

TANZIMAT ERA OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION IN MOUNT LEBANON
(1840-1868)

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Abstract

Bekir Sadık Topaloğlu, “Tanzimat Era Ottoman Administration in Mount Lebanon (1840-1868)”

This thesis aims to investigate the policies developed by the Ottoman bureaucracy concerning the administration of the region of Mount Lebanon during the Tanzimat period. Located in the Syrian Littoral, Mount Lebanon had traditionally remained away from strict Ottoman influence and developed links with the European world. This study strives to evaluate the Ottoman attempts to increase the control in the region under the light of the Tanzimat reforms and the challenges to the Ottoman attempts from the locals and the European governments. The focus of the thesis is on the administrative regimes introduced in the region after inter-communal crises based on Ottoman-Western negotiations and these regimes' relation to the Tanzimat era Ottoman administrative policies. In this thesis, the historical process the region experienced is evaluated in the light of comparisons between Ottoman and Western sources. By revealing the Ottoman policies, this thesis plans to contribute to the challenging of the standard historiography concerning Mount Lebanon which contains anti-Ottoman bias by ignoring the Ottoman side's arguments and interpretations.

The key sources utilized for this thesis consist primarily of *irades* (imperial decrees) and correspondences between the Sublime Porte and Ottoman officials in the region, reflecting the Ottoman official position. Constitutional documents outlining the administration of Mount Lebanon were also consulted.

Özet

Bekir Sadık Topalođlu, “Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Devleti’nin Cebel-i Lübnan Yönetimi (1840-1868)”

Bu tez, Tanzimat Dönemi’nde Osmanlı bürokrasisinin Cebel-i Lübnan bölgesinin yönetimiyle alakalı geliřtirdiđi politikaları arařtırmayı amaç ediniyor. Suriye sahil řeridinde bulunan Cebel-i Lübnan geleneksel olarak Osmanlı etkisinden uzak kalmıřtı ve Avrupa ile yakın iliřkiler geliřtirmiřti. Bu çalıřma Osmanlı yönetiminin Tanzimat reformları iřıđında bölgedeki kontrolünü arttırma gayretlerini ve yerli nüfusla birlikte Avrupa devletlerinin bu gayretlere verdiđi karřılıkları deđerlendirmeye alıyor. Bu tez, bölgedeki gruplar arasındaki krizlerden sonra Osmanlı ve Batı yönetimlerinin müzakereleri sonucunda belirlenen idari rejimler ve bu rejimlerin Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı idari politikalarıyla iliřkisi üzerine yoğunlařıyor. Bu tezde bölgenin tecrübe ettiđi tarihsel süreç Osmanlı ve Batı kaynaklarının karřılařtırmaları iřıđında deđerlendiriliyor. Bu tez Osmanlı kaynaklarını ortaya koyarak, Cebel-i Lübnan hususunda Osmanlı Devleti’nin iddia ve yorumlamalarını göz ardı eden standart tarih yazıcılıđına karřı çıkan literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlıyor.

İradeler ve Bab-ı Ali ile bölgedeki Osmanlı memurları arasındaki yazıřmalar bu tez için kullanılan temel kaynaklar arasında gösterilebilir. Ayrıca, Cebel-i Lübnan’ın yönetimini ana hatlarıyla ortaya koyan anayasal metinler de deđerlendirilmiřtir.

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During my MA years, I strived to learn French in order to evaluate the sources written in French related to my thesis. In this sense, I would especially like to thank my French instructor Seniha Furtun for her efficient teaching skills that helped me progress in French grammar and vocabulary in a surprisingly short time. I would also like to thank the Boğaziçi University Institute of Social Sciences staff and the Library personnel for their contributions.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The nineteenth century is a well-studied period in Ottoman History studies and has a special place thanks to the transformations the Ottoman Empire experienced throughout this period. The Empire gradually lost territories, especially in its European part, and new states came into being from its body. During that time, modernization attempts introduced several new institutions on the one hand, and strived to open a ground for viable state apparatus, on the other. Thus, the end of the century was quite different from its beginning.

The European territories of the Ottoman Empire experienced a quicker change process with respect to the Anatolian and Arab provinces. Here, the communities of the Ottoman Europe became involved in secessionist movements and began to gain their independence as of the first half of the nineteenth century. In the south, however, the Arab lands remained in the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of colonial invasions by France and Britain in North Africa.

The presence of a large Christian community in Mount Lebanon historically rendered the region more prone to Western influence. Thanks to the links with the local communities, European countries— especially France- increased their influence in the region in the nineteenth century. The international conjuncture under the framework of the so-called Eastern Question assisted the interests of the European powers. Thus, Mount Lebanon experienced significant events like the wars between local peoples and establishment of autonomous regimes unlike the relative stability of other Ottoman Arab provinces in the nineteenth century.

Although the Christians constituted a majority in Mount Lebanon, there were non-Christian communities as well. The Druze, who have generally been linked to Islam despite having different rituals, had a certain weight not only in population but also in their contribution to the political and social life of the region. The nineteenth century crises always centered on the Maronites and the Druze. Despite having fewer believers and less political influence, the Sunni and Shiite Muslim communities contributed to the confessional diversity in Mount Lebanon as well. Population diversity was another fact that separated Mount Lebanon from other Ottoman Arab provinces where Islam had a significant dominance.

Mount Lebanon's distinctness in the Ottoman Arab provinces had a significant impact on the writing of this thesis. As the nineteenth century European regions of the Ottoman Empire have attracted many scholars because of the power struggles and anti-Ottoman movements in these regions, the Ottoman Arab lands seem to lag behind because of a relatively more stable political history. Yet, with its distinct experience, Mount Lebanon deserves more attention than it has received, especially in Turkey.

Most of the studies on nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon have been conducted by Lebanese or Western— especially American- scholars. With the exception of some recent studies, most generally ignore Ottoman archival documents which would offer alternative insights to researchers. Studies of Turkish researchers concerning nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon are also scarce. Professor Engin Akarlı's study can be shown as an exception. Based on his thesis for Associate Professorship, *The Long Peace* contributed significantly to the literature on nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon. In this study, Professor Akarlı efficiently

utilized Ottoman archival documents and even classified the related documents for younger researchers in order to encourage them. With a concentration on the *Mutasarrifiyya* regime established after the Civil War of 1860 in Mount Lebanon, his study revealed significant details related to Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon regarding the concentrated period.¹

This thesis will modestly strive to shed light upon the Tanzimat era Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon. In this regard, the stress will be heavily on the Ottoman state mechanisms rather than internal dynamics of that region. Major societal issues like the question of sectarianism and the discussion on its prevalence in the nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon will not significantly prevail, except for the discussion on the Ottoman approach to sectarian identities and divisions. Since societal issues regarding nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon have already been discussed mainly by Lebanese scholars and to concentrate on these issues would require certain proficiency on nineteenth century Arabic texts, it would be beyond the scope of a master thesis. That is why I chose to focus on a less researched field.²

As mentioned above, Professor Akarlı's study provides significant data on Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon concerning the post-1860 period. In this regard, this thesis respects the eminency of Professor Akarlı's study and evaluates it in necessary situations. Nevertheless, the content of this thesis generally covers the earlier periods. The main concentration in this thesis begins with the Tanzimat and

¹ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

² For a relatively recent and significantly prominent study on sectarianism in nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon, see Ussama Makdisi's *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

covers the *Double Kaymakamate* period, the Civil War of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and ends with the first years of the Mutasarrifiyya period.

Ottoman policy on provincial administration profoundly changed during the Tanzimat era. The Tanzimat reforms strived to establish a viable provincial regime which would be expected to secure central state control on the periphery. In this respect, this study will strive to check the applicability of Tanzimat centralization in Mount Lebanon where the Ottoman control had traditionally been loose and foreign attention on local population was in an upward trend. To measure the degree of Ottoman capability to cope with these challenges is one of the most significant aims of this study. In order to determine the Ottoman position, the Porte's relations with the local notables of Mount Lebanon will be evaluated along with foreign representatives and Ottoman officials in the region. Furthermore, the political regimes implemented in Mount Lebanon and their compatibility with the Tanzimat reforms will be discussed. As most of the studies regarding nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon have concentrated on the societal issues and reflected the local or Western position, this study will strive to reflect the Ottoman stance by locating the Porte at the center and evaluating the historical process in the region from the Ottoman perspective. In this regard, different approaches prevalent among the Ottoman statesmen concerning the administration and the crises in the region will be presented and evaluated.

This study geographically concentrates on the Ottoman region of Mount Lebanon. There is a certain difference between the usage of "Mount Lebanon" and "Lebanon". "Mount Lebanon" refers to the historical region of the Levantine littoral surrounding the city of Beirut. On the other hand, "Lebanon" denotes the modern

republic created by France after the First World War that gained full independence from France during the Second World War. The Republic of Lebanon was created by France via the annexation of neighboring regions to the traditional Mount Lebanon. Without this enlargement, Mount Lebanon would have lacked the geographical viability required for an independent state. Mount Lebanon is today one of the six first-level administrative divisions of the Republic of Lebanon.³

The Ottoman Mount Lebanon was located almost on the same territories Mount Lebanon Governorate of the Republic of Lebanon is located today.⁴ Although the fact that the prime focus will be on Ottoman Mount Lebanon, its neighboring regions will be regarded as well on necessary occasions. Despite containing certain differences with Mount Lebanon in terms of history and demographics, these regions cannot be separated from Mount Lebanon because of reciprocal relations and social links.

Among the neighboring territories of Mount Lebanon, the city of Beirut deserves attention. First, it never belonged to Mount Lebanon administratively during the Ottoman era. However, its geographical location rendered it socially inseparable from Mount Lebanon. It was surrounded by Mount Lebanon and its immediate suburbs belonged to the same region as well. Beirut began to develop and attract the natives of Mount Lebanon beginning in the 1840s. Its population boomed during the mid-nineteenth century, mainly thanks to the immigration from Mount Lebanon. The newcomers from Mount Lebanon contributed to the social life in the city and intellectual life began to develop in the second half of the nineteenth

³ For the divisions and the map demonstrating the divisional borders, see the official website of the Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers Central Administration for Statistics. Available [online]: <http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/about-lebanon-en>, [15 August 2014].

⁴ For the map of Ottoman Lebanon, see Appendix A and Appendix B.

century. Pioneered by significant personalities, newspapers and published books began to be part of civic life.⁵ Beirut became a “bright star in late Ottoman galaxy”.⁶ Thanks to its relevance for Mount Lebanon, Beirut will be mentioned on necessary occasions in this study.

The period focused on in this study includes the years between 1840 and 1868. Although the Tanzimat era started in 1839 with the proclamation of the Reform Edict, Mount Lebanon began to experience Tanzimat reforms in 1840 with the Ottoman recapture of the region from the Egyptian control. Then, until 1845, the Ottomans strived to establish a new order in the region. The Double Kaymakamate regime was consolidated in 1845 and lasted until the end of the Civil War which started in 1858 and ended in 1861. With the end of the Civil War, the Mutasarrifiyya regime was established, which lasted until the Allies’ invasion during First World War. Thus, this thesis will cover the early years of the Mutasarrifiyya regime in order to engage in discussions regarding the post-Civil War Mount Lebanon. Since the years between 1861 and 1868 constituted the reconsolidation of order in the region under the tenure of the first *mutasarrif* Davud Pasha, the inclusion of this period will contribute to a better discussion of the period of recovery after the bloody communal strife. The resignation of Davud Pasha in 1868 is the endpoint.

The period under study meant several changes for the Ottoman Empire. The Empire went through a major transformation under the Tanzimat reforms. In terms of provincial administration, Ottoman bureaucrats strived to increase central authority’s

⁵ I. Smilianskaya, “Peasant Uprisings in Lebanon, 1840s-1850s”, in *The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: a Documentary Economic History*, edited by Charles Issawi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 48-49.

⁶ Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 20.

influence throughout the imperial periphery. The centralization attempts were challenged by the local dynamics of Mount Lebanon and the Western interests. As a result, the Double Kaymakamate and Mutasarrifiyya regimes were established subsequently. These regimes were peculiar to Mount Lebanon. Only in later years, some regions of the Empire were granted special status with some coinciding administrative notions with Mount Lebanon. The main features of the two regimes of the Double Kaymakamate and the Mutasarrifiyya will be discussed in this study.

Several primary and secondary sources have been consulted for this study. In the Ottoman Archives, the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive) in Istanbul, several documents shedding light upon Mount Lebanon were obtained. Since this study focuses on the Ottoman administration in the region, the *irades* (imperial decrees) have a significant weight. Under *eyalet-i mümtaze iradeleri* (*irades* regarding privileged provinces) classification, the *Cebel-i Lübnan*⁷ (Mount Lebanon) section provides registered documents related to Mount Lebanon. However, it should be noted that most of the categorized documents in this section date back to the post-1860 period. More documents for the Double Kaymakamate period were obtained from other sections. Especially *dahiliye iradeleri* (*irades* regarding internal affairs) and *hariciye iradeleri* (*irades* regarding external affairs) are helpful for this period. In addition to *irades*, several documents in other sections such as the Foreign Affairs Ministry Catalogue, Sadrazam's Office Catalogue and Translation Office Records have been evaluated. Furthermore, some published books related to this study of the Tanzimat statesmen have been evaluated. Since the

⁷ "Mount Lebanon" is almost exact literally translation of *Jabal Lubnan*, the original Arabic name of the region utilized by the natives. In Turkish, the region is generally referred *Cebel-i Lübnan*, without touching its original form instead of more Turkified usage *Lübnan Dağı*. In other Western languages, the translated form is adopted. The region is called *Mont Liban* in French, *Libanongebirge* in German and *Monte Libano* in Italian.

study's concentration is on state affairs, document collections concerning Mount Lebanon and Ottoman Empire have been evaluated. These collections include constitutional texts, imperial decisions, international treaties, protocols and many other related documents. These texts contribute to the general discussion by providing the legal and written bases of actions of the involving parties.

The evaluated primary sources are not restricted to the Ottoman documents. Several Western accounts concerning Mount Lebanon and Ottoman Empire have also been evaluated. The books, letters, dispatches, diaries, and diplomatic reports of the Western individuals, including diplomatic representatives, academics and travelers – mainly British, American and French - have been included. American missionary reports, including missionary periodicals such as *The Missionary Herald*, have also been evaluated. Therefore, a discussion on the Ottoman position in Mount Lebanon can be enriched with the supply of a wide range of sources belonging to differing and conflicting parties.

Although primary sources play a key role in this study, secondary sources contribute to the general picture by providing a broad range of arguments and alternative comments as well. Several books and theses from Turkish, Lebanese and Western scholars concerning Mount Lebanon and the Ottoman Empire have also been consulted in this study. Nevertheless, the books written in Arabic have not been included because of my insufficient knowledge of the Arabic language. Very few documents written in Arabic in the Ottoman Archives have been utilized.

The second chapter will strive to introduce the political, historical, demographic and diplomatic settings that influenced the politics of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and Mount Lebanon. In this regard, the Tanzimat reforms

will be evaluated with a particular focus on provincial administration. The aims of reforms and their success in terms of implementation will be discussed. The international context – under the framework of the Eastern Question - and its effects on Ottoman relations with the provinces will be evaluated. The geographical and demographic layout of Mount Lebanon will be outlined. Furthermore, the earlier history of Ottoman presence in the region will be presented briefly. Religious communities of the region will be introduced, along with inter-communal relations and their effects on local politics. The role played by Ottoman officials in the region's politics will also be evaluated. The tactical alliances created by Western governments with the local communities and these alliances' effects on Ottoman administration in the region will be discussed. Lastly, the missionary activities and their repercussions in the region will be evaluated.

The third chapter will concentrate on the Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1858. This period witnessed Ottoman attempts for the restoration of order in the region after the Egyptian invasion and presence of Double Kaymakamate regime which divided the region into two entities governed respectively by Maronite and Druze emirs. In the light of Ottoman archival documents, Ottoman relations with the local notables and Ottoman attempts to counter increasing foreign interference will be evaluated. Furthermore, the regime's pillars and their compliance with the goals of the Ottoman Tanzimat will be discussed. Premature sectarian strife and the Ottoman position with respect to sectarian communities will also be evaluated.

The fourth chapter will cover the Civil War period (1858-1861) and early years of the Mutasarrifiyya period (1861-1868). The Ottoman position regarding the

bloody Civil War which devastated the region will be evaluated. The accusations of Western witnesses and researchers of the time will be compared with Ottoman archival documents that reflect the Ottoman activities in Mount Lebanon during the clashes. This comparison can create an alternative perspective on the Ottoman position during the crisis. Therefore, Ottoman patterns of handling the crisis and containing the Western intervention will be evaluated. The coordination among Ottoman administrative institutions will be analyzed. The Ottoman position with regard to the restoration of new order in the region after the Civil War will be discussed and the creation of new Mutasarrifiyya regime will be evaluated in light of the Tanzimat reforms. That is, the new regime's compliance with the Tanzimat reforms will be probed. The first *mutasarrif*, Davud Pasha, and his relations with the locals and the Porte will be evaluated. As a postscript to the general discussion, the Mutasarrifiyya regime's place in the Tanzimat era Ottoman administrative system will be analyzed. As such, the Mutasarrifiyya system's relation with other special regimes of the Ottoman Empire will be compared. In this regard, the special regime in Ottoman Crete will be briefly examined and its converging notions with the Lebanese regime will be discussed.

The fifth chapter will be the last chapter of the study. It will provide concluding remarks and analyses from the previous discussions related to the Tanzimat era Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon. In this regard, the Ottoman position regarding the politics and crises in Mount Lebanon will be reiterated. The Porte's moderate success to limit the Western – especially French - penetration into the region will be mentioned. The Porte's responses to the crises in Mount Lebanon will be evaluated under the framework of the Tanzimat reforms and thus the Ottoman

insufficiency in terms of equipped personnel to display immediate responses to the sudden outbreaks of violence will be argued. The Porte's stance toward the confessional groups will be evaluated and the Western accounts of the time criticizing the Porte for favoring non-Christian groups in Mount Lebanon will be discussed. The position of Mount Lebanon's special regimes in the Tanzimat era Ottoman provincial system will be analyzed and these regimes' significant role of containing more profound hostilities and decreasing anti-Ottoman sentiments will be indicated.

CHAPTER II

TANZIMAT AND MOUNT LEBANON

The nineteenth century witnessed many changes in almost every aspect of the international political realm. The effects of the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and colonialism were visible in every corner of the world. The Western world increased its popularity and many countries developed closer relations with the West in differing ways, ranging from direct subjugation to modernization attempts. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire holds a significant place in terms of its relations with the West. Retaining still a huge territory consisting of diverse nations, the Ottoman Empire was quite prone to Western influence.

The nineteenth century history of the Ottoman Empire is known for major administrative and societal transformation. The broad term "Tanzimat" refers to this notion of change and transformation. Meant literally "reorganization", Tanzimat brought about many reforms in almost every political and societal aspects of life in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, domestic challenges to the Ottoman state peaked as new states and autonomous regions began to emerge from the vast body of the Ottoman Empire. The region of Mount Lebanon occupied a significant place regarding administrative reforms and autonomy during the Tanzimat era.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first part will strive to focus on the content of the Tanzimat reforms and Tanzimat era Ottoman administrative practises. This discussion is required before engaging in the Tanzimat era Ottoman administration of Mount Lebanon, which will be the core discussion of subsequent chapters. After the discussion on Tanzimat, the second part will strive to supply general information in Mount Lebanon. In this sense, the region's geography, natural

boundaries, earlier history and demographic structure will be discussed. Besides, basic information on the local people based on their confessional denominations will be exposed. Furthermore, the Ottoman and Western presence in the region will be discussed.

Tanzimat

This part will discuss the notions of Tanzimat principles and reforms. Furthermore, the success of reforms and their impact on the socio-political arenas of both Ottoman and Arab peoples will be evaluated. The internal and external challenges to the reforms will also be mentioned. An introductory discussion on the Eastern Question and Ottoman reaction to it will follow.

Although the major transformation of the Ottoman state started with the Tanzimat era, the attempt of reforms has a background in the empire. In this sense, we should note the fact that the attempts of modernization in a Western style began with the reign of Selim III, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, these attempts did not lead to an overall transformation.⁸ The reform process on a large scale thus is accepted to be initiated with the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839.

The term Tanzimat is named after the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 and denotes restructuring. The Tanzimat Edict is accepted as the beginning point of lasting reforms in the Ottoman Empire. As a publicly-announced document, its typed versions are necessarily available.⁹

⁸ Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, "Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı", in *Türkler* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), pp. 562-563.

⁹ For an English version, see: J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956), v.I., pp. 113-116.

The reform process during the Tanzimat era is popularly associated with Westernization. Although the reforms included the desire to “catch up with Western standards” in terms of efficient administration, religious concerns were not put aside entirely. Prominent Arab scholar Butrus Abu-Manneh reveals the Islamic content in the Tanzimat Edict by relating the utilization of the terms “life, honor and property” in the Edict to the early Islamic thinker al Ghazali’s text *al-Mustafa*. The Islamic education of Tanzimat reformers proves their awareness of ancient Islamic texts and increases the possibility of their contact with this text while they were working on the Edict.¹⁰ Another prominent Arab scholar Zeine N. Zeine highlights the Islamic attitude of the Ottoman Empire and relates Arab obedience, until the late nineteenth century, to the Ottoman regime to this Islamic positioning of the Ottomans.¹¹ In this respect, Zeine arranges a separate parenthesis for the Christians –especially Lebanese Christians- and explains the prevalence of anti-Ottoman sentiments among Arab Christians with respect to fellow Muslims with the Islamic nature of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century.¹²

The men of Tanzimat had an agenda to adopt Western-style governance in order to create a viable state. Thus, they introduced their reforms on the basis of European bureaucratic systems. However, their implementation was not direct copying or borrowing; rather, the reformers created a synthesis of Western patterns

¹⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 1994, v. 34, p. 196.

¹¹ Zeine N. Zeine, *Türk Arap İlişkileri ve Arap Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu*; translated by Emrah Akbaş (İstanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık, 2003) p. 22.

¹² Zeine, *Türk Arap İlişkileri ve Arap Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu*, 2003, p. 44.

and Ottoman traditions.¹³ In this sense, to stereotype the reformers as pro-Western would be superficial.

The reforms of the Tanzimat era strived to cover every aspect of society, ranging from social services to local governance. State administration was one of the main concerns of the Tanzimat reformers. In this respect, several measures related to provincial administration were introduced. The period until the Provincial Code of 1864 (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) witnessed significant attempts for a more viable provincial system. In this context, many radical changes were introduced and many new institutions were established. Besides the creation of new advisory councils in the capital like *Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye* (Supreme Council for Judiciary Affairs) which aimed to enhance administrative efficiency via increased bureaucratic participation to the decision-making process, provincial councils (*eyalet meclisleri*) were introduced at the provincial level. These councils were established to increase communications between the center and periphery and local representation.¹⁴ The non-Muslims were guaranteed to be represented not only in the provincial councils but also in the councils of smaller administrative units through local notables and clergymen. Thus, their influence in the administration increased.¹⁵

Tanzimat reformers made serious efforts to create a standardized provincial regime. Until the establishment of the 1864 Provincial Code, one of these involved

¹³ Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat", in *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi v. VI "Teşkilat"*, edited by İlber Ortaylı, (Yeni Türkiye Yayınları: Ankara, 1999); Muttullah Sungur, "XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti'nde Taşra İdaresi ve Vilayet Yönetimi", in *Türkler* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002); Meltem Toksöz, "Reform ve Yönetim: Devletten Topluma, Merkezden Bölgeye Osmanlı Modernleşmesi", in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, edited by Halil İnalçık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012).

