

Two Approaches to Poverty:
A Comparative Study on Amartya Sen's Theory of Capability Deprivation
and the Framework of Social Exclusion

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ABSTRACT

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All through history, different concepts have been employed to explain poverty. In contemporary debates about poverty, social exclusion and capability deprivation are two influential approaches. Both approaches highlight the multi-dimensional character of poverty, in other words they both underline that the deprivations involved in poverty cannot be sufficiently articulated only in economic terms; political and symbolic, cultural deprivations must be addressed as well.

Motivated by Amartya Sen's contention that the social exclusion approach can be accommodated within the capability deprivation approach, the aim of this thesis is to present the different ways in which the two approaches problematize poverty and to reveal the different normative foundations that they implicitly embody. Some of the discrepancies are methodological, which are mainly about the nature and the constitution of the evaluative space in which poverty is assessed. Other discrepancies concern the normative underpinnings of the two theories. An interpretation of the social exclusion approach through T. H Marshall's "citizenship status" reveals that while a rights-based framework is necessarily the ground on which the social exclusion approach rests, this normative dimension is not a necessary component of the capability deprivation approach. This difference, I believe, is significant in establishing poverty as a political issue.

KISA ÖZET

İki Yoksulluk Yaklaşımı:

Amartya Sen'in Yapabilirlik Yoksunluğu Teorisi ve Toplumsal Dışlanma Çerçevesinin Karşılaştırması

Latife Demet Yuncu

Yoksulluğa dair bugünkü tartışmalarda etkili olan iki yaklaşım, toplumsal dışlanma ve Amartya Sen tarafından geliştirilen yapabilirlik yoksunluğu teorisidir. Bu iki yaklaşım, ekonomik terimlerin yoksulluğu anlamak için yetersiz kalacağı görüşünden hareketle, yoksulluğun politik, sosyal, kültürel ve sembolik boyutlarını vurgulamaktadırlar.

Amartya Sen, toplumsal dışlanma yaklaşımının, yapabilirlik yoksunluğu çerçevesi içinde anlaşılabileceğini söylüyor. Buna karşılık bu tez çalışmasının amacı, söz konusu iki yaklaşımda yoksulluğun farklı şekillerde sorunsallaştırıldığına dikkat çekmek ve varsaydıkları farklı normatif zemini ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmada, metodolojik farkların üzerinde durmanın yanı sıra, T. H. Marshall'ın "vatandaşlık statüsü" kavramı aracılığıyla toplumsal dışlanma yaklaşımının normatif boyutlarını yorumlamaya çalıştım. Bu yorum, hak zeminli bir anlayışın toplumsal dışlanma yaklaşımının zorunlu bir ögesi olduğunu ancak bu zeminin yoksunluk yaklaşımının zorunlu bir ögesi olmayabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. İki yaklaşım arasındaki bu fark, yoksulluğun politik ve yapısal bir problem olarak ortaya koyulabilmesi açısından önemlidir.

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Introduction

My main motive in working on poverty is to highlight how a philosophical analysis of different concepts of poverty can shed light upon the social, economic and political nature of societies. In this thesis, I will focus on two influential approaches to poverty, namely capability deprivation and social exclusion. I will make an attempt to reveal that despite their similarities in exposing the multi-dimensional features of poverty, the two approaches provide us with different conceptual tools to understand the nature of poverty on the one hand and the normative underpinnings of social order and participation on the other. To put it differently, I aim to show that the ways poverty is problematized for the two approaches reflect different understandings of social order and normative foundations that they implicitly embody.

Roughly, “capability deprivation is the view of poverty as the lack of the capability to live a minimally decent life”.¹ It shifts the focus from income, utilities or commodities to individual freedoms. More recent notion of poverty as social exclusion has prevailed in the European political debates as well as in social inequality research. It addresses the social, economic, political and the cultural processes that deny membership and participation. Furthermore, social exclusion distinctively problematizes social cohesion and the bonds that keep the society together. In the article titled “Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny”, Amartya Sen asserts the affinity of the social exclusion approach with Adam Smith’s “ability to take part in the life of the community” or “ability to appear in public without shame”.

¹ Sen (2000b), p. 5

He argues that “we can appreciate more fully the contribution made by the new literature on social exclusion by placing it in the broader context of the old idea of poverty as capability deprivation.”² In other words, for Sen, social exclusion approach can be subsumed under the broader framework of capability deprivation. For Sen, it is the nature of the causes that lead to deprivation, which determines whether there is need to invoke the language of exclusion or not. Thus, social exclusion is not a notion of poverty in its own right; in other words, it does not invoke any dimensions which cannot be captured by the capability deprivation approach.

This present study will revolve around and try to answer the following question:

Can we accommodate the social exclusion approach within the capability deprivation framework? To answer this question, I will first present the two approaches. I will clarify two main components of the capability approach; namely functionings and capabilities. My basic effort in this section is to elucidate the role assigned to individual functionings/capabilities and to social properties in the constitution of the evaluative space of well-being. Are they constitutive or instrumental for the formation of the evaluative space? I will briefly point to the significance of these roles with respect to holism and individualism. Then I will set forth the dominant paradigms of social exclusion, namely, solidarity, specialization and monopoly. My aim will be to underline the different theoretical and political engagements each paradigm reflects. In order to compare the two approaches, I will examine the role assigned to the socio-economic structures and the institutional

² Ibid., p. 2

organization of the society as a whole for the explanation and evaluation of social exclusion.

Having focused on this methodological aspect, the second chapter opens with the presentation of Sen's argument that social exclusion can be contained within capability deprivation. I will examine Sen's contention in two axes. First is a comparison of the two approaches with respect to their different understandings of social order. In doing this, I will make use of Sen's references to Adam Smith to show that a concern for individual deprivations does not necessarily entail a concern for the disruption of social bonds. Dealing with Smith's concerns will aim to shed light upon the different normative underpinnings of the two approaches. The second axis is the "process" aspect of social exclusion which is commonly accepted to be the distinguishing feature of the social exclusion approach. This dynamic aspect stresses the structural dynamics of the society which systematically render some people as redundant. In that section, I will investigate whether taking social exclusion as a process might enable raising different questions that might otherwise be neglected.

In the literature, polarization of the societies due to increasing social inequalities is posited as a defining aspect of social exclusion. In the third chapter, I will scrutinize the potential of the two approaches to account for this defining aspect. Answering this question requires clarifying the problems that each approach aims to address. The capability approach is mainly about the problem of poverty in the underdeveloped countries, where most of the population is faced with severe deprivations. On the other hand, the concept of social exclusion emerges in the late 70's in Europe, and in the following years it becomes the paradigm of addressing

the structural processes of exclusion that emerge even in rich countries. This difference, as I will try to show, is reflected in the status assigned to the notion of “inequality” in the two approaches. The problem of social exclusion inherently emphasizes the relative deprivation between the most advantageous group and the least advantageous groups of the society. Thus, it might be seen as asserting that the condition of one is not unrelated to the other. On the other hand, although capabilities give an adequate account of the extent of deprivations, they do not attend to the extent of inequality in the whole society. In the light of this, I will formulate the questions that motivate the two approaches. The capability approach aims to answer the following question: “Do individuals have the capability to achieve basic functionings? What are the social and personal factors that affect the conversion of goods, income and services into basic capabilities?” On the other hand, the social exclusion approach asks: “What are the dynamics which create increasing and permanent social distances that characterize the social order? Does the degree of inequality in the society threaten social cohesion?” Such questions aim to spell out the challenge of the structural inequality for the shared rules, the sense of being a member of the same social setting.

The final chapter aims to reveal the different normative underpinnings of the two approaches. In that chapter, I will offer a normative reading of T. H. Marshall’s account of citizenship status as an interpretation of the normative dimension of the social exclusion approach. Marshall defines citizenship as a “status bestowed on those who are full members of a community”. In this reading, citizenship status provides the common bond, which implies social integration and solidarity. Related with this, I will further claim that citizenship status has a normative role in the sense

that it provides a definite answer to how social policies to fight against poverty ought to be understood. My endeavor is to make apparent that citizenship status precludes seeing policies directed at poverty alleviation as temporary policies, voluntary work or charity. It urges to understand the claims of welfare provision as claims of the equals. Citizenship status, as a political means, necessarily posits the problem of poverty as a political issue. This normative dimension, which is rights-based, informs the social exclusion approach.

Finally, in order to show how these considerations relate to the capability deprivation approach, I will distinguish between the substance of a right and the normative form of a right. While the former is about the content of a right (being healthy, being educated etc), the latter explicates how claims *ought to be* understood. This distinction will allow me to establish that while capabilities might form the substance of rights, they do not inherently imply the normative form that the notion of rights necessarily does. Therefore, I will conclude that this normative dimension - a necessary component of the social exclusion approach - is not the ground on which the capability deprivation approach essentially rests. Going back to the central question of this study, these methodological and substantial points will hopefully allow establishing social exclusion as a free-standing concept of poverty.

This preference to focus on a problem that is usually considered to be “economic” or “social” rather than “philosophical” might lead one to look at this project with hesitation. However, poverty figures today show the extent and the significance of the problem that face the whole world. I believe that social and political philosophy must and does have a word to say about how to understand poverty. Philosophical

treatment of the concepts of poverty and seeing how poverty is problematized in the contemporary debates shed light upon the human condition. It allows grasping, as far as we can, the nature of the social, political and economic dynamics that shape our lives to a significant extent. The current trends in the world aim to render poverty as an apolitical issue. This is why political and social philosophy must clarify the different dimensions provided by different approaches to poverty and raise questions that sharpen our critical attitude towards them. I hope that focusing on this problem will enrich our philosophical discussions concerning the kind of world that we want to live in.

I. Two Approaches to Poverty: Capability Deprivation and Social Exclusion

1.1. Poverty as Capability Deprivation

Capability approach offers a new framework to understand poverty. Commonly, poverty has been assessed within the space of incomes. The commodities a person has or his/her level of income has been the focal variable. Despite the identification of the poor as those “whose income is not adequate to meet the specified minimum needs in conformity with conventional pattern of behavior”³, Sen’s focal point is the “life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be”⁴. He defines poverty “...as the failure of basic capabilities to reach certain minimally acceptable levels.”⁵

Capability approach does not deny the impact of income on the quality of life. Income is accepted to be influential on the kind of life we lead and what we can and cannot do, but it insists that it is not *the only* influence that effects one’s life. Besides acknowledging that income is one influential factor among many others, Sen clarifies that what is significant is to focus on what people can do and can be rather than their level of income or the amount of commodities they have. He states that income is a means for well-being; it is not an end to be pursued for its own sake. This means-end relationship indicates that the capability approach is inspired by Aristotle’s view: “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else”⁶. Thus, the central idea is that wealth is a means, not an end to be pursued- in the space of capabilities.

