The Role of the Military in Turkish and Egyptian Politics: A Comparative Analysis

Thesis submitted to the

Institute of Social Sciences

in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations and Political Science

by

Rita Koryan

Boğaziçi University

2001

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express her gratitude to her thesis supervisor, Professor Binnaz Toprak, and her thesis co-supervisors, Professor Yeşim Arat and Assistant Professor Hakan Yılmaz. Throughout her education prior to the preparation of this thesis, they helped the author to broaden her spectrum on various subjects of Turkish political culture and international politics. The members of the thesis committee dedicated their time and energy to read and comment on this thesis, and the author is grateful to them for all their efforts.

The author also wishes to thank İbrahim Kaya Şahin, Professor Ahmet Evin and Assistant Professor Nimet Beriker, who always gave their support during the formation of this thesis.

The moral support and encouragement provided by the family of the author are gratefully acknowledged.

ABSTRACT

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The aim of this thesis has been to make a comparative analysis of military involvement in politics in Turkey and Egypt. This involvement has been studied in the context of modern-republican periods of both countries. After a literature review on the relation between military and politics, necessary historical information concerning the political experiences of both countries has been provided. After laying out a concrete background about military involvement in politics in those countries, a comparative analysis has been realised with the aim of showing similarities and differences between the political histories of both countries. My thesis is that the simple presence of the military in a political body cannot be accounted for its being exclusively autocratic; it seems that there can always be a subtle interplay of forces between the military establishment and the political arena. Beyond the specific cases of Turkey and Egypt, it is hoped that this analysis presents a pattern of nation-building and political modernisation in countries characterised by belated modernisation.

KISA ÖZET

Türkiye ve Mısır'da Askerin Siyasetteki Rolü: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz

Rita Koryan

Bu tezin amacı Türkiye ve Mısır'da askerin siyasete müdahale etme biçimleri arasında karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yapmaktır. Askerin bu ülkelerdeki siyasi rolü her iki ülkenin cumhuriyet dönemleri çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Tezde, asker ile siyaset ilişkisi hakkındaki genel literatür incelendikten sonra, iki ülkenin tarihsel arka planları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu arka plan oluşturulduktan sonra, her iki ülkenin siyasi tarihleri ve askerin siyasete dahil olma biçimleri arasında bir karşılaştırmaya gidilmiş, benzerlik ve farklılıklar ortaya konulmuştur. Bu tezdeki temel argüman, askerin bir siyasi çerçevedeki varlığının tek başına otokratik bir siyasi yapıya işaret etmeyebileceğidir; asker ile siyaset arasında, her zaman için ince bir güçler dengesi söz konusudur. Bu tezin amaçlarından biri de, Türkiye ve Mısır örneklerinin ötesine geçerek, geç modernleşen ülkelerdeki ulus inşası ve siyasi modernleşme biçimlerine dair örnekler sunmaktır.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to realise a comparative analysis between the roles of the military in Turkish and Egyptian politics. There is an impressive body of literature dealing with the role of the military in both countries. These studies include case analyses, as well as general works dealing with the role of the military in the so-called "Third World" or developing countries. It is generally posited, in a large number of studies, that "developing" or "backward" countries experience a greater military intervention in politics, due to the belatedness of democratic institutions. Against the example of "core" democratic countries, where the military is thoroughly professionalised, the military in the periphery is more praetorian in outlook, meaning that it has a share in the process of nation building.

My initial inspiration was derived from this large body of literature on the relation between military and politics. To analyse this crucial relation would, I hoped, also lead me to an analysis of nation building and modernisation in the Third World. Thus, a model of belated modernisation could be drawn via this analysis. Then, I decided to take the Turkish case as an example; the Turkish case seemed to address a variety of dynamics described in the theoretical studies on civil-military relations. Next came Egypt. After deciding to analyse the Turkish case, I wanted to take a second country whose analysis would serve as a check to my analysis concerning the Turkish case. A second example would help to clarify some of its particularities, lead to a more detailed assessment of the role of the military in Turkey. Egypt, rather than another Middle Eastern country, seemed to fit in my design. The Egyptian experience was richer than in the case of other

Middle Eastern countries. The role of the army in the process of nation building was clearer, the relation between the military cadres and the ruling elites presented interesting data and permitted the student to draw parallels between the Turkish and Egyptian cases. On the other hand, differences between the two countries were also significant. To give an example, the Turkish case represented a greater commitment to democracy, while the ruling civilian-military elite carved itself a perpetual autocratic rule in Egypt. Thus, I realised that these differences would provide me with a good critical distance while comparing the experiences of both countries.

My thesis begins with a literature review on civil-military relations, on the role of the military in politics. This review presents some of the major arguments on this issue, and ends with my assessment of the theoretical framework that I will use throughout my study. Then, there are two chapters on Turkey and Egypt, respectively. In these two chapters, a historical background is provided. I think that it is necessary to describe the concrete historical examples of military involvement in politics. These two chapters pave the way for the last chapter, where Egyptian and Turkish cases are compared under several headings. Thus, a concise description of Turkish (from 1923 onwards) and Egyptian (from 1952 onwards) experiences is followed by a final chapter where, under some keywords like "history", "profile", "foreign relations" or "economy", the various facets of the relation between military and politics in both countries are analysed.

As a final remark, I have to add that the history of modern Turkey from 1923 to the present and the history of Egypt from 1952 onwards are not exhaustively covered here. To provide a large and detailed historical account exceeds the limits of this study. What I have tried to do is to give a general

impression about the presence (how and why) of the military in politics, and some necessary data about the overall political and economical developments of the country. Thus, while dealing with, for instance, the Democrat Party (DP) period in Turkey, the focus will be on juntas and conspiracies within the army, on the reaction of low-ranking officers to DP governments; DP's policies of economic liberalisation, or political polarisation against the Republican People's Party (RPP) will only be dealt in so far as these developments will have some implications concerning the military establishment itself. My thesis, and the historical sections appended to it are, in this sense, military- and politics- oriented. The materials of this study are secondary resources that compile the necessary hints to understand complex interaction of the dynamics of both societies. The significance of events is weighed according to the role of the military within them, or according to their impact upon the military establishment.

1. MILITARY AND POLITICS: A LITERATURE REVIEW

Before dealing with the concrete examples of Turkey and Egypt, I think that a concise literature review will be useful. Such a literature review will, in the context of my thesis, serve two purposes. First of all, to analyse the particular relation in Egypt and Turkey between politics and the military, a theoretical background is necessary. Such a background will obviously provide the elementary tools in assessing the dynamics of military coups, the mental disposition of the army and the civilians, the patterns of military control of politics, etc. Second, to review the fairly large body of literature on the relation between military and politics will help to find out the evolution of the thinking on military and politics.

It seems that the issue of the military in politics was, at the beginning, dealt with a kind of bias: There was a perfect separation in Western democracies between military in politics; the Third World, on the other hand, suffered military interventions due to the weakness of democratic institutions. This view still prevails among some political scientists. In a recent book on comparative politics, edited by Gabriel Almond, the post-World War II political developments are assessed with this frame of mind:

> After World War II, parliamentary and democratic governments were instituted among most of the nations of the Third World. In many countries the lack of effectiveness and authority of these civil governments led to their breakdown and their replacement by

> military governments. With its control of instruments of force, and in the absence of a strong constitutional tradition, the military was an effective contender for power.[1]

Similarly, in a classical study, Samuel Huntington argues that military interventions in underdeveloped societies result from the "general politicisation of social forces and institutions". In Europe, continues Huntington, armies display "a high degree of professionalism – that is, expertise, responsibility and corporateness"; European armies have also developed a tradition of non-intervention in politics.[2]

However, this view seems to change in time, and a more functionalist view comes to the fore. In the case of such functionalist assessments, military presence is not imputed to Third World countries, but taken as granted in all the countries of the world. This view, too, has its own vicissitudes. For instance, the first approach, despite its bias, accepts democracy and democratisation as international values, even if it does not single out much the weaknesses of Western democracies. The second approach, on the other hand, often remains at a descriptive level and does not go into discussions about democracy as an ideal, etc. In my study, I have tried to adopt both approaches by twisting them a little to serve my purpose. I will try to avoid a naive separation between democratic Western and non-democratic "Third World" countries. This is where the descriptive method is powerful, because it does not deal with military presence in an instrumental way, i.e. it does not posit a normative separation between Western and non-Western countries. On the other hand, I think it necessary to have something like a positive value judgment about democracy. Military interventions

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[1] Gabriel Almond et. al. (eds.), *Comparative Politics Today. A World View*, 7th edition (New York: Longman, 2000), pp. 97-8.
[2] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 71.

have often meant suffering and oppression, and this is where an only descriptive method fails short of assessing the "human element".

The studies on the role of military in politics boomed after the Second World War, a period which witnessed, in S. E. Finer's term, the coming to the fore of " the men on the horseback"; military intervention has provided a quicker path to the presidential palace than electoral politics. In Finer's work, military intervention, a key feature of post-WW II period in the Third World, results from the "low or minimal political culture of the society concerned". He sees military interference not as "a mere set of ephemeral, exceptional and isolated adventures", but as "a political phenomenon far more profound; one that is abiding, deep seated and distinctive". It is not necessarily the case that the peoples of those states have no political ideas or are unable to act with political convictions; rather, there is little cohesion within the population. When issues arise, they are often decided by force or threat of it. In a sense, a culture develops among the population, which accepts the power and influence of the military as authoritative and potentially violent. In these circumstances, the military does not require the assistance or association of civilian institutions in order to maintain power; it is itself the sole political force.[3]

In Finer's analysis, political culture has a predominant place. Thus, as seen in Turkish and Egyptian cases, the identification of the military with an effective and powerful policy-making may lead to the –willing or unwilling- support of the civilians, and to a bias in favour of the military. To complete Finer's analysis, we may refer to Janowitz who puts more emphasis on the organisational dynamics within the army to explain the political behaviour of soldiers. According to him,

[3] S. E. Finer, *The Men on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), pp. 11-39 *passim*.

"the organisational format designed to carry out the military functions as well as experience in the management of violence is at the root of these armies' ability to intervene politically".[4] Thus, the military may have the ability to act in an organised and concerted fashion where civil parties cannot overcome the fragmented nature of politics; or, the military's degree of organisation and capacity of action may be used as a pretext for staging a coup. In Egypt or in Turkey, the fact that the army was in times the only force able to act in a concerted and orderly fashion greatly favoured the takeover of political power by the army.

To the impact of the political culture and organisational aspects on military intervention in politics, we may add the issue of corporate interests and personal ambitions.[5] Eric Nordlinger also argues that the military is more concerned with the protection and enhancement of its own interests. These corporate interests may easily become an important interventionist motivation. Nordlinger further tells that the inability of the government to preserve public order strengthens the officers' resolve to intervene.[6] This is especially true of the 1971 and 1980 coups in Turkey where the military establishment, as a dynamic force with entrenched interests in the maintenance of the political system, intervened against a background of civilian ineffectiveness. Civilian ineffectiveness may lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of civilian governments. In this case, the crisis of legitimacy may be fulfilled by the military.

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[4] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 32.
[5] S. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 14-15.
[6] Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 64.

However, all authors do not ascribe the military a negative or preventive role, which would function against the development of a democratic polity. Lucian Pye wrote in the 1960s that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation building in Third World countries.[7] Obviously, Pye's analysis applies to the Egyptian case where the army has been the proponent of an Egyptian and Arab identity. Certainly, army-dominated governments have become a feature of post-independent Third World states and to a degree defined a political process that linked these countries to the developing world. According to Huntington, the military was often the most modern and cohesive force in society. Thus, in the early stages of modernisation, the military could play a "highly modernising and progressive role", "promote social and economic reform, national integration".[8]

In all these above-mentioned theories, the dominant theme is the separation between the civilian and the military. Even if all these theories do not handle this separation with the same emphasis, the central argument is that the military should generally stay away from politics in a "normal", i.e. democratic and Western-style political system. As a corollary to this line of argument, it is posited that the political presence of the military is witnessed especially in countries with a weak civic and political culture, where the absence of democratic institutions brings in the necessity, or creates the opportunity, for a military caste to take the initiative.

With regard to this literature on the role of the military in politics, I must say that my aim is not to put forth a *Realpolitik* panorama or to confess that

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[7] Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation", in John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 74-83.

military coups may be "inevitable" in some countries. I think, rather, that such arguments themselves are the products of a given ideological conjuncture and should be suspected. Moreover, a sharp military-civilian dichotomy has some methodological fallacies. For instance, such moralistic approaches may not illustrate the wilful collaboration of the civilians with the military, or the existence of a "pro-military party" within the civilian camp. To give an example, the propaganda and activities of the *Yön* group in Turkey in the 1960s, based on the provocation of the military for organising a coup, shows that civilians may prefer a military intervention to a democratic rule. Thus, I think that a wider theoretical approach permitting to assess the issues that are not taken into account in the dichotomous approach is needed.

I do not want to object bluntly to the argument that the intervention of the army in political life is helped by the absence of a civilian initiative to counter the weight of the military. Indeed, this may well be the case in several Third World polities. However, while studying a country with a long past of military influence in politics, I think that this distinction tends to blur the overall picture. First of all, this separation becomes a political, if not moral, obligation, while the reality may be much more sophisticated in many cases. This ideal categorisation has the risk of ignoring other forms of political experience while searching for the existence or absence of a democratic polity. What I would like to argue throughout my study is that the relation between the military and the civilians may take hybrid forms, and clear-cut distinctions may not often lead us to the real picture.

On the other hand, there are other theories that can be more helpful in the description of civil-military relations. For example, Richard Dekmejian, following

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[8] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 202-3.

to some extent Claude Welch's categorisation, presents a scheme of collaboration and co-action between the civil and the military; it is in a sense a continuum whose nature changes according to the positions taken by the military or the civilians. Within this continuum, "civilian rule" and "military rule" are seen as the two opposite ends of the political spectrum in civil-military relations. According to Dekmejian, in neither case is the power of one actor "pure", for there is always some degree of military influence on civilian regimes and vice versa. Hence, moving towards the centre of continuum, there might be two intermediate categories of civilian-military partnership where either the civilians or the military might be dominant. In this context, there are some keywords like "rule", "control", "partnership" and influence". A civilian rule coupled with military influence corresponds to a military professionalism. The case of a military control/civilian partnership or civilian control/military partnership implies a civilian-military stalemate, where the two parties cannot override each other. Finally, there can be a military rule allowing only a civilian influence, and there is talk of praetorianism in this case.[9] Next to these categorisations, Dekmejian uses Perlmutter's concepts of "praetorian" and "professional" soldiers. In his scheme, a case of civilian rule/military influence means that there is a professional military; a case of military rule/civilian influence implies the existence of a praetorian military body.[10] I think that these concepts are crucial in analysing Egypt and Turkey, where the military often appears as the representative of nation building

[9] Richard Hrair Dekmejian, "Egypt and Turkey: The Military in the Background", in Roman Kolkowitcz and Andrzej Korbonski (eds.), *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Modernising Societies* (Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 28-30.

[10] See *ibid.* Perlmutter's professional soldier considers himself to be submitted to civilian authority, while the praetorian soldier identifies the military's goals, political opinions etc. with national interest and acts according to that. See Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven. & London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 11-13.

or modernisation and takeover the political apparatus in a praetorian way in the name of national interest.