¹⁴ Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 185-219.

¹⁵ Halil İnalçık, "Application of Tanzimat and its Social Effects", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 1973, v. V, p. 108.

increasing the power of provincial governors (*valis*) in addition to further institutionalization on smaller scales of administration such as the presence of district councils (*sancak meclisleri*). The Provincial Code of 1864 was established by taking the attempts during this period into account, providing a framework for provincial administration.¹⁶

These genuine reform attempts were countered by implementation problems. Although the reforms proposed wide grounds to include all Ottoman society like non-Muslims in terms of representation; the problems of implementation, accompanied by rising expectations among the society, turned out unexpectedly negative results. The case of local councils is a good example of this failure. Although the council administration was arranged to provide representation for several groups, local notables who used to dominate local politics before the Tanzimat acquired hegemony over the councils through their influence in the election process. That is, old customs continued with new names or a mixture of old and new emerged.¹⁷

One of the most common explanations for the failure of reforms was the inadequate number of skilled personnel to be appointed to governmental posts. As the reforms provided a large bureaucracy to be employed in newly-introduced administrative bodies like councils, the need for employment of qualified individuals came to the fore. Nevertheless, the Ottoman state could not find sufficient human

¹⁶ Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 236-249.

¹⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Application of Tanzimat and its Social Effects", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 1973, v. V, pp. 107-111.

resources to fill the new cadres.¹⁸ Furthermore, bribery among the officials was prevalent. French diplomat Henri Guys, who spent several years in the Levant, complained about the prevailing venality among the officials in Beirut in the middle of the nineteenth century.¹⁹

Although the outcomes of the reforms did not conform to the expectations of reformers, the reform process cannot be regarded as completely unsuccessful. Even orientalist Western observers praised the reform process for its “modernizing” content.²⁰ Furthermore, though sometimes with negative results, the Porte developed more sophisticated strategies against the prevailing threats thanks to the presence of a larger bureaucratic class. Granting new rights as a measure to pacify the ethnically-based opposition movements and alleging the opposition of public opinion against the unwanted proposals from the West can be counted among major strategies.²¹

Besides certain failures of certain Tanzimat reforms, the Empire undertook significant developments. In terms of administrative transformation, the Ottoman state transformed itself quite successfully. Introduction of ministries based on specialization and transformation of provincial and local administration toward a more European-style modern structure significantly enhanced the state apparatus and

¹⁸ For the discussion on the lack of personnel question, see: Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) v. II, p. 86; Carter V. Findley, *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform: Bâbîâlî*, translated by Latif Boyacı and İzzet Akyol (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994), p. 135; İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 19.

¹⁹ Henri Guys, *Beyrouth et le Liban: Relation d'un Séjour de Plusieurs Années dans ce Pays* (Paris: Comon, 1850), pp. 38-39.

²⁰ For instance, see: Albéric Cahuet, *La Question d'Orient dans l'histoire Contemporaine (1821-1905)* (Paris : Dujarric, 1905), pp. 185-186; Ed. Engelhardt, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye*, translated by Ali Reşad (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999) pp. 111-113.

²¹ Roderick Davison, “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response”, in *Nationalism in a non-national State: the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977) pp. 39-46; Roderic H. Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999) pp. 321-327.

state-society relations that rendered the state approachable by the population who could now establish a relationship with the state based on negotiation.²² However, the lack of coordination among state institutions persisted even during the last decade of the nineteenth century.²³ Nonetheless, it can safely be claimed that the situation in the Ottoman Empire was quite different at the end of the century with respect to the beginning of the century. The reforms and their success are open to question; however, their transformative effect is quite obvious.

If the situation of the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century is taken into consideration, the will to introduce reforms in order to eliminate inertia by the Men of Tanzimat requires tribute. They were determined to initiate the reform process that their predecessors could not. Moreover, they always faced opposition from groups like the ulema that were already benefitting from the status quo.

The Tanzimat era Ottoman politics hosted several competitions. The attitudes of the Ottoman bureaucrats of the time concerning state affairs were not identical; that is, the Ottoman state was not shaped by a single official ideology or discourse. The differences in terms of attitudes were prevalent among the pioneers of the reforms as well. These differences were also reflected in the matters concerning Ottoman Arab provinces. For instance, in his own notes, the prominent figure of the time, Cevdet Pasha, criticizes Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha's harsh measures of being disproportionate concerning the Syrian crisis in 1860, where he acted as the

²² Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat", in *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi v. VI "Teşkilat"*, edited by İlber Ortaylı, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), pp. 183-210.

²³ Nadir Özbek, "Anadolu Islahatı, Ermeni Sorunu ve Vergi Tahsildarlığı, 1895-1908", in *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. IX, 2009, pp. 67-75.

high executor of the Ottoman government.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Tanzimat reformers generally tended to cooperate during the times of crises by dropping their personal competitions and ideological differences.²⁵ Therefore, the Ottoman policies concerning the provinces seemed harmonic and consistent.

Among Tanzimat reformers, Mustafa Reşit Pasha occupies a significant position. He was the most prominent personality of the Tanzimat who used his own initiative to start the reform process. However, in some instances, his attitudes created controversies. During the negotiations of the Ottoman-English Trade Agreement, he was criticized by contemporaries of being an Anglophile and ignoring Ottoman interests by giving too many concessions to the English. In fact, the sources reveal his admiration for the English.²⁶ Indeed, his dismissal from the Sadrazam post disappointed the British government.²⁷

After Reşid Pasha's decline, the reform process was organized by Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. Unlike Reşid Pasha's pro-British stance, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha developed more Francophile attitudes.²⁸ Fuad Pasha contributed to the establishment of the Provincial Code. He proposed pro-peripheral arrangements for provincial

²⁴ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, edited and published by Cavid Baysun (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991) pp. 109-112.

²⁵ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Düşünce Dünyası ve Tarih Yazımı* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), p. 113.

²⁶ Seyfettin Gürsel, "1838 Osmanlı-İngiliz Ticaret Antlaşması", in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1985, vol III, pp. 688-690.

²⁷ Frank Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: a Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853* (London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 205. Indeed, Reşid Pasha's pro-English tendency can be explained by ideological matters. Şerif Mardin reveals that he was under the influence of liberal thought which is closely -and maybe stereotypically- related to the English model. The excerpts from Reşid Pasha depict an ideal regime based on classical liberal mechanisms which promoted unchanging institutions that highlighted the exemption of absolute monarchy from central administration. See: Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimat Fermanı'nın Manası: Yeni Bir İzah Denemesi", in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, edited by Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), pp. 149-155.

²⁸ For detailed information on Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, their characteristics and diplomatic engagements, see: Yılmaz Öztuna, *Tanzimat Paşaları: Ali ve Fuâd Paşalar* (İstanbul: Ötügen Neşriyat, 2006).

administration against Cevdet Pasha's centralist stance. The Provincial Code of 1864 appeared as a consensus between Fuad Pasha and Cevdet Pasha's proposals.²⁹

In addition to internal factors that negatively affected the reform process, the international milieu was a major obstacle before reformers as well. The Eastern Question became a prominent concept in nineteenth-century international politics. Crystallized by the description of the Ottoman Empire as the "Sick Man", the Eastern Question began to dominate European diplomacy in the Orient. Beginning with the 1815 Vienna Congress, the European powers strived to end armed hostilities among themselves and concentrated their efforts on the Near East, mainly on Ottoman territories. They established contacts with Ottoman populations and helped anti-Ottoman movements across the Ottoman territories.³⁰

The Ottoman Empire had to cope with Western intervention in addition to its internal problems. By balancing each other, the European powers did not leave the Ottoman Empire to the control of a single power.³¹ Although the involvement of several countries in internationalized crises supplied the Ottomans a maneuvering ground, the pacification of the crises became more sophisticated. Throughout the Tanzimat period, Western pressure remained a major problem for the Porte. On certain occasions, the Western governments utilized the method of threatening the Porte for the introduction and application of reforms.³²

²⁹ İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 50.

³⁰ M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923* (New York: Longman, 1987), pp. 92-96.

³¹ Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), p. 2.

³² Duke of Argyll, *The Eastern Question: from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878, and to the Second Afghan War* (London: Strahan & Co., 1879), p. 107.

Although international crises were more prevalent in the Balkans, Ottoman Syria experienced significant crises resulting with Western interventions as well. The view that the failure of the Tanzimat reforms necessitated Western intervention in Syria is adopted by Western Orientalists.³³ Whatever the case, Western involvement deepened already-existing problems. Western alliances with local peoples deepened the hatred among groups and rendered the Ottoman re-control more difficult in the crises in the Levant.³⁴

The Tanzimat reforms brought about modern and modernized state institutions. However, the failures in terms of application of reforms created further problems. Despite the enhancement of local governments and introduction of local councils, the bridge between the state and society still remained afar.

Mount Lebanon

This part is planned to describe the geographical and historical layout of the Mount Lebanon region. The geographical features and boundaries of the region will be given and the region will be differentiated from the other parts of Ottoman Arab lands thanks to its population structure and historical traditions which always limited Ottoman influence. Then, a short history up to the Tanzimat will be given and the Lebanese Question's place in Ottoman politics will be briefly discussed. The main ethno-religious groups residing in Mount Lebanon will be introduced with some data on their history, religious practices, historical and political alliances and their relations with each other. After that, the role played by the Ottoman officials – for

³³ For instance, see: Albéric Cahuet, *La Question d'Orient dans l'histoire Contemporaine (1821-1905)* (Paris : Dujarric, 1905), p. 205.

³⁴ Joseph Maila, "The Arab Christians: From the Eastern Question to the Recent Political Situation of the Minorities", in *Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: the Challenge of the Future*, edited by Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 39; Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (London: Clarendon P., 1968), pp. 213-217.

example Şekib Efendi (1845) and Fuad Pasha (1860) - in the region will be briefly discussed.

Foreign officials had a significant impact on Ottoman subjects during Tanzimat. Thanks to the developing conditions for commerce and the protégé system³⁵, the number and impact of foreign representatives increased significantly. The consuls and ambassadors became main actors, especially the French and British, who were far ahead in terms of their interests in the region. They were followed by Russia and Austria. Besides consular agents, non-political actors also constituted a very significant place. Missionary activities and the responses by the locals and the Ottomans will be presented at the end of the part.

The utilization of the term “Lebanon” by Ottomans is relatively late. Earlier dynasties of the region Maans and Shihabis were known as “Druze Emirates”. “Mount Lebanon” was named after the Maronite-dominated Bsharri-Batroun region, which fell to the north of the Beirut-Damascus line. The south of the Beirut-Damascus line used to be called Jabal Druze (Mount Druze) or Jabal Shouf. With the southward influx of Maronites in the eighteenth century, these territories began to be known as Mount Lebanon. The Ottomans began to call the entire region as Mount Lebanon beginning with the Mutasarrifiyya period.³⁶

³⁵ The protégé system stems from the Western economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire as a result of the concessions under capitulation regime that increased its negative effects on the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. The Europeans assumed Ottoman Christians more trustworthy as business partners than Muslims and took them under protection. As protégés of European merchants, thus, Ottoman Christians enjoyed significant economic concessions like tax exemptions. See: Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 68.

³⁶ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), in “Introduction”.

The Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon was situated in the western Levant and covered central parts of today's Lebanese Republic. It was bordered in the north by the *sanjak* of Tripoli of the *vilayet* of Beirut, in the east by the *vilayet* of Syria (*kazas* of Baalbek, Hasbayya, and Rashaiya), in the south by the *kaza* of Sidon of the *vilayet* of Beirut, and in the west by the city of Beirut along with its immediate possessions and the Mediterranean Sea. Its total area was approximately 6500 square kilometres.³⁷

Before engaging in the discussion of the details of ethnic groups residing in Mount Lebanon, it is beneficial to provide some data on the population change and pre-Tanzimat history of the region. The population of Mount Lebanon was composed of several confessional groups, among whom the Druze and Maronites had the largest number and impact. To conduct a census in the region was not a very easy task since the natives strived to avoid it in order to escape taxation. Thus, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the Ottomans could not hold any census. The Europeans conducted several surveys in the nineteenth century to determine the ethnic composition; however, these surveys were not free from biases, as the conductors exaggerated the numbers of their respective governments' favorite people. Nevertheless, these surveys generally indicated the Christian dominance in the region with approximately eighty percent of the population.³⁸ The city of Beirut was another Christian stronghold in the Levant; however, Sunni Muslims had an influence in the city as well. Besides numerical presence, the elite mercantile

³⁷ Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), pp. 203-204. Furthermore, for the map of the region, see Appendix A and Appendix B.

³⁸ Youssef Courbage & Philippe Fargues, *Christians and Jews under Islam*, translated by Judy Mabro (New York: Tauris, 1997), pp. 60-61. For population chart, see: Appendix C.

families like Salam and Bayhum rendered the Sunni Muslims active in the city's politics and economy.³⁹

Mount Lebanon became an Ottoman territory in 1516 during the campaign of Selim I against the Mamluk dynasty. However, the Ottoman impact on the region remained indirect with respect to the other Levantine regions in which the mountainous terrain had a significant role.⁴⁰ Up until the Egyptian invasion in 1832, the Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon continued under the Maan and Shihab dynasties. Maan rulers, mainly known with their first emir Fakhraddin, were Druze. The Shihab family members were traditionally Sunni Muslims; however, in the eighteenth century, some members converted to Maronite Christianity. Druze mass emigration to the Hawran region of Southern Syria in the early eighteenth century and mass conversions among the prominent non-Christian families to Maronite Christianity changed the population structure in favour of Christians.⁴¹

Bashir Shihab II was the last emir before the Tanzimat era and ruled the region between the years 1788 and 1840. During his long tenure, the region experienced many significant events such as the campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte and peasant rebellions. Nevertheless, the Egyptian crisis became the major problem in the region. The rising Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt invaded the entirety of Syria in 1832 and the Ottoman Empire was able to regain the region only in 1840 thanks to a joint European military intervention. This invasion not only affected the sensitive balance in Mount Lebanon but also internationalized the Lebanese Question; that is,

³⁹ Gad G. Gilbar, "The Muslim Big Merchant-Entrepreneurs of the Middle East, 1860-1914", in *Die Welt des Islams*, 2003, 43:1, p. 22.

⁴⁰ A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), p. 2.

⁴¹ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: a Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 115-122.

European powers became more involved with the region because of its problematic situation between the Porte and Mehmed Ali's Egypt.⁴²

The natives of Mount Lebanon shared both similar and distinct traits with neighbouring Levantines. Arabic was the dominant language as in other Syrian regions. Nevertheless, the education level was quite high in Mount Lebanon compared to other regions in the Levant.⁴³ However, there was a certain discrepancy between confessional groups in terms of education and prosperity. Having developed closer relations with Western educational institutions, the Christians were better educated and more prosperous than the Druze and Shiites.⁴⁴

The major Christian confessional groups were Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Protestants. Despite their all being Christian, these groups did not always get along with each other and even sided themselves with non-Christian groups, as revealed in the clashes after the withdrawal of the Egyptians in which the Greek Orthodox cooperated with the Druze against the Maronites.⁴⁵ In terms of liturgical language, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics utilized Arabic, whereas Maronites included Syriac in addition to Arabic.⁴⁶

Among the Christian groups, Maronite Christianity had the most adherents. The Maronite faith traces its heritage back to Saint Maroun, who lived in the fourth

⁴² Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society; Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 35.

⁴³ Charles Issawi, "General and Social Developments", in *The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: a Documentary Economic History*, edited by Charles Issawi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 30.

⁴⁴ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 140.

⁴⁵ Frederick Jones Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine: Lectures Delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the Late William Bross* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1912) p. 30; Charles H. Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 115.

⁴⁶ Daniel Bliss, *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss*, edited and supplemented by his eldest son (New York: Revell, 1920), p. 102.

century. Because of quarrels with the Byzantine Empire, the followers of Saint Maroun established contacts and later engaged in full communion with the Holy See in the medieval age, which initiated a close relationship based on Catholicism between Maronites and the French Empire.⁴⁷ As early as 1649, with Ottoman approval, the French emperor issued an edict that he had taken the Maronite Christians under his protection.⁴⁸ This relationship gradually continued and became a significant matter of the nineteenth-century crises in Mount Lebanon.

Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics followed the Maronites in terms of numbers. Despite the fact that Greek Catholics had sincere relations with fellow Catholic Maronites, the Greek Orthodox did not maintain close relations with the Maronites and allied with the Druze against Maronites on several occasions.⁴⁹ Because of their Catholic faith, Greek Catholics developed close relations with the West, particularly Austria, while the members of the Greek Orthodox Church remained more introverted and thus economically less advanced than other Lebanese Christians. Russian interest in Mount Lebanon's Orthodox population became a significant matter only in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was quite late.⁵⁰

Besides the Orthodox and Catholics of varying denominations, the Protestant community also began to flourish in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century because of missionary activities carried out by British and American missionaries. A

⁴⁷ Kamal Salibi, *A House of many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 87-107.

⁴⁸ For the text, see: J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956), v.l., p. 24.

⁴⁹ Charles H. Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (New York: Arno Pres, 1973), pp. 49-50; P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: a Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 238.

⁵⁰ Robert M. Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: an Interpretation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 61.

French orientalist of the time Edouard Engelhardt claimed that the British strived to establish a Protestant community in the Levant to create for itself an ally and an alternative to the French-Maronite alliance.⁵¹ Although the community was established and recognized by Ottoman authorities⁵², the Protestant population did not boom.⁵³

The most populous group of non-Christians in Mount Lebanon was the Druze community. The Druze faith derives from the Shia sect of Islam; however, throughout the historical process, it welcomed several elements from non-Islamic religions and philosophies. Thus, the place of the Druze faith inside Islam is open to question.⁵⁴ During the Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon, the Druze played quite a significant role. The leaders of the Maan dynasty had unsettled relations with the Porte and established several links with the Italian states of Venice and Tuscany in the seventeenth century.⁵⁵ The links the Druze established with Western Powers – especially with the British - significantly affected the nineteenth-century Lebanese history.

Shiite and Sunni Muslims also inhabited in the Mountain. The Shiites of Mount Lebanon – called *Mutawalis* – became particularly influential in the region on

⁵¹ E. Engelhardt, *Tanzimat ve Türkiye*, translated by Ali Reşad (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 1999), p. 65.

⁵² The Sultan issued a *ferman* to recognize the Protestant *millet* in 1850 and appointed a leader (*milletbaşı*) to the community in 1853. For the *fermans*, see: *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, (Boston: The Board, 1851), pp. 254-255; George Young, *Corps de Droit Ottoman: Recueil des Codes, Lois, Règlements, Ordonnances et Actes les plus Importants du Droit Intérieur, et d'études sur le Droit Coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905-06) v. II, pp. 108-111.

⁵³ See the population chart in Appendix C.

⁵⁴ For the faith system and rituals of the Druze, see: Ahmet Bağlıoğlu, *Orta Doğu Siyasi Tarihinde Dürzîler* (Elazığ: T.C. Fırat Üniversitesi, 2006).

⁵⁵ For detailed information on Druze-Italian relations of pre-modern era, see: Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Rebellion, Myth Making and Nation Building: Lebanon from an Ottoman Mountain Itizam to a Nation State* (Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2009).

several occasions. The families of Hamadeh and Harfoush established short-lived spheres of influence and became involved in alliances both with Druze and Maronites, depending on their political interests.⁵⁶ Although the Sunni Muslims constituted a significant share of the population in the city of Beirut, their population percentage in the Mountain remained insignificant.⁵⁷

Up until the Tanzimat, the Ottoman visibility in Mount Lebanon was quite insignificant. The Ottomans generally allowed the local leaders to rule the region as long as those leaders did not revolt against Ottoman sovereignty. Nevertheless, because of the centralization ideals of Tanzimat reformers that accompanied the increasing foreign intervention in the region, the Porte strived to consolidate its power in Mount Lebanon during the Tanzimat period. In this sense, the representatives of the Porte played a key role. Besides special missions authorized by the Sultan to resolve conflicts and pacify hostilities, the inspection tours conducted by Ottoman officials in the region helped the Porte to better understand the regional dynamics and produce solutions for the crises.⁵⁸ One of the most prominent figures of the Tanzimat reformers, Fuad Pasha, became the highest-ranked Ottoman official who arrived in Mount Lebanon during the Civil War of 1860, with extraordinary

⁵⁶ The prominent Maronite leader of the Mutasarrifiyya era Yusuf Karam's alliance with the Harfoush family against Ottoman mutasarrif is one of the most prominent examples to the Shiite alliances with the Christians. See: A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), p. 83. For general information about the Shiite population of Mount Lebanon, see: Stefan Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1788* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁵⁷ See the population chart in Appendix C.

⁵⁸ Jens Hanssen, "Practises of Integration: Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire", in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, edited by Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), pp. 59-60.

powers to cease the hostilities. At the time, he was serving as the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹

The Porte's activities were not limited to special missions. The *valis* responsible for Mount Lebanon were influential in the Porte regarding the internal affairs of Mount Lebanon. For instance, in 1853 during the initial phase of the Crimean War, the *vali* of Sayda (Sidon) Vamık Pasha responded to the Porte's call for mobilization of troops in Mount Lebanon to Erzurum, stating his concern about the departure of troops that would negatively affect the security in the region. The Porte complied with his request to draft fewer soldiers from Mount Lebanon.⁶⁰

As asserted in the introductory chapter, the question of sectarianism is not the central part of this study. Nevertheless, the Ottoman approach to the sectarian groups and to sectarianism – if it existed - requires evaluation. The Western sources of the time generally criticized the Ottoman statesmen and local officials of being anti-Christian and pro-Druze. Although it is difficult to reliably measure the Ottoman stance toward the sectarian groups of Mount Lebanon, Ottoman archival documents would at least reflect the Ottoman official policy concerning the sectarian groups. However, biased in nature as official texts of the Ottoman governments, these documents carry the risk of hiding some of the intentions and projections of the Porte that might have been hazardous to declare in an official way.

The Ottoman officials generally tended not to produce comparative remarks about the native population in their texts. They frequently employed derogatory comments on the two most populous sectarian groups, either for one group separately

⁵⁹ Jens Hanssen, "‘Your Beirut is on my Desk’: Ottomanizing Beirut under Abdülhamid II, 1876-1909", in *Projecting Beirut: Episodes on the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City*, eds. P. Rowe and H. Sarkis (München: Prestel, 1998), p. 46.