The power of the capability approach lies in the assertion that income, goods and commodities are not sufficient to evaluate well-being. This is reflected in Sen’s

³ Sen (1982), p. 28

⁴ Ibid., p. 28

⁵ Sen (1992), p. 109

⁶ Cited in Sen (2000a), p. 14

statement that the standard of living lies in the living; not in the possession of commodities and that well-being is not merely a matter of opulence. Thus, the relationship between the resources available and the ability to achieve certain ways of doing and being needs to be identified: "...adequacy of the economic means cannot be judged independently of the actual possibilities of converting incomes and resources into capability and functionings."⁷ There is a variety of different factors involved in the conversion of income into capabilities. "First the relationship between income and capability would be strongly effected by the age of the person, by gender and social roles, by location, by epidemiological atmosphere and by other variations a person cannot or have limited control"⁸. These factors, as well as reducing one's ability to earn income, influence the conversion of income into capabilities. How this conversion is done depends both on the personal roles and characteristics on the one hand and the nature of the social context on the other. The former consists of personal characteristics that influence how and to what extent conversion can be realized. Age, health, intelligence, skill, gender all affect whether/how a person can convert certain commodities into a functioning. For example, for a physically disabled person a car might not be converted into the functioning of being mobile, yet the same commodity enables a physically able person to achieve the same functioning. Social factors include the social norms, legal, economic and political conditions, the geographical location, environmental factors, weather etc. For example, in a region with serious air pollution, one might not achieve the functioning to be healthy even if he/she has access to good nutrition. Furthermore, the same amount of income of an old person and a young person would not convert into the same capability to achieve the same functioning. For Sen, taking into account these factors "entail that real poverty in

⁷ Ibid. p. 110

⁸ Sen (2000a), p. 88

terms of capability deprivation may be more intense than what appears in the income space.”⁹ This is why, as Sen asserts in *Development as Freedom*, that we must look at impoverished lives and not just at depleted wallets to understand poverty. The extent and the nature of the deprivations might be easily undermined if we concentrate only on the size of incomes or the goods, the commodities one has. Sen’s account has allowed a rich, multidimensional understanding of poverty and human life that does not overlook diversities. Thus, the strength of Sen’s approach can be briefly summarized as follows:

- a) Income is not the only cause of capability deprivation but it is one of the causes.
- b) The capability approach shifts attention from instrumentally significant deprivations to deprivations of intrinsic significance. In Sen’s words “it moves us away from the space of commodities, income and utilities on to the space of constitutive elements of living.”¹⁰
- c) The relationship between income/commodity deprivation and capability deprivation is influenced by personal and social factors. In other words, these factors can either be constraints or advantages for the conversion of goods into what one is able to do or be in life.

⁹ Sen (2000a), p. 88

¹⁰ Sen (1992), p. 50

A) Capabilities and Functionings

Poverty is evaluated in the space of capabilities to function. The two major components of the capability approach are *functionings* and *capabilities*. Functionings are different “beings and doings”, whereas a person’s capability is “the various combinations of functionings that a person can achieve. Capability is thus a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another”.¹¹ A person’s functionings and her capability are related but distinct. Sen notes that capabilities are defined derivatively from functionings. “In the space of functionings any point, representing an n-tuple of functionings reflects a combination of the person’s beings and doings, relevant to the exercise. The capability, thus, is a set of functioning n-tuples, representing the various alternative combinations of beings and doings any one (combination) of which the person can choose.”¹²

Sen’s primary concern is the capability to function rather than the achieved functionings. This means that mere achieved functionings are not sufficient to evaluate a person’s well-being. The capability approach sees the capability set as the primary informational base. For Sen, functionings are achievements, whereas capability is the ability to achieve. An example from Sen might help to clarify this point. Think of two people who do not eat enough to enable the functioning of being well-nourished. However, one is a person in Africa, whose nourishment lacks due to famine. The other person is someone who is fasting due to his/her religious beliefs. These two cases can be distinguished by making use of the notion of capabilities. Although both lack the functioning of being well-nourished, the person in Africa lacks the capability to this functioning whereas the fasting person has the capability

¹¹ Ibid., p. 40

¹² Sen and Nussbaum (1993), p. 38

to achieve the alleged functioning. If the distinction between the achieved functionings and the capabilities was not made, then “we might be as worried about the rich person fasting as about the starving poor.”¹³ Thus, “choice” and “opportunity”, having the ability to do/act in another way is central to the capability approach. In this sense, *capability* underlines the significance of acting, living in a specific way not out of necessity but out of choice. If one chooses not to eat or not to be literate when he/she is provided with the opportunity, then it would be possible to conclude that he/she has the capability to the alleged functionings. This coincides with Sen’s claim that choosing in itself matters.

Capabilities are kinds of freedom. They reflect the abilities that one has regarding the life that he/she can lead. On the other hand, functionings represent different aspects of human life like being healthy, being literate, being happy etc. For Sen, functionings are not kinds of freedom. The distinction between functionings and capabilities can be formulated as that of having/doing something and freedom/ability to have/do that thing. “It is being *not* suggested that being well-nourished or in good health is to be seen as a freedom in itself. Capability, as a kind of freedom, refers to the extent to which the person is able to choose particular combinations of functionings - including such things as being well-nourished.”¹⁴ A person’s well-being, namely “the quality of his being” involves an examination of his functionings and capabilities. How are capabilities related to well being? Sen suggests that they are linked in two ways. The first is that the capability to achieve functionings will constitute the person’s freedom to have well-being. This freedom reflecting a person’s opportunities of well-being, Sen asserts, must be valued at least for

¹³ Sen (1992), p. 52

¹⁴ Sen (2004), p.334.

instrumental reasons, i.e. in judging how good a deal a person has in the society.¹⁵ Second and more direct connection is that “choosing may itself be a valuable part of living and a life of genuine choice with serious options may be seen - for that reason - to be richer”¹⁶. In this sense, the functionings directly depend on the capabilities to function. For Sen, not all capabilities can be qualified as the ability to do or be something. He is interested in the expansion of the capabilities that “a person has reason to value”. The informational basis of the capability approach (CA for short) is fixed as the capability set, in other words the set of functionings which are attainable by a person. Applying this to poverty, we can say that the assessment of poverty is done by examining the individual’s capability set. As Sen claims, the capability approach assesses the elements which are constitutive of the wellness of a person’s being from the perspective of her own personal welfare.¹⁷

The relevant information for the evaluative space is defined as capabilities and functionings. As well as examining the information relevant for the capability approach, it might be useful to look at what is considered to be irrelevant for the evaluative space of well-being. Charles Gore draws attention to Sen’s agency aspect of personhood to clarify this point. The two aspects, well-being and agency aspect, refer to different but interrelated aspects of human life. “In one perspective (the agency aspect), the person is seen as a doer and a judge whereas in the other (the well-being aspect) the same person is seen as a beneficiary, whose interests and advantages have to be considered.”¹⁸ This distinction addresses to the limits of the space of well-being, which is constituted by functionings/capabilities. The distinction

¹⁵ Sen and Nussbaum (1993), p.41

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Cited in Gore (1997), pp. 239-240

¹⁸ Sen (1985), p. 206; cited in Gore (1997), p. 240

arises from the fact that a person might have objectives other than his/her own well-being. A person's agency is defined as the realization of goals and values she has reasons to pursue, whether or not they are connected to her own well-being. In other words, what is central for well-being assessment is the person's own advantage. Gore quotes from Sen: "The notion of advantage when seen not just in terms of pursuing one's own well-being but in terms of wider objectives and obligations...would require us to go beyond the assessment of functionings and capability sets."¹⁹ Sen also adds that for the evaluation of agency aspect "the space of functionings may be rather restrictive, since the person's goals may well include other types of objectives, going well beyond the person's own state of being."²⁰

Sen defines functionings as states of existence. They can be physical states, such as being healthy, being well-nourished; they can be mental states such as being happy or they can be activities of a person like "going to school", "using public transportation" etc. Sen's distinction between the well-being and the agency aspect of personhood and his view that functionings are *states* of existence show that functionings are seen as "points" in the evaluation space rather than as "processes". In Charles Gore's words, "they are seen as effects, which are divorced from human intentions and the process of realizing them."²¹ Furthermore, "processes of forming objectives and participating in shaping the conditions for action and making things happen are all divorced from what well being is."²² These processes are seen as a part of the agency aspect rather than well being.

¹⁹ Sen (1985), p.66, footnote 15; cited in Gore (1997), p. 239

²⁰ Sen (1993), p. 37; cited in Gore (1997), p. 239

²¹ Gore (1997), p. 241

²² Ibid.

B) The Instrumental Role of the Social Properties for the Evaluative Space

In the previous section, it has been explained that for the CA, poverty is assessed within the space of well-being, which is constituted by functionings/capabilities. Furthermore, Sen's stress on functionings as "states" allows us to see functionings in a particular light. In other words, functionings are not processes; rather they are outcomes of certain processes.

Moreover, individual choice, choosing the functionings the person has reason to value for his/her own advantage is central for the CA. This, of course, does not preclude the relevance of the social context for the evaluation of well-being. In the CA, the social setting is recognized; individuals are definitely not conceived as atomized individuals. Sen emphasizes that valuable functionings/capabilities have to be related to the social norms or the values of the society as well as highlighting the significance social structures either as constraints or as promoters of individual capabilities. However, one might still ask the role of the social factors, the properties of the society and the social structure as a whole for the evaluative space²³, namely the space of capabilities and functionings: Are they instrumental or do they constitute an autonomous space of evaluation for the explanation of poverty?

