations, there seems to be two criteria to separate intuitions and concepts from each other: 1. The Singularity Criterion; 2. The Immediacy Criterion. I will deal with these two criteria in detail, by appealing to the literature written on these two, in the second chapter of the thesis. But for now, it would be necessary to note that intuitions and concepts are separated in Kant's First *Critique* through their relation to the object both in representing it and in referring to it. The reason for this remark is that in Kant's writings there is also another ground on which concepts and intuitions appear to be separated apart from these criteria. According to this ground, intuitions and concepts are distinguished with regard to our faculties, namely sensibility and understanding. However, I will not focus on this distinction for I think this is not the main reason for Kant separating the two kinds of objective representations and for their relation with our faculties are put by Kant after separating them in accordance with their relation with objects. To show both the logical relation with these two ways of distinguishing concepts and intuitions and their relation with our faculties, Kant says that:

> If we reflect on our cognitions in regard to the two essentially different basic faculties, sensibility and the understanding, from which they arise, then here we come upon the distinction between intuitions and concepts. Considered in this respect, all our cognitions are, namely, either intuitions or concepts. The former have their source in sensibility, the faculty of intuitions, the latter in the understanding, the faculty of concepts. This is the logical distinction between understanding and sensibility, according to which the latter provides nothing but intuitions, the former on the other hand nothing but concepts. (§ 36, *JL*[4])

[4] *JL* for *The Jäsche Logic*.

In the quotation, Kant's distinction between the two faculties precedes[5] rationally his distinction between intuitions and concepts, and so the relations between the two couples. Despite putting the distinction between these faculties, Kant thinks that they both play a certain role in knowledge. Kant says that

> Only from their [the understanding and the senses] unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic. (*CPR*, A52=B76)

The first sentence of this last quote is important: "only from their [the understanding and the senses] unification can cognition arise". This means that in any [empirical] cognition there must be a unity of concepts and intuitions: "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible – that is, to have an object through intuitions – as to make our intuitions understandable – that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise" (*CPR*, A51/B75-76). Thus, empirical knowledge depends on the unification of intuitions and concepts. The roles of these two distinct capacities (or of these two distinct sorts of representations) will be discussed throughout the thesis.

Kant's distinction between aesthetic and logic also precedes his distinction between our faculties, understanding and sensibility. In CPR, Kant's classification of representations employs in accordance with the distinction between intuitions and concepts. In accordance with this, I will focus on the primary distinction and here, in this chapter, I will try to focus on the distinction between intuitions and concepts.

The Distinction between Intuitions and Concepts

As aforementioned, there seems to be a fundamental distinction between intuitions and

[5] I do not have any commitment on the historically priority among these pairs. What I try to say is that Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding or the way he distinguishes these two faculties is due to his distinction between intuitions and concepts.

concepts:

"All cognitions, that is, all [re]presentations consciously referred to an object, are either *intuitions* or *concepts*. Intuition is *singular* [re]presentation (*repraesentatio singularis*), the concept is a *general* (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or *reflective* [re]presentation (*repraesentatio discursiva*) (*op. Cit.*, § 1)."

In this quotation the two criteria are given. In the place of intuitions, representations are modified by the adjective "singular" and for concepts they are modified by the adjective "general". Furthermore, in parenthesis, concepts are said to be the representations through common features (*repraesentatio per notas communes*). This latter feature of concepts is seen as the second criterion, namely the mediacy of them. Kant also says that the concept is a *reflective representation,* saying that one needs to reflect on representations to have concepts.[6]

These thoughts are expressed in a shorter and a more explicit way in *CPR*:

"The former [intuition] relates immediately to the object[7] and is single, the latter [concept] refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common." (*CPR*, A320/B377)

If the distinction between intuitions and concepts is merely understood in terms of this last quotation, then one might understand the immediacy of intuitions as an absence of the mediacy of concepts in their way of referring[8] to the object in question. Then what makes intuitions singular would only be the fact that they refer to objects

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[6] The concepts in question are empirical concepts. Throughout the thesis, I will focus on empirical concepts and empirical intuitions for the scope of my thesis. The reason for this restriction is claiming that concepts are reflective representations would be wrong if one also takes a priori concepts into account for they are general but not reflective.

[7] Robert Hanna makes a distinction between the Kantian immediacy [of intuitions] and Cartesian immediacy: "Intuitional immediacy in the Kantian sense, moreover, must not be confused with Cartesian immediacy, according to which a thinking subject is infallibly and self-consciously confronted by an essentially inner object – in Cartesian terms, by an object whose 'formal reality' is wholly mental. In early analytic philosophy, the paradigm of Cartesian immediacy is the relation that obtains between conscious, intentional mind and its purely phenomenal or subjective direct object – a 'sense datum'. But Kantian empirical intuitions never have purely phenomenal or subjective direct objects... Whether a Kantian empirical intuition is outer or inner, then, its object is never a mere sense datum. And, since empirical intuitions can be combined with unclear or indistinct consciousness, no epistemic certainty need be involved... Kant's doctrine of intuition is in no way burdened with Cartesian subjectivism." (p. 197, Hanna, 2001).

[8] This kind of reference, I claim, is not a linguistic reference, i.e., intuitions do not refer to objects as singular terms do. This point will be a subject matter of the fourth chapter.

without a reference to any other object or a relation with any other object whereas if it is the case singularity would not be a distinct criterion between the two for it would be defined in terms of the immediacy criterion as a way of reference. The possibility to reduce one criterion into other is the subject matter of the second chapter.

If intuitions and concepts are separated according to the way their linguistic counterparts refer to objects, then the linguistic counterpart of intuitions can be understood as singular terms in their way of referring to objects and that of concepts as general terms that could be used to refer to many objects. If it is the case, then there would be no difference between the linguistic counterpart of intuitions and that of singular concepts. This conclusion will be discussed in the fourth chapter. For this reason I will postpone the discussion to the fourth chapter.

Recalling what Kant said above, i.e., "the concept is a *general* (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or *reflective* [re]presentation (*repraesentatio discursiva*)", it can be said that he thinks that being general and being reflective are one and the same. If one ignores what is said in parenthesis, this interpretation would be plausible. But what Kant writes as an explanation of the adjective "general" seems like also an explanation of being "reflective" for what makes concepts, according to this quotation, general is the fact that they represent objects through common features, which is a result of reflection. In this sense, the generality of concepts does not imply that they should have many representations under themselves rather it implies that they can logically have many representations under themselves (which implies that their generality can be rendered as their instantiatability) separating them from intuitions since, unlike intuitions, concepts represent objects through reflection, through reflecting on what many objects may have in common. If this is the case, being general and being reflective would not be identical, since the adjective "general" would not modify the concepts but the features of objects for being common to all whereas the adjective "reflective" seems to modify concepts themselves. For example the concept *human* represents all human beings through their general features but it is a reflective representation for it comes from the reflection on many features of human beings in order to seize common ones that belong to all human beings.

Even if it would be the case that the mediacy of concepts and "the generality" of

concepts can be used interchangeably, this does not mean that the singularity criterion is not a criterion between concepts and intuitions. However, Kant also says that:[9]

"A concept is a general representation; representations which are not general are not concepts. … A singular representation is intuition" (*Logik Philippi* (May, 1772), p. 451).

According to this statement that belongs to Kant's precritical period, it seems that generality and singularity are opposite features. To understand this opposition between singularity and generality, one needs to understand in what context Kant uses these two.

If the singularity of intuitions can rendered as being in a 1-1 relation[10] with their objects, then this would imply that concepts are not in 1-1 relation with the same objects but this would not imply that concepts cannot be in 1-1 relation with any object whatsoever. Kant says that:

"It is mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts, a mistake based on a wrong division of concepts into *general, particular* and *singular*. Not the concepts themselves, only *their use* can be divided in this way" (*Logic*, §1, Note 2).

If it is the case that the "generality" of concepts does not imply a quantitative relation with their objects, there is also no need to interpret the singularity of intuitions as a quantitative relation with theirs. The singularity of intuitions can be understood as having a 1-1 relation with their objects. This is also different from the immediacy of intuitions, which implies that there is no mediation between intuitions and objects nothing more.

The quotation mentioned above shows that Kant makes a distinction between the nature of concepts as being general and the use of concepts as being *general, particular* and *singular*. In this sense, I think that the nature of concepts as being general implies that their being reflective representations, that is, being representations through common (general) features of objects. Thus it can be seen that the adjective "general" modifying concepts is not the same with the adjective modifying the use of concepts. The former

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[9] In this quotation, Kant seems to start with concepts as the basis of his definition of intuitions and thus define intuitions negatively. Kant avoids himself defining intuitions positively. The only positive attribute of intuitions, explicitly given, is that they are singular. Other attributes such as being *im*mediate are defined negatively in terms of their differences from concepts.

[10] By *being in a 1-1 relation with their objects*, what I try to say is that an intuition is related to exactly one object and this object cannot be related with another intuition.

implies that concepts made out of representations through abstracting their common features whereas the latter implies that they are used to refer different objects having the same common feature. Then the former is used to express their mediacy that is, being reflective representations whereas the latter is used to express their extension.

Concept Formation

To give evidence in support of this argument, I appeal to *JL*, therein Kant says that:

> To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able *to compare, to reflect*, and *to abstract*, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. (*JL*, note 1, p. 592)

Through knowing different features of these trees, one is able to figure out the marks they have in common and thus to have a concept of a tree. As it can be understood from this quotation, unlike empiricists, Kant does not restrict concept formation solely to abstraction. Abstraction is a negative way for concept formation, i.e., to ignore some other marks and to pick up the common ones. In addition to this negative way of abstraction, through making comparisons, one abstracts (take them separately from the rest, through focusing on specific parts) homologous parts of the trees from the rest and compares them to each other. Yet, the true positive conditions for concept formation are reflection and comparison.

It would also be possible through comparing same kind of trees with, say, a willow to detect it as a distinct species through noticing the marks it has while others do not. Through noticing that this unique tree lacking several features that others have and having several features that others lack, one could be able to detect it as distinct from others, and thus perceive it as an individual of a different sort of tree. In this case, the concept of willow even without naming it as “willow” would be used to single out it from others.

In the quotation above, the concept of tree would be general in the sense that it

has a multitude of different trees in its extension. It would also be general in the other sense that it is a result of reflection on various representations while those other representations (the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.) could also be concepts which are subordinate to the concept of tree.

Apart from singling out a willow from others, each of the trees are singled out from each other, even the ones that belong to the same species through noticing that *they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.*, that is, through having different features which are also concepts.

Generalizing willow, spruce and linden as trees and using the concepts trunk, branch and leaves as parts of a tree in order to make comparisons between them represents different aspects of the analysis of concepts. In regard these different aspects, Kant makes a distinction between to dissect a concept and to divide it:

> To dissect a concept and to divide it are two very different things. In dissecting the concept I see what is contained in it (through analysis); in dividing it I consider what is contained under it. Here I divide the sphere of the concept, not the concept itself. The division, far from dissecting the concept, rather adds to it through its members, for they contain more within them than does the concept. (*Logic*, § 110, Note 1).

By the analysis of a concept, Kant understands to dissect a concept in order to see what is contained in it, to show its content. Whereas by dividing the sphere of a concept, Kant understands finding out what is contained under a concept. For instance, by dividing the concept *tree*, one would encounter different species while by dissecting the same concept one would encounter the elements of the concept *tree*. The latter (what is contained under a concept) is also described by Kant as the sphere of a concept:

"The sphere is the extension of a concept, and concerns the set of things which are subordinated under the concept" (*Weiner Logik*, p. 911).

In terms of its sphere, the generality of concepts is not a tautology for a concept may have one item that is instantiated by one individual, i.e., it may have only one object or only one representation as its extension. Whereas in terms of the content of concepts, the generality of concepts seems like a mere tautology for they necessarily include another concept, that is, it is mediated by another concept. To explain this further, let us see how Kant describes these relations:

Every concept, *as partial concept*, is contained in the representation of things; as

> *ground of cognition, i.e., as mark,* these things are contained *under* it. In the former respect every concept has a *content,* in the other an *extension...*
> The content and extension of a concept stand in inverse relation to one another. The more a concept contains *under* itself, namely, the less it contains *in* itself, and conversely. (*JL,* p. 593)

These two aspects of concepts, namely content and extension, are related with the above discussion on the two senses of "generality". The stuff contained under a concept and what are contained in a concept are two different things. The latter leads us to a hierarchy of concepts in generality in which the more general covers the less general with respect to the scope of their extension, namely *genus* covers *species* which in turn can be a *genus* when it is compared with a concept that have a narrow scope as its extension. This hierarchy is described by Kant:

"Concepts are called *higher (conceptus superiores)* insofar as they have other concepts under themselves, which, in relation to them, are called *lower concepts.* A mark of a mark - a *remote* mark - is a higher concept, the concept in relation to a remote mark is a lower one" (*JL,* p. 594).

The pattern that employs in every subordination relation leads us to see that there is a universal law:

"In respect to the determination of species and genus concepts, then, the following universal law holds: There is a genus that cannot in turn be a species, but there is no species that should not be able in turn to be a genus" (*JL,* p. 595).

In accordance with this law, the efforts to find a concept that is not a genus leads to an end in smoke, since this attempt is looking forward to see a concept that has merely one individual under it corresponding to peculiar mark. Even if there is only one individual in its extension, the concept can still contain another individual under it, i.e., at least it is logically possible to contain another individual, since having a mark in itself is sufficient to claim that there can be another individual having that mark. This can also be formulated as Kant did once:

"The logical division of concepts is a *regress in indefinitum*, for the process of finding specific *differentiae* for a concept *qua* genus continues indefinitely in principle" (*Logic*, § 11).

Recalling Kant's own example about the trees, the concept of a tree is general in

the sense that it includes other concepts such as *spruce, willow*, *linden* as its subordinate concepts and but it is not general in its use when it is used to detect a tree or in its relation to its content, namely such as having a trunk, branches and leaves. Thus conceiving the concept of a tree is mediated by some other concepts which can be elements of a tree or the essential features of a tree, or any such feature that plays a functional role for us to detect a tree and these concepts are the contents of the concept of a tree. When it comes to perceive something as a specific kind of a tree, one also needs the concepts that are the extension of the concept of a tree such as *spruce, willow or linden*.

Breakaway from Leibnizian Tradition

Kant's claim that there is no lower concept is crucial in understanding his breakaway from Leibnizian tradition. As in the quotation I gave in a footnote in previous pages, Kant says that "In a word, Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivized the concepts of understanding in accordance with his system of noogony (if I am permitted this expression), i.e., interpreted them as nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection." Kant's critique on Leibnizian conception depends on his claim that "In the mere concept of a thing no characteristic of its existence can be encountered at all" (*CPR*, A225/B272). Leibnizian conception of concepts can provide a complete knowledge of individual things, which means that one can know empirical objects solely by concepts. Kant's argument for this claim is this:

> For even if this concept is so complete that it lacks nothing required for thinking of a thing with all of its inner determinations, still existence has nothing in the least to do with all of this, but only with the question of whether such a thing is given to us in such a way that the perception of it could in any case precede the concept. For that the concept precedes the perception signifies its mere possibility; but perception, which yields the material for the concept, is the sole characteristic of actuality. (*CPR*, A225/B272-3)

There are two problems with the Leibnizian conception of the issue according to Kant. According to him, Leibnizian conception confuses logical possibility with physical (real) possibility of concepts. As Kant puts it "the possibility of a thing can never be proved merely through the non-contradictoriness of a concept of it, but only vouching for it with

an intuition corresponding to this concept" (*CPR*, B308). Through conceiving a concept purporting an object, Leibnizian way of thinking claims that this concept is instantiated (or at least has an object in its extension). Whereas for Kant, for such a claim to be true, conceivability of that concept is adequate. Kant states that:

> to cognize an object[11], it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or *a priori* through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give my assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This "more", however, need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones. (*CPR*, Bxxvi)

What is needed for such an assurance is, according to Kant, intuitions. Therefore, in order to make existence claims[12], one needs intuitions (or the faculty of intuitions/sensibility). Thus, conceivability or non-contradictoriness of a concept is not adequate to make an existence claim to be true.

To sum up, the two problems with the Leibnizian conception is that (1) concepts (or the faculty of concepts/understanding) are not adequate to make existence claims to be true and (2) there is no lowest concept that is identical with or that can immediately refer to an individual object.

The Part-Whole Relations of Intuitions and that of Concepts

Having extensions and contents concepts differ from intuitions since they do not have extensions or contents in the sense that concepts do. Thus, one can definitely say that

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[11] Kant makes a distinction between "to cognize an object" and "to think of an object": "To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition that is possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic), thus for us thinking of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become cognition only insofar as this concept is related to objects of the senses." (*CPR*, B146).

[12] For the scope of this thesis, I will not deal whether existence is a real predicate or not. But, I must say that it is definitely not a real predicate for Kant.

intuitions are not general in any sense of the word. For the scope of this thesis, I will restrict myself with empirical intuitions. Therefore in order to skip into empirical intuitions, I will try to skip a detailed discussion on space and on time as a priori intuitions.

In order to understand empirical intuitions and their relation with concepts and with knowledge, understanding the difference between a priori intuitions and empirical intuitions is crucial. In order to understand that, one needs to know why Kant sees space as an a priori intuition instead of an a priori concept[13]. I appeal to Kant's words in *CPR*:

"... the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition, not a concept"(*CPR,* A25/B40).

It is a priori for it is a must to be constitutive in our cognition of outer objects. To explicate what Kant means by an *a priori* intuition or by an *a priori* concept, I will briefly appeal to Kant's own remark on the issue and afterwards I will immediately continue the discussion:

"Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts alone are possible *a priori*, empirical ones only *a posteriori*" (*CPR*, A51/B75)

One can say that space should have been conceived as a concept[14] for it is general, that is, it contains under itself a multitude of possible physical objects for it has the space to be filled. Kant's objection to this idea is that space is not an unlimited sum of defined volumes of space rather it is the one and whole ground that is limited and thus

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[13] Actually, in his precritical period Kant wrote that space is a pure concept but in his critical period Kant changed his position on the issue and wrote that space is a pure intuition.

[14] And it is for this reason that Kant speaks of the concept of space but again it is not an a priori concept for one comes up with this concept through discursive act of understanding, through abstracting the physical objects from where they are found or through abstracting the definiteness of a particular part of the space.
Kant says that "Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus all the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of them." (*CPR,* A25/B39).
So Kant does not avoid using "the concept of space" but he says that the concept of space should refer to a part of space that is necessarily limited.

appears to have an infinite multitude of defined volumes. When one thinks of space as an unlimited extension of a definite space, one fails to give an account of space in terms of partial space. In Kant's own words:

"... if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space" (*CPR,* A25/B39).

For being unique and one, and not being mediated by any other concept or representation and for being the ground of such a representation of diverse spaces it cannot be a concept:

"Space is essentially one; the manifold in it … depends solely on limitations" (*CPR,* A25/B39). For this reason, our representation of space as a multitude of diverse spaces is a false generalization for it already assumes that for diverse space is a concept and so space is a whole.

It can be seen that what a concept contains under is quite different from what space as an *a priori* intuition contains its manifolds, which appear as distinct through our senses of location and of coordinate planes. What space contains is mere limitations within itself which are not distinct conceptually but with regard to their location in relation with another limitation, which are all subject to spatiotemporal relations that cannot be conceived merely through understanding without employing sensibility.

Therefore, it can easily be seen that the part-whole relation between a concept and another one which is subordinate to the former is qualitatively different from the part-whole relation between space and a limited part of it. The best way to see this is to examine any part-whole relation among concepts and compare it with the one between space and spaces. To do this let us see the concepts, which are once used by Kant in a similar fashion. Let's take the concepts *spruce* and *tree*. *Spruce* contains the concept of a tree within itself for that being a spruce implies being a tree as well. Yet, *spruce* is also contained under the concept of a tree as a subclass of trees for that all spruces are trees. Being a tree is a feature of a spruce and the genus *tree* has *spruce* as its species. This is not the same for space and for one of its limited parts. Space, indeed, contains any limited part of it within itself but that part does not include *space* in any sense, as a concept or as any other thing. That is the reason that Kant thought that space is not a concept but an *a priori* intuition.

According to Kant, space is not just the universal set containing any possible limited volume but it also is the form of any volume which is filled by any object. This point is also crucial in understanding the role of sensibility and that of intuitions in cognition, especially in empirical cognition:

"... what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space" (*CPR*, A30=B45).

Thus, in any cognition that is about what we call outer objects, intuitions play an essential role for their form is space. This role of intuitions is not restricted to actual visual experience. Any representation of that sort in mind or in actual visual experience implies some sort of representing an object in spatiotemporal relations in mind. Let us take an example that is utmost abstract way of dealing with objects without any being in any relation with time. Suppose we try to represent a line in our mind. Then, the procedure would be as follows:

"I cannot represent to myself a line, however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, generating from a point all its parts one after another" (*CPR*, A162-3/B203).

Drawing this imaginary line in thought through dragging a point on an imaginary direction is merely representing it in form of a linear body which can be perceived empirically. Thus even in such an abstract thought experiment, intuitions would appear in the process, both in representing the line in thought and in forming such a representation in thought.

