

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AS A GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGY IN THE  
SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT

by

Nilay Özok

Submitted to  
the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts

Boğaziçi University  
2004

An abstract of the Thesis of Nilay Özok for the degree of Arts from the Atatürk  
Institute for Modern Turkish History to be taken September 2004

Title: “Social Development” as a Governmental Strategy in the Southeastern  
Anatolia Project (GAP)

This thesis examines the emergence and transformation of social development as a governmental strategy within the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) in the 1990s. GAP, which emerged as an infrastructure project to build dams, irrigation canals and hydroelectricity stations in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin in the 1970s, was transformed into an integrated development project in the early 1990s in which social development was a significant concern. In the late 1990s, under the impact of the shifting of the global development practice from state-led to market-led models, GAP adopted the discourse of “sustainable human development,” which entailed a novel notion of “social development” reconfigured in accordance with the neo-liberal development practices. Since the 1960s, governmental regional development concerns in Turkey were intermingled and became an instrument of managing the Kurdish population which since the early Republican era has had a tense relation with the state. Thus, in the GAP case, dealing with the Kurdish question has become the most significant rationale for the governmental efforts to bring social development to the east. Therefore the notion of “social development” GAP entailed should be considered as a governmental strategy set forth as a means of the governmental aspiration to manage the population living in the region. Considering this relation between the regional development policies and the Kurdish question this thesis looks at the notion of “social development” within GAP through an exploration of the governmental rationalities underlying its emergence and transformation, the technologies it deployed and the processes of subject-formation it entailed. In this manner, the study aims to bring a critical approach to studies on GAP in which “development” is taken as a given entity without being subjected to criticism.

Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Nilay Özok tarafından Eylül 2004'te teslim edilen tezin kısa özeti

Başlık: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi'nde Bir Yönetim Stratejisi Olarak “Sosyal Kalkınma”

Bu tez, 1990'lı yıllarda Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi'nde bir yönetim stratejisi olarak “sosyal kalkınma”nın ortaya çıkışını ve dönüşümünü incelemektedir. 1970'li yıllarda Fırat-Dicle havzasında bir dizi baraj, sulama kanalı ve hidroelektrik enerji santrali kurmak üzere altyapı projesi olarak ortaya çıkan GAP, 1990'lı yılların başlarında sosyal kalkınmanın önemli bir mesele olduğu bir “entegre kalkınma projesi”ne dönüştürüldü. GAP, 1990'lı yılların sonlarında ise, devlet-eksenli kalkınmadan piyasa eksenli kalkınma modeline geçen küresel kalkınma söyleminin etkisi altında, neo-liberal kalkınma pratiklerinin gereklerine göre yeniden yapılandırılan farklı bir “sosyal kalkınma”nosyonuna sahip olan “sürdürülebilir insani gelişme” söylemini benimsedi. Türkiye'de 1960'lı yıllardan beri hükümetlerin bölgesel kalkınma kaygıları, erken Cumhuriyet döneminden beri yönetimle gerilimli bir ilişkisi olan Kürt nüfusunu kontrol etme kaygılarıyla iç içe geçti ve hatta bunun bir aracı oldu. Dolayısıyla GAP örneğinde de Kürt sorunuyla başetme, hükümetlerin Doğu'ya sosyal kalkınmayı getirme çabalarının altında yatan en önemli rasyonel oldu. Bu yüzden, GAP'ın içerdiği sosyal kalkınma da, devletin bölgedeki nüfusu kontrol etmek için ortaya koyduğu bir yönetim stratejisi olarak düşünülmelidir. Kürt sorunu ile bölgesel kalkınma politikaları arasındaki bu ilişkisellikten yola çıkarak bu tez GAP'taki sosyal kalkınma nosyonunu, ortaya çıkışı ve dönüşümünün altında yatan yönetsel rasyonellere, kullanılan teknolojilere ve öngörülen özne-oluşturma süreçlerine bakarak incelemektedir. Bu şekilde, bu tez, “kalkınma” kavramını eleştirmeden verili bir bütün kabul eden GAP üzerine yapılmış çalışmalara eleştirel bir bakış açısı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first express my thanks to my family, İrfan Özok, Nadide Özok, and Özyay Özok, for their warmth, encouragement and belief in my academic orientation. Without their love and generous support, it would be have been impossible for me to write this thesis. From the very early years of my life, my dear uncles Mustafa Feyat and Mehmet Feyyat, have shared their rich experiences, motivated, directed and encouraged me; I am grateful to them.

I have to acknowledge my debt to my thesis advisor Asst. Prof. Nadir Özbek, not only for his courses which were a real “watershed” for me in terms of academic and intellectual insight, but also for his never-ending encouragement and support for my thesis (especially its subject) from the very first moment he heard it. I would also like to thank to Asst. Prof Cengiz Kırılı, Assoc. Prof. Şemsa Özar and Asst. Prof. Zeynep Gambetti, who kindly agreed to participate on my jury and shared their invaluable comments on my thesis. I also thank Assoc. Prof. M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu who provided me with articles, from which I benefited greatly. Also, I want to thank AGON for providing me with an atmosphere within which I found the opportunity to discuss the earlier versions of this thesis in a stimulating intellectual environment of rich debates.

Without the bliss and support of my friends, Can, Fulya, Burak, Sinem, Suzan and Sezen Bayhan, Özlem Kırkım, Metin Yavaş and Mahir Erkan, let alone writing a thesis, “life” would have been very dull indeed. I thank them all. I am also indebted to my dear friends Hande Sözer and Ertürk Demirel, not only for the way in which they have enriched my thinking on the issue with their insightful comments and critiques, but also for their sincere friendship, hospitality and company.

I am also thankful to Nuray Özışık and Leyla Kılıç for providing an enjoyable working environment at the Institute. Tracy Deliismail, with her incisive critiques enriched this thesis. Our dear editor, Kathryn Kranzler not only edited the thesis with great patience, but also offered psychological support with her good-humored contribution.

Finally, I am sincerely grateful to Azat Zana Gündoğan, who, apart from reading the thesis with great interest and sharing his intelligent remarks, stood by me with his never-ending care and love, which refreshed me at every moment.

## CONTENTS

### Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION:	1
Reading “Regional Development” through the Kurdish Question.....	1
GAP and Development”.....	6
Analysis of Development As a “Regime of Practices”.....	14
Examination of GAP through an “Analytics of Government”.....	22
II. FROM 1970s TO 1990s GAP: NOT YET A “SOCIAL” PROJECT.....	27
A Brief Description of the GAP.....	28
Historical Overview of GAP Prior to 1990.....	29
1990s: The Context within which “Social Development” in GAP Emerged.....	35
III. EARLY 1990s: AN ANALYTICS OF “SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT” WITHIN GAP.....	51
The Seeds of Social Aspect in GAP: The Master Plan.....	52
Social Research Projects and the Social Action Plan.....	62
Research on the Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region: Problematization of Settlement, Population and Social Structure within GAP.....	70
Research on the Population Movements in the GAP Region: Managing Migration within GAP.....	82
Research on the Status of Women in the GAP Region and Their Integration to the Process of Development: Development of Women and GAP.....	87
Social Development within GAP As An “Anti-Politics Machine”.....	96
IV. THE LATE 1990s: GAP AND NEO-LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE “SOCIAL”.....	107
“Development” in the Era of “Neoliberal Orthodoxy”.....	108
The Neoliberal Conception of the “Social” and “Development”.....	113
Materialization of the Neoliberal Notion of “Social” Development within GAP.....	117

Neoliberal Social Development within GAP in the Post-Armed Conflict  
Context: A New Mode of Governing the East.....136

V. CONCLUSION: DEVELOPMENT RATIONALITY OR  
“RATIONALITIES” .....143

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....150

*For my father and mother*

## PREFACE

In the first chapter, I will first provide the description of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), presenting the historical background of the project from the 1970s to the 1990s. Here, the aim is to reveal how GAP was initially planned as an infrastructure project, which lacked a vision of “social development” up until the 1990s. The last part of this chapter focuses on the 1990s in order to present the conjuncture in which the notion of “social development” within GAP emerged as an important governmental concern in relation to, and as a means of dealing with, the armed conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party which was escalating in this period in the east and southeast Anatolia where GAP was established. This was the historical context in which GAP was transformed into a “social” development project. Thus, examination of this context may shed light on the governmental rationalities underlying the transformation of GAP into an “integrated regional development” project in which “social” development has become a major concern. Such an analysis, I believe, will make it possible to present how “development,” which is constructed as a global project in a standardized form, is materialized (become concrete projects) in response to the peculiarities of the geography in which it is conducted.

In Chapter Two, drawing on an “analytics of government,” the notion of “social development” that GAP entailed will be examined through the basic texts in which social development was constructed. Here, focus will be given first to the GAP Master Plan (1989) in which are observed the seeds of social development.

Then, the discussion will move on the Social Research Projects which were conducted between 1992 and 1994, and the emergent Social Action Plan. These projects refer to the construction of “social development” as a special realm within GAP, and they constitute the background of social projects developed within GAP in the 1990s. Throughout the analysis the visibilities, episteme, *techne*, and processes of subject formation of development will be given the focus in order to present how problem areas and target groups of intervention were identified within GAP.

The last chapter examines the late 1990s, a time when GAP was transformed into a “sustainable human development project” in accordance with the changes in the global development practice. This transformation of GAP into a sustainable human development project, in fact, conceals the adoption of a novel understanding of development which was a “neo-liberal” construction. Furthermore, the adoption of a neo-liberal conception of development by the Turkish governments corresponded with the termination of the armed conflict in the region. Thus it was deployed by governments for conducting developmental efforts in southeastern Anatolia, where governmental policies and practices faced a loss of credibility during the armed conflict.

Taking development as a “regime of practices,” and examining it through the notion of “social development” that GAP entailed, this study hopes to contribute to the discussions about regional development through an “analytics of government.” To a great extent, the study draws on the primary documents about GAP such as reports, surveys, booklets, and brochures produced by various bodies of state, especially the GAP Regional Development Administration in order to trace the visibilities, rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities of social “development” within GAP. Analyzing the emergence and transformation of social development

within GAP in this manner, the study aims to bring a critical approach to “development,” which is lacking in the literature on GAP. However, the responses, reactions, and views of the population which have been addressed and been influenced by governmental policies and practices carried out within GAP are not included in this study and still await to be examined.



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### On Reading “Regional Development” through the Kurdish Question

In the 1970s, Turkey witnessed the emergence of a huge regional development project in the southeast part of the country called the Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*, GAP). The project consisted of the construction a series of infrastructure investments such as dams, hydroelectric stations, and irrigation canals in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. Then, towards the end of the 1980s, the project extended beyond a mere sum of infrastructure investments and was transformed into an “integrated development project” which aims at improvements in multiple spheres of life ranging from industry, agriculture, and transportation to “social” sectors such as health, education, and the development of women and the youth in the region. Towards the end of the 1990s, GAP underwent another transformation and became a “sustainable human development project.” That is to say, with the 1990s “social development” emerged as a new and increasingly significant concern within GAP. This study examines the emergence, evolution, and transformation of “social development” within GAP in the 1990s.

From the first day when the foundations of the first dam of GAP were laid, the project occupied an important place on the agenda of the policy-makers in

Turkey. In the government accounts mentioning the project, it was claimed that GAP was a grand step taken towards the “development” of the “East,” which, these arguments claim, had been “backward” and “underdeveloped” throughout Republican history. The project, with its massive infrastructural investments (such as dams, canals, hydroelectric stations, etc.) was presented as the eventual remedy to the long-lived “underdevelopment” of the “region.” Likewise, in the 1990s, in the context of the armed conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan* or PKK), GAP, with its claims of bringing “well-being” and “prosperity” to the population living in this region which was the site of the armed conflict, began to be associated with the conflict situation in southeast Anatolia, and turned into and presented as another means of dealing with the armed conflict. It was within this context that GAP gained a new meaning (i.e., as a tool in the fight against “terrorism”), that of “social development.”

The region which was labeled as “underdeveloped” and in need of a development project in the government accounts has had a tense relationship with the government throughout the Republican era. East and the southeast Anatolia are predominantly inhabited by a Kurdish population. Thus, these have been the places where the establishment of the nation-state with its claims to centralization and modernization has faced the harshest resistance in the form of (Kurdish) uprisings.<sup>1</sup> The “Kurdishness” of the population living in the region and the uprisings which, despite the differences in their discourses, demands, and socio-economic and political backgrounds characterized as “Kurdish revolts,” have been one of the (perhaps the most significant) parameters underlying the governments’ policies concerning the region. In this context, the notion of regional (under)development and

---

<sup>1</sup> For the analysis of the Kurdish uprisings in Turkey, see Ahmet Kahraman, *Kürt İsyanları* (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2003); Hıdır Gökteş, *Kürtler İsyan-Tenkil* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1991).

regional development policies towards the east and the southeast Anatolia should be considered in this relationship of the government policies towards the above-mentioned characteristic of the *population* living in this *region*.

As stated above, in the 1970s, when the construction of GAP began, the project was presented as a development project initiated to alleviate, and eventually eliminate, the backwardness and underdevelopment of the region. Regional development policies gained a popular appeal in the governmental policies in Turkey in the 1970s. However, the emergence of “regional development” as a systematized and institutional governmental policy in Turkey goes back to the 1960s. Thus, starting with the 1960s, the Kurdish question was increasingly associated with regional “(under)development” in the governmental accounts. In his analysis of the Kurdish problem in the Turkish state discourse, Mesut Yeğen states that, “with the 1960s, the state started to perceive the Kurdish question as a matter of ‘backward’ region (*geri kalmış yöre*).”<sup>2</sup> This, he contends, led the “reconstruction of the Kurdish question in the Turkish state discourse as a question of regional backwardness.”<sup>3</sup>

Accordingly, this discourse first materialized in the five-year development plans of the 1960s. Despite the differences between the successive plans, regional backwardness was for the first time systematically problematized in these plans. For example, in the First-Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967), primarily east and southeast Anatolia were identified as the “backward” regions and policies and programs were set forth for their development.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 159. “1960’larla birlikte devlet, Kürt meselesini bir ‘geri kalmış yöre’ sorunu olarak algılamaya başlamış”

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. “Kürt sorunu devlet söyleminde bir ‘bölgesel gerikalmışlık meselesi’ olarak yeniden kurulur olmuştur.”

<sup>4</sup> Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, *Türkiye’de Bölge Planlamasının Evreleri* (Ankara: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1993), p. 91.

The issue of regional development, and more specifically the “development of the east” was mentioned in the government programs of the 1960s and 1970s. One of the major texts in which the issue of regional development was problematized, for example, was the program of the 1965 government established by the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) which stated that,

To reduce the regional development disparities is a natural requirement of the realization of our development in social justice in the most balanced manner. In many regions of the country, especially in the East and Southeast Anatolia, there are great disparities in terms of life and living conditions.<sup>5</sup>

The quotation exemplifies the currency of the notion of regional backwardness in the government policies in the 1960s and the significance of the development of the east in these policies. In the program of the government founded by the Justice Party in 1969, we see a similar remark: “Another important issue we stress is that of the development of the eastern regions of our country, the territorial and national integrity of which is indivisible, is a constitutional necessity . . . Our aim is to bring all regions of Turkey to contemporary levels of civilizations. It is for this reason . . . we see the necessity of introducing special measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute. The aim of these special measures is not to create privileged regions, but to *forge integration*.”<sup>6</sup>

Here, the development of the east, which is associated with “territorial and national integration,” was presented as a matter the solution of which required “special measures.” Thus, as Yeğen states, here, the lack of integration refers to the

---

<sup>5</sup> Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1988b, p.104, quoted in Yeğen, p. 163. “*Bölgeler arasındaki gelişme farklarını azaltmak, kalkınmamızın sosyal adalet içinde en dengeli bir şekilde gerçekleştirilmesinin tabii bir icabıdır. Yurdun birçok bölgelerinde; özellikle Doğu ve Güneydoğu’da hayat ve yaşayış şartları bakımından büyük farklar mevcuttur.*”

<sup>6</sup> Turkish Grand National Assembly, *Hükümetler ve Programları, I-II-III* (Ankara, 1988), quoted in Mesut Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 4 (October 1999), p. 564. (Yeğen’s emphasis).

“lack of integration between the *Kurdish* regions and the Turkish market”<sup>7</sup> and, accordingly, these special measures aiming at the “development of the east” inherently imply a reference to the “Kurdishness” of the region.

Thus, GAP came into existence as a grand regional development project to manage the “backwardness” and “underdevelopment” of the east in this period throughout which the Kurdish question was increasingly associated with regional backwardness in the government policies and practices in the 1960s and 1970s. The construction of GAP began in this period, when, as Yeğen states “the Kurdish question was reconstituted in the Turkish state discourse as a matter of ‘regional backwardness.’”<sup>8</sup> Thus, as discussed above, the notion of the development of the “East” as a “region” should be considered in relation to the perception of the “population” living in this region by the government. The development policies towards the region can only be grasped if the ongoing tension between the Kurdishness of the population and governmental policies towards the region are considered in relation to each other.

In this context, GAP is not an exemption. With its huge budget, institutional structure and its promises for the region, GAP represents the apex of the regional development efforts in Turkey which renders it worth analysis in the terms of the relation between the governmental policies for regional development and the Kurdish question. Hence, GAP constitutes a significant case in terms of opening the space for the reconsideration of the notion regional development, and generally the notion “development” in this manner. As a grand governmental project to bring “development” to a “backward” region, GAP presents two possibilities at the

---

<sup>7</sup> Yeğen, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 564.

<sup>8</sup> Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde*, p. 159.

analytical level: First of all, in the light of the discussion made so far, through GAP we can consider the regional development policies in Turkey in relation to Kurdish question. Second, the GAP case offers valuable insights in terms of examining the specific implementation of the broad notion of “development” which was prepared as a standard global model but implemented in different ways in special temporal and spatial contexts.

### GAP and “Development”

Since the beginning of the project in the 1970s, GAP has been the subject of studies from many different academic disciplines. A vast literature on the physical dimension (or technical aspects) of the project exists.<sup>9</sup> In addition, the project has been the subject of studies in the social sciences. It has been a widely discussed theme in the international relations literature, as it was established on the Euphrates, which constituted an area of conflict between Turkey and Syria in terms of international rights for the use of water resources.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, being a regional development project, it has also been examined in development literature. Some of these studies analyze the project from a purely economic rationale and focus on the

---

<sup>9</sup> In these studies, GAP has been examined in terms of the energy, agriculture, and industry projects it includes. For a useful bibliography of this literature, see Nazmiye Demir, *GAP Bölgesinde Verimliliğe İlişkin Çalışmalar ve Önceliklerin Belirlenmesi* (Ankara: Milli Produktivite Merkezi Yayınları, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Thomas Naff, and Ruth C. Matson (eds.), *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Gün Kut, “Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 9, no. 2 (1993); Ali İhsan Bağış *Water as a Element of Cooperation and Development in the Middle East* (İstanbul: Sita Yayınları, 1994); Ali Çarkoğlu and Mine Eder, “Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no.1 (January 2001), pp.41-71; Ali Çarkoğlu and Mine Eder, “GAP&The Water Conflict,” *Private View* 2, no.6 (Autumn 1998), 58-69; Waltina Scheumann W., and Manuel Schiffler, *Water in the Middle East: Potential for conflicts and prospects for cooperation* (Berlin: Springer, 1998); Robert Olson R., “Turkey-Syria relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water,” *Middle East Policy* 5 no.2 (1997), pp.168-194.

prospective benefits it will bring to both regional and national economy.<sup>11</sup> Others, however, approach the project from a critical perspective and propose solutions for the elimination of its defects and problems, to ensure the proper functioning of the project.<sup>12</sup> However, the studies from the social sciences generally analyzed the project from the “development” perspective and stand affirmative on the promises of development. That is to say, as James Ferguson writes, they can be considered “either as insiders or sympathetic outsiders [who] see ‘development’ planning and ‘development’ agencies as a part of great collective effort to fight poverty, raise standards of living, and promote one or another version of progress.”<sup>13</sup> Thus, in these studies, GAP is taken as a test case for the fulfillment of these promises of development.

However, none of these studies has bothered to problematize the notion of “development” *per se*. That is to say, development and its supposed benefits are usually taken as given and are not subjected to a critical examination. Development is taken almost as a God-given entity and the path drawn by development as an inevitable linear process that all nations (peoples) will one day attain as a result of the “collective efforts” of “development agencies.” As Arturo Escobar writes, “one could criticize a given approach and propose modifications or improvements accordingly, but the fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be

---

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, John F. Kolars and William Mitchell, *The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991); Mustafa Akyıldız, “Ülkemizde Üretimi Artıracak Özlenen Proje: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP),” *Tabiat ve İnsan* 17, no.1, 3. (1983), Ali İhsan Bağış, *GAP Souteastern Anatolia Project The Cradle of Civilization Regenerated* (İstanbul: Aksoy Matbaacılık, 1989)

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Ahmet Özer, *Modernleşme ve Güneydoğu*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları: 1998); *GAP ve Sosyal Değişme*, (Diyarbakır: Dicle Üniversitesi GAP Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Yayını, 1994); Rıfat Dağ and Atilla Öztürk, *GAP Yeniden Yapılanmalıdır* (Ankara: Diyarbakır Sanayi ve Ticaret Odası, 1990).

<sup>13</sup> James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 9.

doubted. Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary.”<sup>14</sup> GAP has never been subjected to an analysis that problematizes the claims and promises that were put forth under the rubric of development. The development to be brought by the project to the region has been taken as a smooth process which does not include any conflicts or power relations requiring a critical examination. However, as this study will demonstrate, the operation of development as a real process (i.e., rather than as an abstract concept usually referring to an ideal – and usually fictitious- end-point) is a conflict-ridden one that involves multiple interests, rationalities, and power relations. Thus, it is necessary to examine GAP as a development project keeping these concerns and questions about “development” in mind.

The literature on “development” is a huge realm and here it is difficult to refer to even a selection from this broad literature. However, the studies on development usually start with an effort to present the historical background of the notion of development. Generally, the origins of development are traced back to the post-World War II context<sup>15</sup> and the starting point for development (or, as some commentators say, it was the starting point for “underdevelopment”<sup>16</sup>) is taken as Harry Truman’s infamous speech in 20 January, 1949, which Cowen and Shanton

---

<sup>14</sup> Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> The starting point for the “development” economics is usually taken as the post-World War II period. However, in the literature there are some writers who trace back the roots of the notion “development” to nineteenth- century positivists and eighteenth century colonialists. See for example, Michael Cowen and Robert Shanton, “The Invention of Development.” In Jonathan Crush (ed.), *Power of Development* (London: Routledge, 1995).

I agree with Cowen and Shanton in terms of taking the ideological roots of the general conception of “development” to colonialism. However, here, when I say “development” I refer to a specific economic model envisaged by the developed world –especially the United States- for the underdeveloped countries in the post-World War II period.

<sup>16</sup> Gustavo Esteva, “Development.” In Wolfgang Sachs (ed.) *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed books, 1992), p. 7.

describe as “the day on which Truman called for a ‘bold new program’ for the improvement, growth and development of underdeveloped areas.”<sup>17</sup> In this speech, as Escobar writes, Truman mentioned the notion of “fair deal,” which entailed “an appeal to the United States and the world to solve the problems of the ‘underdeveloped areas’ of the globe.”<sup>18</sup> His frequently referred to speech is worth quoting at some length here in terms of demonstrating the stated rationale of bringing “development” to the “underdeveloped” world in the post-World War II context:

More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions of approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas. For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people . . . I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life . . . What we envisage is a program for development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing . . . Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.<sup>19</sup>

The statement properly summarizes the objectives, ideals and means of the post-war development efforts: bringing “prosperity” for the “fulfillment” of a “better life” to peoples who live in “misery” through “greater production,” which will be ensured by “science and technology.” In the post-World War II context, and thus throughout the Cold War era, the will to bring development to the poor parts of the world, summarized in the words of Truman above, became a significant tool for the U.S. in her fight against communism. The idea that the poverty of the

---

<sup>17</sup> Michael Cowen and Robert Shanton, “The Invention of Development,” in Jonathan Crush (ed.) *Power of Development* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 29.

<sup>18</sup> Escobar, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Harry Truman, [1949] 1964, “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, quoted in Escobar, p. 3.

underdeveloped countries posed a threat for the other parts of the world constituted the rationale behind the efforts of the developed countries, especially the United States, to initiate huge development programs for those countries that lived in poverty. According to Escobar, “[o]ne of the many changes that occurred in the early post-World War II period was the ‘discovery’ of mass poverty in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”<sup>20</sup> Thus, as he elaborates in detail in his study, “this discovery was to provide the anchor for an important restructuring of global culture and political economy.”<sup>21</sup>

The important point to emphasize here is that the emergence of “poverty” as a realm to be managed was not a creation of the post-World-War II context. According to Rahnema, there were two stages of the “discovery of poverty” by the states as a realm to be intervened into and controlled. The first phase emerged “with the emergence of capitalism in Europe,” while the second one started with “the advent of development in the Third World.” According to Rahnema, both two refer to the “break[s] that occurred in the conceptions and management of poverty.”<sup>22</sup> The first break which Rahnema mentions refers to the “modernization of poverty” and “[the appearance of] the poor as a social problem requiring new ways of intervention in society.” Thus, the problematization of poverty as a social problem to be managed led the discovery of new spheres of intervention “in education, health, hygiene,

---

<sup>20</sup> Escobar, p. 21.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

morality, and employment.”<sup>23</sup> This culminated in the emergence of a new domain of intervention called “the social.”<sup>24</sup>

According to Escobar, “the history of development implies the continuation in other places this history of the social.”<sup>25</sup> This, Rahnema argues, was the second break in the problematization of poverty as a realm of intervention which refers to the “globalization of poverty” in the post-World War II context. Escobar writes that “poor countries came to be . . . defined in relation to the standards of wealth of the more economically advantaged nations.”<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, “poverty on a global scale” emerged as a discovery of this post-World War II context. Once the problem was put forth as poverty on the global scale, the proposed solution was economic growth, through, as Truman stated, production, science and technology. As had been the case in the emergence of “the social” as a realm of intervention in the nineteenth century, the elimination of the “global poverty” called for intervention in all spheres ranging from health and education, housing and employment, which were materialized in the integrated development projects in the post-World War II period. In the passage below, Escobar neatly summarizes this process:

“Development” as a mode of thinking and a source of practices, soon became an omnipresent reality. The poor countries became the target of an endless number of programs and interventions that seemed to be inescapable and that ensured their control. Everything that was important in the social and economic control of these countries (their population, processes of capital accumulation, natural resources, agriculture and trade, administration, cultural values, etc.) became the object of explicit

---

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> For a detailed analysis of the emergence and operations of the management of poverty and the emergence of “the social” in the nineteenth century, see Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), see also, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

<sup>25</sup> Escobar, p. 23.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

calculation by experts formed in new sciences developed for that purpose, and the subject of interventions designed by a vast array of newly formed institutions. In a few years, this unprecedented strategy extended its reach to aspect of the social body.<sup>27</sup>

The poverty of the “underdeveloped” world became a realm of intervention and management for other countries especially the United States. Truman declared that the poverty of the underdeveloped world would be eliminated through increased production. Thus, the only way for these countries to increase their production was the importation of the American science and technology. Timothy Mitchell states that, in this period, “Americans planned to build political influence and at the same time subsidize their own industrial technology through a program of ‘technical assistance,’ which would organize post-war international relations around a politics of techno-economic development.”<sup>28</sup> The U.S. provided a great deal of technical assistance for these countries.

The politics of techno-economic development, however, did not remain merely as a program that was produced and imposed by the developed world for the underdeveloped countries. In the post-war period, these programs were adopted and implemented by national governments as a means of completing their nation-building processes. For example, in Egypt, when Jamal Abdul Nasser came to the power with a coup d’etat in 1952, he immediately engaged in building another larger dam at Aswan, which, Mitchell argues, symbolized the “centerpiece of the post-war nation making in Egypt.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, in this context, “damming the river,” which refers

---

<sup>27</sup> Arturo Escobar, “Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World,” *Cultural Antropology* 3, no. 4 (November 1988), p. 429.

<sup>28</sup> Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (California: University of California Press, 2002), p. 41.

<sup>29</sup> Mitchell, p. 45.

to “an ability to rearrange the natural and social environment became a means to demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic power.”<sup>30</sup>

However, apart from its symbolic implications (such as representing the power of the modern state), the techno-economic development provided the states with practical possibilities in order them to ensure their political and economic integration within a territorially bounded geography. Mitchell writes that “if the modern state is characterized by what appears as a structure of rules and institutions whose regularity and abstractness separates it from the social order it governs, it is also distinguished by its territorial character . . . It [modern state] seems to acquire a new *clarity* and *absoluteness* in its control over a particular geographical region.”<sup>31</sup> Development, with the techno-economic possibilities (science, expertise and hence “calculability”) it presented for nation-states, equipped them with the necessary instruments to ensure clarity and absoluteness within their borders. Because, as Mitchell contends, “the politics of national development and economic growth was a politics of techno-science,” which, with its claims to bring “expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science”<sup>32</sup> was to provide absoluteness and clarity, much desired by the nation-states.

It was within this context that many governments engaged in regional development projects to ensure the economic, and hence national, integration in their countries. It is through regional development policies and projects aiming at the development (and integration) of particular regions that nation-states deployed techno-economic mechanisms to ensure the integration (both political and economic)

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p. 15.

of remote regions, which would enable them to establish control over the entire territory. Thus, the regional development efforts of the governments in Turkey which were carried out systematically in the 1960s and 1970s was related this global rise of developmentalism, since the post-World War II period. Furthermore, the construction of GAP by the Turkish state in the 1970s as a grand regional development project can be considered as a reflection of this increasing currency of developmentalism among many national states as a governmental project to ensure control over a territorially bounded geography through the deployment of the techno-scientific instruments (i.e. expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science).

#### Analysis of Development as a “Regime of Practices”

Since its emergence in the post-World War II period in the above-mentioned context, development has been criticized from different positions. Analyzing the emergence of global poverty as a realm of intervention for the developed world through the deployment of “explicit calculation by experts formed in new sciences developed for that purpose” and “vast array of newly formed institutions,” Escobar argues that this process refers to the “‘developmentalization’ of the Third World, its progressive insertion into a *regime of thought and practice* in which certain interventions for the eradication of poverty became central to the world order.”<sup>33</sup>

Analyzing and criticizing development in this manner (i.e. claiming that “development entails a “regime of practices,” as Escobar does above) refers to a novel approach in the critiques of development. In the 1980s and 1990s a new group

---

<sup>33</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 25. (emphases added).

of development critiques, who were inspired by the work of Michel Foucault on governmentality emerged. Following a Foucauldian line, these critiques<sup>34</sup> take development as a “regime of representation” or a “regime of practice.” This group of development critiques, known as “post-development” critiques, argues that “development discourse acts as a regime of representation or hegemonic worldview that systematically shapes and constructs identities of the so-called Third World peoples does not allow people to think alternative organizing principles for the attainment of well-being.”<sup>35</sup>

The post-development critiques of development constitute a huge literature, the elaboration of which extends beyond the limits of this study. However, for the purposes of this paper, as it is inspired from the post-development critiques, the significant point which will receive focus is the idea that “development embodies a regime of practices.”<sup>36</sup> Thus, the elaboration of development as a regime of practices enables its consideration as a governmental practice that can be analyzed in the light of a Foucauldian *governmentality* perspective. This, it is believed, will bring a new approach in the examination of the GAP from a critical perspective which is missing in the literature on GAP. Setting out from this theoretical framework, the emergence and the transformation of this development project will be situated in its peculiar

---

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Arturo Escobar, *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Wolfgang Sachs, (Ed.), *The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power* (London: Zed Books, 1992); Majid Rahnema, and Victoria Bawtree, (Eds.) *The post development reader*. (London: Zed Books, 1996); James Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine: "Development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), Jonathan Crush. (Ed.), *Power of development* (New York: Routledge, 1995), Jan N. Pieterse, "My paradigm or yours? Alternative development, post-development, and reflexive development," *Development and Change* 29, (1998): 343-373.