A constitutive role means being an intrinsic part of evaluation, not an external factor whose *effect* for the individual is taken into account. The constitutive role postulates that the assessment of well-being, more specifically poverty, requires an autonomous

²³ Evaluative space is the space in which well-being is assessed. For example, in his famous question "equality of what?", Sen asks which information is relevant for equality. Rather than the space of utilities or the primary goods, he takes capabilities as the relevant space to assess equality. Thus, choosing an evaluative space requires including some information as relevant, while excluding some others as irrelevant.

evaluation of the nature of cultural, political, economic structures, processes, properties involved. Ascribing a constitutive role means taking the properties of the society as distinct units of analysis for the evaluation of poverty. In this case, analysis of poverty is provided at the societal level without referring to distinct individuals. For example, collective values and institutions which form the social bonds, distinctive nature of the society which is shaped by post-Fordist mode of production, flexible employment practices, the global financial capital movements, the rise of the service sector and how these reflect the institutional organization of the society as a whole form the starting point of the explanation of poverty. On the other hand, for the instrumental role, these properties have neither a value nor an explanatory role independent of their contribution to the individual.

In order to answer the question that has been raised above, it is crucial to briefly distinguish between ethical and methodological individualism. Ethical individualism is the view that in the evaluation of social states of affairs, what is of interest is the effect of those states on the individuals. It postulates that individuals and only individuals are the units of moral concern. On the other hand, the debate on methodological individualism is somewhat more obscure. It includes ontological, explanatory and semantic individualism. Concerning the question about the role of the social properties for the evaluative space, explanatory individualism seems to be of particular relevance. Recently explanatory individualism has been claimed as the core of methodology.²⁴ The debate concerning explanatory individualism and holism revolve around the following question: Are the explanations provided reducible to the individual level or is there an autonomous space of evaluation for the social

²⁴ See Bhargava (1992) for a detailed discussion.

properties? The individualist provides an account at the individual level while the holist provides an explanation at the societal level without referring to distinct individuals. Now, let's look at how these brief distinctions relate to the capability approach.

For Sen, the ultimate unit of concern is the individual capability. This is explicit in his assertion that freedom of individuals is the basic building blocks for development. The states of affairs are evaluated on the basis of individual capabilities. In this sense, it seems possible to conclude that Sen employs ethical individualism. Of course, the conception of "individual" is significant here. Sen does not endorse atomistic individualism. For him individual agency is central to addressing these deprivations. However, the individual freedom is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are available to us. Concerning the methodological dimension, Sen seems to suggest that the social factors are instrumental for the formation of the evaluative space; namely the space of capabilities. Sen's account does not treat the properties of the society as a whole as an autonomous object of inquiry. Furthermore, social, systemic properties constitute neither an object of value nor an object of inquiry in and of themselves. Different structures of living together, the nature of family and neighborhood relationships, social norms, practices and institutional arrangements are conceived as instrumental to individual well-being. Therefore, society is instrumentally relevant to the evaluative space and well being is ultimately assessed in individual terms. Therefore, concerning the level of explanation that Sen provides, it seems reasonable to say that he employs explanatory individualism.

So far, I have tried to summarize the capability approach. By trying to clarify how the evaluative space of well being is constituted by functionings and capabilities, I

highlighted the status of individual characteristics and the social features in this framework. Let me now turn to the social exclusion approach.

1.2. Social Exclusion

Another attempt to understand poverty is the social exclusion (SE for short) approach. The concept of SE originates in France in the early 70s as a response to the problem of sustaining social integration and solidarity. Initially, the term has been used to describe those who had no access to economic resources like the mentally or physically handicapped people, the aged, the suicidal people, delinquents, drug abusers and so on. These are people who do not fit into the norms of an industrial society and social exclusion then referred to a rather marginal phenomenon, which did not affect the whole society.

However, in the late 70's and 80's, the world witnessed the globalization of capital and new mode of production namely Post-Fordism, which involves a new regime of capital accumulation and new modes of regulation. These changes also reflect the processes of deep restructuring of socio-economic organizations of the industrial societies. In these processes, many institutions peculiar to the Fordist societies were dissolved, and the drastic ideological shift is towards self-regulating free markets, privatization, and reduction of public services. The concept of social exclusion as it prevails in the European debates aims to draw attention to the perceived threat to social cohesion, especially considering the "new social problems" arising from growing, persistent unemployment, ghettoization, delinquency, as well as changes in the family structure. Different writers have used the term "SE" differently. This difference is not only a matter of use but marks different views on how SE is

problematized and the different solutions, motivations that underlie the emergence of the discourse. Hilary Silver offers an account to clarify the conceptual confusions involved in the discussions concerning SE. She presents three dominant paradigms, which reflect different theoretical engagements and political ideologies in SE discussions. They are solidarity, specialization and monopoly paradigms.²⁵

A) Solidarity, specialization and monopoly paradigms

The former paradigm with its emphasis on solidarity is related with the French Republican tradition. Exclusion is primarily defined as the rupture of a social bond – which is cultural and moral – *between the individual and society*. The solidarity paradigm conceives the social order as external, moral and normative rather than grounded in individual, group or class interests. This reflects Rousseau's notion of general will, and highlights the significance of solidarity and fraternity. These goods require explanations at the social level; in other words, they cannot be adequately explained by reference to the advantage each individual gets out of them.

The specialization paradigm reflects the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition. It points to “a social order made up of networks of voluntary exchanges between competing individuals with their own interests and motivations”.²⁶ Voluntary exchange between individuals or different groups following their interests creates interdependence among the individuals. The primary role is attributed to the individuals. In this paradigm, the forms and the causes of SE are related fundamentally to individual choice and initiative. Silver maintains that while SE is basic to the solidarity

²⁵ Silver (1994), cited in Littlewood and Glorieux (1999), p. 4

²⁶ Ibid., p. 5

discourse, for specialization, terms such as underclass and discrimination are also relevant. This means that exclusion as specialization allows seeing exclusion to be the consequence of individual behavior such as individuals not choosing to take advantage of the opportunities they have. This attitude of “blaming the poor” for their condition due to the choices they make tends to go together with what Albert O. Hirschmann calls the “perversity thesis” against public assistance. The perversity thesis argues that contrary to what it aims at, public assistance creates new obstacles, which prevent social inclusion.

By contrast, for the monopoly paradigm “social order is essentially coercive and imposed downwards through a set of hierarchical power relations.”²⁷ It is rooted in the “Weberian view of society as neither a constellation of individuals entering into voluntary contracts, nor a totality unified from the start”²⁸, where social groups interact according to their specific interests, trying to turn power and the monopolization of resources into their advantage. Thus, this paradigm emphasizes that exclusion is something that is *done* to some people by others. Exclusion is a process of forming groups, orders and statuses, “the aim of which is always to close off strangers, with varying degrees of completeness, access to the social and economic opportunities that exist in a given field.”²⁹ These processes perpetuate inequalities and facilitate the maintenance of privileges. Monopoly groups restrict the access of outsiders through processes of social closure, and the excluded seek to gain access through claims of citizenship and equal rights.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 6

²⁸ Ibid. p. 6

²⁹ Ibid. p. 6

Silver claims that the conception, which prevails in European discussions, is reflected most adequately in the Thematic Priorities, the document of the Economic and Social Research Council “... *the major societal processes whereby individuals are integrated into or excluded from full participation in the society.*”³⁰ It is further suggested that the motivation of the SE approach is the need to identify the factors, which *underpin stable societies*. This spells out that SE approach originates from the significance of living in a society that does not exclude and whose structure and institutional order allows social integration. What it is to belong to a society, different processes of being a member of a society, the concern about the institutional organization of the society are fundamental motivation that inform the SE framework. This perspective indicates a shift from seeing poverty as an economic category towards understanding the political, economic, social dynamics of exclusion, which are *inherent systemic qualities*.

Silver addresses major common themes in the exclusion discourse. It is commonly agreed that social exclusion is global in its causes and local in its impact. SE is a part of “economic changes, at the international, national and regional level, the concomitant intensification of competitive conditions and restructuring of social and political institutions.”³¹ This is explicit in David Byrne’s identification of SE. “The kinds of changes which are summarily described in this book as constituting the phase shift from industrial to post-industrial capitalism mean that the sorts of lives available to be led have change”³². Silver stresses that besides being a part of massive economic changes, SE is quintessentially treated as a process. The dynamic nature reveals that exclusion surpasses the description of a state; i.e. what people have or do

³⁰ Ibid. p. 7

³¹ Ibid. p. 13

³² Byrne (1999), p. 76

not have, can or cannot do but highlights *the ways through which people become detached from the society*. Thus, an analysis of social exclusion is comprised of an analysis of the processes inherent in post-capitalism.

The third aspect is multi-dimensionality of exclusion. Although people may be excluded, e.g., from livelihoods, employment, earnings, property; housing, minimum consumption, education, personal contacts or respect, etc., multi-dimensional characteristic of SE approach is that people are deprived of *different things at the same time*. Thus, SE is exclusion from political, economic and social spheres at the same time. Another significant aspect of SE is the spatial dimension. In the 18th century, Adam Smith claimed that poverty makes people invisible. Spatial dimension of exclusion can be seen as a solidification of Smith's concern; in the contemporary manifestations of poverty, the poor commonly live behind the walls of the modern ghettos. The spatial dimension of exclusion is not only revealed at the national level but also at the level of global poverty. The geographical exclusion of severely poor regions of the world figure widely.

It seems possible to conclude that the SE analysis is a macro-level analysis, which essentially focuses on the socio-economic structures and institutional organization of the society as a whole. As the European Commission's Fourth Framework Program stresses, SE is marked by a disintegration and a fragmentation of social relations and hence a loss of social cohesion. The influence of political and economic structures on the kind of lives available, the features of societies due to changing modes of production, labor and capital relations, new regimes of accumulation and modes of

regulation are intrinsic parts of the SE evaluation. The changes in the social order as a whole are conceived as independent units of analysis to assess social affairs.

It is significant to make a remark about the paradigms of SE. The specialization paradigm and the solidarity paradigm appear to exemplify almost two opposite analyses. The former does not stress the dynamics, which permit deprivations to arise and to persist. In that sense, it gets closer to the underclass debate as it has emerged in the US. On the other hand, the solidarity paradigm lends itself to the structural analysis of society and a study of different processes which generate inequalities. The monopoly paradigm also leads to a structural analysis. However, it focuses on the material, social, cultural and symbolic privileges of some as the cause of the exclusion of the others who are excluded. It can lend itself to an analysis of how the extent and the scope of some rights entail the exclusion of some people. (i.e the social rights being provided only to the employed) In this perspective, social inclusion implies not only extending access to social security but also transforming the social security and protection system to render it more inclusive and more attuned to the social and individual risks emerging over the life course as well as varieties of life circumstances.³³

In the following sections, we will see Sen's argument that the SE approach can be seen as a part of CA.³⁴ However Sen does not specify which paradigm, which sense of "social exclusion" he takes into account. Since social exclusion has emerged in the

³³ Leisering and Leibfried (1999), *Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States*, cited in <http://64.233.183.104/>

³⁴ Sen (2000b).