⁶⁰ BOA, İ.DH 282/17711, 17 Muharrem 1271 (20 October 1853).

or for both the Druze and Maronites.⁶¹ The undifferentiated approach of the Ottoman authorities toward the sects was valid for rewards as well. When the rank of a local Maronite governor was to be elevated in return for his services in 1855, the Ottoman *Vali* of Sidon assured the same rank for the Druze governor, preserving equality among the sectarian groups.⁶²

A prominent scholar of Lebanese studies Ussama Makdisi employs the terms “Ottoman Imperialism” and “Ottoman Orientalism” to explain the Ottoman approach to the natives of Mount Lebanon. By utilizing these terms, Professor Makdisi likens the approach of the Tanzimat era Ottoman state toward imperial subjects to the Western approach toward the Ottoman state and society. According to him, the Tanzimat reformers aimed to transform the state and society through borrowing Western discourse and combining it with the claim of past’s glory. The Ottoman official discourse utilized Islamic remarks to control the society rather than to oppress the religious minorities. In this sense, Islam’s benevolence and tolerance toward non-Muslims were highlighted.⁶³ Therefore, the Ottoman discourse did not exclude non-Muslim subjects and even appreciated the inclusion of non-Muslim elites to the newly-created “Ottoman modernity”.⁶⁴ Although Makdisi’s terms are open to question and critiques, they provide valuable insights concerning the Ottoman approach to the sectarian groups and are in line with the content of official Ottoman documents.

⁶¹ See, for instance: Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, Violence and the Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform” in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, edited by Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), p. 36.

⁶² BOA, İ.DH 312/20043, 12 Rebiülahir 1271 (2 January 1855).

⁶³ Ussama Makdisi, “Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in 19th century Ottoman Lebanon”, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 42 no. 1 (Cambridge University Press, January 2000), p. 190.

⁶⁴ Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, in *American Historical Review*, 107/3 (Washington DC: American Historical Association, June 2002), p. 791.

The Western presence in Mount Lebanon was prevalent during the Ottoman period. However, in the nineteenth century this presence became more visible thanks to the so-called Eastern Question, which directed the Western powers' energy on the Orient, particularly on Ottoman territories. Having already established good relations with the Maronites thanks to religious connection, France had a distinct advantage in penetrating Mount Lebanon not only via diplomatic missions but also through missionaries. The Porte was aware of these dubious activities of French consular mechanisms in the region thanks to dispatches from local officials.⁶⁵

Aware of their advantageous position in Mount Lebanon, the French diplomats and academics complained of other parties' involvements aimed to offset French superiority. A prominent diplomat who served as consul in the Levant, Eugène Poujade, claimed that Episcopal Britain, schismatic Russia, Lutheran Prussia and Calvinist USA formed an alliance against France and Catholicism and asserted - in a disappointed manner - Catholic Austria's support to this alliance.⁶⁶ Prominent academic Etienne Lamy likened the French presence in the region to a place under siege from several corners for a long time and added that resisting against this siege would protect the French position.⁶⁷

Britain could not utilize religion as such a means in Mount Lebanon since the Protestant community in Mount Lebanon was almost non-existent until the nineteenth century. However, British interest in Mount Lebanon was not a product of the nineteenth century. Not long before, in the late seventeenth century, the British

⁶⁵ For instance, see: BOA, i.DH 64/3177, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1258 (31 July 1842).

⁶⁶ E. Poujade, *Le Liban et la Syrie, 1845-1860* (Paris : Librairie Nouvelle, 1860), p. 59.

⁶⁷ Etienne Lamy, *La France du Levant* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1900), p. 239.

had begun developing strategies regarding Mount Lebanon.⁶⁸ Despite the lack of a religious connection, Britain utilized successful strategies such as establishing relations with the Druze community in order to balance the French-Maronite alliance beginning with the Tanzimat period. These strategies produced fruitful results for the British, as special regimes with complex governmental mechanisms in Mount Lebanon obstructed French aspirations for a Maronite principedom. With the special regimes – especially with the Mutasarrifiyya - Britain, despite lacking a religious advantage, enjoyed equal influence with France on Mount Lebanon.⁶⁹

The Russian presence in Mount Lebanon is a quite late phenomenon. Despite having religious kinship with the Greek Orthodox, Russia could only rise as a major determinant in the region as late as the 1860s.⁷⁰ Alarmed by the Orthodox Patriarchate's links with Russia, the Porte noticed increasing Russian influence on the Greek Orthodox community of the Koura district of Mount Lebanon via local officials in the late 1860s.⁷¹

French-Maronite fraternity deprived Austria of the ability to approach to Maronites. Thus, the Austrians turned to the Greek Catholic community of Mount Lebanon in the Tanzimat period. Local Ottoman officials of the time informed the Porte about the Austrian links with the Greek Catholics.⁷² In addition to maintaining relations with the Greek Catholics, the Austrian government actively participated in diplomatic processes regarding Mount Lebanon as in the case of the post-Egyptian

⁶⁸ J. Hajjar, *L'Europe et les Destinées du Proche-Orient: (1815-1848)* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1970), p. 18.

⁶⁹ Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p. 696.

⁷⁰ A. L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1966), pp. 158-159.

⁷¹ BOA, HR.SYS 81/54, 5 July 1869.

⁷² For instance, see: BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/125, 29 Rebiulahir 1265 (24 March 1849).

diplomatic meetings where Metternich proposed a dual division plan that became the nucleus of the Double Kaymakamate regime.⁷³

French Catholic sects – especially Jesuits and Capuchins - became the first missionaries in Mount Lebanon and were followed by Protestant missionaries from Britain and the USA. Protestant missionaries in particular strived to display a sympathetic outlook in the region by organizing humanitarian aid campaigns for the natives suffering from wars or diseases;⁷⁴ however, their imperialistic ideals behind their religious and humanitarian activities can be traced even in their own reports. For example, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions' report of 1850 revealed the missionary intent of giving Jerusalem back to its real sovereign Jesus Christ.⁷⁵ This expression should have pointed out the missionaries' political goals behind their religious activities.

The Protestant missionaries generally did not feel sympathy toward Levantine Christians, mainly because of sectarian discrepancies between Protestantism and other Christian denominations. Prominent American missionary Rufus Anderson described Levantine Christians as “nominal Christians of Western Asia”.⁷⁶ Another prominent missionary figure Daniel Bliss regarded the Christianity prevalent in the Levant as “primitive, superstitious and unspiritual”.⁷⁷ Despite prejudices against

⁷³ Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p. 214.

⁷⁴ Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1910), p. 195.

⁷⁵ *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1850), p. 64.

⁷⁶ Rufus Anderson, *Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1861), p. 80.

⁷⁷ Daniel Bliss, *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss*, edited and supplemented by his eldest son (New York: Revell, 1920), p. 101.

native Christians, the Protestant missionaries welcomed the converts without discrimination and employed them under the framework of missionary institutions.⁷⁸

The Protestant missionaries did not conflict with the Ottoman authorities except few occasions in the mid-1860s.⁷⁹ The Porte remained indifferent to the conversion of Levantine Christians to Protestantism; however, it reacted when the missionary activities appealed to the Muslims or agitated foreign intervention.⁸⁰ When some American Protestant missionaries complained about Ottoman indifference regarding the massacres during the Civil War of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and urged the American government to implement sanctions, the American government rejected their appeal because of the Ottoman assistance to the American government during the American Civil War.⁸¹

Mount Lebanon was a geographically tiny region and its population was not high compared to other Ottoman provinces. However, as asserted in this chapter, the population structure of Mount Lebanon was quite sophisticated. The existence of several confessional groups underlines the necessity to focus on inter-confessional relations. When demographic heterogeneity is accompanied with the involvement of several foreign governments, the political process becomes more prone to the conflicts. In this regard, this chapter strived to introduce the main political actors – such as native confessional groups, foreign governments and missionaries - that would challenge or restrict the Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon. Moreover,

⁷⁸ Rufus Anderson & Joel Hawes, *Report to the Prudential Committee of a Visit to the Missions in the Levant* (Boston: T. R. Marvin, 1844), p. 28.

⁷⁹ A. L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: a Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1966), p. 171.

⁸⁰ Selim Deringil, ““There Is No Compulsion in Religion”: On Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire: 1839–1856”, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 42 no. 3 (Cambridge University Press, July 2000), p. 565.

⁸¹ Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: an Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), pp. 12-13.

Ottoman internal political milieu of the time under study was evaluated. In the light of the information presented in this chapter, the discussion on Ottoman administration in Mount Lebanon during the Tanzimat period will be carried out in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION IN MOUNT LEBANON: THE DOUBLE KAYMAKAMATE PERIOD (1840-1858)

The preceding chapter strived to evaluate the Tanzimat Era Ottoman reform process and its repercussions in the provinces, and presented the main characteristics of the Mount Lebanon region. This chapter intends to extend the discussion of the Tanzimat reforms' influence on Ottoman provincial administration by focusing on Mount Lebanon.

This chapter and the following one are designed to investigate Ottoman governance in the region with respect to the sub-eras determined by significant breaking points. The aim here is to comprehend the various administrative systems imposed on the region with their positive and negative aspects for the Porte. Furthermore, thanks to the linear division, the degree of Ottoman control with respect to the changing processes can be better grasped.

The first part of the chapter will cover the turbulent era beginning with the restoration of Ottoman administration thanks to the defeat of the Egyptian army in 1840 until the consolidation of the *Double Kaymakamate* regime in the region in 1845. The second part will concentrate on the Double Kaymakamate regime up until the emergence of the Civil War in 1858. The Civil War and the establishment of the *Mutasarrifiyya* regime will be discussed in the next chapter.

Post-Egyptian Years (1840-1845)

The Egyptian invasion in Syria between 1831 and 1840 had many profound effects and its end created a power vacuum and turbulence in Mount Lebanon.⁸² The time span from the end of the Egyptian invasion in 1840 up to the establishment of the Double Kaymakamate regime in 1845 can be regarded as a period of transition when the Ottomans were preoccupied with abolishing the traditional autonomy of the region according to the new Tanzimat principles and reactions to this intention from the West and the locals. Furthermore, this period is noted for the emergence of clashes among different sectarian groups.⁸³

The Ottomans recovered the Syrian territory from the Egyptians with the assistance of the European powers. Especially Britain and Austria actively fought against the Egyptian army.⁸⁴ The European powers felt threatened by the success of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt and sided with the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to the declaration of the Tanzimat Fermanı (Edict of Gülhane) in 1839, the Ottomans had the upper hand in terms of diplomacy against the Egyptians. Only France, who had a closer relationship with Mehmed Ali and aspirations for Syria, seemed to support the Egyptians. However, despite this alliance, France did not intervene in the battleground and took a position of mediation.⁸⁵

The Ottoman-Western joint operation was not a peaceful one. British vessels with support from Austrian and Ottoman navies bombarded the coastal cities –

⁸² See Chapter II for the discussion.

⁸³ Quataert claims that inter-societal clashes boomed during Tanzimat. See: Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 54.

⁸⁴ Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), p. 51.

⁸⁵ A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), p. 38.

mainly Beirut and Sidon - of Syria.⁸⁶ During this term, the foreign residents of the Syrian Littoral faced difficulties. For instance, the American missionaries had to give up their activities in Beirut and sought temporary refuge in the mountains. Facing financial problems, they appealed to their homeland for cash. Upon the request of the Maronite Patriarch, the Ottomans demanded their return to Beirut by assuring the security in the city; however, their return did not happen immediately.⁸⁷

The operation's main figure, appointed by the British Government, was doubtlessly Sir Commodore Napier. Nevertheless, his actions created some controversy in the region. In addition to his operational success, he engaged in meetings with the Egyptian leaders in Alexandria. Thus, the Ottoman government complained to British officials about his actions. The British replied that he was not authorized for those meetings, calming the Ottoman side. A look at his account on his activities in Syria would show the reader his extraordinary personality. Despite the British support to the Ottomans, he takes a somewhat anti-Ottoman stance and praises the native population of Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, he criticizes British activities in the region and champions more autonomy there in order to achieve order.⁸⁸ Napier's activities were also mentioned in the prominent statesman and Sadrazam Kıbrıslı (Cypriot) Kamil Pasha's account - he praised the Commodore's fight against Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali and governor of Syria.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), p.37.

⁸⁷ *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1841), pp. 107-110.

⁸⁸ Sir Charles Napier, *The War in Syria* (J. W. Parker, London, 1842), vol. I and vol. II.

⁸⁹ Kamil Paşa, *Tarih-i Siyasi-yi Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye: Teessüs-i Devlet-i Âliyeden Cennet-Mekân Sultan Abdülmecit Han'ın Evahir-i Saltanatına kadar Güzeran Eden Zamana Aittir* (Matbaa-i Ahmed İhsan, Istanbul, 1909), v. III., pp.205-209.

The peoples of Mount Lebanon had already revolted against the Egyptian administration before the joint operation. The position of Bashir Shihab was still ambiguous.⁹⁰ His close relationship with Mehmed Ali Pasha and France was a significant obstacle for his future career. Although he reiterated his submission to the Sultan, he faced the imperial decision of exile to Malta.⁹¹ However, it was difficult to determine the new emir because all parties had different aspirations for the Mountain's future administration. Thanks to French and Maronite pressure, a Christian member of the Shihab family, Bashir Kassim (known as Bashir III), was selected as the new emir.⁹²

Bashir III, known for his uncharismatic and weak leadership, could not handle this difficult task. Druze opposition against his administration led to an armed operation carried out by Druze notables and he was detained and humiliated in 1841. Then the Druze forces began to assault Maronite villages and clashes broke out.⁹³ Although the Druze fought against the Maronites, this war cannot be explained simply as a struggle between Muslims and Christians or non-Christians against Christians. The Greek Orthodox joined the Druze, whereas the Mutawalis (Shiites) sided with Maronites.⁹⁴

The Ottoman intervention in the clashes is open to discussion. While some sources claim that Ottoman troops in the region did not attempt to end the hostilities

⁹⁰ Emir Bashir was one of the most prominent and powerful leaders of Mount Lebanon who had ruled the region since 1788. Because of reciprocal warm relations, the Egyptian regime allowed the continuation of his rule. However, with the Ottoman recapture of the region, his position became a matter of question. For further discussion on his term, see Chapter II.

⁹¹ Kamil Paşa, *Tarih-i Siyasi-yi Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye* v. III., p. 206.

⁹² Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007), pp. 13-14.

⁹³ Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, 2000, pp. 63-66.

⁹⁴ Charles H. Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (New York: Arno Pres, 1973), p.50.

and even encouraged sectarian strife to establish direct rule,⁹⁵ some others praise the Ottoman government for their efforts to end the hostilities.⁹⁶ According to the Ottoman archives, the central government guaranteed payment for damages the Christians suffered during the extensive violence. The process of payments would be conducted via local officials (*kaymakams*) and the Ottoman Army of Arabia personnel.⁹⁷ This example refutes the Western sources of the time who accused the Porte of having anti-Christian stance regarding the conflict.

The Ottoman intervention stopped the hostilities. However, Western pressure had a significant contribution to the Ottoman intervention. Especially the British urged the Ottomans to act promptly. Although the Ottomans avoided the pressure to some extent, the British attained Ottoman intervention.⁹⁸ Ottoman diplomacy was not restricted to the British affairs. Ottoman diplomats strived to avoid French military intervention⁹⁹ and to contain the French newspapers calling for intervention.¹⁰⁰

The ousting of Bashir III caused again a succession problem. The Porte had indeed appointed him under pressure from the Western governments and was not satisfied with his position. Ottoman designations for the region favoured centralization. The Tanzimat reformers strived to establish a centralized provincial regime; therefore, they strived to increase the traditionally loose Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon. A ferman in 1840 reserved the action of intervention if necessary.

⁹⁵ Charles H. Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites*, pp. 52-53; A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times*, p.50.

⁹⁶ A. L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: a Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1966), p. 95; Michael Mohamad Deeb, *The Dissolution of the State of Lebanon, 1860—1975* (ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 2000), pp. 19-20.

⁹⁷ BOA, A.MKT 54/66, 21 Zilkade 1262 (10 October 1846).

⁹⁸ For the diplomacy between the Ottomans and British, see: *Correspondence with Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople Respecting the Affairs of Syria [May 23, 1841-Feb. 28, 1843]* (London: Printed by T.R. Harrison, 1843); BOA, İ.HR 20/966, 14 Safer 1259 (16 March 1843).

⁹⁹ BOA, İ.HR 20/965, 14 Safer 1259 (16 March 1843).

¹⁰⁰ BOA, İ.HR 33/1507, 8 Safer 1262 (5 February 1846).

The Druze action against Bashir III gave the Ottomans the opportunity for intervention.¹⁰¹ Bashir III was sent into exile and his properties were confiscated by the Porte. The appointment of an Ottoman official instead of a native would contribute to the centralization attempts. Therefore, the Porte appointed Ömer Pasha, an Ottoman officer of European descent.¹⁰² The European powers who were increasing their influence in the region day by day did not comply with this appointment. Before the appointment, France's offer of a Muslim Shihabi emir to replace Bashir III had been refused by the Maronite Patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh. This meant that the Maronites, who regarded Mount Lebanon as a Christian land, were determined not to allow a non-Christian prince in the Mountain, which indicated their increasing power in the region.¹⁰³

Ömer Pasha was discredited by the locals – not only by the Maronites but also by the Druze - within a short time. Furthermore, Western governments were anxious about Ottoman attempts toward centralization in Mount Lebanon. After local pressure was coupled with the French diplomatic criticism, the Porte terminated Ömer Pasha's task in the region.¹⁰⁴ This dismissal was a significant failure for the Ottoman centralization attempts in Mount Lebanon. Holt claims that this failure proved the improbability of a centralized regime in Mount Lebanon.¹⁰⁵ Accustomed to self rule, the natives of Mount Lebanon disapproved a non-native chief administrator. Similarly, the Western governments who regarded the increase of Ottoman control as inimical to their interests, displayed opposition to the

¹⁰¹ M. Jouplain, *La Question du Liban: Etude d'histoire Diplomatique & de Droit International* (Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1908), pp. 254-256.

¹⁰² Sir Charles Napier, *The War in Syria* (J. W. Parker, London, 1842) vol. II., pp. 294-295.

¹⁰³ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 46.

¹⁰⁴ William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913* (The University Press, Cambridge, 1913), p. 153.

¹⁰⁵ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 239.

appointment of an Ottoman official. Under these circumstances, to increase control in Mount Lebanon was quite difficult for the Porte.

The failure of the centralization attempt obliged the Porte to comply with the Western demands. Thus, in 1842, upon Metternich's request after arduous diplomatic negotiations, the Double Kaymakamate regime was accepted.¹⁰⁶ This regime ordained two sub-regions in Mount Lebanon. The northern part would be governed by a Maronite *kaymakam* and the southern part would be under the domain of a Druze *kaymakam*.

For the first time in the region, a division based on sectarianism was planned. Although this system solved the issue of higher representation thanks to the presence of two governors that would satisfy the two leading sectarian groups, the establishment of a sectarian regime would actually pave the way for deepening hostilities. Furthermore, the division did not create homogenous sub-regions. Many Maronites residing in the South became the subjects of a Druze emir.¹⁰⁷

Although this regime did not damage Ottoman interests in the short run because of the fact that the Kaymakamate would be part of the Sayda (Sidon) Province (Eyalet) whose administrative seat moved to Beirut, the independent-like status accorded to the region did not comply with Tanzimat principles. Thus, through Foreign Minister Sarim Efendi's notes to the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the Western governments in Istanbul, the Porte proclaimed its reluctance for this new

¹⁰⁶ Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon*, p. 214.

¹⁰⁷ E. Poujade, *Le Liban et la Syrie, 1845-1860* (Paris : Librairie Nouvelle, 1860), pp. 24-25.

regime by claiming that the regime would not establish peace and in case of problems stemming from the system, the Sultan's fears would become justified.¹⁰⁸

As expected, the new system did not end the hostilities. The Maronites in the South were exposed to arbitrary attitudes from their Druze masters and the Maronite Patriarchate interfered in the affairs of the southern Maronites. Furthermore, the Druze from Jabal Hauran (located in the southeast of Damascus) under the command of the prominent rebellious figure Shibli al Arian worsened the situation. In order to satisfy Western pressure, the Porte sent a special mission under the authority of Foreign Minister Şekib Efendi. This appointment proved successful and Şekib Efendi established order and stability.¹⁰⁹

Şekib Efendi's achievement in the region was also praised by French diplomats.¹¹⁰ Şekib Efendi's success was not only limited to the pacification of the events. He introduced extremely significant amendments in 1845 to the Double Kaymakamate regime known as Şekib Efendi Regulations. The most prominent amendment was to appoint a Druze *vekil* (deputy) to the Maronite *kaymakam* and a Maronite *vekil* to the Druze *kaymakam*.¹¹¹ Thanks to this amendment, the rights and security of the minority sects would be better protected. Thus, it can be claimed that the Şekib Efendi Regulations contributed significantly to the existence of a peaceful milieu in Mount Lebanon during post-1845 period.

Şekib Efendi seems to have explored the region well. In his report to the Porte, he suggests his candidates for *kaymakam* based on his observations in the

¹⁰⁸ J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956), v.I., pp. 124-126.

¹⁰⁹ BOA, HR.SFR.3, 9/71, 27 November 1844.

¹¹⁰ BOA, HR.TO 189/29, 5 February 1845.

¹¹¹ BOA, HR.MKT 10/47, 12 Safer 1262 (9 February 1846).

region.¹¹² This fact refutes the argument that Ottoman officials remained alien to the region. Within a short time, an Ottoman officer was able to collect significant data about the local notables.

The period between the Ottoman recovery and the Şekib Efendi Regulations was, in sum, a tumultuous one. It took five years for the Ottomans to establish a somewhat viable regime. Several clashes between different sects occurred; however, the dimension of these clashes was quite soft compared to the Civil War of 1860. Although the Ottomans displayed interest in centralization, Western attempts always countered Ottoman goals. Although the Double Kaymakamate regime threatened Ottoman sovereignty because of its special status that did not resemble any other entity of the Empire of the time, its submission to the Eyalet of Sayda rendered it more attached to the Porte. That is, the Lebanese would not enjoy a high degree of autonomy under these circumstances.

The Double Kaymakamate (1845-1858)

The so-called Double Kaymakamate period can be confined to the time span beginning with the mission of Şekib Efendi and his regulations up to the Civil War that started in the Kisrawan region in 1858. Regarded as a relatively peaceful era, this era also witnessed some changes in the administration detailed in the Ottoman archives. Furthermore, the Crimean War and the Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict) had significant repercussions in the region. The consolidation of the Double Kaymakamate regime with Şekib Efendi Regulations created a certain degree of order and stability; however, the clashes and the explosion of Civil War in 1858 was in contradiction to the peaceful nature of the regime.

¹¹² BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 1/20, 4 Zilhicce 1258 (6 January 1843).

Although the Western powers complied with the Şekib Efendi Regulations at first, they did not stop meddling in Ottoman affairs during the first years of this period. The Ottoman attempt to bring in some minor temporary clauses to the Şekib Efendi Regulations was countered by British consular agents in 1849. However, the Porte, via effective use of diplomatic discourse, asserted the temporary implementation of new clauses and appeased the British government. As a result, the clauses were temporarily implemented as promised.¹¹³ This case indicates that the Ottomans still had a certain degree of control in the region and could ward off the Western powers via diplomacy.