Unification of Intuitions and Concepts: Empirical Knowledge

Despite their differences, intuitions and concepts are, if not always, sometimes combined in knowledge. Furthermore, their differences are the reasons for their combination in formation of knowledge. Kant summarizes this:

> Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination

> of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but pure if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition. (*CPR*, A50/B74)

According to these lines, intuitions and concepts are essential elements for cognition. Yet, Kant mainly focuses on their combination in the cases of empirical cognition. In doing that he appeals to the incongruent counterparts and the role of sensibility in representing spatiotemporal relations. On the former, I will focus in the third chapter when I will discuss conceptual knowledge and non-conceptual content. But to put it briefly, incongruent counterparts are explained in a well-known example by Kant:

"... the difference between similar and equal things which are not congruent … cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the relation to the right and left hands which immediately refers to intuition" (*Prolegomena*, § 13).

The difference between the right and the left hands is nice example for incongruence between the counterparts. As a result of the fact that this difference cannot be made intelligible by any concept, Kant thinks that our cognition of them depends on intuitions. For I will discuss this issue in detail, now I will focus on the role of intuition in representing spatiotemporal relations. As it is mentioned regarding space that it is not a concept but an *a priori* intuition what is perceived in spatiotemporal relations is due to intuitions:

"... it is especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge that belongs to intuition … contains nothing but mere relations; namely, of locations in an intuition (extension), of change of location (motion), and of laws according to which this change is determined (moving forces)" (*CPR*, B66-7).

Recalling Kant's remark on how the right and the left is noticed in terms of intuitions, it is clear that relations of these depend on our ability to know the difference between the right and the left hand and/or to perceive differences between directions. It is evident that it is impossible to distinguish two distinct directions, solely by concepts, without any appeal to intuitions.

In accordance with the lines above, one might think that both concepts and

intuitions, or both understanding and sensibility are necessary for combination and both pairs contain distinct elements from each other. Being exclusively distinct from each other, the idea that intuitions and concepts being together in a cognition seems contradictory. What Kant makes by critically analyzing the two so sharply is an analysis of cognition, so it is not the case that Kant, by starting with this strong distinction between the two, tries to show that their combination can be in effect rather it is the case that these two sorts of representations are end products of Kant's analysis of such cognitions. Kant describes what he had done through comparing and analyzing these two representations:

> Only from their [the understanding and the senses] unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic. (*CPR*, A52/B76)

In order to understand how these two unite in cognition, Kant tries to separate them:

> Considered in this respect, all our cognitions are, namely, either intuitions or concepts. The former have their source in sensibility, the faculty of intuitions, the latter in the understanding, the faculty of concepts. This is the logical distinction between understanding and sensibility, according to which the latter provides nothing but intuitions, the former on the other hand nothing but concepts. (*JL*, § 36)

Yet this final quotation implies that there is a possibility for a cognition that is solely intuition or that is solely concept. It seems that the concept *cognition* is used differently in these last two quotations. In the former it is used for a determined, that is, determined as being empirical cognition whereas the latter in the place of objective representations, including both intuitions and concepts.

Kant makes further distinctions in order to show the role of intuitions and that of concepts in cognition.

> On empirical concepts and pure concepts in JL, Kant says that
>
> An empirical concept arises from the senses through comparison of objects of experience and attains through the understanding merely the form of universality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which, as to their content, they are drawn. But, whether there are pure concepts of the understanding (*conceptus puri*), which, as such, arise merely from the understanding, independently of all experience, must be investigated by

metaphysics. (§ 3)

So empirical concepts do not come merely from the understanding, by implication, they also need the sensibility. In experience, both empirical intuitions and concepts must take role. As Kant says "Experience means empirical cognition. With an empirical representation something must be perceived (sensed with consciousness). Hence experience presupposes empirical intuition and a concept. Sensation is indispensable for this" (*Lectures on Logic*, *of concepts*).

Instead of defining empirical cognition in terms of experience, Kant defines experience in terms of empirical cognition for he considers experience as a type of cognition. Furthermore, Kant by appealing to the identity with empirical cognition and empirical representation defines experience in terms of empirical representation. More to that Kant sees experience as a consequence of the combination of an empirical intuition and a concept. This shows that what Kant has in mind is that it is not the case that one finds out what is experience through analyzing an cognition, but it is the case that experience as such is a product of the combination of intuitions and concepts, thus it is the case that through the analysis of cognitions we became to know what the subject experiences. After this analysis in order to seize what we know in our quotidian lives, Kant focuses on the combination of intuitions and concepts, as he aptly names it *synthesis*:

"By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one … knowledge" (*CPR*, A77/B103).

Since knowledge does not depend solely on intuitions nor on concepts but on their combination, then the question is how they are combined in becoming knowledge of objects. The way they are combined is called as *synthesis* and this combination is done in the form of judgments:

"Judgment[15] is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, among them of a given representation that is immediately

[15] For Kant, judgments are not linguistic entities (such as sentences or propositions) but mental entities or acts. Like representation, judgment is too both an act and a result of that act.

related to an object. Thus in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility" (*CPR*, A68/B93).

It seems that judgment is also mediate since the subject term is predicated by a concept, which is by definition mediate. As it appears in the example for such a judgment, the term in the subject position of the judgment can also be a concept. Then the role of intuitions is not necessarily to be in the subject position.

In this last quotation, Kant implicitly says that the role of intuitions is to provide the object immediately to the judgment, that is, being a representation that is immediately related to the object and thus to maintain that the judgment as about that peculiar object.

Then it appears that the role of concepts is not merely to make attributions to the subject term of the judgment but also to represent the object in a conceptual domain with its attributes. Let us try to see the roles of intuitions and that of concepts in an example Kant gave. Recalling Kant's example in *JL*, "If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is *mere intuition*, with the other it is *intuition* and *concept* at the same time."

According to this example, both the savage and the man have the same intuition, the representation of the house, however, for the savage it is not possible to attribute any property peculiar to a house to the object given in his mind, which is the same representation with the one that the man has in his mind. But the man is able to perceive that object (the house) as a house and in fact a definite house, as the house for his success in attributing properties peculiar to that house. The peculiarities of the object are same for both since for both the house is an objective appearance as something away from them. But for the man it is more than this appearance for his ability to distinguish as a house that is particular that has several features through which it can be separated

from other houses apart from its spatiotemporal distinctness from other houses.

One may ask: Does this mean that there is no room for concepts in the case of a savage seeing a house? Or, is it the case that despite the fact that the savage sees something, he could not grasp what he sees as a house, that is, he cannot represent the object through its feature shared by the other houses in the world. Of course, there is a room for concepts in the savage's experience but the concept of house has no function in that experience. What the savage has in his mind as concepts is an aggregation of some other features that also belongs to some other objects. What he lacks is the concept of a house, it is his disability to conceive it as *a house*. Yet, Kant's expression "with the one [savage] it is *mere intuition,* with the other [man] it is *intuition* and *concept* at the same time" does not imply that the savage has merely intuition whereas the man has both in a strict sense. What is implied is that the savage has an intuition and lacks the concept *house* whereas the man, in addition to the intuition they both have, has the concept *house*. I believe that, also according to Kant for empirical knowledge must include both intuition and concept, the savage has both intuition and concept but what he has as a concept differs from the one that the man has for he lacks the concept of house.

One might argue that there is no grounds to assert that they have the same intuition for their sensibility are different from each other and they have different sensations, for they stand in different locations and they have different faculties. But if we recall how Kant classifies intuitions and separates them from sensations, namely the former as objective representations whereas the latter as subjective representations, then it can be seen that what the man and the savage shares is that they both can have the same intuition while having different concepts of what they encounter. For this reason, it can be said that the role of the concept of a house, or more specifically that of the concept of a house is to enable the man to make judgments about that peculiar object as being a peculiar house, making such a judgment is impossible for the savage.

If we try to analyze further what the man and the savage shares about their representation of the object (the house), we can find out that it is the matter of the representations of both, that is, merely being a peculiar object standing before them. This objective aspect of the house is the matter of their cognition. Appealing to Kant's distinction between matter of cognition and form of cognition, we can employ the

following definitions (of matter and of form of cognition) to this example:

"In every cognition we must distinguish *matter,* i.e., the object, and form, i.e., *the way in which* we cognize the object" (*JL*, § 33).

Considering these definitions, one might say that it can be said that the matter of both of their representations is the house. However, what counts as *the house* is the representation of the man is not that of the savage and for this reason the matter of the representations in question does not seem as *the house* itself. Applying Kant's distinction, *the object* of the cognition is the peculiar object standing before them, not the house which is the cognition of the man. This does not mean for having the representation of the object, the house, that man has a subjective representation. What this means is that the house is isomorphic with the man's representation of it, similarly the object away from that (the house) is isomorphic with the savage's representation of that object. If this would not be the case, then the man and the savage would have the same representation but this is evidently false. Then, the difference of their representation of the house must be maintained. What makes their cognitions of the house different is the form of their cognitions, so that the matter of their cognitions must be the same, the difference between them should lie in the difference of the forms of their cognitions.

To support the claim that the role of the intuitions is merely to provide the object to the judgment, let us recall Kant's explicit statement:

As Kant says: “Intuition is a representation of the sort which would depend immediately on the presence of the object” (*Prolegomena,* p. 33).

What intuition does in the above example is to bring up the object to the cognition as it is present before the perceiver. In the price of repeating what is said in previous pages, I shall say that the role of the term “immediacy” above stands can be seen ambiguous for it may stand for the way in which intuitions represent the object and for it may stand for the way in which the subject acquire the object of the representation. Against such a position, I may say that the object in question is same with the representation of that object and continue to say that intuition cannot represent the object as something else for that would make intuition mediate, i.e., a concept. Though intuitions purport to represent objects in one's mind, once they purport they are identical

with the appearance of object to us[16] which they purport to represent, they would not be succeeded in representing the objects if they could not become identical with the objects.

If we recall the last example that Kant gives and try to understand the role of the concept of the man in his cognition, then we would find two aspects of concepts. One is that concepts are used practically and/or pragmatically in linguistic way to refer to objects (with the contributions of intuitions for they represent objects as being external to us) and to make intuitions intelligible (the epistemological use). For the former, Kant says that

"It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts – a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into universal, particular, and singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only their use" (*Universal Doctrine of Elements* § 1, in *JL*).

To sum up, what is said in lieu of the last example, let us recall the famous words of Kant on this issue:

> Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. (*CPR*, A51/B75)

Without sensibility, the house would not be given to the savage and the man. As it is seen in the case of the savage, without employing understanding, what he has in his mind mere an intuition of the house. According to these lines, thoughts without content

[16] About the identity in question, I need to appeal what Kant says in *CPR*: "Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accordance with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing would present itself that would yield a rule of synthesis and so correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would be entirely empty, null, and meaningless. Appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition, since intuition by no means requires the functions of thought." (*CPR*, A90-1/B122-23) What we intuit then is what appears to us. Yet, what appears to us must be objects that can be used in the subject position of judgments. As Allison states, by "objects Kant means the subject of a possible judgment … [judgments] define the very meaning of 'object' insofar as 'object' meant something conceptually represented." (Lumsden, 2003 from Allison, 1983, p. 27). Thus, objects must be also conceptual but the objective validity of what we conceive comes from intuitions. since intuitions are the sources for our assurance of the cognized objects objective validity, then in this sense what we intuit is identical with what appears to us, let us recall that what the savage and the man perceive is the one and the same object and it is given to them through intuitions. But in intuiting the house, for both concepts play their role by providing the marks for the representation of the house.

refers to cognitions without intuitions, without having an object that is given to the mind. Whereas when one says that intuitions without concepts are blind, this refers to the savage's situation in which what he has in his mind the matter of (the content of) the cognition which is same with the matter of the man's cognition while the savage lacks the concept that would bring up the given object to a conceptual domain, thus provide it to bear certain attributes peculiar to that house for both being that house and a house.

To sum up what is said in this chapter, the distinction between concepts and intuitions and the explanation of their roles in cognition is a crucial element of Kant's project. How he breaks away from rationalist tradition (especially from Leibnizian tradition) cannot be understood without taking the difference and relation between intuitions and concepts into consideration. How he explains concept formation and the role of the concepts in cognition also distinguishes Kant from empiricist tradition.

For the scope of this thesis, the empirical knowledge and as its constituents empirical intuitions and empirical concepts are taken under consideration. Conceptualizing the distinction between them two criteria emerges: (1) the singularity criterion and (2) the immediacy criterion.

In the second chapter, I will focus on these two criteria and how they are discussed in literature. Whereas in the third chapter, I will try to discuss what is called “non-conceptual content” in the literature and whether or not intuitions are non-conceptual. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I will try to focus on the singular use of concepts and claim that it is possible to speak of singular concepts.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTS & INTUITIONS[17]: THE TWO CRITERIA

In the first chapter, I tried to give a brief account of Kant's conception of concepts and intuitions. In doing that, I mentioned that there are two criteria to distinguish concepts and intuitions. These are the singularity criterion and the immediacy criterion. However, these two criteria do not occur explicitly in Kant's works. Sometimes they are defined vaguely and sometimes they occur as they are distinct yet undefinable without the other. It may also appear that their relation cannot be exposed in a consistent way (at least by being loyal to central tenets of Kant's philosophy). As a result of these, Kant commentators took different positions on the subject matter, each of them providing textual evidences for their positions. I claim, like Lorne Falkenstein, that the variety of these positions is a result of the incoherence in Kantian corpus and for this reason there is no possible way to interpret Kant's explanation (and/or justification) for his distinction between intuitions and concepts in a coherent way. Even if I am right, there may still be a possible way to find out where these confusions start and what is the relation between these two criteria.

With regard to the two criteria, in this chapter, I claim that intuitions are also mediate but their mediacy is different than the mediacy of concepts and that intuitions' role in cognition is to provide a ground for the existence claims about the objects (of thought).

Are These Two Criteria Distinct?

Implying that there are two criteria, Kant makes a distinction between the two sorts of objective representations, namely between concepts and intuitions:

[17] I will try to restrict myself to discuss empirical concepts and empirical intuitions. But since the discussions in the literature is not restricted to empirical ones, I need to discuss them in general as well. Yet, my claims mentioned in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter are about empirical cognition.

"All cognitions, that is, all representations consciously referred to an object, are either *intuitions* or *concepts*. Intuition is *singular* representation (*repraesentatio singularis*), the concept is a *general* (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or *reflective* representation (*repraesentatio discursiva*) (*op. Cit.*, § 1)."

Through the phrases "intuition is singular representation" and "the concept is a general representation", there emerges the singularity criterion separating intuitions from concepts. And through the phrase "repraesentatio per notas communes" (representation through common marks), Kant says that concepts are representations that relate to objects through the common marks which they share with other objects (or at least possible objects). And by implication, it can be said that intuitions lack this sort of relation with their objects, i.e., they do not relate to their objects through common marks which those objects share. Thus, this latter point that emerges by implication indicates that concepts are mediate (mediated by common marks which a multitude of objects may share) and intuitions are immediate.

Despite mentioning these two criteria as separate, at least some philosophers, like Jaakko Hintikka, claim that these are not distinct at all, claiming that one of them is simply another way to speak of the other. Hintikka claims that the immediacy criterion is merely another formulation of the singularity criterion[18]. Hintikka says that

> [Evidences from Kant's texts] show what for Kant was the alternative to an immediate relation to objects. It was a reference to objects by means of certain marks or characteristics which may be shared by several objects, i.e., a reference to objects by means of general concepts. Hence, another way of saying that *Anschauungen* have an immediate relation to their objects is to say that they are *particular* ideas or 'representations' (*Vorstellungen*) in contradistinction to general representations or concepts. (Hintikka, 1969, p. 42)

As it can be seen from this quotation, for Hintikka, having an immediate relation to their objects and being particular [singular] are one and the same thing, and immediacy of intuitions comes from their singularity. According to his interpretation, since intuitions are in 1-1 relation with their objects, they must be in an immediate relation to their objects. As it is put in this way, this reasoning seems problematic for even if intuitions have a 1-1 relation to their objects, their relation with them can be mediated through

[18] Hintikka, J., "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (*Anschauung*)", in *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. T. Penelhum and J. J. MacIntosh (Belmont, 1969), p. 42.

something else. To this point, I will come back when I deal with intuitive marks and sensations as the mediation that enables intuitions to represent their objects.

Against Hintikka's position, Charles Parsons thinks that the two criteria are distinct and the singularity criterion has a broader scope than that of immediacy in characterizing representations as intuitive.[19] For Parsons, the singularity criterion is an independent restriction from the immediacy criterion. Because of this there is a room for singular objective representations[20] that are not intuitions, since the characteristic feature of intuitions is not their singularity but their immediacy.

Kirk Dallas Wilson argues against Hintikka that the immediacy cannot be reduced to singularity, saying that these two criteria differ from each other. He also argues against Parsons that there is no difference among the two criteria with respect to their extension. According to Wilson[21], "Kant's two criteria are *intensionally* different but *extensionally* identical. In other words, although each criterion identifies a different aspect of intuitive representations, any representation that satisfies the one also satisfies the other" (Wilson, 1975, p. 246).

Thus, according to Wilson, though the two criteria are distinct with respect to their relations to each other (neither of them can be reduced to the other and/or neither of them can be derived from the other), what is singular must also be immediate and what is immediate must be singular.

Wilson marks the independence of the two criteria from each other by addressing on which ground they function as criteria between intuitions and concepts. Marking concepts as general and intuitions as singular is a distinction according to the logical structure of a representation (which is not by chance that Kant focuses on the singularity criterion in his *Lectures on Logic*, without saying too much on the immediacy criterion); and marking concepts as mediate and intuitions as immediate is a distinction regarding the modes of representation (i.e., how they represent their objects) (Wilson, 1975).

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[19] Parsons, C., "The Transcendental Aesthetic", in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 54).

[20] "The concept of God, to be sure, only belongs to one being, to which alone it is to be ascribed" *(Blomberg Logic*, § 260). Thus, there is no logically possible object other than God that can be contained under the concept of God, i.e., the concept of God is a singular concept.

[21] Wilson, K. D., "Kant on Intuition", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 100 (Jul., 1975), pp. 247-256.

However, Wilson does not give an explanation for the identity of their extensions despite their intensional difference. How is it possible that and why is it the case that they have the same extension? Is it merely by chance? I think these questions are not answered thoroughly by Wilson.

Thompson, on the other hand, agrees with Hintikka and Wilson that the extensions of the two criteria are the same, but argues against Hintikka that intuitions are not and cannot be singular terms[22]. Thompson gives his account on Hintikka and on the two criteria briefly as:

> Kant's immediacy condition and his singularity condition turn out to be equivalent – whenever one is satisfied so is the other. The objects immediately represented by intuitions are also always represented as singular. While this conclusion agrees with Hintikka's that the immediacy condition is only the singularity condition stated differently, it disagrees with his conclusion in taking it as essential to Kant's position that all intuition is sensuous and in denying that a singular term constitutes a linguistic representation of an intuition. (Thompson, 1972, p. 333)[23]

Howell also argues against Hintikka by saying that the two criteria are distinct:

> ... As against Hintikka the immediacy of intuitions is not a mere corollary of their individuality, neither is that immediacy as Parsons apparently thinks the same notion, in the case of human intuition, as sensible givenness. Givenness indeed is "immediate presentation in intuition" (A 155-56/B195), but (with Hintikka) intuition relates immediately to its object simply in that the relation is not (as is that of concept and object) mediated by marks or characteristics. (Howell, 1973, p. 211)[24]

Hintikka and Parsons agree on that intuitions can be thought as singular terms of Predicate Calculus[25][26] but they disagree about the extensional relation of the two criteria

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[22] I will discuss singular terms and their relations with concepts and intuitions in the fourth chapter.

[23] Thompson, M., "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Dec., 1972), pp. 314-343.

[24] Howell, R., "Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason", *Noũs*,Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 207-232.

[25] "Charles Parsons agrees with Hintikka that, in being singular, an intuition is the analogue of a singular term." (Smit, 2000, p. 237)

[26] "Kant's notion of intuition is not very far from what we would call a singular term. An intuition is for Kant a "representation" - we would perhaps rather say a symbol – which refers to an individual object

and whether these two criteria are distinct. Wilson, on the other hand, by appealing to the different part-whole relation models (mereological primitives for the part-whole relations with respect to intuitions[27] and set-theoretical model for concepts) says that the two criteria are intensionally different but extensionally identical. Against Hintikka's and Parsons' claim that intuitions are (or, at least, can be thought as) singular terms of Predicate Calculus, Wilson, Smit, Thompson and Falkenstein[28] says that they cannot be singular terms of Predicate Calculus[29], otherwise, because of the mediacy in language, that would cancel out the immediacy criterion of intuitions.

As Wilson puts it, the two criteria have different dimensions, singularity is a logical criterion (due to the logical structure of representation) whereas immediacy[30] is related with the mode of representation (how intuitions and concepts represent objets or appearances). Seemingly, these two criteria are different and independent from each other. And, there is no reason why they should be treated as if they are not, which Hintikka does. The sides of the debate seems to agree on these two criteria are extensionally same (except Parsons). Though it is formulated solely by Wilson, Falkenstein, Howell[31], Hintikka, Smit and Thompson agrees on that the two criteria are extensionally same.