European debates to enrich the understanding of poverty, I will mainly focus on the solidarity and monopoly paradigms.

II) Can we accommodate the social exclusion approach within the capability deprivation framework?

So far, I have tried to present two major approaches that dominate the poverty discussions. For the CA, poverty is assessed within the space of individual freedoms. The social factors are taken as instrumental. On the other hand, for the SE approach society as a whole is a distinct unit of analysis for the evaluation of poverty. In this section, I will first refer to the similarities between CA and SE approach. It has recently been suggested by Sen that the SE approach can be accommodated within a broader framework of capability deprivation if the causal processes that lead to the deprivation are qualified as being relational³⁵. My next step will be to evaluate Sen's view that SE approach can be accommodated within the capability framework. In order to do this, I will first highlight what I take to be the distinguishing features of the SE approach. Then, I will try to show that these methodological and substantial features of the SE approach enable us to raise questions concerning the nature of poverty that the CA might overlook.

The most distinguishing similarity between Sen's account and the SE approach is their stress on the multi-dimensional character of deprivations. Sen defines poverty as deprivation of basic individual capabilities. In doing this, he underlines the danger in seeing poverty as income deprivation. "...danger in seeing poverty in narrow terms of income deprivation, and then justifying investment in education, health care and so

³⁵ Ibid., p. 12

forth on the ground that they are good means to the end of reducing income poverty. This would be a confounding of ends and means”.³⁶ The traditional approach is far from capturing poverty as *poor living*, which is central for the approaches of SE and capability deprivation. The term “poor living” highlights the richness of life proper for human beings, different activities people undertake and their different social relations. Sen points out that the capability deprivation is inescapably multidimensional since there are distinct capabilities and functionings that we have reason to value. Likewise multi-dimensional characteristic of SE means that people are deprived of different things at the same time. The SE approach focuses on the political, economic and cultural dimensions of deprivations.

Sen welcomes the SE framework because of its focus on “relational features in the deprivation of capability and thus in the experience of poverty ...”³⁷ He argues that a SE framework can be adequately accommodated in the CA without losing anything valuable. Thus, for Sen, the value of exclusion lies in its reinforcement of the capability deprivation, and its contribution can be revealed within the broader framework of capability. He states that the Aristotelian understanding of human being as a social being forms the link between SE and capability deprivation approaches. For Sen, the deprivation involved in not “being able to appear in public without shame” expressed by Adam Smith is a good example of a capability deprivation which takes the form of SE. Sen links this with “functionings that we have reason to value”. As social beings, he asserts, “first, we have good reason to

³⁶ Sen (2000a), p. 92

³⁷ Sen (2000b), p. 4

value not being excluded from social relations and in this sense, SE may be directly a part of capability deprivation”.³⁸

In order to clarify the concept of SE, he makes two distinctions. He distinguishes the constitutive role of exclusion from its instrumental role with respect to poverty. The prior means that exclusion or deprivation is of intrinsic importance in its own and the latter means that exclusion itself is not impoverishing – like exclusion from credit – but it can lead to impoverishment of human life. The two can overlap, in cases where landlessness has value in itself – i.e “being without land is like being without a limb of one’s own”.³⁹ Second, he differentiates between active and passive exclusion: active exclusion occurs for example when some people are intentionally denied some of their rights or citizenship; while passive exclusion occurs when deprivation is caused without deliberate attempt, for example because of a sluggish economy. Sen rightly warns against using SE too indiscriminately. In order to go beyond a linguistic similarity, he insists that what the concept of SE adds to the idea of deprivation must be clearly spelled out. And for Sen, typology of the causes that lead to deprivation determines whether there is need to invoke the language of exclusion or not. Consider the deprivation involved in starvation or being hungry. One can always say that “starvation is being deprived from access to food” or invoke that “starvation is being excluded from access to food”. In this case, deprivation and exclusion are terms used interchangeably. However there is no added value to use one term rather than the other. Sen clarifies that “since the real merit of using the language of exclusion is to draw attention to the relational features in a deprivation, it is crucial to ask whether a

³⁸ Ibid. p. 10

³⁹ Ibid., p. 20

relational deprivation has been responsible for a particular case of starvation.”⁴⁰ Consider Sen’s example, hunger caused by a crop failure and hunger induced by a fall in the real wages as a result of relative price changes resulting from asymmetric increase in the economic power and increased food demand. According to Sen, since exclusion discourse involves relational causes that lead to deprivation, the latter case is more fruitfully analyzed by the exclusion approach. By contrast, for Sen, hunger caused by crop failure, is not required to be expressed in terms of exclusion since crop failure does not involve a causal link with relational aspects. A different example is hunger caused by the removal of food subsidies. In this case, the process that leads to deprivation involves an active form of exclusion. Sen concludes that the real relevance of an exclusionary process is conditional on the nature of the process that leads to deprivation.⁴¹ This means that, for Sen, not all deprivations can be fruitfully expressed in terms of exclusion but the concept of SE can be fully explained in terms of capability deprivation without a remainder. Therefore, the SE framework can be subsumed under the broader framework of capability deprivation.

This allows Sen to establish that the importance of SE is not in its uniqueness as a free standing concept of poverty but as its being a complementary part of the CA. In order to evaluate Sen’s contention about the accommodation of the social exclusion within the capability framework, I will start by formulating Sen’s presentation of the capability deprivation, which takes the form of social exclusion for Sen.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.10

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 16-19

2.1. The Grammar of Capability Deprivation and Social Exclusion

In the Cambridge Dictionary, “deprivation” is defined as “when you do not have things or conditions that are usually considered necessary for a pleasant life.” “Deprivation” gives a report about a state of affairs without necessarily acknowledging that it is done to someone by some others. The term “exclusion” is defined by the dictionary as “to keep out or omit something or someone” and as “when someone or something is not allowed to take part in an activity or to enter a place.” Although this is rather a loose linguistic point, it seems that the term “exclusion” gets closer to implying an act of rejecting someone from a group, an institution, a space or preventing his/her access to it.

One can formulate Sen’s presentation of the capability deprivation, which takes the form of social exclusion, as:

A is deprived of X because of Y

What is the nature of A, X and Y? For Sen, A is an individual; X is the capabilities/functionings that A has reason to value. People might be deprived of a variety of functionings that they have reason to value; i.e. being educated, having adequate standards of living, political participation, etc. and Y is a cause with relational aspects.

According to Sen, if A, X and Y are qualified as such, then there is nothing left out by the idea of SE, when expressed in the framework of capability deprivation. In the following section, I will try to present the different perspectives each approach

presents in the light of this. The first feature I will inquire into is the relationship between A and X in the capability and SE frameworks. The second feature is the process aspect of the SE approach, which is taken to be a distinguishing feature of social exclusion in the literature.

A) Qualification of relationship between A and X

In the capability framework, the relationship is between the individual (A) and the functionings that he has reason to value (X). In the first section, the instrumental role of the society has been explained. Given the instrumental role of the social structures, they are incorporated as conversion factors between A and the functionings A values. For example, the close family and neighborhood ties are instrumental for the expansion of individual capability, the conflicts of minority groups are instrumental in determining the individual's capability to live in a secure environment. Thus, the deprivations mark a characteristic of the individual.

On the other hand, in the European debates, the SE approach emphasizes the bonds that tie the individual or the group to the society. Unlike the capability approach, the relationship between A and X is not formulated as between the individual A and the kind of life that A values. Rather, its formulation emphasizes the relationship of a group or an individual with the mainstream social networks, values, and identifications through which one is a member. It emphasizes a more stringent relationship between the individual and the society. Being "socially excluded" does not only give a report about the individuals' deprivations but it indispensably addresses to their positions with respect to different groups, classes in the society. In

the SE literature, it is frequently stressed that SE is a systemic term. SE as a systemic term seems to be ignored by Sen who writes: "... the individual is seen as the person to whom the relational deprivation occurs as it is in the literature of SE."⁴² Once seen as a systemic term, the SE approach goes beyond talking about discrete individuals or groups. It goes beyond the individuals or the groups that the term ostensibly refers to. It quintessentially subsumes the whole system. In other words, what is problematized is the socio-economic system that essentially and systematically creates deprivations and inequalities. This is also underlined by Byrne: "Although the term is systemic, that is to say it is about the character of the social system and about the dynamic development of social structures, it has implications for agency."⁴³ Another significant aspect of this characterization is expressed as "being about the character of the whole society, the debate on social exclusion puts the society as a whole the fundamental question of the social bond and the means that society has of holding together and ensuring solidarity among its members, so it becomes an eminently political debate or at least one requiring political settlement."⁴⁴ Pierre Strobel's remarks are important to shed light upon the different senses of the concept of exclusion.

Sen frequently draws attention to Adam Smith. "Smith placed the ideas of inclusion and exclusion at the center of his poverty analysis when he defined the nature of the necessities for leading a decent life."⁴⁵ He recognizes Smith's stress on the inability to appear in public without shame as the pioneering exposition of social exclusion, and this forms a crucial part of Sen's argument. In order to further address the methodological differences between the CA and the SE approach as it emerges in

⁴² Ibid. p.8

⁴³ Byrne (1999), p. 78

⁴⁴ Strobel (1996), p.186

⁴⁵ Sen (2000b), p. 7

the solidarity and monopoly paradigms, let's look at Sen's references to Smith. Smith defines the necessities "not only as commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without....Custom has rendered leather shoes necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them."⁴⁶ Similar to the CA, the focus is not on the commodities but rather on the individual freedoms generated by the commodities, like the ability to participate in the social life. Although the amount or the quality of the commodity might change from one context to another, exclusion/inclusion is analyzed within the space of individual freedoms.