<sup>35</sup> Anthropological Critiques of Development. Available [online]: at [http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org/conference/a\\_and\\_d\\_anthropologicalcritiques.htm](http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org/conference/a_and_d_anthropologicalcritiques.htm) [15 June 2004].

<sup>36</sup> Escobar, *Power and Visibility*, p. 433.

historicity. As discussed above, the policies and practices of GAP materialized in the context of the tense relation between the government policies and the Kurdish population. Therefore, taking development as a regime of practices and analyzing it as a governmental strategy, this study examines how a development project (GAP) emerged and materialized in a specific historical conjuncture and geography. Such an analysis, I believe, will serve two interrelated ends: First, the post-development literature which this paper benefited greatly paper is generally criticized for “presenting development as a homogenous enterprise.”<sup>37</sup>

Development, as the analysis above demonstrates, emerged as a systemic attempt in the post-World-War II period. However, the way it turned into concrete projects in particular historical and geographical contexts requires a more case-sensitive examination that will make us refrain from a timeless and spaceless notion of development that works everywhere in the same way. That is to say, despite initially being planned as systematic and perhaps standard programs, once put into operation, development efforts cannot dissociate themselves from the particularities of the geography in which they are implemented. They enter into a dialogue and sometimes become a means of different governmental rationalities and sensitivities. In the case of GAP, as stated above, the (regional) development promised by the project, became a means of dealing with the Kurdish question for the government. Thus, looking at GAP may shed some light on the ways in which development may become the means of diverse objectives for its practitioners in particular historical conjunctures and is reshaped throughout the process.

In addition, analyzing development in GAP as a “regime of practices” may serve a second end. Taking development as a regime of practice in the GAP case and

---

<sup>37</sup> Anthropological Critiques of Development.

putting it into context by referring to the particular conjuncture in which the project came into existence and was transformed in the process, I aim to bring a critical approach to the literature on GAP. As mentioned above, GAP has always been examined as a positive attempt to bring development to east and southeast Anatolia. Thus, the development promised by GAP, the rationales behind it, and the means and mechanisms it deployed have not been subjected to a critical analysis that problematizes the notion of development *per se*. Examining development as a regime of practices in the context of GAP from a critical perspective in relation to the Kurdish problem may be indicative in terms of demonstrating how development becomes more of a governmental strategy that serves ends other than “development,” than of a naive attempt to bring prosperity to “underdeveloped” regions and populations.

In this context, first it is necessary to elaborate more on what it means to propose that “development embodies a regime of practices.” As stated above, the idea that development can be analyzed as a regime of practices is a creation of the post-development scholars under the influence of Foucault’s works on government. Thus, the analysis of development as a regime of practices has been constructed on studies of government. Development as a regime of practices, then, has much to do with the problems of government and the issue of governmentality, which has become a popular interest for scholars from different disciplines who, in one way or another, are interested in government. Hence, development as a regime of practices can only be grasped if it is associated with an analysis of government.

The term “government” in the Foucauldian governmentality literature is defined broadly as the “conduct of conduct,”<sup>38</sup> which is derived from the two

---

<sup>38</sup> Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 10.

different meanings of the word “conduct.” As a verb, “to conduct’ means “to lead, to direct, or to guide.”<sup>39</sup> As a noun, “conduct” refers to “articulated set of behaviors.”<sup>40</sup> Accordingly, including these two meanings, “government entails any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends.”<sup>41</sup> Thus, government may entail directing or shaping one’s own behaviors (conduct), as well as those of others. The significant point to stress here is that the issue has more to do with the government of others. The “government of the self” becomes relevant as long as it becomes a means of the governing agencies for governing the conducts of others. After making this remark, we can turn to a more expanded definition of government which Mitchell Dean presents us. This definition is worth quoting here in terms of including many questions concerning government, which I will problematize soon in this part:

Government is any more or less a calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects, and outcomes.<sup>42</sup>

Each of these elements in this definition of government presents a question for the analysis of any kind of government, including development. That is to say, as Dean states, “an analysis of government, then, is concerned with the means of calculation, both qualitative and quantitative, the type of governing authority or agency, the forms of knowledge, techniques, and other means employed, the entity to

---

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 11.

be governed and how it is conceived, the ends sought and the outcomes and consequences.”<sup>43</sup> These are the kinds of questions that will be asked to which answers will be sought in following analysis of development as a governmental practice in the context of GAP.

However, the analysis of government in the above mentioned manner should be situated within the framework of studies of governmentality. Here “acting” and “thinking” are the two significant concepts that connect the analysis of government to governmentality. As Dean states “the notion of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ presupposes the freedom of those who are governed entailed in the capacities of acting and thinking.”<sup>44</sup> That is to say, “when we govern our selves and others we exercise our capacities for *thinking*.”<sup>45</sup> Thus, in its broadest meaning, governmentality “deals with how we think about governing, with different mentalities of governing.”<sup>46</sup> Thus, governmentality refers to the relation between government and thought. However, thought is problematized by the analysis of government in so far as it “becomes linked to and is embedded in technical means for the shaping and reshaping of conduct and in *practices* and *institutions*.”<sup>47</sup> It is here that the relationship between governmentality and regimes of practices appears because to claim that analysis of government problematizes thought in practices and institutions means that “studies of governmentality are . . . concerned with how

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-16. (emphasis added).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 18. (emphasis added).

thought operates within our organized ways of doing things” which refers to “regimes of practices.”<sup>48</sup>

“Regimes of practices” (or regimes of government) refers to the “organized practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves.”<sup>49</sup> It implies a routine and coherence in terms of how things are done. That is to say, they are “relatively organized and systemized ways of doing things such as curing, caring, punishing, assisting, educating, and so on.”<sup>50</sup> Besides, as Dean claims, “regimes of practices are institutional practices” in terms of referring “to routinized and ritualized way we do things in certain places and at certain times.”<sup>51</sup>

In this context, we can consider development as a regime of practices. It is, first of all, a way of government in terms of entailing an attempt to govern the behaviors of others. As Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller state if “government is the historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions,”<sup>52</sup> then development can readily be taken as a regime of government. Rose and Miller add that, “in the modern forms of government. . . authorities endeavour to administer the lives of others in the light of the conceptions of what is good, healthy, normal, virtuous, efficient or profitable.”<sup>53</sup>

This kind of reasoning underlies the notion of development, too. That is to say,

---

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. For a full analysis of “regimes of practices”, see *Michel Foucault*, “Questions of Method.” In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 73-86.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.211.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power beyond the State,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 43, no.2 (June 1992), p.175.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

development inherently entails a notion of “developed” versus “underdeveloped.” After establishing the “developed” as the “norm,” development works in a way to shape the conduct of others who are included in the category of “underdeveloped.” In a similar vein, Dean claims that, “key terms in vocabularies of rule. . . are integral components of government, of our organized systems of acting upon and directing human conduct.”<sup>54</sup> Thus, for development, this categorization based on the key terms (developed vs. underdeveloped) is integral for its treatment of “underdevelopment” which works through shaping and directing the conduct of those categorized as “underdeveloped.” These are, to state in Dean’s words, “governmental categories that are produced within specific practices and within attendant forms of knowledge and expertise.”<sup>55</sup> In this sense, knowledge and expertise are significant for development as a regime of government in terms of equipping it with the necessary tools to construct these categories which are essential for its functioning.

In addition, as stated above, regimes of practices are institutional practices. Thus, government aimed by development works through certain systemized and institutional practices. As Escobar argues that, “to examine development is to examine practices about specific problems that emerge from existing theories and institutional apparatuses, not independent of them.”<sup>56</sup> Development works through (if not as) an institutional structure that makes its functioning more or less routine, coherent and systemized, which, as stated above, are the features of regimes of practices. Escobar describes this process as the “institutionalization of development” to refer to the “establishment of an institutional field in which, and from which,

---

<sup>54</sup> Dean, p. 64.

<sup>55</sup> Dean, p. 65.

<sup>56</sup> Escobar, *Power and Visibility*, p. 433.

discourses and techniques are produced, recoded, stabilized, modified, and put into operation.”<sup>57</sup> Working through an institutionalized sphere from which the knowledge and expertise essential for their functioning are produced is a characteristic of regimes of practices. Thus, development, as regime of practice, is not an exemption in this case. As Escobar states, “[b]y using certain forms knowledge and producing specific forms of intervention, these institutions constitute a network that ... makes the exercise of power possible.”<sup>58</sup>

In the light of these discussions related to the regimes of practices, in this study, development is taken as one such regime. Development, that is to say, is a regime of practice (government) that works as a systemized and routinized way of governing which functions through institutional apparatuses that produce knowledge and expertise necessary for it to establish its power and authority. In this context, the question that requires elaboration is the method to be deployed in the examination of development (and in this study GAP case) as a regime of practices. In this study, I will use the perspective presented by Mitchell Dean which is called as an *analytics of government*.<sup>59</sup>

### Examination of GAP through an Analytics of Government

An analytics of government, Dean claims, examine the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained, and transformed.<sup>60</sup> This initial remark presents a valuable insight for the purposes of this study. Taking

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 433.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 431.

<sup>59</sup> Dean, p. 20.

<sup>60</sup> Dean, p. 21.

development as a regime of practice and examining GAP from this perspective, in this study the conditions under which GAP emerged as a governmental practice to deal with the underdevelopment of the East and transformed in time with the requirements and urgencies of time will be examined. As stated above, one particular feature of the regimes of practices is that they appear as coherent, ever-existed, and natural ways of doing things. Accordingly, they are prone to be perceived as being really “natural” regimes that did not emerge under particular historical conditions and relations. For instance, in the case of GAP, the studies on the project generally treat the development promised by it as a natural process without a history of its own. Nonetheless, neither the notion of development generally, nor GAP which is a concrete case of development as a regime of government, emerged as the natural products of an inevitable process. “An analytics of a particular regime of practices,” Dean states, “seeks to identify the emergence of that regime, examine the multiple sources of the elements that constitute it, and follow the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organization and institutional practice.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, through such an analysis, one can criticize and hence, denaturalize development which is generally taken-for-granted in the studies on GAP described.

As mentioned above, regimes of practices act upon knowledge and expertise through which they establish their authority. Thus, an analytics of government examines “how such a regime gives rise to and depends upon particular forms of knowledge, as a consequence of it, becomes the target of various programs of reform and change.”<sup>62</sup> This line of questioning opens up the space for examining how

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

development as a regime of government determines “developed” as the norm and thus specifies certain groups as “underdeveloped,” and in need of treatment through particular programs. Furthermore, analytics of a regime of practices “considers how this regime has a technical or technological dimension through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals and, through which they have a range of effects.”<sup>63</sup> Thus, such an analysis of particular forms of knowledge a regime of practice depends upon, together with an analysis of techniques, instruments, and mechanisms through which it operates, makes it possible to analyze that regime as an “active real force.” In his analysis of development, Escobar states that “to speak development as a historical construct requires an analysis of the mechanisms through which it becomes an active real force. These structures are structured by forms of knowledge and power and can be studied in terms of processes of institutionalization and professionalization.”<sup>64</sup> Thus, in this study, I will focus on the techniques, instruments, and mechanisms deployed in GAP together with the institutional structures it entails, in order to examine how development turns into “an active real force” through the policies and practices of GAP.

All these questions underlying an analytics of government can be summarized in four points: First, development as a regime of government can be analyzed in terms of the *visibilities* it creates for its functioning. As Dean states, “we can identify different regimes of practices with certain forms of visibility.”<sup>65</sup> Development discourse creates (invents) visibilities (such as “underdevelopment,” “backwardness,”) through which it can operate. As Escobar argues, development

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Arturo Escobar, “The Invention of Development,” *Current History* 98, no.631 (November 1999), p. 383.

<sup>65</sup> Dean, p. 30.

discourse brings “client categories” into the “field of vision through a process of enframing that turned them into spectacles.”<sup>66</sup> In this context, the analysis of the visibilities of development as a regime of government is significant because these are what “make it possible to ‘picture’ who and what is to be governed, how relations of authority and obedience are created in space, how different locales and agents are to be connected with one another, what problems are to be solved and what objectives are to be sought.”<sup>67</sup>

Secondly, an analytics of government is concerned with the technical aspect, or what Dean calls the *techne* of government.<sup>68</sup> As stated above, in my examination of development as a regime of practice through GAP case, I will focus on “the means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, techniques, technologies” deployed in the practices of GAP in dealing with the “underdevelopment” of the East because, as Dean rightfully writes, “those technical means are a condition of and often impose limits on what it is possible to do.”<sup>69</sup> Third, an analytics of government asks, what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, and means of calculation or rationality are employed within a regime of practices. This, as Dean says, means an analysis of the *episteme* of development as a governmental regime. Fourth, just as any other regime of government, development presupposes certain *subjectivities*. Or, to put it another way, development discourse attributes certain characteristics such as “underdeveloped, backward, or traditional” (which are its own invention!) to certain groups or populations and renders this groups the target of its programmes. Thus, the

---

<sup>66</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 155.

<sup>67</sup> Dean, p. 30.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

process of subject formation in development (and in GAP) will also be of concern here.

Taking development as a regime of government and analyzing its visibilities, *techné*, episteme, and processes of subject formation, one can denaturalize and hence historicize development promised through GAP in the Turkish “regional development efforts.”

## CHAPTER II

### FROM 1970s TO 1990s THE SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT: NOT YET A “SOCIAL” PROJECT

This chapter first presents a brief description of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi* or GAP), followed by a discussion of the historical background of the project. Here, the focus will be on the establishment of GAP in the 1970s as an infrastructure project aimed at the construction of dams, irrigation canals, and hydroelectricity stations in southeastern Anatolia. In time, the project was transformed first into an “integrated development project,” and then into a “sustainable human development project.” This transformation entailed the emergence and increasing importance of the notion of “social development” within GAP in the 1990s. The following chapter elaborates on the “social” dimension of the project in some detail. However, before moving on to the analysis of the “social development” within GAP, it is necessary to mention the context in which the seeds of “social development” were sown in the 1990s.

In the 1990s, improvement of live standards and social development became significant concerns for the government in order to end the ongoing armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan* or PKK) and the Turkish armed forces. It was within this context that GAP became a means of the governmental efforts to offer social services to southeastern Anatolia in order to

ensure the “wellbeing” of the population, and thereby put an end to the human source of the “terror.” The last part of this chapter, therefore, focuses on the early 1990s in which GAP went beyond being a set of infrastructure projects and social development within GAP became a means of the “fight against terrorism.”

### A Brief Description of the Southeastern Anatolia Project

GAP is a massive regional development project established in the 1970s in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin in southeastern Anatolia. The project area includes the provinces of Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak. This area, called as “GAP region,” has a surface area of 75,358 square kilometers, which corresponds to 9.7 % of Turkey’s total surface area.<sup>70</sup> According to the 2000 General Population Census, the population of the GAP region is 6,604,205, or 9.7 % of the total population of Turkey, 67,844,903.<sup>71</sup>

The project, as stated before, was initially established as an infrastructure project aimed at the utilization of the irrigation and energy potentials of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. This constitutes the “water resources development component” of GAP and it envisages the construction of twenty-two dams and nineteen hydraulic power plants in the GAP region.<sup>72</sup> According to official GAP accounts, the total cost of the project will amount to 32 billion \$ US.<sup>73</sup> Development

---

<sup>70</sup> Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/Frames/fr1.html> [25 July, 2004].

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> This figure refers to the total public finance requirement of the project. Olcay Ünver, “*Speeches and Presentations on Southeastern Anatolia Project*” (Ankara: GAP Regional Development Administration, 1999), p. 2.

of water resources through dams, irrigation canals and hydroelectric power plants has been the major promise of the project since its construction. Thus, it is estimated that with the completion of GAP, the amount of the energy generated solely by the region will be equal to the total amount now produced in all of Turkey.<sup>74</sup> In addition, in the official GAP documents, it is claimed that the water development component of the project envisages the irrigation of 1.7 million hectares of land.<sup>75</sup>

In the 1990s, the scope of the project was extended beyond the aims of irrigation and energy production and at the moment, together with the water development programs, the GAP project entails development programs in “agriculture, rural and urban infrastructure, forestry, education and health.”<sup>76</sup> That is to say, in 1990s, the project started to involve a notion of “social development,” which constitutes the central concern of this study. However, before elaborating on the historical conjuncture in which “social development” within GAP emerged, a brief historical background of the project till the 1990s will be presented in order to elucidate the difference between the pre and post-1990 GAP.

### Historical Overview of GAP Prior to 1990

Any attempt to elaborate on the social projects and practices of GAP requires first an elaboration of the emergence of the project initially as a program to construct dams, hydroelectric power stations, and irrigation projects on the Tigris-Euphrates river basin long before the appearance of its social dimension in the 1990s. John F.

---

<sup>74</sup> Ahmet Özer, *GAP ve Sosyal Değişme* (Diyarbakır: Dicle Üniversitesi GAP Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Yayını, 1994), p. 15.

<sup>75</sup> Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

Kolars and William Mitchell in their analysis of the historical background of GAP claim that it was the early years of the Republic that government planners became interested in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.<sup>77</sup> Likewise, in the narrations of the background of the project by the official GAP accounts, the roots are usually traced back to the early years of the Republic:

The first idea of and decision to utilize the waters of these two rivers rationally belong to Atatürk, the founder of the Republic. In those years ... the need for electrical energy came to the fore as an urgent and priority issue. Then, upon the order of Atatürk, the Electricity Studies Administration (sic) [General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration] was founded in 1936 to investigate issues on how rivers could be utilized for energy production. The Administration began its detailed studies with the “Keban Project” and established observation studies to assess the flow and other characteristics of the Euphrates.<sup>78</sup>

The establishment of the General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (*Elektrik İşleri Etüt İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü*) and the construction of a gauging station near the present site of the Keban Dam in 1936<sup>79</sup> are the signs of the Turkish state’s early interest in the energy potential of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Development planning for the region, however, was delayed by World War II,<sup>80</sup> but in the planned economy years of the 1960s, large scale hydroelectric planning came onto the agenda again. These were the years when the issue of regional development was formulized systematically in the development plans.<sup>81</sup> The Turkish state turned its eyes to the Euphrates again. In

---

<sup>77</sup> John F. Kolars and William Mitchell, *The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 25.

<sup>78</sup> Official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

<sup>79</sup> Kolars and Mitchell, p. 25.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> The emergence and the development of the notion of “regional development” in Turkey deserve an elaborate analysis on its own, which extend beyond the scope and aims of this chapter. Yet, for the

the first two development plans, the Keban Project was the center of energy investments in the east.<sup>82</sup> Thus, the Second Five-Year Plan (1968-1972) included construction of at least four dams in the region.<sup>83</sup>

The institutional infrastructure of the energy investments in the region had already been prepared by the establishment of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (*Devlet Su İşleri* or DSI) in 1954, which gave rise to the conduction of basin scale studies throughout the country.<sup>84</sup> Thus, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the DSI conducted studies in the region and prepared a series of reports about the Euphrates and the Tigris. Throughout this period, there was a great deal of effort to obtain the necessary technical information about these rivers in terms of their energy and irrigation potentials. These studies were completed in 1970,<sup>85</sup> which culminated in the designation of a series of works consisting of the construction of dams, a dumping station and an irrigation tunnel in the region.<sup>86</sup> All these developments are quite in line with Sönmez's statement that energy projects constituted the basis of the state investments in the region during the 1960s and

---

aims of this chapter, concerning the place of GAP in the "regional development" efforts of Turkey, suffice it to say that, the idea of designing a massive development plan consisting of dams and energy stations on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers was first systematically formulized in the Planned Economy years of the 1960s. For the details, see Kolars and Mitchell (1991); Mustafa Sönmez, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi Kürtler; Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* (Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 1992); Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Vakfı Konferans Heyeti, *Türkiye'de Bölgesel Politika* (İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Vakfı, 1989); Milli Güvenlik Komutanlığı Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, *Türkiye'de Bölge Planlamanın Evreleri* (Ankara: Milli Güvenlik Komutanlığı Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1993).

<sup>82</sup> Sönmez, p. 157.

<sup>83</sup> These dams were Keban (1974), Surgu (1969), Medik (1975), and Cip (1965).

<sup>84</sup> Official web page of GAP Regional Development Administration.

<sup>85</sup> Kolars and Mitchell, p. 27.

<sup>86</sup> These include: Karakaya Dam, Gököy Dam, Karababa Dam, Middle Karababa Dam, Medir Pumping Station, Urfa Tunnel, and Hilvan Pumping System. See, *ibid.*

1970s.<sup>87</sup> Eventually, the above-mentioned sub-projects that now constitute GAP were combined under that title in 1976<sup>88</sup> and it was the birth of GAP.

While GAP was being constructed and institutionalized in the above mentioned context, the projects constituting GAP were being conducted by the DSI. Throughout the 1980s, the construction of dams continued to be high on the agenda. In 1983, the construction of the Atatürk Dam, which is a significant element of GAP, was started. By 1985, Turkey had constructed and put into operation one hundred dams.<sup>89</sup> Hence, throughout these years, with all these projects, the seeds of GAP were sown as a project based on the utilization of the energy and irrigation potential of the Tigris-Euphrates. Thus, it should be pointed out that neither the notion of “integrated development” nor the “social dimension” of the Project were on the agenda in these initial years. The signs of this phenomenon were seen first in 1986, when the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* or DPT) was given the mandate of addressing development activities in southeastern Anatolia within the framework of integrated regional planning and ensuring the coordination of these activities.<sup>90</sup> The GAP Coordinator of the DPT, Taylan Dericioğlu, explained why DPT was given the mandate of conducting the development efforts of GAP:

In accordance with the provisions of the Reconstruction Law (*İmar Yasası*) of 2 November 1985, number 3194, the planning of regional development was included in the responsibilities of the State Planning Organization. Thus, the duty of regional development, which leads to the confusion of the competence between the previous Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement and the present Ministry of Public Works and Settlement and the

---

<sup>87</sup> See Sönmez, pp. 157-162.

<sup>88</sup> Kolars and Mitchell, p. 28. For a detailed analysis of these project, see Osman Aytar, *Kürdün “Makus Talihi” i ve “Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi. Sorunlar ve Gerçekler* (İstanbul: Medya Güneşi Yayınları, 1991), pp. 18-24.

<sup>89</sup> Kolars and Mitchell, p. 16.

<sup>90</sup> Official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Development Administration.

DPT, has found its final owner. Although until this date the DPT has carried out a series of works in order to perform similar duties, *it would not be correct to say that these projects properly possess the characteristics of regional development.*<sup>91</sup>

As the quotation above implies, the work performed within GAP until 1986 was not considered as having the necessary qualifications for regional development because the novel understanding of regional development was an “integrated” one, consisting of projects not only of irrigation and energy, but of some other sectors such as agriculture, industry, education, health, transportation, and communication as well.<sup>92</sup> In 1989, this idea and the prospective plans and projects in this direction were formulized by the Master Plan initiated by the DPT. In the following part, the Master Plan, which was usually referred as the “constitution of GAP,” will be discussed in terms of the notion of integrated development it envisaged. For the moment, suffice it to say that with the transference of the management of GAP to the DPT, and DPT’s formulization in the Master Plan of the new meaning GAP would acquire in terms of regional development, an institutional context was prepared for the transformation of the Project into a multi-sector, integrated development project.

However, in contrast to what the quotation above states, the DPT did not remain as the “final owner” of the project. In 1989, the project underwent another step in terms of institutionalization. The official newspaper announced that “the Southeast Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi) was established in 1989 for a period of fifteen years upon a

---

<sup>91</sup> Taylan Demircioğlu, “Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Etkileri.” In *Türkiye’de Bölgesel Politika*, p. 110. “2 Kasım 1985 tarih ve 3194 sayılı İmar Kanunu hükümlerince, bölgesel kalkınmanın planlanması Başbakanlık, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının görevleri arasına dahil edilmiştir. Böylelikle, evvelki İmar ve İskan ve şimdiki Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlıkları ile Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı arasında yetki karmaşasına neden olan bölge planlama görevi nihai sahibini bulmuştur. Her ne kadar Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, benzer görevleri yerine getirmek üzere anılan tarihe dek bir takım çalışmaları gerçekleştirmiş ise de, bu projelerin tam anlamıyla bölge planlama özelliği taşıdıklarını söylemek pek doğru olmasa gerek.” (emphasis added).

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 111.

government decree.”<sup>93</sup> Concerning the official status of the Administration, Polatoğlu wrote that “the GAP Administration is attached to the Prime Ministry as a separate public legal entity and its director is directly appointed by the Prime Minister.”<sup>94</sup>

According to the government decree, the GAP Administration was established to perform the following tasks:

To ensure the rapid development of and the investment in areas covered by the Southeastern Anatolia Project; to deliver or cause to be delivered services for this purposes including those in the fields of planning, infrastructure, grant of licenses; housing, industry, mining, agriculture, energy and transportation; to take or cause to be taken relevant measures to raise the educational level of people living in the region and to ensure coordination among different organizations and agencies involved in these activities.<sup>95</sup>

With the establishment of the GAP Administration, the responsibility of the realization of the development scenario envisaged for the region in the Master Plan by the DPT was transferred to a separate body responsible solely for the development of the GAP Region. This institution was organized on the basis of two offices: The head office in Ankara and a regional directorate in Şanlıurfa. The main responsibility of the GAP Administration was formulized in the following manner by the monthly journal of GAP: “The essential task of the GAP Administration is to perform all the works and facilities concerning the development of the Southeastern Anatolia Region in the light of a ‘comprehensive regional planning approach’ encompassing all social and economic sectors and in accordance with the objectives, goals, and strategies of regional development.”<sup>96</sup> Thus, the task of the GAP Administration, as stated above, can be summarized as performing the development goals envisaged in the Master

---

<sup>93</sup> *Resmi Gazete*, No. 20344, 6 November 1989.

<sup>94</sup> Aykut Polatoğlu, “Southeastern Anatolia Project and Administrative Organization” *METU Studies in Development* 22, no.2 (1995): 191-206.

<sup>95</sup> Official web page of GAP Regional Development Administration

<sup>96</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *GAP Dergisi* Year: 1, no. 3 (Sonbahar 1993).

Plan., summarized as “integrated regional development,” which refers to a novel understanding of development that envisages development not only as making infrastructural investments, but as improvements in all spheres of life.

The institutionalization of development planning in GAP through the establishment of the GAP Regional Development Administration, and thus the emergent notion of social development under the rubric of “integrated development” was a significant step taken in the transformation of the project from an infrastructure project into one in which “social development” had an ever-increasing importance in the 1990s. In the next chapter, a detailed analysis of the notion of social development which was developed and institutionalized within GAP throughout the 1990s will be presented. However, before moving on to the social development within GAP I will mention the historical context within which GAP, with its increasing emphasis on social development, acquired a novel meaning in the 1990s. As stated at the very outset, the regional development policies in general, and regional development envisaged by GAP in particular, cannot be totally grasped if the particular relationship between the “Kurdishness” of the population living in the region and the governmental policies are not taken into consideration. Accordingly, in the following part, I will discuss this relation briefly by focusing on the new meaning GAP acquired in the context of the armed conflict that was taking place in the region in the 1990s.

#### 1990s: The Context within which “Social Development” in GAP Emerged.

In this part, the focus of analysis will be the 1990s, for two interrelated reasons: The first is related to the path GAP followed after 1989. With the

preparation of the Master Plan in 1989, GAP was transformed from an infrastructure project into an integrated development project in which “social development” for the first time emerged as a concern. Thus, starting with the 1990s, social development increasingly gained significance and this culminated in a set of social research and social projects developed under GAP. The second reason for this focus on the 1990s concerns the particular historical conjuncture in which this transformation of GAP took place. This was the armed conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK which escalated and reached its peak throughout the 1990s, during which social development became a more urgent concern than ever within GAP. Therefore, this part will try to present how GAP became a representative of the efforts for the “social development” of the region in this historical conjuncture. That is to say, as the conflict escalated, the government sought means other than the military ones to deal with the Kurdish question in the region. Thus, in this context, GAP was turned into the major means of governmental efforts to prevent the “terrorism” through “social development” in the region.

The important point to emphasize here is that the aim of this study is not focus on this conflict *per se*, as this requires a comprehensive analysis which extends beyond the scope of this study.<sup>97</sup> Rather, here I focus on how the regional development policies towards the region in which this conflict was taking place were formed, reformed, and gained a different meaning in relation to this conflict. Thus, one more point requires clarification. The regional development policies and practices in Turkey in the 1990s as a whole is a broad issue elaboration of which is not the aim of this study. Instead, I interrogate how among the regional development efforts of the 1990s the Southeastern Anatolia Project was transformed into the major

---

<sup>97</sup> It is only after 1999, when the armed conflict was slowed down that a literature on this conflict started to emerge. See for example, Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler* (İstanbul: Doğan Yayıncılık, 2003).

means and representation of social development of southeast Anatolia which was the center of the armed conflict.

The armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan* or PKK) and the Turkish armed forces goes back to August 15, 1984 when the PKK made two attacks in the districts of Erüh and Şemdinli of the province of Siirt, in southeast Anatolia. After this time the conflict gradually escalated reaching its peak in the 1990s. The period between the 1984 and the 1990s saw the repression of the conflict only through the military means for the governmental policies concerning the region. However, starting with the 1990s, as the conflict deepened despite the harsh military measures, there emerged a new agenda for the governors in terms of dealing with the conflict. It was the idea that military means were not sufficient. That is to say, the suggestion was that, the struggle with “terrorism” required improvements in the life-standards of the population living in the region and thus this could only be possible through systematized, institutional development efforts which can bring prosperity to the region. Thus, these kind of “social” policies were considered as the only means that can prevent people from participating in the “terrorist” activities.