As it is to be deduced from Dekmejian's theory, the civil-military relations may be interpreted in a continuum, where the degree of domination of one power changes according to a set of sophisticated factors. I think that Dekmejian's theoretical approach is crucial in the sense that it illustrates the cooperation between the civil and the military. This is especially valid for Third World or modernising countries where the military intervention in politics is often encountered. Thus, the separation of civil and military no longer works in these cases where the civilians themselves agree on collaboration with the military and adopt a policy of cooptation rather than fighting for democratic ideals. I think that this implicit acceptance on the part of the civilians is crucial to understand Egyptian and Turkish experiences.

Next to Dekmejian's analysis, a recent theoretical approach, proposed by Rebecca Schiff, provides a criticism of standard theories on military-civil relations. In some respects, Schiff again proposes a theory where continuities and collaboration strategies are more important than breaks and ruptures. Rebecca Schiff focuses first of all on the ways of predicting and finding out the conditions and dynamics of the existence or the absence of a military intervention. Even if making predictions and designing future models is out of my concern in this present study, I think that Schiff's challenge to the existing literature is worth mentioning.

What Schiff calls the concordance model envisions first of all a civil-military partnership that accomplishes two goals. First, it explains which institutional and cultural conditions -involving separation, integration, or some

other alternative- prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that when agreement prevails among the three partners (the military, the political elite, and the society), domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. The central argument, therefore, is that if the military, the political elite, and the society achieve concordance on four indicators then domestic intervention is less probable. These four indicators are the composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.[11] As I have emphasised above, my aim is not to strictly follow Schiff's approach and inquire for the reasons of the recurrence or absence of military coups. What is of interest to me is, first of all, the notion of a concordance between the military and the civilians. I am far from asserting that a lack of concordance ("discordance" in Schiff's terminology) will necessarily bring a military intervention, and that a concordance dictates itself upon civilians who do not want to have a military coup. For instance, in polities where the military is powerful, a concordance may be realised at the expense of the takeover of the civil sector's prerogatives by the military without realising a coup. However, Schiff's notion of a continuity and cohabitation between the civilian and the military serves my purpose. Moreover, her four indicators may also be fruitfully used to analyse both Turkish and Egyptian cases. Of course, the relative importance of these indicators may change according to countries and periods. For instance, it may be said that the composition (the social profile) of the officer corps in Turkey was an important factor behind the 1960 coup; the inflationary politics of the Democrat Party had

[11] Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7-24. For a polemic of Schiff against one of her critiques, see "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 277-283. For a case study by Schiff, see "Concordance Theory: The Cases of India and Pakistan", in David A. Mares (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Southern Asia and Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 27-44.

eroded the economic might of the military and led to a dissent among low-ranking officers. However, military style (the socialisation pattern, the political culture, the legitimisation discourse, and the indoctrination) was dominant in the 1980 coup. Generally speaking, the composition of the military corps has always been an important factor in Egypt, while issues of military culture (especially after the relative improvement of the economic condition of the military after the 1960 coup) were dominant in Turkey.

To sum up, my theoretical apparatus is made up of some concepts such as civic/military culture; military or civilian influence/partnership/control/rule; concordance (with its four indicators); professionalism versus praetorianism, etc. Throughout my study, I will use a theoretical framework borrowing concepts and insights from various approaches. I will not establish a dichotomy between the civilian and the military, but not deny the virtues of the theory of separation, like its inquiries into the nature of the political culture of a given country. In general, my aim is to show that the relations between the civilian and the military are of a varied sort. These relations influence the course of politics and the decision-making processes in various ways. The remaining part of the study, dealing with Egypt and Turkey, will provide enough material attesting to the fact that these relations go far beyond a simple dichotomy.

2. TURKISH POLITICS AND THE MILITARY

While analysing the Turkish case, it is possible to devise many different categorisations according to the perspectives and interests of the student. I have preferred to adopt the simplest periodization for the sake of clarity. First of all, I will begin with a short historical introduction about the roots of the mentality and position of the Turkish army in Turkish history. My focus will be on the last decades of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century. Following this, I will take into account first the 1923-1950 period. This period is characterised by the single-party regime, the domination of former military men turned into politicians, and the charismatic appeal of the commanders of the War of Liberation. The next period, the decade of 1950-1960, reflects the alienation of the military from the regime, largely due to the dissolution of the concordance of the first decades of the republic and the advent of a new political elite. The army, motivated by the ideological role assigned to it from the first movements of modernisation and enhanced by the mottoes of the Kemalist regime, seeks a solution out of this crisis by a military coup, and leads to the establishment of a new constitution. In the 1960 coup, the army defines itself as dynamic force acting against a reactionary political elite. The period of 1960-1971 signifies a new rapprochement between some sectors of the population and the military, as seen in the emergence of some reformist movements that assign an important role to the military in the modernisation of the country, like the *Yön* movement. On the other hand, the army

begins to loose its "progressive" approach in these years. Against the rise of radical political movements, the army begins to favour the preservation of the regime. The intervention of 1971, realised against a background of a rising unrest and political destabilisation, cannot contain the social turmoil that starts again after a transition period between 1971 and 1973. The army intervenes again in 1980, and is successful to contain and abolish the political opposition. The army thus emphasises its role as the guarantee of the regime against any factor of destabilisation. This outlook, despite the existence of some exceptions under Turgut Özal, continues up to his day. However, the pattern of intervention takes a new aspect in the post-1980 period. Rather than staging coups, the army becomes an important and ever-present political actor. Military intervention in politics takes an aspect of "pre-emptive strike", and the army exercises political control through civilian agencies.

As outlined above, I have divided the history of the Turkish Republic into the following periods: 1923-50, 1950-60, 1960-71, 1971-80, and 1980 to the present. The role of the military is not always the same throughout these periods. The perception of the army by the population, the patterns of intervention, the developments subsequent to military coups are different in each period. Each period preceding a military coup includes the little details, seemingly unimportant events as well as great changes underlying military coups. Similarly, each period following a military coup reflects interesting efforts of consolidation, reshaping of the political scene, constitutional amendments, changes in electoral law, the creation of new institutions of control (the National Security Council, the Higher Education Council), the introduction of new dynamics into the political equation.

The presence of the military in the history of the Turkish Republic is obvious. However, this is a dynamic history. The "enemies" of the army (both internal and external) change according to the political issues, the army assures itself an economic background as seen in the establishment of an economic sector controlled by the military, it opens up new vistas of political intervention. I will try to make sense of all these developments, and show that the presence of the military, deep-rooted in a country where the absence of a civil society required the intervention of extra-social forces, has not been eradicated even if there are no more coups after 1980.

2. a. A Short Historical Inquiry

While dealing with the Turkish case, I will limit my study to the "modern" period following the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. The Ottoman period, that displays a wide range of patterns about the relations of the military and the political establishment, exceeds the limit of this study. Moreover, I think that the military tradition in Turkey, though having been influenced by the Ottoman past, bears rather the legacy of the late-19th and 20th centuries. Beginning with the Young Turk movement, there emerged a type of officer concerned with the political condition of the country. The Military Academy in Istanbul (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*) was one of the centres of the opposition to the autocracy of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. The Abdulhamid period and the Second Constitutional era (beginning in 1908 with the re-proclamation of the 1876 Constitution) saw a rise in the political consciousness of the military. This political consciousness was often coupled with a belief in modernisation, and the officer corps was, already before the Kemalist era, one of the representatives of a belief in the modernisation

in the Ottoman Empire. It may even be said that some members of the officer corps had already developed a "Jacobin" attitude, believing in the supremacy of their political and social design and ready to make use of force to implement their own projects.

On the other hand, the defeats in the Balkan Wars and the First World War created bitterness among the army officers. They thought of themselves as the first responsible of the defeat; some of them indulged in shame, passivity and fatigue while others were motivated to act again and redeem themselves for their past failures. This demoralisation explains to some extent the discourse about the virtues of the Turkish Army after the War of Liberation. In a sense, the War of Liberation meant the restoration of military pride. Against the Ottoman background characterised by defeats, the founding moment of the Turkish Republic was sealed with a military success.

The victory over the Greeks in August 1922 was in a sense the redemption of the Turkish army. Having suffered nothing but defeats since 1912, the army was finally able to emerge victorious. To be sure, the ideological symbolism of the victory went far beyond the technical military victory over the Greek army. It meant that the army was one of the saviours of the liberty of the nation. The army was, together with the National Assembly, accepted as the expression *par excellence* of the people's will to shake the yoke of foreign invaders.

2. b. From 1923 to 1950

It is not easy to fit the first 28 years of the Turkish Republic under a single heading. For instance, if we were to make an economic categorisation, we would be obliged to assess a great number of data and place them under different

headings; for instance, we would be obliged to distinguish first a liberalisation period followed by a statist economy, then interrupted by the conditions of war, etc. However, as what concerns the role of the military in Turkish politics, this period seems to represent a fairly constant picture. We can say that this period is characterised by the absence of military coups, and as such may be deemed to be a period where the military was thoroughly professionalised and abstained from politics. It is true that the active military personnel did not intervene into politics; the army cadres and the bureaucracy were to some extent different. However, this absence of military coups and the withdrawal of the active officers from politics may not be imputed to the existence of a "pro-civilian" outlook. What is at stake is rather a peculiar balance of forces.

At first sight, it appears that one of the factors that prevented military coups was the charismatic appeal of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü. As former commanders of the War of Liberation, they exerted an enormous influence on the army; it would be unconceivable for the military to stage a military coup against them. Just as in the Egypt of Nasser, these two leaders were successful in bridling the army and confining the active officer corps to strict military functions. Another important figure of the period is the field marshal Fevzi Çakmak, chief of staff from 1920 to 1946. Fevzi Çakmak, as a career officer opposed to the involvement of the military in politics, was an important proponent of the professionalization of the military. Çakmak's function was similar to that of Field Marshall Abd al-Hakim Amir, the chief of staff under Nasser. The army was like the personal fief of those two field marshals, and they governed it with an iron hand.

On the other hand, the absence of military coups did not depend solely on the charisma of the leaders of national liberation. The position of these charismatic leaders carried an ambiguity vis-à-vis the army. In the words of Gerassimos Karabelias,

> ... Atatürk was very careful about the construction of the legacy he would leave as a bequest to the officer corps. Having learned a hard lesson from the Young Turk period, he raised legal barriers to the direct involvement of active officers in the country's everyday political life. ... At the same time, he made no attempt to hide his warm feelings towards the military personnel. It was the latter rather than the civilians (politicians, merchants, etc.) whom Atatürk trusted for the accomplishment of the goals he had set for the Turkish Republic.[12]

As Karabelias suggests, two attitudes vis-à-vis the armed forces are to be found in that period. First of all, there is a tendency to prevent the newly established republican polity from being overwhelmed by the struggles between different factions. What I have in mind is the struggle that surfaced in the first National Assembly between the followers of the Preservation of Rights (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk*) group and the followers of the so-called Second Group (*İkinci Grup*). The Second Group included in its ranks an important number of former officers who still had an influence over the army. Thus, while Mustafa Kemal and faction headed by him has pursued a general campaign against their political opponents in the first years of the republic, the neutralisation of the army was one of the important themes of them.

The will to keep a distance between active officers and politics had found its expression in some legal regulations. With the Law 385 issued in 19 December 1923, even if it was not prohibited for active officers to be elected as MPs, it was

decreed that they would have to make a choice between continuing their military career or becoming a member of the National Assembly. Then, in 3 March 1924, the Ministry of General Staff (*Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekâleti*) was abolished and turned into the General Staff Office; thus, the chief of general staff would not be present in the council of ministers and not be a part of the political decision-making process.[13] These moves were dictated by the necessities of countering the activities of the opposition in the National Assembly. Among the opponents to Mustafa Kemal were his old friends from the army, like Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, and others. These generals could well exert an influence in the army, and stage a coup against Mustafa Kemal by making use of their influences.[14] Indeed, the opposition of these old generals became visible in the institution of the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) in 17 November 1924. Against this background, the regime's first move was obviously to put a distance between politics and the military, and confine the officer corps to the functions dictated by the regime. To sum up, I can say that the separation of the military from politics was not an effort of democratisation; rather, it was part of a struggle over politics. In accordance with the Young Turk tradition, to establish a control over the army was an important asset of power. Mustafa Kemal was successful in controlling the army, and erected a wall between it and politics only in the process of struggling against his opponents.

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[12] Gerassimos Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-85", in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Seventy-five Years of the Turkish Republic* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 132.

[13] Ümit Özdağ, *Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi (Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemleri)*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1991), pp. 48-52.

[14] For the "generals' opposition" and the victory of Mustafa Kemal over them, see Özdağ, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-70.

The election of 1924, the closure of the Progressive Republican Party and the proclamation of the Emergency Law (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) in March 1925, the opposition was destroyed and the supremacy of Mustafa Kemal was instituted. It is only after the emergence of Mustafa Kemal as the sole power figure in the country that another discourse about the army came to the fore. The rhetoric about the army's function as a guardian of the Kemalist Republic and of its reforms was in a sense an essential component of the Kemalist ideology after its consolidation and elimination of its rivals.

Thus, the identification of the military with the regime itself was, in the post-1925 period, an important asset in the scheme of concordance that existed between the army and the regime. It has been mentioned above that the Kemalist regime categorised the army as its guardian. In addition, the regime needed the display of armed forces against the Kurdish rebels in the southeastern provinces of the country and against reactionary forces, namely Islamists.

The role of the army as the guardian of the regime against reactionary forces finds its expression in a crucial event, transmitted to subsequent generations and taught to every schoolchildren: the Menemen incident. The incident in itself is simple: a few individuals, supposedly the followers of a local sheikh, gather in a mosque and decide to launch an uprising against the regime deemed to be atheistic and Westernist. Kubilay, a young lieutenant, intervenes against the Islamist rebels but is atrociously killed. His head is said to have been put on top of a long stick and displayed to the population of the town of Menemen. Government forces are quick to act, the rebels and their presumed chiefs are arrested and executed. The martyr, Kubilay, is hailed as the victim of

obscurantist forces desiring to pull the republic back into the oppressive and backward atmosphere of the ancient regime.

This incident bears the marks of the new political agenda and ideological outlook of the Turkish Republic. For instance, it is meaningful that Kubilay is in fact a teacher, who fulfils his military service as a reserve officer. Thus, what the reactionaries kill is both a teacher, an individual having the mission to enlighten the masses, and an officer, an individual having the mission to safeguard the republic against internal and external enemies. Thus, the army's modernist outlook and the identity of its enemies are again emphasised via the incident of Menemen. Even if the incident in itself is not a full scale uprising, the symbolic capital invested in the issue is very significant.

The identification of the military with the regime's guardianship and the existence of former officers in state machinery leads me to conclude that, in the first decades of the republic, there was an ideological bloc, in which a bureaucrat-military elite dominated politics. For instance, Frederic Frey has shown that officials (bureaucrats and former officers) constituted half of the members of Parliament in all single-party National Assemblies from 1920 up to 1947.[15] Thus, we can pretend that there was a convergence of interests during the presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü. This convergence of interests prevented the officer corps from resenting the moves of the regime and being alienated by the political system. The army was given the task of protecting the reforms and conversely, individuals sympathetic to the military were present at all the levels of the state. In Dekmejian's terminology, the relations between the military and the civilians in that period may be defined as a civilian rule together with a military influence. As mentioned above, the military was influential via former officers present in the

national assembly and the administration. To paraphrase Rebecca Schiff, a state of concordance was reached throughout the period whereby there was a mutual understanding and settlement between the army and other sectors. In the ideological level, the military was assigned the role of the guardian of the republic. This guardianship was identified with the preservation of modernist and Westernist values, and a state of vigilance against the enemies of the regime (including internal enemies like Kurdish rebels or Islamist reactionaries).