"The commodity requirements of established patterns of behavior may vary between communities, depending on conventions and customs. For example, being relatively poor in a rich community can prevent a person from achieving some elementary functionings such as taking part in the life of the community, even though her income in absolute terms may be much higher than the level of income at which members of poorer countries can function with great ease and success. For example to be able to appear in public without shame may require higher standards of clothing and other visible consumption in a richer society than in a poorer society."⁴⁷

Thus, as Sen claims, Smith investigates the characteristics of social exclusion within a broader concept of deprivation in the form of inability to do things that one has

⁴⁶ Sen (2000a), p.73

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 71.

reason to want to do.⁴⁸ As far as Sen's references to Smith are concerned, it seems possible to say that the focus of a Smithian analysis is on the relational aspects of individual deprivations, which are expressed in terms of individual freedoms. On the other hand, the perspective that the SE approach provides is inherently about the disruption of social bonds and implicit in this perspective is a core of shared values and institutions around which the social order is constructed. While Smith focuses on the social aspects of individual deprivations, the SE approach underlines the breakdown of social fabric and the loss of collective values. This shift of focus, from the individual deprivations to the bonds that hold the society together, is also revealed by looking at the understandings of social order of the two approaches. Smith's understanding of social order is explicit in the third chapter of *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which is about the admiration of the riches and how this individual disposition shapes the social order. "This disposition to admire and almost worship the rich and the powerful and to despise or at least to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and order of the society, is at the same time the great and the most universal cause of the corruption of moral sentiments."⁴⁹(My emphasis) This view of social order is fundamentally different from that of social order that underlies the SE approach as it emerges in the European debates. As I shall present in detail in the following chapters, the social order implicit in the SE approach is constructed around "citizenship status".⁵⁰ It is not a ranked society. On the contrary, equal status is the common ground and the social bond that informs institutional organization of the social order. On the other hand, for Smith, social order is marked by fragmentation. "Men in the inferior and middling stations of life,

⁴⁸ Sen (2000b), p. 7

⁴⁹ Smith (2000), p. 127

⁵⁰ The notion of "citizenship status" is presented by T.H Marshall.

besides, can never be great enough to be above the law, which must generally overawe them into some sort of respect for, at least, the more important rules of justice. The success of such people, too, almost always depend upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbors and equals; and without a tolerable regular conduct, these can very seldom be obtained.”⁵¹ (My emphasis) Seeing the different understandings of social order, it seems possible to claim that Sen’s presentation of Adam Smith’s “inability to take part in the life of the community” as the pioneering exposition of social exclusion is challengeable. Smith’s concerns might form a starting point to take into account the social aspects of material deprivations and deprivation of individual freedoms, but they fall short of encompassing the concern for the society as expressed in the SE approach. These considerations also disclose that while Smith’s understanding of social order might be compatible with the CA, it cannot be accommodated in the SE approach as reflected in the solidarity paradigm. This means that the CA and the SE attend to different relationships between the individual and the society and this can imply different normative references of social integration.

Arguably, the major motivation of SE approach is solidarity. Another question arises at this point. Can we adequately give an account of solidarity by merely referring to the capabilities, which are individual characteristics or by assigning an instrumental role to social properties? Jeremy Waldron claims that solidarity is a communal good and thus can only be characterized at the social level. In other words, solidarity cannot be given an account of by referring only to individual features. If we accept that solidarity is a property of the society as suggested by Waldron, then it seems

⁵¹ Smith (2000), p. 128

reasonable to argue that the capability approach cannot sufficiently capture the motivation of the SE approach. In the first section, I had concluded that the role of the society for the space of well-being is instrumental. Capabilities are primarily individual properties in the sense that they belong to the individual. Now, in the light of these let's look at the example that Waldron gives to illuminate what he means by communal good. Jeremy Waldron gives the example of conviviality at a party – the good atmosphere, high spirits and lively conversation among the guests. “However intangible it may seem, this is a good that almost every host strives to realize; his choice of guests and choice of wine are often directed precisely to this end. If he succeeds, a considerable benefit will accrue to all concerned. But it is a benefit that they will have enjoyed together, not merely in the sense that to be enjoyed by one guest it cannot be practically denied to the others but in the sense that its enjoyment is primarily a property of the group rather than each of the individual guests considered by himself.”⁵² Conviviality or good atmosphere is a communal good experienced as such by people only to the extent that they are participant members of a group to which the benefit of the good accrues at a collective level. “...what I identify with others is not someone else's private enjoyment, but an enjoyment of theirs in turn is constituted partly by a similar reference to the pleasures (similarly constituted) of me and others....., it looks beyond its embodiment in me to its embodiment in others.”⁵³ (My emphasis) What each individual gets out of it makes essential reference to what everyone enjoys as a whole. Waldron claims that fraternity, solidarity, Rousseau's general will and Marx's species-being are all examples, where something is valuable for human society without its value being adequately characterizable in terms of its worth to any or to all of the individual members considered one by one. Therefore

⁵² Waldron (1993), p. 355

⁵³ Ibid., p. 357

one can say that the significance of solidarity can neither be captured by the individual capabilities nor by assigning an instrumental role to the social factors. “If fraternity is thought to be important, it is not because what each individual gets out of it rather what each individual gets out of it will make essential reference to what all comrades together enjoy.”⁵⁴ If we accept that solidarity is a property of the society, then its analysis requires an autonomous evaluative space for the features at the social level which the capability approach does not provide. By contrast, it might be said that SE approach accepts the “society as a whole” as a distinct unit of analysis, which cannot be reduced to individual characteristics. This allows giving an account of solidarity, which makes ineliminable reference to what kind of a society that one lives in. This perspective is reflected in the motivation of the SE approach; namely, to underpin stable societies. Think of a society which has internalized and adapted to severe inequalities. People are not ashamed to appear in public. An analysis of this society would require invoking the SE approach. However, the CA does not seem to incorporate a conceptual tool at this level of analysis. Byrne’s words reflect the same idea: “the real issue is to how to get rid of the domain, how to create a social order which excludes exclusion”.⁵⁵

In this section, I tried to show how the two formulations, namely “the relationship between the individual/groups and the society” and “the relationship between the individual and the functionings that he has reason to value” inform the two frameworks. In order to grasp the difference between these formulations, I tried to highlight that the SE is a systemic term; it characterizes the structural changes of the whole society. It emphasizes that the societies have become more fragile and it

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 357

⁵⁵ Byrne (1999), p. 126

provides a characterization at the structural level rather than focusing on individual characteristics. By contrast, the CA provides an analysis at the individual level and assigns an instrumental role to the social factors to evaluate deprivations. Given this, I tried to show the impossibility of expressing solidarity, which is a characteristic at the social level, in terms of individual advantages.

Sen's references to Smith form a crucial part of his argument. Following his references to Smith, I tried to show how they might illuminate the underlying understandings of social order and their different normative underpinnings. I tried to show that Smith's considerations are good examples to show that a concern for individual deprivations does not necessarily entail a concern for the disruption of social bonds.

B) The significance of SE as a process

Silver reminds us that the concept of social exclusion is not only a result or a consequence of a certain process but it addresses "the making of superfluosity".⁵⁶ The dynamic connotation highlights the processes by which individuals and groups are detached from social networks and from a share in the values and identifications in the society. The stress is on the structural dynamics of the society which systematically render some people as redundant. In this section, I will investigate whether taking SE as a process might enable raising different questions than those of the CA.

⁵⁶ Strobel (1996), p.170

Sen's presentation of social exclusion has been formulated as "A is deprived of X because of Y". This formulation involves two different senses of exclusion. The first is the state of being excluded (which he uses interchangeably with "deprived") and the latter is the process of exclusion (which corresponds to the causes). The process of SE produces a state of exclusion, which can be described as a combination of some relevant deprivations. For Sen, the relationship between A and X seems to attend to a state of being deprived. Sen uses the term more like a consequence of a certain process. However, SE as a process goes beyond focusing on the description of the situation of the group or the individual. This difference between "exclusion as a process" and "exclusion as an outcome" is not only a change in use but might reflect different attitudes towards poverty. "Initially referring to the action of rejecting someone from a group, an institution or a social space (or preventing his access to it), it now refers to the result of this process, the situation of those who are excluded, without indicating from what, or by what or whom they are excluded.....Talking about exclusion (in this way) then is an old rhetorical device for coming to terms with this situation"⁵⁷ Many of those who prefer to use the language of SE place the dynamic nature at the center of their analysis and appear to believe that this is the major step forward which the notion of exclusion provides.⁵⁸

The emergence and the reproduction of exclusionary dynamics in everyday interactions are at stake for the SE approach. What is the significance of emphasizing the dynamic "act of rejecting"? It points to the malfunctioning of some institutions that should enhance social integration. Thus, this dynamic aspect inherently involves

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.174

⁵⁸ G.J.Room in his article named "Social Exclusion, Solidarity and the Challenge of Globalization" argues for the significance of understanding of social exclusion as a dynamic process. He says "it is not enough to count the numbers and describe the characteristics of those who are disadvantaged; it is also necessary to identify the factors that can trigger entry or exit from this situation and to understand how the duration of disadvantage shapes how it is experienced and what are its consequences. As Walker maintains there is growing evidence that the events which trigger poverty are widespread but that poverty is a comparatively rare outcome."

the responsible agents for the protection of individuals/groups against risks and shifts the focus from individuals to institutions.

What perspective would the process aspect shed light on the nature of the deprivations? To the extent that exclusion is a multi-dimensional process, the deprivation in Sen's crop failure example might be seen as part of a process of weakening social ties. Then, this might even allow explaining the deprivation involved in Sen's crop failure example. Sen holds that hunger caused by crop failure does not involve a relational aspect. He does not specify what he means by a "relational aspect" but it seems that he means a cause which does not emerge from interactions of different social factors. He, then, must be interpreting crop failure as the decline in food availability. Can the decline in the food availability by itself be the mere cause of hunger? Analyzing this case within the framework of SE, one is urged to focus on the different processes that characterize a society. One might then discover that "crop failure" alone is not sufficient to illuminate this deprivation, even if there is a decline in food availability.⁵⁹ The degree of harm caused by sudden changes in the weather or natural disasters differs from one context to another. Preventative measures that could have been implemented, the processes which lead to the unstable, vulnerable conditions of the family, the nature of institutions such as

⁵⁹ In *Poverty and Famine*, Sen introduces the concept of entitlement. He uses the concept of entitlement to highlight that availability of food in the market does not entitle a person to consume it. In other words, "being enough food to eat" and "not having enough food to eat" are distinct. Sen defines entitlements as "the set of alternative bundles of commodities over which a person can establish such command will be referred to as this person's entitlements". What a person can consume directly depends on the extent of the entitlement set. "To illustrate, a peasant who grows his own food is entitled to what he has grown, adjusted for any obligations he may have (e.g. to money-lenders). He can sell, if he wants, a part of the product for cash to buy other goods and services, and all the alternative commodity bundles he can acquire through these means lie within the entitlement set. Similarly, a wage laborer's entitlement is given by what he can buy with his wages, if he does in fact manage to find employment." For Sen, entitlements involve ownership rights. Although he acknowledges that property rights if not supplemented by social rights operate in such a way that leaves no chance of survival for potential famine victims, his analysis of cases of hunger mainly focuses on property rights. Furthermore, entitlements are not only rights but they include social relations that take the broader form of accepted social legitimacy. For example, the oldest male having the biggest portion of food in the household due to traditions can be a form of entitlement. An entitlement analysis provides Sen the conceptual tool to raise similar questions that I have raised in the crop failure example and Sen does deal with parallel questions in *Poverty and Famine*. However, he does not invoke an entitlement analysis in the referred article. Despite the emphasis on entitlements in his analysis of famines, Sen does not give a central place to the concept of entitlements in his later writings. On the contrary, he explicitly asserts that he favors the language of capability. The change of focus concerning the entitlements in the analysis of poverty and what this implies for Sen's views can be a subject of further study.

family, neighborhood relationships, the social safety nets provided by the government and the access of the family to these provisions would then be involved in the analysis. In this case, one might legitimately ask further questions such as: why are the peasants in such a vulnerable condition and why are they the ones who are prone to suffer from unpredictable sudden changes? Furthermore, the institutional organization of the state, the forms of welfare provisions, their effectiveness and the conditions that affect their effectiveness might be a subject of further inquiry.