Seeing the two criteria as if they are same, I think, results from understanding what intuitions are in terms of concepts. Since concepts are general (by their generality this kind of reasoning understands that they have many representations under them as its extension) and mediate (representations through common marks), intuitions must have, at most, one representation which is the intuition itself and represent their objects

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or which is used as if it would refer to one." (Hintikka, 1969, p. 43, end of footnote 23.)

[27] Unfortunately, Wilson's attempt is addressed to pure intuitions (like space) not to empirical intuitions.

[28] Falkenstein, L., "Kant's Account of Intuition", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 165-193.

[29] I will discuss this point in the fourth chapter.

[30] Smit argues against all parties of the debate on the criteria between intuitions and concepts by saying that they misunderstood the immediacy of intuitions.

[31] Howell agrees with Hintikka and Parsons that immediacy of intuitions can be rendered simply as being related with objects without the mediation of marks. But, like others, he thinks the two criteria are distinct, thus he disagrees with Hintikka on that the immediacy of intuitions is not a mere corollary of their singularity.

without marks. And if it is understood in this way, lacking an extension other than itself and the relation to its object being immediate may seem one and the same, or, at least, it may seem that it is possible to define one criteria through the other. It seems that this is what Hintikka argues for. I argue against Hintikka that these are two distinct criteria and they are independent. Furthermore, I argue against his conception of generality and that of immediacy. But, the result of this debate on terms, I think, stems from Kant's use of language and circularity of his justification of the difference between concepts and intuitions.

On the Singularity Criterion: Existence and Uniqueness Claims

Much of the debate is focused on the immediacy of intuitions rather than on the singularity of them. The reason for this is that it is thought that concepts by definition cannot represent objects for they have infinitely many differentiae which cannot be captured by concepts for two reasons:

1- The practical impossibility of human understanding to conceive all the differentiae of objects through intellectual representations (through concepts).

2- The non-contradictoriness of a concept of a thing is not sufficient to state that there is an object in the world having such and such properties.

Argument *for (1)*: For both of the reasons, there are textual evidences. For the first one, it can be said that, as an argument against Leibnizian tradition, there could not be a 'lowest concept' (*Logic*, § 11[32]) that can have a necessary 1-1 to relation with its object. Any object would have infinitely many differentiae that can be used to separate this object from the rest of the world. This is also stated by Falkenstein as

"Kant maintains that it is impossible for intellect to enumerate all the differentiae to be found in any concrete particular (there are just too many)" (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 172).

For humans do not have eternal lives, there is no way to grasp all these

[32] "The logical division of concepts is a *regress in indefinitum*, for the process of finding specific differentiae for a concept *qua* genus continues indefinitely in principle." (*Logic*, § 11)
For another crucial quotation from Kant: "In respect to the determination of species and genus concepts, then, the following universal law holds: There is a genus that cannot in turn be a species, but there is no species that should not be able in turn to be a genus." (*JL*, p. 595).

differentiae in order to describe an object uniquely through concepts. This modifies (1) for making a restriction on the practical impossibility of conceiving all the differentiae of objects through concepts.

In addition to the practical impossibility, concepts for having a discursive character, always include another concept within themselves. So, Kant's argument against the 'lowest concept' employs in favor of this argument (that is for (1)). As Thompson argues:

> The impossibility of achieving an *infima species*... results not from the limitations imposed by our forms of intuition, but from the discursive character of our empirical knowledge. Two objects falling under the same *infima species* would be distinguishable only as objects of intuitive cognition, *i.e.*, only spatiotemporally. But since we can determine a species only by forming a general (discursive)[33] representation which, as general, may always contain less general representations under it, we are never entitled to say we have reached an *infima species* – a limit to all differences except those of spatiotemporal location. (Thompson, 1972, p. 330)

Yet, this argument (the argument for (1)) neglect the contextual limitations in representing objects. In a given context, several of those infinitely many differentiae may be sufficient to describe an object uniquely through concepts. For instance, in a furniture shop, let us say that there is a furniture that is the cheapest in the shop, one can describe that particular furniture merely by concepts without knowing all the differentiae that furniture has. Kant also takes this point into consideration, he says that:

"... Only *comparatively for use* are there lowest concepts, which have attained this significance, as it were, through convention, insofar as one has agreed not to go deeper here" (*JL*, § 11).

In order to make such a description of an individual, one would need a context (or a convention) which cannot be represented merely by concepts.

Argument for (2): There is a textual evidence immediately supporting (2). Kant says that:

"the possibility of a thing can never be proved merely through the non-

[33] Thompson, here, implicitly makes being discursive and being general equivalent. However, as I argue later, the discursivity of concepts implies their mediacy, not their generality. I also argue against the use of the phrase "objects of intuitive cognition". According to Kant, cognition, necessarily, includes concepts and without them nothing can be cognized. Moreover, Thompson's stress on spatiotemporality of objects in this quotation shows that what is in his mind (as far as this quotation is considered) is pure intuitions (like space and time), not empirical intuitions.

contradictoriness of a concept of it, but only vouching for it with an intuition corresponding to this concept" (*CPR*, B308).

Even if one is able to think of a thing through concepts without any contradiction among the concepts, one needs to be sure that the concept of that thing is instantiated. What one needs in this case is to know the presence of such a thing. For satisfying such a need, one needs to be sure that the objects thought through concepts exists. But, again, for Kant, for satisfying such a need, one needs to have intuitions. As Kant puts it: "Intuition is a representation of the sort which would depend immediately on the presence of the object" (*Prolegomena*, p. 33). Having such a relation with an object that enable one to make assertions about the existence of that object depends on sensibility (the faculty that provides intuitions). Thus, concepts do not provide the sufficient basis to make such assertions.

Despite what is said above is true for Kant, the scenario is not like that in order to have an empirical knowledge of an object, one needs to think of that object through concepts and to have an *intuition of* that object. The italicized portion of this sentence implies that one can intuit objects with or without objects. However, Kant does not uses phrases like "intuition of an object" which would imply that in empirical knowledge intuitions may represent objects without concepts. If one looks closer to the quotation above from *Prolegomena*, it can easily be seen that intuitions do not provide the objects for the cognition of them but merely their existence for intuitions depend on the objects (in order to have intuitions, objects need to be present). This may seem confusing but this point is crucial for understanding that the empirical knowledge needs both intuitions and concepts in order to have objects as the unification of these two sorts of representations.

Supporting (2), Kant makes a distinction between thinking of an object and cognizing of that object:

to cognize an object[34], it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether

[34] Kant makes a distinction between "to cognize an object" and "to think of an object": "To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition that is possible for us is

> by the testimony of experience from its actuality or *a priori* through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give my assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This "more", however, need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones. (*CPR*, Bxxvi)

Merely thinking of an object as it is logically possible is only partially a knowledge of a thing (if that object exists), but in order to have a genuine knowledge of that thing one needs to be able to cognize that thing, thus, one needs to have intuitions that are necessary in satisfying the 'existence condition'. I borrowed this concept (existence condition) from Thompson. He says that:

> When a concept is used as the subject of a singular judgment it purports to represent exactly one subject. But then in order to accomplish what it purports to accomplish in this use it must satisfy two conditions: it must represent an object and do so by means of characteristics that this object alone possesses. In other words, it must satisfy an existence condition and a uniqueness condition. It is of course fundamental to Kant's doctrine in the *Critique* that satisfaction of the existence condition can never be achieved through concepts alone. For it is never self-contradictory to deny that a concept represents an object, and all that can be achieved through concepts alone is the establishment of claims that cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Intuitions then enter the picture in connection with the conditions through which concepts are given objects and become capable in their use of satisfying the existence condition. (Thompson, 1972, p. 319)

Concepts may provide the ground on which one make claims about the uniqueness of the object of experience since concepts are represent objects through their differentiae, yet they are not sufficient to make claims on the existence of the objects of thought. This need is satisfied by intuitions.

> One can see a similar remark made by Falkenstein:
>
> "Though intellectual[35] representations may be used to pick out objects, they

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sensible (Aesthetic), thus for us thinking of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become cognition only insofar as this concept is related to objects of the senses." (*CPR*, B146).

[35] Falkenstein uses 'intellect' for 'Verstand' rather than 'understanding'. The reason for this is as he says: "I do this to preserve continuity between Kant's Latin in his 'Inaugural Dissertation' and his German in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as well as because, 'intellect' permits convenient adjectival and adverbial constructions". (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 165, 1st footnote.)

always have inherent generality" (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 172).

As Falkenstein puts it, concepts can be used to represent an object uniquely, but they need to be instantiated. This instantiation depends on intuitions, which depend on the presence of objects. I believe that this point is the reason Kant focused on the role of intuitions in making representations actual object with contrast to logically possible objects. Kant's motive[36] to come up with intuitions (not merely empirical intuitions but also pure intuitions) is his attempt to break away from Leibnizian tradition in order to make a true distinction between logically possible objects and actual objects depending on the epistemological role of intuitions in cognition.

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[36] By using the expression "Kant's motive", I emphasize that Kant for certain reasons made a distinction between intuitions and concepts. Before that Kant thought that there are singular concepts which can be represented by proper names and definite descriptions (by implication, since he thought that common or general concepts can be represented by indefinite descriptions). In his pre-critical period, Kant writes in *Logic Blomberg* (1771) that

"All *conceptus* are either A. *conceptus singularis* or B. *conceptus communes.*
In the former I think only one thing, but through the latter I go further, namely, I think that which is common to many things. Thus the former concepts consider something individual. Thus, e.g., Rome, Bucephalus, etc. This is *conceptus singulares.* The latter, on the other hand, are concerned with a *complexus* of many individual things, thus, e.g., a city, a 4-footed animal, etc. A man, that is a *conceptus communis*. The representations of immediate experience are all *conceptus singulares,* for they represent individual things. Mediate concepts of experience, however, which are abstracted from many experiences, are *conceptus communes*; so, too, are all our concepts of reason." (§ 260). In this pre-critical period, not only the empirical intuitions but also the pure intuitions seem to be thought as concepts: Intuitions *qua* singular concepts would be in immediate (and unproblematic) relation to their objects insofar as they are intuitions, but in mediate (and problematic) relations to these same objects insofar as they are conceptual. These critical associations of singularity-immediacy and generality-mediacy contrast with Kant's pre-critical position where intuitions were treated as singular concepts. In the *Dissertation* of 1770, the concepts of time and space are said to be singular and intuitions." (Wilson, 1975, p. 250)

But, later in the critical period, Kant writes in *JL* that "It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts – a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into *universal, particular*, and *singular.* Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only *their use*." (*JL*, § 1, footnote 2). However, to think of *critical* Kant describing *singular concepts* of the pre-critical period as intuitions would be misleading. Because, neither concepts nor intuitions are not linguistic entities and intuitions cannot be represented in language through singular terms for they are in the realm of language which includes reflection. So, through the transition from the pre-critical period to the critical period, both singular concepts and singular terms as representing singular concepts had disappeared. To most loyal interpretation of the conception of singular terms in Kant's critical period, I think to be the singular use of concepts, but not singular concepts.

Knowing Something as Singular vs. Knowing a Possible Object Existing (Cognizing)

Under this subtitle, I would like to summarize my position and to answer the separate roles of intuitions and of concepts in detail. Here, I propose two kinds of singularity, i.e., one of them is for intuitions, namely, the singularity of intuitions as the basis for existential claims and the other is for concepts, namely, the singularity of concepts as the basis for uniqueness claims. A similar remark is made by Thompson:

"A singularity and a uniqueness condition differ, then, in that the former is satisfied through intuitions alone while the latter requires concepts" (Thompson, 1972, p. 332).

Thompson's use of the term 'singularity', if it is considered in this quotation, does not include the uniqueness of the object, thus it differs from mine. I think mine is more loyal to Kant, since for him empirical knowledge, so that the cognition of objects requires both intuitions and concepts, the singularity must include both (1) the existence of the object and its (2) uniqueness.

In his attempt to state what a concept is, Robert Hanna[37] says that concepts function in uniquely grasping the objects that are in the extension of that concept:

"... a concept is a representation whose intension contains in itself an ordered complex of subconcepts or characteristics, which in turn collectively and uniquely determine a comprehension of possible objects contained under that concept" (Hanna, 2001, p. 196).

In addition to the role of concepts stated by Hanna, there is another role of them in correction of what is given through intuitions. Thompson states this role explicitly:

"Concepts are related to objects mediately through intuitions, but the immediacy of the latter in relation to objects is subject to correction by concepts in the form of discursively represented criteria of empirical knowledge" (Thompson, 1972, p. 334).

Thus, through representing objects as uniquely objects, concepts play a crucial role in cognizing objects, in empirical knowledge. One might think that if the role of the intuitions is giving its objects for cognition and thus providing the basis for existence

[37] Hanna, R., *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York: 2001.

claims of those objects, there is no need for concepts in order to make uniqueness claims for them. If the role of intuitions in this process is understood in this way, then the role of the concepts would not be understood properly. Concepts' role could not be restricted to their role in making uniqueness claims. In order to make existence claims, one also needs concepts to claim that what is uniquely determined through concepts exists. When it comes to cognition (or empirical knowledge), it is not a matter of knowing that an existing object is singular, it is by definition evident. However, what is at stake is that knowing that a possible singular object exists. In order to have such an object, one needs to have a concept of that object. Even if there is no intuition, one can think of such an object merely through concepts. But when it comes to state that that object exists, one must have intuitions, that is, in order to know whether what is thought as the concept of that object is instantiated, intuitions are needed. Therefore, intuitions' role is to provide the basis for the transition from thinking of an object to cognizing of that object.

It is crucial to understand, what is given merely through intuitions does not guarantee the existence of objects. Kant states this point explicitly:

> From the fact that the existence of outer objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in delusions); but this is possible merely through the reproduction of previous outer perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the actuality of outer objects. Here it had to be proved only that inner experience in general is possible only through outer experience in general. Whether this or that putative experience is not mere imagination must be ascertained according to its particular determinations and through its coherence with the criteria of all actual experience. (*CPR,* B 279)

What is provided to the subject through intuitions can be products of imagination. If it is the case, then how can be sure about our empirical knowledge?

Kant does not say much about the grounds of such an assurance. What he says in the quotation above is that even if we have product of imagination instead of empirical knowledge, this shows that what imagination produces must depend upon the presence of a previous outer experience. Through sensations and comparisons through concepts, one can make corrections on what is perceived. Let us say that one perceives something in front of her, without the presence of that thing. The object of this pseudo perception

should have been (partially or wholly) perceived previously. Through checking the existence conditions of the object of the present experience with that of the previous one, one can find out that the present experience is not an outer experience but merely a product of imagination. The existence conditions of the past experiences are questionable, thus, this questioning may lead us to an infinite regress. But, this point is not in the scope of my thesis. So, I will stop here by assuming that past experiences are real rather than imaginary.

In cognition concepts are necessary in addition to intuitions to make existence claims. Concepts' role in cognition of objects (and in making uniqueness claims) depend upon the presence of appropriate empirical intuitions, or else, what is provided by the concepts would be merely to think of possible objects. However, without an appropriate concept, through intuitions, we cannot think of or conceive of or perceive a singular object. This does not mean without the concept of a house, one cannot perceive a house, since one can also have other concepts, like a wooden thing, a place where one leaves, a furniture, a construction, a particular shape etc. provided a conceptual basis for her to perceive such an object. But without having a concept of house, one would not be able to cognize that particular house as a house. Concepts function in correction of what is provided by intuitions.

As we have seen from the aforementioned arguments and quotations, for empirical knowledge, both intuitions and concepts are necessary. Kant's remark on this point became a famous slogan:

> Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. *Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.* It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. (*CPR*, A 51/B 75)[38]

[38] There is also another crucial textual evidence stressing on the unification of intuitions and concepts for empirical cognition: "Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but pure if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition." (A50=B74).

If it is the case that intuitions without concepts are blind, then there is no way to have any cognition of objects without concepts in play. Falkenstein stresses on this point, through referring the second half of the famous slogan by naming it as “the blindness thesis”:

“If blindness is correct, there can be no cognition of objects independently of intellectual synthesis” (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 182).

If the blindness thesis is correct, and so is for Kant, what concepts make in cognition is not merely to reflect on the object that is provided by intuitions but also to enable the representation of the object in the mind in collaboration with intuitions. Intuitions' function is not providing the objects without the collaboration of concepts, if it would be the case, then the blindness thesis would be wrong for in that case intuitions without concepts would not be blind.

What do Intuitions Provide for Cognition

If one thinks that the blindness is correct, then what intuitions provide for cognition of objects becomes problematic. For some, they provide objects themselves, if it is the case, then the blindness thesis is wrong. For others, intuitions are receptive and what they do is to present raw data to us in order to be processed by concepts. According to others, they provide intuitive marks and through them in collaboration with concepts, one can cognize of objects. I believe that some of these interpretations are not loyal to Kant while others have textual evidences in the Kantian corpus. Because of the incoherence and vagueness of terms in the Kantian corpus, I think, there can multiple possible interpretations which are incompatible with each other. My claim is Kant's motive for saying that there are empirical intuitions is to provide an element of cognition that enables concepts' instantiation and the objectivity of what is perceived.

One of these approaches is exemplified by Wilson as:

“I cannot distinguish within my perception (intuition) of my desk a separate item which is my desk. The implication of transcendental idealism is that we must *identify* the appearance *qua* object of intuition with the intuition itself.” (Wilson, 1975, p. 265)

Argument contra Wilson's model

According to Wilson, perception of his desk and intuition of his desk are one and the same. Recalling the blindness thesis, perceptions (which is empirical knowledge according to Kant) includes both concepts and intuitions for this reason, Wilson's perception of his desk cannot be identical with his intuition of his desk. For this reason, this identity that is put by using parenthesis implying that perception of an object and intuition of that object are identical is simply wrong within the Kantian framework.

The identification of intuitions with appearances *qua* objects is strong attempt, especially when one keeps the blindness thesis in her mind. Without the concept of a desk, Wilson's intuition of his desk is merely a blind intuition, thus it cannot represent his desk. Moreover, the phrase "intuition of my desk" implies that without concepts intuitions can *see* objects and in addition to that it also implies that intuitions can pick out objects as a whole without concepts. When I discuss the singularity of concepts (their role in making uniqueness claims), I assume that it can be seen that in order to pick out objects, one needs to have concepts to play their role. Furthermore, in Kantian corpus, there is no explicit remark which includes such a phrase as "intuition of an object". If Wilson is right, then the blindness thesis would be wrong. In this case, perceptions would be identical with intuitions. Then, concepts would not play any role in perceiving objects. Thus, all the parts in the *Critique of Pure Reason* on synthesis, on the unification[39] of intuitions and concepts in empirical cognition would be redundant, or else wrong.

On the immediacy and mediacy of intuitions, Wilson says that:

"We cannot define immediacy as epistemologically direct awareness of the object, for Kant defines empirical intuitions as representations which stand in immediate relation to their object through sensations" (Wilson, 1975, p. 264).

Together with the previous quotation from Wilson this last one leads us to think on the way by how intuitions represent objects through sensory input and thus form

[39] To exemplify such a textual evidence, Kant says that: "Only from their [the understanding and the senses] unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic." (*CPR*, A52/B76).

objective representations of objects. Since sensations, according to Kant's *Stufenleiter*[40] passage, are subjective representation, in order to form objective representations out of them concepts are needed to gather these raw data imported by sensations and to uniquely determine objects. If what Wilson says is instead of concepts intuitions play this gathering and uniquely determining role, then the role of concepts in empirical cognition would be in question. Then, I think, there is no reason to speak of concepts' role in empirical cognition.

According to Falkenstein, intuitions' function is to provide raw data to us. This approach, I think, neglects the distinction between sensations and intuitions. For a closer look, I shall quote what Falkenstein says:

> In the *Critique* intuition is truly receptive; its function is simply to present raw data to us for processing. Intellect, in contrast, is facilitative in the sense that it does *all* the processing required to bring these data to a cognition – including combination of various items in a singular representation, as well as abstraction of specific differences in a concept. To thought belong all the processes, and all the products of processes, which can be conceived to be performed upon raw data. To intuition belongs the mere act of receiving raw data. (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 186)

Argument contra Falkenstein's model

I think in Falkenstein's model there is no violation of the blindness thesis, since according to the blindness thesis, intuitions are blind, receiving raw data does not imply that intuitions are able to see objects without the collaboration of concepts. As Falkenstein puts it these received raw data needs to be processed by understanding (through concepts), the blindness thesis is not violated.

But, according to this model, the distinction between sensations and intuitions fades out. Furthermore, according to Kant, objects are immediately related to intuitions,

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[40] "The genus is representation in general. Subordinate to it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. The pure concept, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion. A concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or a concept of reason. Anyone who has familiarized himself with these distinctions must find it intolerable to hear the representation of the colour, red, called an idea. It ought not even to be called a concept of understanding, a notion." (*CPR*, A320/B377)

but if Falkenstein is right then what is related immediately to intuitions would not be objects themselves but their impressions on our sensory organs. These impressions would be the raw data through intuitions conveyed to a cognition to be processed by understanding. This may be the actual case in our cognition of objects, but as it seems to me, this model is not loyal to Kant's account of cognition.