Before moving on to the examination of how social development of the southeastern Anatolia became a significant concern for the governmental policies and how this concern was embodied in the social projects developed within GAP, I want to mention how the Kurdish question turned into the subject of the day and how this interest culminated in a set of reports, plans and analyses prepared by both governmental and non-governmental bodies.<sup>98</sup> Here, one can observe that, for the

---

<sup>98</sup> For example, see *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti –Merkez Yürütme Kurulu, Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri* (Ankara: n.p., 1990); Ümit Özdağ (ed.), *Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi'nde ve Doğu ve Güneydoğu'dan Batıya Göç Edenlerde*

first time, the Kurdish question was problematized and discussed extensively among different circles as a result of the urgency generated by the ongoing, escalating, armed conflict in the region. This urgency to deal with the conflict in the region, together with the threat posed by the possible growth of support from the population among living in the region led the emergence of a novel interest towards the region and hence its population. This interest that stemmed from the urgency of dealing with the conflict generated some kind of a *normalization* process in the social imagination in terms of thinking, speaking, and writing on the Kurdish question. As the news of the escalating armed conflict inevitably became the point of the discussion, it was no longer possible to avoid the question.

This new interest generated by the actuality of the phenomenon came out initially as a willingness to know the region and population living there with all their characteristics. A series of reports about the Kurdish (or depending on the context southeastern) question were prepared by different bodies (such as political parties, the GAP Administration, and chambers of commerce). The important point to emphasize here is that, it does not come to argue that these different governmental and non-governmental institutions reached a consensus on the possible solutions to, or means of dealing with the Kurdish question. Their rationales, opinions and visions were diverse in terms of perceiving the issue and each of them deserves an analysis on its own. However, the point here is that, despite the differences between these bodies concerning their perceptions of the phenomenon, they were similar in terms of their newly emerged interest in the region, which was the plot for the ongoing conflict that was the source of their curiosity. Whether a report prepared by the

---

*Kültürel Yapı ve Kimlik Sorunu*, (Ankara: Türk Metal Sendikası, 1995); *Türkiye Odalar Borsalar Birliği (TOBB) Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tespitler* (n.p.: TOBB, 1995);

Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce;<sup>99</sup> or by the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* or SHP),<sup>100</sup> a political party then in opposition; or a survey conducted by the GAP Regional Development Administration, notwithstanding their differences of perception of the problem, the effort to attain an elaborated knowledge of the region and hence population remained the common concern for these reports and studies. In each context, acquiring the knowledge of the region might serve a different rationale, analysis of which extends beyond the scope of this study. However, reaching the knowledge of the region and population remained the common *technology* for all of these different bodies, whose major concern was to deal with the conflict situation which constituted a (separate) threat for each of them.

In the 1990s, then, as the discussion above demonstrates, the region in which the conflict was taking place and the population living in this region emerged as the objects of a different curiosity that sought for reaching the knowledge of them. As one of the popular journals of the time stated, in the 1990s, “the ‘Mountain Turks’ [had] suddenly turned into ‘10 million Kurds’”<sup>101</sup> in the social imagination. That is to say, this was the period during which the need to deal with the conflict rendered the region (southeast Anatolia) and the population (Kurds) observable, quantifiable, and thus controllable objects of a novel interest that aspired to know them better than ever.

---

<sup>99</sup> The Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce (*Türkiye Odalar Borsalar Birliği, TOBB*), “Eastern Question-Diagnoses and Facts,” (*Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tespitler*), (n.p.: TOBB, 1995).

<sup>100</sup> Central Executive Commission of the Social Democrat People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti –Merkez Yürütme Kurulu*), *The Perspective and Proposed Solutions of the Social Democratic People's Party on the Eastern and Southeastern Problems (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri)*, (Ankara: n.p, 1990).

<sup>101</sup> *Nokta*, 10 February 1991. Here the statement refers to a widely accepted perspective, or a kind of euphemism in the official nationalist discourse which claimed that Kurds are originally Turks living in the mountains.

Here, I focus on the emergence of this interest on the side of governmental policies and practices. The transformation of the region and the population into knowable objects can be observed in the government's perception of the issue and in the emergent policies and practices of the 1990s. Thus, GAP turned out to be the institutional mechanism in which this aspiration was embodied as a set of surveys, plans, and eventually concrete social projects.<sup>102</sup> That is, the governmental efforts to attain the knowledge of the population and produce programs to control it were materialized within the social projects of GAP. The reason for GAP to become a means of the materialization of this aspiration was due to the possibilities posed by its institutional structure, huge budget, and prestige. By the time social development became a significant governmental concern, GAP had already completed its institutionalization, which rendered it an appropriate means of carrying out social projects and services in the southeastern Anatolia. For the moment, however, rather than elaborating on the *techne* (the means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, techniques, technologies<sup>103</sup>) deployed through GAP to know the region, focus will be given instead to how this governmental aspiration to know, observe, and control the region and population through policies that aim at "social development" in the region were shaped in relation to the conflict situation.

In October 1989, a weekly journal, *Nokta* published an interesting, and for the aims of this study, significant, article titled as "No Limit in Services. (*Hizmette Sınır Yok*)"<sup>104</sup> The article was about a new package of measures for the Southeast

---

<sup>102</sup> Between 1992 and 1994, GAP-RDA conducted a series of surveys about the social characteristics of southeastern Anatolia and of the population living here. In these researches, the governmental aspiration to *know* the population is explicit. It is through these surveys that the target groups of various social projects were specified by GAP.

<sup>103</sup> Dean, p. 31.

<sup>104</sup> *Nokta*, 22 October 1989, p.22. "*Hizmette Sınır Yok*"

Anatolia prepared by the government and presented to the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK*). According to the article, the significant point concerning these measures was that they were prepared by government in response to the decisions taken by the recently convened PKK congress for southeast Anatolia. The journal presented the subject in the following manner:

[A]lmost all of the executive ministers had chosen the region [southeast Anatolia] as for services for the year 1990. . . .It was clear that the government's sudden insight concerning how to defeat the misfortune of the East had not emerged without reason. The first factor that facilitated the speed of understanding was over one hundred decisions taken against Turkey in the two-day long congress of the ERNK (a sub-organization of the PKK).<sup>105</sup>

As the excerpt indicates, the article states that the most significant reason underlying the government's increased efforts to bring services to the region was the PKK's decisions concerning the region. The important point here concerns the type of the decisions taken by the PKK in their congress. The article claims that in this congress "the PKK decided to offer services 'directed towards human' in the region."<sup>106</sup> In this manner, the "PKK would engage in the solution of the population's problems, ranging from meeting the material needs to solution of health problems, which could not be met by government."<sup>107</sup> The journal connected this to the government's attempts to offer these kinds of "human-oriented" services to the

---

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., "[i]cracı bakanların hemen hepsi de 1990 yılı için bölgeyi hizmet bölgesi olarak seçmişlerdi . . . Hükümetin, Doğu'nun makus talihinin nasıl yenileceğine ilişkin bu ani kavrayışının, durup dururken ortaya çıkmadığı ortadaydı. Öncelikli olarak, PKK'nin bir alt örgütü olan ERNK'nin iki gün süren kongresinde Türkiye aleyhine alınan yüzden fazla karar, kavrama hızını artıran birinci faktördü."

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., "PKK bölgede 'insana yönelik hizmet' götürmeye karar vermişti."

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., "Bölge halkının maddi ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasından, sağlık sorunlarının çözümlenmesine kadar, hükümet elinin uzanamadığı sorunların çözümü için PKK eli uzanacaktı."

region and pointed out to the similarity between the decisions of the PKK and those of government in terms of the services to be offered in the region. In this sense, for example, in response to the PKK's decision to offer health services to the population through mobile hospitals, the Ministry of Health had decided to increase its mobile hospitals, to offer general health check-ups, and to deliver tooth paste and tooth brushes to the population free of charge. That is to say, according to the article, "this important change of strategy of the PKK's had found its echoes in the Turkish government."<sup>108</sup>

The truth value of this article is of course open to discussion. However, the significant point is that, the idea that struggle against "terrorism" required intervention and improvements in all spheres of life had started to become an important item on the agenda of the governmental efforts at this time. The following week, an article titled "Investment Attack for the East (*Doğu'ya Yatırım Atağı*)"<sup>109</sup> appeared on the pages of the same journal. According to the article, "setting out from the decisions taken by the National Security Council concerning the development of thirteen provinces<sup>110</sup> in the East, the government prepared a set of measures which included radical proposals."<sup>111</sup> The reason for this was, the article stated, that "[i]n the time elapsed, the opinions of all the commanders had been clarified: 'In the East, the military power is sufficient for many things, but the underdevelopment [and] the

---

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., "PKK'nun yaptığı bu önemli strateji değişikliği Türk hükümetinde de yankı buluyordu."

<sup>109</sup> *Nokta*, 30 July, 1989, p. 24. "Doğu'ya yatırım atağı"

<sup>110</sup> These provinces include Adıyaman, Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Kars, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. Of these provinces, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır and Siirt are included in GAP.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. "MGK'da alınan Doğu'daki onüç ilin bir an önce kalkındırılması kararından sonra harekete geçen hükümet, radikal teklifler içeren bir dizi önlem belirledi."

economic conditions of the region continuously work against us. Therefore, especially the border areas should be developed immediately...”<sup>112</sup>

This is an important point in terms of emphasizing the increasing significance the development of the east acquired in dealing with the conflict in the region. As the excerpt reveals, there emerged at that time an insight on the side of the governors (including military) that the military measures were not sufficient in fighting against “terrorism.” Thus, in this conjuncture, “development” gained a novel meaning as it was started to be perceived as another realm of struggle with the conflict situation. The measures included in the government plan consisted of the provision of services in the areas of education, health, communication. In *Nokta*, there was also an interview conducted with one of the ministers of the time, Kamran İnan. In the interview, İnan stated that “the government already gives priority to the East. In the government program, in terms of the state’s not making investments except infrastructural ones, the only exception recognized is the East.”<sup>113</sup> In addition, the plan stated that “in one way or another, these thirteen provinces would be connected to GAP.”<sup>114</sup> This is indicative in terms of giving the signs of the increasing importance GAP gained as a sign or representation of the government’s development efforts in this period.

In this period, then, the issue of development of the east was generally thought of in relation to its importance in terms of preventing the people living in the region from participating in “terrorist” activities. In a meeting the subject of which

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., “Çünkü, geçen süre zarfında bütün komutanların görüşleri netleşmiştir: ‘Doğu’da asker gücü birçok şeye yetiyor ama kalkınmamışlık, bölgenin ekonomik koşulları sürekli aleyhimize işliyor. Onun için bilhassa sınır bölgelerinin bir an önce kalkandırılması gerekli...”

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 25. “Hükümet zaten Doğu’ya büyük öncelik veriyor. Hükümet programında altyapının dışında yatırım olmaması hususunda sadece Doğu’ya istisna tanınıyor.”

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p.25. “Söz konusu on üç ilin bir şekilde GAP’la bağlantısı sağlanacak.”

was “*Regions of Priority in Development (Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler)* and GAP,” Kamran İnan expressed his views about the development of the east, and stated that, “with the infrastructural investments made by the state in the region, the disparities in this sphere have been managed to a great extent . . . Now it is turn for the dissolution of the disparities in the *social* sphere.”<sup>115</sup>

In this period, the newspapers were full of news that informed the public about the services to be offered by the state to the region. The most important part of these public investments was made in the provision of services that aimed at the amelioration of living conditions in the region. For example, in *Hürriyet*, a popular newspaper, it was written that, “in a speech the minister of internal affairs Abdülkadir Aksu stated that they [government] were trying to solve the security problems together with the infrastructural problems.”<sup>116</sup> In the rest of the article, figures related to villages lacking water, roads, electricity, schools, and telephone lines were presented and it is stated that over five trillion Turkish liras of investments had been made by the state in these places. That is to say, the development of the east and the investments made by the state for the improvement of living conditions and the raising of the living standards in the region were the subjects of the day. Thus, it was reflected in the government policies of the period. For example, in the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1990-1994) can observe the increasing importance of social development of the region. In the plan, it was stated that, “regional development disparities [would be] reduced by focusing on new projects of social

---

<sup>115</sup> *Hürriyet*, 28 April, 1989. “Devlet Bakanı Kamran İnan, hükümetin doğuya yaptığı altyapı yatırımlarıyla, bu alandaki farklılığın büyük ölçüde halledildiğini kaydederek, ‘Şimdi sıra sosyal alandaki farklılığın eritilmesine gelmiştir. . . dedi,’ (Emphasis added).

<sup>116</sup> *Hürriyet*, 24 July, 1989. “İçişleri Bakanı Abdülkadir Aksu, yaptığı açıklamada, bölgede güvenlik sorunlarının alt yapı hizmetleriyle birlikte çözümüne çalıştıklarını belirtti.”

objectives alongside the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).”<sup>117</sup> Likewise, this kind of an approach can be seen in the government programs of the 1990s. For instance, in the program of the coalition government formed in November 1991 by Süleyman Demirel, it was stated that “special attention would be paid to the development of the East and the Southeast.”<sup>118</sup> Here the significant point is that, in the program, the measures to be taken for the development of these regions were connected to GAP and the project was presented as the major means to ensure development in these regions. Hence, in the program it was claimed that “GAP would be transformed into an ‘INTEGRATED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT’” with its, economic, social and cultural aspects . . . to extend beyond being only a project for irrigation and energy.”<sup>119</sup> In the following chapter examine the transformation of GAP from an energy and irrigation project into an integrated development project in which social development became a novel and important concern will be examined. For the moment, the point I want to emphasize is the increasing importance of the social development of the region in the governmental policies in this period and its relation to the political conjuncture mentioned above. That is, in the 1990s, in the governmental regional development efforts, the improvement in the life-standards of the population through social development programs became a concern more urgent than ever because, the measures to be taken for the social development of the region concealed an effort to control the population in the region in order to prevent them from engaging in “terrorist” activities, which

---

<sup>117</sup> Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, *Türkiye’de Bölge Planlamasının Evreleri*, p. 305. “Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) yanında sosyal amaçlı yeni programlara ağırlık vererek bölgelerarası gelişmişlik farkının azaltılması.”

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 307. “Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’nun gelişmesine özel bir önem verileceği . . . ”

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., “GAP’ın sadece bir enerji ve sulama projesi olmaktan öte; ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel yönleriyle. . . bir ‘BÖLGESEL ENTEGRE KALKINMA PROJESİ’ne dönüştürüleceği. . . .” (Emphasis original).

was the most important political concern in this conjuncture. In this period, the search for other means of dealing with the conflict in the region that would accompany and reinforce the military ones was an important concern. As the words of the commander quoted above reveal, the idea was that, “the military power was sufficient for many things”, but that the socio-economic conditions of the region were “working against” the fight with “terrorism.”

This was a period during which dealing with the conflict in the region became widely discussed by various circles ranging from political parties to non-governmental organizations, and chambers, etc. Thus, in these discussions “development” was the standard recipe put forth for the solution of the conflict. *Nokta* devoted many issues to these discussions. In one issue, the journal opens the stage for the discussions on the “searches for models” in southeastern Anatolia.<sup>120</sup> The article states that “for the solution of the Southeastern question, both government and opposition started to look for solutions beyond the military (*polisive*) measures.”<sup>121</sup> Then, the article gives an elaborate examination of the different parties’ proposals for the solution of the problem. In the programs prepared for the solution of the southeastern problem, non-military means, that is to say, the improvement of the living conditions and raising the living standards of the region constituted a significant agenda for both government and the opposition parties. For instance, in the model envisaged by the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) the government party of the time, it was stated that, “in order to prevent the population from becoming a victim (*av*) of the PKK, first of all, individual well-being (*ferdi*

---

<sup>120</sup> *Nokta*, 3 June, 1990, p. 17. “*Güneydoğu: Çözüm Arayışları.*”

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, “*Güneydoğu sorununda hem iktidar, hem muhalafet, polisive tedbirlerden öte çözüm arayışlarına girdi.*”

*rahatlama*) will be ensured.”<sup>122</sup> Thus, the program counted “increasing [the amount of] and supporting the incentives for the investments in the GAP region.”<sup>123</sup> One of the representatives of the party,<sup>124</sup> talking about the views of the government party concerning the southeastern question, expressed the opinion of the part in the following manner:

There has been some state of affairs in the region. And since the beginning of the 1980s this has been the most focused issue in the last decade. Especially *ANAP* after becoming the government has looked for solutions based on the economic welfare rather than military ones. And GAP is the best example of this. When GAP is completed, economic wellbeing will be ensured in the region. . . .”<sup>125</sup>

In the 1990s, as the discussion above reveals, the “development of the east” became a major concern in the face of escalating conflict in the region. In this period, there was almost a consensus on the significance of development as a means of dealing with “terrorism” among different circles, ranging from the military, to political parties and non-governmental organizations. Thus, the issue was not only one of ensuring economic well-being in an economically backward region; the development to be brought to the region would be an “integrated” one that would aim at amelioration in all spheres of the social structure. In this sense, social development policies were the proposed recipe. It was within this context that GAP started to be planned as an integrated development project that extended beyond a mere sum of infrastructural investments. That is to say, development in the social

---

<sup>122</sup> *Nokta*, 10 June, 1990, p. 36. “*Bölge halkının PKK'nın avı durumuna gelmemesi için birinci aşamada ferdi rahatlama sağlanacak.*”

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, “*GAP bölgesi yatırımları daha da teşvik edilip artırılabacak*”

<sup>124</sup> The vice-president of the Motherland Party’s party organization Ercan Vuralhan.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, “*Bölgede birtakım durumlar var. Ve bu 1980’lerin başından beri geçen on yıl içinde, üzerinde en çok durulan konu olmuş. Özellikle ANAP iktidara geldikten sonra, meselenin polisiye tedbirlerle çözümünden ziyade, ekonomik refaha dayalı çözümler aramıştır. İşte GAP bunun en güzel örneğidir. GAP bittiğinde bölgeye ekonomik bir rahatlama gelecek. . . .*”

sphere became an urgent concern in this context, the major determinant of which was an increasing armed conflict in the east, and GAP became a project that would embrace and represent these governmental policies and practices aiming at social development in the region.

The governmental efforts to offer social services to southeastern Anatolia through GAP, however, have another rationale. The provision of social services to improve the living conditions entailed an effort for the state to gain legitimacy in a region in which it was represented to a great extent by security forces because of the armed conflict. Social projects, carried out through GAP became another realm (apart from the military one) in which the “state” would gain another form of visibility, more as a caring, curing, and protecting body than as a disciplinary and punishing force.

In his book *Kürtler* (The Kurds) Hasan Cemal, a journalist, writes his memories of those years when the solution of the southeastern question was high on the agenda. In a remark from 1988, we can find the seeds of the new meaning GAP acquired in the 1990s:

Building “warm ties” between the local population and the state... Civilian or soldier whomever you talk to, you can hear this [statement]. From this aspect, that is to say, in terms of the alienation between the state [and] citizen, everybody recognizes the mistakes. . . The state should be rescued from being perceived as “the institution coming with the stick in hand.” Almost everyone has already learnt by heart as a principle that priority must be given to the economy and the problems of food (*aş*) and employment in order to “dry up the swamp.” Everybody agrees that the blows that will be dealt to poverty and unemployment will be blows to separatist terrorism. . . From this aspect, the greatest hope has been put on GAP, the Southeastern Anatolia Project”<sup>126</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup> Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), p. 92. “Yöre insanıyla devlet arasında ‘sıcak bağlar’ kurulması...Sivil asker kiminle konuşsan bu söz kulağına çalınabiliyor. Bu açıdan, yani – devlet-vatandaş yabancılaşması konusunda yapılan hatalar teslim ediliyor. . . .Devleti yalnız ‘eli sopayla giden kurum olmaktan çıkarmak lazım. ‘Bataklığın kurutulması’ için önceliğin ekonomiye, aş ve iş sorununun çözümüne ait olduğunu hemen herkes bir ilke olarak ezberlemiş durumda. Yoksulluk

Cemal's statements reveal that, in the context of the armed conflict where state was perceived by citizens only through its military force (i.e. as an institution coming with the stick in hand), the development promised by GAP (welfare and prosperity to be brought to the region) was conceived as the major means of eliminating the alienation between state and society. GAP, in this context, gained a key position. There are two points that require elaboration underlying the rationale behind this meaning attributed to GAP: The first one concerns the prospective material well-being that was to be ensured by the investments made through GAP. Poverty in this context was conceived by the governors as the major force that compelled people to become involved in "terrorist" activities. Once the population living in the region attained some degree of material well-being, it is argued, they would not support, or participate in "separatist" activities. That is to say, the development concerns in this context intermingled with those of security concerns.

Second, it was in this period that GAP was transformed into an integrated project which aimed at amelioration in all spheres of social life. The social development to be brought by GAP entailed the above mentioned concern (i.e. preventing the population from participating in the "terrorist" activities). In addition, the social programs to be offered through GAP to the population were conceived of as a means of eliminating the alienation between the state and the local population and reforming the relations between them. Because, state would no more be represented by its security forces, but by the economic opportunities and social services GAP would offer to the region. For the state, the provision of social services through GAP had turned into an appropriate means of gaining legitimacy in a region

---

*ve işsizliğe indirilecek darbelerin aynı zamanda ayrılıkçı teröre darbe olacağı konusunda kiminle konuşsan ağız birliği var . . . Bu açıdan en büyük umut GAP'a, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi'ne bağlanmış durumda."*

in which it was perceived by the people less as an institution that fosters the population through social services than as one that disciplines and punishes the local population for “security” reasons or “coming with the stick in hand.”

In this context, the emergence of social development as an important concern within GAP in the 1990s, and the social programs and projects it entailed should be considered in relation to the above-mentioned political conjuncture, which rendered GAP as a spokesperson for the governmental efforts to deal with the armed conflict and gain legitimacy in the region through social policies and practices.

## CHAPTER III

### AN ANALYTICS OF “SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT”

#### WITHIN GAP IN THE EARLY 1990s

This chapter analyzes the “social development” GAP entailed through an examination of the basic documents which constructed the social development within GAP. In the previous chapter the historical conjuncture in which GAP gained a novel meaning in the context of the armed struggle taking place in the southeastern Anatolia in the 1990s was presented. It was the period in which “social development” emerged as a concern within GAP. In the following analysis, I will present how this concern (i.e. social development) was materialized in GAP through an analysis of the Master Plan (1989) and the Social Research Projects (1992-1994). In this chapter, how the notion of social development was perceived, constructed, and transformed within GAP in the early 1990s will be presented.

As stated at the very outset, in this study, I consider “development” as a “regime of practices,” and accordingly, in this chapter, I discuss the institutionalization and professionalization of social development within GAP as a regime of practices. Furthermore, in the analysis of the basic texts in which social development was constructed, how social development was determined as a sphere that required institutionalized intervention by government will be examine. This entails the analysis of the *visibilities* of social development envisaged by GAP. That

is to say, the way certain problem areas are specified as demanding improvement through social development projects. In this way, one can examine the way “who or what is to be governed” is determined through these social projects of GAP. The Master Plan and the Social Research Projects, apart from specifying the problem areas, presented the means, mechanisms, instruments and technologies that were to be deployed in the provision of social services, which require an examination of the *techne* of the social projects. Thus, in the analysis below, the technical aspect, or the *techne* of social development within GAP, will be investigated together with an examination of the forms of thought, or means of calculation (i.e. *episteme*) underlying these projects. Development as a regime of practices, as stated above, specifies certain categories (e.g. “backward”) as demanding improvement, and furthermore, it attributes the characteristics of these categories to some social groups and renders them the target of its programs. That is to say, development attributes certain *subjectivities* to some sectors of society. In the analysis below, how certain subjectivities are presupposed by GAP will be examined while specifying some groups as “disadvantaged” or “target groups” that need to be addressed by the social projects to be developed within GAP.

#### The Seeds of the Social Aspect in GAP: The Master Plan (1989)

In the examination of the notion of social development envisaged within GAP, the first document to be analyzed here is the GAP Master Plan, which is the place where we observe the first signs of the emergence of the social sphere as a realm of intervention within GAP. Thus, this makes it necessary to analyze the Master Plan in terms of the notion of social development it envisages.

The GAP Master Plan, defined as a “regional planning study (*bölge planlama çalışması*),”<sup>127</sup> was initiated by the State Planning Organization (DPT) and conducted by a consortium composed of a Japanese (Nippen Koe) and a Turkish (*Yüksek Proje*) company.<sup>128</sup> The studies for the plan started in 1988 and were completed in 1989.<sup>129</sup> The Master Plan was a “general frame for the regional development”<sup>130</sup> and accordingly, designated the general goals, strategies and frameworks of development, and the periodization and institutional provisions for the realization of these goals.<sup>131</sup> In the Plan, the basic aim of the preparation of this Plan was stated as follows: “The Master Plan Study is an attempt to complement the execution of the original GAP projects and to formulate the concrete measures which will situate these projects within the framework of consistent and integrated long-term regional development plans. The basic objective of this study is to support the execution of GAP through the provision of a guide and a tool that will facilitate the integration and coordination of the development efforts of various state institutions.”<sup>132</sup>

The “original GAP Projects” mentioned above refer to the energy and irrigation projects constituting the basis of GAP since the initial years of the project. In the Master Plan, however, the idea was to complement these original projects of GAP with the development efforts in especially the agricultural and industrial

---

<sup>127</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *GAP Dergisi*, year 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 5.

<sup>128</sup> Özer, *Modernleşme ve Güneydoğu*, p. 81.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Official web page of GAP Regional Development Administration.

<sup>131</sup> See T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Master Plan Çalışması Master Plan Nihai Raporu* (Ankara: TCBDPT, 1990).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 3. “*GAP Master Plan Çalışması, orijinal GAP projelerinin yürürlüğe konmasını bütünlenecek ve bu projeleri tutarlı ve entgre uzun vadeli bölgesel kalkınma planları çerçevesine yerleştirecek somut önlemlerin formüle edilmesi girişimidir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, çeşitli devlet kuruluşlarının kalkınma çabalarının bütünleştirilmesi ve eşgüdümlemesini kolaylaştıracak bir kılavuz ve araç sağlayarak GAP’ın yürütülmesine destek olmaktadır.*”

sectors. The development objectives of GAP were presented under three categories as: general development, agricultural development, and industrial development.”<sup>133</sup>

The general development goals refer to the basic objectives of the plan concerning the development of the region and its relation to national development. The first of these goals was described as “to increase the income levels in the GAP Region through the strengthening of the economic structure and thus to narrow the differences of income between the GAP Region and other regions.”<sup>134</sup>

As stated previously, basically, GAP was launched and presented as a “regional” development project and the statement above refers to this “regional” dimension. Thus, while aiming at the development of the region, it also targeted “national” development, which constituted another general goal stated in the plan: “Through the efficient utilization of the resources of the region, to contribute the national objectives such as economic growth on its own, and the encouragement of social stability and export.”<sup>135</sup>

Yet the basic development scenario envisioned for the region was stated as “transforming the Region into an export center based on agriculture.”<sup>136</sup>

Accordingly, the development of agriculture and the investments in the sectors related to agriculture (e.g., irrigation, stock raising, fishing, and forestry) constitute a significant part of the development goals. The “industrial development” goals stated in the plan are also based on this basic objective of the development of the region on

---

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. “*Ekonomik yapıyı geliştirerek GAP bölgesindeki gelir düzeylerini yükseltmek ve böylece GAP bölgesi ve diğer bölgeler arasındaki gelir farklılıklarını daraltmak.*”

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. “*Bölge kaynaklarının etkili kullanımı yoluyla, kendi başına ekonomik büyüme, sosyal istikrarın ve ihracatın teşviki gibi ulusal amaçlara katkıda bulunmak*”

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., p. 5. “*GAP Bölgesi için temel kalkınma senaryosu, Bölgeyi ‘Tarıma Dayalı İhracat Bölgesi’ haline getirmektir*”

the basis of agriculture. For example, in the industries which promised progress (*ümitvar sanayiler*) and in the ones which were of strategic importance (*Stratejik önem taşıyan sanayiler*), agricultural products held a significant weight.<sup>137</sup>

An important aspect of the plan was that it presented an elaborate description of the region in terms of its existing conditions and the prospects it promises in these sectors. Thus, detailed descriptive and quantitative data about the region constituted a significant part of the document. In addition to the description of the existing situation and the designation of prospective development scenarios, the plan presented institutional measures to be taken in various spheres in order to realize its objectives. These sectors include agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry and fishery, industry, trade, infrastructure, and the urban sector.<sup>138</sup>

This pluralization and diversification of the sectors to be developed within the scope of GAP was the novelty brought by the Master Plan. It was described in the monthly journal of GAP as follows: “The Master Plan, completed in 1989, designated the development framework of the region at the macro level in terms of *all* of its sectors; thus, put forth the sub-regional works which should be performed on a sectoral basis to support the macro framework.<sup>139</sup>”

Thus, after the designation of the Master Plan, the project was defined as a multi-sector, integrated development project, referring to the idea that development was a total phenomenon leading to changes and requiring improvement in *all* sectors.

---

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 8. Here, in addition to industries related to construction and packaging, the ones related to grain, cotton, food oil, and animal products are presented as industries “promising progress.” This is the same for the industries which have “strategic importance.”

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., pp. 23-27.

<sup>139</sup> *GAP Dergisi*, Year 1, no.3 (Autumn 1993), p. 9. “1989 yılında tamamlanan GAP Master Plan çalışması, makro ölçekte olmak üzere bölgenin tüm sektörleri itibariyle kalkınma çerçevesini belirlemiş, ayrıca makro çerçeveyi destekleyecek ve sektörler bazında yürütülmesi gereken alt bölge çalışmalarını ortaya koymuştur.” (emphasis added).

The statements below properly summarized this novel notion of “integrated development” brought by the Master Plan:

The GAP Master Plan, which draws the general frame for regional development paid particular attention to linking investments for the development of water and land resources to a time schedule by considering both the financial and technical capacities projected for *changes in economic and social sectors, employment, population and its spatial distribution induced by this development*; assessed at the macro level the needs for education, health, housing and urban infrastructure.<sup>140</sup>

As the quote indicates, considering the possible changes that the development of the water and land resources would create in the other spheres the Master Plan envisaged interventions in other sectors. The “social” sphere was one of these above-mentioned spheres which would undergo changes as a result of the investments in the physical sectors, such as irrigation and energy. However, the “social” sphere and the policies and practices to be carried out for this end are not presented as a separate section in the Master Plan. Nevertheless, throughout the text, the objectives, strategies and necessary measures related to the social sphere were often referred to in relation to the other sectors. Yet the important question concerns how the notion of “social” and “development in the social sphere” were formulized in the Master Plan.

The plan, states that “in relation to economic growth, the development of the social services sector is a must, too.”<sup>141</sup> At this point, what is implied by “development in the social services” is not clarified, but in the rest of the text it is possible to find the implications of this statement. For example, “to minimize the tendencies for external migration through the enhancement of employment

---

<sup>140</sup> Official web site of the Southeast Anatolia Regional Development Administration. (emphasis added)

<sup>141</sup> *Master Plan*, p. 3. “*Ekonomik büyümeyle bağlantılı olarak sosyal hizmetler sektörünün geliştirilmesi zorunludur.*”

opportunities”<sup>142</sup> was presented as one of the goals of the Plan. Despite being posed as one of the agricultural development goals, the enhancement of employment opportunities was one of the services directly related to the lives of individuals, which may properly render it a social service. Likewise, one of the industrial development goals was formulized as “the enhancement of the image of the GAP region and the development of the social welfare and the motivation of people through playing a role as demand-creator for training and education.”<sup>143</sup>

The development of educational services was an issue elaborated later in the plan. For the moment, suffice it to say that the enhancement of employment and education opportunities was an issue problematized as services to be provided in the social sphere. However, these are mentioned within the development goals of the agricultural and industrial sectors and their expected impact on society. The enhancement of employment opportunities aimed at to ensure the prevention of migration, or to say it differently, the maintenance of the rural population in the places they inhabited. Likewise, the development of the educational services was considered in relation to the potential of industrial investments to create demand for educated people in the region. That is to say, the services to be provided in the social sphere were considered simply in relation to the possible effects GAP might create in the region.