In the two previous sections, I tried to examine whether/how the SE approach might provide some perspectives, which are different from those provided by the CA concerning the emerging social problems. It seems crucial to take into account that the SE approach is not a “relabelling” for an old problem but it rather emphasizes the socio economic structural changes. It underlines the structural changes of post-Fordist societies and the emerging global economy, which is strongly characterized by the strong tendency towards the rupture of the social fabric. Furthermore, the SE approach necessarily forces to redefine the role of the state in this socio-economic climate, where markets and private sector are to a significant extent replacing the functions of the governmental sector. In the SE debates, one defining aspect of the post-Fordist and post-industrial societies is the polarization of societies due to increasing inequalities. The rising income gaps between the top and the bottom segments of the society and mass vulnerability due to different modes of accumulation and the flexible employment practices are strongly associated in the explanation of problems of contemporary societies. The next part of the thesis will be devoted to scrutinize and compare the potential of both approaches to account for this

defining aspect. I will examine the role assigned to the inequalities in each approach and the extent to which inequalities play a role for the explanation of poverty.

III) The status of inequality

What is the status of the notion of inequality for the CA and the SE approach? The concept of inequality can be captured in relative terms. In this sense, inequality reflects relative deprivation. Peter Townsend takes up the import of relative deprivation. "People are relatively deprived if they cannot obtain, at all or sufficiently, the conditions of life....which allow them to play the roles, participate in the relations and follow the customary behavior which is expected of them by virtue of their membership in the society. If they lack or are denied resources to obtain these conditions of life and so fall out of membership, they may be said to be in poverty."⁶⁰ Therefore, relative deprivation necessarily involves a comparison between some people's conditions with the conditions of others in the society.

As opposed to relative deprivation, poverty can be conceptualized in absolute terms. The "absoluteness" refers to the specified minimum absolute levels, rather than the relative terms vis-à-vis the levels enjoyed by other people in the society. The identification of the poor through the level of income is an absolute conceptualization of poverty. However, the level of income is not necessarily the only absolute standard for the identification of poverty, nor does absoluteness imply that the alleged level is the same everywhere. The "absoluteness" entails that deprivations are not evaluated in comparison with deprivations of the others. For example, the 2\$ per day purchasing power parity is an example of an absolute deprivation indicator. As Sen

⁶⁰ Cited in <http://www.scvo.org.uk/equalities>

aptly puts it, “if a person is seen as poor because he is unable to satisfy his hunger, then that diagnosis of poverty cannot be altered merely by the fact that others too may also be hungry.”⁶¹ Capabilities represent the ability to do or to be and for Sen, poverty is assessed within the space of absolute capabilities. Sen claims that relative deprivations in the space of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in the space of capabilities. This shows that even if there is relativity in the space of commodities, poverty is absolute in the space of capabilities. This is because the same level of absolute capabilities might require different commodities or incomes between different societies or within the same society because of different personal or social factors. This is reflected in Sen’s emphasis on the idea of *adequacy* of resources to reach certain capabilities rather than their *sufficiency*.

On the other hand, SE is quintessentially about belonging and about some fragments of the society that cannot keep up with others. Thus, it seems possible to conclude that SE framework is intimately related with relative deprivation as described by Townsend. “Relative deprivation in an objective sense describes situations where people possess less of some desired attribute, be it income, favorable employment conditions or power than do others.”⁶² It is interested in how different people relate themselves to the others in the society. In the light of these, one might still ask whether there is a theoretical difference between the two approaches or since it is allowed that relative deprivations can yield to absolute deprivations in the space of capabilities, would this be sufficient to conclude that the SE, as a framework of thought, can be captured within the capability framework without a remainder?

⁶¹ Sen (1982), p.16

⁶² Cited in <http://www.scvo.org.uk/equalities>

I think in order to answer this question it is crucial to keep in mind the problems that the CA and the SE approach aim to address. The former provides a lens to understand poverty especially in the underdeveloped countries, where most of the population faces significant deprivations. On the other hand, the concept of SE emerges in industrialized countries, especially Europe, in the late 1970's, to address the processes of exclusion that can emerge even in rich countries. It seems that crisis of solidarity coincides with the crisis of the welfare state in Europe.

This difference is also reflected in the role the different approaches ascribe to inequality. Although in "Inequality Reexamined" Sen's topic is inequality, he is mainly motivated by the deprivations of the most disadvantaged in the society rather than the inequality within the whole society. In the relevant chapter, Amartya Sen's concern is with the distribution among the poor. Referring to the head-count ratio (H) and the income gap (I) for the identification of poverty, he recognizes that the weakness of these approaches is that they pay no attention to the distribution of income among the poor. "For example a transfer of income, from a poor person to one less poor but also below the poverty line (before and after the transfer) would leave both the values of H and I unchanged. But it can certainly be argued that this transfer increases aggregate poverty, since the poorer person is even poorer now and this intensification of the more acute deprivation cannot be outweighed by the increase in the income of the person who was less poor even to start with. Hence we need some other statistic, presumably some measure of inequality in the distribution of income among the poor."⁶³ In the same chapter, Sen refers also to poverty in rich countries. However, he does not bring up the issue of inequality between the most

⁶³ Sen (1992), p.103

advantageous and the least advantageous groups of the society. He focuses on the conversion of income into capability and his main concern is with different levels of income needed to achieve the same functioning in a poor and a relatively rich country. "In a country that is generally rich more income may be needed to buy the same commodities to achieve the same social functioning, such as "appearing in public without shame". He adds that "the apparent paradox of hunger in the rich countries is not hard to explain once our attention is shifted from exclusive concentration on the space of incomes so that we can take note of the conversion of income and other resources into capabilities of various types."⁶⁴ Then, it is clear that his concern is mainly with poverty rather than inequality within the whole society. The space of capabilities serves the purpose of illuminating the extent of deprivations perfectly. Furthermore, capabilities draw attention to the idea of freedom that has been ignored in the literature. However, capabilities might not be as illuminating as it is initially thought to spot the degree and extent of inequality within the society. There is no limit to the riches that one can get; however there is a limit to a basic capability like being well nourished or having access to healthy water. This point is recognized by G. A. Cohen: "You can get richer and richer, but you cannot keep on rising in the dimensions of nourishment and health...you cannot keep on adding to your stock of self-respect and there is necessarily a limit to how much you can or can want to take part in the life of the community."⁶⁵ Therefore, attainment of capabilities does not as effectively attend to the extent of inequality in the whole society. By contrast, the concept of SE, which has emerged in industrialized European countries, is essentially motivated by the degree of inequalities. The growing income gap between different social classes is presented as a threat to the sense of being a

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.116

⁶⁵ Cohen (1993), p.118

member of the same social setting. In Europe, 60% of median income threshold, a relative deprivation threshold, is being used as one of the exclusion indicators. Thus, the stress is mainly on income inequalities. Once it is clarified that social exclusion derives from polarizing inequalities, then it seems possible to say that the top segments of the society living in residences with private security, who are detached from public discourses and who live with no sense of social responsibility is also a problematic issue for the SE approach. The more there is emphasis on the relative deprivation between the most advantageous group and the group at the other end of the spectrum, the further one gets away from the idea that the condition of one is not related with the other.

In the light of the status of inequality for the two approaches, let's look at how one might formulate the questions that motivate them. It has been indicated that the capability approach focuses on the freedoms to live a life that one has reason to value. In the case of poverty, what is at stake are the basic capabilities and basic capabilities are "intended to separate out the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings"⁶⁶ Sen himself does not provide a list of basic capabilities. M. Nussbaum has argued that there is an overlapping consensus between different societies on the conception of a human being and what is needed to be fully human. Thus, she develops a list of basic universal capabilities.⁶⁷ The fundamental question that the CA aims to answer can be formulated as: do individuals have the capability to achieve basic functionings? What are the social and personal factors that affect the conversion of goods, income and services into basic capabilities, which is the adequate space to evaluate poverty?

⁶⁶ Sen (1992), p.45

⁶⁷ <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~freedom/>

Alternatively, the motivation of the SE approach can be formulated in the following way: What are the dynamics which create increasing and permanent social distances that characterize the social order? Does the degree of inequality in the society threaten social cohesion? Such questions draw attention to the importance of structural inequality for the shared rules and the sense of being a member of the same social setting. In this framework, what is problematized is not merely the individual capability to “appear in public without shame”. As well as addressing the individual’s or the group’s position within the society, the SE approach emphasizes the risk of the annihilation of a single scale for comparing individuals’ position within a community. The increasing social distances that lead to a loss of social cohesion is the primary driving force of the SE debate. This is revealed in Byrne’s formulation: “The question is whether or not income distribution has changed in such a way as to produce a qualitatively different kind of social order.”⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Byrne (1999), p. 50

IV) An Interpretation of Social Exclusion

4.1. The Social Exclusion Debate and Marshall's Citizenship Status

In this section, I intend to show how Marshall's conception of citizenship can provide us with an insight about the SE approach. At the end of the last section, it has been noted that SE emphasizes the risk of the annihilation of a single scale for comparing each individual's position within a community. I will try to argue that Marshall's citizenship status exactly provides this scale and this status aims at social integration and solidarity.