In addition to what Falkenstein says about the intuitions' contribution to empirical cognition in providing raw data, Thompson says that intuitions can also be rendered as *the apprehension of an amorphous sensory manifold as a spatiotemporal something*:

> An empirical intuition, then, is not merely an immediate apprehension of an amorphous sensory manifold. It is also an immediate apprehension of this manifold as a spatiotemporal something, and in this respect it is a cognitive representation, an objective perception, even though it is blind in the sense that it is not an apprehension of an object characterized by sensory qualities. (Thompson, 1972, p. 322)

Argument contra Thompson's approach

Thompson's approach differs from that of Falkenstein in two ways, depending on the passages I quote from both of their texts. First, Thompson does not attribute to empirical intuitions a role for providing experiential intake (raw sensory data). Second, he also focuses on the role of pure intuitions in cognizing objects as existing spatiotemporally. I think that Falkenstein would accept the role of pure intuitions in cognition.

What Thompson attributes to empirical intuitions is unclear for according to him, “an empirical intuition is an immediate apprehension of an amorphous sensory manifold” but at the same “it is not an apprehension of an object characterized by sensory qualities”. Against Wilson, Thompson admits that intuition is not capable of apprehending an object but against Falkenstein, he attributes to intuitions a role in processing on raw data received by sensibility or through sensations. By using the adjective “immediate”, he may intend to avoid attributing a role in processing on raw data to intuitions, but by merely modifying apprehension by the adjective “immediate”, I think, one cannot avoid attributing such a role to intuitions. Through attributing apprehension to intuitions, intuitions gain mediacy for they play their role on another sort of representation, namely sensation. I think this approach neglects the immediacy

criterion as an aspect of the distinction between concepts and intuitions.

However, one can interpret the immediacy criterion by defining mediacy in terms of being mediated through another objective representation for it is applied among concepts and intuitions. I am inclined to accept such a formulation of the immediacy criterion, since though intuitions are defined by Kant as immediate representations and they are also described as in relation with objects through sensibility, mediacy in this sense may mean being mediated by intuitions and/or concepts. According to this interpretation, concepts' mediacy may imply that concepts are mediated by other concepts and/or intuitions. If this interpretation of the mediacy is accepted, then Thompson's approach seems to me acceptable. On the other hand, in this case, the argument against Thompson's approach can be built on the lack of evidence for concepts' inability to function in apprehension of an amorphous sensory manifold. Then, the reason for putting intuitions in between concepts and amorphous sensory manifold as a third term through which concepts play their role becomes questionable. I see no reason for such a mediation in between concepts and raw data.

One radical model is proposed by Allison[41] not focusing merely on intuitions neither on concepts but on representations in general. Allison says that:

"... when we distinguish between representations and their objects, we are not distinguishing between two kinds of entities, one in the mind, and the other "out there", but between two ways in which we can regard our representations..." (Allison, 1968, p. 179).

Argument contra Allison's approach

I think that Allison not only violates perhaps one of the most crucial distinction within the Kant's *Critical Philosophy,* namely the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon (*CPR*) but also neglects the distinction between objective representations and subjective ones. Sensations, subjective representations, are about the objects which appear as being "out there" and they are definitely not identical with the objects "out there". And again, if both representations and their objects are our representations, then there is no room for objectivity in Kant's philosophy. If this is not the case and our

[41] Allison, Henry E., "Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object", *Kant-Studien,* Band 59, Heft 2 (1968).

representations appear as if ones being “out there” and others in the mind, then the difference between the products of imagination and the objects of empirical cognition would fade out. In either case, I think that Allison's approach is not loyal to Kant's classification of representations and to the most central tenets of Kantian philosophy.

Focusing on intuitions' role in cognition, Robert Hanna seeks the nature of concept-independent intuition:

What is a concept-independent intuition like, according to Kant?” (Hanna, 2001, p. 199).

One of the answers to this question is:

> In having such an intuition, one is perceptually affected by an object without conceptualizing it as an object of any specific sort... The object does indeed show up in the conscious attentive focus of the subject's perceptual field (so the perception is phenomenologically clear and non-obscure), yet the object is not sorted or articulated under any specific descriptive classification. (Hanna, 2001, p. 199)

Hanna's answer depends heavily on one of the examples that Kant gives in *JL*:

> If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is *mere intuition,* with the other it is *intuition* and *concept* at the same time. (*JL*, § 33)

Hanna interprets the above passage as “The civilized cognizer recognizes the house as house, by descriptively articulating its various parts (roof, door, windows, and so on) within a total representational *Gestalt*. The uncivilized cognizer, by contrast, is aware only of a largely unlabelled, unarticulated object in the focus of perception” (Hanna, 2001, p. 200).

Hanna interprets the phrase “with the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time” as a lack of concepts of the perception of the savage. In fact, what Kant implies is that the savage merely lacks the concept of an house, it is not the case that the savage perceives the house merely by intuitions. Intuition is still complementary in his perception, what changes for the savage is that he is not able to recognize what he perceives as a house.

I think that the role of intuitions (empirical intuitions) in cognition asserted by

Kant lies on Kant's attempt (1) to find a way to make a distinction between logically possible objects and actual objects and (2) to provide an objective ground in order to combine the sensory input with concepts. I think the first goal can be accomplished merely relying on the spatiotemporal relations of objects through pure intuitions for they provide the ground to think of the objects determined uniquely by concepts as existing "out there". But when it comes to second goal, even if one accepts the role of intuitions attributed by Kant and by Kant scholars, the objective ground in question is still problematic as it is seen from the various models and approaches in which either the blindness thesis is violated or the distinction between concepts and intuitions fades out or what is received through sensory input is thought as intuitions (which again leaves us with subjective representations).

The role of empirical intuitions is defined as a complement of the role of concepts, through being immediately related to objects. Since the reason for the insufficiency of concepts in capturing objects solely by themselves is stated in terms of Kant's argument on the absence of the 'lowest concept' that can be matched with objects, how intuitions, that are distinct from sensations, are able to provide a ground for existence claims about objects cannot be answered properly. I think that this question is not any different than how concepts cannot form singular representations of objects. Concepts' (or understanding's) inability to form singular representations is tried to be shown through the absence of the "lowest concept" but intuitions' (or sensibility's) ability to form singular representations is not shown other than appealing to the role of pure intuitions[42]

[42] Falkenstein questions the incapability of the understanding in forming singular representations and tries to summarize Kant's answer though focusing on the role of pure intuitions and neglecting or ignoring the role of empirical intuition, then argues against Kant's answer: "Granting that Kant accepted a tradition which encouraged the equation of sensory experience with singular representation, we may still wonder what justifies this equation. Why should we suppose that intellect is incapable of forming singular representations or, as Kant would put it, of descending to the lowest species? … We are not capable of having intellectual intuitions or of intellectually conceptualizing objects, Kant tells us, because of our cognition of objects is bound to the conditions of space and time, which apply only to sensory experience. But the point that the conditions of space and time apply only to sensory and not to intellectual experience is precisely what is in question... [Later] Kant blithely 'proves' that time is not a form of the intelligible world by appealing to the claim that intellect cannot represent objects. Thus, the argument ends up moving in a circle." (Falkenstein, 1991, pp. 177-8). In this quotation, however, Falkenstein, ignores Kant's argument for the absence of the 'lowest concept' and thereby jumps on his arguments on pure intuitions. The reason for Kant for the understanding's incapability of forming singular representations is not the pure intuitions but the absence of the 'lowest concept' that is related with objects. Kant accepts that concepts can be used singularly to represent objects within a certain context.

in cognition of objects as having spatiotemporal relations. Though, it is accepted that through convention and/or in a certain context they can be used to refer to objects, there is no an instance or a satisfactory argument for showing how and why empirical intuitions function in empirical cognition.

How are Intuitions Immediate?

Recalling the arguments given above, I think the problematic part of Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is that the role intuitions play in cognition, namely the concept-independent role in representing singular representations through immediate relation with what it is represented.

In previous pages, it is said that intuitions are also mediate for depending on sensations. However, this mediacy is different from that of concepts. According to Kantian conception of objective representations, concepts' mediacy is a result of their discursive (and/or reflexive) character, for they reflect on the representations that are either concepts or intuitions. By implication, this means that intuitions do not represent or do not depend on representations other than sensations, namely on concepts or other intuitions, in order to form singular representations.

Marks of Intuitions vs. Marks of Concepts

If we focus on Kant's explicit remarks on the distinction between intuitions and concepts, it can be seen that concepts are representations that are formed through common marks that are shared by many objects (at least, they can be shared by logically possible objects). For there are possibly infinitely many objects that may share those marks, concepts are said to be general by definition. If the generality of concepts is understood in this way, then the possibility of singularity of concepts depends on the possibility of the marks that are possessed solely by one individual object. If there would be such marks that can be used to represent objects uniquely and also can be possessed solely by these objects. This possibility would not challenge Kant's argument against the

“lowest concepts”, if one, through convention or depending on the context, uses those marks to represent objects uniquely. Otherwise, i.e., without such a restriction, those marks could be shared by infinitely many logically possible objects, thus could not used to represent objects uniquely. Even so, if there are such marks that each individual object alone can possess, then these marks would not be the ones Kant refers in defining concepts. In this case, those marks would not be represented by concepts.

In literature, it is said that there are such marks, namely 'intuitive marks'[43]. I think that, through appealing to these marks, intuitions are mediate both for being mediated through sensations and for being mediated through such marks. The problem is that when these intuitive marks are considered the ability of intuitions in using these marks and the inability of concepts in such a use appear to be a new distinction. The difference in terms of this ability may depend on the singularity criterion. I think that for Kant posits the singularity criterion, he also makes a distinction between intuitive marks and conceptual marks in order to provide a basis for intuitions to detect what is represented by them and keep intuitions singular. I think, this point also leads us to consider the coherency problem in Kant's conception of intuitions and concepts. After dealing with this new distinction, I will discuss this coherency problem.

In order to discuss the two different aspects of marks, I will appeal to Kant's conception of a mark:

“every mark may be considered from two sides: first, as a representation in itself; second, as belonging as a partial concept to the whole representation of a thing, and thereby as a ground of cognition of this thing itself” (*JL*, Introduction § 8)

Throughout the discussion, marks appeared to be a part of a conceptual contribution or a part of concepts' element in cognition of objects. However, now, I will try to introduce marks as a component of intuitions or of intuitive representations by appealing to Smit's approach on this issue.

From the quotation above, a mark is an element of the whole representation and also this element is a ground of cognition of the whole representation. In this sense, no

[43] Textual evidences supporting the presence of intuitive marks is against Parson's conception of the immediacy criterion. Since according to Parsons, the immediacy of intuitions can be rendered as “at least that it does not relate to an object by means of marks”. (Parsons, C., “Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic”, in *Philosophy, Science, and Method*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser, *et al.* (New York, 1969), p. 570.)

difference emerges with the conceptual marks, i.e., it can still be considered as a mark of concepts. But, what is new here is that Kant speaks of a mark not merely as a part of cognition of a thing, but also as a representation by itself and more importantly as a ground of cognition of a thing. This point is stressed by Smit, considering the parties of the debate on the two criteria, especially on the immediacy criterion.

"A mark... is an identifying property through which we can cognize a thing; Kant's notion of a mark, then, is that of a property through which we can cognize, not just any subject matter, but things" (Smit, 2000, p. 245).

If one combines these lines with what I quote from Kant above, then we can say that "a mark is not just an identifying property through which we can cognize a thing" but also for being such an identifying property it is a representation, a partial representation of cognition. As being grounds of the cognition, since cognizing and thinking are two different things and only through the former one's thinking differs with respect to objects, marks provide the ground of such a transition from merely thinking of an object to cognition of it. Thus, within Kantian terminology, they are related with intuitions, since this transition, as aforementioned, is a role of intuitions.

Beyond what is said above, Kant's expressions "cognition of a thing", "representation of a thing" implies that through marks, one relates herself not just with objects but also with things. Since objects are also representations, or can be conceived as representations through empirical cognition, things differ from objects. As Smit puts it:

"A thing, unlike a mere representation, is wholly determined in respect of every possible predicate of things" (Smit, 2000, p. 248).

Then, a thing not only fills a spatiotemporally determinable place but also has many properties through which conceptual representations can be formed. However, these conceptual representations depend on impressions, or on sensations (and also it can be claimed that on empirical intuitions) in order to be formed from them as they are conceived as singular instances of general marks that infinitely many possible object can have. Thus, in a certain moment of concept formation, these marks, which we can call later on conceptual marks (or concepts for those marks are themselves representations), are intuitive marks according to Smit.

This change in the character of marks is also written by Allison but Allison does not think of marks in the beginning of concept formation as marks, rather they are merely impressions. Smit argues against this account by conceiving the ones that are transformed into conceptual marks as intuitive marks:

"Allison presents Kant's account of the generation of concepts as a process whereby "impressions become transformed into marks" (*Kant's Transcendental Idealism,* 67). But what is distinctive about this process is precisely that it produces discursive marks from intuitive ones" (Smit, 2000, p. 259, note).

Smit's use of the terms 'discursive marks' and 'intuitive marks' is directly from Kant:

> An intuitive mark is a property as it makes up a thing's (partial) cognition in intuition (that is, a property as it is represented, and thus has intentional being, in intuition), and a discursive mark, a property as it makes up a thing's (partial) cognition in a concept (that is, a property as it is represented, and thus has intentional being, in a concept). (Smit, 2000, p. 254, from R 2286; 16:299-300)

In accordance with what I have said above on the transformation of intuitive marks, through conception of them as singular instances of general marks, to conceptual ones, Smit says that:

> He [Kant] has in mind a case in which we reflect on an objective content that is contained in intuition, an intuitive mark, so that it simultaneously also constitutes a discursive mark. Indeed, to do so just is, on Kant's view, to subsume an intuition under a concept: to recognize an intuitive mark as a singular instance of a discursive mark. (Smit, 2000, p. 259)

If as it is said marks are representations and if there are intuitive marks as Kant says, then intuitive marks must be representations and since they are immediate, singular and depends on sensibility, then they must be intuitions. Then, there emerges some problems concerning the immediacy of intuitions:

(1) If intuitive marks are intuitions and there are no empirical intuitions[44] other than

[44] I think choosing this option will lead us to accept that the objective (or material) content of our cognition as identical with intuitions which are intuitive marks. Then, empirical intuitions would be intuitive marks. Smit's remark quoted in below implies that empirical intuitions are intuitive marks: "In particular, insofar as our intuitions are objective perceptions through which we can cognize objects, they constitute objective content of our cognition, and thus consist of marks. Indeed, it follows that all of our objective perceptions – including the categories, which as our concepts of an object in general do not themselves constitute objective content – relate to things only through marks." (Smit, 2000, p. 253).

intuitive marks, then what differs intuitions from concepts would be the ability of intuitions to be the marks that an object alone possesses. In this case, the problem turns out to be about the discussion on the possibility of the "lowest concepts" since accordance with such an understanding of intuitions what distinguishes them from concepts would be the singularity criterion. This does not seem loyal to Kant's account of objective representations.

(2) If intuitive marks are also intuitions and there are other empirical intuitions that are not intuitive marks[45], the relation between the two would again annihilate the immediacy criterion between the empirical intuitions that are mediated by intuitive marks and concepts. Then the immediacy criterion would not be a genuine distinction between concepts and intuitions. Again, this account is not loyal to Kant's account.

(3) The last point is that since intuitive marks are immediate and singular but can become discursive marks, a question emerges: why, then, understand cannot think of these marks at first? The reason for this, I think, Kant's strategy in his critical period to restrict the singularity of concepts merely their use and to avoid the possibility of singular concepts, of which he speaks in pre-critical period. But if this is the case, then there is an inconsistency within Kant's account. Since empirical cognition[46] includes both empirical intuitions and empirical concepts, and intuitive marks can become discursive marks, then once they become discursive marks, empirical cognition of such an object would not include empirical intuition in case intuitive marks and intuitions are

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Thinking of concepts as being common marks, by implication and by the textual evidences for intuitive marks, is in accordance with what Kant says about the identity between empirical concepts and common marks: "One must indeed think of every concept as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common mark)." (*CPR*, B40)

[45] Smit argues for that there can a mode of cognition that does not serve as the ground of cognition. In this case, there can be a distinct mode of empirical intuitions that are not intuitive marks. I think Smit's account makes a room for such a conception of intuitions: "To consider a partial representation as a mark is to consider it as "ground of cognition of the whole representation," and we can, according to Kant, at least conceive of a mode of cognition in which a partial representation does not serve as the ground of that cognition." (Smit, 2000, p. 251).

[46] "Considered in this respect, all our cognitions are, namely, either intuitions or concepts. The former have their source in sensibility, the faculty of intuitions, the latter in the understanding, the faculty of concepts. This is the logical distinction between understanding and sensibility, according to which the latter provides nothing but intuitions, the former on the other hand nothing but concepts." (*JL*, § 36).

"Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition." (*CPR*, A50/B74).

identical. If they are not, then the second problem emerges.

As Smith says “Examining Kant's notion of a mark, and his account of the way we cognize things through marks, will show that concepts are not the only objective representations that relate to objects through marks: our intuitions, being sensible, are also objective perceptions that relate to objects through marks” (Smit, 2000, p. 238).

Then, to solve these problems one needs to define two kinds of immediacy, thus to use one of them to make a distinction between concepts and intuitions. Say, the mediacy of cognitions is their ability to reflect on concepts and intuitions, whereas the mediacy of intuitions is their relation with intuitive marks and sensations. Despite this attempt, the relation between intuitive marks and discursive marks, and the unexplained cause (if there is) of the inability of the understanding to think of intuitive marks at first and the role of intuitions in cognition after the transformation of intuitive marks to discursive marks are need to be explained. In my research, I could not find any explanations and answers for these problems.

One of the attempts to redefine the immediacy criterion belongs to Manley Thompson and it is formulated as:

“To refer immediately, then, is to refer to an object by means of marks or characteristics that it alone possesses. The reference, in other words, is unique. On the other hand, to refer mediately is to refer to an object along with any other object with which it may share certain marks or characteristics” (Thompson, 1972, p. 315).

If Thompson's formulation is correct, then the immediacy criterion would be just another formulation of the singularity criterion (then, Hintikka would be right but not with respect to his arguments). Recalling that even a concept represents an object under itself through a mark is possessed solely by this object, it is logically possible that that mark can be possessed by infinitely many objects, so that how we can determine the character of a mark whether it is an intuitive mark that is possessed merely by one object or a discursive one that can be possessed by infinitely many logically possible objects would be a problem.

Moreover, if intuitions are understood in this way, then they appear as if they are singular concepts for the distinction between concepts and intuitions merely depends on

the singularity criterion[47] and for there is no genuine distinction between intuitive marks and discursive marks. This possibility is considered by Thompson:

> They [intuitions] refer to an object immediately because they somehow mark characteristics peculiar to that object alone, while empirical concepts can refer to the same object only mediately because they mark only characteristics that the object may share with indefinitely many other objects. But intuitions then appear to be simply concepts of a special sort – individual or singular rather than general concepts. (Thompson, 1972, p. 316)

If there is a possible way, as Thompson puts it, to mark characteristics peculiar to a particular concept, then this, I think, violates one of the central tenets of Kantian philosophy, namely the impossibility of the 'lowest concept'. Otherwise, such a marking procedure would depend on the context or on convention, which, in turn, would lead one to ignore either what Kant says about intuitive marks or that about the singular use of concepts.

Against Thompson's conception of intuitions as singular concepts, like many others Smit comes up with the generality of concepts and in addition to that, in a similar fashion with Hintikka though instead of the relation between intuitions and singularity with respect to immediacy, Smit[48] says that "On Kant's conception of intuition, it is (at least logically) possible that there are intuitions that do not relate objects by means of marks. Concepts, in contrast, relate to objects by means of marks as a matter of logical necessity" (Smit, 2000, p. 239, footnote 11). Thus, Smit thinks that mediacy of concepts is a logical corollary of their generality. Instead of conceiving (at least some of the) empirical intuitions that are intuitive marks as singular concepts, Smit does not attack on the immediacy criterion. His strategy is to classify two different accounts on immediacy criterion, namely "the standard minimal reading of the singularity criterion" (Smit, 2000, p. 238) and his own account according to which the mediacy of concepts implies that concepts are mediated by intuitions and concepts[49].

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[47] This account seems against the general conception: "The authors who have recently proposed and defended different readings of the immediacy criterion agree on the import of the contrast between the singularity of intuitions and the generality of concepts. What divides them is their understanding of the contrast between the immediacy of intuitions and the mediacy of concepts." (Smit, 2000, p. 237)

[48] Smit, H., "Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 235-266.

[49] Longuenesse also takes a similar position on this issue: "Kant's characterization of intuition as

There is another problem that emerges when one accepts one of the remarks of Smit on the relation between intuitions and intuitive marks:

> Intuitive marks are singular instances of properties, as they are represented in, and make up the content of, our intuitions. Discursive marks, in contrast, are general properties as they are represented in, and make up the content of, our concepts. Once one sees that Kant makes this distinction, it becomes clear that our intuitions, on his view, relate to objects through marks – in particular, through intuitive marks that make up their contents. (Smit, 2000, p. 266)

If intuitive marks are the content of intuitions, as it is said by Smit, then because intuitive marks are also representations, as it is said by Kant, the immediacy criterion would be violated. If this is the case, intuitions are mediated both by sensations[50] and by intuitions (that are intuitive marks). Then, Smit's and Longuenesse's accounts on the immediacy criterion would be wrong because in this case, intuitions, like concepts, would also be mediate though they would keep their singularity. This shows that the singularity criterion and the immediacy criterion are two distinct criteria. Moreover, this will also show that the generality of concepts is irrelevant with their mediacy since intuitions through intuitive, despite their mediacy, marks can represent singular representations.