This state of concordance, or convergence of interests, began to change with the outcome of the 1946 elections. In the words of Ergun Özbudun, "there was a noticeable decline in the representation of officials and a corresponding increase in the percentage of deputies with a professional or economic background".[16] This change in the profile of the state elite or the substitution of what Özbudun calls a political elite to the state elite made up of bureaucrats and former officers, has in a sense launched the process of alienation of the military from the political system. The new cadres symbolised new outlooks, new policies, and new economic designs. In the eyes of former state elites, the new political elite meant the destruction of the Kemalist reforms, and their own prerogatives to rule. In the mentality of the committed Kemalist, the Democrat Party was a corrupt political institution, giving concessions to the Islamist and localist interests, undermining the mission of enlightenment, reversing Kemalist reforms. Bluntly saying, these arguments were in reality the critiques of a class fraction that was being replaced by a new one in the government. On the other hand, the ideological discourse formed in the first decades of the republic was very

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[15] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 181, 190.
[16] Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey", in Larry Diamond (ed.), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 252.

powerful and encompassing, and intolerant against any will to change the Kemalist agenda. To sum up, the 1946 elections represented the beginning of resentment towards the "newcomers". The army, with the ideological mission assigned to it –an ideological mission often used to legitimate its presence in politics- and with the prospect of the loss of privileges given by the Kemalist regime, would join this chorus of criticism in the process.

2.c. From 1950 to 1960

Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, when they came to power in 1950, were well aware of the resentment and reaction in the ranks of the army. As former Kemalist MPs, they knew that the army would not be sympathetic to a transfer of power from the Republican People's Party to the Democrat Party. Thus, they tried to neutralise the army by a purge at the top of the armed forces. The Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy and air force, and a number of other generals were all removed in June 1950, a few months after the Democrats came to power. This purge was to some extent intended to head off a coup by anti-Democrat officers.[17] This coup has led to two things. First, it has created an army leadership loyal to the Democrat Party, and prevented the intrusion of the military into politics. Thus, R. Dekmejian is right in defining this period as one of civilian rule and military influence.[18] The Democrat Party, enjoying a huge popular support in the first years of its rule, was successful in keeping the army away. On the other hand, a second and negative consequence of the June 1950 purge in the army was that it had increased the suspicion of the military against

[17] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 93.
[18] Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

the Democrat Party. Especially the low ranking officers, more imbued with Kemalist idealism and more vulnerable to the inflationist economic policies of the Democrat Party, were to a large extent alienated from the political power. In addition to all these, the military was irritated by the fact that Adnan Menderes government was basing promotions on personal fidelity to itself.[19]

It is obvious that there was some military staff loyal to the Democrat Party, especially among the higher ranks of the army. What provided the "civilian rule/military influence" atmosphere or the concordance of the period 1950-60 was to a large extent dependent on the loyalty of high ranking military towards the Democrat Party. One of the originalities of the 1960 coup is that it was largely worked out by low ranking officers. Captains, majors and colonels constituted small groups in order to stage a coup. The distance between the low ranking and high ranking officers is evident in the fact that the interventionists began to look for a general to take the lead just in the wake of the May 1960 coup: they had worked out a kind of conspiracy, but badly needed a general or generals to legitimise their move and to create the impression that high ranking officers were supporting the coup as well. Unlike the interventions of March 1971 and September 1980 which are said to have been realised conforming to the military hierarchy (*emir ve komuta zinciri içinde*), the 1960 coup has been associated with a move both against the government and against its supporters among the high ranking military.

The 1960 coup has been later categorised by a movement against the "backward/reactionary" policies of the DP government that was claimed to favour the Islamists and conservatives, undermine the legacy of the Kemalist revolution and so on. In the 1960s, the army was hailed by Kemalists of various tendencies –

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

especially by the so-called "left Kemalists"- as the motor force of the Kemalist revolution; the army was defined as the leading force of modernisation and Westernisation. It was thus quite possible to legitimise the coup of 1960 on the basis of these arguments: the army was assigned a role in Turkish modernisation, and its place was defined as the guardian of the Kemalist revolution. According to that line of thought, it was to be expected that the army would intervene each time the Kemalist revolution was betrayed.

This typical argument assigns the Turkish modernisation an essentialist character: Turkish modernisation, according to that argument, is started by Mustafa Kemal and has a clearly defined agenda. Changes in that agenda are not permissible, because these would mean the betrayal of the Kemalist revolution. On the other hand, the army is always there in case the revolution would be set off its track by reactionary forces.

I myself do not share this understanding about the Turkish modernisation and the role of the army in politics. I think that the army and the civilian-bureaucrat class in general, has developed, and sustained a certain type of class-consciousness from the very early days of the Young Turk movement. Due to that quality, the army has developed certain autonomy, coupled with a political consciousness and a set of singular interests. Thus, even if the discourse of modernisation may be used as a reason to intervene, even if there may be some officers believing in their mission as the guardians of the Kemalist revolution, the picture is more complicated than that. For myself, I share the views of Kurtuluş Kayalı about the position and mentality of the army in the period preceding the May 1960 coup. There was a relative amelioration in economic and political conditions in post-1957 period, a period that also witnessed the growth of the

interventionist tendencies within the army.[20] Normally, it was to be expected that the new measures of economic amelioration and the rapprochement between the DP and the RPP would stop the growth of the wave of opposition and intervention within the army. However, it seems that the army was asserting its existence as an autonomous political actor, regardless of the moves of the other party. It also appears that there is a limitation to the discourse of the army's guardianship of the modernisation process. Once the tendency to intervene and to assert itself increased, the army would make use of any pretext to become a determinant in politics.

To finish the discussion about the 1950-60 period, another important development was the adherence of Turkey to NATO in 1950. The engagement of Turkey was symbolised by the sending of troops to Korea to fight in the ranks of the "free world" against Communist aggression. The adherence to NATO meant massive US military aid, in the form of equipment and personnel formation. The consequences of this engagement in NATO would be witnessed mostly in the post-1960 period. Turkey became involved in the Cold War, and this also meant a strong anti-Communist bias. The army in the post-1960 period, especially in its highest ranks, would identify itself with this anti-Communist stance, as the guarantor of the survival of the regime against the rise of leftist/revolutionary opposition.

2. d. From 1960 to 1971

The coup of May 1960 has been much contested. In William Hale's words, the first concern was "the legitimacy of the action itself – whether Turkish

[20] Kurtuluş Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset. 27 Mayıs-12 Mart* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), pp. 62-7.

situation in the spring of 1960 was such that the army was justified in overthrowing an elected government by force".[21] The intervention was legitimised on the basis of preventing the country from falling into a political crisis, and the DP was blamed for its non-democratic applications. This supposed intervention on behalf of democracy has determined to a large extent the discourse of the leaders of the coup. According to William Hale,

> ... because one of the army's main reasons for intervening was the claim that the Menderes government had lost democratic legitimacy, the military chiefs were under strong pressure from both fellow officers and politicians to restore an elected civilian government at the earliest practicable moment. [22]

The armed forces were in an ambivalent position. As Feroz Ahmad points out, they had inherited two contradictory legacies, that of defending the legitimacy of the 27 May coup, and of protecting parliamentary democracy at the same time.[23] In the aftermath of the May 1960 coup, these two roles have often collided. For instance, the condemnations and executions of the former prime minister Adnan Menderes, former minister of foreign affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and former minister of finance Hasan Polatkan were legitimised as a way of safeguarding the legacy of the coup by exterminating the so-called detractors of democracy. On the other hand, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that first met on January 1961, the creation of a liberal constitution with a bicameral parliamentary system allowing for an increased right of political expression and freedom, and the organisation of elections on October 1961 represent the other side of the coin, and signify the commitment of going back to democratic rule.

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[21] William Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[23] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-75* (London: Hurst, 1977), pp. 179-80.

However, it should not be forgotten that the newly instituted National Security Council (NSC) perpetuated military intervention in politics. At first sight, the NSC was intended to act as an advisory body vis-à-vis the council of ministers on issues of national security. But, in the years to come, the NSC became one of the major actors in Turkish politics, and has in fact provided a direct agency of control to the military. It is interesting to note that the intervention of the military to such an extent was for the first time legalised in the history of the Turkish Republic. In the words of Feroz Ahmad, the army had become so intertwined in politics that it "no longer [could] afford to be neutral or above politics".[24]

The period between 1960 and 1971 is significant both with respect to the redefinition of the position of the military within the regime and the overall developments in Turkish politics. First of all, the military carved itself a place within the regime, as it has been suggested above, by the institution of the NSC. Second, with the establishment of the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK) in 1961 with the aim of providing social security to military personnel, the army has secured both the welfare of its members in an inflationist economy and obtained an important asset in the economy. OYAK has become an important financial conglomerate, and increased the identification of the military with the ongoing system.[25] Another important political development is that the period witnessed the rise of socialist, Islamist and extreme nationalist movements. In the elections of 1963, a socialist party, the Turkish Workers' Party, entered for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic the National Assembly. The establishment of a leftist trade union federation (the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions, DİSK), of leftist student organisations (and notably of the Revolutionary Youth,

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 281.
[25] Serdar Şen, *Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizm* (İstanbul: Kavram, 1996), p. 159.

the *Dev-Genç*, that would provide cadres for all the future leftist revolutionary organisations in Turkey), the rise of political tension with the clashes between the leftist and nationalist youth organisations, changed the face of Turkish politics. Moreover, with the extreme politicisation reigning in the country, there had emerged some leftist groups favouring a military intervention to realise their program. These groups were represented by the reviews *Yön* and *Türk Solu*, and the weekly *Devrim*. The coup of May 1960 had created the opinion that the military were among the most "advanced" sectors of the society, and some leftists fomented about giving a social and economic content to military interventions.[26] They had their counterparts among low-ranking officers as well, who entertained a naive belief in the army's role in securing the modernisation of the country.

The military intervention of March 1971 came against that background. This time, it took the form of a memorandum, consisting of the criticisms of the armed forces about the current political situation, and blaming the active government in failing to provide security and stability. The memorandum had another motivation as well: It was a last minute attempt, by some high-ranking officers, in order to prevent a group of radical officers from gaining political power and to maintain the unity and discipline of the military. [27] The vigilance of the high-ranking officers thus led to the prevention of a possible coup by leftist officers, and to the preservation of stability. It is interesting to note that the democratic overtones of the May 1960 coup had now reverted to the search for stability and security. The March 1971 memorandum signified the last step in the identification of the military with the maintenance of the political regime itself at any cost. The predominance of Kemalist idealism of the May 1960 coup thus gave

[26] K. Kayalı, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
[27] Gerassimos Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

way to a political opportunism, coupled with the growth of the vested interests of the military within the regime, both in the political and economic sense.

To sum up the position of the army in that period, the period preceding and coming just after the coup of 1960 defined the subsequent role of the army in Turkish politics. I have already emphasised that there had been different factions in the army, or that there had prevailed different opinions among the officer corps. The period from 1957 to 1963 witnessed an important activity on the part of the officer corps. Between 1957 and 1963, Turkey had very nearly slid into the position of the typical Latin American or Middle Eastern praetorian state, beset by constant coups, counter-coups, conspiracies and threats from the officer corps.[28] The coups of Talat Aydemir in February 1962 and May 1963, the purges among the army ranks, the formation of several revolutionary committees characterise that period. However, the army, with the vigilance and efforts of the high-ranking officers, succeeded in undermining these efforts. Thus, that period witnessed the redefinition of the role of the army in politics. First of all, any political activity on the part of the military has been submitted to the scrutiny of high officers. Second, there has been a rapprochement with the Justice Party, that is, with the representatives of the Turkish right; the army has thus divested itself of the image of the supporter of the RPP; moreover, the army and the Turkish right have reached an understanding on the basis of anti-communism.[29] Third, the army has institutionalised its political presence through the foundation of the NSC, and secured itself an economic basis through OYAK. Fourth, and most important of it all, the army has this time emerged with the discourse of preserving the regime at

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[28] Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[29] For the relations between the army and the Justice Party at that period, see Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri. Bir İkilemin Anatomisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), pp. 59-93 *passim*.

all costs. The enemies of the army were no more the reactionaries or Islamists, but anybody that would cause the regime to become destabilised. Some sections of the Turkish left, hoping to attract the army to their political schemes, have been largely disillusioned: The Kemalist legacy as interpreted by the leftists was no longer on the agenda of the army, which emerged from that period with a more hierarchical organisation and more pragmatic political outlook.

2. e. From 1971 to 1980

The military memorandum of March 1971 may be seen as the abandonment of the legacy of May 1960 with respect to democracy and multi-party politics. With March 1971, the military clearly identified multi-party politics as a system with various fallacies and shortcomings, open to destabilisation and chaos. This conception would again be put forth in the coup of September 1980. However, the military restrained its intervention to the proclamation of a memorandum. With the memorandum, the Demirel government was implicitly invited to resign. As a result, a cabinet including a host of ministers from the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party as well as from neutral technocrats and bureaucrats was formed under the leadership of Nihat Erim in 19 March 1971. The Erim government was soon to proclaim martial law in April 1971; meanwhile, the Turkish Workers' Party and the National Order Party were closed on the grounds that they had propagated respectively pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist arguments. Some intellectuals, among who were the most outstanding academicians and writers of the country, were arrested. Strikes were banned, freedom of press was restricted. As a final step of all these measures, the

constitution of 1961 was revised on the basis of the fact that it was "luxurious" for the Turkish society, and a number of civil rights granted by the constitution were curtailed.[30]

To sum up, this period was one of military control and civilian partnership[31]: The technocratic cabinets of Nihat Erim, and then of Ferit Melen that lasted until 1973 were in reality established to fulfil the political program devised by the military. They had to establish stability by police measures and implement, if possible, a kind of "reform" program, including a simple land reform and measures towards economic equality. However, economic measures were not implemented at the end. What resulted from that interregnum was that the army became disillusioned with that half-coup: Neither the reformist wing of the army with a proposal for economic reform, nor the hawkish wing with the aim of establishing stability had reached what they wanted.[32] This was to be an important lesson for the cadres who staged the coup of September 1980.

The period of 1973-1980 has been, in many aspects, a period of constant crisis. The Cyprus War, the clashes between the left-wing and right-wing militants, economic crisis coupled with inflation and shortage of consumer goods, the weakness of multi-party coalition governments created an atmosphere of uneasiness, and a constant turmoil whereby neither side, legal or illegal, parliamentary or extra-parliamentary, could work out an alternative. What had been designed as a tool to prevent DP-like governments to establish a quasi-dictatorship as a result of elections had proved to be a factor of destabilisation within the system.[33] As I have mentioned earlier, the army had already carved

[30] Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-7 *passim.*
[31] N. Narlı, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
[32] Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
[33] Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

itself a role as the defender of the regime; thus, such an atmosphere was ripe for armed intervention.

It seems that the army cadres waited for the crisis to ripen to the extreme. It is no surprise that the intervention came just after the presidential election crisis, when the assembly could not elect a president of republic for a period of over 100 days. Thus, the army intervened at the moment when the image of the assembly, of parliamentary politics in general, was totally undermined.

2. f. 1980 and Beyond

The coup of September 12, 1980, was the most sweeping coup that has ever been staged in Turkey. Invoking the power granted to them by the Internal Service Code and referring to the deteriorating social, political, and economic conditions in the country, the leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces staged a coup, dissolved the parliament and the government, arrested all political and union leaders and installed themselves in power.[34] The head of the coup, the chief of staff Kenan Evren was to be the head of the state, with four force commanders as members of the National Security Council. Thus, the NSC, formerly founded as an advisory body, constituted itself as a political organ, purged of its civilian members. A cabinet of non-party technocrats headed by Bülent Ulusu, a retired admiral, was formed, and a Consultative Assembly (*Danışma Meclisi*) was convened in October 1981.