In the following pages of the plan, however, the services to be provided in the social sphere *per se* were more explicit. Among the frameworks of development, human resources were problematized as a separate part. Despite having a small place within the overall bulk of the plan, this part sheds some light on the general insight of

---

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. “İstihdam olanaklarını artırarak kırsal nüfusun dışa göç etme eğilimlerini en aza indirmek”

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. “eğitim/öğretim için bir talep yaratıcısı rolü oynayarak GAP bölgesinin imajını, toplumsal refahını ve halkın motivasyonu geliştirmek”

the “social” in the text. According to the plan, “the development of human resources is not only an objective for successful regional development, but is an aim in itself.”<sup>144</sup> Thus, the objective of the “development of human resources was two-fold: The first was the reversal of the tendency of net external migration from the region.”<sup>145</sup> As stated above, the provision of the social services to the population living in the region is considered as a major means of the maintenance of the people in the region.

The second aim was the development of the human force in the region.<sup>146</sup> Here, the term “human force” implied fostering the population in a way to render them qualified, productive and healthy subjects engaging in the agricultural and industrial production processes which would be developed by GAP in the region. In the rest of this part, the Plan presents the necessary measures to be taken for the realization of the development of human resources. This clarifies what was implied by the phrase “development of the human force.”

The first set of measures concerned education and health services. The first of these involves “making the different levels of attaining educational services (education levels) (*okullaşmalar*) reach at least today’s level of national averages before 2005, and the improvement of the education and health services in the GAP region in terms of the provision of health facilities and personnel”<sup>147</sup> Here, the solution of the long-lived problems of the region concerning education and health

---

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p. 19. “*İnsan kaynaklarının gelişimi, yalnızca başarılı bir bölgesel kalkınma için değil; daha önemlisi kendi başına bir amaçtır*”

<sup>145</sup> Ibid. “*Bölge dışına net göç eğilimini tersine çevirmek*”

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. “*Bölge içindeki insan gücünü geliştirmeyi hedeflemektedir*”

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. “*Farklı düzeylerdeki okullaşma oranlarının 2005 yılına kadar en az bugünkü ulusal ortalamaya ulaştırılması, sağlık tesislerinin ve personelinin teminine ilişkin olarak GAP bölgesindeki sağlık ve eğitim hizmetlerinin iyileştirilmesi*”

services and the elimination of their relative underdevelopment with respect to national levels were included in the objectives of GAP.

The second element of the measures related to health services was “monitoring and controlling the epidemics which may increase with the widespread irrigation and pond constructions.”<sup>148</sup> This one can be considered as a preventive measure aimed at the alleviation of the possible negative impact GAP might have on the region. The second set of measures concerned technical training and education. Here, the encouragement of technical training and education about agriculture and stock-raising was emphasized.<sup>149</sup> In addition, the assistance of widespread education in accordance with the concrete needs of the region such as “weaving, handicrafts, and household economy,” was proposed. The last set of measures was summed up under the title “services of higher level.”<sup>150</sup> This involves the “the improvement of the general image of the region by opening up an institution of high education and in the long term the establishment of facilities which will perform high-level functions such as international conferences and technology development.”<sup>151</sup> As the measures proposed in the realm of education, these “high-level” measures set out to equip the population with the necessary qualifications which would be required by the prospective developments to be generated by GAP.

The above-mentioned social services envisioned by the Master Plan for the region can shed some light on the roots of the social dimension of GAP, which constituted the basic theme of this chapter. The first thing to stress here is that the

---

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. “*Yaygın sulama ve göletlerin tesisi sonucu artabilecek hastalıkların izlenmesi ve kontrol edilmesi*”

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. “*Daha yüksek düzeydeki hizmetler*”

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. “*Yakın bir gelecekte önemli bir yüksek öğrenim kurumunun açılması ve uzun vadede uluslararası konferanslar ve teknoloji geliştirme gibi daha yüksek düzeyde fonksiyonları yerine getirecek tesislerin kurulması yoluyla, Bölgenin genel imajının iyileştirilmesi.*”

development in the social sphere did not constitute a separate space in the Master Plan. Among the development objectives and strategies, the social sphere was not taken as an exclusive realm in which to intervene. Instead, the issue was formulated as the “provision of social services” and problematized under and in relation to the other spheres, such as industry and agriculture, considered as the main sectors to be developed by GAP. However, this was not to say that the Master Plan in general did not have implications in terms of the development in the social realm. As the discussion above demonstrates, in the Plan, the provision of the social services was referred to at many points.

The important question here concerns the way the plan constructed the “social” and “social services.” With a quick glance, in terms of the notion of the “social development” it entailed, what can be seen in the Master Plan is, as Maia Green states, is a “conventional” understanding of “social development” which refers to “planned development outcomes that prioritize social impacts, often through the social sectors of health and education.”<sup>152</sup> In the Master Plan, the provision of educational and health services was stated as an objective of GAP. However, the plan went beyond the basic aim of providing the fundamental humanitarian services and set forth the development of “human force” as an objective. Here, equipping the population with the necessary technical learning and skills through the provision of relevant opportunities for education was put forth as the basic means of the development of human force in the region. Here, again, the implied reference was to the social realm; but it stemmed less from the requirements of the population than the requirements of the regional development plan *itself*, which demanded educated, skillful, and qualified individuals who could engage in productive activities.

---

<sup>152</sup> Maia Green, “Social Development: Issues and Approaches.” In Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue (eds.), *Development Theory and Practices* (China: Palgrave, 2002), p. 52.

In addition, the provision of social services had another objective. In the plan, migration from the region to other parts of the country was presented as a problem. Here “migration” and migrating people were rendered *visible* as problems areas to be solved and managed. However, migration from the region, which had a multitude of underlying reasons (such as economic problems, the poor quality of social services, or the armed conflict) was considered as a homogenous enterprise that stemmed only from economic problems. Accordingly, the means and mechanisms proposed for the maintenance of the population in the region depended on this limited understanding of migration. The development of human resources was the proposed means of managing migration, which again referred to a limited understanding of the problem and its solution. Once the basic source of migration was taken as only economic problems, then in order to maintain the population in the region, the proposed solution concerned the provision of the basic social services, such as employment, that were to be offered by the development efforts of GAP in the industrial and agricultural sectors. It was declared that development in these spheres and the employment opportunities supplied by these sectors would stop the migration of the people from the region. That is to say, migration was problematized and rendered as a realm of governmental intervention in the plan, but from a narrow and homogenizing manner depending more on the requirements of the Project (GAP) than the social phenomenon.

Overall, it can be argued that, despite the absence of an exclusive section concerning development in the social realm, the development framework envisioned by the Master Plan included implications for the provision of social services within the scope of GAP to the region. The development framework designated by the plan was an “integrated, multi-sector” development aimed at development in the multiple

spheres of life. In this context, the provision of the “social” services was handled either in a way to facilitate the development in other spheres, or in relation to the possible impacts of the changes in other spheres (e.g. the construction of dams, new irrigation methods, or new industries) might have on the social realm.

The important thing here is that in time, however, this idea was developed and the GAP Administration conducted four “social surveys” between 1992 and 1994. In the light of the results of these surveys, the GAP Social Action Plan (*Sosyal Eylem Planı*) was prepared as a document “drawing the general frame for social development.”<sup>153</sup> These surveys and the resultant Social Action Plan did what the Master Plan did not: The development in the social sphere was designated as an exclusive realm requiring special plans, policies and practices. These surveys and the Social Action Plan drew the framework for the subsequent social projects organized for the specific needs of different social groups in society. The elaboration of these social surveys and the Social Action Plan constitutes the subject of the following part.

#### Social Research Projects and Social Action Plan

In 1992, the GAP Administration set out to conduct a series of social research projects. These studies are important for the aims of this study because it was for the first time with them that “social” development emerged as an exclusive realm of intervention within GAP. In the Master Plan (1989), which had drawn the path GAP would follow in the following years, social development was taken in relation to the possible impact of the infrastructural investments on the GAP social structure and population, and the interventions in the social realm aimed at the facilitation of the

---

<sup>153</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Development Project.

functioning of the project. Accordingly, the notion of “social development” in the Master Plan remained limited to the provision of the basic needs of the population (such as education and health) and fostering the population to equip them with the necessary skills and qualifications to engage in productive activities, which will facilitate the development process envisioned by GAP.

However, with these studies emerged a different understanding of the “social” within GAP, as a separate realm within the entire GAP project. Here the notion of social development extended beyond the basic aim of the provision of education and health services. Social structure and the plurality of the components that constitute it, that is to say, different social sectors and their diverse needs and requirements, seemed to be recognized and rendered the target of numerous policies and programs that would respond to the different demands of various social sectors. In these studies, compared to the Master Plan, was evidenced a will to obtain more detailed and sophisticated information about the social structure and population.

These studies which were conducted between 1992 and 1994, were the “Research on the Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region (*GAP Bölgesi Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması*, 1993),” the “Research on Population Movements in the GAP Region (*GAP Bölgesi Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırması*, 1994),” the “Research on the Problems of Resettlement and Employment in Areas to Remain under Reservoirs in the GAP Region, (*GAP Bölgesi Baraj Göl Aynası Altında Kalacak Yörelere İstihdam ve Yeniden Yerleştirme Sorunları*, 1994),”<sup>154</sup> and the “Research on the Status of Women in the GAP Region and Their Integration into the Process of Development (*GAP Bölgesinde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine*

---

<sup>154</sup> Within the scope of this study, I will not elaborate on the “Research on the Problems of Resettlement and Employment in Areas to Remain under Reservoirs in the GAP Region, as the other three studies are considered more indicative in terms of the notion of social development GAP entailed at that time.

*Entegre Edilmesi Araştırması*, 1994).” The overall objective of these studies was described as “to develop a better understanding of the socio-economic and cultural make up of the region; to identify the needs, expectations, attitudes and tendencies of the society in general and specific social groups; and to identify the special target groups (especially those in disadvantaged position) in development.”<sup>155</sup>

The studies focusing on different themes were conducted by different institutions.<sup>156</sup> However, they all shared some common characteristics stemming from this overall objective of the social research of GAP expressed in the quotation above. The studies, first of all, set out to obtain detailed information about the population living in the region. Thus, each of them included a descriptive part consisting of information about the characteristics of the population related to the subject of the research. These detailed descriptions included a great deal of quantitative information derived from the survey conducted. Here, the aim was to acquire concrete data to specify problem areas and to propose policy alternatives in the light of this information.

Arturo Escobar, in his analysis of development as a regime of practices argues that, “development . . . provides a space [for the developed world] in which poor countries are known, specified, and intervened upon.”<sup>157</sup> Here, the significant point is that this aspiration to know everything about the object (i.e., region and

---

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> All of these researches were commissioned by the GAP Administration; but they were conducted by different institutions. The “Research on Trends of Social Change was conducted by Chamber of Engineer- Agronomists (*TMMOB-Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası*) “Population Movements in the GAP Region” was conducted by Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology; “Status of Women in the GAP Region and Their Integration to the Process of Development” was conducted by the Turkish Development Foundation (*Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı*); and the “Research on the Problems of Resettlement and Employment in Areas to Remain Under Dam Lakes in the GAP Region” was conducted by Association of Sociology (*Sosyoloji Derneği*).

<sup>157</sup> Escobar, “The Invention of Development,” p. 384.

population) to be developed, corresponds to a will to “intervene upon.” In these social studies of the GAP, one can witness this relation between the will to “know” the population, and to “intervene upon” it through various programs that would be developed in accordance with the knowledge acquired about it. These entailed, to state in the words of Escobar “an unprecedented will to know everything”<sup>158</sup> about the southeastern Anatolia and the population living there. Thus, these social researches, in the context of GAP, prepared the ground for the successive interventions in the problem areas through social projects (such as those prepared for women, or the youth).

In the previous chapter, the emergence of a novel interest in Turkey in the 1990s concerning southeastern Anatolia and the Kurdish population living there as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region between the Kurdistan Workers` Party (PKK) and the Turkish armed forces was mentioned. A series of reports were produced by different bodies dealing with the solution of the southeastern or Kurdish “question.” The source of this novel interest in the region, which was materialized in a series of reports, was the urgency of learning the dynamics associated with the characteristics of the region which was the plot, or the source of, the conflict continuing in this period. The GAP research projects were the products of this political conjuncture, too. That is to say, the decision to engage in elaborated social surveys about the region and the population corresponded to the period during which the solution of the Kurdish question, which had become the subject of the day, and social development of the region were perceived by the government as another means (that would accompany and reinforce the military ones) of ending the armed conflict in the region. In this context the governmental efforts to deal with the

---

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 385.

Kurdish question were materialized in the notion of social development carried out within GAP. Thus, these social research projects can be considered as the products of these governmental efforts to “know” the region and the population in order to “intervene upon” and control it.

In the relation between the “will to know” and the “will to intervene upon,” the significant point to emphasize is that the ability of “development” to establish its authority so as to intervene in its object stems from the way development acquires this knowledge. According to Escobar, this is the “professionalization of development,” through which development acquires the knowledge of its object, and establishes its authority to intervene upon it. “Professionalization,” Escobar states, is “accomplished through a set of techniques, strategies, and disciplinary practices that organize the generation, validation, and diffusion of development knowledge, including the academic disciplines, methods of research, and teaching criteria of experts and manifold professional practices.”<sup>159</sup> It is through these mechanisms that development establishes certain categories (such as “developed”) as the norm and evaluates the characteristics of its object in accordance with the norms determined by these mechanisms of professionalization. That is to say, it was through these mechanisms that, as Escobar states, “a politics of truth is created and maintained through which certain forms of knowledge are given the status of truth.”<sup>160</sup>

In the context of the social research projects of GAP one can see that it was through the deployment of these mechanisms (e.g. “methods of research,” “criteria of experts”) that these researches attain the knowledge of the population which render later interventions not only possible but also legitimate and necessary. These studies

---

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

were conducted by bodies that had an institutionalized authority on the issue for which they were conducting the research. For instance, the “Research on the Problems of Resettlement and Employment in Areas to Remain Under Dam Reservoirs in the GAP Region” was conducted by the Association of Sociology (*Sosyoloji Derneği*). Similarly, the “Research on the Population Movements in the GAP Region” was conducted by Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology. The GAP Administration turned to the expertise of the Association of Sociology, or an academic institution (Middle East Technical University) in order to specify the problem areas through an elaborated examination of the population. In the light of the results acquired through this research, which was conducted by an establishment that had institutionalized expertise about the issue, the GAP Administration selected the problem areas and put forth certain plans and programs to deal with these problems. As Escobar states, “at stake was a politics of knowledge that allowed experts to classify problems and formulate policies, to pass judgments on entire social groups and forecast their future.”<sup>161</sup>

In these studies, the elaborated information about the population which was acquired through these mechanisms of professionalization worked in a way to specify the problem areas in the region. Here we can see how certain areas are defined as problematic and in need of development policies and practices. Escobar claims that, “development proceed[s] by creating ‘abnormalities’ (such as the ‘illiterate,’ the ‘underdeveloped,’ the ‘malnourished,’ ‘small farmers,’ or ‘landless peasants’) which it would later treat and reform.”<sup>162</sup> In the studies examined for this paper, the similar process of the specification of the problem areas was clear.

---

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 41.

Furthermore, these problems were attached to some sections of the society that were rendered the target of developmental efforts. This referred to the specification of target groups which would be treated in order to handle their “problematic” characteristics and adapt them to the pre-determined norms (such as “developed”) set forth and rendered authoritative through the institutionalized and professionalized mechanisms of development.

In the GAP studies we can find the similar mechanisms that specify the problem areas and attribute them to some sectors of society. Each study identified a “target group” which would be addressed by specific projects and policies designated for their specific “needs, expectations, and demands.” The target groups were to be composed of certain sections of the population already in disadvantaged positions (e.g. women), or the sections which would be influenced by the GAP policies in a negative way (e.g. people who will be influenced negatively by the construction of dams in the region). The statements of the Director of the GAP Administration may light on the stated rationale behind the social projects and the way the “target groups” are specified:

GAP . . . will lead significant social transformations in the Southeast Anatolia Region where it is being implemented. To estimate the direction of this transformation in a correct way depends, to a great extent, on the degree to which the present social structure is identified with its dynamics. This, though, requires scientific research on the social structure of the region. With such a study, *the social elements which might hinder the attainment of the project to its goals in an effective way* and possible negative social effects of the project will be determined; therefore it will be possible to take the necessary measures in advance and prepare projects which can be adopted by society.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *GAP Bölgesinde Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması: Sonuç ve Öneriler*, (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1993), p. i. “GAP, uygulanmakta olduğu Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgemizde toplumsal dönüşümlere yol açacaktır. Bu dönüşümün yönünü doğru olarak kestirebilmek, büyük ölçüde, bölgedeki mevcut toplumsal yapının, dinamikleriyle bilinmesine bağlı bulunmaktadır. Bu ise, bölgenin toplumsal yapısı üzerine bilimsel bir çalışmayı gerektirmektedir. Böyle bir çalışma ile, projenin hedeflerine etkin bir biçimde ulaşmasını engelleyecek toplumsal öğeler ve projenin olabilecek olumsuz toplumsal etkileri saptanarak, önceden gerekli

Then, on the surface, the target groups of the social researches depended to a great extent on the groups' positioning in the transformation processes led by GAP. Target groups were "the social elements which might hinder the attainment of the project to its goals." Accordingly, depending on the context, women, migrants, landless peasants, youth, and so on might be specified as a disadvantaged group in order to be the target of special projects. Thus, these studies, the elaborated knowledge of the social structure and population they possessed, and their policy proposals seemed to intend to facilitate the implementation of GAP.

While these studies were being carried out, the organizations conducting them, academics, representatives from the State Planning Organization and the GAP Administration came together and established the GAP Commission for Social Research and Action in order to prepare an "action plan" on the basis of the results of these studies.<sup>164</sup> After holding regular meetings, this commission prepared the GAP Social Action Plan (*Sosyal Eylem Planı*) in 1994, "which [would] constitute the framework for implementations."<sup>165</sup> The reason behind the Social Action Plan seems to have been derived from the notion of integrated regional development and it set out to "constitute the framework for the implementations related to *human dimension*."<sup>166</sup>

The Social Action Plan was not only a summary of the results of these studies, but was also an effort for the systematization of the policy options proposed

---

*tedbirlerin alınmasına ve toplum tarafından benimsenebilecek tarzda projelerin üretilmesine olanak sağlayabilecektir.*" (emphases added).

<sup>164</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1995), p. 2.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid. p. 3. "*insan boyutuna yönelik uygulamalara çerçeve oluşturma . . .*" (emphasis added).

by each study. The Action Plan, just like the studies, presented a description of the region, and mentioned the characteristics of the region which might hinder the smooth implementation of GAP. In the end, the Social Action Plan came up with “policies, strategies, and action plans” to eliminate the potential obstacles for the success of the Project. Again, “target groups” to be addressed were specified by these policies. Looking at some aspects of these studies and resultant Social Action Plan in detail may shed light on how they defined problem areas, specified target groups, and presented policy options.

“Research on the Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region:”

Problematization of Settlement, Population and Social Structure within GAP

The study called “Research on the Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region” was conducted in 1992. The aim of the project was “to derive the socio-economic profile of the rural and urban communities within the GAP area and to find out with its dynamics the changes GAP [would] create in this structure.<sup>167</sup> Setting out from this aim, the survey was conducted through field research based on random sampling. At the end, the results of the survey, the conclusions arrived at, and policy recommendations were published as a detailed two-volume report of about 1,500 pages. The results and relevant policy recommendations were presented under the titles of “settlement and infrastructure,” “population,” “agriculture,” “industry,” “health,” “education,” and “participation.” After presenting the current conditions and problems, the policies and programs necessary for the solution of these problems

---

<sup>167</sup> *GAP Bölgesinde Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması: Sonuç ve Öneriler*, p. 1. “GAP alanına giren kırsal ve kentsel toplulukların sosyo ekonomik profilini çıkarmak ve bu yapıda GAP’ın yaratacağı değişimleri dinamikleriyle birlikte saptamak amacıyla gerçekleştirilen araştırma . . .”

were proposed. These categories stated above referred to the areas which were considered as problematic and required amelioration or transformation through planned interventions.

When we look at the way the study formulated the problems in the region it seems that the determination of problem areas depended on the way they inhibited the smooth-functioning of the Project. The description of the structure of “settlement” in the region and the relevant policies presented for this issue properly exemplified this idea:

A scattered and dispersed order of settlement composed of numerous units of small population is prevalent in the region. The fact is that it is neither rational, nor cost-efficient to offer services to each of these units of settlement, a significant part of which are deprived of physical and social infrastructure and services. Therefore, it is possible to select some units of settlement that have convenient positioning and potential for development, and concentrate infrastructure and services in these units, which will not only decrease cost through the creation of centers of gravity (attraction), but also make it possible to control and steer the intra-region population movements.<sup>168</sup>

Here, the dispersed order of settlement was specified as a problem increasing the cost of the services to be offered to the region, and the solution proposed here was the physical and social integration of sub-village (*köyaltı*) settlements, especially hamlets (*mezra*), with villages to which they are tied. This type of dispersed settlement has been the long-established form of settlement in east and southeastern Anatolia. In the research this phenomenon, which had geographical, economic, cultural, and historical reasons behind it, was presented as a “problem” area to be

---

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p. 2. “*Bölgede az nüfuslu çok sayıda birimden oluşmuş yaygın ve dağınık bir yerleşme düzeni egemendir. Önemli bir kesimiyle fiziksel ve toplumsal alt yapı ve hizmetlerden yoksun olan bu yerleşim birimlerine ayrı hizmet götürmenin, ekonomik maliyeti çok yüksek olduğu gibi, rasyonel olmadığı da bir gerçektir.*

*Bu nedenle fiziksel konumu elverişli ve gelişme potansiyeli olan kırsal ve kentsel kimi yerleşim birimlerinin seçilerek alt yapı ve hizmetlerin bu birimlerde yoğunlaştırılması ve böylelikle yaratılan çekim (cazibe) merkezleriyle hizmetlerin maliyeti düşürülürken bölge içi nüfus hareketlerinin denetlenip yönlendirilmesi olanaklıdır.”*

intervened through GAP. Thus, the rationale for the problematization of this phenomenon was stated as “cost-efficiency” in the provision of services. In accordance with the increasing significance of social development in the 1990s’ context, there seems to have been a great deal of governmental efforts to provide social services to the region *without delay*. However, it resulted in focusing on the end-points (such as “dispersed settlement) which was the product of a multitude of (geographical, economic, cultural, etc.) processes, which was neither mentioned nor problematized in the study.

In the research, the “nomad communities” were presented as a problem area, too. It was stated that “nomad communities who continually change their places between mountain pastures (*yaylak*) and sheltered areas (*kışlak*) following the herds, face not only economic losses but they are also deprived of modern life conditions. Thus, this mobile life has some social implications generating various problems.”<sup>169</sup> Taking the “nomadic” life as a problem area, the research proposed the policies to solve this problem and contended that “it is appropriate to follow a policy of settlement (*iskân*) encouraging these communities to settle on land, or taking the necessary measures to ensure that they earn their lives in the places where they live.”

<sup>170</sup> Here, mobile life was rendered *visible* as a problem area, and nomad communities were defined as non-modern since “they lack modern life conditions.” As stated before, putting the “modern” (which was never clarified in its discourse) as the norm development discourse labeled some sections of society (here, the nomads) as non-modern, and set out to treat them to eliminate their “abnormalities.” Here

---

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p. 2-3. “Hayvan sürüleri peşinde yaylak ve kışlaklar arasında sürekli yer değiştiren göçebe topluluklar, ekonomik yitimlere uğradığı gibi, çağdaş yaşam koşullarından da yoksundur. Bu hareketle (sic) yaşamın, çeşitli sorunlara yol açan toplumsal içerimleri de vardır.”

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 3. “anılan toplulukların toprağa yerleşmelerini özendirici ya da başka yerlerde geçimlerini sağlayıcı bir yerleştirme (iskan) politikasının uygulanması uygun olur.”

again, the development discourse took a multi-dimensional social phenomenon which was the product of multiple processes and relations, and approaches it as a mere “abnormality” which should be normalized *immediately*.

The Social Action Plan, setting out from these results, presented concrete policies and strategies to deal with the problem of dispersed population and nomad communities. In other words, it elaborated the policies to be implemented for the target groups specified by the research. One of the means of controlling these population movements put forth by the Social Action Plan was to “take the necessary measures to encourage the population to center in the central villages and middle-size provinces.”<sup>171</sup> The Plan also presented the necessary administrative arrangements to confer some villages the status of central village. Thus, another element of the action plan was to “give priority to those villages specified as central village and the middle-size provinces in terms of the completion of their physical and infrastructures.”<sup>172</sup> The technologies to be deployed for the integration of the dispersed settlements to the center were administrative arrangements (such as making some villages “central” villages) and giving priority to them in the provision of services. Here again one can observe the sense of urgency in the treatment of the long-lived features of a region which were rendered as “problematic.”

In the study, the section on population is also indicative in terms of demonstrating the processes of the identification of problem areas and the target groups to be addressed by specific projects and policies:

The most outstanding demographic characteristic of the population of the region is its rate of growth which is higher than

---

<sup>171</sup> *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı*, p. 35. “nüfusun merkez köylerde ve orta büyüklükteki köylerde yoğunlaşmasını sağlayacak tedbirler alınacaktır.”

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36. “Belirlenen merkezi köyler ve orta büyükteki kentlerin fiziksel ve sosyal altyapılarının tamamlanmasına öncelik verilmelidir.”

that of overall country average. The high rate of population growth not only enlarges the number of household members (*its size*), and thus forces the living conditions; but with the hard demand it creates, it also leads the public services and employment opportunities to remain insufficient. The population pressure is the leading cause of low living standards in the region.<sup>173</sup>

Here the high-rate of population growth was identified as the major cause of the poverty in the region.<sup>174</sup> It was stated that this tendency for families to have many children (*çok çocukluluk*) was both economic and cultural. As families needed human force to maintain production, having many children was encouraged by customs and traditions.<sup>175</sup> After the identification of the problem (i.e. the high-rate of growth) as such, the study again presented the policy options and the target groups to be addressed by them: “Thus, to restrain the rate of population growth becomes possible through, above all, the reduction of the need for human force especially in the villages (rural enterprises). The method for this is the substitution of human force (organic power) by mechanical power.”<sup>176</sup>

The mechanization of agricultural production was proposed as the solution for the problem of the high-rate of population growth among the rural population. The study also proposed more direct solutions to deal with the problem, such as teaching methods of birth-control to the villagers. Here, the study stated that “the

---

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., “*Bölge nüfusunun başta gelen özelliği, ülke ortalamasının üzerindeki artış hızıdır. Nüfus artış hızının yüksekliği, hanehalklarının birey sayısını (büyüklüğünü) artırarak geçim koşullarını zorlarken, yarattığı ağır taleple kamu hizmetlerinin ve istihdam olanaklarının yetersiz kalmasına yol açmaktadır. Nüfus baskısı, bölgedeki düşük yaşam standardının başlıca sorumlusudur.*”

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid. “*Bu nedenle, nüfus artış hızının frenlenememesi, her şeyden önce, özellikle köylük yerlerde insan gücüne duyulan gereksinimin azaltılmasıyla olanaklıdır. Bunun yönetemiyse, insan gücünün (organik gücün) yerini mekanik gücün almasıdır.*”

selection of young people and women for these [birth-control] programs is the most effective way for the achievement of the goal.”<sup>177</sup>

Apart from being the target of birth-control programs, the youth would be addressed by another set of policies to restrain the high rate of population growth. “The major means” of the transformation of the “framework of the extended family” into “modern nucleus family” was “to ensure the diversification of occupations.” This would liberate the youth from their dependencies on the family enterprise and encourage them to acquire skills in areas of the economy other than agriculture.<sup>178</sup>

The Social Action Plan addressed the population issue, too. It was stated that to deal with the high birth rate it was essential to take “the necessary measures to bring down the mortality rates of infants, children and mothers, and fertility rates to at least national averages.”<sup>179</sup> And this involved “increasing family-planning services, ensuring the availability of these services, and education of couples and the youth.”<sup>180</sup>

Without doubt, the governments’ preoccupation with “population problem”<sup>181</sup> was not a new phenomenon. However, the emergence of population growth as a realm of problematization for development policies went back to the 1970s, when population has started to be taken as one of the major parameters of development. Barbara Duden states that, up until the 1970s, “population [was] treated as one of

---

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., p. 4. “*Bu programlar için hedef kitle olarak gençlerin ve kadınların seçilmesi, amaca ulaşmada en etkin yoldur.*”

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı*, p. 35. “*Bebek, çocuk ve anne ölüm oranları ile doğurganlık oranlarını en azından ülke ortalamalarına yaklaştıracı önlemler alınacaktır.*”

<sup>180</sup> Ibid. p. 36 “*aile planlaması hizmetlerinin artırılması, bunlara ulaşılabilirliğin sağlanması ve eşlerin-gençlerin eğitilmesi.*”

<sup>181</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 35.

*external* factors in the development calculus, a given like a country's rivers or subsoil.”<sup>182</sup> However, “in the mid-1970s,” she argues, “population growth [came] to be seen as one among many inter-related processes,” and it was “treated as an endogenous factor of the developing ‘system.’”<sup>183</sup>

However, the emergence of population growth and birth-control as realms of management within GAP was a product of the 1990s. In the context of the 1990s, when the social development of southeastern Anatolia became a more significant concern for the government than ever, population growth was problematized and rendered the target of various programs (such as teaching birth-control methods) to be developed within GAP. Prior to the 1990s, population growth had not been taken as a problem to be managed in GAP. In the Master Plan, in which we observe the first signs of the emergence of the notion of social development within GAP, the population issue was not problematized in this manner. There was not a governmental will to intervene in the reproductive matters of the population through planned programs. However, in the 1990s, when the high-rate of population growth in southeastern Anatolia became a preoccupation for governmental policies towards the region, as it is the case in this study, population was presented as a problem area to be subjected to governmental intervention through services to be developed within GAP.

This was related to the transformation of GAP in this period into a project which articulated and represented the government's increasing concern for the “social” development of southeastern Anatolia. At this time, the notion of social development within GAP extended beyond the mere aim of the provision of social services to intervention in almost all aspects of the social body, including

---

<sup>182</sup> Barbara Duden, *Population* in Sachs, p. 149. (emphasis original).