The period of stability also affected missionary activities after 1845. The missionaries had had to give up their activities in the Mountain during the turbulence. However, they resumed their activities after the Ottoman soldiers seized the weaponry of the natives.¹¹⁴ The following years also witnessed the rise of missionary activities in the region. The reports of 1847¹¹⁵ and 1849¹¹⁶ indicate an upward trend for the missionaries. The natives became less hostile toward them and the number of conversions increased. The report of 1850 reveals some hostile activities against the missionaries and an American citizen in the northern town of Ehden known as the stronghold of the Maronites.¹¹⁷ However, those events can be counted as minor exceptions to the general stability of the time.

¹¹³ BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/125, 29 Rebiülahir 1265 (24 March 1849).

¹¹⁴ *The Missionary Herald/American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1846), p. 141.

¹¹⁵ *The Missionary Herald/ American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1847), p. 6.

¹¹⁶ *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1849), pp. 118-124.

¹¹⁷ *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: The Board, 1850), pp. 112-113.

The disappearance of uneasiness in the region also affected the relations among natives, Ottomans and foreigners. For instance, in 1852, the Druze sheikhs Nasif Abu Nakad and Said Janbolat informed the Ottoman officials that they had decided to leave the British protection they had adopted during the clashes. They declared that they did not have to remain under British protection because of the security supplied by the Ottomans. The Porte, as expected, appreciated this intention.¹¹⁸

The peaceful mood was challenged by the Crimean War. With the explosion of war, the Ottoman army strived to enroll soldiers to the army. A new recruitment system based on draws had been introduced in 1846 as part of reforms. Officially called as *kura-i şeriyye* (sharia draw), this system enrolled soldiers to the army in accordance with draw results.¹¹⁹ The Ottoman documents shed light on the recruitment process during the Crimean War in Mount Lebanon. The natives of Mount Lebanon seem to have responded positively to the call for war. Vamık Pasha, governor of Sidon, asserted that the enrolments were completed without problems except for some disturbances around Latakia.¹²⁰ As well as the Druze, the Maronites also responded positively to the call. The officials of the Christian Kaymakamate (*Nesara Kaymakamlığı*) acknowledged their eternal submission to the Ottoman Sultan and offered to send more soldiers in case of necessity.¹²¹

Serasker Mustafa Pasha informed the Porte about the process. He claimed that he and other Ottoman officials had successfully coordinated with the local

¹¹⁸ BOA, İ.DH 249/15283, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1268 (2 March 1852).

¹¹⁹ Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat", in *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi v. VI "Teşkilat"*, edited by İlber Ortaylı, (Yeni Türkiye Yayınları: Ankara, 1999), p. 186.

¹²⁰ BOA, İ.DH 251/15437, 7 Receb 1268 (27 April 1852).

¹²¹ BOA, İ.DH 285/17949, 27 Rebiülevvel 1270 (28 December 1853).

kaymakams, both Druze and Maronite. Furthermore, he sent the letters of the Northern and Southern Kaymakamates (the Christian Kaymakamate and the Druze Kaymakamate respectively) to the Porte. These letters were signed not only by the kaymakams but also by other officials and notables. In these letters, the signatories claimed their loyalty to the Sultan by using the phrase “with soul and head” (*can ve baş yolunda*). The Porte was pleased by the submission of the region. Traditionally, the region had generally created problems to the Porte on the issue of recruitment. The Porte rewarded this submissive manner by official appraisal (*taltif*) and decided to send presents to the notables. Moreover, some native officers were rewarded with higher ranks.¹²²

The secondary literature verifies the peaceful nature of the enrollment process. Salibi asserts that the Lebanese participated in the campaign; however, generally they did not engage in major battles.¹²³ Fawaz claims that during the last phases of the war, the Lebanese participation decreased with respect to the earlier phases because of the fact that the Lebanese participants were not treated well during the campaign.¹²⁴ Despite this late decrease, it can be claimed that the Lebanese largely supported the Crimean War on the Ottoman side. Despite the problems of the past and turbulent relations with the Ottomans, the natives of Mount Lebanon did not challenge the Ottomans in this difficult situation. It seems that the locals did still have a certain degree of respect toward their sovereign. This submission cannot be explained by fear.

¹²² BOA, İ.DH 251/15444, 12 Receb 1268 (2 May 1852).

¹²³ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 78.

¹²⁴ Leila Fawaz, “Foreign Presence and the Perception of the Ottoman Rule in Beirut”, in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, edited by Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), p. 102.

During the Crimean Crisis, Mount Lebanon experienced a significant event. In 1854, the Maronite Patriarch Yusuf al Khazin died and the Maronite clerics elected Bulus Masad, titular bishop of Tarsus, as the new patriarch. The Ottoman governor of Sidon, Vamık Pasha, informed the Porte about the election and asked for permission to present the medal which symbolizes the official recognition to the new Patriarch. He also attached the letter of the clerics to the Sultan acknowledging their submission to him and petitioning for the medal's delivery to the elected Patriarch. The Sultan approved the election and permitted the delivery of medal to Masad. There were prominent figures or members of prominent families among the signatory clerics who were the titular bishops of the Maronite Patriarchate. The prominent Khazin family was represented by two members: Estefan al Khazin, Bishop of Damascus and Anton al Khazin, Bishop of Baalbek. Filipos Hubaysh, Bishop of Hama, was the relative of the Patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh who had been succeeded by Yusuf al Khazin. This representation demonstrates the dignitary and upper level status of these prominent families not only in the secular realm but also in the religious realm. Furthermore, Niqula Murad, an influential cleric known not only in the region but also in Europe, was also among the signatories as the Bishop of Latakia.¹²⁵ A prominent personality among the Maronites, he spent several years in France as the representative of the Patriarchate. He was known as a significant thinker of the time. His accounts contributed to the development of the Maronite identity. In his treatises and memoirs, he proposed an independent Lebanon with Maronite dominance. The Druze nation would be recognized as a minority.¹²⁶ Thus,

¹²⁵ BOA, İ.HR 117/5731, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1271 (22 January 1855).

¹²⁶ Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society; Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 139-143.

it can be claimed that the Maronite Patriarchate of the time harboured influential and to some extent controversial figures.

The new Patriarch Bulus Masad was of humble descent. Unlike his predecessor Yusuf al Khazin, he was a member of a family of peasants. Thus, the already developing relations between Patriarchate and the peasants gained momentum.¹²⁷ The upcoming peasant revolt, which will be discussed in the next section, has strong links with this election. Furthermore, the Khazin family, main target of the peasant uneasiness as the landlords of the Northern Lebanon, lost a significant ground and their power declined as the time approached toward Civil War.

The kaymakams were the significant figures of the Double Kaymakamate regime as top local officers. However, their power was significantly limited by the non-local forces. Although the Şekib Efendi Regulations granted some power to the kaymakams, they depended on the central authority on many occasions. For instance, in the election process of a new kaymakam, the Porte was the major force for the determination.

The election process of Mir Beşir Asaf (Bashir Assaf) in 1854 might be a good example. Vamık Pasha, who was responsible from the region as the Vali of Sidon, informed the Porte that the Nasara (Christian) kaymakam Mir Haydar was about to pass away because of his illness, and in accordance with the first article of the Regulation (of Şekib Efendi), Mir Beşir Asaf was automatically authorized as acting kaymakam until the appointment of a new kaymakam by the Porte. A few

¹²⁷ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 240.

days after the first notification, Vamık Pasha recalled the Porte to inform them that Mir Haydar had died and that a dispute over the kaymakam post had erupted between acting kaymakam Mir Beşir and Haydar's son-in-law Mir Ismail. Then he explained that Mir Beşir deserved the post. He asserted that he had also contacted the Western consuls and agreed with them on the mentioned candidate. Upon these notifications, *Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye* (Assembly of Judicial Decisions) – one of the critical central institutions of Tanzimat - accepted Vamık Pasha's views and appealed to the Sadrazam. The Sadrazam informed the Sultan about the decision of the Assembly. At the end, the Sultan authorized Mir Beşir as the new kaymakam and ordered the dictation of a response letter to the interlocutors.¹²⁸

The process of the election shows the fact that despite somewhat autonomous nature of the Double Kaymakamate regime, the Ottomans played an extremely significant role in the determination of vital issues like the election of a new kaymakam. Although the establishment of the special regime Double Kaymakamate threatened the Tanzimat reforms, the maintenance of Ottoman interference in Lebanese affairs conformed to the centralizing nature of the Tanzimat. Furthermore, the hierarchical lines of the decision process prove the realization of at least some reforms. The local governor, the executive assembly, and the sadrazam observed the process before the decision of the Sultan. In the context of the Tanzimat reforms, the Sultan did not have much to do. He reviewed the considerations and approved. On the other hand, the foreign consular organs were involved in the process as they negotiated with the Vali. Since no disagreements erupted, foreign involvement did not become critical. However, in a disputed case, foreign involvement could have been critical.

¹²⁸ BOA, İ.MVL 308/12743, 18 Ramazan 1270 (14 June 1854).

The Ottoman relations with kaymakams of the Double Kaymakamate regime were generally peaceful and unproblematic. Mir Beşir of the Maronites had close relations with the Ottomans; therefore, he was regarded as an Ottoman agent among the Maronite circles. He was born into a Druze family and later converted to the Maronite faith. He did not regularly attend church sermons, for which reason the Maronite Church disapproved of his indifference to religious activities.¹²⁹ The predecessor of Beşir, Mir Haydar, had acted somewhat independently despite his established good relations with the Ottomans.¹³⁰

The Druze kaymakams were known for their hypocrisy (*taqiyya*) as well as their warm relations with the Porte.¹³¹ For instance, Mir Emin of the Druze Kaymakamate publicly practised the Islamic rituals, unlike the Druze indifference to the religious practises of mainstream Sunni Islam. However, he was respected by the local Druze.¹³²

From a letter sent by Mir Emin to the Porte in 1853, we observe that the kaymakam had planned to pay a visit to Istanbul (*Dersaadet*). The letter was written in Ottoman Turkish, unlike the majority of the Lebanese letters, which were written in Arabic and translated into Turkish by local Ottoman officers. However, this information does not directly lead us to the hypothesis that Emin was fluent in Turkish. Presumably he dictated it to someone who was fluent in Turkish. However, at the end, the utilization of the Ottoman language by the local administrative staff is

¹²⁹ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 81.

¹³⁰ M. Joplain, *La Question du Liban: Etude d'histoire Diplomatique & de Droit International* (Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1908), p. 365.

¹³¹ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 76.

¹³² G. W. Chasseaud, *The Druzes of the Lebanon: Their Manners, Customs, and History* (R. Bentley: London, 1855), pp. 371-372.

a significant indicator. The Sultan's *irade* approved the planned visit.¹³³ This official visit, though possibly symbolic, is significant in its ability to demonstrate the close relations of the Ottomans with prominent Lebanese figures. Western primary sources tend not to include the positive facets of Ottoman-Lebanese relations such as this visit, probably because of their partiality and prejudice against the Ottomans and/or Lebanese peoples.

The Ottoman government's presentation of rewards in return for loyalty and efficient administration has been mentioned previously. Among the rewards, granting higher ranks constitutes a significant place. As a significant means of status, acquisition of a higher rank pleased the local Lebanese. When the rank of Mir Beşir of the Maronites was to be determined thanks to his loyal and efficient services for his subjects in 1855, the *Vali* of Sidon, Vamık Pasha, urged the sadrazam and the Sultan that the planned rank should be equal to that of the Druze kaymakam. The Sultan approved this call and granted same rank for the Druze kaymakam.¹³⁴ Besides the adherence to the notion of equality, which was one of the main promises of Tanzimat, the *Vali*'s involvement in the decision-making process related to the local affairs can be regarded as the successful application of the Tanzimat reforms, at least in this case.

Rank granting was not limited to the kaymakams. The prominent local notables were rewarded with high ranks as well. One major instance of this application is the *kapıcıbaşı* rank ordered in 1853 to the prominent and controversial

¹³³ BOA, İ.DH 283/17772, 15 Safer 1270 (17 November 1853).

¹³⁴ BOA, İ.DH 312/20043, 12 Rebiülahir 1271 (2 January 1855).

Druze figure Said Canbolat, descendant of Canbolat Bey. He, in response, expressed his thanks and declared his loyalty.¹³⁵

Said Canbolat had always been a significant player in Lebanese polity, not only during the Civil War but also in the pre-war period. The prominent British diplomat and traveller David Urquhart had paid a visit to him in the Mountain in early 1850s. He was warmly welcomed by Said. As a protégé of Britain, Said expressed his appreciation of British interest in Mount Lebanon.¹³⁶ His reputation increased on the eve of the Civil War as one of the perpetrators of hatred. In a letter sent to Hammoud Abu Nakad, another prominent Druze of a noble family, he vowed to eradicate the Maronites by describing them as a pervert nation. He sent another letter to the Muslims (of Sunni confession) of the Kharrub region promising to protect them against the Christians and claiming his harmony with Ottoman forces in his cause.¹³⁷ He is mostly remembered for his active role in the civil war which will be discussed in the following pages.

The period just before the civil war gave certain clues in favour of an outbreak in the region. In addition to the economic crisis in 1856 stemming from the Crimean War, the Maronite peasants' discontent against the landowner Khazins in the Christian Kaymakamate was increasing significantly. The peasants imported large amounts of artillery as an indicator of a rebellion.¹³⁸

The increase in arming was noticed by the Ottoman government. The Ottoman kaymakam of Tripoli informed the Porte in 1857 that he was notified by an

¹³⁵ BOA, i.DH 280/17556, 29 Zilhicce 1269 (3 October 1853).

¹³⁶ D. Urquhart, *The Lebanon (Mount Souria)* (T. C. Newby: London, 1860), v. I pp. 183-214.

¹³⁷ E. Poujade, *Le Liban et la Syrie, 1845-1860* (Paris : Librairie Nouvelle, 1860), pp. 248-249.

¹³⁸ Marwan R. Buheiry, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations, Economic Malaise, and the Incentive to Arm," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, edited by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), pp. 295-297.

official of Ehden (in the Northern Kaymakamate) Yusuf Karam (a famous figure in the later periods) about clashes in the north which had erupted between the natives of Zghorta and Bsharri (both Maronite towns). In the clashes, many heavy weapons including cannons were utilized. The Kaymakam of Tripoli gave further notice that Ottoman forces had been able to collect most of the cannons and were striving to get the remaining ones. The collected cannons were sent to the Imperial Armoury in Beirut.¹³⁹ That is, the Ottoman officials were successful at gathering information on the arms smuggling and preventing this minor intra-confessional unrest. However, there were other disturbances among the Christians in other parts of the region.

In 1858, the natives of the predominantly Greek Catholic town of Zahle petitioned the Ottoman local institutions for the dismissal of Maronite kaymakam Mir Beşir. They asserted their previous demands for the replacement of Mir Beşir and expressed their fear on security issues. Upon their demands, the Vali of Sidon, Hurşid Pasha, who had just replaced Vamık Pasha, informed the Porte about the complaints and an investigational commission was arranged to inquire about the kaymakam. After other correspondences between the Vali and the Porte, the Sultan decided not to dismiss the kaymakam.¹⁴⁰ The disturbances among the Christian populations were preliminary cursors of the civil war which started as a Christian peasant uprising against their co-religionist landowners. However, soon it turned into an inter-confessional affair, which will be discussed in detail in the following pages.

After the discussion on the major events of the Double Kaymakamate period, and before the discussion of the eruption of the civil war, some general remarks on this period as a whole will be beneficial. In this sense, the views of some travellers

¹³⁹ BOA, İ.DH 379/25058, 16 Şevval 1273 (9 June 1857).

¹⁴⁰ BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/136, 18 Ramazan 1275 (21 April 1859).

and observers of the time would contribute to the discussion. David Urquhart, who travelled and visited even the remotest parts of the region and contacted with several groups, describes the Double Kaymakamate system as incomprehensible and contradictory based on different personal interpretations of Ottoman officers attached to the region.¹⁴¹

Gregory Wortabet, an ethnic Armenian of Syria and a Protestant missionary who spent a major part of his life in Britain with close links to the British government, verifies Urquhart's claims on the vagueness of the system in terms of implementation. He praises the Tanzimat reforms; however, he asserts the fact that the corruption of the local officers obstructed the implementation of reforms.¹⁴² That is, the lack of incorrupt personnel was a significant problem for the system, as it was one of the greatest challenges to the Tanzimat reforms in all corners of the Empire.

In terms of centralization, although the system was a special one and the region enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy unlike most parts of the Empire, there were some indicators proving the applicability of the Tanzimat reforms for this region such as the payment of local council members' salaries by the central authority as determined in Şekib Efendi's regulation.¹⁴³ Salibi finds Şekib Efendi's regulation compatible with the Tanzimat reforms and praises its positive effect on the modernization of Mount Lebanon. Nevertheless, he asserts the inefficiency of the system in mixed districts as well.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹D. Urquhart, *The Lebanon (Mount Souria)* (T. C. Newby: London, 1860), v. II, p. 37.

¹⁴²Gregory Wortabet, *Syria and the Syrians; or, Turkey in the Dependencies* (J. Madden: London, 1856), p. 88.

¹⁴³ . M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 240.

¹⁴⁴ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 72-73.

With regard to the instances on the preceding pages, one can claim that the Ottomans did not face significant opposition to their presence in Mount Lebanon. Although some local forces such as the Maronite Patriarchate increased their control on the local people, almost no challenges were raised against the Ottomans. In case of problems among the locals, the Ottoman authorities generally acted as mediators. Surely the Ottomans faced problems related to their weakness to carry on the reforms and felt Western pressure; however, in many cases they eliminated or at least appeased European involvements. The local mechanisms were quite successful in certain cases such as recruitment and intra-communal contestations. The networks connected the periphery to the central. Mount Lebanon was no longer a remote corner of the Empire. The Sultan welcomed the local kaymakam in his seat, and the local subjects delivered their voices to the Sultan. In this sense, despite the autonomy the region enjoyed, the centralization notion of the Tanzimat was not out of the picture.

One of the major insufficiencies of the Double Kaymakamate system was the demographic heterogeneity of the region. Although sectarian representation was implemented to some extent thanks to the creation of local councils, this implementation contributed to increasing division along sectarian lines. Hanssen claims that this system institutionalized sectarianism.¹⁴⁵ Hanssen deserves attention in this sense; however, without the institutionalization of a sectarian system, it would have been quite difficult to please the different interest groups in the region. Although sectarian awareness still seemed premature in the early years of the Double Kaymakamate period, the diversity of interest groups such as religious bodies and

¹⁴⁵Jens Hanssen, "Practises of Integration: Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire", in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, edited by Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), p. 58.

landowners and changing relations among them would again divide the society along sectarian lines. Moreover, the absence of sectarian representation could give the opportunity for the powerful groups to suppress the minorities. Then, the probability of sectarian division would again come into the picture.

In terms of local affairs, the Double Kaymakamate years witnessed the rise of Maronite peasants who deepened their relations with the Patriarchate throughout the era.¹⁴⁶ This development was one of the major causes of the civil war as it erupted with the rebellion of Maronite peasants against notable landowner families. The following chapter will start with the civil war period with detailed references to its causes. Although the Double Kaymakamate regime officially came to an end with the end of the civil war, the civil war period deserves to be evaluated in a separate sub-section because of its profound effects on almost all areas of politics, society and diplomacy.

¹⁴⁶ Haluk Ülman, *1860-1861 Suriye Buhranı: Osmanlı Diplomasisinden Bir Örnek Olay* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1966), pp. 25-26.

CHAPTER IV

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION IN MOUNT LEBANON: CIVIL WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTASARRIFIYYA (1858-1868)

As the previous chapter concentrated on the Double Kaymakamate regime's establishment and consolidation periods, this chapter will discuss the civil war period and the early years of the Mutasarrifiyya regime. The first part of the chapter will focus on the civil war period (1858-1861) and discuss the attempts for a new order in the region. The second part will discuss the establishment of the Mutasarrifiyya regime in 1861 and the tenure of Davud Pasha, the first governor (mutasarraf), which lasted until 1868. A further discussion will be held in the third part on the systems introduced in Mount Lebanon and their effects on the Ottoman administrative system with a particular focus on the special regime in Crete that shared certain administrative qualities in common with the Lebanese regime.

Civil War (1858-1861)

Although covering a short time span, this period is perhaps the most prominent phase in nineteenth-century Lebanese history. The steps taken – or not taken - by the Ottoman government have been highly criticized not only by eyewitnesses or foreign representatives but also by some historians of our times. This part will strive to determine the Ottoman stance toward the massacres by evaluating the archival documents. In this way, the criticisms directed at the Ottoman government can be re-evaluated.

The uneasiness in the region during and after the Crimean War has already been discussed. However, the uneasiness was not restricted to Mount Lebanon. The Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict) of 1856 triggered the religious hostilities not only in

the Balkan provinces but also in Syria. Reforms offered equality to Christians, or at least aimed to do so. This may have led to the development of a Christian bourgeoisie, and in return, may have created resentment among the Muslim population.¹⁴⁷ It is quite clear that the notion of losing their superior status vis-à-vis the Christians led to the rise of the anti-Christian sentiments in the Ottoman Arab lands. Thus, during the clashes in Mount Lebanon, riots targeting Christians erupted in Damascus. This stage of terror and the links between events will be investigated after the discussion on the early phase of clashes in Mount Lebanon.

The increasing tension in the region after the Crimean War has already been discussed. By 1858, the Maronite peasants' uneasiness in Northern Lebanon toward their landowners, who were mainly from the prominent Khazin family, turned into a revolt. The Maronite peasants assaulted the Khazins and began to occupy their territories.¹⁴⁸ Internal contentions among Khazins accompanied the peasants' increasing power thanks to the alliance with the Maronite Patriarchate and eased the spread of the peasant rebellion.¹⁴⁹

The accounts of the peasant rebellion in Mount Lebanon are scarcer in the literature compared to those about the civil war of 1860. In this sense, the German scholar Havemann's study on peasant rebellions in nineteenth-century Lebanon, which is based mainly on primary sources, becomes a significant point of reference. He describes the peasant rebellion in Kisrawan as social revolt and its leader Tanius

¹⁴⁷ Leila Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994) p. 100.

¹⁴⁸ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 29.

¹⁴⁹ Marwan Buheiry, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations Economic Malaise and the Incentive to Arm", in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, edited by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), pp. 293-295.