In short, the generals had five aims: combating political violence, overcoming the economic crisis, eliminating the legislative backlog, eliminating the old political parties, and putting an end to strikes (that were viewed both as the means of propaganda of the revolutionary left and as factors of economic

destabilisation).[35] As it may be deduced from the speeches of Kenan Evren, the general outlook of the military may be summarised as follows: saving the armed forces from being infected by politics, safeguarding democracy (the military thought that the political violence of the late 1970s had undermined the basis of democratic institutions), safeguarding Turkey's defence capability, and ensuring constitutional reform (the 1961 Constitution being seen as one of the sources of political instability).[36]

There were three important differences of the September 1980 coup compared with two former coups. In the first place, there was no alteration of the hierarchy within the armed forces. Around March 1971, for instance, there were several groups in the armed forces that opted for different designs. This was not the case in the September 1980 coup, and the regime represented the collective will of the high command rather than that of particular military groups. Secondly, power was far more centralised than it had been on earlier occasions. Unlike the May 1960 coup, the role of low- and middle-ranking officers did not play any independent part in bringing about the coup; moreover, there were not subsequent coups, such as those organised by Talat Aydemir and his friends in 1962 and 1963. Thirdly, there was no division between military rulers and the active commanders of military forces. All these factors immensely enhanced the solidarity and stability of the regime. Moreover, there was an undeniable public support.[37] The public, tired of the political and economic crisis, as well as the everyday violence of the late 1970s, welcomed the coup as a mean of normalisation. To sum up, time was ripe for staging a military coup.

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[34] Gerassimos Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[35] Aryeh Shmuelevitz, *Republican Turkey: Aspects of Internal Affairs and International Relations* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1999), pp. 165-6.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-8.

Like the instigators of the coup of May 1960, the leaders of the coup of September 1980 ensured the preparation of a new constitution, but this time "restricting formerly granted civil liberties and enhancing the military's influence".[38] Beyond ensuring a tight control by the military over the society, this new constitution paved the way for authoritative measures against civil initiatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

The constitution of 1982, which is still in power, has been approved by a referendum held in November 7 of the same year. Despite some hints about the unfair conditions of the referendum concerning the security of the ballots, the new constitution has been ratified, with an overwhelming majority of the voters (91.4 per cent).[39] Under the new Constitution, Kenan Evren became president of republic. In the words of Gerassimos Karabelias,

> ... worried that the politicians might destroy [the army's] work when in power, the leaders of the military regime were determined to lay down new rules and limitations for the conduct of political life in the country during the post-junta period. Hence the introduction of a new constitution and its "acceptance" by the people indicated that the process of reconstructing the country's major political institutions was irreversible.[40]

This new constitution, as well as the implementation of new economic policies in order to overcome the crisis of the late 1970s were signs attesting to the fact that the military was determined, in William Hale's words, to "reconstruct political and economic institutions". Together with the trials involving former left- and right-wing activists, as well as union leaders and other political figures,

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[37] These points have been taken from William Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-50.
[38] For the role of the military in decision-making in 1980s, see George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers" in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), pp. 177-200.
[39] Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[40] *Ibid.*

the new political establishment, under the direction of the NSC, tried to realise what was called "a safe and secure atmosphere" (*huzur ve güven ortamı*). This may be described as a phase of transition, where a military establishment substituted itself in place of all political institutions and governed the country from the above. The imposition of martial law, the formal dissolution of all political parties in 16 October 1981, and the ban on chairmen, general secretaries and other senior office holders from any kind of relations with future political parties for the next ten years from October 1982 onwards[41], totally excluded the existing civil politicians of the country from any kind of political activity. What was left was a political scene dominated by the military and technocrats, or Consultative Assembly members who were not popularly elected but nominated by the military. This would last until normalisation, itself defined and decided by the military, was achieved.

After the introduction of a new constitution in November 1982, the generals moved to the next step of "political reconstruction": the establishment of new political parties. A new Law on Political Parties was issued on 24th April 1983. Under this legislation, the new political parties were subjected to a bureaucratic control. The founders of the parties should be approved of by the Ministry of Interior. The Law further stipulated that parties should be "attached to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" and the basic foundations of the Kemalist Republic.[42] This law gave the authorities a "veto power" in accordance with the aim of the military to disband old politicians from politics and to continue to monitor Turkish politics. For instance, the True Path Party viewed as the continuation of the former Justice Party, and the Social Democratic Party, viewed

[41] İlter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in post-1983", in Heper & Evin (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 69-74.

as the continuation of the former RPP, was not allowed to participate in the elections. As a result of this screening of political parties, only three parties could participate in the elections: the Motherland Party (headed by Turgut Özal), the Populist Party (headed by Necdet Calp), and the Nationalist Democracy Party (headed by Turgut Sunalp, given tacit support by the leaders of the military government). To quote Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert,

> The question in November 1983 was: will the electorate continue to support the military leaders by endorsing political parties favoured by them or would *politics* and all political cleavages become once again salient? The voters in 1983 have reverted from regime issues to *politics* ...[43]

The results gave Özal's Motherland Party 45 per cent of the popular vote and 211 seats out of a total of 400 in the new National Assembly. The Populist Party was second, with 30 per cent of the vote and 117 seats. Nationalist Democracy Party followed them with 24 per cent and 71 seats. It is necessary to note that, despite the unexpected defeat of the NDP, Kenan Evren accepted the results of the election and designated Turgut Özal as prime minister.[44]

I agree with Gerassimos Karabelias that there have mainly been three distinct stages in civil-military relations in the post-junta period: the first when Kenan Evren was the president and Turgut Özal the prime minister (1983-89), the second when Özal occupied the seat of president (1989-93), and the third the post-Özal period (1993 till now).[45]

The 1983 elections did not mean a complete withdrawal of the military from politics. The activities of the NSC and the presence of Kenan Evren as

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[42] William Hale, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
[43] Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 94.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 95-6.

president (it should be noted that he headed cabinet meetings when the agenda included major national security items) meant that the military retained considerable influence over policy making. Turgut Özal, known for his later moves against the military, worked at first a *modus operandi* with the military, with president Kenan Evren "taking responsibility over all matters relating to internal and external security, as well as foreign affairs and higher education matters about which the military commanders were highly sensitive".[46] While the political parties in opposition voiced criticisms about the interference of the military in politics, these criticisms failed to substantiate. The first years of the post-1980 parliamentary settlement were characterised by a division of labour between the military and the civilians, whereby the Özal government focused especially on economic matters.

The first move against the presence of the military within the political system came from Turgut Özal in June 1987, four years after the elections. In the summer of 1987, he overruled the recommendation of the senior military command to appoint General Necdet Öztorun to the position of the Chief of the General Staff and instead put in office the candidate he preferred, General Necip Torumtay. Interestingly enough, Kenan Evren swiftly approved of this decision and Özal's candidate has been nominated.[47] The summer of 1987 has been a critical period in the sense of including other measures towards the civilianisation of the regime. First of all, the Özal administration took the initiative in reviewing the country's defence funds and brought into public discussion resource requirements for professionalising the army. A few months later, Özal declared

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[45] Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[46] Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarisation and Civilianisation of the Regime", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 26.
[47] Karabelias, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

his plan to make the Chief of General Staff report to the defence minister rather than the prime minister, citing the example of Western democracies.[48] Even if these last two suggestions failed to materialise, Özal's moves were quite effective in bringing about the position of the military to public discussion. Even if these arguments may be interpreted as Özal's moves against the criticisms of his political opponents, these were nevertheless crucial, especially when compared to the revival of the interference of the military in politics in post-Özal period. The position of Kenan Evren throughout the period has gradually declined in power, as shown by his approval of the decisions of Turgut Özal in June 1987. It may be said that Turgut Özal has carefully calculated his moves, and passed into action only when he deemed himself powerful enough to implement his own designs. Thus, the powerful president of the 1983, heading cabinet meetings and acting of his own reverted to a more symbolic position. Kenan Evren was especially sensitive on the issue of secularism, and he had fears about the infiltration of religious extremists into the army[49], while the Özal government, due to its being a coalition of several rightist factions, was more lenient on the issue of Islamic fundamentalism. Nevertheless, this opposition did not materialise into an overall political crisis, and Kenan Evren retired from his position when his term ended. Another critical issue concerning the prime ministry of Özal is that the police forces were endowed with great powers, in part with the aim of countering the army's presence and leaving the issue of internal security completely to the police forces, depending on the Ministry of Interior.

In the second stage of the post-junta phase, i.e. during Turgut Özal's presidency, the prominence of the civilians over the military continued. The

[48] Ahmet Evin, in Heper and Evin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[49] C. H. Dodd, "Kenan Evren as President", in Heper and Evin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 182.

resignation of the Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay in December 1990 is in this respect important. General Torumtay resigned due to his objection to Turgut Özal's policy concerning the involvement of Turkey in the Gulf War. It was the first time that a Chief of General Staff resigned, and the event showed that the civilians had become able to dictate their outlooks to the military, while the military preferred to comply or to resign. To sum up, the period of 1983 and 1993 (the year when Özal died) has been characterised by what William Hale has called the "disengagement of the military". First of all, the "party of the military", the Nationalist Democracy Party, did not become a significant political force and faded away from the political scene. More than all, the post-1983 period witnessed the gradual relaxation of political restrictions like the re-opening of the Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederations and the return of once banned pre-1980 politicians to the political scene.[50] However, these gradual measures, as well as the initiatives of Turgut Özal, have not paved the way for a total and wholesome civilianisation of the regime. Especially in the post-Özal period, i.e. in what I have called the third stage after the post-junta period, the military came back with a vengeance.

This new period has witnessed a new rapprochement between the military and the civilians, started with Süleyman Demirel after the 1991 elections and perpetuated especially by Tansu Çiller, coming into the office of prime minister after Demirel was elected president in 1993. To quote Nilüfer Narlı,

> In the mid-1990s, the civilian governments' failure to check the growing influence of the Islamists and Kurdish separatists gave the military an opportunity to justify and even expand its dominant role in Turkey's internal affairs.[51]

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[50] Hale, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-95 *passim.*
[51] Nilüfer Narlı, *op, cit.*, p. 115.

The revival of military intervention has first began as a response to the escalation of the Kurdish crisis, and the relegation of the "solution" of the problem to the military, even if criticised in many respects, has meant a growing military participation in internal politics. Then, the electoral gains made by Islamists in the municipal elections of 1994 and the parliamentary elections of 1995 have led to the involvement of the military high command in politics, through NSC decisions and debates as well as individual statements.

The military's power reached its peak when it unseated Turkey's first Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan and of his Welfare Party, after an 18-point list of policy recommendations were presented to the True Path-Welfare Parties government. Then, on April 29, officers of the Turkish General Staff gave a media briefing at which, for the first time, the threat of Islamism and separatism within the country was rated by the military as a greater danger to Turkey than any external factors. In May and June 1997, the military elaborated on the Islamist threat by pointing out that the infiltration of the Islamists into professional life and public administration, the high percent of religious school graduates at the universities, and the proliferation of Islamist publications were the clear signs of an Islamist design to take over the regime in Turkey. On January 16, 1998, the Constitutional Court announced the closure of the Welfare Party, together with a ban on some of its prominent figures including Necmettin Erbakan. All these measures were legitimized in the name of Kemalist principles, and the mission of the army as the safeguard of secularism.

The army's intervention in politics has gone on unhindered since then. Recently, in the last months of 2000, the army has manifested its interest in the

campaign against corruption, and announced that corruption was one of the most important threats against the regime.

The reaction against Islamists, a potential reaction since the army's identification with modernist values and secularism is a Kemalist legacy, has thus been coupled a new concept of "internal enemy". These developments have shown that the army has in fact a dynamic and pragmatic stance, positioning itself according to the circumstances and acting on the allegation of reacting against "internal enemies", be they leftists, Islamists, separatists, or corrupt bureaucrats.

The political developments of the post-1980 period have, in sum, clearly shown that the intervention of the army in Turkish politics is an undeniable fact. In the words of Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "the ... constitution of 1982 entrenched the military's veto power in the political system to such an extent that it has made crude military intervention into politics [i.e. military coups] redundant".[52]

[52] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 29, no. 2 (January 1997), pp. 153-4.

3. EGYPTIAN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY

While analysing the Egyptian experience, I will begin with the impact of the colonial past, and thus skip over the Ottoman period and the reign of Muhammad Ali. I think that the colonial past explains some aspects of the military establishment, and defines the subsequent position of the military in Egypt. To compare this with the background of the Turkish army, we may say that the Egyptian army has not a heroic and successful "foundation myth". Thus, while the Turkish army pretends to be the guardian of a regime founded by Mustafa Kemal, the Egyptian military in a sense defends a regime created by the army itself from the July Revolution onwards.

As in the Turkish case, a periodization will be provided below. After a historical background, the reigns of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak will be separately analysed. What is interesting in the Egyptian case is that the periodisation is necessarily tied to the reigns of three leaders. Beyond an apparent continuity between the reigns of these leaders, there are in fact significant differences with regard to foreign policy, economics, relations with the army and the civilians, and relations with Israel, the archenemy of the Arabs. After the founding father Nasser comes Sadat, who consolidated the new regime and followed a policy of reconciliation; finally, Mubarak perpetuated the legacy of the state as left to him by Sadat. Of course, history is not only written by single individuals. However, in this case, the names of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak mean something beyond their immediate denotation: These are the symbolic names used to refer to periods that represent a set of characteristics, conditions, political outlooks. When it is considered that the periods rather than the individuals come to the fore in the Turkish case, the peculiarity of the Egyptian experience is better understood. As a

final remark, I want to add that the Egyptian case rather represents the emergence of a political class out of the army, which then makes use of the army as a support of its own political domination but does not let it to have a political autonomy.

3. a. A Short Historical Inquiry

Before dealing with the nature of the military in Egypt, it is worth examining briefly the context within which it came to operate. The 1952 coup, which Egyptians have come to refer to as the "July Revolution", and the increasingly radical course that the Nasser regime followed were a response to Egypt's severe political, social, and economic problems. Occupied by Britain in 1882, Egypt had (after a popular anti-colonial uprising in 1919) won limited self-rule in 1922 and a fuller measure of independence in 1936. But Egyptians resented continuing foreign political and economic influence, especially the presence of British troops in bases along the Suez Canal, itself controlled by a European company. The countryside, where most Egyptians lived, was dominated by absentee landowners (including the king and his family), while most of the peasants were desperately poor, illiterate, and disenfranchised. The political system was increasingly discredited by corruption and by the politicians' failure to confront the country's problems adequately.[53]

The defeat in 1948 of the Egyptian army in Palestine further undermined the monarchical regime and highlighted the need for reform. With radical elements, including communists and Islamists, gaining ground, the "Free Officers", most of whom were of middling social origins and for whom the military career had been the path to upward social mobility, resolved to save

Egypt by seizing power and implementing essential political and social reforms. These officers were influenced by a middle-class opposition. In the economical sense, some of these officers were not far removed from the impoverished village or petty officialdom. In the ideological sense, the officers were preoccupied with the humiliation of foreign control over Egypt; they soon developed into a force with the will and capacity to topple the *ancien régime* and break the impasse into which they had fallen.[54]

The July Revolution came against this background. The progressive elements of the middle classes represented by the Marxists, the Islamist opposition, and the army came together to stage what seemed at the beginning a revolution organised by an alliance of different social strata. In the process, the army under Nasser took over the political apparatus. However, the anti-imperialist and socialist overtones of this movement have been retained by Nasser, who formulated a singular discourse of "Arab socialism" and tried to implement it during his reign.