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

reproductive issues. While the social development envisaged within Master Plan remained limited to the provision of basic needs (such as education and health services) and equipping the population with the necessary technical learning to render them qualified and productive individuals in the development process, the social development aimed at through these studies was a more comprehensive one that problematized the notion of population with all its dynamics, including the reproductive matters using scientific and technological instruments to manage it.

The study included a section on education. Setting out from the fact that the demand for education and the level of instruction were low<sup>184</sup> in the region, the research elaborated on the causes of this situation: “Recently, though, in the anarchic environment of the region, the terrorist pressure and attacks on schools –especially on teachers- has left some schools without teachers and thus to the interruption of instruction. These active (*eylemli*) obstructions are not only relatively recent, but also local incidents. To put it differently, the cause of the problems of education and instruction in the region is not the lack of schools and teachers.”<sup>185</sup>

The research determined what the source of the problem was *not* and related the issue to the problem of “dispersed, small units of settlement common in the region” and stated that “it is apparent that bringing schooling services to each of the sub-village settlements of which number extends beyond the that of villages, let alone exceeding the resources, is neither rational, nor economic.”<sup>186</sup> The solution

---

<sup>184</sup> “GAP Bölgesinde Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması, p. 9.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p. 9. “Gerçi son yıllarda bölgedeki anarşik ortamda okullara –özellikle öğretmenlere-yönelik terörist baskı ve saldırılar, kimi köy okullarının öğretmensiz kalmasına ve öğretimin kesintiye uğramasına yol açmıştır. Ancak bu eylemli engellemeler görece yeni olduğu gibi, yerel olaylar niteliğindedir. Başka bir deyişle, Bölgedeki eğitim sorunlarının nedeni okulsuzluk ve öğretmensizlik değildir.”

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p. 9. “sayıları köy sayısını aşan köy altı yerleşimlerinin her birine okul hizmeti götürmenin kaynakları aşması bir yana, rasyonel ve ekonomik olmadığı da açıktır”

proposed was to establish school-bus services to take the children to the center to benefit from the educational facilities focused in the rural and urban centers.<sup>187</sup>

Likewise, the strategies and policies put forth in the Social Action Plan were in line with the study's statement concerning the problem of the dispersed population. Thus, some of the strategies were based on the idea of offering educational services to peripheral villages through "establishing primary education schools in central villages and carrying out the education of the children in peripheral villages in these schools [in the central villages] by 'carrier (*taşımalı*) system'"<sup>188</sup> Hence, in contrast to what the research claimed, the low level of schooling in the region was identified as a problem in the Action Plan, and the constitution of "a long-term plan to make the level of education levels in the region reach the national averages"<sup>189</sup> was presented as a policy in the Plan.

While identifying the reasons behind the low level of demand for education in the region, the study noted the fact "the mother tongue of a significant portion of the local population is not Turkish." However the study did not state what the language of the population was. There was an explicit insistence on to not enunciating that the mother-tongue of the majority of the population living in the region was Kurdish. In the study it was claimed that, "children start to learn Turkish at the age of primary school" and "this not only reduces the effectiveness of the school, but also decreases students' level of success."<sup>190</sup> Therefore, the study stated

---

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>188</sup> *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı*, p. 38. "Merkez köylerde sekiz yıllık ilköğretim okulları kurularak ve 'taşımalı sistem'e geçilerek çevre köylerdeki çocukların eğitiminin bu okullarda yapılması."

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p. 37 "Bölgedeki okullaşma oranlarının Türkiye ortalaması seviyesine ulaşması için uzun vadeli bir plan yapılarak."

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., "Çocukların özellikle ilkokul çağında Türkçe öğrenmeye başlamaları, okulun etkinliğini azalttığı gibi, öğrencilerin başarı düzeylerini düşüren bir etkidir."

that, “in order to reduce the unfamiliarity of children with the language of instruction stemming from the difference of their mother-tongue, and to increase their chance for success, pre-school education must be given special attention.”<sup>191</sup> However, in the Social Plan, the issue of “language” was not mentioned at all. Here “pre-school education was emphasized without mentioning the motive behind this necessity. Rather, it was stated that “in order to increase the effectiveness of formal and informal education in the region, pre-school education programs will be opened and made widespread.”<sup>192</sup> Thus, neither in the section describing the region, nor in the one stating the policies and strategies Action Plan did mention the issue of language which was presented as a problem area in the report.

As a last point, the study’s analysis of social structure will be mentioned. The idea behind this part is explained as follows in the report: “Regional development is not merely the development of the physical or social infrastructure or economic development. The ultimate aim of development is the constitution of the conditions of a developed social structure and modern life. Such a development involves the transformation and renovation of the social structure *with all its institutions and relations.*”<sup>193</sup>

Thus, the study recommended that social structures and relations which inhibit the development process in the GAP region should be transformed, too. “The region is

---

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 10. “Çocukların ana dillerinin farklılığı nedeniyle, okul diline olan yabancılıklarını azaltmak ve öğrenimde başarı şanslarını artırmak üzere okul öncesi eğitime özel bir önem tanınmalıdır.”

<sup>192</sup> Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı, p. 37. “Bölgede örgün ve yaygın eğitimin etkinliğinin artırılması için okul öncesi eğitim programları açılacak ve yaygınlaştırılacaktır”

<sup>193</sup> GAP Bölgesinde Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması: Sonuç ve Öneriler, p. 10. “Bölge kalkınması, salt fiziksel ve sosyal alt yapı gelişmesi ve ekonomik kalkınma değildir. Kalkınmanın son hedefi, gelişmiş bir toplumsal yapının ve çağdaş yapının koşullarını oluşturmaktır. Böyle bir gelişme, toplumsal yapının tüm kurum ve işleyişleriyle değişmesini ve yenileşmesini içerir.” (emphasis added)

economically and socially closed”, the report noted, and depended heavily on “traditional social organization forms such as *aşiret* [tribe], (*şeyhlik* [sheikh] and, *ağalık* [the leader of the tribe is called as ‘agha’ who is the major authority of the region and local big landowner].”<sup>194</sup> “These traditional structures are obstacles to development process,” the research argued, and therefore “an attempt like GAP, which will accelerate the structural transformations in the region, should recognize those characteristics of the region which might create obstacles to change.”<sup>195</sup>

In his analysis of the “modern-traditional” dichotomy deployed in the development discourse, Escobar states that, “in spite of the fact that the . . . researcher/economist is mandated to share the time of the other- the ‘native,’ the ‘underdeveloped’-. . . this other is nevertheless represented as belonging to another time period . . . in such a way that a specific power relation is created.”<sup>196</sup> This kind of a misconception of time is essential for development to justify its interventions in those sections of society which are represented as belonging to another time period.

In the case of GAP, in a similar manner, development works through the dualism of “tradition” and “modernity.” These social formations (*aşiret*, *şeyhlik*, *ağalık*) were problematized as they are considered as being obstacles to the transformation process started by GAP in the region. In this sense, they were presented as the remnants of a past era, which had to be dissolved in order to open the way for modernization to be brought by GAP. Setting out from this dualism some sections of the population were labeled as “traditional” formations that inhibit the transformation (modernization) process.

---

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p. 11. “Bu nedenle GAP gibi bölgede yapısal değişmelere ivme kazandıracak olan bir girişimin, toplumsal yapının değişme yönünde engeller yaratabilecek olan özelliklerini tanıması gerekir.”

<sup>196</sup> Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 78.

Describing these formations as the elements of the past, the research stated that they constitute “the obstacle for change.” This meant that these groups were not defined as the target of development efforts. The research stated that in order to accelerate change, then, “the transformation process should start from the social groups which are least resistant to changes.” In this context, the social group most susceptible to change was identified as the youth.

In the Action Plan too, the traditional structures were problematized and it was stated that “the effectiveness of modern organizations and institutions would be enhanced in order to accelerate the dissolution of the traditional organizations which impede development.”<sup>197</sup> Thus in the Plan, “the reconstruction of local governments, the encouragement of non-governmental organizations, and using local leaders who can be functional in terms of modern organization and participation”<sup>198</sup> were presented among the strategies to facilitate the transformation process.

Examination of the Research on Trends of Social Change in the GAP Region and the GAP Social Action Plan simultaneously sheds light on the way the two documents describe the region and specify the target groups for the necessary policies and strategies to be implemented by GAP. Overall, what we observe in the study was the problematization of, and a will to intervene upon, the population and various elements associated with it, such as population growth, type of settlement and the social formations. Thus, as the analysis demonstrated, depending on the problem area, nomads, women, and the youth were identified as the target group and the relevant policies were proposed in line with this description.

---

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., “*Geleneksel örgütlenmelerden kalkınmaya engel teşkil edenlerin çözülme sürecini hızlandırıcı yönde çağdaş örgüt ve kurumların etkinliği artırılacaktır.*”

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., pp. 34-35.

“Research on the Population Movements in the GAP Region:”

Managing Migration within GAP

Among the studies commissioned by GAP, one titled “Population Movements in the GAP Region” also deserves attention in terms of its description of the region and determination of the problem areas. Conducted by the Department of Sociology at the Middle East Technical University in 1994, it used a questionnaire method and random sampling. According to the President of GAP, conducting research on the population movements was necessary as “population and population movements are among the basic parameters to take into account in the process of planning.”<sup>199</sup> “In the GAP Region,” he argued “as a consequence of the regional development disparities, intra-regional and extra-regional [*bölge içi* and *bölge-dışı*] migration is intensive” and in a region “like Southeast Anatolia where population mobility is so intensive, and within the framework of the planning efforts of a comprehensive multi-sector project like GAP, the importance of determining the dynamics of population correctly cannot be ignored.”<sup>200</sup> Thus, the study was necessitated by the conditions of the region in which migration was widespread, and the planners needed to *know* the characteristics of the movements in the region in order to “forecast what kind of trends the population may follow under the impact of GAP.”<sup>201</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *GAP Bölgesi Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırması: Yöneticiler İçin Özet*, (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1994) (no page number) “*Nüfus ve nüfus hareketleri, planlama sürecinde temel parametrelerdir.*”

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. “*Özellikle Güneydoğu gibi nüfus hareketliliğinin çok yoğun olduğu bir bölgede ve GAP gibi kapsamlı ve sektörlü bir proje çerçevesinde yapılacak planlama çalışmalarında, nüfus dinamiklerinin doğru olarak saptanmasının önemi yadsınamaz*”

<sup>201</sup> Ibid. “*Bu ise . . . GAP’ın etkisi altında kalan nüfusun ne türden yönelimlere gireceğinin belirlenmesini gerektirmektedir.*”

The study was conducted with samples composed of rural and urban (those living in squatter settlements) residents, and seasonal and permanent migrant workers.<sup>202</sup> It aimed to find out “the conditions of the population living in the GAP Region which might change as a result of the recently accelerated social, economic and cultural transformations, their intentions to change places, the possibility of return for those who have already migrated to places outside the GAP Region, the contributions they might make for the region, and also the expectations related to all these issues.”<sup>203</sup> As the elements of this aim indicated, the research centered on two issues: the seasonal and permanent migration out of the GAP region and the possibility of their return; and the population movements within the GAP region. Thus, with these questions in mind, the study arrived at a set of conclusions presented in detail.

First, the study stated that “the intra-GAP region city and town centers receive migration basically from the units of settlement within the borders of the same city.”<sup>204</sup> This referred to the internal character of the migration. Consequently, “the GAP region has lost its rural character in terms of population and an urban character has become dominant.”<sup>205</sup> Of course, there were many social and economic implications of this situation and the research elaborated on them in detail. For instance, the rural population was quite young, uneducated and constituted the

---

<sup>202</sup> Those go to Çukurova as seasonal workers, and those migrated to metropolises in the Western regions to work without taking their families with them.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p. 3. “*Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, GAP bölgesinde yaşayan nüfusun son yıllarda hızlanan sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel dönüşümler sonucu değişebilecek konumları, yer değiştirme niyetleri, halen GAP-dışı bir bölgeye sürekli olarak göç etmiş bulunanların geriye dönüş olasılığı ve Bölgeye yapabilecekleri katkıları yanısıra bütün bunlara ilişkin beklentileri saptayabilmektir.*”

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p. 5. “*GAP-ıçi il ve ilçe merkezleri göçü esas olarak aynı ilin sınırları içindeki yerleşim birimlerinden almaktadır.*”

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., “*Sonuçta GAP bölgesi nüfus açısından kırsallık vurgusunu kaybederken kentsel özelliği ağır basar hale gelmektedir.*”

unskilled labor force in the cities.<sup>206</sup> As a result of the underdevelopment of the industrial sector in the cities, the chance of working as waged-labor was limited. Therefore, the study claimed, a large portion of those people who migrated to the cities engaged in marginal activities as “street vendors, porters, and grocers to earn their livings and thus “the division of labor and specialization” remained quite limited in the population of the squatter towns (*gecekondus*).<sup>207</sup> However, the study argued that although the rate of unemployment seemed quite high in the cities it was misleading, because people making their earnings through this kind of temporary works were included in the unemployment figures. So the problem could not be defined as absolute unemployment, (*mutlak işsizlik*), but rather, it concerned “working without social security, instability, irregularity, and poverty.”<sup>208</sup> Thus, “despite being above the limit of hunger the income of a big portion of the population [in the GAP region] is not above the poverty level.”<sup>209</sup> These people migrated to urban centers which did not provide them with a regular income (at least above the poverty level) because of what are called *push* factors.<sup>210</sup> That is to say, “the pressure of population growth, losing the agricultural land (*topraksızlaşma*), the fragmentation of land or mechanization of agriculture, months of unemployment, low productivity and low income, and increasing difficulty of making livelihood through animal husbandry make it increasingly difficult to maintain the conditions of

---

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., p. 7. “Sorun mutlak işsizlikten çok güvencesiz çalışma, istikrarsızlık, düzensizlik ve yoksulluktur anlamına gelmektedir.”

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. “açlık düzeyinin üzerinde olmakla birlikte çoğunluğun gelirleri yoksulluk çizgisinin üzerinde değildir.”

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

existence in rural areas.”<sup>211</sup> Nevertheless, “despite employment, lack of guarantee, and hard living conditions” the findings of the study indicated that “a big majority thinks in favor of the city and does not think of returning to village.”<sup>212</sup> The conditions forcing the rural population to migrate to the cities, which failed to offer them even their basic needs, were summed up by the research in this manner. Then, the survey argued that “the attractive aspect of the city is not economic, but rather those characteristics which can be assessed in terms of the quality of life.”<sup>213</sup>

Considering all these points, the study reached the conclusion that “the future of the population of the region will be shaped in the cities and planning has to take this statement as the basis”<sup>214</sup> and presented the policies of population movements to be followed. These concerned the development of cost-efficient and practical settlement policies which would reduce social problems to the minimum in the cities, and revived places with the potential for industry and investments.<sup>215</sup>

As stated before, in line with the findings of the research, the Social Action Plan formulized strategies, policies, and action plans concerning the population movements in the region and stated that “necessary measures will be taken to lead the population to central villages and middle-sized cities.”<sup>216</sup> As a corollary of the

---

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 8. “Artan nüfus baskısı, topraksızlaşma ya da toprak parçalanması, tarımın makinalaşması, aylar süren işsizlik, düşük verim ve düşük gelir, hayvancılığa dayalı geçimin giderek zorlaşması ailelerin kırsal bölgelerde varolma koşullarını sürdürmelerini giderek zorlaştırmaktadır.”

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 10. “İşsizlik, güvence eksikliği ve güç yaşam koşullarına rağmen büyük çoğunluk kent lehinde düşünmekte ve köye dönmeyi pek fazla düşünmemektedir.”

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., p. 19. “kentin çekici yanının ekonomik olmaktan çok yaşam standardı bağlamında değerlendirilebilecek özellikleri olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.”

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., “bölge nüfusunun geleceği kentlerde biçimlenecektir ve planlama bu saptamayı esas alam durumundadır.”

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>216</sup> Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı, p. 35. “nüfusun merkez köylerde ve orta büyüklükteki kentlerde yoğunlaşması sağlanacaktır.”

research's argument that the attraction of the cities stemmed less from the economic opportunities they presented than the quality of life they promised, the Action Plan proposed the "development of the infrastructural services in central villages and middle-size cities . . . in order to offer social services (education, health, etc.)."<sup>217</sup>

In addition, the issue of language was addressed in the report. According to the survey, a large percentage (73 %) of the village samples composed of the heads of households stated that their mother-tongue was Kurdish. 93% of them said that they spoke Turkish as a second language.<sup>218</sup> Setting out from the idea that the cultural identities are shaped around the language spoken, the research related the issue of language to the phenomenon of migration and contended that "pluralism [in terms of the plurality of ethnic identities] facilitates the migration movements and makes adaptation to the places migrated easier."<sup>219</sup> In the light of these assumptions and findings of the survey, the report contended that "it will be appropriate to analyze the issue within the framework of the cooperation between sociology and anthropology, and to shape the policies jointed with the matter of cultural identities in accordance with the findings of this study."<sup>220</sup>

However, although the research problematized the issue of language and proposed policies, the Social Action Plan once more ignored the issue and did not specify any strategies or policies about it. While the previous study took the issue in the context of the problems of education, this study considered it in relation to

---

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., p. 36. "Sosyal hizmetlerin (eđitim, sađlık, vb.) verilebilmesi iin gerekli altyapı hizmetlerinin merkez kylerde, orta byklkteki kentlerde . . . geliřtirilmesi ve yođunlařtırılması."

<sup>218</sup> GAP Blgesi Nfus Hareketleri Arařtırması, p. 23. "Ky rneklemindeki aile reislerinin %73' Krtenin konuřtukları esas dil veya anadil olduđunu belirtmiřlerdir. Ana dili Trke olmayanların konuřtukları ikinci dile baktıđımızda kylerdeki hane reislerinin % 93' Trke bilmektedir."

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., "Bu konunun sosyoloji-antropoloji iřbirliđi erevesinde incelenmesi ve kltrel kimlik konularıyla eklemlenmiř politikaların bu arařtırmanın bulgularına řekillendirilmesi uygun olur."

migration and the plurality of cultural identities. Thus, both of these studies presented the issue as a problem area requiring specific policies. However, in the Social Action Plan the issue was not mentioned at all.

In general, “Population Movements in the GAP Region” focused on the issue of recently increased migration in the region. The research aimed to derive an elaborated knowledge of the implications of the population movements for the functioning of the development plan. Thus, it presented a detailed description of the characteristics of the population movements in the region and of the tendencies of the migrating population. The relevant policy options derived from the findings of the survey and formulized in the Action Plan focused on the efforts to offer social services in villages and medium-size cities in order to prevent the flow of the population to the big cities.

“Research on the Status of Women in the GAP Region and Their Integration to the Process of Development:” Development of Women and GAP

The last study to be discussed here is “The Status of Women in the GAP Region and Their Integration to the Process of Development (*GAP Bölgesi 'nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması*),” conducted by the Turkish Development Foundation (*Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı*) in 1994. Like the ones mentioned above, this study included a descriptive section on the current conditions and problems of women living in the region. But, this one presented policies, strategies, and action plans as a separate report prepared exclusively on this

theme.<sup>221</sup> It differs from the first two also in that it was based on a pre-determined social (target) group (i.e., women). The other studies determined the target groups in the light of the findings of the survey but this one determines the target group from the very start as “women” and the results of the survey worked towards elaborating this broad category of “women” and specifying policies for their diverse needs from different sectors. The fact that “women enjoy the benefits of the social development less and have difficulties in attaining some services”<sup>222</sup> constituted the basic idea behind the study.

The study had two objectives: to “redefine the existing status of women . . . in the GAP region depending on scientific data,” and to “develop concrete suggestions towards the improvement of the status of women in the provinces of GAP, and to raise the level of their social influence and prestige.”<sup>223</sup> “The status of women” was taken as the main dependent variable and was determined by “labor burden in the household,” “the status of women in the structuring of power and authority,” “extra-household relations” and “the share they take from production.”<sup>224</sup> These

---

<sup>221</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *GAP Bölgesi'nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Eylem Planı* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1994).

<sup>222</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *GAP Bölgesi'nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Yöneticiler İçin Özet*, (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1994), (no page number) “kadınların toplumsal gelişmenin nimetlerinden daha az yararlandığını, birtakım hizmetlere ulaşmakta güçlük çektiklerini . . . görmekteyiz”

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., p. 3. “Bölgedeki kadının, çoğunlukla bilindiği varsayılan mevcut statüsünü bilimsel verilere dayanarak yeniden tanımlamak, GAP illerindeki kadının durumunu iyileştirmeye, toplumsal etki ve saygınlık düzeyini yükseltmeye yönelik somut öneriler geliştirmektedir.”

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. “ana bağımlı değişken olan ‘kadının statüsü’ nün ‘hane içi iş yükü’, ‘kadının yetki ve güç yapılanmasındaki konumu’, ‘hane dışı ilişkileri’ ve ‘üretimden aldığı pay’ tarafından belirlendiği varsayılmıştır.”

independent variables were fixed at three different levels as society/community, household, and the individual.<sup>225</sup>

In the paper, the women of the region were examined under two broad categories, “women in the rural area”<sup>226</sup> and “women in the urban area.”<sup>227</sup> The characteristics of women under these broad categories were examined in terms of “family and marriage, education and health, usage of borrowing/credit, occupation areas, attitudes and expectations, and being aware of GAP and expectations [from GAP].”<sup>228</sup> The study described the conditions of women from these aspects with figures expressed in percentages. The problem areas to be dealt with were not presented exclusively. The questions asked and the answers systematized demonstrate what was taken as problematic about women in the region. For example, the section on family and marriage presents the figures related to “the age of marriage, polygamy, bride-price, marriage with relatives, official vs. religious marriage, and decision-making process of marriage.”<sup>229</sup> This offers us an idea of what was identified as problematic by the study. In the same way, the section on education presented the figures of women’s levels of education. The findings again demonstrate the problem, as seventy-six per cent of the women were illiterate.<sup>230</sup> The section on health presented only the figures related to the proportion of women

---

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. “Bağımsız değişkenler toplum/topluluk, hane ve birey olmak üzere üç ayrı düzeyde tasarlanmıştır.”

<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>228</sup> See ibid., pp. 11-25. “Aile ve evlilik, eğitim ve sağlık, borç/kredi kullanımı, uğraş alanları, tutum ve beklentiler, ve GAP’tan haberdar olma ve beklentiler.”

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., pp. 11-12.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

having health problems and of those using birth-control.<sup>231</sup> There is also a section on borrowing/debt, which appears a bit odd here, as it seems to have stemmed more from the policies determined in advance (e.g. giving financial credit to women) than from the findings of the survey. The study points out the “lack of any special projects in the region providing women with credit via official organizations or banks”<sup>232</sup> which seemed to be determined by the study as a problem area to be addressed.

Yet, concerning the matters identified here, the above mentioned Action Plan, prepared exclusively on the basis of this research, put forth the strategies to be followed. The objective of the Action Plan was to “identify the target groups to be included in the projects, to relate these groups with general and sectoral objectives of GAP and to put forth main project areas to ensure the integration of women into the regional development.”<sup>233</sup> Here, the identification of “target groups” referred to determining which groups of “women” would be selected among all. Thus, according to the study, “to classify the projects as rural and urban area women projects and in these areas to give priority especially to the women of low socio-economic status should be the basic policy.”<sup>234</sup>

Identifying the target group as such, the Plan presented the strategies to be adopted by these projects. Thus, “within the scope of GAP,” the Plan contended, “women’s projects, first of all, should be based on the development of SKILL and

---

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., p. 14. “*Bölgede resmi kuruluşlar ya da bankalar aracılığıyla kadınların kredi kullanımını sağlayıcı herhangi özel bir proje bulunmamaktadır.*”

<sup>233</sup> *GAP Bölgesi’nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Eylem Planı*, p. 3. “*Eylem Planı’nın amacı, kalkınma kapsamına alınacak hedef grupların belirlenmesi, bu grupların GAP’ın genel ve sektörel hedefleriyle ilişkilendirilmesi ve bölgesel kalkınmaya kadınların entegre edilmesini sağlamak için temel proje alanlarının ortaya konmasıdır.*”

<sup>234</sup> Ibid. “*Projeleri kent ve kırsal alan kadın projeleri olarak gruplamak ve alanlarda özellikle sosyoekonomik statüsü düşük düzeydeki kadın gruplarına öncelik tanımak temel politika olmalıdır.*”

bringing of INCOME on the basis of production for market.”<sup>235</sup> Accordingly, “income generating facilities” were presented as a project area<sup>236</sup> and policies in various sectors determined to this end. These sectors include “agricultural production, production in stock-raising women handicrafts, tourism and rural industry.”<sup>237</sup>

The basic idea behind all the policies stated in these sectors was to raise income and connecting production to the market. However, the study argues that this is not the only objective of the projects to be developed within GAP and claimed that “in parallel with this, in order for women to acquire rights in accordance with the roles they undertake in the society and to make them gain prestige in the system of social relations, SOCIAL services to be provided around the issues such as education, health, nutrition, etc. should be paid equal attention.”<sup>238</sup> Thus, the Plan proposed “social services” for this end. The policies set forth under this category involved “courses for development of skills, literacy courses, constitution of mobile health services, training on mother-child health, birth control and hygiene . . . education on the protection and utilization of products, the management and usage of water resources, and the development of environmental consciousness.”<sup>239</sup>

Apart from these kinds of services providing women with training on the issues above, there was also another sub-set of the social services category,

---

<sup>235</sup> Ibid. “GAP kapsamında kadın projeleri öncelikle BECERİ geliştirmeye ve pazara yönelik ÜRETİM temelinde GELİR getiriciliğe yönelik bir stratejiye dayanmalıdır.” (emphases original).

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., pp. 10-11.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p. 3. “Buna paralel olarak kadının toplum içinde üstlendiği rollere uygun haklar elde etmesi ve toplumsal ilişkiler sisteminde saygınlık kazanması amacıyla eğitim, sağlık, beslenme vb. konular etrafında SOSYAL çalışmalara da aynı ağırlıkta yer verilmelidir.” (emphasis original).

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

constituting facilities for common (public) usage such as “providing potable water, bakeries, public laundries, women’s shelters in cities and villages, health clinics, the usage of energy resources, and forestation for heating purposes.”<sup>240</sup>”

In the Plan, there was a comprehensive chart presenting the target groups of these services. Depending on the kind of service, different women groups (e.g. married women, illiterate women, adolescents, women from landless families, women workers and farmers, unemployed women, women whose spouses were unemployed, women living in ghettos, or *all* women) were identified as the target group.<sup>241</sup> In addition, different categories of the services presented above –income generating services and social services- were elaborated in accordance with the target groups. The plan also specified the institutions, organizations, occupational groups, academics and experts to cooperate in the process of providing these services.

On the whole, the plan, together with the research preceding it, set forth the strategy for the “integration of women in the development process.” The problem areas of women were identified, the solutions were formulized, the groups of women to be addressed by these services were specified and a comprehensive strategy for the “development” of women was put forth, which set the stage for the subsequent projects planned within the scope of GAP exclusively for women, the most example of which was the Multi-Purpose Community Centers.

This study and its Action Plan set forth strategies to “enhance the condition of the women of the region and to integrate them to the process of development.”<sup>242</sup>

---

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., pp. 13-19.

<sup>242</sup> GAP Bölgesi’nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Süreçlerine Entegrasyonu Araştırması Eylem Planı, (no page number), “*Bu araştırma bölge kadınının. . . statüsünün yükseltilmesi ve kalkınma sürecine entegre edilmesine yönelik ne tür proje ve programların gerçekleştirilebileceğini belirlemek amacıyla yürürlüğe konmuştur.*”

Setting out from this general objective, the GAP Administration established “The Multi-Purpose Community Centers (ÇATOM) in 1995. ÇATOMs were established “in primarily those squatter settlements (*gecekondus*) of the GAP provinces consisting of poor families migrated from rural areas and in central village settlements where women were marginalized.”<sup>243</sup> Currently, in total there are twenty-three ÇATOMs in the GAP Region.

ÇATOMs were established as places to provide “educational and social programs to women and female adolescents 14 to 51 years of ages in order to enhance the status of women in the GAP Region.”<sup>244</sup> The basic idea underlying the projects was that women’s projects should aim for “the development of skills and a strategy based on the generation of income on the basis of production for market.”<sup>245</sup> In addition, the Plan proposed providing women with the necessary educational facilities concerning issues such as birth-control, mother-child health, and hygiene.<sup>246</sup> Accordingly, ÇATOMs focus on training in various fields, promoting income-generating skills, part-time polyclinic services and various social and cultural activities specifically designed to improve the status of local women.<sup>247</sup>

Thus, the generation of income and offering social-educational services for the women constituted the basis of the ÇATOMs. These programs include “training courses on literacy, general health, mother-child health, hygiene, nutrition, and

---

<sup>243</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project “ÇATOM'lar . . . GAP Bölgesi'ndeki kentlerin daha çok kırdan göç etmiş yoksul ailelerin oluşturduğu gecekondu mahallelerinde ve kadınların marjinalleştiği merkezi nitelikli köy yerleşimlerinde kurulan . . . merkezlerdir”

<sup>244</sup> *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi: Son Durum (2001)* p. 39. “GAP Bölgesi'nde kadının statüsünün yükseltilmesi amacıyla, 14-51 yaşları arasındaki kadın ve genç kızlara, eğitici ve sosyal programlar uygulamak üzere Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM) kurulmuştur.”

<sup>245</sup> See footnote 113.

<sup>246</sup> See footnotes 127.

<sup>247</sup> The official web site of the Southeast Anatolia Project.

household economics [and] courses for the development of skills directed towards the generation of income (e.g. tailoring, kilim-weaving, machine embroidery, handicrafts, and embroidery of *oltu-taşı*).”<sup>248</sup> In time, “the facilities of ÇATOM have been diversified and training programs have been carried out within a wide scope ranging from hairdressing to computer processing.”<sup>249</sup>

As the scope of the facilities provided by ÇATOMs demonstrate, these projects seem to set out from the idea that as one of the most underdeveloped groups in the society hindering the smooth functioning of the development plan (GAP), women should be developed and fostered through facilities that will equip them with the necessary skills to integrate into the development project. Women are taken here not only as a target group to be educated and socialized, but also one to be integrated into the market through the encouragement of the improvement of skills to produce for the market.