The way that the singularity criterion applied for such a distinction between intuitions and concepts is not explained or justified other than appealing to definitions. But for the application of the immediacy criterion there are some arguments, yet through these arguments together with the blindness thesis and Kant's argument against the possibility of the 'lowest concept' together with intuitive marks seems contradicting either with the central tenets of Kant's conception of objective representations or with

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immediate representation essentially means, I think, that intuition does not require the mediation of another representation to relate to an object." Longuenesse, B., *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, p. 202)

[50] For sensations are not objective representations, modifying the immediacy criterion by defining immediacy of intuitions with this respect would be a valid attempt. Yet, as I tried to show, despite this modification, mediacy through intuitive marks would still be in effect. For a remark on the mediacy of intuitions through sensations, I appeal to Smit:
"The independence of intuition from further representations needs qualification: some of our intuitions require the mediation of some further representation to relate to an object; it is only further representation *of an object* that does not mediate an intuition's relation to an object. For Kant holds that an intuition is empirical if "it relates to the object through sensation" (A 20 / B 23). This does not render the intuition's relation to its object mediate, because these sensations are not, of themselves, representations of objects (objective perceptions). It is only in conjunction with empirical intuition that sensations may be attributed to an object (and even so, only relative to the subjective constitution of the particular cognizing subject)." (Smit, 2000, p. 264).

the exposition of the two criteria.

Part-Whole Relations in Concepts and in Intuitions

I think one crucial distinction between the mediacy of concepts and that of intuitions can be understood in terms of Wilson's strategy to show that the immediacy criterion and the singularity criterion are extensionally same but intensionally different. I will not say too much on their extensional relation. But, in this context, their being intensionally different must be taken into account.

Wilson proposed his strategy for justification of the distinction between intuitions and concepts, namely putting part-whole relations within concepts and that within intuitions. I think, Wilson's concern is restricted to the distinction between concepts and non-empirical intuitions (for his argument heavily depends on his analysis of space). For this reason, what he says on intuitions does not have any effect on empirical intuitions, especially when intuitive marks are considered.

According to Wilson, the character of part-whole relation within concepts can be conceived in terms of set theory for this reason he names the character of part-whole relations within concepts as 'the set-theoretic character of the conceptual part-whole relation'. According to this account, a concept, by definition, contains another concept that is *under* it, which, in turn, contains another. There are textual evidences for such a conceptualization of the part-whole relations within concepts, one of the famous one is in *JL* (§ 11). Kant also says that

"The sphere is the extension of a concept, and concerns the *set of things* which are subordinated under the concept" (*Weiner Logik*, p. 911).

Wilson gives an example for the part-whole relations in concepts:

"The concept Philosopher is subordinated *under* the concept Human which in turn is subordinated *under* Animal; conversely, the concept Human is contained *in* the concept Philosopher, which differs from the concept Human by some specific *differentia*, and Animal is contained *in* Human, which also contains the *differentia*

Rational" (Wilson, 1975, p. 252).

Thus, for concepts what is contained under them is not greater from the other, i.e., though the concept Human has more members than the concept Philosopher, the latter contains more concept in itself. When it comes to the part-whole relations in intuitions, Wilson defines the part-whole relation as:

"... the parts of an intuition are contained *within* the whole and that the whole is greater than any individual part" (Wilson, 1975, p. 254).

Then, as it is seen from the quotation, the part-whole relation within *intuitions* is mereological:

"Since the conceptual part-whole relation is a counterpart to a set-theoretic notion of membership, it is natural to suggest that the singularity criterion determines the structure of a representation according to a mereological conception of the part-whole relation. Also called the calculus of individuals, mereology is the study of the formal relations in which the parts of a concrete whole, or of an individual, stand to the whole itself" (Wilson, 1975, p. 254)[51].

However, in Wilson's strategy what is considered primarily is not empirical intuitions. When it comes to empirical intuitions, Wilson says:

"Intuitive representations "show forth' their object by representing its mereological structure and, in the case of empirical intuitions, its empirical properties (B69, footnote)" (Wilson, 1975, p. 258)

If Wilson is right and if in empirical intuitions what is represented is the objects mereological structure in terms of their empirical properties, then the difference between empirical concepts and empirical intuitions would fade out. Since empirical properties of objects are their marks, even if intuitive marks are considered, it would be expected that empirical intuitions represent mereological structure of these marks. In this case, through a multitude of intuitive marks, empirical intuitions would order these marks in

[51] A more detailed discussion on Wilson's attempt would be out of the scope of this thesis for his concern in the part-whole relations within intuitions is restricted to pure intuitions. Yet, on Wilson's attempt to distinguish concepts and intuitions with respect to the part-whole relations they exhibit, I agree with Falkenstein on that Wilson's attempt trivializes what Kant tries to do in the Transcendental Aesthetic: "Kant wants to prove that space and time are forms of intuition. Giving this proof entails explaining why certain features of space and time, such as their singularity or their mereological structure, could not be rendered by intellect. Simply defining intuitions as representations which exhibit these features, and intellections as representations which do not, trivializes the whole project." (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 184).

accordance with their mereological structure.

If those marks are not intuitive marks, then empirical intuitions would not differ from empirical concepts other than being singular and in this case, what Thompson says would be in question, that is, these empirical intuitions could be considered as singular concepts.

Inconsistencies in the Kantian Corpus about Concepts and Intuitions

Throughout this chapter, I tried to show several problems about the distinctions made by Kant and the attempts to solve these problems. I believe that some of these problems emerge because of the inconsistencies in the Kantian corpus. Now, I would like to give an overall analysis of some of these problems.

One of these inconsistencies is that though Kant's definition of intuitions heavily relies on the immediacy criterion, he often speaks of intuitive marks without giving any explanation why they differ from discursive ones other than saying that these marks are possessed solely by one object per each. By intuitions, it is evident that Kant's motive is to break away from Leibnizian tradition through arguing against the possibility of the "lowest concept" and to provide a ground for cognition other than merely thinking of objects. For these projects, Kant insists on putting definitions and remarks on the character of intuitions and on their importance in accomplishing these goals but he does not give consistent explanations for their immediacy and singularity. Moreover, he sometimes his terms inconsistently as Falkenstein claims that "Kant, unfortunately, did not use his terms in any consistent way. Sometimes, by 'intuition' he means intuition in what may be called the metaphysical sense: that of raw data for the cognitive process supplied by a distinct cognitive faculty. But sometimes, as in the passage about the savage, he means it in what may be called the logical sense – which does not appeal to a distinct faculty at all, but merely to the (necessarily intellectual) experience of objects. Likewise, 'concept' sometimes means the product of intellectual processing – which is the metaphysical sense – but sometime means just a universal cognized through abstracting specific differences, which is the logical sense." (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 193).

When intuitions are taken ambiguously in this way, they either become identical

with sensations or exhibit themselves as a special sort of concepts, namely singular concepts. But, for being immediate by definition, Kant never gives examples of intuitions of objects without an appeal to the contribution of concepts. For instance, in his pre-critical period he speaks of singular concepts and gives proper names, definite descriptions as examples of singular concepts and indefinite descriptions as that of general concepts, whereas when, in critical period, he speaks of definite objects, he says that the unification of intuitions and concepts is necessary in order to have an empirical cognition and does not give an example of intuitions as if they are represented by proper names or by definite descriptions. In addition to this, reference to singular concepts ends up within the critical period, and those examples that are given for singular concepts in his pre-critical period are not recited. By implication, those examples are conceived as singular uses of concepts without an argument.

Similar to the inconsistencies about intuitions, their mediacy and singularity, 'concepts' are also used in an inconsistent way:

> If 'concept' means 'universal', then it does not refer to the product of any intellectual process, but only to the products of a particular process: abstraction. In this sense, indeed, concepts cannot be singular or have mereological structure. But in this sense concepts are only one among the products of intellectual synthesis; there are also perceptions and images. (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 192)

Apart from inconsistent uses of terms and that of concepts, there is also a circularity problem with I mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis. Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts emerges in two ways: 1- with respect to their relation with cognition and 2- with respect to the faculties they are produced. The second way of the distinction leads to circularity. Because, those faculties are too distinguished in terms of their products, thus the circularity emerges[52].

One final point is about the arguments favoring the immediacy criterion. Arguments favoring the immediacy criterion, as they are exposed in this chapter, depend heavily on spatiotemporal relations of objects. Thus, when it comes showing that an immediate and direct relation with objects is necessary in terms of pure intuitions, many

[52] "Kant might in fact have good reasons for separating intuitive from intellectual representation in this way. But given blindness, much would have to be said to justify such criteria. They could not, therefore, be simply defined as the original or fundamental grounds of distinction between the representations delivered by the faculties." (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 184).

philosopher attempt to show that in order to cognize any actual physical object one needs to have pure intuitions. However, in this case, categories and/or pure concepts are also needed for they provide the ground for perceiving objects as wholes and as if they exhibit distinct unities etc. So, the attempts to restrict concepts in abstracting, comparing what is given through intuitions, through perception of objects neglect the intellectual ground of experience[53].

Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to give various accounts on the two criteria. After a brief exposition of these account, I discussed whether these criteria, as it is claimed by Hintikka, are not that different or they are distinct. Then, I focused on the two criteria. I argued that these criteria are distinct and they exhibit different features of concepts and intuitions. I also argued that both criteria, as they are expressed by Kant, are problematic since it can be shown that intuitions too are mediate and that when one considers that there are intuitive marks and that these marks can become conceptual ones through reflection, there is a room for singular concepts, thus both criteria are problematic.

I have no solution for a consistent and a loyal interpretation of Kant to serve for these problems. But, I think it is possible not to violate central tenets of Kantian project (against conceptualization of all representations of Leibnizian tradition) and to provide a distinction between intuitions and concepts without ignoring Kantian slogan that "intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty". Empirical intuitions can be conceived as objective representations that are a product of sensibility but as differing from sensations through concepts' contribution to the empirical cognition these sensations can be said that objective. In that case, empirical intuitions are not different from sensations that provide experiential intake of sensory raw data but special in the sense that what are received through intuitions must be objective. So, their difference from sensation is not their way of representing the content

[53] This point is nicely put by Falkenstein: " These views entail that even the perception of objects or mereological wholes must already involve synthesis under the categories and so cannot be non-intellectual." (Falkenstein, 1991, p. 184).

of cognition but what they receive. Then, it can be said that my solution assumes that empirical intuitions are defined retrospectively throughout the analysis of empirical cognition (by abstracting concepts from empirical cognition). I believe that Kant's motive and analysis are in accord with my solution.

When it comes it intuitive marks, what I argue for in this chapter, I think, is clear. To make it explicit, briefly, I can say that intuitive marks are the conditions for concepts to conceptualize the marks of objects in order to form conceptual marks but their role cannot be understood from bottom-up direction in formation of cognition. Instead, they are the products of the analysis of concept formation and that of empirical cognition. Empirical intuitions differ from concepts for not being mediated by other concepts (by other empirical concepts) and differ from sensations for being objective. Their singularity, however, I think, is a strategical claim that Kant asserts to break away from Leibnizian tradition and his pre-critical period for the sake of the argument against the 'lowest concept'. Otherwise, through an analysis of a particular empirical cognition of an object, one can say that a particular intuition belongs to a particular object, which would lead us to think of intuitions as if they are conceptual. The reason for this is if intuitions can alone provide objects, then these intuitions would not differ from perceptions. And this result is against one of the main assertions of Kantian philosophy, namely synthesis, that a perception or an empirical cognition includes both intuitions and concepts. If intuitions can provide objects as such, then there would not be any difference from a Lockean picture of the issue. Since Kant's critical philosophy claims against empiricism that cognition cannot be sensitivized as in empiricism, this approach would not be loyal to Kant's critical philosophy.

In accordance with these lines, empirical intuitions are meant to be the way through which experiential sensory intake is provided for the processing of understanding to form empirical cognition and through the analysis of empirical cognition these sensory intake are thought to be objective and thus they are distinguished from mere sensations for being objective. Though the two criteria are distinct and are interdependent from each other, none of them can be reduced to the other.

CHAPTER III

NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT & COGNITION

What is said in the second chapter on the distinction between intuitions and concepts are directly related with the discussion between conceptualists[54] and nonconceptualists[55]. On the terms "nonconceptualism" and "conceptualism", there is not any consensus. For this reason, I will give my own accounts of these terms.

It is possible to define nonconceptualism in terms of conceptualism, as its denial. But, I think that the motives of the two are different, so I will define these separately which enables one to think that there are possible ways to commit to conceptualism and at the same time to some sort of nonconceptualism, or vice versa.

Conceptualism, in general, holds that in order to have empirical cognition concepts are necessary. Nonconceptualism, on the other hand, holds that what enables cognition is nonconceptual mental content, otherwise one cannot cognize but only think of. Each

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[54] For the definitions of conceptualism and that of nonconceptualism, I appeal to Robert Hanna:
"Conceptualism holds that non-conceptual content neither exists nor is representationally significant. More precisely, conceptualism says: (a) that all cognitive capacities are fully determined by conceptual capacities, and (b) that none of the cognitive capacities of rational human animals can also be possessed by non-rational animals, whether human or non-human.
… there are ... at least three weakened versions of conceptualism. The first weakened version says that non-conceptual content indeed exists but is not representationally significant, because such content is nothing but the intrinsic non-relational qualitative content of sensations: namely, phenomenal qualia, whether qualia are taken to be sensory types or sensory tokens. In other words, this sort of conceptualism is prepared to admit non-conceptual content, but only if it is pure sensory content. Oddly this sort of conceptualism could also, with a little squinting and tweaking, be regarded as a super-weak version of non-conceptualism: a ''pure sensationalist non-conceptualism.''
By contrast, the second weakened version of conceptualism says that while there are non-conceptual cognitions, there are nevertheless no non-conceptual contents: the contents of non-conceptual cognitions are themselves conceptually fully determined.
… The third weakened version of conceptualism says that (a) is true but denies (b): some non-rational human or non-human animals also have primitive or ''proto'' conceptual capacities. Not surprisingly, this sort of conceptualism is favored by some of those interested in non-human animal cognition." (Hanna, 2006, pp. 87-88)

[55] "Non-conceptualism holds that non-conceptual content exists and is representationally significant—that is, meaningful in the ''semantic'' sense of describing or referring to states-of-affairs, properties, or individuals of some sort. More precisely, non-conceptualism says: (a) that there are cognitive capacities which are not determined (or at least not fully determined) by conceptual capacities; and (b) that the cognitive capacities which outstrip conceptual capacities can be possessed by rational and non-rational animals alike, whether human or non-human." (Hanna, 2006, pp. 84-5)

of the positions have strong and weak versions. For strong conceptualism, concepts are not only necessary to have empirical cognition but also sufficient. Strong versions of nonconceptualism, on the other hand, claim that one can have empirical cognition without any concept. For weak versions of conceptualism, concepts are neccesary for empirical cognition but they are not sufficient. Weak nonconceptualism claims that though concepts are not necessary for cognition, without them one cannot have empirical knowledge of particulars in the proper sense of the word, the knowledge that humans can alone acquire. Since, for nonconceptualism, it is possible to speak of empirical cognition of animals and of mental content that by alone can represent particulars, I claim that Kant is not a nonconceptualist. My claim is that Kant is a conceptualist, for he thinks that animals cannot have empirical cognitions, all cognition is necessarily conceptual but, he is *weak* conceptualist, for he thinks that sensory content is nonconceptual yet it cannot be meaningful without concepts. What I claim is directly related with my interpretation of the roles of intuitions and of concepts in empirical cognition and that of the difference between intuitions and sensations. Thus, the debate on nonconceptual content is directly related with the role of intuitions in empirical cognition.

Favoring a form of nonconceptualism, Hanna also states this relation:

> Non-conceptual cognitive content in the contemporary sense is, for all philosophical intents and purposes, identical to intuitional cognitive content in Kant's sense. Indeed, in my opinion the contemporary distinction between non-conceptual cognitions and their content, and conceptual cognitions and their content, is essentially the same as Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts. (Hanna, 2006, p. 85)

Nonconceptualist position favors the ability of intuitions, without a function of understanding, to provide objects for cognition. Whereas conceptualists, in general, argue against this by saying that concepts and conceptual relations are necessary not only for cognition but also for recognition of objects. Among commentators on Kantian account of intuitions and concepts the strongest conceptualist is John McDowell, and the strongest nonconceptualist is Lucy Allais. McDowell justifies his arguments depending on the Myth of the Given, on a Hegelian conception of experience and on a Hegelian critique of Kantian conception of experience whereas Allais' argument depends on pragmatic aspects of the issue (on which I will not focus) and on textual evidences from

Kant. I believe that if Kantian corpus is taken into consideration in accordance with Kantian assumptions, Lucy Allais' interpretation can be seen as loyal to Kant. However, as I have tried to show in the previous chapter, there are some problems in Kant's account if one considers the textual evidences that I quoted from Kantian corpus. Considering these problems and being loyal to central tenets of Kantian philosophy, McDowell's interpretation is also a strong one.

Lucy Allais' strategy is to depend heavily on the immediacy of intuitions, ignoring what Kant says about intuitive marks, and on the objectivity of cognition. Ultimately, Allais' argument depends on the spatiotemporal relations and properties of objects. McDowell, on the other hand, focuses on the general characteristics of Kantian philosophy, namely the sort of idealism (subjective idealism) to which Kantian philosophy belongs and emphasizes the role of the blindness thesis.

Robert Hanna, a nonconceptualist, defines intuitions in their role in the sensory experiential intake and tries to justify his position by appealing to the argument from incongruent counterparts (the two hands argument). It can be seen that the discussion depends on the immediacy of intuitions, spatiotemporal relations of objects on one side and on the other side depends on the blindness thesis and on the synthesis.

My position on this issue is in accordance with what I have said in the previous chapter. I believe that empirical intuitions are products of the analysis of cognition, i.e., end products of the cognition when concepts are abstracted from cognitions. Thus, I do not see any real difference between empirical intuitions and sensations in terms of experiential intake (metaphysical sense of empirical intuitions). But, because of intuitive marks, I think that what Kant calls “empirical intuitions” could be conceived as singular concepts in terms of the logical sense of empirical intuitions. Thus, I argue against concept-independency of intuitions but I do not think that McDowell's interpretation is loyal to Kant's account of the issue.

Concept-Independency of Intuitions

Lucy Allais says that “for Kant, the application of concepts is not necessary for our being perceptually presented with outer particulars: the *role* of intuition is to present us

with particulars, and it does not depend on concepts to play this role" (Allais, 2009, p. 384). Against Allais' position, McDowell claims that "intuition does not make an even notionally separable contribution to cognition" (McDowell, 1996, p. 9).

McDowell's claim, at first sight, seems to be contradicting with Kant's conception of intuitions since for Kant intuitions and concepts have distinct roles in empirical cognition. Against McDowell, Allais quotes from Kant for textual evidence:

> Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to the functions of the understanding... For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity. … Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for *intuition by no means require the functions of thinking*. (A 89/B 122 – A 90/B123)[56]. (Allais, 2009, p. 387) [57]

Despite this quotation, McDowell's claim is, I think, still in secure, for his claim does not imply that intuitions require the functions of thinking. In order to refute McDowell's claim, one needs to show the concept-independent contribution of intuitions in cognition. For such a refutation, Allais' strategy is clear, she focuses on the immediacy of intuitions. Allais argues for that "for Kant, the role of empirical intuitions is to present us with empirical particulars, and it does not depend on concepts to make this contribution" (Allais, 2009, p. 386).

As I mentioned in the previous chapter there is a problem with such a move against McDowell. Empirical particulars are conceived by Kant as appearances, which, in turn, can be identical with representations. Sensibility provides experiential intake and through empirical intuitions somehow, the matter of cognition is given to mind with the contribution of categories (like unity, magnitude, etc.) and that of empirical concepts (common features like colors). In addition to these, as mentioned in the second chapter, there are also intuitive marks (which can become discursive marks later on) in order to

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[56] "The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions." (*CPR*, A89/B122).

[57] In spite of being a nonconceptualist, Hanna says that: "... All and only the objects of possible human experience are necessarily conceptualizable under the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, and necessarily constrained by the transcendental laws of a pure science of nature. Otherwise blind intuitions might pick out objects human experience that are partially or wholly unconceptualizable, and nomologically intractable." (Hanna, 2007, p. 45).

cognize objects. Thus, intuitions' role in providing objects for cognition is not that clear as Allais says. Then, I think that claiming that intuitions independently from concepts provide objects for cognition is a very strong claim.

Against what I said above, one might recall the examples Kant gave in his *Lectures on Logic*:

"Concepts differ from intuition by virtue of the fact that all intuition is singular. He who sees his first tree does not know what it is that he sees" (*VL*, 905).