3. b. The July Revolution and Beyond: The Years Under Nasser

In contrast with the role of the Turkish army in the national liberation process, can we say that the overthrow of King Farouk has brought to the fore an emphasis of "fight against the *ancien régime*" categorised as corrupt, or "fight against injustice"? It is certainly true that the political discourse of the coup of 1952 included such themes; the king was seen as the agent of colonial powers, and as the perpetrator of economic inequality and poverty. Therefore, the coup of

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[53] The overall picture is taken from P. J. Vatikiotis, "Egypt's Political Experience: The 1952 Revolution as an Expression of the Historical Heritage", in *The Middle East: From the End of Empire to the End of Cold War* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 89-116.

[54] Anouar Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. xiii-xiv.

1952 included a vast coalition of political organisations determined to overthrow the king and bring in a new political setting. In Alain Roussillon's words,

> the military may have constituted the "armed hand" of the movement, but its militant base and its links to society were made up of two trends that could not be reconciled and that the new regime immediately repressed: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Marxist left, to both of which certain officers were linked.[55]

In this context, the army was only one among many forces that took part in the coup; as it is to be expected, it was the spearhead of the coup, and provided the necessary armed support. At first sight, General Naguib was the leader of the armed forces that supported the coup, and he intended to "go back to the barracks" once the coup would be fulfilled. However, as the leader of the Free Officers, Nasser did away with General Naguib by putting him under house arrest and took over the political power. More than that, the first years after the coup have witnessed the elimination of a number of political organisations, such as the Marxist left, the Wafd Party representing the liberal parliamentarians, and the Muslim Brothers. Thus, in Nordlinger's terminology, what has begun as a "guardian" military regime in Egypt with the intention of withdrawing from politics has continued as a "ruler" military regime, where the military kept the political power in its hands.[56] To quote Roussillon once again, the Free Officers movement, approved at first by all Egyptian political parties, "appeared as an expected, necessary reaction to the 'anomie' of which the 1948 disaster in Palestine, the proliferation of peasant revolts, and the burning of Cairo on January

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[55] Alain Roussillon, "Republican Egypt Interpreted: Revolution and Beyond", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt. Volume Two: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 338.
[56] Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 21-7.

26, 1952 constituted obvious symptoms".[57] Thus, the military regime came to be accepted as a remedy against the humiliation of the Egyptian forces before the small Israeli army in the war of 1948; moreover, the army was viewed as the force that would bring in social equality against the corruption of the monarchy. Thus, from the very beginning, the Free Officers have been accepted as a political power without viable alternatives. Again, the political agenda of the officers included, in a highly populist manner, some themes of economic equality, land reform, welfare, etc. Unlike the Turkish case where the army generally lacked any emphasis on economic and political equality (with the exception of May 1960 coup), the coup of 1952 in Egypt has turned into a typical Third-World movement where a "progressive" sector of the society set out to implement a program against the torts and abuses of an ancient regime, categorised as an ineffective tool at the hands of colonisers or wealthy classes. Nasser's peculiar notion of Arab socialism, with some overtones of Arab nationalism and economic equality secured throughout statist economic measures, found its legitimisation in the social and political conditions prior to the coup of 1952: the blow on Arab pride by Israeli armies, the appalling economic conditions in which the large peasant population lived, the corruption of the monarchy coupled with the privileged position of a wealthy class including non-Muslim and non-Arab capitalists.

As mentioned above, the first years of the coup witnessed a struggle of power within the Revolutionary Command Council, founded in the aftermath of the coup. At the beginning, the Council was headed by General Naguib, chosen by lower raking officers as a figurehead, much like the case of General Cemal Gürsel in the Turkish coup of May 1960. However, General Naguib went beyond the calculations of the Free Officers who had hoped that he would not interfere in

[57] Roussillon, *ibid.*

their designs. In an unexpected way, General Naguib became the proponent of a transfer of power to the civilians. After a struggle of two years, he was neutralised in late 1954. With the neutralisation of Naguib and the liquidation of political parties, the coup has genuinely entered the "revolutionary" phase under Nasser and his fellow officers.[58]

It should be said that the Nasser regime began as a military rule, but changed in its characteristics during the process. At the beginning, the army was the only dynamic force of the society; the alternatives like the Muslim Brotherhood, various Marxist organisations and the Wafd Party were closed and banned from politics. The army was both the guarantor of Nasser's and the new regime's survival and a reservoir of human capital.

The army's role as a guarantor was evident in its support of the various moves of Nasser. For instance, he needed the army in order to crash Marxist workers who had interpreted the message of the July 1952 Revolution as a possibility of socialist revolution. The army was again needed in order to crush various political organisations, and the army's intelligence apparatus was utilised in order to establish a control over the society. Again, the army was necessary in order to contain the reactions of the landed and capitalist classes, badly hurt by Nasser's policies of land reform and nationalisation. Again, the invasion of Suez Canal by Israel, Britain and France as a result of Nasser's decision to nationalise the canal, the war of 1967 with Israel, the military support given to Yemenite revolutionaries required the mobilisation of large numbers of armed forces. In a sense, Nasser's policies –enmity towards Israel, nationalisations and abolition of

[58] The pattern of low-ranking officers making use of a high-ranking officer as a screen behind which they can work freely has been a widespread metaphor. In March 1971 coup, members of the Turkish High Command clearly stated that they would not be "Turkish General Naguib", i.e. that

capitalist interests, the importation of revolution to other Arab countries- necessitated the display of armed forces.[59]

Second, the military's presence under Nasser is due to the fact that the army was seen as a reservoir of human capital. Looking for a new political class to sustain and perpetuate the revolution, Nasser' administration heavily relied upon the help of non-party technocrats and army cadres recruited as bureaucrats and public functionaries. According to R. H. Dekmejian, there was a conscious plan to make use of military cadres in the political apparatus. Accordingly, three basic strategies were applied. The first one was the outright takeover of key ministries by leading RCC members; civilians were only used in second level positions, as sources of expert advice. The second strategy was to maintain a military presence in civilian-led ministries by placing officers in number two positions. The last strategy consisted of the appointment of a new breed of officers, whom Dekmejian calls "officer-technocrats" or "off-techs".[60] These officers-cum-bureaucrats symbolised the regime's suspicion against civilians and represented its aim to create a new class, which would then help the reproduction and continuation of the regime itself.

The control exercised over the military by Nasser reflected a division of labour within the ruling spheres of the regime. Nasser himself, as a prominent figure advocating Arab socialism, unification with other Arab countries, a kind of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, was the founding father of the regime who needed a strong support to implement his own radical program. Moreover,

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they would not let themselves to be manipulated and then thrown away by radical low-ranking officers.

[59] The information about the events of the reign of Nasser is taken from Tareq Y. and Jacqueline S. Ismael, "The Arab Republic of Egypt", in Tareq Y. and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.)., *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 326-36 *passim*.

[60] Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-3.

against the possible excesses of a radical political attitude prevailing in the society in the form of strikes and peasant movements, the army was again needed to contain the deviations from the path designed by Nasser. The control of the army was delegated by Nasser to Marshall Abd al-Hakim Amir who, in the words of Roussillon, was given "the possibility of organising the military as his personal fief".[61] Amir had also the task of containing the factions within the army that were opposed to Nasserism in some way or another. Thus, the fragile balance was founded on the continuous support of the military secured through what I would like to call a "vassal" of Nasser.

On the other hand, the relation between Nasser and Amir was not without tensions. To begin with, the legacy of the July Revolution had also endowed the army with the legitimacy to act in its own name, and Nasser was obliged to secure the loyalty of the army in some way, be it through the clientelism of Amir or through the distribution of posts and economic incentives to the officer corps. To sum up, the army had in itself become a "centre of power", not always associated to Nasser and his supporters. This tension surfaced especially in the last years of Nasser's regime, when the growing presence of the army and the existence of anti-Nasserist fractions in it pushed Nasser to find new basis for support and mobilisation. The defeat of 1967 against Israel provided Nasser with the much-needed pretext. According to John Waterbury, "[w]ith the crushing defeat of the armed forces in 1967, followed by Amir's suicide ... the senior officer corps ceased to be an effective power".[62] In order to break the centres of power that threatened his own, Nasser turned to the Arab Socialist Union, already founded in

[61] Roussillon, *op. cit.*, p. 349.
[62] John Waterbury, *Egypt: Burdens of the Past / Options for the Future* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 267.

1962 as a counterpart to the military.[63] After years of cohabitation between the army itself and the Nasserists in the political apparatus, the real break had appeared. In the words of Dekmejian,

> ... there was a corporate separatism between the ruling elite and the military establishment. As a ruling class, the ex-officers and civilian technocrats around Nasser could not regard the army as their primary client; they now had larger popular constituencies to satisfy, in addition to their own self-clientship – the imperative of surviving as a corporate political elite.[64]

The "imperative of surviving as a corporate elite" led to the search for new bases of legitimacy and popular support. For the first time since the July Revolution, one of the organisations created in order to infuse the masses with the propaganda of the new regime (like the former Liberation Rally, and the National Union), namely the Arab Socialist Union, was given priority over the clientelist network with the army. This inevitably led to a "civilianisation" of the regime, began by Nasser after the critical threshold of 1967 War and perpetuated by Sadat.

3. c. Egypt under Sadat: A Change of Course

Sadat is the most controversial one of the three post-1952 Egyptian leaders. The controversy lays in the fact that he instigated a new set of policies different from those adopted by Nasser. He ended the pro-Soviet and pro-socialist stance of Nasser and established new relations with Western countries, he introduced new economic policies in contrast to the statism of Nasser, and he pursued a policy of cooptation vis-à-vis the Islamists. In short, his time has been one of restoration after the July Revolution.

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[63] For the new attitude of Nasser towards the military, see *ibid.*, pp. 350-2.
[64] Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Sadat was an ex-officer who took part in the coup of July 1952 and was subsequently nominated editor of the daily paper *Al-Jumhuriya* (The Republic) established in 1953 to defend the new regime. He was named speaker of the National Assembly in 1959 and vice president in 1969, but he was not a prominent figure among the ruling elite. When Nasser died, he was still vice-president, but did not exert a political or personal influence in Egyptian politics. It seems that Sadat's rise to power was due to the particular configuration of ruling elites following the death of Nasser:

> Upon Nasser's demise, his power collectively devolved for the time being on the members of his court. Each one of these figures, controlling a security or party fief, had his own ambitions, which conflicted with those of his rivals. This may have been the reason why they chose Sadat for the succession. He had no fief of his own, and was thus thought unlikely to pose a threat to any of them.[65]

At first, Sadat's presidency was placed on a fragile balance of powers, and the powerful figures, a heritage of Nasser's reign, were likely to topple down Sadat. However, Sadat was skilful enough to demise the "centres of power" by arresting several high-ranking officials, including ministers and leaders of the Arab Socialist Union. In a sense, he thus perpetuated the tradition of autocracy as illustrated by Nasser. These purges were the first move of Sadat into what would be a new course taken by Egyptian politics.

Sadat's policies may be summarised as the "de-Nasserization" of Egypt. First of all, Nasser's statist policies with their emphasis on social equality were abandoned in favour of a liberal opening (the *infitah*) by arguing that the public sector had become inefficient. With respect to foreign policy, Sadat gradually disengaged Egypt from a pro-Soviet attitude and decided to form an alliance with

the United States. This was again an important difference from the anti-imperialist and anti-American discourse of the former period. Even if he was the instigator of the 1973 war with Israel by ordering Egyptian troops to cross the Suez Canal and take back lands lost in 1967, he also introduced a new era in Israeli-Egyptian relations. More than that, he followed a policy of cooptation with the Islamists and recognised a degree of independence to the political opposition.[66]

It is obvious that Sadat was faced with the dilemmas created under Nasser. The statist system, including a high cost of public expenditures, had created a deadlock that was not easy to tolerate. The war of attrition with Israel and the frequent phases of de-escalation created the necessity of high military expenditures, adding an extra burden to the budget. The engagement with the Soviet Union isolated Egypt from the Western world, and meant the absence of US and Western subsidies and aids. On the other hand, the question of carving a social basis to the regime after the influence of the military was discarded by Nasser in 1967, was still a burning issue. Sadat's moves against the powerful Nasserist figures, the dismemberment and subsequent abolition of the Arab Socialist Union cleared the way for implementing reforms by dismantling possible obstacles. On the other hand, the Islamists and conservative stratas of the population, whom Sadat viewed as possible allies, were alienated by his pro-Western stance and new economic policies harming the lower classes. These were in a sense the dilemmas of Sadat, which were initially deemed to be solutions out of the dilemmas of Nasser.

Compared with the period under Nasser, the reign of Sadat reflects a pattern of civilian-military partnership, rather than a military rule coupled with

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[65] Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 311.

civilian assistance. In the first years of his reign, he made use of military support as a tool in his struggle against the Nasserist hardcore in the administrative apparatus. In this struggle, he was backed by his Presidential Guard, initially organised by Nasser as a counterweight to the army in the struggles of 1967. The October 1973 war was another instance where Sadat made use of the armed forces in order to ascertain his predominance. The initial successes of the Egyptian army in the war, the taking back of the Sinai Peninsula strengthened the image of Sadat and ensured him enough charisma to introduce changes in economy and politics. However, the army has never been more than a strike force, lacking political autonomy, acting only when called to do so. Thus, Sadat increased the distance between the army and politics by a series of purges during late 1970s, against a background of mounting military criticism of his policies and several plots of military coups. Sadat decreased the size of the army after Camp David agreements with Israel, cut down a portion of military expenditure, and tried to instil a sense of professionalization to the officer corps.[67] On the other hand, the army, with its habit of profiting from clientelism, was not eager to accept easily all these restrictions. Moreover, Sadat's economic policies hit a large portion of the society, and his gradual policy of allowing new social forces into the political arena meant the birth of an opportunity for his opponents to voice their opposition on a wider scale. The disengagement of the military from Sadat, the rise of the Islamist opposition, the increasing poverty of lower classes created an atmosphere of unrest in Egypt, that found its peak in the assassination of Sadat in 1981 by an Islamist officer.

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[66] For further details, see William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 359-72; T. Y. Ismael and J. S. Ismael, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-9.

3. d. Mubarak's Egypt: Another Restoration

Compared with Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak is a relatively latecomer in politics. During the reign of Nasser and the first years of Sadat, he was occupied with his military career as a professional soldier, a successful pilot and a commander of the Egyptian Air Force. Compared with the highly politicised officers of two earlier generations, he stayed away from the bombastic political mobilisations of Nasser, of the plots among the armed forces, or of the activities of military technocrats within the Egyptian state apparatus. His nomination as vice-president by Sadat in the spring of 1975 was a finely calculated political decision. To quote John Waterbury,

> It was no surprise that Sadat chose someone from the military. For his own survival, Sadat had to reassure the senior officers that he would not ignore their interest in an era that was already being dubbed as one of peace. Mubarak was by no means the most prominent of those who could have been chosen, but it may have been easier to pick someone from the airforce rather than undertake the invidious choice of a single person from among rival ground forces.[68]

To elaborate Waterbury's explanations, Sadat's policies of finding a new social basis, excluding the armed forces, to support his regime, resulted in an alienation of the military from Sadat. The appointment of Mubarak by Sadat was first and foremost a proposal of reconciliation to the military. But, it is also noteworthy that his choice was not from among the ground forces where plots and juntas against Sadat were known to exist, but from the air force whose members were not as involved as the ground forces in the opposition against Sadat. To

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[67] Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-40 *passim.*
[68] John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat. The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. xv.

conclude, it is likely that Sadat wanted to create a break in the midst of the military establishment by recruiting a professional from the air force.