Shahin as social rebel who is of *bauer hintergrund* (peasant roots). Havemann likens him to Robin Hood.¹⁵⁰

Havemann continues that instead of mutual war, the rebellion assaults were developed in terms of *überfälle und plünderungen* (raids and plundering) against Khazins. The rebels were of peasantry without any landowner presence and were supported by the clergy. In terms of geography, the rebellion was confined to the boundaries of Kisrawan region populated almost entirely by the Maronites. Nevertheless, the rebels had the *konfessionales gefühl* (confessional feeling) which can be understood from their desire to help fellow Maronites of the south when the Druze campaign against southern Maronites commenced. The rebels planned to march southwards to protect their co-religionists; however, they displayed poor organization and failed to protect the victims.¹⁵¹

The spread of the peasant movement in Kisrawan region under the leadership of Tanius Shahin turned into a peasant republic. Certain committees were organized and achieved order throughout Kisrawan. Thus, it can be claimed that the movement comprised democratic elements.¹⁵² On the other hand, the lack of constitutional norms and the authoritarian nature of the organizational structure prevent researchers from describing the movement as democratic.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Axel Havemann, *Rurale Bewegungen im Libanongebirge des 19. Jahrhunderts : Ein Beitrag zur Problematik sozialer Veränderungen* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1983), pp. 259-260.

¹⁵¹ Axel Havemann, *Rurale Bewegungen*, pp. 264-273.

¹⁵² Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 63.

¹⁵³ Axel Havemann, *Rurale Bewegungen*, p. 263; Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon*, p. 719.

The rebels, despite their disobedience against the Khazins, never challenged the Ottomans. Tanius Shahin persisted in his obedience to the Sultan.¹⁵⁴ Thanks to the loyal discourse of the rebels toward the Ottomans, some scholars like Kamal Salibi and Samir Khalaf claim that the Porte supported the rebels.¹⁵⁵ However, the negative attitude of the Vali of Sidon, Hurşid Pasha, toward Tanius Shahin¹⁵⁶ challenges the accuracy of this argument.

The peasant rebellion of Kisrawan affected the southern territories of Mount Lebanon in a sectarian way, despite its class struggle characteristics. Already harassed under their Druze landlords, the Maronite peasants of the south were encouraged by the Kisrawan rebellion; however, the Druze notables managed to avoid the class-based opposition by utilizing sectarian discourse through championing the Druze identity, which prevented the Druze peasantry from supporting the Maronite peasant cause.¹⁵⁷ Then, an extremely bloody campaign against the Maronites of the south began in 1860.

The civil war of 1860 consisted mainly of several Druze assaults against the Christian - not only Maronite but also Greek Catholic – population as observed in the siege targeting Zahle, a predominantly Greek Catholic city. To discuss the sequence of assaults or to detail the calamities is not the main goal of this study. Instead, this study will strive to evaluate the Ottoman stance and intervention in the civil war by exploring primary sources produced not only by Western and local eyewitnesses, diplomats and academics but also those available in the Ottoman archives. In this

¹⁵⁴ Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), p. 105.

¹⁵⁵ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 86; Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, pp. 93-94.

¹⁵⁶ Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, p. 106.

¹⁵⁷ Philip K. Hitti, *A Short History of Lebanon* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) p. 194.

sense, Ottoman archival documents can help to probe the reliability of Western accounts by reflecting the Ottoman interpretations.

The civil war of 1860 is perhaps the most significant and striking event of the nineteenth-century Lebanon and even the Western Mediterranean. The mass massacres in Mount Lebanon triggered anti-Christian pogroms in Damascus, where Muslim Damascenes targeted the Christian quarters of the city and engaged in mass killings. Because of the dimension of massacres, the issue attracted Western attention. Thanks to the existing presence of many Western nationals during the clashes and favourable circumstances during the interventions and post-war settlements, we can trace several primary accounts.

French and Anglo-Saxon (British or American) missionaries, diplomatic representatives, scholars and other residents published most of the accounts. One of the common peculiarities of these accounts is their biased content reflecting mainly their own countries' policies. Therefore, in most of these accounts, the Ottomans and native peoples are subjected to pejorative and exaggerative remarks. However, in the final analysis, these works provide extensive information about the events. In the following paragraphs, the significant points of selected accounts will be evaluated.

The massacres significantly disturbed the French public opinion, as France had extremely close relations with the Maronites.¹⁵⁸ The French, because of their relations with Ottoman Syria, strived to shed light on the question. Thus, the French accounts represent a significant share of the publications related to the massacres. Almost all accounts hold anti-Ottoman, anti-Druze, anti-British and pro-Maronite

¹⁵⁸ Alyce Edythe Mange, *The Near Eastern Policy of the Emperor Napoleon III* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940), p. 85.

stances. Since they mainly address French public opinion, emotional overtones accompanied by religious motives are prevalent.

François Lenormant, a prominent assyriologist and archeologist who visited the region after the massacres and collected a considerable number of documents from French mission, produced a significant work on the issue.¹⁵⁹ In his account, he blames the Ottoman officials by claiming that they predicted the potential tensions and strived for their realization.¹⁶⁰ He also criticizes the plunders by Albanian *başıbozüks* (irregular paratroopers), who were prevalent in the region.¹⁶¹ He continues by condemning Hurşid Pasha, the Vali of Sidon, on several occasions.¹⁶² Although Hurşid Pasha was a controversial figure because of his role during the civil war, Lenormant's inductions toward the Ottoman administration as a whole, based on Hurşid Pasha's actions, do not seem consistent and impartial.

Baptistin Poujoulat, the brother of Jean-Joseph Poujoulat, was a prominent French diplomat in Syria during the civil war who expressed parallel arguments with Lenormant. A historian by profession, he participated in the French expedition to the Syrian coast during the civil war and based his book on his personal observations and collected diplomatic documents. He criticizes the voices condemning the Patriarchate as the perpetrator of the events and argues that the Druze and the Ottomans were the

¹⁵⁹ For his biography, see: Fernand Mayence, "François Lenormant", The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910.12 Apr. 2014 <<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09151a.htm>>. His account: François Lenormant, *Histoire des Massacres de Syrie en 1860* (Paris : Hachette, 1861).

¹⁶⁰ François Lenormant, *Histoire des Massacres de Syrie en 1860*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶¹ François Lenormant, *Histoire des Massacres de Syrie en 1860*, p. 16. Indeed, this problem has been raised by many authors. See for instance: Jean Baptiste Jobin, *La Syrie en 1860 et 1861: Lettres et Documents Formant une Histoire Complète et Suivie des Massacres du Liban et de Damas, des Secours Envoyés aux Chrétiens et de l'expédition Française* (Lille: L. Lefort, 1880) pp.21-22.

¹⁶² François Lenormant, *Histoire des Massacres de Syrie en 1860*, p. 19, pp. 22-23.

prime perpetrators. However, he does not produce any evidence to support his argument.¹⁶³

The French antipathy against the Ottomans and the Druze is understandable because of French political interests. In this sense, a focus on the British accounts will be beneficial. Although Britain generally supported the Ottoman territorial integrity and developed close relations with the Druze, the stance in British accounts may vary to some extent regarding the evaluations of the Ottomans, the Maronites and the Druze.

Charles Henry Churchill can be a good example to demonstrate the variations in British accounts regarding the civil war. As a veteran diplomat who had spent significant time in Syria, Churchill fanatically insults the Ottomans, including the Turkish race and the Druze. Like other exemplary accounts, he blames the Ottomans for the massacres.¹⁶⁴ He does not refrain from championing the French expedition and criticizes the British queen for her reluctance about it.¹⁶⁵

James Lewis Farley, an Irish banker and writer who resided several years in Istanbul, paints quite a different picture. Consisting of collected documents and letters, his account is perhaps the most pro-Ottoman book written by a Westerner about the civil war of 1860.¹⁶⁶ He sympathizes with the Maronites and engages in derogatory explanations about the Druze. He puts the blame on the Druze and claims

¹⁶³ Baptistin Poujoulat, *La Vérité sur la Syrie et l'expédition Française* (Paris: Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861) p. 108.

¹⁶⁴ See: Charles Henry Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (New York: Arno Press, 1973, Reprint of the 1862 ed. published by B. Quaritch, London).

¹⁶⁵ Charles Henry Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites*, pp. 242-246.

¹⁶⁶ For his biography see: George Clement Boase, "Farley, James Lewis", *Dictionary of National Biography*, London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1889, p. 209. His account: James Lewis Farley, *The Massacres in Syria* (London: Bradbury & Evans, 1861).

that the Ottoman government was perhaps the least guilty party of the conflict.¹⁶⁷ He claims that the Ottoman government had strived to achieve equality of non-Muslims. He also claims that during the massacres, the Ottoman government could do nothing because of its weak presence in the region. On the other hand, he corroborates other authors regarding the complicity of Vali Hurşid Pasha, calling him traitor.¹⁶⁸

Although Farley's positive attitude toward Ottoman policy is a good indicator for the discussion of Ottoman role, his controversial personality creates suspicions about his arguments. According to Roderic Davison, Farley worked for Ottoman propaganda in return for financial gains and switched discourse when he saw his financial interests at stake.¹⁶⁹

In addition to French and British authors, thanks to missionary presence, there are also several primary accounts regarding the civil war produced by the Americans. As part of the Protestant missions, several Americans who resided in Mount Lebanon and Beirut witnessed the civil war. Owing to the lack of American political interests in the region except for trade volume and missionary activities, the accounts of the American citizens tend to be less insulting. Unlike the French and British, the Americans did not have any companionship or hostility toward either the local peoples or the Ottoman Empire.

Daniel Bliss, one of the most prominent missionaries in the Levant, expresses his observations during the civil war in his memoirs.¹⁷⁰ Bliss blames almost all parties related to the conflict. He criticizes the Maronite Patriarchate of intervening

¹⁶⁷ James Lewis Farley, *The Massacres in Syria*, p. 90.

¹⁶⁸ James Lewis Farley, *The Massacres in Syria*, p. 43.

¹⁶⁹ Roderic H. Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999) pp. 355-356.

¹⁷⁰ See: Daniel Bliss, *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss*, edited and supplemented by his eldest son (New York: Revell, 1920).

in the affairs of the Maronites under Druze domain, which contributed to the sectarian crisis. Furthermore, he criticizes France and Britain for deepening the crisis by supporting the conflicting parties and the Ottoman Empire of not handling the issue in a serious way.¹⁷¹ Thus, his account seems to take a more reliable position with respect to the others, thanks to the lack of support for any party regarding the conflict.

Henry Harris Jessup, a Presbyterian missionary who was present in the region, is another eyewitness to the events. He asserts his deep wrath that even many years after the events, he still does not want to remember in his autobiographical account the calamities he witnessed.¹⁷² Besides criticizing the provocative role of Maronite clerics, he blames the Ottomans not for their complicity, as claimed by most other authors, but rather for their “unconcern”.¹⁷³ Thus, the fact that he and Bliss differ from the French and some British authors in terms of explaining the Ottoman role in the conflict, the utilization of Lebanese and Ottoman sources becomes more significant.

Among the Lebanese, Iskandar Abkarius’ text seems of prime importance. Annotated and translated by J. F. Scheltema, this account provides wide range of information about the civil war from a native’s perspective.¹⁷⁴ There is not sufficient information on Abkarius; however, his surname points to his Armenian origin. From the text, his devotion to Christianity is observable. Besides providing detailed data

¹⁷¹ Daniel Bliss, *The Reminiscences*, p. 141.

¹⁷² See: Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1910), p. 157.

¹⁷³ Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria*, p. 173.

¹⁷⁴ See: Iskander ibn Yaqub Abkarius, *The Lebanon in Turmoil, Syria and the Powers in 1860: Book of the Marvels of the Time Concerning the Massacres in the Arab Country*; translated and annotated and provided with an introduction and conclusion by J. F. Scheltema (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920).

about the civil war, he engages in a discussion on the relationship between Islam and the massacres carried out by the Muslims (mainly of Damascus) and Druze by claiming that Islam bans massacring and the perpetrators ignored the Islamic principles.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, he praises the Sultan's efforts for stabilization as well as those of special executor Fuad Pasha's.¹⁷⁶ Since we do not have detailed biographical information about the author, we should consider the probability of fear in his explanation of the pro-Ottoman remarks. Nevertheless, the fact that an Eastern Christian native of the region produces different arguments from his Western contemporaries contributes to the discussion on the reliability of Western sources.

The Ottoman accounts of the time do not focus on the issue in a profound way. As usual, the Ottomans concentrated their efforts mostly on the Balkans. A typical example for this disinterest is Cevdet Pasha's prestigious work *Tezâkir*. In *Tezâkir*, Cevdet Pasha focuses mostly on the general condition of the Empire and the problems in European provinces. Nevertheless, he reserves a few pages for the Syrian Question, mostly centering on Fuad Pasha's mission to the region. In a small passage, he expresses his concern for the Druze assaults on the Maronites.¹⁷⁷

Unlike the relative indifference toward the Lebanese Question suggested in Ottoman accounts, the Ottoman central government strived to handle the crisis. The appointment of Fuad Pasha, who was foreign minister at the time, as the general prosecutor to satisfy the region and terminate the crisis demonstrates the Ottoman interest in the region. After the evaluation of non-Ottoman arguments up to here, it is beneficial to discuss the Ottoman archival documents and compare the information in

¹⁷⁵ Iskander ibn Yaquub Abkarius, *The Lebanon in Turmoil*, ch. 8.

¹⁷⁶ Iskander ibn Yaquub Abkarius, *The Lebanon in Turmoil*, ch. 9.

¹⁷⁷ For the parts regarding the Civil War, see: Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, edited and published by Cavid Baysun (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991) pp. 109-112.

these documents with Western viewpoints in order to better determine the Ottoman position regarding the civil war of 1860. In order to avoid repetition and irrelevant information, only significant documents will be evaluated.

When the first news about the Druze assaults against Maronites in Hasbaya reached the capital, the Porte decided to take action and authorized an officer from the Arabistan army (of the Empire) with extra troops to calm the events. The Druze assault was called *gaddarca* (ferocious). Moreover, thanks to information from the Vali (Hurşid Pasha), the Porte became aware of the fact that the Ottoman soldiers present in the region did not act against the Druze militia, and this inaction drew the reaction of the Western consular missions. Thus, the Porte decided to appease the reactions by authorizing the army officer to investigate the events and promised a just trial process.¹⁷⁸

In another communication between the Porte and its officers, the same anxiety is observable. The Porte admits the insufficient number of soldiers in the region and promises to coordinate the move of extra soldiers to the Syrian coast. Again, because of the privileged status of the region, the Porte takes Western attention into account.¹⁷⁹ In another dispatch, the Porte promised Hurşid Pasha that the expenditures of the troops in the region would be paid by the central treasury.¹⁸⁰

After the evaluation of these documents, we can claim that the attitude of the Porte was not the same as the attitude of the local soldiers. The Porte did not approve the Druze assaults and strived to take precautions. Western pressure seems to have contributed to the Ottoman reaction. The promise of monetary rewards which would

¹⁷⁸ BOA, İ.HR 176/9696, 8 Zilhicce 1276 (27 June 1860).

¹⁷⁹ BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/138, 7 Zilhicce 1276 (26 June 1860).

¹⁸⁰ BOA, İ.DH 1290/101495, 15 Zilhicce 1276 (4 July 1860).

better motivate the troops and the local officials is another indicator of the Ottoman will to halt the unwanted massacres. However, when the first precautions did not suffice, the Porte introduced more radical policies. In this sense, the granting of broad power in the region to Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha was an effective step toward pacification.

Sadrazam Ali Pasha prompted the Sultan to appoint Fuad Pasha as special executor after the failure of earlier Ottoman attempts to end the crisis in Mount Lebanon. Ali Pasha exposes his fear to the Sultan that, in case of further intensification of the conflict, the event may spread to the Muslim population as well and become internationalized as a result of Western pressure. Then, he acknowledges his trust in Fuad Pasha based on his previous accomplishments and recommends him as the special representative in order to pacify the region. The Sultan approves this demand and appoints him to the region.¹⁸¹ Appointing the Foreign Minister to the Mountain is a significant indicator of Ottoman desire to handle the issue.

As the clashes started in Mount Lebanon and then spread to Damascus, the Porte feared further spread to other neighboring regions. The same fear was also prevalent in the natives of the Ottoman Arab lands. The Vali of Jerusalem petitioned the Porte for extra troops because of the fear in the city implied by the Greek Catholic Patriarch of Jerusalem. In addition to a positive response to the call from Jerusalem, the Porte urged other neighboring provinces such as Kurdistan and Aleppo to be alert against the threat of spreading unrest and to collaborate with the army.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ BOA, İ.MMS 132/5673, 29 Zilhicce 1276 (18 July 1860).

¹⁸² BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/139, 2 Muharrem 1277 (21 July 1860).

The mission of Fuad Pasha displayed positive outcomes even before the arrival of the delegation to the region. Hurşid Pasha, perhaps the most controversial Ottoman figure of the conflict, gathered the Druze and Maronite notables and compelled them to sign an agreement in order to halt the conflict. Then, in a letter to the Porte, he informed his government about the agreement and attached the agreement sheets along with the loyalty letters of the Druze and Maronite notables.¹⁸³

Fuad Pasha's mission turned out fruitful results. In the dispatches sent to the capital, Fuad Pasha heralded the re-establishment of tranquility and safety in the region and added that the fugitives (the criminal suspects who sought refuge in the mountains when the mission began) had begun to surrender to the Ottoman troops. He also urged the Porte to provide help for the prevailing hunger in the region. The Porte was quite satisfied with the news and decided to respond to the hunger issue (*mekulat maddesi*).¹⁸⁴ Fuad Pasha is thus generally appreciated for his accomplishments in the region. Besides his intervention against the belligerents of the conflict, he also supplied several services such as food (as mentioned above) and healthcare.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, he identified the incapability of the Ottoman officials in the region.¹⁸⁶

The timing of the mission was almost perfect. The French had long waited for an opportunity to send an expedition to the region. The Porte was aware of French intentions, as France carried out diplomacy to convince the Western governments. Thus, before the French started their expedition, Fuad Pasha had already achieved a

¹⁸³ BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 2/140, 10 Muharrem 1277 (29 July 1860).

¹⁸⁴ BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 3/143, 16 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (30 November 1860).

¹⁸⁵ He founded hospitals in the region during his mission. See: Enver Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), v. VI., p. 37.

¹⁸⁶ Haluk Ülman, *1860-1861 Suriye Buhranı: Osmanlı Diplomasisinden Bir Örnek Olay* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1966), p. 35.

certain degree of tranquility in the region. Therefore, the French troops en route were accorded under Ottoman organization.¹⁸⁷ Thanks to the early Ottoman action, the French troops became auxiliary forces and a possible invasion threat was abolished. Furthermore, the Druze were spared from French threat. However, the French expedition was not totally ineffectual. This expedition increased the morale of the Maronite Christians and the French troops left the region only after the agreement on a new regime.¹⁸⁸

After the pacification of the events and arrest of the suspects, Fuad Pasha's mission initiated the stage of trials and decided on severe punishments. Nevertheless, in subsequent phases, the punishments were evaluated as exaggerated and reductions were implemented. In this sense, the documents of the mission sent to the Porte on trials and punishments give certain clues about the process.

Fuad Pasha notified the Porte about the British intervention to reduce the punishments of the Druze, an action which was countered by France, who proposed higher punishments. That is, the Western powers were part of the process and the mission looked for a balance among their claims. For the suspect Ottoman officers, Fuad took a defensive position and called their crime as *adm-i dirayet* (inability to act) rather than *ihanet* (betrayal). He applied the verb *kurtarmak* (to save) for the punishment reductions of the officers.¹⁸⁹ This means that he desired the reductions and was alert to Western pressure to counter his actions.

The trial commission members of the mission defended the position of Ottoman officers during the civil war in their communication with the Porte.

¹⁸⁷ Alyce Edythe Mange, *The Near Eastern Policy of the Emperor Napoleon III* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940), p. 89.

¹⁸⁸ Georges Samné, *La Syrie* (Paris :Bossard, 1920), p. 52.

¹⁸⁹ BOA, i.MMS 22/958/2, 29 Zilkade 1277 (8 June 1861).

According to information gathered in the region, the inaction of Ottoman officers would be explained by their weakness rather than their partisanship. They insisted on the fact that the indifference of the officers was not limited to Druze atrocities. In earlier phases of the conflict, the Ottoman officers failed to challenge the Maronite brigands who offended the Druze. Thus, they claimed that execution and life sentences would be excessively harsh. The Porte approved the reduction demands and authorized the commission to re-evaluate the sentences.¹⁹⁰

In the re-evaluation process, the commission reiterated its interpretation of the events. According to this interpretation, there existed high tension between the Druze and Maronites from the past (*kadimden berü*) and the events started as minor skirmishes which soon evolved into intense fighting. Although the Maronites initiated the war, the Druze were guilty of carrying out mass killings. The commission members referred to the faults of the Ottoman officers during the conflict as *ihimamsızlık ve vazifesizlik* (indifference and misconduct) upon the evaluations of their actions and inactions during the course of the conflict. The commission evidenced the officers' inaction against Maronite brigands and ineffective measures for the pacification. Utilizing the favorable diplomatic circumstances of the day, the commission proposed reductions in the sentences. Most capital punishment sentences for officers and Druze leaders were replaced by exile work punishments (*kalebend, kürek*). The commission also commented that the absence of punishments for Maronites (no Maronites were arrested because of fear of

¹⁹⁰ BOA, İ.MMS 22/958/2, 29 Zilkade 1277 (8 June 1861).

the West) would trigger Druze re-action in case no reductions were held. The Meclis-i Vala (High Assembly) and the Sultan approved the reductions.¹⁹¹

The sentences for the convicts of the Lebanese conflict were lighter than those of the Damascus events. Salibi explains this fact by the difference in these two conflicts' essence. The Lebanese conflict was a civil war between two contesting parties; on the other hand, the Damascus affair was a unilateral assault of one party against unarmed civilians. Therefore, equal verdicts would be unjust.¹⁹²

The local Ottoman authorities in Mount Lebanon informed the Porte that the Druze convicts had been shipped to Istanbul in accordance with their specified eternal exile work sentence in the Castle of Belgrade.¹⁹³ In another communication related to the sentences, the Ottoman officer on Lesbos Island informed the Porte that the convicted Ottoman officers had been handed over to the local units as arranged.¹⁹⁴ That is, the sentences were implemented without any long delay.

During the issue of sentences, the future of the region became another significant matter. After a bloody civil war which paralyzed the society, to arrange a viable political system required much effort. In this sense, the Western powers seemed not to let the Ottomans decide alone. The Ottomans approved the creation of an international commission to determine the new regime. The fact that during the events some Western representatives and citizens were killed had already internationalized the conflict and prevented Ottomans from taking measures without

¹⁹¹ BOA, i.MMS 22/958/2, 29 Zilkade 1277 (8 June 1861).

¹⁹² Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 108.

¹⁹³ BOA, A.MKT.UM 479/12, 18 Zilhicce 1277 (27 June 1861).

¹⁹⁴ BOA, A.MKT.UM 484/97, 8 Muharrem 1278 (16 July 1861).

any foreign intervention. However, Sultan urged Fuad Pasha to lead the commission and eliminate Western intervention in other issues such as sentencing.¹⁹⁵

The commission, centered in Beirut and hosting several diplomatic representatives from the major powers under Fuad Pasha's chairmanship, witnessed tough negotiations on the future of the region. France insisted on an autonomous regime under a Maronite member from Shihab family.¹⁹⁶ The British representative Lord Dufferin countered the French plan and offered a surprising plan which projected the whole of Syria as a semi-independent *paşalık* (which meant an autonomous governorate distant from central authority).¹⁹⁷ At the end, a common ground was found. The Mutasarrifiyya regime, which implied the creation of an autonomous sanjak headed by a Christian mutasarrif appointed by and directly responsible to the Porte, was determined. Furthermore, the parties agreed on a written regulation commonly known as *Règlement Organique* (Organic Regulation) for the administration of the Mutasarrifiyya in the summer of 1861.¹⁹⁸ Thus, the bloody civil war period came to an end. The new regime will be discussed under the next subheading.