Hanna, Allais, Allison and other nonconceptualists quote such expressions in order to show that intuitions (at least some of them) are epistemically prior to thought in cognition. Another famous example is the one in *JL*§ 33:

> If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is *mere intuition*, with the other it is *intuition* and *concept* at the same time. (*JL*, § 33)

Providing a theoretical ground for such examples in case they seem to one as in contradicting with the Blindness thesis, Hanna says these:

> In my opinion, what Kant's famous slogan about blind intuitions and empty thoughts actually means is that intuitions and concepts must always be combined together for the special purpose of making objectively valid judgments. But *outside* that context it is also perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions without concepts ("blind intuitions," e.g., someone's first cognitive encounter with a tree), and also to have thinkable concepts without intuitions ("empty concepts," e.g., concepts of things-in-themselves). (Hanna, 2007, p. 45)

In both of these examples, it is said that one does not need concepts in order to perceive those objects that can be put under these concepts. However, giving these examples against conceptualism is not a strong move for these examples do not imply the priority of intuitions to concepts in general. What they imply is simply that some concepts can be formed through abstraction of certain marks after one is acquainted with several objects having these marks as their common marks and in order to perceive them as objects one may not need the concepts of those objects as definite objects under a concept. But, these examples do not imply that that savage or the one who sees his first tree perceive the house and the tree without any contribution of concepts. Against what Hanna states,

in fact, it is the opposite that “outside that context” those examples would not help nonconceptualists since outside that particular context, there are also other concepts that can play their role in cognition of particulars, like the house and the tree.

Furthermore, if it is understood in this way, then the only relation of empirical concepts with intuitions would be to name the matter of cognition by concepts and the formation of these empirical concepts through abstracting what is common in several objects that are perceived solely by intuitions.

Givenness Trap and Concept Formation Merely by Abstraction

Another problem with this nonconceptualist interpretation of those lines is that it presupposes that intuitions can alone become empirical cognitions. This presupposition is evidently against the blindness thesis and the empirical cognition's structure that includes both intuitions and concepts.

Concept-independency of intuitions and their priority to concepts lead us to accept a kind of Given. Claiming that concepts are formed through abstracting common marks without the help of empirical concepts assumes that what is common to several objects can be given in intuitions or can be conceived by understanding through abstracting what is found in intuitions on which concepts reflect. This is a typical case of the Given. This kind of a scenario is given and criticized by deVries and Triplett:

> Sellars's story of concept acquisition is quite different from the traditional abstractive theory. *Concepts* are primarily exercised in *judging*: To have the concept *F* is to be able to judge that something is *F*. The givenist holds that, even without having the concept *F*, we can epistemically aware of, *notice*, an *F* thing and from that awareness abstract the concept *F*. *Noticing* is often treated as a kind of minimally structured (but nevertheless epistemic) awareness. So the givenist holds that there is a subconceptual but still epistemic noticing on the basis of which we acquire concepts. (deVries and Triplett, 2000, p. 120)

If a nonconceptualist is trapped in such a givenist position, then a new strategy, for not to be trapped, may be to claim that what seems to be given is already conceptual. But, then, this strategy would be a sign of surrender for her accepting the most central idea of conceptualism. A similar route is taken by Kant, since he speaks of intuitive marks, which somehow pick out the marks peculiar to each individual object alone. Through

modification of the term “mark”, Kant enables such a use without violating the immediacy criterion. Yet, he cannot provide an explanation (or justification) for such a modification.

Against such claims from conceptualists, Allais says that:

> At the center of McDowell's rejection of the Myth of the Given is the idea that only what has conceptual content can be within the space of reasons, and can play a role in justifying beliefs. … Since relative non-conceptual content does not claim that the contents of perceptions have an intrinsically different structure from the content of beliefs, there is no obstacle to its allowing that perceptual experience has the kind of representational content it needs to be able to serve as reasons for belief... the role of intuitions in Kant's epistemology is not that which McDowell and Sellars want to deny sensation. I have suggested that when Kant says that it is through intuitions that objects are given to us, his concern with givenness is with the objects being directly presented to our consciousness, rather than with unprocessed mental data. The role of intuitions is not to provide sensory input that provides external “guidance” to our cognition (as perhaps may the role of sensations), but to present us with objects. (Allais, 2009, p. 400)

Allais' move includes two stages: (1) Intuitions are not sensations which provide sensory experiential intake and (2) Intuitions do not provide objects through those unprocessed mental data but function in presenting us with objects directly.

In favor of (1), Allais states in a more detailed fashion: “Although Kant is not entirely consistent in what he says about sensations, in the first *Critique* his dominant view seems to be that sensations are nonintentional or nonreferential; they do not themselves, present objects to the mind, but “refer to the subject as a modification of its state” (A320/B376)” (Allais, 2009, p. 398).

Then, the second point becomes prominent for it negatively states the way intuitions function but does not include a positive and solid description of the way intuitions function. Allais makes this negative aspect through making a distinction between intuitions and sensations. Somewhere else, she takes a similar route by making a distinction between intuitions and concepts: “Kant thinks that concepts alone cannot put us in direct cognitive contact with their objects because they are essentially general, and therefore, on their own, cannot secure reference to particular individual things” (Allais, 2009, p. 391).

Thus, there are two weak points of Allais strategy, one of them is the violation of the blindness thesis and the other is the unjustified way (that is negatively described)

intuitions present objects to us for cognition independent of concepts. Concerning the former, Allais accepts the weakness:

"In terms of Kant's initial presentation of the notion of intuition, probably the most obvious objection to my reading is Kant's famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind" (Allais, 2009, p. 392).

Empirical Intuitions as Appearance (of Objects)

One helpful remark for Allais and other nonconceptualists would be that intuitions can be taken into account as appearances of objects. Then what is represented and the representation can be identical, thus the direct relation between intuitions and appearances (*qua* objects) would be trivialized. I think this approach leads us to the most problematic attempt in favor of nonconceptualism.

At first, one is encountered with something before her. What stands before her is not an object of cognition yet. So, one needs a representation of it. This representation will become an object of the subject insofar it is an empirical cognition, then what is cognized would be a representation that is also objective in the sense that there is something that corresponds to this representation as real. In order to give a more detailed account, the terms "Objekt", "Ding" (thing), and "Gegenstand" need to be clarified[58]:

> The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point for reflection, which is not contained in the first. Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object [Objekt]; only what this word is to mean in case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects [Objekte], but rather only insofar as they designate an object [Objekt], requires a deeper investigation. Insofar as they are merely as representations, at the same time objects [Gegenstände] of consciousness, they do not differ from apprehension, i.e., from their being taken up into the synthesis of the imagination, and one must therefore say that the manifold of appearances is always successively generated

[58] By *Objekt*, I understand that Kant uses the term in order to refer to phenomenal objects (narrow sense of *objekt*) and sometimes to refer to all representations, together with the phenomenal objects (broad sense of *objekt*). By *Gegenstand*, however, Kant refers to any content of thought which is not contradictory. Thus, I understand that *Gegenstand*, in general, is broader than his use of *objekt*. Saying these, I also think that Kant, sometimes, uses these terms interchangeably. By *Ding*, I think that Kant means a being (an object), not merely in the sense of phenomenal objects but also things-in-themselves.

> in the mind. If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the object [Objekt]. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere." (*CPR*, A189-190/B234-5). As Smit says that "a thing (*Ding*, *res*) in the relevant sense is... not just anything, but something real (*etwas reales*). (Smit, 2000, p. 241)

If intuitions are taken to be identical with the Objekt that is real and that is also represented, then what intuitions provide for cognition would be nothing other than the cognizer's first object "out there". Then, as it seen, the more direct the intuition is the less it provides for cognition whereas if the impact of intuition in cognition would be increased, then the immediacy criterion would be violated.

Then, the role intuitions play in cognition is still in question. Nonconceptualist strategy deviates Kant's account into an empiricist one. However, Kant's critique is not directed merely to rationalist tradition. It is also addressed to empiricist conception of object and to that of representing.

Kant gives an example on the succession of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance and says that to know that whether the manifold of things-in-themselves is also successive is impossible:

> E.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now the question is whether the manifold of this house itself is also successive, which certainly no one will concede. Now, however, as soon as I raise my concept of an object to transcendental significance, the house is not a thing in itself at all but only an appearance, i.e., a representation, the transcendental object of which is unknown. (*CPR*, A190-1/B235-6)

In accordance with these lines, what is directly represented through sensibility might very well be the representation of the object, which, in turn, is identical with appearance of it. Since for our cognition, there is nothing other than appearances, the object in question that appears to us by itself through our intuitions would be identical with the singular representation, once it is guaranteed that this singular representation is objective in the sense that it is not merely a representation but also an appearance that is real. In this case, intuitions' would not have any role, since they do not have any effect on what is cognized other than merely being what is cognized. Then, concepts play their role

from the very beginning, ordering parts of the whole properly in order to cognize that object.

Since both intuitions and concepts can be thought as mental representations[59], the object in question would be a mental entity insofar as it is being represented is an appearance. If, in this appearance, there is not any conceptual complement or any conceptual character, then it would be impossible to be thought by understanding. This leads us to the Hegelian themes in Kantian philosophy as it is described by McDowell:

> Consider Kant's advance over Hume. Hume inherits from his predecessors a conception according to which no experience in its very nature, intrinsically, an encounter with objects. What Kant takes from Hume is that there is no rationally satisfactory route from such a predicament to the epistemic position that we are in (obviously in, we might say). Transcendental synthesis (or whatever) is not supposed to be such a route: the whole point of its being transcendental, in this context, is that it is not supposed to be something that we, our familiar empirical selves, go in for. It would be a mistake to think we can domesticate Kant's point by detranscendentalizing the idea of synthesis, so as to suggest that the idea of encountering objects is put in place by interpretation of data, perhaps by inference to the best explanation, with the interpretation being something we do, or at least something that might figure in a 'rational reconstruction' of our being in the epistemic position we are in. That would just be missing Hume's point. Kant does not miss Hume's point. He builds on it: since there is no rationally satisfactory route from experiences, conceived as, in general, less than encounters with objects, glimpses of objective reality, to the epistemic position we are manifestly in, experiences must be intrinsically encounters with objects. (McDowell, 1993, pp. 192-193)

What manifests itself as being an immediate relation with objects and being a path to take objective sensory experiential intake seems to be empirical intuitions. Yet, as I have previously tried to demonstrate, these roles of empirical intuitions explained retrospectively, through the analysis of the cognitions and through abstracting the seeming characteristics of concepts from cognitions what is left there seems to be some faculty that guarantees the objectivity of cognition and thus reality of the matter of cognition. However, this move is challenged by McDowell, by appealing to the characteristics of Kantian philosophy and with its relations between Lockean empiricism and Leibnizian rationalism. The paradigm of conceiving subject-object relations in terms

[59] "Mental representations are the means by which rational and other conscious animals refer to or describe items in their world for the purposes of cognition and intentional action." (Hanna, 2007, p. 42)

of mind-the thing "out there" seems to be misleading for the readers of Kant since as I quoted above according to him what seems to be "out there" is appearances not things-in-themselves, thus they are also constructs of pure intuitions and that of categories. As Smit points out "A thing [*Ding,res*] ... is not just anything, but something real (*etwas reales*): something whose *esse* is *not percipi*[60] but has its being, so that it can exist, outside of being represented" (Smit, 2000, p. 241).

As a condition of the application of concepts within cognitions, there must be conceptual elements already prior to understanding's process on the matter of cognition, if there is a part of cognition prior to thought. But this case is taken into account above. In accordance with the Hegelian themes that are stated implicitly in the texts, there is one (at least one) explicit remark and that is:

"The form of all our experiences is rational. All experiences have the form of reason, and without this they will not be experiences." (*The Blomberg Logic*, § 203-4).

This rational form of experiences not only comes from concepts but also exists prior to a specific process of understanding on appearances, otherwise, there would not be a conceptual role in cognition. Thus, it is evident that prior to a particular cognition there are conceptual elements in appearances, which can be conceived by concepts in empirical cognition.

Psychologistic Attack of Nonconceptualists

Against the lines above and others favoring the conceptuality of all cognitions and also of empirical intuitions, nonconceptualists use a psychologistic strategy, which I call as such, i.e., arguing against conceptualism in terms of concept-independent perceptions of children and that of other creatures.

Allais appeals one sort of these attacks:

> If a creature can discriminate a thing on the basis of redness, that might give us grounds to think that the distinct intrinsic quality of redness features in its experience, and in that sense that it perceives a red thing and it perceives the redness of the thing. But we need not think that it perceives the thing as *being red* in the sense that it recognizes the redness of the thing as a property that other

[60] In Latin, it literally means "whose existence is not perceived" (a reference to Berkeley's famous slogan *esse est percipi* – "to be is to be perceived").

> things could share. Without concepts, we cannot represent things as having general features. A crucial point that follows from this is that concepts are necessary to represent an object *as an object*. However, it does not follow from this that concepts are necessary to perceive particulars. (Allais, 2009, p. 401)

It is a strong attack on strong conceptualism, like the one advocated by John McDowell. However, there is a weak side of this argument for two reasons:

(1)- In the phrase "To perceive particulars" the word perceiving is used loosely. It deviates from the original use in the Kantian corpus.

(2)- It admits that in order to represent an object *qua* object, concepts are needed.

I will try to deal with these two one by one.

On (1). Perception is, according to Kant, empirical cognition which demands for both intuitions and concepts. Thus, without concepts, by definition, perception is impossible, at least in the Kantian sense of the word. And without representing objects *qua* objects, one cannot perceive particulars. What is perceived (here, I am using the word loosely) is merely an individual object as sign of a threat or that of something that must be reached, not "the redness of a thing", otherwise[61] what is perceived would be multiply instantiatable for "redness" being a common mark that can be shared by infinitely many objects.

On (2). Accepting the role of concepts as such contradicts with the first one since perceiving particulars is called by Kant experience, which is the same as empirical cognition.

In addition to these remarks, there is also textual evidences in accordance with what I said against this attack: "Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them" (*JL,* p. 645).

Besides that, a similar argument could be formulated concerning a child lacking a particular concept in a particular cognition just as in the case of the savage perceiving the house without having the concept of a house, thus perceives the house not *qua* a house. In this case, another textual evidence can be presented against this attack:

"The synthetic unity of consciousness is … an objective condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object but rather something

[61] "Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the function of thinking." (*CPR*, A91/B123).

under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me, since in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness" (*CPR*, B138).

Then, as it is seen from these lines, concepts are crucial not only in order to cognize an object but also for every intuitions becoming an object for consciousness. Thus, either explicitly or implicitly, concepts of objects must play their role in any empirical cognition.

Which One is Complementary: Concepts or Intuitions

In accordance with Kant's argument against the 'lowest concept' and against our practical inability to conceive all the possible predicates of an object, Smit gives a brief account of Kant on "The complete experience of an object":

> The "complete experience of the object" is a representation that determines an object in respect of all possible predicates of appearances and thus as a phenomenon. On Kant's account, such an objective content would be infinite and thus one that we, having finite minds, cannot have. Our concept of such a "complete experience" is, thus, a problematic concept, an idea: its object (like that of the cosmological idea of the world) cannot be given to us. Nonetheless, Kant holds that this idea is our idea of a thing as it appears, of a thing that is determined in respect of all possible predicates of appearances. (Smit, 2000, p. 251)

For complete experience of an object, Kant makes a restriction to concept not the other way around. I believe that this, by implication, shows that concepts are primary in empirical cognition of objects for concepts alone can uniquely describe and represent their objects. Yet, without a restriction by conventions or by reference to spatiotemporal relations our concepts cannot assure one to make claims about the existence of objects. This is where intuitions play their role, according to some textual evidences that I quoted in the second chapter. However, my claim is that that role of intuitions is not distinct from that of sensations other than their objectivity but I believe that intuitions' characteristic relation with objectivity[62] is given merely by definition.

[62] By *objectivity*, here, I mean being non subjective. Objectivity in this sense, according to Kant, is guaranteed by intuitions. But, there is another sense of objectivity, namely what is in question is of an object. For this, I think, concepts are needed.

Nonconceptualist Motives

Taking the side of nonconceptualists seems plausible and seems to in accord with common sense. Robert Hanna gives two important reasons for being a non-conceptualist:

> First, if our original encounter with the world is independent of concepts, then the prospects for some form of direct perceptual realism look good. Second, if Non-Conceptualism is true, then the prospects for a bottom-up theory of human rationality, according to which conceptual and other intellectual capacities, including those associated with practical reasoning, are at least partially explained in terms of more primitive psychological capacities shared with many non-human animals, also look good. (Hanna, 2007, p. 43)

Above, I tried to show that the second motive of nonconceptualism is in contradiction with Kant's account of empirical cognition. The former clearly contradicts with the central tenets of Kantian philosophy. According to Kant, even intuitions are not immediate, their immediacy is just a relative immediacy with respect to that of concepts, for having intuitive marks, which are also intuitions, and for being related to appearances through sensations.

What nonconceptualists (at least the ones that are a part of the discussion on Kantian intuitions) look for is primarily the immediate relation between representations and objects. Likewise, in her defense of nonconceptualism, Allais stresses on Kant's words on the mediacy of concepts by focusing on the role of common marks in this mediation. Furthermore, she also focuses on the role of intuitions in empirical cognition that cannot be played by concepts alone:

"Kant does not say just that intuitions are necessary for our being able to [be] presented with individual things, but that intuitions *are immediate, singular representations that give us objects*, and he distinguishes them from sensations" (Allais, 2009, p. 399).

Kant's distinction between sensations and intuitions does not depend on immediacy or singularity but on objectivity. Yet, how Kant distinguishes intuitions from concepts, as I believe, is not clear enough. Kant's notion of "intuitive marks" increases this confusion. Despite Allais' insistence on the immediacy of intuitions and on the

necessity of such an immediate representation in empirical cognition, once one thinks of intuitive marks and their potential generality that emerges when they are transformed into discursive marks, the claims on the necessity of an immediate element of cognition become groundless.

The former motive of nonconceptualism, as it is stated by Hanna, is to provide a way to relate cognitions with the world. In a similar fashion, conceptualists also seeks for such a way to relate cognitions with the world. McDowell's attempt is to find a ground on which both cognition and inherently conceptual relations with the world are found together:

> *That things are thus and so* is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment: it becomes the content of judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But *that things are thus and so* is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experiences as openness to the layout of reality. Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks. (McDowell, 1994, § 2, p. 26)

If intuitions can be conceived as containing conceptual content in itself, then the openness to the layout of reality would not be a problem. McDowell suggests a similar understanding of intuitions:

> We should understand what Kant calls "intuition" - experiential intake - not as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state that already has conceptual content. In experience one takes in, for instance sees, *that things are thus and so*. That is the sort of thing one can also, for instance, judge. (McDowell, 1994, §4, p. 9)

This move of McDowell, I believe, in accordance with Kantian subjective idealism but this idealism in McDowell's case is radicalized with respect to the regulative use of reason in the formation of appearances. Thus, this radicalization I think is valid but it does not seem compatible with Kantian conception of the things-in-themselves. In any case, since we as people do not have any access to that realm for our lack of intellectual intuitions this contradiction would not make any difference in terms of empirical cognitions. Furthermore, since for Kant both appearances and objects (as objects of representations which are representations themselves) are representations, McDowell's move seems to me loyal to Kant:

> This image of openness to reality is at our disposal because of how we place the reality that makes its impression on a subject in experience. Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. *That things are thus and so* is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, *that things are thus and so*, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world. (McDowell, 1994, § 2, p. 26)

This last remark of McDowell "that things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world" is in accordance with Kantian conception of objectivity, thus, I believe, it is valid in terms of fidelity to Kantian conception of cognition.

Arguments from Incongruent Counterparts: The Two Hands Argument (THA)

There is one final attack by nonconceptualists which is also stated explicitly by Kant, which is very challenging for conceptualist project, that is, the two hands argument:

> I shall call a body which is exactly equal and similar to another, but which cannot be enclosed in the same limits as the other, its incongruent counterpart. Now, in order to demonstrate the possibility of such a thing, let a body be taken consisting, not of two halves which are symmetrically arranged relatively to a single intersecting plane, but rather, say, a human hand. From all the points on its surface let perpendicular lines be extended to a plane surface set up opposite to it; and let these lines be extended the same distance behind the plane surface, as the points on the surface of the hang are in front of it; the ends of the lines, thus extended, constitute, when connected together, the surface of a corporeal form. That form is the incongruent counterpart of the first. In other words, if the hand in question is a right hand, then its counterpart is a left hand. The reflection of an object in a mirror rests upon exactly the same principles. For the object always appears as far behind the mirror as it is in front of it. Hence, the image of a right hand in the mirror is always a left hand. If the object itself consists of two incongruent counterparts, as the human body does if it is divided by means of a vertical intersection running from front to back, then its image is congruent with that object. That this is the case can easily be recognized if one imagines the body making half a rotation; for the counterpart of the counterpart of an object is necessarily congruent with that object.[63]

[63] Hanna, 2007, p. 53 from Kant, I., "Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of directions in space". In I. Kant, *Theoretical philosophy: 1755-1770* (pp. 365-372, Ak 2: 375-383) (D. Walford & R. Meerbote, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The descriptional content of this argument relies heavily on our intuition of space, thus it differs from empirical intuitions. As Hanna puts it "so by definition, there is no descriptive difference between incongruent counterparts" (Hanna, 2007, p. 55). The "right" and "left" as directions that cannot be made intelligible without having such an intuition (pure intuition, not an empirical one), the referents of these directions cannot be understood. Kant emphasizes the same point:

"... the difference between similar and equal things which are not congruent … cannot be made intelligible by any concept[64], but only by the relation to the right and left hands which immediately refers to intuition" (*Prolegomena*, § 13).