Mubarak has come to power much like his predecessor Sadat, who himself was the vice-president of Nasser. Thus, the succession was conforming to the Egyptian pattern of power transfer. After the assassination of Sadat in October 6, 1981 by Islamist militants, Mubarak was nominated as the president of Egypt.

A short time after he came to power, Mubarak made a speech to the People's Assembly in November 1981 where he outlined the government's policies and spoke about the future he wanted for Egypt. Economically, he would bring benefits to the poorer members of the society in order to counter the conspicuous consumption and profiteering, created by Sadat's policies of economic liberalisation (*İnfitah*). Sadat's *İnfitah*, as a radical disengagement from Nasser's centrally planned economy, had "opened up" some sectors of the economy but brought with it disillusionment, poverty and social inequality. Mubarak's emphasis on "social justice" was meant to be a method of appeasing the social reaction, shown by the food riots of Sadat's last years. Next, declared Mubarak, the peace treaty with Israel would be observed. I think that the reason Mubarak openly emphasised the continuation of reconciliation with Israel was rather due to Mubarak's will of continuing the good relations with the United States. Finally, Mubarak's immediate concern in the aftermath of the assassination and in the mounting wave of religious fervour was to ensure that "the internal front was totally secured and that the security forces were guarding the peace". Sadat's death was a warning to Egypt "to cleanse itself of the plague of religious extremism". This could be achieved only with social justice. According to Mubarak, "Egypt is for all society – not a privileged few or the chosen elite or the

sectarian dictatorship". Opposition parties would be allowed but opposition should be about "differences not conflict, without creating confusion; it should be an exchange of views, not an exchange of accusations".[69]

To sum up, Mubarak's agenda included only a few items, and was tainted to some extent with populism. A "social justice", not well defined at all, would be applied as a remedy to the ills of the poor masses. On the other hand, Egypt's realignment in the international sphere would continue as the same. The definition of the issue of "internal security", however, was different: Islamists had always been suspected by the regime, despite some openings granted by Sadat in his first years but, this time, they were not only a potential but a real threat to the survival of the regime.

What Mubarak did can be considered as de-Sadatization but, compared with Sadat's de-Nasserization, it is limited in scope. As Sadat was critical of Nasser and was dedicated, at least in appearance, to "correct" the misdeeds of his predecessor (it should be reminded here that one of Sadat's political campaigns was called the "corrective revolution"), Mubarak himself tried to do the same.

The early years of Mubarak were marked by a move towards a more democratic and pluralist political system. The elections of 1984 were the most open since 1952. These elections took on an appearance of a new era of political freedom by the government's decision to permit the Wafd Party, the biggest Egyptian political party before July 1952, to enter elections after 32 years of banishment. After 1984, however, the state introduced tighter controls over oppositional political activity and used its full range of powers to ensure the election of government candidates. On the economic side, Mubarak's discourse of "social justice" meant often nothing more than a policy of state employment. The

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[69] Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985), p. 184.

extent of the state's role as employer led to the fact that 10 percent of the country's entire population and 35 percent of the labour force were on public payroll.[70] Public guarantee of employment did not meant that welfare was equally distributed in the country. The gap between public and private sectors, the dependency of the private sector on bureaucratic mechanisms brought widespread corruption.[71]

The closing of the political representation after 1984 and the wave of corruption eventually prepared the ground for social protest. The most persistent opposition to the regime came from the diverse Islamic organisations within the country. Force was displayed to crush Islamic groups, while the state tried to coopt moderate Islamic groups. Although moderate Islamists did not contest the authority of the state, their growing numbers, their call for democracy, and their efficient alternative social welfare programs represented a challenge to a regime that was determined to prevent the emergence of viable opposition groups.[72]

To sum up, after a short period of pluralism and economic optimism, Mubarak's regime became stagnant, open to corruption and, compared with its predecessors, more unable to contain political opposition. The authoritarianism of Mubarak, including the imprisonment of opposing figures among both moderate and radical Islamists, and election frauds, became more and more redundant.

Concerning the role of the military in Mubarak's Egypt, there is again a contrast with the period of Sadat. Sadat had a policy of discrediting the army, pushing the military aside in the public sphere. Mubarak, on the other hand, brought back the influence of the army. To be sure, Mubarak needed the army in

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[70] Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Colorado: Boulder, 1989), p. 137.
[71] Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 382-3.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 516.

order to contain Islamic radicalism that came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s. In the face of a growing popular dissent taking radical forms (i.e. armed attacks, assassinations, including one attempt against Mubarak himself in 1995 in Addis Ababa), the reliance of Mubarak on the army had to be greater than Sadat. This factor, together with Egypt's position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gulf War, meant an increase in military expenditure and privileges. To sum up, the army under Mubarak has been more than all one of the pillars of an increasingly authoritarian regime. The army has been denied a political participation as seen in the earlier years of Nasser, but it has continued its life as an interest group of its own.

4. THE MILITARY IN TURKEY AND EGYPT: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Comparing the presence of the military in Turkish and Egyptian politics is not an easy task. The difficulty of such a comparison is not due to the lack of data, or to a great disparity between the cases. Rather, there is always an embedded risk of reductionism, and this risk may bring an interpretation full of stereotypes. My above analysis of the historical contexts of military intervention in both countries was intended to overcome such a risk, and to identify more clearly the patterns of the relation between military and politics.

I will here employ an eclectic methodology that takes into account both internal dynamics of Egypt and Turkey and the effect of international environment. There will be some keywords, like historical backgrounds, coups and interventions (both direct and indirect), political involvement (patterns of praetorianism and professionalism, of concordance and discordance), modernisation, nation building, foreign policy (and especially relations with the United States and the Soviet Union), ideology, economy, and the like. My ultimate aim throughout this comparison will be to provide a comprehensive picture where the primary figures are military men. At the end, I hope that this study will also provide some general insights, beyond the Turkish and Egyptian cases, about military-civilian relations.

4. a. Historical Backgrounds

In both Egypt and Turkey, the military stands out by its commitment to some values. Unlike professional armies, these values are most often politicised and laden with a certain political standpoint. There is a discourse of achievement

and heroism in any kind of military institution: memories of past campaigns, names of cherished heroes and martyrs, and the like. Nevertheless, in Egypt and Turkey, this discourse is related to a political mission. Military institutions are generally involved in political and economic matters. They appear to be the proponents of modernisation both in cultural and in the economic sense. Officers present their opinions in political issues, whether in an institutional context as in Turkey, or whether in a casual manner, as in Egypt. These facts are the continuations of a historical tradition and of past experiences particular to these countries.

The Turkish case has an important particularity. The Turkish military class, from the Young Turk movement onwards, i.e. since the last decades of the 19th century, was endowed with self-consciousness and a "sense of mission". Jacobin attitudes, a political idealism whose aim is to "save the country", and a modernist tendency prevailed among the military. In a sense, the Turkish case presents an older tradition, compared with the Egyptian case. Nevertheless, the themes are similar: national independence (from both the foreigners and the monarchy), modernisation of the country (to reach the "level of contemporary civilisation"), an emphasis on popular mobilisation, a stress on national economic development. To sum up, in the military traditions of both countries, it is possible to find a reaction to belated development and modernisation.

On the basis of concrete events, similar issues and motifs are encountered in the past of both armies. In both Turkish and Egyptian cases, there are lost wars that are seen as a blow to the self-pride of the army (the First World War and the 1948 war, respectively). Moreover, in both cases, we encounter monarchies that are retrospectively categorised as corrupt, as unable to resist the control and

domination of foreign powers (compare the subsequent images of Vahdeddin and Farouk in the nationalist narratives). Thus, the War of Independence and the July Revolution, among many other things, are seen as the compensation of old defeats. These events credited the armies of both countries, and reconstructed them as one of the pillars of the new regimes. And there, I think, lies one of the crucial factors in the emergence of the military as an undeniable force in the political life of both countries. First, there is a crisis situation. In Egypt, there is a corrupt monarchy and indirect English control. In Turkey, there is again an ineffective monarchy that is said to collaborate with foreign powers, and there is a foreign invasion. These critical situations are overcome with the intervention of the armed forces, and new political institutions are created.

Of course, the overwhelming role that is ascribed to the military in both countries is an *ex post facto* achievement. In Egypt, as I have mentioned above, the military represents the "spearhead" of a large coalition of opposition forces. In Turkey, when we think of the composition of the first National Assembly opened in 23 April 1920, there is again a large coalition of forces, and the army is seen as the "force" of the assembly against invaders. Subsequently, however, there comes a period of purges: Egypt between 1952 and 1955, and Turkey between 1923 and 1926, witness a large number of trials, the condemnation of former politicians and officers who had taken part in the activities for national liberation. To sum up, a political centre gets rid of its enemies, and emerges as the dominant power in the country. In this context, the army appears as the necessary tool for implementing the rule of that political centre. The former civilian tendencies are eroded, and the role of the army as the guardian of the regime is stressed.

4. b. Profile of the Officer Corps

The officer corps of both armies presents some identifiable characteristics with respect to their class origins or social motivations. As Rebecca Schiff suggests, on the other hand, the profile of the officer corps is a valuable indicator while analysing the reactions of the military towards politics and political issues. That is why I have found it adequate to add a section on the profile of the officer corps.

A striking similarity between the officers of the two countries is the issue of class origins. Turkish and Egyptian officers generally come from lower-middle class families. It may even be said that the so-called "revolutionary" tendencies became to prevail among the ranks of the Egyptian military only after the sons of lower-middle class families have began to be admitted to military academies in Egypt from 1936 onwards.[73] In Turkey, similarly, the Young Turk movement was largely made up of the sons of middle and lower-middle class families who were admitted to military and civil academies. It seems that the opportunities provided by education have created among the sons of these middle classes a feeling of nationalism and a political idealism. As the members of the non-privileged social classes of the Ottoman Empire and colonial Egypt, these people represented a new political outlook and a new spirit of action.

The same drive still prevails for both armies and the sons of middle and lower-middle classes still enlist in the army ranks as commissioned and non-commissioned officers. First of all, this is due to the fact that enrolment in the army represents a number of securities in these countries that are vulnerable to economic crises. To begin with, the army schools provide the cadets with a good

[73] Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, p. 44. For an analysis of the "mentality" of this new officer corps imbued with nationalist ideas, see *ibid.*, pp. 44-6.

education as compared to the ordinary schools run by the state. Again, to become a salaried army member entails such rights as profiting from army hospitals, enjoying extensive housing rights and summer programs, shopping in army shopping malls with discount prices, etc.[74] In general, the army serves as a means of social mobilisation for the members of lower-middle classes.

Next to these concrete benefits, the armies also have a "civilising" mission in both countries, serving as agents of socialisation. The new recruits are offered training in various professional areas, they are exposed to new technologies and life styles. Next to these, the military institution acts as a centre of indoctrination. In military schools, there are extensive programs on history and social sciences in general, next to the purely professional training. The army's role as the guardian of the regime is stressed in various occasions. The implicit injection of the concept of civic responsibility together with secularism and nationalism is an important part of military education. This identity formation leads to the formation of a consciousness, an *esprit de corps* particular to the officer corps. Armies may acquire highly prized skills and values such as the capacity for intercommunication, an *esprit de corps*, and self-sufficiency throughout the world. But, in Egypt and Turkey, this feeling of "us", this cohesion and solidarity among the military takes on a very sophisticated form. In both cases, the formation of the military includes political concerns, and the values attached to the military establishment include highly political ones.

To sum up, this is roughly the profile of the officer corps in Turkey and Egypt. Sons of middle and lower-middle classes achieve an upward social mobility, they become acknowledged with political missions including the

[74] For the economic and social privileges granted to the Egyptian military, see S. H. Gotowicki, "The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society", *Foreign Military Studies Office*

preservation of stability and the continuation of the regime. Meanwhile, they enjoy a set of social and economic privileges as the first-hand promoters of the regime. Nevertheless, it is not to be disregarded that the army's *esprit de corps* signifies an important degree of self-sufficiency and autonomy. I will deal with the various aspects of this issue while discussing the economic involvement of the military.

4. c. The Military and Economy

It is not surprising that the Turkish and Egyptian armies, already engaged within the existing political regime, hold some economic assets. In addition, the Turkish and Egyptian states have traditionally been involved in the economy as important economic agents. I will not deal with all the implications of this involvement here. It suffices to say that the army, due to its relations with the state, has been permitted to get into economic activities of its own. It has been mentioned above that the "mentality" of the officer corps in both countries includes some notions of autonomy. The economic background of the army has been the most important support of that sentiment of self-sufficiency and autonomy.

In order to understand the army's involvement in the economic sphere, the discussion must take into account two different venues: first, the share of the military in the budget; second, the army's own economic activities.

As an agency of the state, the armies of both countries received their share from the budget. During the 1960s and 1970s, especially, the tensions of the Cold War and the problems of foreign policy (the Israeli question for Egypt, the Cyprus problem for Turkey) led to the increase in military expenditure (Some of this

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Publications (1995).

expenditure was met by the United States and the Soviet Union. Below, I will analyse the relations with superpowers in more detail). Of course, there are some differences between the facts that are encountered in either country. It would perhaps be more adequate to follow the relation between the military and the economy from the first days of the Turkish and Egyptian republics onwards.

In the past of the economic existence of Turkish and Egyptian armies, it seems that there is an inversely correlated relationship. Under Atatürk, İnönü and Menderes, the army did not receive an important share of the budget. Rather than that, the existing economic resources were directed at the overall economic recovery and infrastructural reconstruction of the country. The effects of the economic crisis of 1929 and the economic hardships of the Second World War defined the economic priority of the regime as the strengthening of the national economy rather than a policy of armament. At this point, it is also worth considering that the relative absence of the army in the political sphere has also prevented the military from acting on behalf of their economic advantages. The first signs of dissent began to appear under Menderes government. The high inflation rates and the rise in prices struck state employees, and the military among them. This economic impoverishment was one of the factors behind the discontent of the officer corps.

The situation began to change in 1960. The redefinition of the role of the military within domestic politics and its reimposition in the state apparatus changed the previous economic logic. There were three crucial factors in the development of the economic and financial stake of the military. The first factor was the United States military aid, already begun under Menderes but reaching higher levels with the escalation of the Cold War. A second factor was the

increase in the budget portion of the military. However, the most important issue was the formation of a military-economic sector. The Armed Forces Mutual Support Fund, founded first as a pension fund for the officer corps, has taken large equity stakes in a number of public and private enterprises, as well as joint ventures with foreign partners since then.[75] This economic initiative has since then grown up as a military-industrial complex.[76] Since 1985, this trend has been reinforced by the establishment of an off-budget fund, the Defence Industry Support Fund, "with dedicated tax and tariff revenues totalling anywhere from $ 600 million to $ 1.5 billion annually, to finance arms procurement and investment in military industry".[77] Three similar foundations, the Naval, Air Force and Land Forces Foundations "also have shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprises".[78] To sum up, the economic existence of the Turkish army has been strengthened after the May 1960 coup onwards. After 1980, this involvement has gained impetus. The Kurdish problem contributed to the maintenance of high rates of military expenditure. Moreover, the military economic activities developed and took new forms. The creation of a military industry producing high-tech military equipment (ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, etc.) contributed to the self-sufficiency of the military.