One of the most significant points the long discussion on the civil war is that the difference between Western primary sources and Ottoman archival documents is extremely wide. Therefore, contemporary authors who do not utilize the Ottoman archival documents may fail to produce consistent data. Of course, Ottoman archival

¹⁹⁵ BOA, İ.MMS 20/864/5, 27 Safer 1277 (14 September 1860).

¹⁹⁶ Camille de Rochemonteix, *Le Liban et l'expédition Française en Syrie, 1860-1861, Documents Inédits du Général A. Ducrot* (Paris : A. Picard, 1921), p. 154.

¹⁹⁷ For the details on the so-called Dufferin Plan, see: Fruma Zachs, "'Novice' or 'Heaven-Born' Diplomat? Lord Dufferin's Plan for a 'Province of Syria': Beirut, 1860-61" in *Middle Eastern Studies* (Taylor & Francis Ltd, July 2000), Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 160-176.

¹⁹⁸ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 31.

documents do include errors and biases; therefore, to “uncover” the truth would be an impossible task. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a balanced perspective, the comparison of different arguments is necessary.

This discussion has strived to show the Ottoman actions in a civil war in one of the Empire’s distant territories. The comparison of sources neither justifies nor criticizes the Ottoman actions. However, the utilization of Ottoman archival documents causes the researcher to re-think the satanic depiction of the Ottomans in Western primary sources and contemporary sources which ignore the Ottoman side’s arguments.

The Tanzimat years passed with infinite difficulties for the Ottoman Empire. Societal discontent was prevalent in many regions and the Porte had to handle not only this discontent but also Western intervention actions. Therefore, the Ottoman failure to react to the massacres in earlier stages of the conflict can be explained by administrative weaknesses. On the other hand, the attitude of local Ottoman officers and troops in the earlier phases do not seem excusable, as even the Ottoman sources disapprove of their inaction. However, the Ottoman claim that this inaction was not only against the Maronites but also the Druze at least strengthens the probability of the non-sectarian position of the Ottomans. The fact that the Ottomans punished no Maronites again serves the argument rejecting the sectarian nature of Ottoman policy in Mount Lebanon.

Despite the difficulty of the overall Ottoman situation, the Porte still displayed certain achievements in this crisis. Fuad Pasha’s mission immediately pacified the region. This means that the Ottoman government was still able to solve the crises in its Arab-populated provinces. Furthermore, the contesting parties of the

conflict protested neither the Ottoman sovereignty nor Ottoman intervention. Moreover, although the Porte could not eliminate Western intervention, it developed certain strategies to contain the Western powers, as in the case of the French expedition's isolation with Fuad Pasha's mission. The Ottoman officials displayed similar containment strategies against the Western powers during the negotiations on the new order in Mount Lebanon as well as in the example of insisting on a non-native Christian to head the region.

Mutasarrifiyya Regime: Davud Pasha's Term (1861-1868)

This part aims to deal with the first years of the Mutasarrifiyya Regime established after the Ottoman and foreign intervention. The tenure of the first mutasarrif Davud Pasha will be evaluated along with the new regime's effect on the Lebanese people and the Ottoman Empire. Besides the arrangements regarding new regime, the archival sources also provide several significant documents on Davud Pasha's relations with the Porte and his clash with Yusuf Karam.

The Mutasarrifiyya regime was quite different from the previous systems. It introduced several changes against the *ancien régime*. After several centuries of emir dominance on the land, the mutasarrif of the new regime would no more be a tax-farmer.¹⁹⁹ As a non-native, the mutasarrif would only be an Ottoman civil servant. In terms of representation, the Central Administrative Council, with its sectarian-based representation, would cooperate with the non-native mutasarrif in the administrative realm. The sectarian nature of the Council may seem to sharpen the sectarian tensions at first glance; however, prominent scholars like Ortaylı and Baaklini claim that the Council significantly reduced the probability of sectarian tensions by

¹⁹⁹ A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-1900* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), p. 80.

including all major denominations into the system.²⁰⁰ The creation of a non-sectarian body would have the risk of non-representation of some denominations, which could foster sectarian tensions.

Davud Pasha, who was of Armenian-Catholic descent, was designated as the first mutasarrif, and the Sultan appointed him to the mission by granting him the title of Minister (*vezaret menşuru*).²⁰¹ Taking the difficulty of the mission into consideration, the Foreign Ministry of the Ottoman Empire recommended a salary of forty thousand *kuruş* for Davud Pasha, and the Sultan approved this amount.²⁰²

Garabet Artin Davud Pasha, born in Istanbul from an Anatolian background, was a reputable Ottoman bureaucrat having served in several significant institutions like the Telegraph Office and Imperial Treasury.²⁰³ Salibi comments on his appointment as good choice.²⁰⁴ However, this appointment, despite a majority of positive comments, is criticized by early-twentieth century French historian Rochemonteix. She describes Davud Pasha as *un chrétien de nom* (a nominal Christian) and accuses him of pursuing his personal fortune with no dedication to the locals.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, Davud Pasha acquired popularity within a short time. The French emperor ordained him with the *Legion d'Honneur*. With the Sultan's permission, he accepted to wear this medal.²⁰⁶ The French countenance toward

²⁰⁰ See: İber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 64; Abdo I. Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), p. 56.

²⁰¹ BOA, İ.DH 474/31822, 8 Muharrem 1278 (16 July 1861).

²⁰² BOA, İ.DH 475/31858, 16 Muharrem 1278 (24 July 1861).

²⁰³ M. Jouplain, *La Question du Liban: Etude d'histoire Diplomatique & de Droit International* (Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1908), p. 484.

²⁰⁴ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 111.

²⁰⁵ Camille de Rochemonteix, *Le Liban et l'expédition Française en Syrie, 1860-1861, Documents Inédits du Général A. Ducrot* (Paris : A. Picard, 1921), p. 226.

²⁰⁶ BOA, İ.HR 202/11579, 25 Rebiülevvel 1280 (9 September 1863).

Davud Pasha strengthens the arguments, praising him as the right choice, as France was the most potential opponent to his appointment.

The civil war had left Mount Lebanon in total devastation. Thanks to the sensibility of Western public opinion on the conflict, organized international aid campaigns were held after the civil war.²⁰⁷ In order to compensate for the damages the monasteries and clerics were exposed to during the civil war, the Porte undertook to pay more than four hundred thousand francs from the Imperial Treasury and sent the policy of compensation to the French ambassador via the Ministry of Finance.²⁰⁸

Davud Pasha had to strive for the restoration of the order in the region. In this sense, he faced several disagreements among the society. For instance, the landowner Khazin tribes, who were dislocated by peasant rebels during the civil war, consulted Davud Pasha to be able to return to their lands. Nevertheless, their return caused discontent among the locals who had fought against them. Davud Pasha inaugurated a mediatory commission to solve the problems and strived to appease the parties until the full authority he demanded from the Porte became effective.²⁰⁹

Davud Pasha handled the issue of safety after the civil war thanks to his energetic nature. He covered the region and observed the locals' attitudes and notified the Porte about his expeditions. He expressed the homage displayed by the locals toward him and the Sultan, despite a certain distrust of a few people. He also noticed the risk in the northern towns of Zghorta, Ehden and Bsharri and retained some troops in these towns.²¹⁰ This calculation proved its necessity when the

²⁰⁷ Albert Hourani, *Arap Halkları Tarihi*, translated by Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997) p. 355.

²⁰⁸ BOA, İ.DH 507/34534, 7 Zilhicce 1279 (26 May 1863).

²⁰⁹ BOA, İ.DH 487/32935, 23 Ramazan 1278 (24 March 1862).

²¹⁰ BOA, İ.DH 492/33368, 13 Muharrem 1279 (11 July 1862).

rebellion of Yusuf Karam erupted around these towns, as they were his stronghold areas.

Tranquility reigned throughout Davud Pasha's first term, which was fixed at three years. Throughout his first term, possibly the only major uneasiness was the discontent in the Koura region, populated mainly by Greek Orthodox. This unrest was pacified promptly and Davud Pasha was awarded with the appraisal of the Sultan in return.²¹¹ This peaceful mood in the region led to the extension of Davud Pasha's term for five years more. Upon the declaration of this extension before the local population, Davud Pasha informed the Porte about positive feedback displayed by the locals and promised to continue working for safety.²¹²

The challenge of Yusuf Karam dominated the second term of Davud Pasha. After some years of relative tranquility, the region witnessed its most significant clash since the civil war. Yusuf Karam was active in the politics of Mount Lebanon and reached his career's zenith during the civil war by protecting the northern territories of Mount Lebanon from the Druze threat. After the pacification of the region, he was appointed by the Porte as the acting kaymakam of Christians (the Double Kaymakamate system was then effective). During his temporary position, the Pope awarded him a medal of honor in 1861. He informed the Porte and asked for permission to accept the medal. The Porte responded positively toward his demand.²¹³

The warm relations of the Porte with Karam were disrupted by the appointment of Davud Pasha as mutasarrif. Karam did not agree with the mutasarrif

²¹¹ BOA, İ.DH 526/36341, 28 Muharrem 1281 (3 July 1864).

²¹² BOA, İ.MTZ.CL 3/151, 17 Receb 1281 (11 December 1864).

²¹³ BOA, İ.HR 186/10355, 23 Muharrem 1278 (31 July 1861).

and the worsened relations turned into conflict in 1866. In his homeland, Northern Lebanon, he waged war with the help of the notable Shiite (Mutawali) Harfoush family against the Ottoman troops.²¹⁴ However, thanks to Davud Pasha's efforts, Ottoman troops defeated Karam and he was exiled. In his defeat, French support for Davud Pasha was a significant factor. Despite its warm relations with Karam in particular and Maronites in general, France opted not to support Karam, who was in a sectarian campaign.²¹⁵ Thus, with the loss of the moral support of France, Karam's failure became inevitable.

In his dispatches, Davud Pasha reported to the Porte the events that occurred during the clash. He stated that only some natives of the Kisrawan district supported Karam; therefore, the conflict did not last long. He also attached the letter of Lebanese Council members in which they asserted their gratefulness to the Sultan for abolishing the threats and restoring order.²¹⁶ This letter demonstrates that even the Maronite members of the Council did not opt to voice support for Karam. Again, the opposition to the Ottoman administration was not large in scale and the Porte was still respected by the Christians in the region.

Another communiqué of Davud Pasha also provides evidence of the loyalty of the Lebanese Christians to the Ottoman regime. The mutasarrif sent a letter of the Greek Catholic Patriarch to the Sultan. In this letter, the Patriarch thanked the Sultan for the pacification of events and prayed for the name of the Sultan. Davud Pasha's other attachment was more surprising. The prominent Lebanese man of literature

²¹⁴ Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1910), p. 287.

²¹⁵ Alyce Edythe Mange, *The Near Eastern Policy of the Emperor Napoleon III* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940), pp. 106-107.

²¹⁶ BOA, İ.DH 554/38547, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1283 (20 September 1866).

Nasif al Yaziji, also a Greek Catholic, had written a poem for Sultan Abdulaziz in order to assert his thanks. The poem is written in Arabic and, contrary to general application, the Ottoman Chamber of Translation did not translate it. In the poem, Yaziji utilizes exaggerated remarks for Sultan like *khalifatillah al kareem* (Allah's benevolent caliph) and *malik al adheem* (the great monarch).²¹⁷

The appraisals and prayers from prominent Christian figures demonstrated the fact that the Ottomans still retained a certain degree of respect in Mount Lebanon. The Ottomans secured the elimination of the threat of Yusuf Karam; however, the *dépêche* of Russian diplomat Ignatiev's aide reveals the fact that the Ottomans were shaken and shocked by the rebellion at first.²¹⁸ That is, despite the powerful nature of Davud Pasha, the Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon still showed weaknesses.

After the Karam rebellion, the relations between the Porte and Davud Pasha began to deteriorate due to Davud Pasha's increasing devotion to Mount Lebanon. Therefore, the first mutasarrif did not wait for the end of his tenure and resigned his post in 1868, one year before the arranged final date.²¹⁹ After his resignation, the Porte decided on Franko Nasri Pasha, after the negotiations with the powers.²²⁰

Davud Pasha's administration is generally appreciated by historians. Known for his sympathy toward the Maronite cause, Bulus Nujaym (known by his pseudonym M. Jouplain) praised Davud Pasha's efforts for the sake of tranquility

²¹⁷ BOA, i.DH 549/38235, 12 Muharrem 1283 (27 May 1866).

²¹⁸ BOA, HR.SYS 9/31, 13 February 1866.

²¹⁹ A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), p. 84.

²²⁰ A. Schopoff, *Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie, 1673-1904: Firmans, Bérats, Protocoles, Traités, Capitulations, Conventions, Arrangements, Notes, Circulaires, Règlements, Lois, Mémoires, etc.* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1904), pp. 595-596.

and development in the region.²²¹ A French scholar of the time, Gustave d'Alaux, also praised Davud Pasha's performance as mutasarrif. However, he asserted that certain actions of the Pasha had undermined the R glement.²²² Armenian historian Sanjian emphasizes Davud Pasha's contributions to the Armenians during his tenure. He encouraged Armenians to settle in Mount Lebanon and Beirut. Thus, the Armenians gained popularity in the region via their entrepreneurship in certain sectors like finance and transportation. For instance, Manouk Manoukian, a prominent Armenian figure, headed the French-owned Beirut-Damascus highway project.²²³

In general, thanks to his efforts for tranquility and development, Davud Pasha was able to become a respected personality in Mount Lebanon. In a devastated and socially paralyzed land, he achieved the revival of the country and reconciliation of the conflicting parties to some extent with the moral support of the Porte. Except for the rebellion of Yusuf Karam, tranquility reigned in the region during his term. Furthermore, opposition to Ottoman presence was still premature.

The positive aspects of the constitution-like R glement Organique were visible in the political realm. The new system encouraged political participation via the Central Administrative Council and the minor confessional groups found the opportunity to raise their voices. The system had certain negative aspects for the Lebanese such as the broad power of the mutasarrif; nevertheless, it seems that the gains of the Lebanese outweighed the negative aspects of the system.

²²¹ M. Jouplain, *La Question du Liban: Etude d'histoire Diplomatique & de Droit International* (Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1908), p. 501.

²²² G. d'Alaux, "Le Liban et Davoud Pacha", in *Extrait de la Revue des deux Mondes* (Paris: 1 May 1866), v. 63, p. 20.

²²³ Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) p. 67.

The Mutasarrifiyya Model and the Question of Crete

The Tanzimat principles strived to establish a viable provincial administrative system able to cope with the challenges arising from the provinces and ensure imperial control across the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, the Men of the Tanzimat displayed several efforts. Nevertheless, in certain cases like Mount Lebanon, these efforts were restricted by local problems and foreign involvements. Thus, the aim of providing standardization in the administrative system was not entirely achieved. The *Mutasarrifiyya* model contradicted the Tanzimat reforms. Although it ensured the continuation of Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon, it was a special local system that granted extremely broad privileges to the locals, unlike the standard Ottoman administration in neighbouring territories.

The administrative standardization attempts peaked during the Mutasarrifiyya era. The Provincial Code of 1864 (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) established a new administrative system based on a hierarchical division of units and increasing centralization. Nevertheless, the presence of special regimes contradicted with the hierarchical line. In this sense, the Mutasarrifiyya system paved the way for special regimes in other problematic regions. Crete was a significant example of these problematic regions. Because of its peculiar characteristics such as its demographic structure and foreign interests, Crete experienced certain turbulences in the mid-nineteenth century. The Organic Act of 1866 that established a special regime relative to the Mutasarrifiyya regime ceased the tensions.²²⁴

²²⁴ Abel Pavet de Courteille & Abdolonyme Ubicini, *État Présent de l'empire Ottoman: Statistique, Gouvernement, Administration, Finances, Armée, Communautés non Musulmanes, etc., etc.* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876), p. 108.

This part intends to engage in a discussion of the special regimes of Mount Lebanon and Crete and their positions in the Tanzimat era administrative system. First, the Mutasarrifiyya regime's qualities and relationship with the Ottoman administrative system will be related. Then, the Tanzimat era Ottoman administrative reforms will be discussed with a special focus on the *Vilayet Nizamnamesi*. Thirdly, the Cretan crisis and its relation to the Lebanese crisis in terms of administrative models will be evaluated. Lastly, the effects of the Mutasarrifiyya model in other geographies and the significance of the special regimes for the Ottoman Empire will be evaluated.

This part does not intend to draw comparisons between the histories of Mount Lebanon and Crete since these regions are located in quite different geographical areas and experienced different processes throughout their respective histories. Because of their geographical and demographic layouts, to try to produce comparative remarks would turn out inconsistent arguments. Instead, this part aims to demonstrate the profound effect of the Mutasarrifiyya regime on the Ottoman administrative system by explaining its spread to different regions such as Crete.

The previous discussions strived to assess the Ottoman involvement in the regional affairs in the Tanzimat Era. Thus, one of the aims of this part is to engage in a discussion on the fundamentals of the Mutasarrifiyya regime and document which defined it, the *Règlement Organique*. This would help to give significant insights about the post-civil war administration in Mount Lebanon and benefit the discussion on the spread of special regimes in other geographical regions of the empire.

The Règlement Organique outlined the main principles of the administration of Mount Lebanon. It was designed in 1861 by Ottoman-European consensus²²⁵ and was revised in 1864.²²⁶ In this sense, the Règlement Organique has a significant place in discussions related to the Lebanese Question and other special regimes of the Ottoman Empire.

The regulation described the main pillars of the Mutasarrifiyya regime, from administrative divisions to the criteria for the operation of the system. In this sense, it can be viewed as a constitution. Its first article determined the appointment and duties of the mutasarrif. The second article detailed the duties of the Central Administrative Council and its election process by regarding the demographic structure of regional administrative units.²²⁷ The 1864 revision lessened the under-representation of the Maronites, the most populous confessional group.²²⁸

The third and fourth articles determined the administration of districts and smaller subdivisions. The region was divided into seven districts whose leaders would be appointed by the mutasarrif in accordance with the demographic nature of

²²⁵ For detailed information on this consensus, see the first part of this chapter.

²²⁶ Règlement Organique as a text is necessarily available in many sources. For English version, see: J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: a Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956), v.I., pp. 165-168. For French text, see: Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885) pp. 212-218; Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris: F. Pichon, 1897) v. III, pp. 144-149; I. de Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissance étrangères, depuis le Premier Traité Conclu en 1536 entre Suléyman I et François I jusqu'à nos Jours* (Paris: Amyot Editeur, 1864), pp. 338-343. The revised text of 1864 can be found in Ottoman Archive handwritten in Ottoman Turkish, see: BOA, Y.EE 31/2, 14 Rebiulahir 1281 (16 September 1864).

²²⁷ For detailed information on Central Administrative Council, see the second part of this chapter.

²²⁸ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 83.

the respective division.²²⁹ Thus, the local representation of the confessions was secured by a written document.

Besides articles related to the administration of the region, the Règlement also envisioned several articles for the judicial branch. Articles six to thirteen provided the detailed tools related to the mechanisms of justice, ranging from the appointment of judges in accordance with the principle of sectarian representation to the question of mixed suits. The remaining articles included several clauses related to such issues as the police force and taxation.²³⁰ Thus, despite consisting of few papers, the Règlement strived to cover the clauses related to significant issues.

As asserted in the Règlement, the mutasarrif and Central Administrative Council had broad powers in the internal affairs of Mount Lebanon. With this charter, Mount Lebanon became an “isolated entity” that was liberated from direct Ottoman control, unlike its neighbors, although the mutasarrif was appointed by the center.²³¹ Through the end of the Mutasarrifiyya regime just before the outbreak of the First World War, Frederick Jones Bliss, the son of a prominent American missionary, Daniel Bliss, described the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon as “imperium in imperio”, highlighting its independent-like nature.²³²

Several modern historians of the Ottoman Empire tend to regard the Mutasarrifiyya regime as a blow to Ottoman power. For instance, Karal argues that the Mutasarrifiyya regime undermined the Ottoman prestige and encouraged the

²²⁹ For comprehensive data on the divisions of Mount Lebanon and demographic structure, see: Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), pp. 234-281.

²³⁰ See: Appendix D and Appendix E.

²³¹ A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), p. 79.

²³² Frederick Jones Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine: Lectures Delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the Late William Bross* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1912), p. 104.

demands for autonomy in other problematic regions of the empire.²³³ In a similar manner, Ortaylı claims that the Mutasarrifiyya regime was the first and most concrete example of decentralization in an alarming degree in Ottoman Empire. He continues that with *Règlement Organique*, Mount Lebanon became almost independent. However, he adds that in terms of practice, the Porte was able to limit the local power.²³⁴

The historians of Lebanon tend to produce positive arguments for the Mutasarrifiyya regime. Salibi claims that Mount Lebanon's special status significantly contributed to the Lebanese difference from its neighbors in terms of historical evolution of politics and administration in era after the 1860's civil war.²³⁵ Similarly, Akarlı, who produced a detailed study on the Mutasarrifiyya regime and its bodies, praises the positive role of the special status of Mount Lebanon in the political and intellectual development in the region.²³⁶ The fact that Mount Lebanon remained an integral part of Ottoman Empire despite its broad autonomy until the spread of First World War may show that the introduced autonomy did not result in a significant threat against Ottoman sovereignty. The Mutasarrifiyya era is known as a quiet and peaceful period without significant armed clashes against the Ottoman administration. Only in the last years of the Ottoman control in the region, during the First World War under the state of emergency, the Union and Progress Party government implemented harsh measures against locals suspected of betrayal.²³⁷

²³³ Enver Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), v. VI., p. 42.

²³⁴ İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri (1840-1880)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 52.

²³⁵ Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 120.

²³⁶ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) pp. 184-187.

²³⁷ For the punishments against the local suspects, see: Le Commandement de la IV^{me} Armée, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne* (Stamboul: Tanine, 1916). This account was published by a branch of

The Mutasarrifiyya regime emerged in the period of Ottoman attempts for a more viable and stable provincial administration. The Tanzimat reforms aimed at achieving control in the provinces. The Men of Tanzimat envisioned a vertically divided administrative system based on central control and equal units. In this sense, several attempts were implemented regarding the role of the heads of provinces (*valis*). During the first years of Tanzimat, the *valis*' powers were decreased in order to eliminate corruption and arbitrary practices. However, this measure yielded negative results, as the *valis* were not able to maintain order because of their limited power. This situation led the Ottomans to re-establish *vali* domination in 1858 with a Provincial Regulation via the attempts of Fuad Pasha. Nevertheless, the Provincial Code of 1864 (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) redressed the power of the *vali*.²³⁸ In this sense, it can be claimed that the previous applications were taken into consideration and equilibrium was the aim in the preparation process of the Provincial Code.