Concerning the projects developed by ÇATOMs, it is stated that “the programs are determined on the basis of local conditions and needs”<sup>250</sup> That is to say, the projects are prepared for the particular requirements of the locality in which ÇATOMs provide facilities. The diversity of the services provided by ÇATOM can be related to this reliance on the needs and demands of the locality. The reference to locality in the context of GAP has another implication related to the functioning of the ÇATOMs. In the Action Plan of the Research on the Integration of Women into

---

<sup>248</sup> GAP Dergisi, Year 5, No: 8, Summer (1997) p. 8. “*okuma-yazma, genel sağlık, ana-çocuk sağlığı, hijyen, beslenme, ev ekonomisi, gelir getirmeye yönelik beceri kazandırma (biçki-dikiş, iğne oyası, makina nakışı, Karabağ Kilimi Dokumacılığı, Oltu-taşı İşlemeciliği)*”

<sup>249</sup> Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi: Son Durum (2001) p. 41. “*ÇATOM faaliyetleri zaman içinde çeşitlenmekte, kuaförlükten bilgisayar işletmenliğine kadar geniş bir alanda eğitim programları yürütülmektedir.*”

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., “*Programların belirlenmesinde yerel koşul ve ihtiyaçlar ile hedef grubun katılımı esas alınmaktadır.*”

the Development Process (1994), “bringing up personnel experienced in the ‘women’s programs’” is set forth as a policy to be adopted.<sup>251</sup> Yet, the significant point to mention here is that, in the Plan it is also proposed that “this staff should be mostly from the region.”<sup>252</sup> Thus, in the case of ÇATOM, the selection of the development personnel from the region was implemented as a general principle. “ÇATOMs are,” it is argued “managed by the women/adolescents . . . coming from (having roots in) the region/locality.”<sup>253</sup> These people, who are called as the “representative of change,” are supposed to be persons able to “construct strong relations with the target group of the projects, willing to live in the rural areas and work with public.”<sup>254</sup> The idea here is to assign the management of ÇATOMs to women who are familiar with the particular needs and conditions of the region, and thus can communicate with the local population easily to attract them to participate to the programs of ÇATOM. In general, the emphasis of locality is prevalent in ÇATOMs reflected not only in the programs developed on the basis of the particular features of the region but also in the selection of the “development personnel” who will conduct the activities from the people who are familiar with the region.<sup>255</sup>

---

<sup>251</sup> GAP Bölgesi’nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Süreçlerine Entegrasyonu Araştırması Eylem Planı (1994). p.4. “*kadın programları’ konusunda deneyimli eleman yetiştirilmesi. . . . başlıca amaç olarak benimsenmelidir.*”

<sup>252</sup> ibid. p. 4 “. . . bu elemanların çoğunlukla yöreden olması. . . ”

<sup>253</sup> Aygül Fazlıoğlu, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesinde Kadının Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonunda Bir Model Arayışı: ÇATOM*. Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. “*ÇATOM’lar yöre/bölge kökenli. . . kadınlar ve genç kızlar tarafından tarafından yönetilmektedir*”

<sup>254</sup> GAP Bölgesinde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Eylem Planı p. 8 “*Değişim temsilcisi*” olarak da adlandırılabilir bu kişiler; proje hedef kitlesi ile sağlıklı ilişkiler kurabilen. . . [kişiler] olmalıdırlar.”

<sup>255</sup> For the implications of selecting the development personnel of ÇATOM from the region and for a detailed examination of these local agents of development called “field-supervisers (*saha sorumluları*),” see, Hande Sözer, *ÇATOM Project: Field Supervisors In-Between “The State” and “The Society”* (master’s thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2004).

As the analysis demonstrates, the development of women became a significant concern in the early 1990s. Setting out from the results of the survey on women, ÇATOMs were established to carry out the facilities concerning the integration of women to the development process. Considering the notion of social development GAP started to entail in the early 1990s ÇATOMs are significant in terms of indicating the will on the side of the government to address the different sectors of the society with projects designed for their particular needs and requirements. That is to say, the notion of social development in the early 1990s extended beyond that was envisioned in the Master Plan of 1989 and aimed to embrace different social sections through social specific programs such as ÇATOM. The facilities provided within ÇATOMs aimed at the providing the women living in the region with an institution that offers a variety of services ranging from educational facilities to income-generating activities. Thus, the notion of social development was not any more limited to the provision of educational and health services to an undefined or unspecified population as it was the case in the Master Plan but rather, one that problematized and tried to manage different social groups through specific projects.

#### Social Development within GAP As An “Anti-Politics Machine”

These studies, which were conducted in the 1992-1994 period, are significant in terms of representing the emergence of social development as an exclusive realm of intervention within GAP. As stated before, in the 1990s, the development of southeastern Anatolia became a major concern for the government because it was considered as another means of struggling with the conflict taking place in the

region. Thus, there emerged a sense of urgency to intervene in and ameliorate the social realm with all its dynamics. It was within this context that social development projects started to be carried out within GAP. These studies conducted within GAP became the major instruments of the governmental aspiration to know the population in order to address it through various social projects that would ensure their economic and political integration.

The notion of “social development” envisioned in these studies was not limited to the provision of education and health services to the region. Rather, “society” and the elements constituting it were problematized in a comprehensive manner to intervene in all of its elements such as social structure, population, settlement, migration and women’s development. In the Master Plan (1989), no such comprehensive understanding of social development exists. In the 1990s, the poverty of the population living in southeast Anatolia was problematized in relation to the escalating armed conflict and, as stated in the previous chapter, social development was considered as the major means to prevent people from participating in the “terrorist” activities. It was in this context that social development was problematized and institutionalized within GAP.

This comprehensive understanding of development which initially materialized in research projects discussed above entailed some kind of what Michel Foucault calls “bio-politics,” which refers to “a politics concerning the administration of life, particularly. . . at the level of population.”<sup>256</sup> As seen in these researches, population and a set of practices and processes related to it were problematized and rendered the object of governmental intervention in this period within GAP. Bio-politics, as Dean states, “is concerned with the family, with

---

<sup>256</sup> Dean, p. 99.

housing, with living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle,’ with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living.”<sup>257</sup> As the analysis of these studies demonstrates, the notion of social development GAP entailed in the early 1990s was one that problematized and tried to manage a set of bio-political problems concerning the population living in the region, ranging from settlement patterns, the composition of the social structure, living standards and migration, to education, mother-child health, birth control and hygiene. In the early 1990s, the urgency of controlling the population in the region which was the center of the armed conflict produced a new form of governmental strategy articulating this kind of a bio-politics that “defined the population in relation to matters of life and death, health and illness, propagation and longevity, which can be known by statistical, demographic and epidemiological instruments.”<sup>258</sup> Thus, these studies were the instruments of this bio-political imperative to reach the knowledge of the population in this manner and identify its elements, which may have been abnormal, or pathological.

Dean claims that, “knowledge of population in this sense is concerned with the specification of variations around norms, themselves generated by statistical measures.”<sup>259</sup> As seen in the studies, there was a will to specify some characteristics of the population as “problematic” as they deviated from the norms which were set forth by development (e.g. “developed,” “modern”). In this context, variations from the norms and those aspects of the population (such as “traditional” social formations, or population growth) were defined sometimes as pathological, or sometimes as the remnants of the past, but in any case as abnormal elements to be

---

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

normalized through bio-political practices of governmental development efforts. In these studies the comprehensive understanding of social development envisioned as a governmental strategy to control the population, then, took the population living in the southeast Anatolia as the object of development and tried to intervene in the bio-political “problems” of its object. These “problems” of the population were rendered *visible* through these studies in order to ensure the subsequent interventions to be made through the social projects of GAP. For instance, once the population growth in the region was identified as a problem to be managed, the way was opened for the governmental policies presented in the Action Plan to teach the birth-control methods to the youth and the women.

However, in these studies, the specification of the problem areas concerning the region and population and the projects to be carried out to manage these problems entailed a sense of urgency to deal with these problems without delay, through palliative policies and programs that would eliminate the negative elements of them immediately. As discussed above, “dispersed settlement” was constructed as a problem area to be intervened in the research, but the solutions proposed to deal with this “phenomenon,” (not a problem in itself, but a “problem” for the functioning of governmental development efforts) which had deeply rooted geographical, economic and cultural reasons were administrative arrangements to define some units as the “center” and provide social services in these centers. In a similar manner, the research took the social formations such as *aşiret*, *şeyhlik*, and *ağalık* as problems, but only because they constituted obstacles for the transformation process, and without being bothered to reflect on the causes of this kind of social organization in the region, the research immediately rendered them as “backward” and “traditional,” proposed immediate solutions, such as increasing the effectiveness of

the modern institutions and organizations in order to eliminate the negative effects of these formations to facilitate the development process.

Specifying the problems in the above-mentioned manner concealed an effort to dissociate these problem areas from the politics underlying them. In the studies, the problems were presented as merely the result of natural processes which did not have political causes behind them. It is presented as if the region (southeastern Anatolia), and the problems related to population living there came out as a result of the processes only related to region itself, having no relation to, or stemming not from, the political processes associated with government which intended to address it by development policies. In his analysis of the image of Egypt in the eyes of the USAID, which set out to address it through development projects, Timothy Mitchell states that, in the discourse of development, Egypt was constituted as a “self-contained object” that “exists apart from the discourse that describes it.”<sup>260</sup> The significant point is that, in this manner, “the organization itself [USAID] stands above the map of Egypt to measure and make plans, a rational center of expertise and policy making that forms no part of the object observed.”<sup>261</sup> Thus, rendering itself apart from its object, development can carry out its policies and practices and establish its authority over it. In the following passage, Mitchell eloquently expresses this process:

Development discourse thus practices a self-deception-what Partha Chatterjee calls a “necessary self-deception,” for without it development could not constitute itself. Development is a discourse of rational planning. To plan effectively, it must grasp the object of its planning in its entirety. It must represent on the plans it draws every significant aspect of the reality with which it is dealing. A miscalculation or omission may cause the missing factor to disrupt the execution of the plan. *Its calculation must*

---

<sup>260</sup> Mitchell, p. 233.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

*even include the political forces that will affect the process of execution itself.*<sup>262</sup>

However, development, while acting as a rational agency that calculates everything that might jeopardize its functioning, does not include itself in this process. It is at this point that it practices a “self-deception” as it sets itself apart from the object of development in a way to ignore its own role in the emergence of the “problems” related to its object which it tries to treat.

In the case of GAP, we can observe a similar situation. While describing the region and population, and proposing strategies and policy alternatives to manage their “problems,” southeastern Anatolia and the population living there are represented as “self-contained” entities in the official accounts. Thus, government, with its development efforts to be carried out through GAP, and its various components (such as ministries or GAP Administration) that were to perform these development practices altogether were considered as another entity that had no necessary relation to the region and its problems which required treatment. That is to say, in the official GAP accounts, like the studies examined above, the government, which would conduct the development efforts in the region was represented as an external rationality that would identify the problem areas, make rational planning, and eliminate the problems through calculations, policies, and practices.

Consider, for example, the way the “Research on the Population Movements in the GAP Region” problematized the intra-regional migration in the region. The research pointed out the “local” character of the migration and contended that the people in the region usually migrated from the villages to the city-centers of the same

---

<sup>262</sup> Ibid. (emphasis added).

province.<sup>263</sup> Intra-regional migration was related primarily to factors such as the increasing population growth, the division of agricultural land, the mechanization of agriculture, and unemployment.<sup>264</sup> While explaining the extra-regional migration from the southeastern Anatolia to the western regions of the country, it was stated that “lack of political tranquility” (*siyasi huzusuzluk*) was one the reason. However, it did not bother to refer to the phenomenon of the “forced village evacuations,” which was a widespread event in the region in the 1990s in the context of the armed conflict. The villages were evacuated for the “security” reasons by the government, which was a primary cause of the migration in the region during this period. According to a recently conducted research by the TMMOB, “forced migration” started in the 1990s and continued up until 1999 and during this period about three million people were forced by the state to leave the places they lived without their own.<sup>265</sup>

However, in the study of GAP on the population movements, the issue was represented only as a matter stemming from economic reasons, or from the desires of the families to benefit from the “social facilities” offered by the city-life. Thus, the relation between the armed conflict and migration was only referred to as a “lack of political tranquility in the region;” as if government itself was not a part of the problem.

The problematization of the issue of language in the region in the “Research on the Trends of Social Change” is also indicative in terms of demonstrating the way governmental development discourse set itself apart from the region and its

---

<sup>263</sup> *GAP Bölgesi Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırması*, p. 5. “GAP-içi il ve ilçe merkezleri göçü esas olarak aynı ilin sınırları içindeki yerleşim birimlerinden almaktadır.”

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. “Artan nüfus baskısı . . . toprak parçalanması . . . tarımın makinalaşması . . . işsizlik.”

<sup>265</sup> Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, *Zorunlu Göç Raporu* (2003). Web page of TMMOB. Availbale [online] at <http://www.tmmob.org.tr> [25 July 2004].

problems. In the research, it was stated that the low level of demand for education in the region stemmed to a great extent from the fact that the language of a significant section of the population were not Turkish.<sup>266</sup> Then, the measures (such as improving the pre-school education in the region) to be taken to teach Turkish to the population was presented in the research. That the mother-tongue of the population in this region was not Turkish was recognized in the study but only as a “problem” to be treated by governmental development practices. However, here again, the government was presented only as an external rationality which would bring these services to solve the problem. It was set apart from the problem while disregarding the political processes which rendered the language of education Turkish in this region where people predominantly spoke Kurdish.

Overall, in these studies, government was represented, as Mitchell contends, as “a rational consciousness standing outside” the region, where, in fact “it [was] a central element in configurations of power.”<sup>267</sup> Representing the government in the above-mentioned manner the development discourse reduced the problems of the region to mere technical issues which could be managed through rational calculations, expertise and planning. In this way, the problems of the region were dissociated from the political causes behind them and, thus they are depoliticized. To state in the words of the James Ferguson, GAP and the discourse that constructed it functioned as an “anti-politics machine,”<sup>268</sup> which depoliticized any issue (such as migration, issue of language, education, etc. problematized in these researches) that it problematized and set out to treat. However, paradoxically, all the social matters

---

<sup>266</sup> *GAP Bölgesi Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırması*, p. 9. “Eğitim talebinin düşüklüğünde, yöre halkının önemli bir kesiminin ana dilinin Türkçe olmayışının. . . önemli bir payı vardır.”

<sup>267</sup> Mitchell, p. 233.

<sup>268</sup> Ferguson, p. 254.

concerning the population were rendered the target of governmental policies and practices to be developed within GAP. That is to say, while depoliticizing the social phenomena, GAP also functioned in such a way to make them the issues to be subjected to planned governmental interventions. As Ferguson states, “by making the intentional blueprints for ‘development’ so highly visible, a ‘development’ project can end up performing extremely political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object.”<sup>269</sup> As the discussions related to the social research projects reveal, GAP, as a governmental development project that aimed at intervention in almost all spheres of life, set out to expand the institutional power of the state in the region under the rubric of “social development,” which was perceived as a technical, rather than political matter. That is to say, while functioning as an “anti-politics machine” that dissociated the social phenomena from the political processes, GAP, at the same time, made them the objects of direct governmental intervention and worked in such a way to make the institutional state power visible through the provision of social services in the region, which was the plot for the armed conflict in this period.

This ends the part on the social research projects of GAP. These studies and the resultant Social Action Plan constituted the basis of various social projects to be developed within GAP. As stated above, with the Master Plan, GAP was transformed into a “multi-sector, integrated development project.” The notion of integrity in the Master Plan referred to the plurality of the sectors (e.g. agriculture, industry, etc.) to be developed by the policies and projects of GAP. Yet the social realm and social projects were not specified as a sphere of development. The social research projects,

---

<sup>269</sup> Ibid., p. 256.

however, exclusively problematized the social realm and set forth specific policies for the diverse needs of different social groups (e.g., women, the youth, landless peasants, and urban poor). Thus, the social groups to be addressed by the projects of GAP were pluralized and in the light of the results of these studies, a set of social projects were designated by GAP.

Meanwhile, however, while these studies were being conducted and the path of the implementation of the social projects of GAP were accelerating, the project on the whole underwent a second wave of transformation and started to be formulized and described as a sustainable development project. That is to say, the integrated regional development plan of the Master Plan was transformed into a project presenting itself as a sustainable development project with a great emphasis on environment, participation, and human development. This transformation has had significant implications for the social projects designed since then. With the adoption of this novel discourse, not only have the ongoing social projects undergone changes, but also new social projects were included within the scope of GAP. The following chapter discusses the implications of this transformation that turned the irrigation and dam project of 1970s into a “sustainable human development project.”



## CHAPTER IV

### GAP IN THE LATE 1990s: “SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT” OR A NEOLIBERAL CONCEPTION OF “SOCIAL” DEVELOPMENT?

In the late 1990s, the Southeastern Anatolia Development Project underwent a transformation and started to be presented as a “sustainable human development project.” With this transformation, the project adopted a series of novel concepts, such as environment, participation, and sustainability which were the products of the transformation of the global development discourse in the 1990s.

However, the transformation of the development within GAP was not only a matter of the adoption of environmental concerns or recognizing the necessity of more participation of people in the development process. Rather, what we witness in the late 1990s was that GAP was reconstituted as a project that would be carried out by greater cooperation between the government and the private sector, international development institutions, and national and international non-governmental organizations. That is to say, the discourse of sustainable development concealed a shift from state-led development to market-led development within GAP, which was a corollary of the transformation of the practice of development in the context of the

global rise of neoliberal principles. In the GAP case, the neoliberal notion of development emerged in the guise of “sustainable human development.”

As stated before, in this study, my aim is to examine development as an “actual process,” through problematizing how the global development discourse was materialized in a particular temporal and spatial context. In the case of GAP, I consider the governmental development policies carried out through GAP in relation to the armed conflict taking place in the 1990s between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. The late 1990s was a period which saw the termination of the armed conflict in the region. The important point is that the adoption of this neoliberal notion of development coincided with the end of the armed conflict. The implications of this coincidence should be taken into account while analyzing the transformation of GAP into a neoliberal development project in the guise of a sustainable human development project.

In the following analysis, I will first focus on the transformation of development in the context of the neoliberal practices since the 1980s. After examining the notion of neoliberal conception of “social” development, I will elaborate on the reflections of the transformation of global development practice in GAP in the late 1990s. In the last part, I reflect on the implications of this transformation in relation to the end of the armed conflict in the region.

### “Development” in the Era of “Neoliberal Orthodoxy”

As discussed in the Chapter 1, “development” emerged in the post-World War II period as an attempt of the “developed” world to fight against “global poverty,” which was perceived as a threat for the well-being of the developed

countries. The problematization of global poverty in this period culminated in a set of development plans and projects designed by the “developed” countries and imported and adapted by the national governments of these “underdeveloped” countries as a means of post-war nation building processes. Thus, “developmentalism,” from the post-World War II era to up until the late 1980s remained the widely accepted model that would ensure not only rapid economic growth, but also the welfare and well-being of the societies.

In this period, there was almost a consensus that development, which would bring economic growth and social welfare, would be an enterprise that would be carried out by state because it was a time during which the premises of economic liberalism (such as perpetual economic growth through the operations of the unrelenting forces of market) faced a loss of credibility as a result of a series of historical developments such as “the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the stock-market crash and subsequent depression, the Second World War, and the proliferation of anti-imperialism in the colonized world.”<sup>270</sup> As Paul Cammack states, in the face of all these successive events, the prospects of global capitalism were called into question in the post-World War II context. Thus, the idea that economic development would be executed by the state gained currency in this period in both the “developed” and “underdeveloped” world. Thus, the developmentalism of the post-World War II period was, to a great extent, based on the premises of the Keynesian welfare state. That is, from the post-World War II period until the 1970s, “debates on development took place ‘in the shadow of Keynes.’”<sup>271</sup> Thus, it was in this context that many governments resorted to national economic planning and

---

<sup>270</sup> Paul Cammack, “Neoliberalism, the World Bank, and Development,” in Kothari and Minogue, p. 158.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

furthermore engaged in grand regional development programs to ensure the national, and hence economic integration, within their borders.

However, starting with the 1980s, the consensus of the post-war period was thrown away and what emerged instead was the revival of the liberal principles under the rubric of neoliberalism. It was the start of a period which would be defined by the increasing saliency and hegemony of global capitalism. Cammack neatly summarizes the emergent order based on the global capitalism and its requirements in the 1980s:

As the twenty-first century dawned, a bid was under way to establish the global hegemony of capitalism. The essential elements of a global capitalist system –the authority of capital over labour, the unimpeded operation of capitalist market for labour, goods and investment, the receptiveness of the governments to the needs of capital, the presence of domestic and global regulatory orders capable of reinforcing the disciplines essential to capitalist reproduction, and the dissemination of ideologies justifying capitalism and dismissing alternatives- were in place, together, for the first time.<sup>272</sup>

In this context, what emerged was a neoliberal turn to the endorsement of the market, which was sanctified as the leading force at the global level. As Berthoud states, “in the minds of a growing number of decision-makers, it has become increasingly self-evident that the market should no longer be viewed as an institution which must be regulated by external forces, but, on the contrary, that it should be used to regulate society as a whole.”<sup>273</sup> Thus, the new global capitalism rendered the market the major mechanism around which the economic, political and social relations were reconfigured.

Development was one of these fields which underwent a transformation under the impact of rising global capitalism and the growing domination of the market forces. Starting with the 1980s, both the notion and practice of development changed

---

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>273</sup> Gérald Berthoud, “Market,” in Sachs, p. 70.

in accordance with the requirements of global capitalism. As Berthoud claims, “the market [was] increasingly viewed as the only means to promote development.”<sup>274</sup>

This was the throwing away of the post-War consensus on the idea that state, which would “intervene directly in production and distribution,” was the major motor of development that would render “the idea of development as an active process.”<sup>275</sup>

However, starting with the 1980s, as one commentator claims, “neoliberal economics. . . rebuffed ‘development’ on the grounds that it was a statist enterprise that hampered and was inferior to the efficient operations of the market.”<sup>276</sup> Thus, state, which was accorded a significant role in development in the postwar context, started to stay outside development efforts in accordance with this neoliberal agenda. This, as Katherine Rankin claims, represented a “decisive shifting of development practice . . . from state-led to market-led approaches.”<sup>277</sup>

This neoliberal turn in development practice was reinforced and imposed by the international development institutions, such as the World Bank. Cammack claims that, “the World Bank and its allies around the world have had outstanding success in overturning the assumptions on which debates about development had rested since the Second World War, establishing a new neoliberal orthodoxy that is faithful to the disciplines required for global capitalist accumulation on a global scale.”<sup>278</sup> The development recipes proposed (if not imposed) by these international development

---

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>275</sup> Cammack, p. 161.

<sup>276</sup> Bruce Braun, Vinay Gidwani, and Charlie Sugnet, “Development and Its Discontents,” web page of *Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change, The MacArthur Interdisciplinary Program on Global Change, Sustainability and Justice* Available [online] at [www.icgc.umn.edu/Courses/DSS8310%20syllabus%20\\_Sept3,%202003%20version\\_.pdf](http://www.icgc.umn.edu/Courses/DSS8310%20syllabus%20_Sept3,%202003%20version_.pdf) [June 2004].

<sup>277</sup> Katherine N. Rankin, “Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit, and Rational Economic Woman,” *Economy and Society*, Volume 30, no. 1 (February 2001), pp. 18-19.

<sup>278</sup> Cammack, p. 157.

institutions to “underdeveloped” countries envisioned greater role for the market forces in the development practices against the state, whose role was reduced to facilitating the operations of the market. In the 1990s, the World Bank produced a series of reports in which one can witness the “emergence of and legitimization of this new orthodoxy”<sup>279</sup> representing this shift in the development practice from the state-led to market led approaches. Analyzing the World Bank Development Report dated 1991 Cammack neatly summarizes the role accorded by this neoliberal orthodoxy to state in the development process and claims that, according to the report, “governments would provide a stable macroeconomic foundation in order to inspire the confidence of the private sector, create a competitive environment within which enterprise could flourish, integrate their economies into the global economy, and ‘invest in people’ to supplement the market where needs were unmet in the areas of health, education, nutrition and family planning.”<sup>280</sup> That is to say, the role governments would play in the rise of global capitalism, as these four points properly demonstrate, is to constitute the conditions necessary for the functioning of the market, which, is endorsed, even sanctified, by this neoliberal orthodoxy. In this manner, development, which claimed to bring welfare and prosperity to the populations living in poverty, was rendered a market-led process and reconfigured, less in accordance with the actual needs of the people, than the requirements of the capital of which operations were carried out at the global level.

In this context, the question that demands elaboration concerns how the notion of “social” development was reconstituted in line with this neoliberal conception of development. In the following part I will discuss this question further through the elaboration of the “social” by this neoliberal development practices.

---

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., p. 166.

## The Neoliberal Conception of the “Social” and Development

The neoliberal development practices of the 1980, just as the post-World War II development discourse did, entailed a problematization of poverty and proposed the strategies to deal with it. This was a question related to the role of the state in the provision of the basic social services to the population. However, the means proposed by the neoliberal conception of development to deal with poverty were different from those of the post-World War II period, which, as stated before, were configured “in the shadow of Keynesian economics that envisioned a greater role for the state in the development process, and hence in the provision of the social services to the population. That is to say, in the context of the rising saliency of the neoliberal principles, the Keynesian welfare state of the postwar period underwent a transformation, which resulted in the reconfiguration of the notion of “social” and “social development” since the 1980s.

In the late twentieth century, “the welfarist regime of the social,” which had been the prevalent model since the post-World War II era, “[was] subject to a crisis of governability” which stemmed from a series of crises (such as “crisis of capitalism, crisis of the state, fiscal crisis, crisis of democracy, legitimation crisis”) from the 1970s.”<sup>281</sup> The underlying reason behind these developments was that, as Nadir Özbek states, “with the internationalization of capitalism . . . the Keynesian welfare state was not any more able to respond to the capital’s demands for global accumulation in the new conditions.”<sup>282</sup> Accordingly, the welfare regimes of the

---

<sup>281</sup> Dean, p. 196.

<sup>282</sup> Nadir Özbek, “Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Sosyal Devlet,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 92, (Spring 2002), p. 29.

post-World War II period have been restructured in accordance with the new conditions whose major determinant was the demands of the internationalized capital.<sup>283</sup> It is in this context that we face a novel understanding of the “social” which was reconstituted in response to the demands of the internationalized capital.

An important aspect of this emergent notion of the “social” in the context of the neoliberal critiques of “too much government” is that despite being reconfigured, as Dean states, “the ‘social’ remains as a domain of knowledge, practices and institutions.”<sup>284</sup> That is to say, “various national governments and transnational associations . . . take up and utilize this domain of social government for various purposes.”<sup>285</sup> In this context, the “social” remains as a realm of intervention for governmental purposes of the neoliberal governments of the late twentieth century.

The peculiarity of the neoliberal conception of the “social” is that, as Dean argues, “it is no longer the diverse sector that is subject to the ineluctable logic of bureaucratic rationalization under the aegis of the welfare state. Rather the social is reconfigured as a series of ‘quasi-markets’ in the provision of social services and expertise by a range of publicly funded, non-profit and private-profit, organizations and bodies.”<sup>286</sup>

However, the distinctiveness of the neoliberal conception of the social (and social development) is not only the way the social services are offered (i.e. less government, but more private sector and civil society). Taking the social sphere as the realm of management, it presupposes different subjectivities, constructed in

---

<sup>283</sup> The transformation of welfare regime in the late 1980s is a broad subject elaboration of which extends beyond the aims and scope of this study. For a detailed analysis of the issue, see, Özbek (2002); Dean (1999).

<sup>284</sup> Dean, p. 152.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

accordance with the requirements of capital. In this context, the outstanding feature of the neoliberal understanding of the social is that it “sought to redeploy the ‘free subject’ as a technical instrument of governmental purposes and objectives.”<sup>287</sup> That is to say, the neoliberal government of the social works through the freedom, capacities and capabilities of individuals which should be fostered and reinforced for governmental purposes. In this sense, the provision of social services becomes a means of reinforcing social capital in response to capital’s demand for qualified and skillful individuals who can engage in productive activities.

Thus, this was the leading thought that shaped the policies and practices of development agencies in their management of poverty, which was problematized in accordance with the demands of the internationalized capital for utilizing the potential of each and every individual to make them properly act in the market. That is, in the neoliberal understanding of the “social,” the problematization of poverty and the technologies deployed to deal with it sought to reconstitute the “free subject as a technical means of governmental purposes.” In one of the reports of the World Bank, one can see the way the neoliberal conception of development problematized poverty and the mechanisms it proposed to deal with poverty:

A review of development experience shows that the most effective way of achieving rapid and politically sustainable improvements in the quality of life for the poor has been through a two-part strategy. The first element of the strategy is the pursuit of a pattern of growth that ensures the *productive use of the poor’s most abundant asset-labor*. The second element is widespread provision to the poor of basic social services, especially primary education, primary health care, and family planning. The first component provides opportunities; the second increases the capacity of the poor to take advantage of these opportunities.<sup>288</sup>

---

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>288</sup> World Bank, *World Bank Development Report 1990: Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.iii, quoted in Cammack, pp. 164-165. (emphasis added).

The neoliberal understanding of the provision of the social services, then, aims at, to a great extent, improving the poor's capacity to ensure "the productive use of their labor." Achievement of the developmental and welfare goals turns out to be a means of reinforcing and facilitating the smooth functioning of the market.

Furthermore, in this framework, the provision of the basic social services, such as health and education, remains tied to this logic of development, for which the market was both an end, and an instrument. As Cammack claims, in the World Bank Report of 1993, the health services were one of the spheres which were to be offered through "market-oriented policies." In the report, it was stated that, "government financing of public health and essential clinical services would leave the coverage of remaining clinical services to private finance, usually mediated through insurance, or to social insurance."<sup>289</sup> As the World Bank's proposal concerning the provision of health services demonstrates, in the neoliberal understanding of the provision of the social services, as Dean claims, "market has ceased to be a kind of 'fenced-off nature reserve' kept at arm's length from the sphere of public service; instead, the contrivance of markets becomes the technical means for the reformation of all types of provision."<sup>290</sup> That is to say, the neoliberal regime of government takes the "social" sphere as one of the realms that to be managed in accordance with the rules of the market, and, in addition, as a means of facilitating its functioning.

Taken altogether what we witness here is the emergence of a novel conception of the "social" constituted in the context of and in line with the neoliberal principles since the 1980s. It then refers, as Dean states, not to the "death of the

---

<sup>289</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report 1993*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. iii, quoted in Cammack, p. 168.

<sup>290</sup> Dean., p. 172.

social” but to its “metamorphosis.”<sup>291</sup> The social was reconfigured in such a way that “provision [would] be made through diverse agencies, community groups, and associations, coordinated by market rather than bureaucratic means.”<sup>292</sup> Thus, the individuals to be addressed by these services are tried to be rendered skillful, self-managing and productive persons much desired by the market.

#### Materialization of the Neoliberal Notion of “Social” Development within GAP

GAP, as a regional development project in which “social” development has had an ever increasing significance since the 1990s, underwent a transformation in the late 1990s quite in line with the above-mentioned context in which development discourse and practice was reconfigured in accordance with the neoliberal principles. The global transition to market-led development models found reflections within GAP in the policies and practices carried out in the late 1990s. However, the neoliberal, market-led development practice emerged in the form of a novel discourse of “sustainable human development” within GAP. That is to say, it is the discourse of sustainable human development where we can find the implications of the novel understanding of development which was in line with the neo-liberal turn to market-led development.