In his essay titled "Citizenship and Social Class", T. H Marshall argues that there are three constitutive elements of citizenship: civil rights, political rights and social rights. Civil rights encompass the liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice. The institutions, which correspond to civil rights, are primarily the courts of law. The second element is the category of political rights. They amount to the "right to participate in the exercise of the political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body."⁶⁹ The corresponding institutions are parliaments and councils of government. For Marshall, "social rights range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society".⁷⁰ The institutional order involves the educational system and the social services. Marshall presents a historical account of the evolution of these categories of rights. These rights are the products of, respectively, 18th, 19th and 20th century social, economic and political life. Taking

⁶⁹ Marshall (1964), p. 72

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 72

Britain as his example, Marshall takes the formation period of civil rights to be the period between the Revolution and the Reform Act. The emergence of modern universal rights of citizenship is parallel with the growth of market economies. According to Marshall, capitalist economy required the institutionalization property rights through the enforcement of basic civil rights. With the end of feudalism, "...the story of civil rights in their formative period is one of the gradual addition of new rights to a status that already existed and was held to appertain to all adult members of the community...This democratic, or universal, character of the status arose naturally from the fact that it was essentially the status of freedom, and in seventeenth-century Britain, all men were free".⁷¹ Marshall underlines the right to work, a civil right which developed in the economic field. In line with the formation of this right is the changing attitude towards work. The shift is from the traditional view that local and group monopolies are in public interest to the attitude that they are an offence to the liberty of the subject. Especially, two civil rights - the right to property and the right to employment - are the two conditions that make capitalism possible by opening the way to the commodification of labor and land.

Commodification of land and labor represents a totally new universe. Marshall reflects this change as "the differential status, associated with class, function and family, was replaced by the single uniform status of citizenship, which provided the foundation of inequality on which the structure of (capitalist) inequality could be built"⁷². 19th century is the beginning of the formation period of political rights. Political rights were not recognized as the rights of citizenship; rather they were privileges of a limited economic class. Thus, they were the extensions of civil rights.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 77

⁷² Ibid. p. 78

For Marshall, expansion and enforcement of civil rights was a necessary condition for political rights to be implemented. Without the general status of citizenship, political rights independent of the socio economic status was not comprehensible. Thus, the expansion of political rights consisted in distributing the already existing rights to everyone who grants the status of citizen: "...granting of old rights to new sections of the population....Political rights were defective, not in content, but in distribution-defective, that is to say, by the standards of democratic citizenship".⁷³ The process of establishing the political rights of citizenship ends with the 1918 British Reform Act, when political rights were for the first time attached directly to citizenship with the adoption of universal suffrage regardless of the person's economic status.

Social rights, which culminate the evolution of citizenship, have been formed in the 20th century. Improving the situation of the poor has been the subject of debate since 16th century, but the debate did not revolve around the notion of citizenship. On the contrary, by the Act of 1834, Poor Law regarded the social rights as detached from the status of citizenship and "treated the claims of the poor not as an integral part of the rights of citizens but as an alternative to them – as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word. For paupers forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty, by internment in the workhouse and they forfeited by law any political rights that they might possess."⁷⁴ Marshall warns us that this is not the only example of the isolation of social rights from the status of citizenship. The Factory Laws, despite providing an improvement of the work conditions and a reduction of working hours, were not directly provided to adult males but to women and children. The reason is that the former is endowed with the

⁷³ Ibid. p. 77

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 80

status of citizenship, whereas women and children are not citizens par excellence. Thus, it was underlined that the benefits and improvements are not granted in virtue of citizenship. In other words, providing people with better conditions of work is not seen as a matter of right. The normative form of making a claim, asserting a right in virtue of citizenship is precluded in this line of thought.

20th century witnessed the extension of health, social security, education as constitutive elements of citizenship. Thus, social rights that operated in tension with the market could no longer be conceived as contingent or alternative elements of citizenship. However, it is significant to note that although different categories of rights are analytically distinguishable, they are interdependent. Marshall's example of education is enlightening at this point. Although education provides the personal opportunity to follow one's own life plan, it is intimately related to take part in political activities, effectively enjoy the right to freedom of information, freedom of speech etc. Referring to education, Marshall indicates that we have here a personal right combined with a public duty to exercise the right. This underlines the social aspect of individual rights. Rights do not only serve to enhance individual well-being, but they recognize the individual's status as a participant in the social life and imply the social health of the society through the exercise of one's rights.

As stated above, Marshall provides an historical account of the evolution of the citizenship. Marshall's account implicitly assumes that conflicting interests do not mark society and that different class interests might be in harmony rather than in conflict with each other. In this social order, the society acts towards an ideal of citizenship. Is Marshall's account only a historical, descriptive one? I think that as well as being a descriptive account, it is possible to read Marshall as providing a

normative account of how we ought to understand the concept of citizenship status in the face of the social inequalities of capitalist societies. The tensions between the social inequalities inherent in a capitalist society, a system of private property and the welfare provisions, which necessarily demand a system of social equality lie at the center of Marshall's notion of citizenship status.⁷⁵

In the next section, I will try to show how "citizenship status" provides a way to understand the normative underpinnings of the alleviation of deprivations. In this reading, the notion of citizenship status itself is not merely descriptive; it also has a normative role. It provides a definite answer to the question of how social policies should fight against poverty. This picture necessarily conceives of poverty as a political problem, which can only be captured in a "rights-based" framework.

4.2. Normative account of citizenship status

Marshall defines citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community"⁷⁶ There are two interrelated, constitutive aspects of this status. The first is the notion of equality and the second is the notion of rights. This is explicit in the following passage:

"All, who possess the status, are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is not a universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be

⁷⁵ Waldron also underlines the normative significance of Marshall's notion of citizenship. See Waldron (1993) for a detailed discussion.

⁷⁶ Marshall (1964), p. 84

measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality”⁷⁷

Marshall acknowledges capitalism as an inherently unequal system. It implies a class society. He draws attention to distinct understandings of social class. The first is based on a hierarchy of status and is an institution in its own right. “The differences between social levels are not differences in standard of living because there is no common standard by which they can be measured.”⁷⁸ This order is accepted as a natural one. The second understanding of social class is “not an institution in its own right but as a by product of other institutions.... Class differences are not established and defined by the laws and customs of the society but emerge from the interplay of a variety of factors related to the institutions of property and education and the structure of national economy.”⁷⁹ It is the latter sense that characterizes the capitalist societies. Stratification of the society into social classes due to increase in the unequal distribution of income, services and commodities, might rise to such a degree that there is no common ground among the different classes. This also implies that there is no solidarity within the society. On the other hand, citizenship status implies equality of status. Marshall does not aim at an absolute equality: “The extension of the social services is not primarily a means of equalizing incomes. In some cases it may, in others it may not.....What matters is that there is a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels...Equality of status is more important than equality of incomes.”⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 84

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 84

⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 85

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 103

It is explicit then that social class and citizenship status are conflicting notions. While the evolution of citizenship rights, which begins with the expansion of civil rights and progressing through political and social rights, prepares the ground on which capitalist economy could grow, citizenship status, through the adaptation of social rights, is a remedy in the face of social inequalities inherent in capitalism. This draws attention to how Marshall's conception of citizenship status necessarily accommodates conflicting principles. Citizenship status is the social bond that provides solidarity in the society. It is offered by Marshall as a political instrument to dissolve the inequalities inherent in capitalism.

I think it is significant to note that in this framework of thought solidarity and social integration are political ideas. They arise neither from sentiments, nor charity nor patriotism but through being endowed with the same rights and obligations. "Social integration spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment. The components of a civilized and cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within reach of the many, who were encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards those that still eluded their grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare"⁸¹

The second significant aspect of citizenship status is the notion of rights. This aspect, I shall call, is the normative form of the citizenship status. The normative form supplies us with *how* demands of citizens must be understood, highlights what kinds

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 87

of claims they are and in virtue of what they must be implemented. Seeing welfare provisions as a matter of charity, benevolence, traditional institutions, conditional or as temporary amelioration of the conditions is strictly eliminated in this framework. Social security, welfare provision, how to keep the society together are issues, which have been discussed in moral and political philosophy since centuries. Duties like feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, giving money and food to the poor have been imposed by different religions. Although one might assume a moral consensus about the unacceptable consequences of poverty for human life, the views diverge about how and on what grounds the needs of the poor must be met. Thus, the normative form of the provisions is a central issue. The dispute, then, is not about the moral rightness or wrongness of helping the worst off, but it is about the form these provisions must take. One might help the poor out of altruistic motives, out of pity, out of religious or moral duties, but the crucial question is whether the alleged person in need has a right to demand these provisions. Kant's notion of imperfect duties is an enlightening example. In the *Groundwork*, Kant establishes charity as a universal duty. It is an imperfect duty in the sense that "imperfect duties are prescriptions of general ends, and fulfilling them by means of performing appropriate particular actions is *praiseworthy*."⁸² However, in this framework, the needy do not have a right to the alleged assistance. In other words, the morally desirable act of helping the poor does not entail that those in need have a right to this assistance. Thus, the problem of provision does not involve any political sense but it is strictly a moral issue. Being a moral issue, it is argued that helping others can neither be compulsory nor be enforced by legal norms or institutional organizations of the society. The Poor Law is another enlightening example. Marshall points out that the Poor Law was one item in

⁸² Kant (1964), 4:422-423

a broad program of economic planning whose general object was not to create a social order, but to preserve the existing one with a minimum change. By the Act of 1834, the law offered relief only to those who could not work due to age or sickness and “treated the claims of the poor not as an integral part of the rights of citizens but as an alternative to them – as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word.”⁸³ The Poor Law Amendment Act stated that an able bodied person can only receive money or help only if he/she is in a workhouse. Thus, help of the Poor Law was conditional on employment in harsh working conditions. “Even participation of public affairs was more a duty than a right”. In these cases, “the benefits of the unfortunate did not flow from an enrichment of the status of citizenship. Where they were given officially by the State, this was done by measures, which offered alternatives to the rights of citizenship, rather than additions to them. But the major part of the task was left to private charity and it was the general, though not universal, view of charitable bodies that those who received their help have no personal right to claim it.”⁸⁴

By contrast, in Marshall’s picture, the benefits are provided as a matter of right, which derive from the status of citizenship. Marshall does not leave any ambiguity about the normative form that these claims must take. Some thinkers argue that claiming as a right a particular share in wealth and claims to welfare provision are a matter of “envy”. “Egalitarian demands are based on nothing better than envy.”⁸⁵ One reason for taking the claims as “envy” might be that they are perceived as claims of those of a lower social class addressed to an affluent upper class. They are claims

⁸³ Marshall (1964), p. 80

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 73

⁸⁵ Hayek (1960), p. 93

directed towards the income or the goods of the affluent others. Marshall's understanding of citizenship status represents a completely different universe. These claims are not claims from a lower to a higher class nor are claims to correct a cosmic injustice but they are claims of the equals to "a right to share to the full social heritage."⁸⁶ An approach which might support the alleviation of poverty through benevolence, voluntary work, charity cannot be accommodated in Marshall's framework. It is in virtue of being a member that claims to welfare emerge. These claims are not only claims to wealth, goods or commodities but "the broad idea is that this is what our society does for its members and this is how, and is used as a primary point of reference for the way people organize their lives. To launch an attack, then, on the very idea of welfare provision, in the way that some New Right thinkers suggest, would be to challenge the way people have grown accustomed to think about themselves and the planning of their lives. For that reason, it is to attack their very basic sense of what it is to live here, to make a life here, to belong here. It is, in a way, to attack their sense of citizenship."⁸⁷ Thus, belonging, being a member in the sense of being a citizen cannot be *sufficiently* characterized only "as a functioning that one has reason to value"; it is the very ground which shapes how claims and demands must be understood and provided.