Any definition that could be ascribed to "right" and "left" would depend on certain places which to a certain initial place would be either at "left" or at "right", so this distinction could not be expressed in terms of any other things other than the directions themselves. I think that this is the strongest attack on the strong conceptualism, that ascribes conceptuality to any mental entity that one has. However, for my position, this attack has no relevance for my attack on nonconceptualism is restricted to empirical intuitions.

What is said through THA is that the information about locations, directions, movements flow through, independent of concepts, intuitions. In order to form empirical cognition, concepts are needed. But it also shows that there are some elements of cognition that cannot be reduced to concepts, like spatiotemporal relations among objects.

When it comes to flow of information through sensorimotor subjectivity, there is a room for nonconceptual consciousness as Hanna successfully shows:

"Sensorimotor subjectivity is non-conceptual consciousness precisely because all sensorimotor-subjective states contain essentially non-conceptual information. By contrast, as Kant explicitly held in the Transcendental Analytic, self-consciousness is *conceptual consciousness* precisely because to be self-conscious is to be able to make reflexive judgments about one's own mental states and to possess … a concept of oneself" (Hanna, 2007, p. 60).

[64] "The difference between right and left is a difference in the arrangement of parts of a representation; hence, it must be ascribed to the structure of an intuitive representation rather than to concepts." (Wilson, 1975, p. 255).

Apart from lacking concepts in the proper sense, animals also lack self-consciousness, thus lack conceptual consciousness which lead them to lack empirical cognition, or cognition in general. Apart from pure intuitions or from pure forms of intuitions, there are no intuitions (no empirical cognitions) that are independent of concepts.

Conclusion

Having empirical cognitions, i.e. experience in the Kantian sense, one needs both 'empirical intuitions' and concepts. Since empirical cognition consists of empirical judgments, concepts are necessary to have empirical cognitions. The role of 'intuitions' is to relate the cognition with the world, that is why Kant ascribes them immediacy and for the same reason they must be related with objects. I believe that this relation depends on the presence of concepts. What intuitions provide for cognitions are either singularity (in this case those intuitions can be thought as a special sort of concepts) or experiential intake (in this case these intuitions differ from sensation merely by being objectively valid – which emerges when concepts are abstracted from empirical cognitions since concepts themselves cannot provide the ground for objectivity for merely thinking of an object does not guarantee its existence). For these reasons, I believe that in cognition we do not need an additional element like empirical intuitions. Their immediacy, as it is shown in the second chapter of my thesis, is problematic for there are intuitive marks which themselves are also intuitions and when it comes to their singularity there is no justification or explanation for it other than defining them as such.

Without empirical intuitions, the only grounds of nonconceptual mental content are pure intuitions and sensations. I think this does not violate any central building blocks of Kantian philosophy if empirical intuitions are conceived as I offer.

Since both illusions and truths depend on the process of understanding in judgment, the objectivity also depends on the application of rules of understanding on sensations. As Kant says:

> Truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not

> judge at all. Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relations of the object to our understanding." (*CPR*, A294/B)

Then, the extract of empirical cognition does not necessarily imply that objectivity merely comes from empirical intuitions. As it is shown in the second chapter, concepts are also play their role in correction of our empirical claims about the world. Since the products of imagination can also play their role instead of empirical intuitions, this correction procedure is crucial in having empirical cognition.

In a similar fashion with the concept-independency of pure intuitions, the exercise of categories are also independent of sensations and that of 'intuitions' (of both empirical and pure ones). Through this exercise of categories what is given by experiential intake become a part of intelligible empirical cognitions:

"Because Kant begins with the distinction between concept and intuition assumed, the categories appear only to belong to us and not to the world. The categories make the 'intuitive sensory given' intelligible, we require them to experience the manifold" (Lumsden, 2003, pp. 43-44).

For this reason, what McDowell says concerning the compatibility of empirical content with the requirements of understanding is valid:[65]

> it appears that in the context of the transcendental ideality of space and time, the very idea of objects as they are given to our senses has to be seen as reflecting a subjective imposition. And if that is right, the most Kant can claim to have established is that there is no *extra* subjective imposition involved in demanding that a world empirically knowable by us conform to the requirements of understanding. (McDowell, 2009, p. 77)

On the contribution of empirical intuition to empirical cognition, it is said that it facilitates the transition from thinking of an object to cognition an object. Since the distinction between sensations and the some of the empirical intuitions depends on the objectivity of the judgments, and considering the role of understanding in correction of images produced by sensibility and approval of the representations, there is no

[65] For a similar remark: "we perceive things not only as red and apples, but also as substances, as having qualities, and as standing in causal relations. But that our perceptual experience has representational content in the first place is not due to the particular ways that we associated our representations, but rather to the consciousness of normativity in those associations. So while the specific representational contents of our perceptions can be ascribed to our sensibility, it is understanding which is responsible for these perceptions' having representational content." (Ginsborg, 2008, p. 76).

ontological gap between these two act of mind on object: “There is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one things truly, what one thinks is what is the case” (McDowell, 1994, §3, p. 27).

CHAPTER IV

THE SINGULAR USE OF CONCEPTS & THE SINGULAR CONCEPTS

My reading of Kant as a weak conceptualist leads me to conceive singular terms in terms of concepts. In *The Blomberg Logic*, Kant explicitly used the term 'singular concept' as mental counterparts for singular terms in the subject positions of singular judgments. Later on, however, in the critical period, because of his radical change against Leibnizian tradition and of his endeavor to think of concepts as by definition general, he accepted that not concept themselves but their uses can be classified as universal, particular, and singular. Though he explicitly speaks of such a change in his conception of concepts, he does not give examples of singular uses of concepts other than the ones that once are given for the use of singular concepts in singular judgments. Moreover, he did not write anything concerning how the singular use of concepts and singular concepts can be distinguished. First, this situation led to me to think of this change as mere a change in terminology for there is nothing more that is explicitly said. But, later, when I think of the referential uses of indefinite descriptions and that of definite descriptions, I came up with the idea that, at the expense of being disloyal to Kant's account of concepts, to render definite descriptions and proper names as singular concepts, the referential uses of indefinite descriptions as singular uses of concepts and non-referential uses of indefinite descriptions as other uses that are said to be universal and particular uses (which are out of the scope of my thesis). I deal with indexicals as contextual signifiers which modify the uses of linguistic counterparts of concepts and argue against the possibility of any sort of linguistic counterpart of intuitions.

In this chapter, I will begin with the arguments against the claim that intuitions are the singular terms of Predicate Calculus, and that they can be rendered as singular terms in general. In addition to that I will also claim that neither concepts nor intuitions are linguistic entities, by saying that they are irreducibly mental entities.

Following these arguments, I will give a brief account of Kant on singular

concepts in his pre-critical period. Afterwards, I will give my account of singular use of concepts and that of singular concepts.

Kantian Representations are not Linguistic Entities

Both Kantian representations and their combination, namely judgments are not linguistic entities. In accordance with this idea, neither representations are terms nor their combinations, judgments are propositions or sentences.

The distinction between mental entities and linguistic entities are implied throughout the Kantian corpus by his use of the terms 'sentence' (and/or 'proposition' for both of these words Kant uses "*Satz*"), and 'judgments' (*Urteil*) separately. In addition to that his use of the terms 'term' ("*Term*"), 'concept' ("*Begriff*"), 'intuition' ("*Anschauung*"), 'use of concepts' ("*usus conceptuum*") by implication shows that what is in his mind is that elements of cognition (intuitions and concepts, and representations in general) are different from their linguistic counterparts. Since the categories and the pure forms of intuitions are, by definition, prior to any cognition, they must be merely mental entities.

When it comes to empirical concepts and empirical intuitions, it is evident that intuitions do not contain any differentiae that can be conceived or understood, thus, they are not linguistic entities. However, empirical concepts can be understood and expressed in terms of linguistic tools. The same is true for judgments and the way they are referred through propositions and sentences.

As it is said in previous chapters, all representations are mental entities which can also be appearances themselves but they are not linguistic entities. These fact is neglected by Hintikka, Parsons, and by Sellars since they all take intuitions as singular terms, where as concepts as general terms. Though, as I claim here, concepts can be referred through singular and general terms, intuitions cannot be referred, nor represented by linguistic entities, nor can they be used in language.

Both Hintikka and Parsons takes intuitions as singular terms of the Predicate Calculus, but "no singular term of the Predicate Calculus conforms to Kant's use of 'intuition'. In particular then, no singular term can conform to Kant's singularity criterion" (Wilson, 1975, p. 252).

I agree with Wilson and Smit[66] on their critique of Hintikka's and Parson's attempt to take singular terms of the Predicate Calculus as confirming to Kantian intuitions. But, unlike Wilson, I claim that singular terms cannot conform to Kant's use of 'intuition' not because singular terms cannot conform to Kant's singularity criterion but because they cannot conform to the immediacy criterion. The reason for this is the mediacy that is inherent in language.

In addition to these, attributing referential use to intuitions would violate their immediacy for they cannot be given descriptively. If intuitions could be given descriptively, since it can easily be shown that any description includes conceptual contents as its parts, then it would turn out that intuitions are mediated by concepts. But, this conclusion evidently false with respect to Kantian conception of intuitions. Furthermore, Robert Hanna defines intuitions' immediacy through their not being descriptively referential entities: "An intuition is thus immediate precisely because it is non-descriptively referential" (Hanna, 2006, p. 197).

Intuitions for lacking a descriptive content (and/or a conceptual content) according to what is said explicitly by Kant, there is no room for intuitions as singular terms as definite and/or indefinite descriptions. Then, one might argue that intuitions as singular terms could be proper names. In this case, I think a problem emerges because of the textual evidences from Kantian corpus.

Intuitions and Singular Terms

In his pre-critical period, Kant thought that there are singular concepts which can be represented by proper names and definite descriptions (by implication, since he thought that common or general concepts can be represented by indefinite descriptions). In his pre-critical period, Kant writes in *Logic Blomberg* (1771) that

> All *conceptus* are either A. *conceptus singularis* or B. *conceptus communes*.
>
> In the former I think only one thing, but through the latter I go further, namely, I think that which is common to many things. Thus the former concepts consider something individual. Thus, e.g., Rome, Bucephalus, etc. This is *conceptus singulares.* The latter, on the other hand, are concerned with a

[66] "Jaakko Hintikka ascribes to Kant the view that an intuition is simply a singular representation, the counterpart of a singular term in the latter's system of representations." (Smit, 2000, p. 237)

> *complexus* of many individual things, thus, e.g., a city, a 4-footed animal, etc. A man, that is a *conceptus communis*. The representations of immediate experience are all *conceptus singulares,* for they represent individual things. Mediate concepts of experience, however, which are abstracted from many experiences, are *conceptus communes*; so, too, are all our concepts of reason." (§ 260).[67]

But, later in the critical period, Kant writes in *JL* that "It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts – a mistake that is grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into *universal*, *particular*, and *singular.* Concepts themselves cannot be so divided, but only *their use*" (*JL*, § 1, footnote 2). However, to think of *critical* Kant describing *singular concepts* of the pre-critical period as intuitions would be misleading. Because, neither concepts nor intuitions are not linguistic entities and intuitions cannot be represented in language through singular terms for they are in the realm of language which includes reflection. So, through the transition from the pre-critical period to the critical period, both singular concepts and singular terms as representing singular concepts had disappeared. To most loyal interpretation of the conception of singular terms in Kant's critical period, I think to be the singular use of concepts, but not singular concepts.

Despite this textual evidence and my interpretation, one might insist on that what was once singular concepts might have become intuitions and thus the examples that are given for singular concepts might be valid for intuitions. To this I will appeal to another textual evidence that belongs to Kant's critical period.

> By virtue of the fact that in immediate inferences only the form of judgments is altered and not in any way the matter, these inferences differ essential from all mediate inferences, in which the judgments are distinct *as to matter* too, since here a new concept must be added as mediating judgment or as middle concept (*terminus medius*) in order to deduce the one judgment from the other. If I infer, e.g., All men are mortal, hence Caius is mortal too, this is not an immediate inference. For here I need for the deduction the mediating judgment, Caius is man; through this new concept, however, the matter of the judgments is altered. (*JL*, § 44)

One can still say that despite the mediacy among judgments, there is no explicit remark saying that the term in the subject position of a singular judgment must be a concept. For

[67] In the *Dissertation* of 1770, the concepts of time and space are said to be singular and intuitions." (Wilson, 1975, p. 250)

this, I appeal to another textual evidence:

"In the singular judgment, finally, a concept that has no sphere at all is enclosed, merely as part then, under the sphere of another" (*JL*, § 21).

What is contained in the other, in a singular judgment, is the one that fills out the subject position in the proposition that expresses that judgment. Then, it can be seen that there is a concept, whose extension has at most one object, "is enclosed, merely as part then, under the sphere of another (which fills out the predicate positions)".

This, I think, is sufficient to show that even in his critical period, subject position of singular judgments cannot be filled by intuitions, for as I have said earlier, intuitions cannot be represented by means of linguistic entities.

In either periods of Kant, there is no an explicit example showing that intuitions can be thought as proper names or as singular terms. But, in *The Blomberg Logic*, though it belongs to his pre-critical period, makes a distinction between the 'lowest concepts' and singular ones:

"For a *conceptus singularis*, even if it is immediately subordinated to another *conceptus communis*, is not a species. E.g., if, under the learned, I think of Herr von Wolff, this is not longer a species [is will not be an example of *infima species*], but instead an *individuum* [an individual]" (*The Blomberg Logic*, § 261). Then, Kant tries to restrict the use of singular concepts to objects not to representations that are under genus and thus can be thought as *infima species* which is somehow immediately related with objects.

Other than textual evidences, Thompson gives another argument for intuitions' not being proper names:

> For apart from concepts an object is merely a spatiotemporal something correlated with a *given* intuition, so that restricted to our intuitive cognitions we cannot speak of applying and reapplying the same object. Hence, if we take proper names as linguistic representations solely of our intuitions we cannot speak of applying and reapplying the same name. When we speak thus we treat names as conceptual rather than intuitive representations. Names can be applied, reapplied, and misapplied; so can concepts, but not intuitions. (Thompson, 1972, p. 328)

If these lines can be considered along with the lines I wrote in the second chapter of this thesis, it can be seen that

(1) For intuitions are not *of objects*, they cannot be considered as singular terms. (I argued for this in the second and third chapter of this thesis)

(2) For intuitions cannot be applied, reapplied, and misapplied, they cannot be proper names. (Thompson argues for this)

(3) For intuitions are non-descriptively referential, they cannot be thought as singular terms. (Robert Hanna argues for this)

(4) For intuitions do not include any mark other than intuitive marks (which cannot be described or referred *qua* intuitive marks), they cannot contain conceptual content, which, in turn, prevents their use in the realm of language. (This argument is based on Hegelian account of language, even indexicals are thought to be general terms that can be used singularly in a particular context. Wilson has a similar strategy).

Against Hintikka and Parsons, Wilson[68] argues for (3) and (4) as:

> But neither demonstratives nor proper names can function as formal counterparts of Kantian intuitions for the same reason that definite descriptions cannot – namely, their conceptuality... Demonstratives such as 'this' and 'the … here' are construed in Kantian logic as giving concepts a singular use in judgments in order to enable one to use a (general) concept to refer to a single object of that kind. (Wilson, 1975, p. 251)

Robert Howell also takes a similar course with Robert Hanna and Kirk Dallas Wilson:

> Contrary to Hintikka, I think it is reasonably clear that definite descriptions are for Kant concepts, not intuitions. To apply a definite description surely is to subsume an object under a concept, and Kant says at B 68 and elsewhere that intuitions can occur independently of any act of thinking (subsuming individuals under concepts). (Howell, 1973, p. 210)

But, Howell argues against Hegelian account of demonstratives, as Smit puts it:

"[Howell] suggests, Kant complements his strict definition of intuition's immediacy with a positive conception of this immediacy, analogous to the contemporary notion of the direct reference had by demonstrative terms." (Smit, 2000, p. 238).

Wilson's argument for (3) and (4) do not include my move (1):

> Proper names cannot represent Kantian intuitions, for proper names are eliminable in the Predicate Calculus in favour of general terms (representations

[68] Wilson argues against Parsons in favor of the singularity criterion: "Parsons is correct in pointing out that definite descriptions are singular but that they designate by means of conceptual representations... This identification [identification of intuitions with definite descriptions] would amount to conceiving of intuitions in terms of conceptual singularity." (Wilson, 1975, p. 251).

> of concepts) and variables of quantification. Interpreting intuitions as proper names would reduce intuitions in principle to conceptual representations. That such a reduction would be misguided is seen from the fact that one cannot make a judgment about Wilson by just possessing the proper name 'Wilson'. An intuition of Wilson is still required. Indeed, the use of proper names shares common features with the use of concepts, features that distinguish proper names from intuitions. As with conceptual representations, it makes sense to talk about the application, reapplication, and misapplication of names. But since intuitions are means by which objects are given (A50=B74), they are not *applied* to objects; therefore, they cannot be reapplied or misapplied. (Wilson, 1975, p. 252)

I think the reason for this, namely the reason for Wilson to say that "one cannot make a judgment about Wilson by just possessing the proper name 'Wilson'. An intuition of Wilson is still required", is that he makes a parallel between Russell's knowledge by acquaintance and Kantian empirical intuition. In terms of their non-descriptive character, there is such a link between the two, but empirical intuitions do not have a role other than their role in providing the ground for instantiation of concepts objectively (which differs them from products of imagination and sensations). Possessing a proper name, as it is understood by Wilson, is merely the ability to hear and utter the word for that proper name. However, possessing a proper name, I believe, is possessing the ability to know for whom it stands either descriptively (perhaps, through knowledge by testimony) or non-descriptively merely by knowing the subject for whom that proper name stands. Through having sensations indicating that there is such a person before me having that name, I think, is enough to know for whom that name stands without any further description.

The Relation between Concepts and Intuitions in Judgments

Judgments can be expressed through sentences. In this case, the predicate term of the judgment must be always a word referring to a concept. One might expect what refers to intuitions to be the subject term of such judgments. The subject term can refer to a concept, which is, by definition, evident. Against this expectancy, I argue that intuitions cannot be referred by the subject terms of judgments[69].

[69] "The subject term in 'Caius is mortal' may not represent an intuition but rather a concept used to form the subject of a singular judgment. Unfortunately, Kant never makes clear exactly what he means by

Within empirical cognition, concepts and intuitions are combined. By the contribution of intuitions, one is assured of the existence of the object thought in order to cognize that objects. However, the uniqueness of the object depends on the presence and on the role of concepts (of understanding). Since I have discussed these points in great detail in both the second and third chapters, I will now focus on the possibility of singular concepts within the Kantian corpus.

Are Singular Concepts Possible within the Kantian Corpus?

Robert Hanna makes a distinction between two kinds of individual [singular] concepts:

> (1) Individual concepts that pick out one and only one object in the actual world or in an arbitrarily chosen possible world, but that can nevertheless pick out different particular objects in different possible worlds; [Hanna calls this sort of individual concepts an 'accidentally individual concept' (AIC)]
> (2) Individual concepts that pick out the self-same particular object in every possible world. [Hanna calls this sort of them an 'essentially individual concept' (EIC)]. (Hanna, 2001, p. 204)

Concepts of the second sort are definitely the ones that Kant avoids their use for their correspondence with Leibniz's 'complete individual notion' or 'haecceity' (Hanna, 2001, p. 204).

The first one seems to be fine candidate to conform to the Kantian picture of concepts. Since EICs would violate one of the central tenets of Kantian philosophy, namely the mediacy of concepts and in addition to that there would be no need to speak of such representations as empirical intuitions. Hanna neatly puts it: "If Kant does accept their [EIC's] existence, then there will be the possibility of eliminating all intuitions in favor of EICs. For by hypothesis the EIC plays the same semantic role as the intuition – namely, to pick out a single individual rigidly – across all possible set of circumstances" (Hanna, 2001, p. 205).

When it comes to AICs, Hanna says that accepting their existence would not lead us to such problems within the Kantian corpus: "Kant's acceptance of the existence of AICs does not imply the possibility of semantically eliminating intuitions, because the

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giving a concept a singular use." (Thompson, 1972, pp. 317-18)

application of those concepts to objects is always logically parasitic upon the existence of intuitions" (Hanna, 2001, p. 205).

In Hanna's account of the possible scenarios, there is a confusion which stems from the equivocal use of empirical intuitions and that of the pure forms of intuitions (namely, space and time). If one accepts EICs, then all intuitions would be eliminable, but when it comes to accept AICs, then empirical intuition *qua* empirical intuitions could be eliminable. In the first case, what is at stake is intuitions as a whole, but in the second case, AICs would not be logically parasitic upon the existence of empirical intuitions for they can pick out different particular objects without the need of empirical intuitions (I tried to explain the outcomes of such a move in the second and third chapters).

Kant, in fact, accepts such concepts by labeling them as 'singular use of concepts' for their relation with objects are singular depending upon the context and/or on convention. Kant's name for such a use is 'a concrete use' of a concept (*JL*, §16). Through this concrete use, concepts can uniquely refer to their objects within the restriction and on the ground that both of which depend on convention and/or context.