In Egypt, as compared to Turkey, the army was granted an important share in the economy in the first days of the Egyptian republic. I have examined above to what extent the Egyptian state was dominated by the army itself, and I have also tried to show that the leaders tried to control the army and to use it for their

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[75] John Waterbury *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions. Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 105.
[76] Bent Hansen, *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth. Egypt and Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 455.
[77] Waterbury, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
[78] Ömer Karasapan, "Turkey's Armaments Industries", *Middle East Report* 144 (January-February 1987).

own benefit. Thus, the Egyptian army was positioned like a large fief of Marshall Amir. The grants and economic aid given to the army was a means to secure the army's support for the regime. In a sense, there was a classic relationship of clientelism between the Egyptian state and the army. The involvement of Egypt in Yemeni civil war, the wars of 1967 and 1973 required the dedication of important sums to the service of the armed forces. The trend was an inverse one, compared with the Turkish experience: In the first decades of the republic, the Egyptian army enjoyed an important allocation of funds while other sectors of the economy suffered from a lack of resources. With the implementation of a liberal economy under Sadat's, it has been impossible to allocate an important part of the budget to military expenditures. Sadat had to solve severe economic problems and he had to shift the emphasis to economic reconstruction. As a consequence, the budget share of the army decreased.

As in many other issues, Mubarak changed Sadat's policies. Partly as an aspect of his policy of re-integrating the military into the regime, Mubarak "embraced the military as a partner in the economic development of the country".[79] The army established economic enterprises in the fields of arms production. The military also founded or took over some civilian industries, together with activities in the field of infrastructure.[80] To sum up, the Egyptian military has become a huge economic actor, holding more assets than the Turkish army. But this economic presence did not lead to the autonomy of the army. Mubarak has always been keen in controlling the activities of the military. According to Frisch, "officers are frequently rotated and discouraged from

[79] Gotowicki, *op. cit.*
[80] *Ibid.*

interfering in civilian policy issues, even when these affect the military's interests".[81]

The economic fortunes of Egyptian and Turkish armies bear some resemblances to each other. The Turkish army suffered from a modest budget share in the first decades of the republic while the Egyptian army experienced the same under Sadat, although in different contexts. Both armies went out of this crisis through an active involvement in domestic economy and enjoyed autonomy to a certain extent. The Turkish army, however, has been holding a greater political influence while the activity of the Egyptian army is more technocratic, more subject to civilian monitoring.

4. d. Enemies of the Regime: Internal Enemies

It has been mentioned in various parts of this study that both Turkish and Egyptian armies have been identified as the guardians of political regimes. There is a difference, though: The Turkish army held a greater degree of autonomy since 1960, and often acted on its behalf while the Egyptian army has generally been directed by the holders of political power after it lost the political initiative in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Who has been the enemies of Turkish and Egyptian armies? The answer to this question is, on the one hand, quite simple: all those who oppose in some way or another the political regime try to topple it down, change its principles, etc. To specify, in Turkish case, leftists (from revolutionaries of all convictions to more modest radical democrats), Islamists and Kurdish separatists have been viewed as

[81] Hillel Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5 (2), June 2001.

the most dangerous threats to the fundamentals of the establishment. In the words of Nilüfer Narlı,

> Despite the concordance between the military and citizenry regarding the army's involvement in politics, tension has emerged between the military and certain groups which either challenged the secular nature of the state (namely, the Islamists), or its unitary character. During crises, when the government is incapable of acting effectively, the military has intervened to right domestic political affairs.[82]

In the first years of the Turkish republic, the army was an important security guarantee against frequent Kurdish uprisings in the eastern provinces. In addition, as seen in the Menemen incident, there also was a discourse defining the army as a progressive-secular force against conservative religious groups. These two legacies have always been preserved by the Turkish armed forces, and these two groups have always been viewed with suspicion by the army. The existence of such threats as Kurdish separatism and Islamist reaction served as the justifications of the army's existence.

From the 1950s onwards, the realignment of Turkey in the pro-American bloc during the Cold War added the leftists and communists on the list of the regime's internal enemies. Despite the existence of some leftist, or left-Kemalist tendencies within the army and especially among the low-ranking officers, the high command preferred to be loyal to the regime and to act against leftist movements. In this new context, there was even a rapprochement between the high command and the Justice Party, which was in fact a continuation of the Democrat Party, the scapegoat of the military in 1960.[83] As mentioned above, the

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[82] Narlı, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20.
[83] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-8.

coup of March 1971 brought with it the closure of the Turkish Workers Party, together with the political organisation of Islamists, the National Order Party.

During the 1970s, the army was deeply engaged against the leftists. Especially from 1978 onwards, martial law was declared in big cities and army commanders were given the authority to arrest and judge civilians under the allegation of terrorist activities. The coup of September 1980 was termed by many as a "coup against leftists". Indeed, even if rightist activists were also arrested and tried, leftist activists bore the brunt of the coup.

From the second half of the 1980s, the emphasis of the internal enemy changed, and it shifted from leftist terrorism to Kurdish separatism. The activities of the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) first in the Eastern regions, then in the metropolises of the Western regions required the displacement of a large scale effort on the part of the Turkish armed forces. This emphasis again shifted in 1995, after the considerable election victory of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party. This time, the army deployed its energy in order to counter an Islamist takeover of the country and of the state mechanism. Think tanks investigating on the activities of Islamists have been founded (like the Batı Çalışma Grubu, the Western Study Group), high ranking officers made speeches pointing to the reality of the Islamist threat; the apex of the army's attitude against Islamists has been the resignation of Necmettin Erbakan from the office of prime minister. The army "outlined [its] case against the elected civilian government". It was even stated that the threat against secularism was more serious than the 12-year war with the PKK.[84] The subsequent closure of the Welfare Party in 1998, and of its continuation under the name of the Virtue Party in 2001, were important steps in the general reaction

[84] Nasser Momayezi, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", *International Journal on World Peace*, vol. 15, no. 3 (1998).

against Islamists. During this process, the Turkish army has always expressed its support for Kemalist principles and favoured the secularist discourse in politics. The priority given to secularism in a way superseded the importance accorded to democracy.

What stems from the analysis of the internal enemies of the Turkish armed forces may be summarised in two points. First of all, it appears that the army closely identifies itself with the political regime and passes into action in an autonomous manner, sometimes against the will of civilians. Second, the army has in fact a very dynamic attitude in the sense that it can swiftly and effectively change the definition of internal threat and mobilise itself according to the new situation.

The Egyptian case presents some similarities with the Turkish case in the sense that the army had also the task to support the regime and to act as its armed hand. In the first decades following the July Revolution, the army itself was in power and there was a close identification between the people in power and the army itself. In those years, Nasser and his entourage, ruling Egypt in the name of its people, made use of their control over the armed forces in order to suppress any kind of political opposition. In the first years of the Nasserite regime, the enemies were the Wafd Party representing the old liberal tradition, the Islamists under the Muslim Brotherhood, and various Marxist organisations. Even if the new regime preserved some notions of social justice and popular piety, the organisations related to these ideas were suppressed. What we have at hand is a struggle for power, where ideologies lose their importance. For instance, the Egyptian army was, before the July Revolution, a section of a wider popular opposition against the monarchy and England. However, after the July

Revolution, the army took the power in its hands and eliminated its old allies who had now become opponents.

After the dissolution of all political parties, including the Wafd Party, on January 1953, the two remaining political sources of opposition were leftists and Islamists. The leftists confronted the new regime in the early days of the July Revolution. On August 1952, troops were ordered to open fire on workers who had occupied the textile factory in a place called Kafr al-Dawwar. Two leaders of the strike were hanged on the accusation of counter-revolutionary activities. Between 1952 and 1958, trade unionists, teachers, peasant activists were arrested and sent to camps while the regime itself tried to create a "legal left" controlled by the state.[85]

The first confrontation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood began when the association was dissolved in 1954. A member of the organisation attempted to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria. After this attempt to the life of Nasser, there was a violent repression against the Muslim Brotherhood. Six leaders of the organisation were hanged, and hundreds of activists were arrested.[86]

The interesting point about these campaigns of repression in the first years of the July Revolution is that the cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood, leftist organisations and Free Officers came from similar backgrounds. Among the ranks of Free Officers, there were individuals with leftist or Islamist sympathies. To quote Alain Roussillon, "a faction of the petty bourgeoisie [i.e. of lower middle classes whose sons were either enrolled in the Free Officers movement or in various other organisations under the old regime] in the process of constituting

[85] Roussillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-41 *passim*.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 341.

itself as a state power liquidate[d] its direct competitors".[87] The emphasis on the army as a direct force in state foundation was thus greater in Egypt, as compared to Turkey. While the Turkish army lacked political autonomy to act in its own name in the first decades of the Turkish Republic, the Egyptian army was directly involved in the formation of the new regime. As Anouar Abdel-Malek suggests, the aim of the officer corps was the "complete seizure of the state apparatus" first, and to realise the "conquest of the totality of political power of decision" next.[88]

These purges meant a stabilisation of the political atmosphere in Egypt. The supremacy of the ruling elite was secured through the elimination of the so-called internal enemies. Moreover, from 1956 onwards, international problems like the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, wars with Israeli and involvement in Yemen occupied the forefront of politics. Under Sadat, the policy of cooptation of the various social strata led to an attitude of leniency on the part of the regime against Islamists and leftists. Sadat allowed comparative freedom of action to the Muslim Brotherhood. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were freed in 1974 along with other political prisoners. They were not allowed to become a legal organisation, but they were allowed to operate openly and to publish their magazine, *Al Awd* (The Return) as long as they did not criticise the regime too sharply (Relations between Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood became tense after the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty whereby the organisation started to criticise Sadat's policies).[89] A form of expression was also granted to leftists, again on the condition that they would not openly criticise Sadat. Thus, Sadat's reign led to two things. First of all, the once repressed political organisations were to some

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 342.
[88] Abdel-Malek, *op. cit.*, p. xxvi-vii.
[89] Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), *Egypt. A Country Study,* Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/egtoc/html, December 1990.

extent legalised and they were no more viewed as major threats. Second, the loss of the army's autonomy disabled the officer corps to act of its own against Islamists or leftists.

Under Mubarak, the Islamist movement came back with a vengeance. During the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt witnessed extreme acts of religiously inspired violence. Over 1,000 people were killed between 1991 and 1996 alone. However, the army has played only a minor part in the fight against these fundamentalists. More than the army, police forces have been used against Islamic fundamentalists (It should also be noted that Mubarak fears, like Sadat, to grant the army much room for autonomous action). The fight against terrorism is not therefore perceived as a task that the armed forces must address directly. According to Hillel Frisch, "the Egyptian armed forces' role has thus far mainly concentrated on providing a decisive, deterrent force situated in the background".[90] Together with the increasing civilianisation of the military, the army has been, in Robert Springborg's words, "enclavized".[91] In this context, the regime desired to isolate the military from the rest of the population, and not to engage it in a war with Islamists. What the regime fears is the possibility of an Islamic contamination in the army ranks. That is why the concerns of internal security are mostly delegated to the police forces.

To sum up, the position of the Egyptian army vis-à-vis its internal enemies changed a lot from July 1952 up to the present. While the Turkish army took over a growing role of guardianship and autonomous action, the Egyptian military institution steadily withdraw from the political system and began "to assert a more

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[90] Hillel Frisch, "Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army", *MERIA Journal*, vol. 5, no. 2, June 2001.

[91] Robert Springborg, "Military Elites and the Polity in Arab States", *A Development Associates Occasional Paper in Democracy and Governance* 2 (September 1998), p. 4.

active economic role in its own right, rather than through officers occupying roles in the civilian public sector as had been the case previously".[92]

As mentioned above, the action of the army against what is termed as the threats to the regime is an indicator showing the degree of involvement of the military in the internal affairs of a country. It appears that the Egyptian army has evolved from a wide scale of political control to a lower one, but that it obtained important economic incentives during the process. The Turkish army, on the other hand, always preserved its right to political involvement after the coup of 1960. It also obtained some economic advantages, even if these are not as various and sophisticated as in the Egyptian case.

4. e. The Military and Foreign Policy

The Turkish and Egyptian armies' relation with foreign policy has two dimensions. On the one hand, the army itself may pretend to define foreign policy according to its expectations and aims. On the other hand, the army may be affected by foreign policy concerns of civilian governments. This relation may change according to periods. As mentioned in the previous section, an increase in the army's autonomy may lead to a greater impact on foreign policy. Or, a civilian government able to rule over the military may subdue the military and make use of it in its foreign policy. All of these options are encountered in both Egyptian and Turkish cases. I will try to describe the relation between the military and foreign policy by providing concrete examples.

It has been often told that Turkish foreign policy is based on the Kemalist principle of "Peace at home, peace at world". The Turkish republic does not hold irredentist claims, does not pursue a policy of expansion towards the territories of

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[92] *Ibid.*, p. 1

the former Ottoman Empire. In this sense, there is a great break with the pan-Turkish policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. Within this conception of foreign policy, the Turkish army appears primarily as a defensive force. The most important foreign policy objective of the Turkish republic has always been security.[93]

Under Atatürk and İnönü, Turkish foreign policy was thus very cautious, refusing any kind of adventures beyond the borders of Turkey. Regional alliances were established with Balkan countries, again with the aim to establish regional "security" and cooperation zones. During the Second World War, this policy of non-alignment continued. The "active neutrality", in Selim Deringil's terms[94], did not include the deployment of Turkish armed forces, which were quite weak and unprepared for a large-scale war. What Turkey did "consisted of maintaining cordial but distant relations with the warring sides".[95]

The great turn in Turkish foreign policy came after 1950, with Adnan Menderes and the involvement of Turkey in the pro-American camp at the beginning of the Cold War. Some signs of an eventual Turkish engagement with the United States were already present before 1950. The threat of the Soviet Union was an important factor in this new alignment. In 1945, the Soviet Union had demanded the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits (meaning a unilateral revision of the 1936 treaty of Montreux), the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits, and the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, taken back by Turkey in 1921, to the Soviet Union. It was obvious that Turkey would not be able to resist an eventual Soviet aggression. Against this background,

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[93] Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p. 26.

[94] Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Turkey had been included by the Truman government in the United States in the Marshall plan including both economic and military aid.[96] What William Hale calls Turkey's "engagement phase" in the Western bloc gained impetus with the advent of the Democrat Party to power. The ideology of the Democrat Party government rested on free-market capitalism and multi-party politics, at least in practice. This new ideological setting was identified with an alignment in the Western camp. The Turkish army had an important mission within this new alignment. The symbolic move sealing the entry of Turkey into the pro-American camp was the sending of Turkish troops to Korea to fight against communist China. The pro-American involvement, enhanced by Turkey's adherence to NATO in September 1951, also meant a large-scale modernisation and reorganisation of the Turkish army. American military instructors and American military material flowed to Turkey. The newly organised army was to form a powerful barrier against a possible Soviet invasion.

During the Cold War, the Turkish army also had a mission in internal policy. First of all, engagement in the pro-American camp meant anti-communism in the home front. As discussed above, from 1960 onwards, the high command of the army allied itself with the Turkish right on the basis of anti-communism. There was, in the issue of foreign policy and anti-communism, a perfect concordance between the military command and the Turkish right. This concordance lasted from 1960 to 1980, despite the interlude lived after the March 1971 coup, which was a warning given to a civilian government unable to contain political opposition and the left in particular.

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[95] Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[96] William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 111-6 *passim*.