⁸⁶ Marshall (1964), p. 72

⁸⁷ Waldron (1993), p. 432

4.3. Citizenship Status as a Political Means and the Capability Deprivation Approach

In the previous section, I have explained the distinctive features of Marshall's conception of citizenship status. Specifically, I have drawn attention to the normative aspect of "citizenship status". The normative aspect clarifies that social integration must be interpreted within a rights-based framework, which straightforward implies obligations of the state. Associating the SE approach with "citizenship status" directly involves treating this status as a threshold below which one should not fall. In the SE literature, exclusion is frequently associated with citizenship. "Poverty is antithetical to full citizenship...Poverty represents a strategically important limit for the concept of social citizenship. Beyond this limit in some respects people are not full and participating members of the society and also they are not full citizens. Beyond this limit, people are politically and civically as well as socially 'excluded', they are 'second – class citizens' or less."⁸⁸

Social exclusion as the opposite of citizenship status results from the denial of fundamental rights. Following what has been underlined in the previous section, it seems possible to assert that the SE approach quintessentially incorporates a normative dimension, which the capability approach does not explicitly accommodate. Citizenship rights provide the ground to analyze the nature and the causal processes of exclusion. This, of course, *does not* mean that the basic capabilities like the capability to be healthy, capability to be well-nourished, the capability to reach clean water resources cannot provide the substance of rights. However, the content of a right is distinct from the normative form of a right. While

⁸⁸ Littlewood and Glorieux (1999), p. 16

the former determines the substance of rights, the latter explains how the claims must be understood. Although Sen points out that the ethical force of freedoms can help to generate rights, capabilities in and of themselves do not imply the normativity in the sense that a rights-language inherently does. In his article “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”, Sen makes a distinction between claims and freedoms. “Note that while rights involve claims, freedoms, in contrast, are primarily descriptive characteristics of the conditions of persons”⁸⁹. While the SE approach as associated with citizenship status intrinsically involves a normative account of how we ought to understand exclusion and the claims of the citizens, this normative approach is not an intrinsic part of the capability approach. Sen’s clear distinction between the language of rights and the language of freedom endorses this point. “Ultimately, the ethical assertion of a right goes beyond the value of the corresponding freedom only to the extent that some demands are placed on others that they should try to help. While we may be able to manage well enough with the language of freedom rather than of rights (indeed it is the language of freedom that I have been mainly invoking in *Development as Freedom*) there may sometimes be a good case for suggesting that others help the person to achieve the freedom in question. The language of rights can supplement that of freedom.”⁹⁰ This, of course, does not show by any means the weakness of the capability approach, but it does point to the fact that what is taken to be a necessary component of the SE is not something that the CA inherently provides. In other words, although it might be theoretically possible for the CA to involve a rights-based framework, this is not necessarily the ground on which it rests.

Although this might be a subject of further research, the normative dimension of the SE approach has implications for social policy. For example, do social safety nets

⁸⁹ Sen (2000b), p. 328

⁹⁰ Sen (2000), p. 231

aim at poverty reduction only at the time of crisis? In other words, is there a temporary aid that aims to reduce the social risks only at the time of crisis? If the answer is affirmative, this means that the provisions aim to ameliorate the existing condition, but their implementation does not aim at a structural change of the society. This point is very crucial to underline a distinctive feature of SE in its identification of poverty. Providing social safety nets only in time of crisis opens the way to specify existing poverty as something that emerges only in time of crisis; thus not as internal to the socio-economic framework. In other words, deprivations that arise at the time of crisis are conceived as “outside” the socio-economic framework. They emerge at the time of crisis, thus they do not exist as inherent parts of the institutional structure. In other words, these deprivations are conceived as not “rules of the game”, but rather they are exceptions to the rule. This shows us that there is a strong parallel with how poverty is conceived and the different ways in which social policies might be regulated.

Conclusion

All through history, poverty has been a problem for the most disadvantaged people of the society. Different concepts have been employed to explain poverty and most of the debates have been about choosing the appropriate space for the evaluation of deprivations. Social exclusion and capability deprivation are two prevailing approaches in contemporary debates. Both approaches effectively illuminate that deprivations involved in poverty cannot be sufficiently articulated only in economic terms; political and the cultural deprivations must be addressed as well.

Motivated by Sen's contention that the SE approach can be accommodated within the CA without a remainder, my main goal in this thesis has been to emphasize the differences between the two approaches by presenting the different issues they problematize and by revealing their underlying motivations. Some of these discrepancies are methodological, which are mainly about the nature and the constitution of the evaluative space. Other differences arise from the different roles both approaches assign to inequality and from their different normative dimensions. Associating the social exclusion approach with Marshall's citizenship status assigns an equal status to all categories of rights. Therefore, welfare provisions can no longer be seen as a matter of contingency or something that could be abolished. A normative rather than a historical reading of Marshall's citizenship status might imply that no categories of rights are morally or logically prior to each other. Chronological priority does not entail priority in the logical or the moral sense. In this picture, citizenship status accommodates the conflicting nature of rights. Arguably once this conception of citizenship is accepted, it precludes putting forward any civil rights, i.e property rights as a justification to oppose welfare provisions. Social exclusion

conceived as such necessarily involves a rights-based framework. On the other hand, the capabilities, as freedoms, can of course form the substance of rights. However, the normative form that these claims must take is not a necessary, integral part of the capability approach. Therefore, unlike the social exclusion approach, how policies that aim to alleviate poverty must be understood is not the ground on which the capability approach essentially rests.

Even though poverty has been problematized all through history, due to technological developments, different forms of production, global trends, discrete policies, different organizations of economic, political and social life, an analysis of poverty requires different operational frameworks unique to that period of time. Although this sounds like a trivial remark, it is significant in the sense that it draws our attention to the social contexts in which different concepts arise. The concept of social exclusion is developed in Europe in the context of the transformation of capitalism and the restructuring of socio-economic systems. This, I believe, is something that Sen has not been paid sufficient attention to in his contention that CA can accommodate SE approach. The emergence of the concept of SE addresses to the fall of the welfare state in the face of the neo-liberal trends, which have dominated the world. Poverty, then, has prevailed as an inherently structural problem, which relates to the processes of social polarization with rising income gaps.

One remark has to be made at this point: the similarity of the contemporary neo-liberal discourse with the discourse prevalent in the 19th century is worthy of notice. Just like the inclinations in the 19th century, neo-liberal trends tend to locate poverty out of the political domain. The tendency is to provide provision through temporary

policies, voluntary work, or charity. Thus, the aim is to render welfare provisions as contingent. It is exactly against this background that the concept of SE evolves. Thus, it can be seen as a straightforward answer to render poverty as an apolitical issue. Taking into account the social context in which it has emerged allows us to see the centrality of the normative dimension and of inequality for the SE approach. It necessarily derives from social inequality within the whole society and is informed by the normativity of solidarity, which sees poverty as a political problem.

Both the motivational and the methodological differences between these approaches might also open the way to evaluate them as instances of methodological individualism and holism. Although this is a broad issue which requires a distinct analysis, the treatment of evaluative spaces and the alleged motivations of the two approaches might provide some hints. Methodological individualism is the view that all social phenomena must be accounted for in terms of what individuals think, choose and do. On the other hand, holism is the view that social phenomena may be studied at their own autonomous, macroscopic level of analysis. The significance of giving an explanation at a higher level might provide insight about some patterning in the world that becomes apparent only at such levels.⁹¹ There have been many disputes concerning what really distinguishes the two. Recently, it has been claimed that the real dispute between the individualists and the holists is over the irreducible social properties and practices.⁹² According to this view, although an individualist might acknowledge social aspects of individuals, he/she might still reject the existence of irreducible social properties and practices. Bhargava distinguishes

⁹¹ Jepperson, (1994). In his review of Bhargava's book, *Individualism in Social Science: Forms and Limits of a Methodology* published in "Contemporary Sociology", Jepperson makes this remark to draw attention to the significance of providing theories at different levels. "We are driven to theorize at higher levels of organization precisely because some patterning in the world only becomes apparent at such levels." p. 20

⁹² See Bhargava (1992) for a detailed discussion.

between ontological, explanatory and semantic individualism, which he argues to be interrelated but analytically distinguishable. As mentioned before, he proposes the explanatory feature as the core of methodology.

Given the differences of the two approaches, a further analysis might be pursued, which aim to clarify the relationship between the methodological and substantial aspects. Is it possible to depict a relationship between the different explanatory roles ascribed to social factors, the different levels of explanation and the normative foundations that two theories ascribe to? One might also pursue this line of thought both in H. Silver's remark that "exclusion reflects a holistic conception of society, in which social cohesion is undermined by the polarization of inequalities."⁹³ and in Marshall's claim that "the obligation of the State is towards society as a whole, ... instead of to individual citizens."⁹⁴

⁹³ Cited in Littlewood and Glorieux (1999), p. 12

⁹⁴ Marshall (1964), p. 105

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