The Provincial Code consisted of several clauses related to the provincial administration.²³⁹ The Ottoman periphery was divided into *vilayets* instead of *eyalets*.²⁴⁰ In addition, the equation of first-level administrative units with the creation of *vilayets*, the Provincial Code introduced a vertical hierarchical line for

Ottoman army in order to prove that certain locals of Syria including Lebanon were in betrayal against the Ottoman Empire and they were judged and sentenced by the Ottoman courts in return for their betrayal.

²³⁸ Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) v. II, pp. 84-89.

²³⁹ The Provincial Code as a text is necessarily available in many sources. For a Latinized Turkish version, see: S. Şener, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yerel Meclisler (1839-1913)* (master's thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1997), Ek Belge IV. In French, see: George Young, *Corps de Droit Ottoman: Recueil des Codes, Lois, Règlements, Ordonnances et Actes les plus Importants du Droit Intérieur, et d'études sur le Droit Coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905-06) v. I, pp. 36-47.

²⁴⁰ The term *vilayet* denotes a first level administrative unit with strict dependence to the central authority. In this sense, its possibly most close version in English can be "province". On the other hand, *eyalet* has larger autonomy with respect to *vilayet* and it can be best translated as "state" or "governorate".

subdivisions of *vilayets*, by creating *sanjaks* and *kazas*. In the Levant, the *vilayets* of Sidon and Damascus were incorporated into a single Vilayet of Syria.²⁴¹

Mount Lebanon remained outside the realm of the enlarged Syria as an autonomous entity without any mediator institution in terms of its relations with the Porte.²⁴² However, in terms of status, the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon was counted as a *sanjak*. Thus, the head of the Mutasarrifiyya was hierarchically inferior to the heads of *vilayets*.²⁴³ As a result, the Provincial Code of 1864 established several vilayets with equal statuses in the Ottoman Arab lands with the exception of Mount Lebanon. Although Mount Lebanon was granted a lower status compared to the other regions, it enjoyed higher autonomy. Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon was significantly restricted by administrative concessions granted to the locals. To cite just two examples: the Central Administrative Council was planned to assist the mutasarrif in local affairs, and Western governments had an advisory role in the determination process of the mutasarrif. This meant that Mount Lebanon's administrative system experienced a significant deviation from other Ottoman Arab regions. The boundaries of the Mutasarrifiyya arranged after the post-war negotiations remained unchanged. The Mutasarrifiyya was surrounded by the Vilayet of Syria and Beirut became an enclave of Syria surrounded by the territories of Mount Lebanon.²⁴⁴

The exclusion of Mount Lebanon from the standardized administrative system was not compatible with the Tanzimat reforms. Nevertheless, Mehmet

²⁴¹ Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 40.

²⁴² Fruma Zachs, "'Novice' or 'Heaven-Born' Diplomat? Lord Dufferin's Plan for a 'Province of Syria': Beirut, 1860-61" in *Middle Eastern Studies* (Taylor & Francis Ltd, July 2000), Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 173.

²⁴³ H. Lammens, *La Syrie: Précis Historique* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1921), p. 192.

²⁴⁴ See the map in Appendix A.

Seyitdanlioğlu, a prominent modern historian of the late Ottoman Empire provides fruitful arguments for this exclusion. He claims that the Men of Tanzimat feared the potential spread of private regimes similar to the Mutasarrifiyya regime and therefore established a standardized provincial system as a precaution to further pro-autonomy demands in other problematic territories.²⁴⁵ Despite certain risks of proposing direct links between the Mutasarrifiyya system and establishment of the Provincial Code, the establishment of a standardized system would be an efficient step to counter further claims toward autonomy in other parts of the empire. In this sense, the Ottoman statesmen presumably noticed the risk of further demands for autonomy and admitted Mount Lebanon's special status which was guaranteed by the Western governments and concentrated on the integrity of other regions. This policy seemed justifiable when regarded on the basis of the Tanzimat era Ottoman policies.

After the establishment of *vilayet* system across the empire, the spread of special regimes did not erupt except in the case of Crete. Crete obtained special status just few years after Mount Lebanon in 1868 via an imperial *ferman*. However, in terms of administrative status, the Cretan regime differed from its Lebanese counterpart. Unlike Mount Lebanon which had *sanjak* status, Crete remained as a *vilayet*, making it different from other *vilayets* with its more autonomous nature. As a well-established *vilayet*, Crete retained its own *sanjaks*.²⁴⁶

The internal and external dynamics of Crete and Mount Lebanon were quite different. For Crete, the presence of a Greek state and the Muslim population on the

²⁴⁵ Mehmet Seyitdanlioğlu, "Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı", in *Türkler* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 572.

²⁴⁶ Abel Pavet de Courteille & Abdolonyme Ubicini, *État Présent de l'empire Ottoman: Statistique, Gouvernement, Administration, Finances, Armée, Communautés non Musulmanes, etc., etc.* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876), pp. 108-109.

island seems to have deepened the crises. On the other hand, although the desire for union with France can be traced among the Maronite circles in Mount Lebanon, the demands for autonomy or independence, which became popular quite late after the establishment of Mutasarrifiyya regime, were more prevalent. Furthermore, the unrest in Mount Lebanon did not target the Ottoman presence; rather, the natives fought each other. It is unlikely that the Cretan rebels directly targeted the Ottoman authorities and the Muslim population.

Foreign involvement was a significant issue in both Mount Lebanon and Crete. As France had established close relations with the Maronite Christians mainly based on religion, the Cretan Christians allied themselves not only with fellow Greeks of the Greek Kingdom but also with Orthodox Russia. Thus, the Ottomans always faced external threats when they planned to take initiative.

Although the clauses of the constitutional documents reveal a certain degree of relationship between the regimes of Mount Lebanon and Crete, the historians of these regions tend not to claim any Lebanese influence on the Cretan regime. A prominent British historian, William Miller, who produced several works about the Orient in the early twentieth century, can be shown as an exception. He claims that the Lebanese regime affected the foundation of a special regime in Crete.²⁴⁷ This claim surely implies a political influence; that is, the Lebanese R glement was regarded as a model for the Ottomans to implement in Crete. Although this argument is not prevalently adopted or claimed by historians, the links between constitutional documents strengthen the probability of an influence.

²⁴⁷ William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913* (The University Press, Cambridge, 1913), p. 305.

To arrange a constitutional document upon an existing model should have been easier for the Porte instead of creating a peculiar document. Furthermore, Mount Lebanon had already attained certain degree of prominence thanks to its special regime. In this sense, claiming a relation between these regimes would not be insignificant to evaluate.

Ottoman hegemony in Crete started relatively late. After a long campaign from 1645 to 1669, the Ottomans annexed the island from Venetians. Crete was the last Ottoman territorial acquisition in the West. Although the island was conquered from the Venetians, the habitants were mainly Greek Orthodox Christians and spoke the Cretan variant of the Greek language.²⁴⁸

After the conquest, the Muslim population began to flourish thanks to conversion among the native population rather than an influx of Muslims from mainland Anatolia. Molly Greene claims that the conversion rate in Crete was much higher than in other Greek-speaking places. She explains several factors for this high rate, such as the negative effects of long wars on religious institutions and career opportunities in the Ottoman army.²⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the Christian population never lost its prominence and several Christian rebellions dominated the island beginning almost one century after conquest. One major uprising erupted in 1770 under the leadership of a wealthy merchant, Daskalogiannis, in a remote part of the island. The failure to secure Russian assistance led to the Ottoman counter-attack and after a short period of success of the rebels, and the Ottoman forces re-established control over the island.

²⁴⁸ Adam Hopkins, *Crete: Its Past, Present, and People* (London: Faber, 1977), pp. 118- 119.

²⁴⁹ Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 40.

The Greek war of independence stirred up the Cretan Greeks; however, the Ottoman units responded with harsh measures such as the killing of the Metropolitan of Iraklion in 1821. As part of their mission, the forces of Mehmed Ali Pasha landed on the island to intervene in the crisis. Until 1840, the island was put under Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule in return for his help in the Greek war of independence. Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule in Crete ended in 1840 and the Porte sent Mustafa Pasha to Crete as governor. Up to 1866, several protests and riots emerged against Ottoman rule in favour of union with Greece. The Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict) of 1856 raised expectations and demands for more rights among the Christian population. A crowded protest in 1858 in Parabolia was a good example of unrest among the population.²⁵⁰

The unrest in Crete peaked in 1866 and the Greeks initiated armed resistance against the Ottoman Empire. Some elements inside the movement supported more rights and freedom, whereas more radical cliques claimed unification with Greece. The insurrection found support in Greek and Russian public opinion. The harsh response of Ottoman forces did not suppress the rebellion and in the end, in 1868, the Porte agreed to negotiate with the Cretans.²⁵¹

The Organic Act of Crete had the same name with the R glement Organique of Mount Lebanon. In French texts, both documents are known as R glement Organique. Nevertheless, the English literature on the Lebanese Question has adopted French version; on the other hand, the English literature on the Cretan

²⁵⁰ Pınar Şenışık, *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Revolts, Politics and Identity in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011), pp. 73-75.

²⁵¹ Elektra Kostopoulou, *The Muslim Millet of Autonomous Crete: An Exploration into its Origins and Implications* (Diss, Boğaziçi University, Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2009), pp. 76-81.

Question tends to utilize the translated version of the title. In terms of content, the Cretan document had clauses that paralleled its Lebanese counterpart. The first clauses determined the head of the entity and his tasks. Then the administrative divisions were revealed. Subsequently, significant issues like the law courts and taxation were provisioned.²⁵²

The similarities in terms of clauses between two texts strengthen the probability of a Lebanese effect in the determination of the Cretan regime. Although Crete retained its status of *vilayet* unlike the *sanjak* status of Mount Lebanon, the guarantee for the non-Muslim representation in the state apparatus under the framework of a constitutional document endowed the Cretans with a certain degree of autonomy from the Ottoman central authority. Nevertheless, unlike the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon whose head was constitutionally determined as a Christian, Crete would be governed by a centrally-appointed *vali* who would presumably be a Muslim as the *valis* of other regions were.

The dissatisfaction among the Cretan Christians led to another revolt in 1878. This revolt contained similar demands to the previous rebellions such as unification with Greece and call for support from Russia. The Ottoman defeat before the Russians and the Treaty of Berlin compelled the Porte to approve the Halepa Pact in 1878, which envisioned more autonomy for the island by enlarging the Christian dominance via determining a Christian *vali* and changing the representational ratio in

²⁵² For the text of Organic Act; see: Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), pp. 78-82. For the description of administrative units of the island, see: Abel Pavet de Courteille & Abdolonyme Ubicini, *État Présent de l'empire Ottoman* (Paris: J. Doumaine, 1876), p. 110. The text can also be found in Appendix F.

the councils to the favour of Christians.²⁵³ The determination of the head as Christian seems to have increased the similarities between the regimes of Crete and Mount Lebanon. Although both regions had heterogeneous demographics, each had one dominant group: Orthodox Greeks in Crete and Catholic Maronites in Mount Lebanon. These groups were able to dominate the local politics and establish contacts with the West. Obviously, their local power and international contacts contributed to the designation of Christian governors.

If a comparison is made between the historical processes of the administrative regimes of the above-mentioned regions, the relatively easier breakaway of Crete from the Ottoman Empire compared to Mount Lebanon becomes visible. Granting autonomy in Crete resulted in extra demands from the Cretan Christians and the established special regime did not live long. On the other hand, the Lebanese regime lasted until the First World War with few and relatively insignificant amendments. Although intra-communal tensions significantly slowed down during the long Mutasarrifiyya period, the Cretan history during the same period continued to experience significant violence.

In 1872 another autonomous *sanjak*, the Mutasarrifiyya of Jerusalem, directly dependent under Istanbul, was created by Sadrazam Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Abu Manneh explains this step as an Ottoman attempt to counter increasing European influence around the region and to strengthen the control vis à vis the Egyptian regime.²⁵⁴ This example demonstrates the fact that societal crisis was not a

²⁵³ Pınar Şenışık, *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Revolts, Politics and Identity in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011), p. 79.

²⁵⁴ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century", in *The Israel/Palestine Question*, edited by Ilan Pappé (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.

prerequisite to the establishment of special regimes. In a sensitive region, the Porte seems to have taken a sensitive measure to balance the foreign influence.

The increasing number of special regimes created divergence from the Tanzimat ideals which championed administrative efficiency and central control over periphery. In addition to the territorial losses, the Ottoman administration suffered from discrepancies among its administrative units. The researchers of the time who strived to classify the administrative units of the Ottoman Empire produced complicated lists and subgroups. For instance, Heidborn, a German researcher of early twentieth century, divided the Ottoman administrative units into two at first as *possessions immédiates* and *possessions médiates*. While the former meant proper vilayets where the Ottoman control was unlimited, the latter included several problematic and special regions ranging from Austria-invaded Bosnia to Crete and Mount Lebanon. Thus, he created subgroups for *possessions médiates*. Nevertheless, his presentation of autonomous territories (*territoires autonomes*) and semi-sovereign states (*états demi-souverains*) under separate categories seems interchangeable and problematic. On the other hand, under *possessions immédiates*, he includes the privileged territories of Hejaz and Mount Athos.²⁵⁵ This classification attempt proves the difficulty of grouping late Ottoman administrative units. This complexity can be regarded as a failure of Tanzimat ideals in terms of administrative organization.

Although the special regimes negatively affected the Porte, the subjects of these special regimes enjoyed significant political and social benefits. Thanks to the constitutionally guaranteed administrative apparatus, the special regions prepared the

²⁵⁵ A. Heidborn, *Manuel de Droit Public et Administratif de l'Empire Ottoman* (Vienne-Leipzig: C.W.Stern, 1908) pp. 6-36.

infrastructure for probable future self-governance. In this sense, to claim that the R glement Organique of Mount Lebanon was the precursor of Lebanese independence²⁵⁶ would not be an exaggerated comment. On the other hand, the special regimes were restricted to only few non-Muslim Ottoman nations. Many nations continued to be governed by direct Ottoman control under regular vilayets.²⁵⁷ This fact constitutes another piece of evidence for the complexity of the late Ottoman administrative system. As enriched with several examples, the special regimes - especially the Lebanese model - significantly influenced the Ottoman politics.

²⁵⁶ Joseph Maila, "The Arab Christians: From the Eastern Question to the Recent Political Situation of the Minorities", in *Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: the Challenge of the Future*, edited by Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 41.

²⁵⁷ Roderick Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response", in *Nationalism in a non-national State: the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by William W. Haddad and William Ochsenswald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977) p. 49.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Ottoman bureaucrats strived to implement the Tanzimat reforms under significantly dire circumstances. Their attempts faced internal and external challenges. As this study has strived to assess the Porte's responses to the challenges concerning its control in Mount Lebanon – a region with several confessional groups and significant foreign interest - during the period of Tanzimat reforms, the conclusive argument is that despite certain administrative shortages such as the lack of well-equipped personnel to carry out the reforms and the problems arising from the international context that facilitated intervention into Ottoman administrative affairs under the concept of the Eastern Question, the Porte was still able to handle crises among native groups in Mount Lebanon and to develop alternative policies against the intervention attempts of the European governments. Although the Porte was not able to integrate Mount Lebanon into the *vilayet* system, potential events such as a fight for independence or colonization by France did not arise and Mount Lebanon remained Ottoman despite its large autonomy.

Since this study has focused on the evaluation of the dimensions and the limits of the Ottoman control, documents produced by Ottoman officials either in the center or in the Levant have been thoroughly examined. Arguments in the accounts produced by Western diplomats and travelers have also been compared to the data in the Ottoman archival documents, and final evaluations have been conducted based on the comparisons. The comparison reveals the great margin between the Ottoman official discourse and the Western discourse in terms of the evaluation of the crises in Mount Lebanon. If a researcher focuses solely on Western primary sources

concerning the crises in Mount Lebanon, a barbaric and demonic Ottoman Empire with extremely obsessive anti-Christian prejudice becomes the central issue.

This study does not aim to demonstrate either the mercy or the benevolence of the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat era Ottoman bureaucrats perhaps did not feel sympathy toward the Christians of Mount Lebanon. To measure their attitudes toward the Christians is not an easy task. Nevertheless, they were - as would be expected from rational actors - aware of the intensions of foreign governments who looked for pretexts to intervene in the region. For this reason, the Ottoman relations with the natives of Mount Lebanon should be evaluated through the logic of a foreign policy logic basis. In this sense, to identify the Ottoman bureaucrats as the perpetrators of the massacres against the Christians of Mount Lebanon is an inconsistent argument. Furthermore, as observed in the 1860 civil war in Mount Lebanon, the Ottoman officials in the region who did not take the necessary measures to halt the crisis faced harsh sentences after the pacification of the region. Moreover, the Ottoman documents utilized in this study reveal numerous examples of good conduct between the Christian natives of Mount Lebanon and the Porte.

As Mount Lebanon had traditionally enjoyed a high degree of autonomy before the Tanzimat era, to increase the control in the region was a quite difficult task for the Porte. However, during the period under study, the Ottomans strived to evaluate the opportunities that created possibilities for them to increase their control. During the conflicts among the natives of Mount Lebanon, the Ottoman statesmen sent either special missions or appointed new officials to rule the region in an attempt to fill the power vacuum in favor of the Porte. These attempts were always challenged by Western governments.

Throughout the period under study, Ottoman control in Mount Lebanon did not remain constant. During the first years after the Egyptian invasion, the Porte faced significant difficulties in re-establishing order. The appointment of a non-native Muslim governor in 1842 led to criticisms by both the Europeans and the natives. In 1845, with the consolidation of the Double Kaymakamate regime via the Şekib Efendi Regulations, the Porte assured its control in Mount Lebanon. During the Double Kaymakamate period, the Ottoman authority in the region was not significantly challenged. Although the Lebanese notables enjoyed the rule of the region, the governor of Sidon intervened in the regional affairs in the name of the Porte. In earlier periods, the intervention from neighboring Ottoman officials used to face opposition from the natives.


During the civil war of 1860, the Porte noticed the brutal dimension of the conflict quite late. However, the mission of Fuad Pasha was successful in putting an end to the conflict and re-establishing order in the region. Because of the effective measures of this mission, the French expedition did not turned into a permanent invasion. However, the Porte agreed to grant significant concessions to the European governments during the creation of the Mutasarrifiyya regime. During the first years of the Mutasarrifiyya period, the Porte successfully collaborated with the *mutasarrif* Davud Pasha in the re-establishment of order and the elimination of post-civil war crises. However, compared to the Double Kaymakamate regime, the Mutasarrifiyya regime had more restrictions on the Ottoman control in the region because of the concessions granted to the European governments and to the natives.

The Tanzimat reformers attempted to establish a centralized and standardized administrative system. The Provincial Code of 1864 was a successful outcome of the

reformers' attempts. However, the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon did not become part of the regular administrative units and maintained its privileged status. Mount Lebanon's privileged position may be regarded as the failure of the Ottoman centralization attempts in the region. However, if the local experience from the early years of the Ottoman control and the international pressure in varying forms such as diplomatic interventions and even military expeditions are counted, the integration of the region to the Ottoman mainstream administrative regime was almost impossible for the Porte. The cases provided in this study concerning Ottoman policies on Mount Lebanon point to the opposite. The attempts displayed by the Porte eliminated more threatening possibilities like French colonization. Although the notables of Mount Lebanon enjoyed a high degree of autonomy during the Mutasarrifiyya period, the region remained Ottoman land and secession from the Empire came quite late.

APPENDIX A


T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK OSMANLI ARŞİVİ DAİRE BAŞKANLIĞI (BOA) ©



HRT.1914

The map indicating the borders and subdivisions of Mount Lebanon. Source: BOA, HRT.h 1914, 23 Şevval 1334 (23 August 1916).

APPENDIX B



The map indicating the traditional *mukataas* (financial subdivisions) of Mount Lebanon and its vicinities. Source: Axel Havemann, *Rurale Bewegungen im Libanongebirge des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein Beitrag zur Problematik Sozialer Veränderungen* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1983), p. 406.

APPENDIX C

POPULATION DU LIBAN

CAZAS	MUSULMANS		CATHOLIQUES					CHRÉTIENS NON USIS		DRUZES	TOTAUX PAR CAZA
	Sunnites	Chittes (antiochi)	Maronites	Grecs unis	Arméniens catholiques	Syriens unis	Latins	Syriens grecs orthodoxes	Protestants		
Le Chouf	8.972	1.044	28.268	7.312	"	"	"	9.000	600	40.140	95.986 hab.
Le Métu	268	1.500	56.380	6.782	"	"	11	18.112	68	9.608	92.792
Kétronân	748	6.800	68.600	1.148	30	30	35	2.044	"	"	79.456
Batroûn	740	4.352	53.040	872	"	"	18	4.536	10	"	63.568
Djéssin	344	2.920	11.812	6.232	"	"	"	356	15	64	21.743
Zahléh	144	60	2.676	11.436	"	"	45	2.268	45	"	16.674
Le Kourah	2.360	80	3.640	16	"	"	2	17.892	"	"	23.990
Déir el-Qamar	"	"	4.664	704	"	"	4	"	"	"	5.372
TOTAUX PAR COMMUNAUTÉS.	13.576	16.846	229.680	84.472	30	30	138	64.203	738	49.812	
TOTAL GÉNÉRAL . . .										399.630 hab.	

The population chart of Mount Lebanon at the end of the nineteenth century. Source: Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), p. 211.

APPENDICE

ANNEXE N° 1

RÈGLEMENT POUR L'ADMINISTRATION DU LIBAN

(9 juin 1861).

ART. 1

Le Liban sera administré par un gouverneur chrétien nommé par la Sublime-Porte et relevant d'elle directement. Ce fonctionnaire, amovible, sera investi de toutes les attributions du pouvoir exécutif, veillera au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique dans toute l'étendue de la Montagne, percevra les impôts; nommera, sous sa responsabilité, en vertu du pouvoir qu'il recevra de S. M. I. le Sultan, les agents administratifs; il instituera les juges, convoquera et présidera le *médjlis* (conseil) administratif central et approuvera l'exécution de toutes les sentences légalement rendues par les tribunaux, sauf les réserves prévues par l'art. 9. Chacun des éléments constitutifs de la population de la Montagne sera représenté auprès du gouverneur par un *vékil* nommé par les chefs et notables de chaque communauté.

ART. 2

Il y aura pour toute la Montagne un *médjlis* administratif central composé de douze membres, deux maronites, deux druzes, deux grecs catholiques, deux grecs orthodoxes, deux moutéouâll, deux musulmans, chargés de répartir l'impôt, contrôler la gestion des revenus et des dépenses, et de donner un avis consultatif sur toutes les questions qui lui seront posées par le gouverneur.