During the 1960s and 1970s, another issue of Turkish foreign policy was the Cyprus problem. Starting form the 1950s, the Cyprus issue had become the first foreign policy problem of the Turkish republic including the eventuality of an armed intervention outside the borders of Turkey, and bringing in a series of debates on the international level.[97] This was also the first issue that created a breach between the United States and Turkey. From the Johnson Letter of 1960s to the intervention of 1974, the United States opposed an active Turkish involvement in Cyprus. This even led to an arms embargo on the part of the United States, a very serious move if we think that the United States was the major arms provider of Turkey.[98] Nevertheless, these events did not disrupt Turkish engagement on the American side and anti-Sovietism in foreign policy.[99]

The foreign policy of the military government of 1980-83 did not depart from these general lines: pro-Americanism, cooperation with NATO and guarantorship of the Turkish Cypriots.[100] Despite some criticisms about the harsh measures taken by the military government, Western and American military and economic aid flowed to Turkey. The military government even gave some concessions in foreign policy, like accepting Greece's re-entry to the armed wing of NATO.[101] Turgut Özal, coming to power in 1983, generally continued this line of foreign policy, with a greater emphasis on the adherence of Turkey to the European Union (then called European Economic Community). There was thus

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[97] Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1987", in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments* ([n. p.] Madison, Wisconsin, 1996), pp. 171-86.
[98] For a study of the American arms embargo, see Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984).
[99] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 148-62 *passim*.
[100] Shmuelevitz, *Republican Turkey*, pp. 217-8, 221.
[101] *Ibid.*

not a major difference between the foreign policy preferences of the military and of the civilian party.

In the 1990s, on the other hand, three issues came to the fore, affecting Turkish foreign policy directly or indirectly: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the relations with the European Union, and the Kurdish problem. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia meant the independence of Turkic countries[102], together with the new status of Muslim and Turkish populations living in the Balkans.[103] Turkey has adopted an active attitude towards these countries and populations, established cultural and economic links. Generally speaking, to quote Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's relatively subdued and passive foreign policy behavior during the Cold War has been replaced by an assertive one impacting on the course of international political developments".[104] Turkey also sent an armed contingent to Bosnia, together with military equipment and advisers sent to Turkic republics of former Soviet Union, thus making her military presence be felt in those regions. Problems engaging the Turkish military to come to grips with Western powers have been the issues of adherence to the European Union and the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish problem, as mentioned above, meant a direct involvement of the military, when civilian governments have not been able to provide a political solution to the issue. Turkish armed forces in this context have often been accused of pursuing non-democratic policies in the region, and their involvement in the problem has been contested. In the debates on the European Union, one issue has been the place occupied by the

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[102] Umut Arık, "The New Independent States and Turkish Foreign Policy", in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 25-36.
[103] Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region", in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East and West. New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 71-95.
[104] Kemal Kirişçi, "New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior", in Çiğdem Balım et. al., *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p. 2.

military in Turkish politics. Shown by some European circles as an obstacle before a complete democratisation, it has been posited that Turkey's way to Europe passes from a civilianisation of the regime. The military institution, together with some civilians, has defended itself by pretending that European powers have not the right to become involved in the internal affairs of the Turkish republic, thus refuting the legitimacy of these criticisms.

As seen above, the Turkish military has taken initiative in foreign policy especially in the 1990s, at a period when it is a considerable political force in the country. Before this period, there was often a concordance between foreign policy notions of the military and the civilians, as seen in the 1960-80 period and during the military government of 1980-83. The security concerns of the early years of the republic were transformed to a pro-American policy during the Cold War, which meant the reorganisation of the Turkish army. In the 1990s, however, there emerged a certain breach with the military's views concerning adherence to the European Union and some sections of the civilian politicians.

In Egypt, we see a gradual disengagement of the military from politics, and this is also valid in matters of foreign policy. Nasser's rule, involving a large military participation in politics, was ridden with ideological debates. The first years after the July Revolution were conditioned by the foreign policy objectives of Nasser. These objectives included the dissemination of Arab socialism to other Arab countries[105], an engagement in the non-aligned movement, a strong enmity against Israel, and finally an anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet approach. Israel remained as an enemy in the first years of Sadat's reign, and the pro-Soviet stance continued. However, after the war of 1973, the position of Egypt against Israel

changed, and the priorities of foreign policy were transformed. The pro-Soviet approach was dropped in favour of closer relations with the United States, then continued by Mubarak.

The "revolutionary" tendencies of the July Revolution led to some problems in foreign policy, and shaped it to a great extent. The anti-imperialism of the new regime depended first of all on internal policy matters, like the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and Western economic assets in Egypt. It has been mentioned beforehand that the Free Officers movement had a social agenda including an economic populism. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal together with French and English economic assets in Egypt were part of the new economic program of the Free Officers. The result was the so-called Tri-Partite Aggression by England, France and Israel. The concerted attack of these three countries was halted in a few days by an UN-sponsored cease-fire. This move was condemned by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The protests of these superpowers stemmed from the fact that both forces desired to pull Egypt to their side. The result of the Tri-Partite Aggression was the increase in the anti-imperialist discourse of Nasser, and an increase in the legitimacy of the army. Israel's enmity against Arabs was once again displayed, and Western powers were seen as the supporters of Israel.[106]

The "modernising" aim of Nasser was reflected in his attitude against the Arab world. Nasser, in his populist discourse, clearly advocated a pan-Arab policy. According to him, Arabs suffered due to the backwardness of their governments who collaborated with imperialist powers. His pan-Arab policies

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[105] For an encompassing and detailed study on Arab socialism and Arab political thought in general, see Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[106] Cleveland, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-4 *passim*.

were realised in two instances. The first one of these was the unification of Syria and Egypt under the name of United Arab Republic in January 1958. A plebiscite was held in both countries in 1958, and Nasser was elected president. Cairo was designated the capital of the United Arab Republic. This union ended in July 1961, after a coup led by officers took place in Damascus. The Syrians had not supported the leadership of Nasser and the domination of Egyptians.[107] A second opportunity came when, in Yemen, a coup occurred in September 1962 against monarchy. The republicans asked the help of Nasser against royalist militants who were backed by Saudi Arabia. Nasser sent 75 000 Egyptian soldiers to Yemen who fought there for five years without gaining the upper hand.[108] In these foreign adventures, Nasser needed the support of the Egyptian army. His aim was to secure Egyptian supremacy under the guise of Arab socialism in regions that were often hostile to his designs. The Egyptian army was thought to be the only tool in order to achieve these objectives.

The anti-imperialism and Arab socialism of Nasser stemmed from the dynamics of the Free Officers movement that was akin to a national liberation struggle witnessed in many countries of the Third World after 1945. Beyond this, however, was the reality of the Cold War, of the separation of the world into two blocs. Even if Nasser's Egypt was one of the proponents of the Non-Aligned Movement founded in the Bandung Conference in 1955, its pro-Soviet tendencies were quite obvious. Just like the Americans, the Soviets were keen in obtaining allies for themselves in the Middle East and they were willing to grant economic and military support to the regimes that would take their side. The Egyptian-Soviet relations became closer after the Tri-Partite Aggression of 1956. In the

[107] Helen Chapin Metz, *op. cit.*
[108] Kedourie, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-10.

aftermath of the 1967 war, these relations had turned into a closer Soviet supervision over the Egyptian army.[109] Soviet aid in Egypt took mostly the form of military aid and technical know-how over large-scale projects like the construction of the Aswan Dam.[110] The constant atmosphere of struggle with Israel favoured Soviet military aid under the form of armaments and instructors. The Egyptian army itself was not an instigator of a pro-Soviet foreign policy, but it was among those who benefited most from it.

The change in the pro-Soviet engagement, in Nasser's foreign policy in general, came with Sadat. Nasser had never severed completely Egypt's relations with the West and the United States. Sadat radically changed this course. Although he signed the first Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on May 27, 1971, his aim was to speed up deliveries of Soviet military supplies badly needed for an eventual war with Israel. Thus, his pro-Soviet approach depended solely on short-term considerations. After the 1973 war, however, Sadat clearly adopted a pro-American foreign policy. He hoped that his new political and economic policies would attract large sums of private American investment. He also felt that the United States was the only country that could pressure Israel into a final peace settlement. To enhance relations with the United States and to respond to the Soviet Union's refusal to reschedule repayments of Egypt's debt, Sadat unilaterally renounced the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in March 15, 1976.[111] To quote Hillel Frisch,

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[109] Ismael & Ismael, *op. cit.*, p. 338.
[110] Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, pp. 392-3.
[111] Helen Chapin Metz, *op. cit.*

> Sadat's prescient decision in the early 1970s to abandon the Soviet patron for the United States laid the foundation of the Egyptian army's radical transformation from an armed forces consisting of an army that relied mainly on infantry, a weak air force, and an essentially defensive navy, to an Egyptian armed forces that now reflect an offensive orientation.[112]

Mubarak's foreign policy rested on checks and balances and cautious moves. It has been characterised by the continuation of the Egyptian-US relations[113], an effort of re-integration to the Arab world to supersede the tensions left by Sadat together with the pursuing of the general principles of Camp David accords.[114] The army under Mubarak continued to benefit from American aid, together with enjoying the incentives in the context of domestic economy. Mubarak's policy of avoiding a new war with Israel by making use of the force of the Egyptian army as a deterrent force has been largely successful. Different from the period of Nasser, the army itself has not had much effect on the Egyptian foreign policy.

The last major issue in Egyptian foreign policy in the post-1952 period was the relation with Israel. As mentioned before, the defeat suffered in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was an important factor in the consciousness and nationalist pride of the Free Officers movement. After the July Revolution, the constant struggle, aggravated by Nasser's pretension to be the defender of the Arab cause, brought the issue of Israel to the fore.

In the first decades, Israeli-Egyptian relations took the form of three wars, namely the 1956, 1967 and 1973 campaigns. The 1956 campaign was, as mentioned above, an occasion for the display of the anti-imperialist discourse and

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[112] Frisch, *op. cit.*
[113] During the 1980s, Egypt received $ 2.2 billion a year in economic assistance from the United States, second only to the amount the United States provided Israel. See Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 383.
[114] Ismael & Ismael, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-2.

the argument that Israel was backed by Western powers. The war of 1967, however, was the occasion for Nasser to purge high officers and to reduce the army's influence in politics. Here, we see a perfect example of how a foreign policy issue affected the position of the army negatively. The war of 1973, on the other hand, was conceived by Sadat as a means to restore popularity and to secure support in the home front. The army was used for providing prestige to the regime in internal affairs. Thus, there was a long way from the discourse following the 1956 war, where the army was politically active, to the discourse following the 1973 war, where the political discourse was dominated not by the army but by Sadat himself. Sadat then proceeded by signing the Camp David Accords with Israel in September 1978. Sadat had proven that the Egyptian army could successfully counter Israeli army in 1973, and he was thus able to bring Israelis to a settlement.[115] Here too, the role of the army was secondary, and it was used as a tool for implementing the designs of the political regime.

Mubarak has adopted a more careful policy vis-à-vis Israel, and joined the Arab world. However, the Egyptian army has not been an autonomous agent of foreign policy during his presidency. At present, the Egyptian army is a deterrent force against Israeli Defence Forces, and successfully keeps up to this mission due to its reorganisation from the second half of the 1970s onwards.[116] In that sense, it now presents the features of a professional army submitted to the will of the political regime.

In Egypt, the army has gradually withdrawn from political involvement, nevertheless by preserving important economic assets. It may even be said that these economic assets are the price paid, or the concession granted to the army

[115] Ismael & Ismael, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-9.
[116] Frisch, *op. cit.*

within a web of clientelism. In foreign policy, too, the officer corps was very influential in the first years preceding the July Revolution. They were trying to design a foreign policy in conformity with their ideological discourse. In time, and especially with the advent of Sadat, the picture radically changed. The army has always been cherished as the pillar of Egyptian security against Israeli Defence Forces, but policy matters have been taken over by civilians. As seen in the Camp David Accords, a leader could act against the will of the army, and make use of it as a card on the table of negotiations.

CONCLUSION

This study tries to provide a critical evaluation of the military's presence in the politics of selected developing countries. The foregoing analysis of military-civilian relations in Egypt and Turkey reveals some similarities as well as many differences. Although initial impressions of similarity and difference offer a novel and promising way of reconciling in-depth case studies with broader comparative methods of analysis it is not such simple and straightforward. As a consequence of different legacies of their politics the involvement of the military yields different patterns and results.

It can be claimed that the role of the military in Egypt has in fact been one of state-building and modernisation. In a time when the monarchy was not able to sustain the continuity of political order nor provide the country with necessary economic measures, the army intervened and assumed the function of re-building the state and modernizing the country. To be sure, the army did not assume this function out of pure dedication to the national interest. As an interest group of its own, it promoted the needs and the political designs of the military, to the extent of alienating an important section of Egyptian society from the regime. Nevertheless, from the rise to power of Nasser to Husnu Mubarak, there has been a continual process of nation-building. The development of a democratic polity is obviously slower, depending on the concessions of the ruling elite. Thus, in Egypt, the process of nation-building preceded the emergence of political democracy. I think that it is one of the peculiarities of Third World countries

where, as distinct from the Western model, there has been a disjonction between state-building and the emergence of a democratic process.

In Turkey, in the process of nation-building, the army has not been a direct political agent, but rather a first-hand promoter. Nevertheless, its appropriation of the discourse of nation-building, its representation of itself as the janitor of the reforms realized after 1923, have been more than once stressed to legitimize military coups. In the Turkish example, Janowitz's description of the military is relevant: Despite its allusions to its being the guardian of the political regime, the military has been acting as a monolithic body, pursuing its own interests. Therefore, the identification of the army with the regime meant to guard not only the regime's basic principles, but the vested interests of the army as well.

In Turkey, despite endemic military coups, the military returned political power to the elected representatives. However, the army has always tried to become entrenched in the political system. By way of new constitutions or constitutional amendments realized after coups, by the establishment of quasi-executive bodies like the National Security Council, it has secured itself a place within politics. It also promoted its vested interests, by receiving economic concessions from the state.

At first sight, it seems that the role of the military in Turkey has been reduced to intervene in times of crisis, when the regime is under the threat of subversive movements, and then retire to its previous position. This simplistic assessment implies a positive approach to the Turkish military. However, I think that it is not the case. In Turkey, despite the fact that the military always allowed civilians to take over the state, it did not come out to be a democratic contribution. After each coup, the army secured its political and economic influence more than

before. In addition, in case it did not intervene physically, it has always exerted a political influence, which, more than once, turned out to be a preventive attempt against democratization.

The most outstanding similarity between the Egyptian and Turkish military establishment is their "behind-the-scenes" role in the political process. While ex-officers still occupy prominent positions in the civilianised political structure, the officer corps remains institutionally separate from the government, although there is an institutionalised "consultative" linkage at the top in both countries between the government and military establishment.

My thesis is that the presence of the military in a government cannot be accounted for its being exclusively autocratic, committed to the promotion of the interests of the military; there can always be a subtle interplay forces. Or, the absence of the military from a government cannot be accounted for its being free of any element of military autocracy. In both cases, the attention should be focused beyond the appearance of things, and try to discover what lies behind.

Another peculiar aspect of the Turkish army can lead to the revision of the thesis purporting that the only –or, purest- form of military presence in a political regime is an armed intervention on the part of the army. Indeed, after the coup of 1980, the army has become a political actor of its own, to the extent of dictating what it sees as urgent or necessary to the elected representatives. My idea is that any scholar trying to assess the characteristics of the political regime in Turkey should come to terms with this so-called "hidden" presence of the military in Turkish politics.

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