As it is shown by Thompson, there is no room for intuitions in the subject position of singular judgments and my account of the singular use of concepts (and/or the elimination of empirical intuitions) is completely compatible what is said below:

> He [Kant] speaks of "the concept of the subject" of a singular judgment and contrasts it with a general concept (A 71 = B 96). It is clear that he is thinking of a concept in this case that is represented in language by a proper name. In the Dialectic (A 322 = B 378) he gives 'Caius is mortal' as an example of a syllogistic premise, and in his *Logic* (§ 21) [*JL*, § 21], he uses the same sentence as an example of a singular judgment. There is no doubt that the judgment in this case is empirical... Intuitions contrast with concepts as singular with general or discursive representations (§ 1), and again as completely determinate cognitions (*Erkenntnisse*) with cognitions whose logical determination can never be taken as final (§ 15, Note). It would seem to follow that a proper name as the subject of a singular judgment must represent an intuition ≠ a concept, but this conclusion is rendered doubtful by other remarks Kant makes in the *Logic*. (Thompson, 1972, p. 331)

Singular Use of Concepts vs. Singular Concepts

Under this subtitle, I will show that once we accept that definite descriptions that serve

as singular terms are singular concepts (that are not EICs) and that singular use of concepts can be thought as anaphoric uses of definite descriptions and indefinite descriptions. My aim is to make such a distinction which is compatible with generality of concepts, which may transform to logically singular concepts and the distinction (in the texts of the pre-critical period) between singular concepts and general concepts.

In this attempt, I will mention what I call *quantificational ambiguity* and give examples from other texts that include different implications of some ambiguous sentences. Then, I will recall some examples and analyze them in the distinction between *hearer-old* and *hearer-new* objects. After doing this, I will bring a linguistic phenomenon called *anaphora* and analyze *the problematic anaphoras*. I will use this phenomenon as an evidence for the referential use of indefinite descriptions, which is also for the singular use of concepts. Considering the ambiguities in these examples, I will get assistance from Latin language and compare some sentences in Latin with their translations in English to show the absence of a certain type of pronoun gives rise to such ambiguities. Then, I will try to show the similarities between the referential use of indefinite descriptions and the singular use of concepts, and that between the definite descriptions and singular concepts.

Russell says that there are two sorts of descriptions: definite and indefinite descriptions. He defines them, in his text (*Descriptions* which is an extract from Chapter XVI of Russell's *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*), through their morphological appearances in their use:

"An indefinite description is a phrase of the form 'a so-and-so', and definite description is a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular)" (Russell, 1919, p.1). In what sense are these indefinite and indefinite given by examples by Russell? He gives "I met a man" as an answer to the question "who did you meet?", as an example of an indefinite description. In this respect, 'I met a man' is an indefinite description for the identity of the person that the speaker met is not mentioned. What is uttered is not 'I met Jones', or 'I met Bertrand Russell' but any of these could be the case, if Lord Russell would not have been passed away.

If the assertion that 'I met a man' is true (by saying that it is true, I mean that there is someone that I have met and it is a man), then this case is analyzed by Russell as

such:

> It is clear that what I assert is not 'I met Jones'. I may say 'I met a man, but it was not Jones'; in that case, though I lie, I do not contradict myself, as I should do if when I say I met a man I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that the person to whom I am speaking can understand what I say, even if he is a foreigner and has never heard of Jones. (Russell, 1919, p. 1)

Russell thinks that for the indefinite article 'a/an' is used for individually existent things while it does not refer to a definite object but the object is ambiguously described (for instance, being a man not anything else), he takes another example that includes a mythical entity to show that the indefinite description has no referential use, i.e. it does not denote anything but it can be used as a part of a propositional function:

> Indeed the statement ('I met a man') would remain significant, though it could not possibly be true, even if there were no man at all. 'I met a unicorn' or 'I met a sea-serpent' is a perfectly significant assertion, if we know what it would be to be a unicorn or a sea-serpent, i.e. what is the definition of these fabulous monsters. Thus it is only what we may call the *concept* that enters into the proposition. In the case of 'unicorn', for example, there is only the concept: there is not also, somewhere among the shades, something unreal which may be called 'a unicorn'. (Russell, 1919)

Through this example, Russell states that this use of indefinite description does not denote to any particular individual but a concept which can also be a predicate of an existent thing as in the example 'I met a man' or that cannot be a predicate of anything but still be a concept which is somehow described as in the example 'I met a unicorn'.

Then for Russell, despite the grammatical analysis, 'I met Jones' and 'I met a man' are not same logically. And furthermore 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is human' are also not same logically. “The *is* of 'Socrates is human' expresses the relation of subject and predicate; the *is* of 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity... The identity in “Socrates is a man” is identity between an object named and an object ambiguously described” (Russell, 1919).

Besides the ambiguity arises in this use, the object is somehow described by the use of an indefinite description. The thing that is indefinite is the individual which shares the same quality (being a man) with other individuals. Russell does not think, though the object is ambiguously described, that through the sentence 'I met a man' an object is referred. The indefinite description here is used for Russell as a part of a propositional

function. I will challenge to this view through examples later on.

Degrees of Definiteness

Russell makes the distinction between definite descriptions and indefinite descriptions with respect to a concept, uniqueness, as such: “The only thing that distinguishes 'the so-and-so' from 'a so-and-so' is the implication of uniqueness”, and he continues “We cannot speak of 'the inhabitant of London, because inhabiting is an attribute which is not unique” (Russell, 1919). But, we can use both 'a man' and 'the man' in sentences.

Russell states that whatever exists is definite. It is sure that what exists must be definite for being something other than both being nothing and being another thing. What exists is definitely a part of reality and is different from other things that are also parts of the reality (how one defines reality is not the issue here). For being an individual, the thing must have some certain qualities and through these the thing in question can be identified from its environment (not in a physical sense necessarily but also in sense that for everything can be a part of a set that is defined in a certain way, then it must be in an environment in which the other things must be similar to that thing. But still for being an individual – and unique – it must be possible to distinguish the thing from other things).

Since everything that exists is definite, and has certain qualities that may serve for the identification of that thing, there are various combinations of these qualities. For there is a multitude of them, there must be degrees of their combinations. One may distinguish a man from a chair by only using the quality of being man though this quality could not serve well to distinguish him from another man. Let us say that there is a room in which there are a multitude of pens, each of which is in different colors and a man using them. Then the man can be distinguished from other things in the room for being a man, but by the quality of being a pen we cannot distinguish any pen among others and for that we need to mention its color as well.

Let us give another example. Let there be a business center in which there is only one man. And two women are chatting about their affairs in the building. One of them

works in the building and the other is a friend of the former. When the latter says that 'I met a man working in his desk in your building', the former will understand who she is talking about. And let the speaker would not know that there is only one man working in that building. Then, the use of the noun phrase 'a man' would be sufficient to define the object that is in question. If it would be the case that there are two men in the building, one of which was referred by the two in a previous conversation for being handsome. Then the woman talking about him can easily refer to that man by saying 'I met the man that is very handsome' and in this case using the noun phrase 'a man' would be insufficient to refer to that man. According to the context in which the object is taken under consideration and according to the context in which the speaker and the auditor are involved in a conversation the degree of definiteness of the phrases can vary.

Referential Use of Indefinite Descriptions

The distinction between referential use and attributive use is given by Keith Donnellan (in the paper, namely *Reference and Definite Descriptions*) and, there, though no referential use is attributed to indefinite descriptions, the referential use is defined as:

"I shall say that in this use the speaker uses the definite description to *refer* to something, and call this the "referential use" of a definite description"[70](Donnellan, 1966).

In conjunction with this definition, I use the similar aspect of indefinite descriptions and call this the "referential use" of an indefinite description.

Quantificational Ambiguity[71]

In some uses of indefinite descriptions an ambiguity arises. I call this quantificational ambiguity for in these uses the definite description implies more than one interpretation

[70] Keith Donnellan, *Reference and Definite Descriptions*, 1966.

[71] Janet Dean Fodor and Ivan A. Sag do similar observations of this ambiguity in *Referential and Quantificational Indefinites*, Linguistics and Philosophy, 1982.

of the sentence each of which differ from another quantitatively. In some other cases, the quantity that is implied is clear. I will try to explain this by listing some examples[72]:

I) A horse is in the sandbox.

II) A horse is a mammal.

III) A cowboy works in the west.

IV) A bolt in your Volvo will rust.

Among these examples for the first pair the quantificational implications of the uses of indefinite descriptions are clear. We can translate I as ‘some horse is in the sandbox’ or more properly ‘there is at least one horse in the sandbox’. But we cannot translate II as the first one. The proper translation of this one is ‘all horses are mammals’ or ‘if a thing is horse, then it is also a mammal’.

Because of the quantificational ambiguity, the second pair gives rise to two different translations for each. III can be translated as both ‘there is at least one cowboy working in the west’ and ‘all cowboys work in the west’, or ‘if someone is cowboy, then he works in the west’. There are apparently different in meaning. IV can also be translated in two different versions that are similar the ones for III: ‘At least one bolt in your Volvo will rust’ or ‘all bolts in your Volvo will rust’. These examples show that indefinite descriptions can be used quantificationally and are used for different quantities, and moreover their use can lead to ambiguities. It can be seen that only the first use in a certain context can refer to a particular thing.

Hearer-Old vs. Hearer-New

Recalling Russell's example 'I met a man', now, I can introduce the difference between two types of objects: hearer-old and hearer-new. When I say to my friend that 'I bought a car' then the car that I bought is new to my friend and if she would wait patiently, I can show her the car. In this utterance, the car that I bought is a hearer-new and when I say to my lecturer that 'I have written the paper', the paper that I wrote, he would understand about which paper I am talking about, and this is an example of hearer-old.

[72] These examples are taken from George Wilson, *On Definite and Indefinite Descriptions*, The Philosophical Review 1978.

In both pairs of the examples (the one with definite article and the other with indefinite article), what I am talking about is definite and I refer to a definite object, to an individual; and the only difference between them is the knowledge of the hearer. One can also refer to a hearer-old entity by using an indefinite description:

This use, however, is different from the aforementioned example ('A certain person came by to see you this afternoon') since in this case the phrase 'a certain person' is not referring to the same person at each time necessarily for it is not fixed by a certain person, its referent may change according to the context in which it is used. But in the example mentioned above, it seems to me Jones is identified by the phrase 'a convicted embezzler' and thus the noun phrase is fixed by Jones. Hence, these are different cases for the referential use of indefinite descriptions.

An Evidence for Referential Use: Anaphora

There are two types of anaphora: problematic and unproblematic anaphora (I borrowed this nomenclature from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Through examples these can be seen:

-John left. He said he was ill. (Unproblematic anaphora)

-An anthropologist discovered the skeleton called "Lucy". He named the skeleton after a Beatles' song. (Problematic anaphora)[73]

The first one is unproblematic for it is clear that the pronoun 'he' refers definitely to John in the previous sentence. And in all of this kind of anaphora the pronoun is used to refer to name that appeared in a previous sentence. The second one is only a type of unproblematic anaphora, i.e. there are other types among the unproblematic anaphoras as well but for the purpose of this paper I will not mention them since they are irrelevant.

The problem arises from the second type of sentences for pronouns are used, without discussion, to refer to individuals whereas the referential use of indefinite descriptions is controversial. So when a pronoun is used to refer to an individual that is not referred by a name or a definite description, there occurs a problematic anaphora.

[73] These examples are taken from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anaphora/

Let me give some other examples[74]:

-A secretary will be hired today. She will start immediately.

-A drug addict spent the night here. He left a syringe behind.

In all of these examples, by indefinite descriptions, a certain individual is referred that is known to the speaker. And also the appearance of the pronouns 'he' and 'she' shows that the referents are individuals. These examples are, typically, used commonly. I think the uses of the pronouns as such are evidence for the referential use of indefinite descriptions.

The need for the use of indefinite descriptions as such can differ from context to context and due to the intention of the speaker. Some contexts are aforementioned. To give another example supposes that I have met a man yesterday and I am telling you this by the sentence 'I met a man'. I will also continue speaking about him, but since when I have met him, I did not know who he was for that reason I am trying to be loyal to the original scenario and I do not give further information in that sentence, leaving this to succeeding sentences. Then, in my first utterance (I met a man) I refer to someone who is definite for me and who he is will become definite also for the auditor in succeeding sentences but not for the moment I uttered the sentence above. Since the person is definite for me, and I introduced one of his descriptions (the person that I have met, being an object of my action), later, I will refer to him for I want the auditor can understand about which person I will speak.

There is also another ambiguity that arises from the lack of a pronoun in English (the reflexive pronoun that is present in many languages, especially in Romanesque Languages – like French, Italian, Latin) and the compensation of this lack by personal pronouns 'he', 'she', 'it', 'they'. Let us see this difference by comparing two languages in two examples (English and Latin)[75]:

1- *Cicero laudavit amicum suum* (Cicero praised his own friend)

2- *Cicero laudavit amicum eius* (Cicero praised the friend of one of another person – this person is referred by the pronoun 'he').

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[74] These examples are taken from Villy Rouchota, *On Indefinite Descriptions*, Journal of Linguistics, 1994.

[75] The examples in Latin are taken from a Latin textbook, namely *Wheelock's Latin* written by Frederic M. Wheelock, edited by Richard A. LaFleur, 6th edition, p. 84.

So the English sentence 'Cicero praised his friend' is ambiguous for the pronoun 'he' may refer to Cicero or somebody else.

Also in the examples above, in the succeeding sentences the pronouns may refer to someone else as well. Once there is no such ambiguity, I think, they refer to the person who is referred previously by an indefinite description.

One argument against this view is that the indefinite descriptions in the former sentences of the examples mentioned above, are used quantificationally and by the use of the pronouns in the succeeding sentences are used referentially. But I think this thesis is not peculiar to these examples, so, here, there is no need for a special attention.

It can be seen from the discussion on the referential uses of indefinite descriptions, which has the form of 'a thing having such and such' or 'a thing being such and such'. These forms are similar to the form of Kant's general concepts, such as 'a man', 'a house'. Then, their referential uses can be conceived as singular use of concepts, while securing the use of singular concepts, like Herr von Wolff, the philosopher that wrote *Critique of Pure Reason*, the house that we are living in.

If my attempt is not compatible with the pre-critical Kant's account of the distinction between general and singular concepts, then I think it is impossible to find a way to make a distinction between the singular use of concepts and singular concepts with respect to their forms. If this is the case, then there will not be any difference between the two.

Intuitions' Role in Indexicals

Against my claims concerning the inability of intuitions to partake in linguistic realm, one might argue that through indexicals, intuitions play their role, since concepts cannot refer to spatiotemporal relations without an appeal to intuitions. Indexicals like 'here' and 'now' indicate spatiotemporal features that one addresses one's focus of attention.

However, this argument suffers for two reasons:

(1) Since intuitions are immediate in their relation with appearances, they must not be mediated by anything whatsoever in this relation. But, if one argues that through the

indexicals like 'here' and 'now', one can indicate physical objects or physical appearances, then intuitions would become mediate for being mediated by these words. (2) Since our focus is on empirical intuitions and since they are different from pure intuitions, what empirical intuitions represent must be different from spatiotemporal relations of objects. What the indexicals like 'here' and 'now' refer to are merely the spatiotemporal relations of objects. Then, what they refer to must differ from what empirical intuitions represent.

Against similar counterarguments by McDowell, Sean Kelly argues for indexicals like *this* are singular terms:

> As Sean Kelly has correctly pointed out, "the demonstrative concept is something of a chimera: it has the head of a singular term but the body of a general concept." In fact, the content *this F* is nothing more and nothing less than a *2-part hybrid content* consisting of
> (i) the essentially indexical demonstrative *this*,
> and (ii) the concept *F*." (Hanna, 2007, p. 56)

Against this counterargument, I must say that the (i) would be wrong since it is no different than singular use of concepts. The word *this* by itself not singular, but what it refers is singular. But, then any reference to objects or states of affairs for they being singular, the terms that refer to them must be singular. It is clearly not the case. The indexical *this* and *now* refer to objects and/or states of affairs within in a certain context and for they are about the physical world, they need to depend upon the pure forms of intuitions, but there is no such a necessity for them to depend upon the empirical intuitions. Discussing their dependence on space and time is beyond the scope of my thesis, for I focus on empirical intuitions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I focused on the difference between mental entities and linguistic entities. I claimed that representations are not linguistic entities, but merely mental entities. I tried to show that empirical intuitions cannot have any linguistic counterpart whatsoever in any sorts of judgments for being immediate. I attempted to show that there is a possibility for singular concepts within Kantian picture of representations which can also be called as 'accidentally individual concepts' (like Robert Hanna does).

Furthermore, in parallel lines with Kant's (in his pre-critical period) distinction between singular concepts and general concepts, I asserted that there can be a way to render definite descriptions as singular concepts and referential use of indefinite descriptions as the singular use of concepts, which is unfortunately not explained or exemplified by Kant. Thus, I believe that the difference between these two uses of concepts became more vivid.

In addition to these, for the sake of the compactness of my thesis, I restrict myself not to discuss the role of space and time in reference through indexicals in detail, yet, I believe that I briefly expressed my position on the issue, which is that those indexicals in question are, I think, general terms that together with the context they are used to refer particulars.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to focus on the two criteria separating empirical intuitions from empirical concepts. My goal in dealing with these two criteria is to provide a clearer account of them. After taking combating interpretations into account, I argued, against Hintikka, that these two criteria are distinct from one another; against Parsons and Hintikka, that intuitions are not singular terms; against Parsons, that immediacy criterion cannot be broader than the singularity criterion. Against all parties of the discussion, except Smit and perhaps Falkenstein, I argued that intuitions are also mediate but their mediacy is different from that of concepts.

Empirical cognitions are defined as an end product of synthesis which combines empirical intuitions and empirical concepts. However, in this thesis, I argue that their contributions are not separable for empirical intuitions cannot pick out objects without concepts. Thus, my claim can be brought into the debates on nonconceptual content as an example of a weak conceptualism. Moreover, such a conception of empirical cognitions challenges the strict reading of immediacy of intuitions. I argue that intuitions are also mediate but their mediacy is different from that of concepts.

There are some implications of these insights on the mediacy of concepts. Since for having empirical cognition, concepts and 'empirical intuitions' are necessary to have empirical cognitions. The role of the latter is taken to be to relate the cognition with the world, but in this thesis, I argued that this relation depends on the presence of concepts. There are two possible candidates for the roles of empirical intuitions: (1) What intuitions provide for cognitions are either singularity (in this case those intuitions can be thought as a special sort of concepts) or (2) experiential intake (in this case these intuitions differ from sensation merely by being objectively valid – which emerges when concepts are abstracted from empirical cognitions since concepts themselves cannot provide the ground for objectivity for merely thinking of an object does not guarantee its

existence). As a result of this argument, I believe that in empirical cognition, such an additional element like empirical intuitions are not needed.

To put it briefly, their immediacy leads one to see them as a special sort of concepts for they too function through intuitive marks which are, in turn, 'intuitions', and when it comes to their singularity there is no justification or explanation for it other than defining them as such and if they are singular, i.e., able to represent singular objects then in order to function, the contribution of categories is necessary for without such contribution what is provided by intuitions to empirical cognition would not be intelligible.

When it comes to the roles of empirical intuitions in forming existential claims about objects, I argue that this role may belong to pure forms of intuitions (like space and time) for all spatiotemporal relations ultimately depend on them, and to sensations for they provide the experiential intake. Since, according to Kant, sensations are subjective representations, to make use of such representations in empirical cognition as the ground of objectivity may seem contradictory. However, with the contribution of the pure forms of intuitions, categories and empirical concepts (which are used for uniqueness claims, as I argue) these subjective representations for being the ground of sensory experiential intake make their role in empirical cognition.

Kant's conception of singularity has changed throughout the transition from pre-critical period to critical period, in order to break away from Leibnizian tradition. As a result of this transition, Kant thought that the notion of singular concepts would lead him to this tradition. However, as I claim that it is possible to accept that notion without accepting the 'lowest concept' as an *infima species*. Claiming that both the singular use of general concepts and singular concepts can be a part of cognition is, I think,compatible with the entire Kantian corpus, except the definitions of concepts implying that they can merely be general.

Throughout the fourth chapter, I tried to show that there is a possibility of singular concepts, which are concepts of a special sort, within the pre-critical period; and are intuitions as a special sort of concepts, within the critical period. In addition to that, I attempted to show that the claim there is a possibility for singular concepts within Kantian picture of representations is compatible with Robert Hanna's assertion that there

are singular concepts within Kantian philosophy, which can also be called as 'accidentally individual concepts'.

Against my position, one can recall Kant's remark that says concepts are general by nature but their uses can be universal, particular, or singular. However, instead of giving counter arguments to this move, I tried to make a distinction between singular use of concepts and singular concepts. In order to make such a distinction, I used the referential use of indefinite descriptions as an instance of singular use of concepts and claim that when used referentially one can see that definite descriptions are singular concepts. My attempt to make a connection between the referential use of indefinite descriptions and the singular use of concepts on the form of examples that are given by Kant in *The Blomberg Logic* for singular concepts and general concepts. By doing that I not only argue for my position, but also give examples for the singular use of concepts that are not found anywhere in the Kant's works of his critical period.

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