ART. 3

La Montagne sera divisée en six arrondissements administratifs, savoir :

1° — Le Kourah, y compris la partie inférieure et les autres fractions du territoire avoisinant dont la population appartient au rite grec orthodoxe, moins la ville de Qalmoûn, située sur la côte et à peu près exclusivement habitée par des musulmans ;

2° — La partie septentrionale du Liban, sauf le Kourah jusqu'au *nahr el-Kélib* ;

3° — Zahlèh et son territoire ;

4° — Le Mètn, y compris le Sahèl chrétien et les territoires de Qâtha'â et de Salima ;

5° — Le territoire situé au sud de la route de Damas à Beyrouth jusqu'à Djèzzin ;

6° — Le Djèzzin et le Tèffâh.

Il y aura, dans chacun de ces arrondissements, un agent administratif nommé par le gouverneur et choisi dans le rite dominant, soit par le chiffre de la population, soit par l'importance de ses propriétés.

ART. 4

Il y aura dans chaque arrondissement un *médjlis* administratif local composé de trois à six membres représentant les divers éléments de la population et les intérêts de la propriété foncière dans l'arrondissement ; ce *médjlis* local, présidé et convoqué annuellement par le chef de l'arrondissement, devra résoudre en premier ressort toutes les affaires de contentieux administratif, entendre les réclamations des habitants, fournir les renseignements statistiques nécessaires à la répartition de l'impôt dans l'arrondissement, et donner son avis consultatif sur toutes les questions d'utilité locale.

ART. 5

Les arrondissements administratifs seront subdivisés en cantons dont le territoire, à peu près réglé sur celui des anciens *iqlim*, ne renfermera, autant que possible, que des groupes homogènes de population, et ses cantons en communes qui se composeront chacune d'au moins cinq cents habitants. A la tête de chaque canton il y aura un agent nommé par le gouverneur sur la proposition du chef de l'arrondissement, et à la tête de chaque commune un *chéikh* choisi par les habitants et nommé par le gouverneur. Dans les communes mixtes, chaque élément consultatif de la po-

pulation aura un *chéikh* particulier dont l'autorité ne s'exercera que sur ces coreligionnaires.

ART. 6

Égalité de tous devant la loi, abolition de tous les privilèges féodaux, et notamment de ceux qui appartenaient aux *mouqâtha'adji*.

ART. 7

Il y aura dans chaque canton un juge de paix pour chaque rite ; dans chaque arrondissement, un *médjlis* judiciaire de première instance, composé de trois à six membres représentant les divers éléments de la population ; et au siège du gouvernement, un *médjlis* judiciaire supérieur, composé de douze membres, dont deux appartenant à chacune des sept communautés désignées dans l'article 2, et auquel on adjoindra un représentant des cultes protestant et israélite, toutes les fois qu'un membre de ces communautés aura des intérêts engagés dans le procès. La présidence des *médjlis* judiciaires sera exercée trimestriellement et à tour de rôle par chacun de leurs membres.

ART. 8

Les juges de paix jugeront sans appel jusqu'à concurrence de cinq cents piastres ; les affaires, au-dessus de cinq cents piastres, seront de la compétence des *médjlis* judiciaires de première instance. Les affaires mixtes, c'est-à-dire entre particuliers n'appartenant pas au même rite, quelle que soit la valeur engagée dans le procès, seront immédiatement portées devant le *médjlis* de première instance, à moins que les parties ne soient d'accord pour reconnaître la compétence du juge de paix du défendeur. En principe, toute affaire sera jugée par la totalité des membres du *médjlis*. Néanmoins, quand toutes les parties engagées dans le procès appartiendront au même rite, elles auront le droit de récuser le juge appartenant à un rite différent ; mais, dans ce cas même, les juges récusés devront assister au jugement.

ART. 9

En matière criminelle, il y aura trois degrés de juridiction : les contraventions seront jugées par les juges de paix, les délits par le *médjlis* de première instance, et les crimes par le *médjlis* judiciaire supérieur, dont les sentences ne pourront être mises à exécution qu'après l'accomplissement des formalités en usage dans le reste de l'Empire.

ART. 10

Tout procès en matière commerciale sera porté devant le tribunal de commerce de Beyrouth, et tout procès, même en matière civile, entre un sujet ou protégé d'une puissance étrangère et un habitant de la Montagne, sera soumis à la juridiction de ce même tribunal.

ART. 11

Tous les membres du *médjlis* judiciaire et administratif, sans exception, ainsi que les juges de paix, seront choisis et désignés, après une entente avec les notables, par les chefs de leur communauté respective, et institués par le gouvernement. Le personnel des *médjlis* administratifs sera renouvelé par moitié tous les ans, et les membres sortants pourront être réélus.

ART. 12

Tous les juges seront rétribués. Si, après enquête, il est prouvé que l'un d'entre eux a prévariqué ou s'est rendu, par un fait quelconque, indigne de ses fonctions, il devra être révoqué, et sera, en outre, passible d'une peine proportionnée à la faute qu'il aura commise.

ART. 13

Les audiences de tous les *médjlis* judiciaires seront publiques, et il en sera rédigé procès-verbal par un greffier institué *ad hoc*. Ce greffier sera, en outre, chargé de tenir un registre de tous les contrats portant aliénation de biens immobiliers, lesquels contrats ne seront valables qu'après avoir été soumis à la formalité de l'enregistrement.

ART. 14

Les habitants du Liban, qui auraient commis un crime ou délit dans un autre sandjaq, seront justiciables des autorités de ce sandjaq; de même que les habitants des autres arrondissements qui auraient commis un crime ou délit dans la circonscription du Liban seront justiciables des tribunaux de la Montagne. En conséquence, les individus indigènes ou non indigènes, qui se seraient rendus coupables d'un crime ou délit dans le Liban et qui se seraient évadés dans un autre sandjaq, seront, sur la demande de l'autorité de la Montagne, arrêtés par celles du sandjaq où ils se trouvent et remis à l'administration du Liban. De même, les indigènes de la Montagne ou les habitants d'autres départements, qui auraient commis un crime ou délit

dans un sandjaq quelconque et autre que le Liban, et qui s'y seront réfugiés, seront sans retard arrêtés par l'autorité de la Montagne, sur la demande de celle du sandjaq intéressé, et seront remis à cette dernière autorité. Les agents de l'autorité, qui auraient apporté une négligence ou des retards non justifiés dans l'exécution des ordres relatifs au renvoi des coupables devant les tribunaux compétents, seront, comme ceux qui chercheraient à dérober ces coupables aux poursuites de la police, punis conformément aux lois. Enfin, les rapports de l'administration du Liban avec l'administration respective des autres sandjaqs seront exactement les mêmes que les relations qui existent et qui seront entretenues entre tous les autres sandjaqs de l'Empire.

ART. 15

En temps ordinaire, le maintien de l'ordre et l'exécution des lois seront exclusivement assurés par le gouverneur, au moyen d'un corps de police mixte recruté par la voie des engagements volontaires et composé à raison de sept hommes par mille habitants. L'exécution par garnisaires devant être abolie et devant être remplacée par d'autres modes de contrainte, tels que la saisie et l'emprisonnement, il sera interdit aux agents de police, sous les peines les plus sévères, d'exiger des habitants aucune rétribution, soit en argent, soit en nature.

Ils devront porter un uniforme ou quelque signe extérieur de leurs fonctions, et, dans l'exécution d'un ordre quelconque de l'autorité, on emploiera, autant que possible, des agents appartenant à la nation ou au rite de l'individu que cette mesure concernera. Jusqu'à ce que la police locale ait été reconnue, par le gouvernement, en état de faire face à tous les devoirs qui lui sont imposés en temps ordinaire, les routes de Beyrouth à Damas et de Saïda à Tripoli seront occupées par les troupes impériales ; ces troupes seront sous les ordres du gouverneur de la Montagne. En cas extraordinaire et de nécessité, et après avoir pris l'avis du *médjlis* administratif central, le gouverneur pourra requérir, auprès des autorités militaires de la Syrie, l'assistance des troupes régulières. L'officier qui commandera ces troupes en personne devra se concerter, pour les mesures à prendre, avec le gouvernement de la Montagne, et, tout en conservant son droit d'initiative et d'appréciation pour toutes les questions purement militaires, telles que les questions de stratégie et de discipline, il sera subordonné au gouverneur de la Montagne, durant le temps de son séjour dans le Liban, et agira sous la responsabilité de ce dernier. Les troupes se retireront de la Montagne aussitôt que le gouverneur aura officiellement déclaré à leur commandant que le but pour lequel elles ont été appelées a été atteint.

ART. 16

La Sublime-Porte ottomane se réservant le droit de lever, par l'intermédiaire du gouverneur du Liban, 3500 bourses qui constituent aujourd'hui l'impôt de la Montagne, impôt qui pourra être augmenté jusqu'à la somme de 7000 bourses lorsque les circonstances le permettront, il est bien entendu que le produit de ces impôts sera affecté, avant tout, aux frais d'administration de la Montagne et à ses dépenses d'utilité publique; le surplus seulement, s'il y a lieu, entrera dans les caisses de l'État.

Si les frais généraux strictement nécessaires à la marche régulière de l'administration dépassaient le produit des impôts, la Sublime-Porte aurait à pourvoir à ces excédents de dépense.

Mais il est bien entendu que, pour les travaux publics et autres dépenses extraordinaires, la Sublime-Porte n'en serait responsable qu'autant qu'elle les aurait préalablement approuvés.

ART. 17

Il sera procédé le plus tôt possible au recensement de la population par commune et par rite, et à la levée du cadastre de toutes les terres cultivées.

Arrêté et convenu à Péra, le 9 juin 1861.

Signé : AALI,
H.-L. BULWER,
LAVALETTE,
PROKESCH-OSTEN,
GOLTZ,
LOBANOFF.

Protocole adopté par la Sublime-Porte et les représentants des cinq grandes puissances, à la suite de l'entente à laquelle a donné lieu, de leur part, l'examen du projet de règlement élaboré par une commission internationale pour la réorganisation du Liban. Ce projet de règlement, daté du 1^{er} mai 1861, ayant été, après modifications introduites d'un commun accord, converti en règlement définitif, sera promulgué, sous la forme de firman, par S. M. I. le Sultan et communiqué officiellement aux représentants des cinq grandes puissances.

L'article premier a donné lieu à la déclaration suivante faite par S. A. Aali pacha et acceptée par les cinq représentants :

« Le gouverneur chrétien chargé de l'administration du Liban sera choisi par la Sublime-Porte, dont il relèvera directement. Il aura le titre de *muchir*

et résidera habituellement à Dêir el-Qamar, qui se trouve replacé sous son autorité directe. Investi de l'autorité pour trois ans, il sera néanmoins amovible, mais sa révocation ne pourra jamais être prononcée qu'à la suite d'un jugement. Trois mois avant l'expiration de son mandat, la Sublime-Porte, avant d'aviser, provoquera une nouvelle entente avec les représentants des grandes puissances. »

Il a été entendu également que le pouvoir conféré par la Sublime-Porte à ce fonctionnaire, de nommer sous sa responsabilité les agents administratifs, lui serait conféré une fois pour toutes, au moment où il serait lui-même investi de l'autorité, et non pas à propos de chaque nomination.

Relativement à l'article 10, qui a trait aux procès entre les sujets ou protégés d'une puissance étrangère, d'une part, et les habitants de la Montagne, d'autre part, il a été convenu qu'une commission mixte siégeant à Beyrouth serait chargée de vérifier et de réviser les titres de protection.

Afin de maintenir la sécurité et la liberté de la grande route de Beyrouth à Damas, en tout temps, la Sublime-Porte établira un *blockhaus* sur le point de ladite route qui lui paraîtra le plus convenable.

Le gouverneur du Liban pourra procéder au désarmement de la Montagne lorsqu'il jugera les circonstances et le moment favorables.

Péra, le 9 juin 1861.

Signé : AALI,
H.-L. BULWER,
LAVALETTE,
PROKESCH-OSTEN,
GOLTZ,
LOBANOFF.

ANNEXE N° 2

RÈGLEMENT DU LIBAN

(6 septembre 1864)


ART. 1


Le Liban sera administré par un gouverneur chrétien nommé par la Sublime-Porte et relevant d'elle directement.

Ce fonctionnaire amovible sera investi de toutes les attributions du pouvoir exécutif, veillera au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique dans toute l'étendue de la Montagne, percevra les impôts et nommera sous sa

The 1861 Règlement Organique of Mount Lebanon. Source: Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie Administrative, Statistique, Descriptive et Raisonnée* (Paris: E. Leroux, 1896), pp. 283-289.

APPENDIX E





The 1864 Revision of Règlement Organique of Mount Lebanon. Source: BOA, Y.EE 31/2, 14 Rebiulahir 1281 (16 September 1864).

Arrondissements de Candie, de Réthimo, de Sphakia, et de Lassithe, et aux Sous-Gouverneurs de l'Île de Crète.

Les pertes et les souffrances éprouvées par la Crète et qui ont été la triste conséquence des désordres survenus dans cette île ont rempli notre cœur d'affliction. Désirant avant toute chose remédier à ces maux, régler l'administration ultérieure de l'île, et assurer à tous habitants indistinctement le bien-être et la prospérité, sous tous les rapports, nous avons décidé qu'à partir du 1 Mars de l'année prochaine (1868) et pour la durée de deux années consécutives, il sera fait grâce à tous les habitants de l'île de la dîme de tous les produits soumis à cet impôt ; qu'à l'expiration de ces deux années de complète exemption de la dîme, il sera perçu, à partir du 1 Mars, 1870, également pendant deux ans en lieu et place de la dîme, une moitié de dîme, soit 5 pour cent, dont le produit doit être affecté aux améliorations qui seront indiquées, comme les plus favorables aux intérêts commerciaux et agricoles de l'île, par l'Assemblée Générale qui, élue par toute la population, doit se réunir chaque année au chef-lieu du vilayet.

Payments
in lieu of
military
service.

Tous nos sujets ayant un égal titre à notre sollicitude, nous avons, en outre, décidé que les habitants Chrétiens de Crète seront exemptés de la contribution pour le rachat du service militaire, aussi longtemps que la population Musulmane de l'île sera exempte de ce service ; et qu'il sera donné suite aux vœux exprimés, concernant certains impôts, dans l'adresse présentée par les délégués Musulmans et Chrétiens qui se sont réunis à la Canée, conformément aux dispositions de notre Firman Impérial émané à ce sujet.

Taxes.

Nous avons également décrété les dispositions suivantes formant le Règlement Organique qui se trouve annexé à notre Ordonnance Impériale adressée à notre Grand Vézir, en date du 2 Djémazi-ul-sanié de l'année courante, et qui, revêtu de notre écriture Impériale, a été promulgué dans l'île.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE.

The Vali.

The com-
mander-in-
chief.

1. L'Administration Générale de l'Île de Crète sera confiée à un Vali (Gouverneur-Général) nommé par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et le commandement des forteresses

Impériales, ainsi que des troupes de l'île, à un Commandant-en-chef.

2. Les postes de Vali et de Commandant seront indépendants l'un de l'autre ; il appartiendra, toutefois, à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de réunir, en cas de besoin, les fonctions du Vali à celles du Commandant.

3. Le Vali administre l'île conformément aux lois générales de l'Empire et aux règlements particuliers qui se rapportent à l'île.

Le Vali sera assisté de deux Conseillers nommés par ordonnance Impériale et choisis, l'un parmi les fonctionnaires Musulmans et l'autre parmi les fonctionnaires Chrétiens de l'Empire. The Councillors of the Vali.

4. L'île sera divisée en autant de Sandjaks ou Arrondissements qu'il sera nécessaire. Ces Arrondissements seront administrés par des Mutessarifis (Gouverneurs) choisis parmi les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement Impérial ; les Gouverneurs seront, moitié des Musulmans et moitié des Chrétiens. Les Gouverneurs Musulmans seront assistés par des Mouavins (Adjoints) Chrétiens et les Gouverneurs Chrétiens par des Mouavins Musulmans, nommés les uns et les autres par le Gouvernement Impérial. Sandjaks.

5. Les Sandjaks seront subdivisés en Kazas (Cantons), et Kazas. les Kazas seront gouvernés par des Caïmacams (Sous-Gouverneurs) choisis et nommés par la Sublime Porte et pris selon le besoin parmi les fonctionnaires Musulmans ou Chrétiens du Gouvernement Impérial. Ces Caïmacams seront assistés par des Mouavins suivant les règles posées ci-dessus.

6. L'administration des finances sera confiée, pour le Gouvernement Général, à un Defterdar (Directeur), pour chaque Sandjack à un Mouassébédji (Sous-Directeur), et pour chaque Kaza à un Mal-Mudiri. Ces diverses fonctions seront dévolues suivant les circonstances à des fonctionnaires Musulmans et Chrétiens. Finances.

7. Il y aura un Conseil d'Administration auprès du Gouverneur-Général ainsi que de chacun des Gouverneurs et des Sous-Gouverneurs. Le Conseil d'Administration du Gouvernement Général sera présidé par le Gouverneur-Général, et aura pour membres les deux Conseillers, le Chef de la Magistrature (Mufettichi-Hukkian), le Métropolitain Grec, Administrative Councils.

le Desterdar (Directeur des Finances), les Mektoubdjis (Directeurs des Correspondances), et six autres membres dont trois Musulmans et trois Chrétiens, élus par leurs communautés respectives.

La correspondance officielle dans l'île devant être faite en deux langues, elle sera confiée à deux Mektoubdjis pour le Gouvernement Général, et à deux Bachkiatibs (Directeurs de la Correspondance) pour chaque Sandjack.

8. Le Conseil d'Administration de chaque Sandjack Mixte sera composé, sous la présidence du Gouverneur, du Mouavin, du Juge, de l'Evêque, du Mouassébédji, des Directeurs de la Correspondance, et de six membres, trois Chrétiens et trois Musulmans, élus par la population. Dans les Sandjacks exclusivement Chrétiens, ce Conseil sera composé, toujours sous la présidence du Gouverneur, du Mouavin, de l'Evêque, du Mouassébédji, des Directeurs de la Correspondance, et de six membres Chrétiens élus par la population.

Les règles qui précèdent seront également appliquées aux Conseils d'Administration des Kazas.

The Law
Courts.

9. Il sera institué dans le chef-lieu du Gouvernement Général et dans les Sandjacks et les Kazas, des Tribunaux chargés de connaître des procès civils et militaires.

Les Tribunaux du chef-lieu du Gouvernement Général et dans les Sandjacks et Kazas Mixtes seront composés de membres Musulmans et Chrétiens élus par la population. Dans les Sandjacks ou Kazas exclusivement Chrétiens, ces Tribunaux ne seront composés que de Chrétiens.

10. Il y aura au chef-lieu du Gouvernement Général et dans chaque Sandjack Mixte un Tribunal religieux Musulman qui connaîtra des procès entre Musulmans. Chaque commune aura un Conseil des Anciens, et chaque Sandjack une Démogérontie ou Conseil des Anciens, pour chacune des deux communautés Musulmane et Chrétienne.

Les membres de ces Conseils seront élus par leurs justiciables.

Mixed
Causes

11. Tous les procès civils, criminels et commerciaux entre Chrétiens et Musulmans, et toute autre contestation mixte, seront jugés par les Tribunaux Civils et Commerciaux Mixtes. Des règlements spéciaux détermineront la compétence et les

attributions de ces Tribunaux religieux Musulmans et des Démogéronties. The General Council of the Island,

12. Il sera institué au centre du Gouvernement Général un Conseil Général élu par la population et dans lequel chaque Kaza sera représenté par deux Délégués ; chaque Kaza exclusivement Musulman enverra au Conseil Général des Délégués Musulmans ; il en sera de même des Kazas exclusivement Chrétiens ; enfin chaque Kaza Mixte sera représenté par un Délégué Musulman.

Le mode d'élection de ces Délégués sera fixé par un règlement spécial.

Ce Conseil, qui se réunira une fois par an, aura pour mission d'étudier les questions relatives aux travaux d'utilité publique, telles que le développement des voies de la communication, la formation de caisses de crédit, et tout ce qui peut servir à favoriser l'agriculture, le commerce et l'industrie, enfin aux moyens de répandre l'instruction publique en ce qui est d'une application générale. Le Gouvernement Impérial allouera, sur les revenus de l'île, des fonds qui seront destinés aux améliorations étudiées et proposées par le Conseil Général et approuvées et décrétées par la Sublime Porte. L'emploi de ces fonds sera placé sous le contrôle du Conseil Général. its functions.

13. Les habitants de la Crète ayant été exempts de tout temps de l'impôt direct que toutes les autres Provinces de l'Empire payent à l'Etat, il ne sera perçu dans l'île que la dîme, le droit d'exemption du service militaire, le droit sur les boissons, les droits de douane, et les droits sur le sel et sur le tabac, créés en compensation du dégrèvement des droits de douane, et certains autres droits qui sont payés par les habitants de l'île, comme dans les autres parties de l'Empire, et dont la modification est actuellement à l'étude. Taxation.

Il ne sera imposé dans l'île aucune autre contribution.

14. L'examen des moyens propres à assurer la perception intégrale des revenus de l'Etat et à fournir à la population de l'île des facilités et des avantages dans le payement des dîmes et de l'impôt militaire sera dévolu au Conseil Général. Le Gouvernement Impérial avisera à l'application de ces améliorations suivant les vœux qui seront exprimés à ce sujet par le Conseil Général.

Nous avons enfin revêtu de notre sanction les règlements dont la teneur suit, et qui reposent sur les bases indiquées dans le Règlement Organique ; ils concernent l'organisation judiciaire et administrative et les finances de l'île.

RÈGLEMENT JUDICIAIRE.—ORGANISATION DE LA JUSTICE.

Préambule.

The Mixed Courts. Conformément aux Articles 9, 10, et 11 du Règlement Organique de l'île de Crète sanctionné par Sa Majesté le Sultan, les Tribunaux de la loi Musulmane demeurant exclusivement chargés du jugement de certaines contestations spéciales entre Musulmans, les procès au sujet d'intérêts particuliers commerciaux, la poursuite des délits et des crimes, ainsi que toutes les contestations entre Musulmans et Chrétiens, seront dévolus à la compétence des Tribunaux Mixtes établis hiérarchiquement dans les Districts, les Gouvernements et au siège du Gouvernement Général, ainsi que des Tribunaux de Commerce. En conséquence, le présent Règlement concernant la composition, le mode d'élection, la compétence, le mode d'appel des Tribunaux Mixtes des Districts, des Gouvernements, et du Gouvernement Général, les règles applicables aux Tribunaux de Commerce, aux Conseils des Anciens ou Démogéronties des Villages ou des Gouvernements, a été approuvé par Sa Majesté le Sultan.

[Here follow fourteen Chapters, entitled as follows :—

CH. I. *De la Composition des Tribunaux Mixtes.*

CH. II. *De la Composition des Tribunaux Mixtes de Gouvernements.*

CH. III. *De la Composition du Tribunal Mixte du Gouvernement Général.*

CH. IV. *De la Compétence des Tribunaux Mixtes des divers ordres.*

CH. V. *De la Compétence des Tribunaux Mixtes de Gouvernements.*

CH. VI. *De la Compétence du Tribunal Mixte du Gouvernement Général.*

CH. VII. *De la Compétence Spéciale des Tribunaux Mixtes.*

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