The Master Plan prepared in 1989, as stated before, drew the path GAP was to follow until 2005. Thus, the notion of sustainable human development was not envisioned in this time when the seeds of the social development started to emerge within GAP. With the adoption of this discourse, we see the emergence of new

---

<sup>291</sup> Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

concepts and practices within GAP which were absent in the Master Plan. The basic elements of the notion of sustainable human development were within GAP were identified as “environment, participation, and sustainability.”<sup>293</sup> With the adoption of these new concepts, what we observe in GAP was not only the emergence of new projects (such as environment projects which started to carried out in the late 1990s), but also the transformation of the methods, means, and instruments of development which were in line with the market-led development approaches.

According to the official GAP documents, these new concepts were adopted because “[i]n the recent years, in parallel with the structural changes in the world economy, development targets, objectives and discourses of the countries changed; new approaches emerged in the sphere of planning [and] new concepts were adopted, and international community added new dimensions and concepts to the definition of ‘development.’”<sup>294</sup> Thus, here the transformation of GAP was related to the inclusion of the notion of “sustainability” in the international issues of development. “With the emergence of this new concept,” it was reported, “the urgency of human development to constitute the basis of sustainable development in the GAP Region emerged.”<sup>295</sup> In this context, the 1992 world summit held in Rio and Agenda 21, which emerged at the end of this summit, were taken as the starting point by GAP in terms of adopting the principles of sustainable development.

However, with the adoption of this new approach, the Master Plan was considered insufficient to meet the demands of the changes in the notion of

---

<sup>293</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

<sup>294</sup> T.C. Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi: Son Durum* (2001), p. 5. “Son yıllarda, dünya ekonomisinde yaşanan yapısal değişime paralel olarak ülkelerin kalkınma hedefleri, amaçları ve söylemleri de farklılaşmış; planlama alanında yeni yaklaşımlar ortaya çıkmış, yeni kavramlar benimsenmiştir.”

<sup>295</sup> Ibid., “Bu kavramla birlikte, GAP Bölgesi’nde de insani gelişmenin sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın özünü oluşturması gereği ortaya çıkmıştır.”

“development” and this paved the way for its revision. Before the new plan was prepared, the GAP Administration organized a meeting in Diyarbakır called The Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Plan Brainstorming Meeting with the participation of various public institutions and non-governmental organizations. The presentations and discussions of this meeting were published as a booklet titled “From Central Planning to Participatory Planning (*Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya*).<sup>296</sup> It was one of the preparatory meetings for the revision of the Master Plan and for the designation of the new Development Plan. Here, it was claimed that this new plan would be different from the “Master Plan of 1989 prepared with the traditional central planning approach,” in terms of “taking regional and world developments into account.”<sup>297</sup> Here, the above-mentioned developments (e.g. the Rio Summit) which led to the transformation of the notion of development are implied.

According to this report, “it [the new understanding of development] pays attention to participation.” The notion of participation here refers to “the active participation of the sectors influenced by the project to planning and implementation processes.”<sup>298</sup> It was stated that “participation makes it possible for people to take part in the decision-making policies concerning their own interests and ensures the active participation and contribution of communities, local governments and voluntary organizations in the process of development.”<sup>299</sup> Later, the notion of

---

<sup>296</sup> T.C Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 1. Diyarbakır* (Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2000).

<sup>297</sup> Ibid. p. 5.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid. “katılımcılığa önem vermesi . . . projeden etkilenen kesimlerin plan hazırlama ve uygulama sürecinde etkin rol almalarını benimsemesi”

<sup>299</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

people's participation was stated as one of the tenants of the new Plan and of the projects later developed within GAP.

Yet, apart from people's participation in these processes, here participation has another implication. In the new plan, "the rational utilization of public resources and potential"<sup>300</sup> was accepted as the basic approach for the maintenance of GAP. The novelty of this principle can only be grasped by considering another one: "the participation of the private sector in the development activities."<sup>301</sup> Thus, with the adoption of this new understanding, through cooperation with the private sector GAP aimed to reduce the burden of development costs which had been met by public resources until that time. Thus, taken as a whole, the Plan involved the "planning and implementation of the projects . . . not only by public organizations, but also with the participation of private sector and local capacity (local governments, non-governmental organizations and local people) as much as possible."<sup>302</sup> In other words, the new Plan contended that "sustainable development relies on a basis consisted of private sector and people's participation together with public sector."<sup>303</sup> Here, each of these elements to be the participant to GAP was assigned a distinct a role in the process of development. In this context, "public investments have to establish the infrastructure necessary for sustainable development; the private sector has to realize the investments largely in the industrial sector, and people should be

---

<sup>300</sup> GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Son Durum 2001*, (Ankara: T.C Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, n.d.), p. 5. "kamu kaynak ve potansiyelinin rasyonel kullanımı."

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., "özel sektörün kalkınma faaliyetlerine katılımı"

<sup>302</sup> Ibid. "Böylece, . . . proje etkinliklerinin, yalnızca kamu kuruluşları tarafından değil, mümkün olduğunca özel sektör ve yerel kapasitenin (yerel yönetimler, hükümet dışı kuruluşlar ve yöre halkı) katılımıyla planlanması ve uygulanması planlanmıştır."

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 7. "sürdürülebilir kalkınma kamu sektörüyle birlikte özel sektör ve halk katılımından oluşan bir tabana dayalıdır."

present within the developments taking place in all spheres from planning to implementation.”<sup>304</sup>

It was in this contest that GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centers (*Girişimci Destekleme ve Yönlendirme Merkezleri*) were established in order “extend consultancy services to local and external entrepreneurs who would like to invest in the GAP Region.”<sup>305</sup> The project started in 1997 under the aegis of the Sustainable Development Program carried out the United Nations development Program (UNDP) and GAP Regional Development Administration.<sup>306</sup> One of the aims of the GAP-GIDEM was stated as “to form a scheme to encourage and further expand private sector investments in the region.” The rationale behind this objective was related to the idea that despite its richness in terms of land and water resources, “GAP Region [was] lagging behind other regions of the country in terms of the composition of manufacturing industry, number of enterprises, industrial employment and value added.”<sup>307</sup> Thus it was stated that, “one of the reasons for launching GIDEMs was to channel this accumulated surplus to productive fields of investment.”<sup>308</sup> That is to say, the development of the region through effective utilization of its resources which had been the motto of GAP since its inception turned out to be the task of the private

---

<sup>304</sup> Ibid. ”*Bu çerçevede kamu yatırımları sürdürülebilir kalkınmada gerekli altyapıyı oluşturmak; özel sektör ağırlıklı olarak sanayi yatırımları yapmak; halk ise planlamadan uygulamaya kadar her alanda gelişmenin içinde olmak durumundadır.*”

<sup>305</sup> GAP Regional Development Administration, *GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centers (GAP-GİDEM)*, booklet, (Ankara: GAP Regional Development Administration, n.d.), p. 1.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>307</sup> GAP Regional Development Administration, *GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centers (GAP-GİDEM): “A New Approach Towards Regional Development and Promotion of Entrepreneurship*, brochure, (Ankara: GAP Regional Development Administration, n.d.), no page number.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

sector in the late 1990s. Thus, GAP-GIDEMs were to be the major motor of realizing this end.

Here what we observe, as Rankin states, is that the “state hollow[ed] *itself* out, by rescaling its powers to supra- and sub-national levels.”<sup>309</sup> At the sub-national level, a greater role was conferred to the private sector and non-governmental organizations in the performance of the development practices within GAP. In a similar manner, since the late 1990s we observe greater cooperation between the GAP Regional Development Administration and the international institutions in the planning, financing and performing development policies and practices of GAP. For instance, in 1997 the GAP Administration started to implement a program called the Sustainable Development Package in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In the document describing the project, it was claimed that “although the project activities under this package so far have been government of Turkey and the UNDP, there is need for funding by third parties . . . [and] Swiss government agreed to contribute a grant of US\$ 2.2 million for projects targeting youth, disadvantaged groups, and the urban poor.”<sup>310</sup>

Furthermore, in the 1999 relations between the GAP Administration and the European Union started. In 2000, the European Union allocated 43, 5 million Euros to the “GAP Regional Development Program,” which included the components of “Promotion of Small Scale Enterprises, Rural Development, and Development of Cultural Heritage.”<sup>311</sup> This increasing cooperation between the GAP Administration and international organizations was the reason underlying GAP’s adoption of the

---

<sup>309</sup> Rankin, p. 21.

<sup>310</sup> GAP Regional Development Administration, *International Relations*, brochure (Ankara: GAP Regional Development Administration, n.d.), no page number.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

discourse of “sustainable development” which rendered the development policies of GAP more harmonious with the neo-liberal development agenda of the 1990s that entailed a smaller role for the central state in development efforts in favor of private sector and civil society. With the new plan, the GAP Administration started to make greater cooperation with the private sector and non-governmental organizations than it did at the time of the Master Plan.

The new Plan differed from the Master Plan also in its “consideration of economic, social and environmental development totally.”<sup>312</sup> This understanding was reflected in GAP’s formulization of the elements of sustainability. Thus, the basic elements of sustainability for GAP were “social sustainability; agricultural sustainability; economic relevancy; physical and spatial sustainability; and environmental sustainability.”<sup>313</sup> For the purposes of this study, what “social sustainability” entailed in the new plan deserves elaboration.

“Social sustainability,” it declares, “can be ensured by the adoption of the principles of participation, equality, fairness and the development of human resources.”<sup>314</sup> The meaning of “participation” has already been defined above. As for the principle of fairness, it was stated that “fairness in development requires such targets in social policies as the participation of the poor in the process of development, improved access to social services including, health and education, employment generation and the expansion of the coverage of social protection.”<sup>315</sup>

---

<sup>312</sup> *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 1*, p. 5. “ekonomik, sosyal, ve çevresel gelişmeyi birlikte ele alması.”

<sup>313</sup> *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi’nde Son Durum 2001*, p. 6. “GAP’ta sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın temel bileşenleriyse sosyal sürdürülebilirlik, tarımsal sürdürülebilirlik, ekonomik geçerlilik, fiziksel ve mekansal sürdürülebilirlik ile çevresel sürdürülebilirlik olarak ifade edilmiştir.”

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, “Sosyal sürdürülebilirlik katılımcılık, eşitlik, adillik ve insan kaynaklarının gelişimi ilkelerinin benimsenmesi ile sağlanabilmektedir.”

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*

Here, as the quotation implies, the focus was on the integration of “disadvantaged groups” into the process of development.

Before the preparation of the New Regional Development Plan, in 1999, the GAP Regional Development Administration commissioned the Symposium on the Social Service (*Sosyal Hizmet Sempozyumu*)<sup>316</sup> in Diyarbakır. In this symposium, one can observe the systematization of the emergent notion of social sustainability, which would later be one of the tenants of Regional Development Plan that would replace the Master Plan. In the foreword to the book composed of the papers presented to this symposium, the president of the GAP Administration stated that, for GAP, “the projects of priority that [were] tried to be completed and extended [were] those directed towards the disadvantaged population, which [would] be negatively influenced from the consequences of development and accordingly be delayed to the participation process because of the reasons stemming from the social structure of the Region.”<sup>317</sup> The idea that those sectors of the society which will be negatively influenced from the development process should be addressed by special policies and practices found itself a place in the social development approach within GAP expressed by the social sustainability concept.

In the same symposium, the social projects coordinators of the GAP Administration presented a paper titled “The Integration of the Disadvantaged Groups to the Development Process in the GAP Region” (*GAP Bölgesi 'nde*

---

<sup>316</sup> *Bölgesel Kalkınma Sürecinde Sosyal Hizmet*, Diyarbakır, 20-21-22 October, 1999.

<sup>317</sup> GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi and Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Hizmetler Yüksekokulu, *Sosyal Hizmet Sempozyumu '99 Bölgesel Kalkınma Sürecinde Sosyal Hizmet* (Ankara: Afşaroğlu Matbaası, 2001), p.v. “Bölge'nin sosyal yapısından kaynaklanan nedenlerle kalkınmanın sonuçlarından olumsuz etkilenecek ve dolayısıyla kalkınma sürecine katılımları gecikecek dezavantajlı nüfusa yönelik sosyal projelerimiz öncelikli olarak tamamlamaya ve yaygınlaştırmaya çalıştığımız projelerimizdir.”

*Dezavantajlı Grupların Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu*)<sup>318</sup> Here one can observe the elaboration of the notion of “disadvantaged populations” and the rationale behind the concept within GAP:

In the transformation process to be brought by GAP, the aim is not only to raise total revenue and production, but also to increase social welfare in the Region . . . However, there is no guarantee that development at the regional and national level will always reflect on all sections of society. Therefore, as it is the case in the GAP example, considering the differentiations of power in society, development projects have to be directed towards certain defined target groups. These are those sections of the population which are in a disadvantaged position—landless peasants or peasants having little land, urban poor, nomadic populations (*göçerler*), women, the youth and children working in the streets, and etc.<sup>319</sup>

What we observe here is, as Dean argues, “an emergent division between *active citizens* (capable of managing their own risk) and *targeted populations* (disadvantaged groups, the ‘at risk,’ the high risk) who require intervention in the management of the risk.”<sup>320</sup> Those sections of the society defined as “disadvantaged” above were rendered in need of governmental intervention to be performed through the special projects that would be formed within GAP. In the rest of the study, some of the projects prepared for these disadvantaged groups were presented. Here what we observe is the pluralization and diversification of the social sections which were included in the “target group” category. In addition to the target groups which were identified in the research projects of GAP in the early 1990s (e.g.

---

<sup>318</sup> İbrahim Tuğrul and Aygül Fazlıoğlu, “GAP Bölgesi’nde Dezavantajlı Grupların Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu,” in *Sosyal Hizmet Sempozyumu ’99 Bölgesel Kalkınma Sürecinde Sosyal Hizmet*, pp. 301-310.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., p. 302. “GAP’ın sağlayacağı dönüşüm süreci içinde, gerçekleştirilmek istenen salt toplam üretim ve gelirin artırılması olmayıp, Bölge’de toplumsal refahın artırılmasıdır ... Ancak bölgesel ve ulusal düzeydeki bir kalkınmanın her zaman için bütün toplumsal kesimlere yansıtılmasının bir garantisi bulunmamaktadır. Durum böyle olunca AP özelinde olduğu gibi, kalkınma projeleri, toplum içinde güç farklılıklarını göz önünde bulundurarak, belirli, tanımlanmış gruplara yönelmek durumundadır. Bunlar da toplumun dezavantajlı konumunda bulunan nüfus kesimleri – topraksız ve az topraklı köylüler, kent yoksulları, göçerler, kadınlar, gençler ve sokakta çalışan çocuklar gibidir.”

<sup>320</sup> Dean, p. 167, (emphasis original).

women), new target groups were defined to be intervened upon through special policies and practices. For instance, in the social research projects of 1992-1994 children living and working in the streets were not identified as a target group yet. However, by 1999, we witness the emergence of this as a problem area and target group. These children were defined as the target group and the Project for the Rehabilitation of Children Working in the Streets in Diyarbakır started by GAP Administration, ILO, the governorship of Diyarbakır and the Institution for Social Services and the Protection of Children (*Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu*).<sup>321</sup> The idea underlying the project was that some sections of society cannot manage their own risk and they require intervention in the management of risk. In a similar manner, in the study, the urban poor were defined as a new target group and the plans were set forth for a project that aimed at supporting the poor population living in the city-centers. The aim in these projects was to improve and support the “disadvantaged” groups to become responsible, productive, and active agents possessing the *basic* skills to manage their own risks in the development process.

As a result of the emergence of these novel concerns and new instruments for development in the late 1990s, the GAP Administration set out to revise the Master Plan which was the basic scheme that had drawn the framework of development within GAP since 1989. In 2002, the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Plan (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı*) was prepared which was to replace the Master Plan. The new plan was prepared with the financial assistance of the United Nations Development Program. In this plan, we see the elaboration of the notion of sustainable development. The “vision” of the project

---

<sup>321</sup> Tuğrul and Fazlıoğlu, p. 306. “*Diyarbakır Kentinde Sokakta Çalışan Çocukların Rehabilitasyonu Projesi.*”

was stated as “sustainable development in the light of global thinking and local conditions.”<sup>322</sup> The “mission” of the plan was the “creation of human and environment oriented value.”<sup>323</sup> The emphasis on the *human* dimension of the sustainable development was frequently emphasized in the plan. Thus, the role of the state in the development process was explained in relation to this aspect of the project: “in the new world order the new and basic function of state at the regional level must focus on the development of human capital, the dissemination of learning and information and the enhancement of creative thought (*buluşçuluk*).”<sup>324</sup> In this context, the role accorded to state in the development process was stated as one of the improvement of the social capital to pave the way for the “deployment of local capacity . . . in the conditions of international competition.”<sup>325</sup> This was the idea that led the emergence of new social development projects in the late 1990s within GAP. Thus, in the plan, the social policies to be developed for different sections (e.g., youth, women, etc.) were based on this rationale stemming from this objective of the development of human capital in the region.

For example, in the plan, one of the objectives concerning the development of the youth was stated as “to improve cultural and social infrastructures which will strengthen the individual and to open Youth Houses/Youth Centers in every province

---

<sup>322</sup> T.C.Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Ana Rapor, Cilt 2*, (Ankara: T.C.Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2002), no page number, “*Küresel düşünce ve yerel koşullar ışığında sürdürülebilir insani kalkınma.*”

<sup>323</sup> Ibid. “*Çevre ve insan odaklı değer yaratma.*”

<sup>324</sup> Ibid., p. 2. “*yeni dünya düzeninde devletin bölgesel düzlemdeki yeni ve temel işlevinin insan sermayesini geliştirme, öğrenme ve bilgiyi yaygınlaştırma ve buluşçuluğu geliştirme konularında yoğunlaşması gerektiği.*”

<sup>325</sup> Ibid. “*yerel kapasite[nin] ... uluslararası rekabet koşullarında kullanılabilmesi.*”

to realize this end.”<sup>326</sup> Furthermore, “to offer training on information technologies and foreign language to youth” was stated as another objective in the Plan.<sup>327</sup>

Overall, the objectives and policies concerning the development of the youth in the region were designed in such a way as to equip them with the necessary skills and qualifications through these kinds of facilities to improve the human capital of the country, which was stated as the novel task of the state in the new understanding of development of which basic determinant was competition.

However, these objectives and policies concerning the youth in terms of the improvement of the social capital was just a formulization and the systematization of the ongoing projects because in 1999 the first project concerning the youth had already been started in the region with the similar aims. It was the project named Youth-to-Youth Social Progress (*Gençten Gence Sosyal Gelişim Projesi*). The project was launched in Mardin in 1999 with the cooperation of the GAP Administration and an international youth association, AIESEC. Also, the Mardin governorship and municipality supported the project. In the GAP documents, it was stated that “the overall objective of this project [was] to enhance communication among the youth, encourage their initiatives and organized action in various fields and help them in being active members of their communities.”<sup>328</sup> Setting out from this objective, the Mardin Youth and Culture Center (*Mardin Gençlik ve Kültür Evi*) was established. This was a center which offered courses (in such areas as computer, painting, music, and English) to young people living in the region.

---

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p. 114. “Bireyi güçlendiren kültürel ve sosyal altyapıları geliştirmek, bunun için her ilde Gençlik Evi/Gençlik Merkezleri açmak.”

<sup>327</sup> Ibid. “gençlere yönelik bilgi teknolojileri ve yabancı dil eğitimi vermek.”

<sup>328</sup> The official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

The project continued one year and then, in the light of the experiences gained from this project plans were prepared to extend the scope of the project in the region. Another project called the Social Progress for Youth (*Gençlik İçin Sosyal Gelişim Projesi*) was developed in 2001. This project was prepared under the competence of the GAP Administration and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The Swiss Government has provided the financial support for the project and it is being implemented by the Habitat and Agenda 21 Youth Association. In the monthly bulletin published by Habitat and Agenda 21 Youth Association, the objective of the project was elaborated in the following manner: “The aim of this project is to develop the capacities of the young in the Southeast by providing assistance for the establishment of the youth platforms and by the encouragement of social and cultural institutional facilities and of the networks of communication among the youth.”<sup>329</sup>

The project set out from this broad objective and presented the results expected from the project. For instance, the “establishment of youth centers and youth councils” was presented as one of the results expected from the project.<sup>330</sup> The participation of the youth in the decision-making processes has been a frequently stressed theme in the presentations of the project. Thus, in time, within the scope of the Youth Centers, Youth Executive Councils (*Gençlik Yürütme Kurulları*) were established in order to “increase the administrative capacities of the youth through

---

<sup>329</sup> Habitat ve Gündem 21 Gençlik Derneği, *Platform*, (April, 2002), p. 4. “Bu projenin amacı, gençlik platformlarının kurulması için yardım sağlanması, sosyal ve kültürel kurumsal etkinliklerin ve gençler arasındaki iletişim ağlarının teşvik edilmesi yoluyla, sosyal ve kültürel kurumsal etkinliklerin ve gençler arasındaki iletişim ağlarının teşvik edilmesi yoluyla, Güneydoğu Anadolu’da gençlerin kapasitesini geliştirmektir.”

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4. “Gençlik Merkezleri ve Gençlik Konseyleri’nin oluşturulması.”

the establishment of their own managerial councils . . . and to ensure the participation of the youth in the decision-making processes.”<sup>331</sup>

The facilities performed in the youth centers were categorized into four as “capacity development programs (*kapasite geliştirme programları*), social-cultural programs (*sosyal-kültürel programlar*), employment programs (*istihdam programları*), and social sensitivity programs (*toplumsal duyarlılık programları*)”<sup>332</sup>

In the youth centers the facilities were offered in accordance with the special characteristics and needs of different groups of young people of from the ages of fifteen to twenty-five. Social-cultural programs were developed for the all sections of the youth. However, for instance, the programs for the improvement of the occupational skills (*mesleki beceri kazandırma kursları*) aimed at unemployed young people. Likewise, programs of teaching entrepreneurial skills (*kendi işini kendin kur programları*) were offered to the young people.

Capacity development programs offered training programs about the “environment, leadership, entrepreneurship, communication . . . and project management.”<sup>333</sup> Within the scope of social-cultural programs, facilities such as painting, music, local dance (*folklor*), sports, and drama are offered in the youth centers. Employment programs were established in order to produce solutions to unemployment, which is one of the most significant problems of the youth in the region. Thus, employment programs aimed at the provision of the programs for the improvement of skills which will facilitate finding jobs and help in the establishment of businesses for the youth. As for the social sensibility programs, it was stated that

---

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., p.14. “*Bu kurulların amacının (sic), gençlerin kendi yönetim mekanizmalarını oluşturarak idari kapasitelerini artırmak . . . ve gençlerin karar alma mekanizmalarına katılımlarını sağlamaktır.*”

<sup>332</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid. “*çevre, liderlik, girişimcilik, iletişim. . . . ve proje yönetimi.*”

these programs aimed at “making the young people conscious and self-sacrificing citizens who participate in voluntary activities for the enhancement of the social welfare.”<sup>334</sup> Thus, within the scope of these programs, for example, young people from Diyarbakır performed a play and donated the income gained from this performance for the medical treatment of one of their friends who suffered from leukemia. In addition, the young people from Mardin painted the walls of a school voluntarily. Thus, it was stated, as a result of these programs, “it has been observed that the youth started to focus its energy on the spheres that are sensitive to humans and environment.”<sup>335</sup>

The improvement of the human capital through this kind of facilities was the product of the increasing impact of the neo-liberal understanding of development within GAP. However, the impact of the changes in the global understanding of development was not limited to the emergence of the improvement of social capital through various programs as an important concern. In the late 1990s there was also a change of direction in the way these social projects were carried out in GAP. As stated before, in contrast to the previous attempts to carry out projects through public finances and means, we see increasing cooperation between the state, private sector and non-governmental organizations. As a corollary of the increasing saliency of the non-governmental organizations in GAP, what we see in the new plan was that particular emphasis was put on the role of non-governmental organizations in the development process. A section was devoted to this issue in the plan and here it can

---

<sup>334</sup> Ibid. “*Bu programların amacı gençleri toplumsal refahın artışı için gönüllü çalışmalara katılan bilinçli ve verici yurttaş konumuna getirmektir.*”

<sup>335</sup> Ibid. “*gençliğin enerjisini insan ve çevreye duyarlı alanlara kanalize etmeye başladığının işaretleri görülmeye başlanmıştır.*”

be seen that NGOs were to have increasing role in the projects of GAP in time.<sup>336</sup> However, in the process what we observe in GAP was not only the increasing cooperation with the NGOs in the performance of the projects of GAP, but also the functioning of some bodies of GAP as NGOs in the region. The most explicit example of this situation was the case of Multi-Purpose Community Centers (*Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri*, or ÇATOM).

In the initial years, ÇATOMs functioned as institutions through which governmental policies concerning the development of women in the region were carried out. ÇATOMs were the places through which the state offered some services to women. That is to say, they were governmental institutions financed and executed by state. In this sense, in ÇATOMs, literacy courses, birth-control education, handicraft courses, and such were offered as services provided by the state to the region. In time, however, under the impact of the increasing attention paid to the NGOs within GAP, they started cooperate with the non-governmental bodies and private sector as well. As stated before, in the initial years of GAP, the projects were carried out predominantly by state funds. After the 1990s, “the rational utilization of public resources” became the prevailing approach adopted as one of the principles of sustainable development by GAP and the projects have increasingly been carried out with the financial support of the private sector and non-governmental organizations.

For example, one of the ÇATOMs opened in Batman was established with the support of the Turkish Education Foundation, while another was opened in Siverek with the contribution of Procter & Gamble.<sup>337</sup> However, what we observe here is not only greater cooperation with the NGOs, but also ÇATOM’s own

---

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>337</sup> The official web site of the Southeastern Anatolia Project.

transformation into a body functioning like an NGO. In the GAP accounts it was stated that "in the towns, villages, and districts in which they are present, ÇATOMs perform the function of *assistive mediator* in order to ensure people's attainment of the services offered by public and non-governmental institutions. They [ÇATOMs] carry out efforts such as helping the local population benefit from green-card services and social aid programs, or providing scholarships to successful students."<sup>338</sup> In this sense, the activities of ÇATOMs were diversified. For example, in 2003 a ÇATOM established in the Ömerli district of the province of Mardin engaged in a project called "Pre-school Child Education" (*Okul Öncesi Çocuk Eğitimi*) with the cooperation of the Directorate of National Education.<sup>339</sup> Likewise, the same ÇATOM cooperated with the village health clinic and its participants worked as volunteers in a vaccine campaign against infantile paralysis.<sup>340</sup> In the ÇATOM in Cizre, the participants worked as volunteers in the project for forestation of the environment.<sup>341</sup> That is to say, the role of ÇATOMs was transformed from an instrument of the provision of governmental services into a mediatory body between the state and local population to ensure the access of the local population to basic governmental services.

Taken altogether the social facilities offered within GAP in the 1990s under the discourse of "sustainable human development" point to the deployment of novel

---

<sup>338</sup> Ibid. "*Sosyal Destek Programları: ÇATOM'lar buldukları kasaba, köy ve mahallelerde, devlet ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının sunduğu sosyal hizmetlere halkın ulaşabilmesi için destekleyici aracılık işlevi üstlenmiştir. ÇATOM'lar, bu bölgelerdeki halkın yeşil kart sahibi olması, sosyal yardım programlarından yararlanması ve ihtiyacı olan başarılı öğrencilerin burs bulabilmesi gibi konularda çalışmalar yürütmektedir.*" (emphasis added).

<sup>339</sup> Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr/Turkish/Sosprj/ch2003>, June 2004.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr/Turkish/Sosprj/ch2004>, June 2004.

*technologies* in GAP for “social” development which had an increasing (but in a changing form) throughout the 1990s within the project. The provision of social facilities, in this context, aimed at the empowerment of those sections of society which were considered as under risk (e.g. the urban poor or children living in the streets) and those groups whose capacities should be fostered in order to render them active and productive agents in the development process. In addition, the provision of these social services within GAP was increasingly transferred to non-governmental bodies under the impact of the shifting of the global development practice from state-led models. Furthermore, in the GAP case, we witness the transformation of various bodies of the project (such as ÇATOM) into non-governmental bodies acting as mediating organizations between the state and society, notwithstanding their initial “governmental” character in terms of being established and financed by state.

In his analysis of the post-welfarist regime of the “social,” Dean states that these regimes function through the deployment of two distinct but interrelated technologies: technologies of agency and technologies of performance.<sup>342</sup> Technologies of agency “seek to enhance and improve our capacities for participation, agreement, and action.”<sup>343</sup> The significant point here is that, “technologies of agency often come into play when certain individuals, groups and communities become ... targeted populations i.e. populations that manifest high risk or are individuals deemed at risk.”<sup>344</sup> In the context of GAP, what we see is the deployment of these technologies of agency not only for the management of the

---

<sup>342</sup> See Dean pp. 167-174.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

populations that manifest risk (e.g., urban poor or children working in the streets), but also for those whose capacities must be improved to render them qualified and active individuals (e.g. the youth). All these programs developed for the youth (e.g. capacity development programs, social-cultural programs, employment programs and social sensitivity programs) or for women (i.e. educational and income-generating facilities) are technologies of agency that seek to enhance the capacities of the target group (e.g. women or the youth) for participation and action in the development process envisioned by GAP.

Technologies of performance, on the other hand, are those “in which our capacities are made calculable and comparable so that they might be optimized.”<sup>345</sup> For instance, “the privatization of the formerly public services,” or the “establishment of ‘quasi-markets’ in expertise and service provision” are examples of these technologies of performance.<sup>346</sup> These technologies make the establishment of “‘calculable spaces’ subject to ‘calculative regimes’”<sup>347</sup> possible which is a governmental means of shaping the conduct. The transference of the provision of the social services to non-governmental bodies is such a technology that makes the establishment of an institutional sphere possible in which the “capacities” which were to be developed by the technologies of agency are made calculable so that they can be “optimized.”<sup>348</sup> As the discussions above demonstrates, the devolution of the carrying out of the social projects of GAP to non-governmental bodies in the late 1990s was this kind of a technology that rendered the realization of governmental

---

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

aims through a plurality of institutional spheres which provided the possibility of calculation and hence the optimization of the capacities of the target groups.

Thus, the transformation of GAP in the late 1990s in terms of the “social” development it envisaged was less a disappearance of “social” development than its “reconfiguration as a series of ‘quasi-markets’ in the provision of services and expertise by a range of publicly funded, non-profit, and private profits and bodies.”<sup>349</sup>

### Neoliberal Social Development within GAP in the Post-Armed Conflict

#### Context: A New Mode of Governing the East?

In this study, as stated before, I have examined GAP as a governmental regional development practice in relation to the tense relation between state and the Kurdish population living in the region. In this context, I analyzed the emergence of social development within GAP as a novel concern in the early 1990s as a means of dealing with the armed conflict. It was in this context that GAP became a representative of the governmental policies towards the region with its claims to bring the wellbeing to the population which was considered as a potential human force for the “terrorist” activities. Thus, the social development to be brought by the practices of GAP was presented as another means of dealing with the conflict.

In the late 1990s, the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces slowed down and eventually ended with the PKK’s decision to end armed

---

<sup>349</sup> Ibid.

struggle in August 1999.<sup>350</sup> Thus, the situation in the region entered into a gradual normalization process. Martial Law was completely abolished in October 2002. The number of armed forces in the region was decreased. The region, which had been the center of violent clashes for a long time, turned into a post-conflict geography in the social imagination. It was in this context that GAP started to adopt the discourse of sustainable development and the above-mentioned projects and programs started to be carried out in terms of social development under the rubric of social sustainability. However, the discourse of sustainable development in GAP was constituted in relation to, or within the context of the post-conflict situation. That is to say, once the region entered into a normalization process in the late 1990s, the policies and practices of GAP started to be designed and presented in reference to this post-conflict situation.

In the new Regional Development Plan (2002), it was stated that one of the reasons behind the inability of the Master Plan to realize its objectives was the “terror events, which were controlled and marginalized towards the end of the 1990s.”<sup>351</sup> The end of the armed conflict, then, was stated as one of the reasons behind the need to revise the Master Plan and the designation of a new plan in accordance with the new conditions of the region. As stated before, in the early 1990s GAP had turned into the representative of the governmental efforts to provide the social services to the region in order to ensure the well-being of the population, which was believed would end the human source of the armed conflict. Once the

---

<sup>350</sup> For the analysis of the reasons behind the PKK’s decision to end the armed struggle and the path of the events in the late 1990s, see Hamit Bozarslan, “Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000),” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Milliyetçilik*. Edited by. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

<sup>351</sup> Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı, p. 5. “1990’ların sonlarında kontrol altına alınabilen ve marjinalleştirilen terör olaylarının etkisiyle, Master Plan öngörülerini gerçekleştirilememiştir.”

conflict ended, then, this time the post-conflict situation became a major determinant of the path GAP followed in the late 1990s. The need to revise the Master Plan was a reflection of this ineluctable relation between the governmental policies and the course of the armed conflict.

In the new plan, as stated before, the non-governmental bodies were accorded a great role in the policies and practices of GAP. This was a technology which was preferred to be deployed only with the end of the conflict. Once the armed conflict ended and the security measures were softened, the region witnessed the flow of non-governmental organizations, which had had no possibility to act in the region within the armed conflict conditions under the strict security measures taken by the state. However, once the normalization process started, the region, which was considered as in need of an immediate cure to overcome the traumas of the conflict, became a suitable place for the NGO activities.<sup>352</sup> It was in this context that GAP set out to make greater cooperation with the non-governmental bodies in the provision of social services and the organizations of GAP (e.g., ÇATOM, Youth Centers) started to act as NGOs in the region.

The normalization process influenced the type of services provided by GAP to the region. In the early 1990s, when the armed conflict was a major determinant that influenced the measures to be taken within GAP, the idea was to provide basic social services as soon as possible to the population by the state.<sup>353</sup> In this context, the region and the population with all their structural characteristics, were problematized (e.g. dispersed settlement, nomad populations) in order to ensure the rapid delivery of basic services such as education and health to the population in

---

<sup>352</sup> For example, for an analysis of the NGOs and their activities in the province of Diyarbakır after the end of the armed conflict, see Şeyhmus Diken, *Güneydoğu'da Sivil Hayat*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2001).

<sup>353</sup> See Chapter 3 in this study.

order to ensure the individual wellbeing as fast as possible and hence to render the power of the state visible through these services in the region. However, once the armed conflict ended new problem areas related to the armed conflict entered the agenda of GAP.

For instance, as stated before, during the conflict the region witnessed the phenomenon of forced migration of the population living in the villages to the city-centers. In the research projects of GAP, however, migration was problematized but only as an issue stemming from the economic reasons. In 1999, the GAP administration was conferred by the government the coordination of a project called the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” (*Köye Dönüş ve Rehabilitasyon Projesi*). According to GAP accounts, the project aimed at “making possible the return of the population that had to leave their villages because of separatist terrorism and to constitute the sustainable living conditions in these settlements.”<sup>354</sup> Thus, within the scope of this project, GAP carried out the settlement of some of these populations to the villages they had left during the armed conflict.<sup>355</sup> The issue found was also discussed in the new regional development plan (2002). In the social research projects (1992-1994), as stated before, the migration was explained only with economic reasons, but in the new plan it was stated that “the reason for the outward migration of the population with a 0.5 % rate did not stem only from economic reasons but from the terror events taking place in the eastern part of the

---

<sup>354</sup> Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr/Turkish/Frames/fr2.html>, [August 2004]. “*Ayrılkçı Terör nedeniyle köylerini terketmek zorunda kalan nüfustan, isteyenlerin geri dönüşlerinin sağlanması ve bu yerleşimlerde sürdürülebilir yaşam koşullarının oluşturulmasını öngören projenin koordinasyonu için GAP İdaresi görevlendirmiştir.*”

<sup>355</sup> For the details of the project see *ibid.*

Region.”<sup>356</sup> Accordingly, the plan referred to above-mentioned project prepared for returning the village.<sup>357</sup>

Apart from engaging in the projects which were related to the armed conflict like the one mentioned above, the impact of post-conflict situation was also seen in some other projects which were prepared in order to treat the problems which were the result of the years of conflict in the region. For example, the emergence of urban poverty as a chronic problem in the region was related to the migration from villages to the city-centers during the armed conflict. Thus, in 2001 GAP initiated a project for the rehabilitation of children working in the streets.

As a last remark, concerning the relation between the end of conflict and the transformation of the notion of social development in GAP in this manner to adopt the sustainable development discourse, there are two points to emphasize. First, it was only with the end of the armed conflict that GAP started to be reformed in accordance with the neo-liberal development model, which has been the increasing trend in the world since the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the social services to be provided by state to the region were offered through GAP. Thus, they were the technologies deployed by the government to end the conflict in the region. Therefore, at a time when global development practices were increasingly shifting from the state-led to market-led models, GAP remained as a huge project financed and carried

---

<sup>356</sup> Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı, p. 5. “Nüfusun yaklaşık yüzde 0,5’lik bir hızla göç etmesi sadece ekonomik nedenlerden değil, özellikle Bölge’nin doğu kesiminde terör olaylarından kaynaklanmıştır.”

<sup>357</sup> Both in the project document and in the plan the reason of the migration was explained as “separatist terrorism” and there was no mention of the forced village evacuations by the state which aimed at the prevention of the logistic support from the local population to PKK. Here again, development discourse functions through an “essential self-deception” through which it rendered itself an external reality from the object of its practices. That is to say, it disregards that it is the part of the problem that it sets out to treat. Thus, the result is explaining the phenomenon as a product of “separatist terrorism” and making no reference to the village evacuations. For a discussion on the functioning of GAP as a development project through an “essential self-deception” see Chapter 3 in this study.

out by the state. The reason for this was the armed conflict taking place in the region because, as stated in Chapter 2, the projects –especially the social projects- to be offered by state through GAP were perceived by it not only as another realm of fighting against terrorism, but also as a means of having another form of visibility to the population. Therefore, the adoption of the global shift towards the market-led development models had to be suspended until the end of the armed conflict. Thus, once the normalization process started in the late 1990s, the global neo-liberal development practice was adopted immediately.

Second, with the end of the armed conflict and the adoption of the sustainable development discourse the notion of social development within GAP was transformed as well. As discussed above in detail, new problem areas and target groups were identified, and new technologies were deployed to manage these problems. In this process, what we see is that there was a sense of post-conflict trauma treatment which was carried out by the policies and practices of GAP. The project, which had been the representative of the governmental efforts to deal with the armed conflict in the early 1990s, was turned into a means of the treatment of the problems which were the products of the conflict period. In this context, with its claims to ensure development through the services to be carried out less by the state than non-governmental bodies, the neo-liberal understanding of development turned into an appropriate technology for the state to realize its developmental objectives in the region, where it had lost its credibility and prestige during the conflict period in which it was represented and by perceived through its security forces. That is to say, the adoption of the neoliberal mode of development was a way to kill two birds with one stone; first by decreasing the costs of the development practices through the devolution of them to non-governmental bodies and private capital; and second,

through this transference, the finding a means of providing the services to the region (it wanted to control through social development) by bodies other than itself, which had lost credibility in the region because of its practices during the armed conflict period.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

#### Development “Rationality” or Rationalities?

The last 40 years can be called the age of development ... Like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast, “development” stood as the *idea* which oriented emerging nations in their journey through post-war history. No matter whether democracies or dictatorships, the countries of the South proclaimed development as their primary aspiration, after they had been freed from colonial subordination. Four decades later, governments and citizens alike still have their eyes fixed on this light flashing just as far away as ever: every effort and every sacrifice is justified in reaching the goal, but the light keeps on receding into the dark.<sup>358</sup>

Since the post-World War II period, “development,” as Wolfgang Sachs neatly expressed above, stood as the organizing idea for many nations throughout the world. However, although as an *idea* development has been the same organizing concept for many nations, as an *actual process*, the emergence of development as the first and the major policy option for the states has not stemmed from the same standard rationale in each case. That is to say, development has been “like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast,” for states, but the rationales underlying their aspiration to turn their faces to this “towering lighthouse” have varied in different temporal and spatial contexts. In this study, I aimed to take a picture of the

---

<sup>358</sup> Sachs, p. 2.

materialization of “development” as an actual process in a specific historical context by focusing on the case of GAP of Turkey.

Turkey, which caught the rising trend of “developmentalism” in the 1960s, was not an exception to the countries for which development emerged as a major policy alternative in the postwar era. Starting with the 1960s, the notion of “development” became a way of organizing the governmental policies and practices in Turkey and GAP was the apex of this ever-increasing weight of development in the minds of Turkish elites under the impact of developmentalism throughout the world since the postwar period.

In the Turkish case, GAP, which was the most significant product of the state’s development policies, emerged with the claims to eliminate the “poverty” and “backwardness” of a particular region of the country (i.e., southeastern Anatolia). Accordingly, the rationales underlying the emergence of development and GAP as a governmental policy emerged in the context of the tense relationship between state and the population living in this region. Southeastern Anatolia, predominated overwhelmingly by a Kurdish population, has been a region characterized by tense relationship with the governments’ policies and practices since the early Republican era. Thus, the regional development policies of the Turkish state have been intermingled with and become an instrument of its aspiration to manage the Kurdish population, which constitutes a major threat to the centralization and integration efforts of the nation-state. That is to say, the regional development policies of the Turkish state should be considered in relation to and as a means of dealing with the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Mesut Yeğen writes that “since the 1950s, Kurdish question started to be perceived and presented as a social question that needs to be resolved rather than as a

problem to be eliminated. Thus the thematic surface in which this perception and presentation were materialized was the discourse of ‘regional backwardness.’ With the 1960s, the state started to perceive the Kurdish question as one of question of a ‘backward region’ and the Kurdish question started to be reconstituted as a question of ‘regional backwardness’ in the Turkish state discourse.”<sup>359</sup> Thus, as Yeğen’s remarks reveal, the notion of “regional development” inherently came to the fore as a novel mode of perceiving and managing the Kurdish question.

GAP, as the apex of the regional development efforts of Turkey, was a corollary of this relationship. The perception of the Kurdish question as a matter of “regional backwardness” was the underlying motive behind the elimination of the “backwardness” of the region through systematic, institutionalized development efforts and hence the construction of a huge development project in southeastern Anatolia.

However, not only the emergence, but also the transformation of the notion of (regional) development was intricately related to this motive. That is to say, the governmental development efforts were reconfigured in accordance with the path of the tense relationship between the Kurdish question and the Turkish state. In the 1990s, the region where GAP was established witnessed the emergence of another Kurdish revolt in the form of an armed conflict carried out by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish armed forces. The efforts of the state to deal with the armed conflict and with the Kurdish question emerged as an urgent agenda in this period. In this context, the regional development policies were transformed once more as another (apart from the military ones) means of managing the conflict. It was in this context that the “social” development of the region (and population)

---

<sup>359</sup> Yeğen, p. 159.

emerged as a vital concern in the minds of the Turkish elites. As the conflict escalated in the region, the Kurdish question became the subject of the day and the efforts to manage it appeared first as a governmental aspiration to *know* the region and the population with all their characteristics to intervene upon them. The interest in the population resulted in the emergence of “social” development as a major means of managing the Kurdish question

The transformation of GAP from an infrastructure project to an integrated one in which social development was a novel and significant concern in the early 1990s was a corollary of this urgency to deal first with the armed conflict in the region and eventually with the Kurdish question. It was in this context that GAP turned into the major means and the representative of the governmental development efforts to deal with the Kurdish question. That is, in the 1990s the development efforts were reformed in accordance with the path of the Kurdish question and social development was constituted as the primary mechanism to deal with the conflict. Thus, in this context, GAP was the place where the aspirations of state to manage Kurdish question were materialized. Accordingly, the governmental efforts to know the region and to produce policies and projects in accordance with the features of the population were carried out through GAP. At that time, social research and social projects developed in line with the results of these researches within GAP had been the technologies deployed to know and control the population.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the armed conflict in the region entered into a period of deceleration. In 1998, the PKK declared a cease-fire and ended the armed struggle. The region entered a gradual normalization process. However, GAP was still there with its ever-developing social policies and projects which emerged and were formulated as a response to and as an instrument of managing the Kurdish

question. Once the armed conflict started to slow down in the late 1990s, the development practice carried out within GAP was transformed once again. The project increasingly adopted the global development practice which has been transformed in line with the neo-liberal turn. Thus, under the rubric of sustainable development, GAP was transformed from a state-led development project to a market-led one in which social development was reconstituted in accordance with the requirements of the capital for self-managing and productive individuals who not only do not constitute a risk or obstacle for the smooth-functioning of the market-led development process, but also facilitate and reinforce it with their abilities to manage their risk and act as productive agents in the process.

The adoption of this new development model, which has been the prevalent one in the world since the 1980s, however, only became possible with the end of the armed conflict in the region after 1998. The project, with its diversified social programs, which started to be carried out to a great extent by NGOs and private capital came to become the major medium of the neo-liberal social development model in Turkey. Before the end of the conflict, the social development envisaged for the region within GAP had been a state-led model. The difficulty of conducting a market-led development in a region where armed conflict was taking place had prevented the adoption of market-led development which would have been to be carried out by non-governmental bodies and private capital. Throughout the armed conflict the region was governed under the conditions of Martial Law, which curbed the activities of non-governmental bodies in the region. However, in line with the path of the armed conflict which slowed down in the late 1990s, the development model shifted from a state-led to market-led practices and GAP was transformed in this direction.

Looking at the materialization of development within GAP in relation to the Kurdish question in this manner is revealing in terms of grasping the functioning of development as an actual process formed and reformed in accordance with the historically specific governmental rationalities rather than as an abstract idea that works everywhere in the same way and for the same governmental ends. In Turkey, since the 1960s, development (in the form of “regional” development) has been the “thematic surface” in which the Kurdish question was perceived and thus regional development policies have been the major technologies deployed to manage the Kurdish question. Development as *the idea* since the post-World War II period became the first policy-option for the Turkish state as for many other nations did, that is to say, the Turkish state too turned its face to this “towering light” which was seen as an appropriate tool for many governmental ends. However, the motive behind taking on development as a remedy was controlling the Kurdish population, the integration of which to the nation-state *ideal* had been envisioned since the early Republican era. Development was a suitable instrument to realize this *ideal* because the practices to be developed under the rubric of development were designed in such a way for governments to ensure their control over their territories.

The establishment of this control required a great deal of calculability in the governmental practices. That is to say, the nation-states’ claims to establish their absolute control over a territory required them to calculate anything that might hinder realizing this end. Calculation, as a matter of fact, is a matter of expertise and technology. The modern state, as Mitchell states, is a techno-state, for which technology, expertise, and science are the essential elements.<sup>360</sup> Development, with its mechanisms of institutionalization and professionalization, then, was just a

---

<sup>360</sup> See, Mitchell, pp. 1-19.

materialization of the modern state's aspiration to establish control over a territorially bounded geography through the deployment of modern forms of expertise and technology.

GAP, in the Turkish case, was both a product and a means of the state's aspiration to ensure control over its territory. Stemming from this motive, it turned into a significant means of realizing this end because it was the most outstanding institutional mechanism which entailed the modern forms of expertise and technology. Thus, as a significant instrument and symbol of the modern Turkish state to ensure absolute control over its territories, GAP was inherently related to governmental policies to ensure the integration of the Kurdish population to the long-lived nation-state *ideal*. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the governmental development policies carried out through GAP in relation to the Kurdish question. As Leila Harris claims, then, "the many policies and programs of GAP need to be understood and evaluated in relation to this long history of aggressive state policies toward the region"<sup>361</sup> aiming at the integration of the Kurdish population. Thus, this study was an effort to keep the track of this relation analyzing the "social development" within GAP in the 1990s.

---

<sup>361</sup> Leila Harris, "Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project," *Society and Natural Resources* 15, (2002), p. 752.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books and Articles

- Aydın, Abdürrauf. *İktisadi Açıdan Bölgesel Dengesizlik Olgusu: Diyarbakır Örneği*. Master's thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 1998.
- Aydın, M.Tevfik. *Bölgesel Kalkınma Hedefleri Açısından GAP ve GAP Bölgesinin Başlıca Özellikleri*. Master's thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 1999.
- Aydın, Suavi, Kudret Emiroğlu, Oktay Özel and Süha Unsal. *Mardin: Aşiret-Cemaat-Devlet*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000.
- Aytar, Osman. Kürdün "Makus Talihi"i ve "Güneydoğu" Anadolu Projesi. Sorunlar ve Gerçekler, İstanbul: Medya Güneşi Yayınları, 1991.
- Bağış, Ali İhsan. "Turkey's Hydropolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin. *Water Resources Development* 13, no. 4 (1997): 567-581.
- Bağış, Ali İhsan. *GAP Southeastern Anatolia Project The Cradle of Civilization Regenerated*. İstanbul: Aksoy Matbaacılık, 1989.
- Berthoud, Gérald. "Market." *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. Edited by Wolfgang Sachs. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1992.
- Beşikçi, İsmail. *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller*. Ankara: e Yayınları, 1970.
- Bevir, Mark. "Foucault, Power, and Institutions." *Political Studies* 47, (1999): 345-359.
- Bilgili, Ahmet, ed. *Sosyal Bilimler Kavşağında Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu*, Van: Van Valiliği ve Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 1997.
- Booth, David, ed. *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*. Harlow: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1994.

- Bozarslan, Hamit. "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000)." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Milliyetçilik İletişim Yayınları*. Edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002.
- Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. *The Foucault Effect*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Bulut, Mustafa. *Bölgesel Kalkınma ve Diyarbakır*. Master's thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 1998.
- Cammack, Paul. "Neoliberalism, the World Bank, and Development." *Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives*. Edited by Uma Kothari, and Martin Minogue. China: Palgrave, 2002.
- Cemal, Hasan. *Kürtler*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003.
- Cooper, Frederick. "Modernezing Bureoucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept." *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard. California: University of California Press: 1997.
- Cowen Michael and Robert Shanton. "The Invention of Development." *Power of Development*. Edited by Jonathan Crush. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Çarkoğlu, Ali and Mine Eder. "Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no.1 (January 2001): 41-71.
- Dağ, Rıfat and Atilla Göktürk. *GAP Yeniden Yapılanmalıdır*. Ankara: Diyarbakır Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 1990.
- Dean, Mitchell. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage Publications, 1999.
- Demir, Nazmiye. *GAP Bölgesinde Verimliliğe İlişkin Çalışmalar ve Önceliklerin Belirlenmesi*, Ankara: Milli Prodüktivite Merkezi Yayınları, 1993.
- Demircioğlu, Taylan. "Güneydoğu Projesinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Etkileri." *Türkiye'de Bölgesel Politika*. Edited by Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Konferans Heyeti İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Konferans Heyeti, 1989.
- Diken, Şeyhmus. *Güneydoğu'da Sivil Hayat*. İstanbul: Metis, 2001.
- Donzelot, Jacques. *The Policing of Families*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1979.
- Duden, Barbara. "Population." *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. Edited by Wolfgang Sachs. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1992.
- Elçi, Hüseyin. *Delâl'a Mektuplar*. İstanbul: Gün Yayıncılık, 2003.

- Escobar, Arturo. "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World." *Cultural Anthropology* 3, no. 4 (November 1988): 428-443.
- Escobar, Arturo. "Anthropology and the Development Encounter: The Making and Marketing of Development Anthropology." *American Ethnologist* 18, no. 4 (November 1991): 658-682.
- Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Escobar, Arturo. "The Invention of Development." *Current History* 98, no. 631 (November 1999): 382-386.
- Esteva, Gustavo. "Development." *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. Edited by Wolfgang Sachs. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1992.
- Everett, Margaret. "The Ghost in the Machine: Agency in 'Poststructural' Critiques of Development." *Anthropological Quarterly* 70 (July 1997): 137-149.
- Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
- Ferguson, James. "Anthropology and Its Evil Twin." *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*. Edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard. California: University of California Press: 1997.
- Fine, Ben. "The Developmental State is Dead – Long Live Social Capital?" *Development and Change* 30 (1999): 1-19.
- Foucault, Michel. "Questions of Method." *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf: 1991.
- Green, Maia. "Social Development: Issues and Approaches." *Development Theory and Practice*. Edited by Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue. China: Palgrave, 2002.
- Göktaş, Hıdır. *Kürtler İsyân-Tenkil*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1991.
- Harris, Leila M. "Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project." *Society and Natural Resources* 15 (2002): 743-759.
- Kahraman, Ahmet. *Kürt İsyânları*. İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2003.
- Kaya, Süleyman. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi'nin Ekonomik Yapısı*. Master's thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 1999.

- Keyder, Çağlar. "GAP Üzerine." *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996).
- Keyder, Çağlar. *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996).
- Kolars, John F., and William Mitchell. *The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project*. Catbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991.
- Kolars, John. "Defining the Political/Ecological Threshold for the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 101-112.
- Kothari, Uma and Martin Minogue, eds. *Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives*. China: Palgrave, 2002.
- Kut, Gün. "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 9, no. 2. (1993).
- Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği. *Türkiye'de Bölge Planlamasının Evreleri*. Ankara: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1993.
- Mitchell, Timothy. "The Representation of Rural Violence in Writings on Political Development in Nasserist Egypt." In *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East*. Edited by Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991).
- Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. California: University of California Press: 2002.
- Mutlu, Servet. "Economic Bases of Ethnic Separatism in Turkey: An Evaluation of Claims and Counterclaims." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 4 (October 2001): 101-105.
- Naff, Thomas and Ruth C. Matson. eds. *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.
- Olson, Robert, "Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water," *Middle East Policy* 5, no.2 (1997): 168-194.
- Önal, Ayşe. *Kan Görmeyi Sevmem*. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1994.
- Özbek, Nadir. "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Sosyal Devlet." *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 92 (Bahar 2002): 7-33.
- Özer Ahmet. *GAP ve Sosyal Değişme*. Diyarbakır: Dicle Üniversitesi GAP Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Yayını, 1994.
- Özer, Ahmet. *Modernleşme ve Güneydoğu*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998.

- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. "My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development." *Development and Change* 29 (1998): 343-373.
- Polatođlu, Aykut. "Southeastern Anatolia Project and Administrative Organization." *METU Studies in Development* 22, no. 2 (1995): 191-206.
- Rahnema, Majid and Victoria Bawtree, eds. *The post development reader*, London: Zed Books, 1996.
- Rankin, Katherine N. "Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit, and Rational Economic Woman." *Economy and Society* 30, no.1 (February 2001): 18-37.
- Rew, Alan. "The Donors' Discourse: Official Social Development Knowledge in the 1980s." *Discourses of Development: Anthropological Perspectives*. Edited by R.D. Grillo and R.L. Stirrat. Oxford, New York: Berg, 1997.
- Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller. "Political Power beyond the State." *The British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (June 1992): 173-205.
- Sachs, Wolfgang, ed. *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. London: Zed Books, 1992.
- Sakallıođlu, Ümit Cizre. "Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future of the Kurdish Problem: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 14 (Spring 1996): 1-22.
- Scheumann, Waltina W., and Manuel Schiffler, *Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation*. Berlin: Springer, 1998.
- Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-Merkez Yürütme Kurulu, *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti'nin Dođu ve Güneydođu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri*. Ankara: n.p., 1990.
- Sönmez, Mustafa. *Dođu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi Kürtler: ekonomik ve sosyal tarihi*. Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 1992.
- Sözer, Hande. *ÇATOM Project: Field Supervisors In-Between "The State" and "The Society"*. Master thesis, Bođaziçi Üniversitesi, 2004.
- Truman, Harry. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman* [1949]. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
- Tuđrul, İbrahim, and Aygöl Fazlıođlu, "GAP Bölgesi'nde Dezavantajlı Grupların Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu." *Sosyal Hizmet Sempozyumu '99 Bölgesel Kalkınma Sürecinde Sosyal Hizmet*, Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, 2001

- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. *Hükümetler ve Programları, I-II-III* Ankara: TBMM, 1988.
- Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. İktisadi Araştırmalar. *Kalkınmada Bölgesel Farklılıklar, Büyüme Kutupları ve G.Doğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP): (Tespitler ve Çözüm Önerileri)*. Ankara: Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası, 2002.
- Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği. *Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tespitler*. n.p.: TOBB, 1995.
- Ünver, Olcay. “*Speeches and Presentations on Southeastern Anatolia Project.*” Ankara: GAP Regional Development Administration, 1999.
- Vali, Abbas. “The Kurds and Their “Others”: Fragmented Identity and Fragmented Politics.” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 17, no. 2 (1998): 83-94.
- Vali, Abbas. “Genealogies of the Kurds: Constructions of Nation and National Identity in Kurdish Historical Writing.” *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*. Edited by Abbas Vali. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2003.
- Walsh, Catherine E. “The (Re)articulation of Political Subjectivities and Colonial Difference in Ecuador: Reflections on Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge.” *Nepantla: Views from South* 3.1. Duke University Press, 2002.
- Watts, Michael. “Development and Governmentality.” *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 24, no.1 (2003): 6-34.
- Watts, Nicole. “Relocating Dersim: Turkish State Building and Kurdish Resistance: 1931-1938.” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no.23 (Fall 2000): 5-30.
- Yeğen, Mesut. “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no.4 (October, 1999): 555-568.
- Yeğen, Mesut. “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük.” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 93 (Yaz 2002): 200-217.
- Yeğen, Mesut. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.
- Yıldız, Kerim and Koray Düzgören, eds. *Ülke İçinde Göç Ettirilen İnsanlar: Kürt Göçü*. Translated by Emin Soğancı. İstanbul: Senfoni/KHRP, 2002.
- Zentrum Für Türkeistudien. *G.A.P Southeastern Anatolia Project: Its Impact on the Turkish Economy and on the Middle East Balances*. Bonn: Zentrum Für Türkeistudien, 1989.

## Official GAP Documents

Habitat ve Gündem 21 Gençlik Derneği, *Platform*, (April 2002).

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı. *GAP Yöresi İstihdam, İnsan Gücü ve Eğitim Planlaması Etütü 2. Ana Rapor*. Ankara: Sınai Tesisler A.Ş., 1991.

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Sustainable Development Programme*. Ankara, 1997.

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Women and GAP Towards 21. Century*. Ankara, 1997.

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Industrialization Strategy*. Ankara, 1997.

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Social Policy Objectives*. Ankara, 1998.

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *GAP Review*, no. 11 (Yaz 1998).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *GAP Review*, no.15 (2001).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *International Relations*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Youth to Youth Social Progress Project*, brochure, (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *The Civilizations of the Euphrates from Atatürk Dam to Birecik Dam*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Southeastern Anatolia in History: From Mesopotamia to GAP*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Mardin*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Kelaynak Birds*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Hasankeyf*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Rehabilitation of Children Working Street Children in Diyarbakır*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

- Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. *Zeugma was Once A Bridge*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).
- Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centers (GAP-GİDEM): "A New Approach Towards Regional Development and Promotion of Entrepreneurship," brochure (n.p.: n.d.).
- T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Master Plan Çalışması Master Plan Nihai Raporu*, 1990.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)*. Ankara, 1993.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Bölge Planının Amacı, Stratejisi, Kaynak ve Yönetimi*. Ankara, 1993.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Bölgesi'nde Göç Hareketleri*. Ankara, 1993.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Dergisi*, no. 3 (Sonbahar 1993).
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Bölgesinde Toplumsal Değişme Eğilimleri Araştırması: Sonuç ve Öneriler*. Ankara, 1993.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Bölgesi'nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Eylem Planı*. Ankara, 1994.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Bölgesi'nde Kadının Statüsü ve Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonu Araştırması: Yöneticiler İçin Özet*. Ankara, 1994.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Bölgesi Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırması: Yöneticiler İçin Özet*. Ankara, 1994.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Dergisi: Sulama Özel Sayısı*, no. 5 (Kasım 1994).
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Sosyal Eylem Planı*. Ankara, 1995.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Dergisi: Hasat Özel Sayısı*. no. 7 (Sonbahar 1995).
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Dergisi*, no. 8 (Yaz 1997).
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *GAP Dergisi*, no. 9 (Kış 1998).

- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 1: Diyarbakir*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 2: Gaziantep*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 3: Şanlıurfa*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 4: Şırnak*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 5: Mardin*, Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 6: Batman*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 7: Siirt*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 8: Kilis*. Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *Merkezi Planlamadan Katılımcı Planlamaya: GAP Bölge Kalkınma Planı, Bilgilendirme Toplantısı Çalışma Raporu 9: Adıyaman*, Ankara, 2000.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi'nde Son Durum, 2001*. Ankara, 2001.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi, *2000 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*. Ankara, 2001.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi. *Her Yönüyle GAP*, Symposium Report, Ankara, 8-9 Ocak 2001.
- T.C. Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi and Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Hizmetler Yüksekokulu. *Sosyal Hizmet Sempozyumu '99 Bölgesel Kalkınma Sürecinde Sosyal Hizmet*. Ankara: Afşaroğlu Matbaası, 2001.

T.C.Başbakanlık GAP Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma Planı: Ana Rapor, Cilt 2*. Ankara: 2002.

T.C Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı. *ÇATOM: Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri*. (n.p.: n.d.).

T.C Başbakanlık Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölge Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı. *Social Dimension of GAP*, brochure (n.p.: n.d.).

## Periodicals

*Hürriyet*

*Resmi Gazete*, No. 20344, 6 November 1989.

*Nokta*, July 1989-June 1991

## Online Sources

Anthropological Critiques of Development. Home page of *Culture and Public Action*. <http://www.cultureandpublicaction.org>

Braun, Bruce, Vinay Gidwani, and Charlie Sugnet, “Development and Its Discontents,” web page of *Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change, The MacArthur Interdisciplinary Program on Global Change, Sustainability and Justice*. Available [online] at <http://www.icgc.umn.edu>

Fazlıoğlu, Aygül. *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesinde Kadının Kalkınma Sürecine Entegrasyonunda Bir Model Arayışı: ÇATOM*. Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. Available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr>

Republic of Turkey GAP Regional Development Administration. Official web page of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. Available [online] at <http://www.gap.gov.tr>

Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği (TMMOB) İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, *Zorunlu Göç Raporu* (2003). Web page of TMMOB. Available [online] at <http://www.tmmob.org.tr> [25 July 2004].

