

THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTRA-ELITE DEBATE ON THE CUSTOMS UNION
AND IDENTITY POLITICS (1993-1996)

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Title: The Dynamics of the Intra-Elite Debate on Turkey's Integration to the Customs Union and Identity Politics (1993-1996)

The Customs Union has been the breakpoint point of Turkey's long history with the European Union. The welcoming of the idea of being included in the European integration witnessed a process which was dominated by the fait accompli attitude of the government by opening a significant era in the future of Turkey's relations with the EU. This thesis argue that the discourse of the political elite in this period saw an emphasis on identity politics as the only way not to miss the critical opportunity to enter the EU. Through the two-sided discourse, the Çiller government encouraged the unitary and strong state model and protect it more than ever against to increase in identity problems whereas in her relations with the EU, she persuaded the European leaders if they closed down the channels for integration of Turkey, it would leave Turkey alone to deal with ethnic and religious based demands and rise of Euroscepticism. This maneuvering between the domestic politics and relations with the EU affected the process which ended in the completion of the Customs Union in 1996.

Through analyzing the dynamics of the CU, this study examines the atmosphere of Turkish internal politics in the 1990s, in the light of the international dynamics. The study aims to give the real atmosphere through analyzing the role of prominent actors such as different views in the print media and business circles and their opinions about Turkey's integration to the CU and domestic problems in which strengthened the government's discourse in the unitary state model.

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Başlık: Gümrük Birliği Üzerine Siyasi-Elit İçi Tartışmanın Dinamikleri ve Kimlik
Siyaseti (1993-1996)

Gümrük Birliği, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği ile olan uzun tarihi içinde kırılma noktası olmuştur. Bu dönem, Türkiye'nin Avrupa bütünleşmesine dâhil olma fikrinin hükümetin emrivaki tavrıyla hâkim olduğu sürece tanıklık ederken, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin geleceği konusunda önemli bir dönemi açtı. Bu tez, bu önemli dönemde siyasi elit söyleminin kimlik siyasetine vurgu yapmayı, AB'ye girmek için kritik fırsat gördükleri Gümrük Birliği üyeliğini kaçırmamak için tek yol olarak gördüğünü savunuyor. İki taraflı söylem ile iç politikada Çiller Hükümeti üniter ve güçlü devlet modelini, artan kimlik problemlerine karşı her zamankinden çok teşvik edip, koruyor; AB ile ilişkilerinde ise, Avrupalı liderleri Türkiye için entegrasyon kanallarını kapatırlarsa Türkiye'nin etnik ve dini temelli taleplerle karşında yalnız kalacağını ve Avrupa Birliği karşıtlığını arttıracığını söyleyerek ikna edebiliyordu. İç politika ile AB ile ilişkiler arasında yaratılan bu manevra alanı 1996 yılında Gümrük Birliği'nin tamamlanmasıyla sona eren süreci etkilemiştir.

Bu çalışma Gümrük Birliği dinamiklerini, 1990'lı yılların uluslar arası dinamikleri ışığında Türkiye iç siyasetine odaklanarak inceliyor. Çalışma, hükümetin üniter devlet söylemini güçlendirmesinde siyasi partiler, iş çevreleri ve farklı görüşlerdeki yazılı basının rolü ve Gümrük Birliği ve iç problemler ile ilgili görüşlerine de değinerek gerçek atmosferi vermeyi hedefliyor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP: Motherland Party

AP: Justice Party

BBP: Grand Unity Party

CHP: Republican People's Party

CU: Customs Union

DEP: Democracy Party

DP: Democrat Party

DSP: Democratic Left Party

DYP: True Path Party

EC: European Community

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

HP: People's Party

IKV: Economic Development Foundation

PACE: Parliamentary Assembly of the Countries of Europe

PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party

RP: Welfare Party

SEE: State Subsidized Enterprises

SHP: Social Democrat People's Party

SODEP: Social Democracy Party

TOBB: Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The start of the 1990s witnessed a number of changes for Turkey and for the international system. The international changes, especially the triumph of liberalism and globalization gave the message that liberal and democratic world order was more respectful of local identities. Through the 1990s, the term “human rights” in concept to include the social and political rights of people who were excluded in the system that global world order both pushed global tendencies and pulling the local identities to a bigger human rights level. The nation-state was founded on the base of modernity; however, globalization brought an end to a particular definition of modernity. The 1990s brought deep ambivalence about and skepticism to the notion of the modern nation-state. The dichotomous emphasis on identity and culture produced a new maneuvering space to the political elites’ use of identity politics.

As Çağlar Keyder states, in the globalization era “there is no possibility for nation-states to exist in their old form.”¹ The Turkish nation-state, too, was being questioned by the globalizing forces. Keyder also writes that the Islamic revival and Kurdish nationalism were used as a pretext to re-define the national authoritarian identity of the state by the governing elite.² Hence, the governing elite, who emphasized the unitary state model, gradually become more sensitive about the unity of the nation state while participating in a globalizing experiment of the CU.

¹ Çağlar Keyder, *Memalik-i Osmaniye’ den Avrupa Birliğine* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p.9

² p. 231.

This ambiguous situation is remarked upon by Keyman. For him until 1990s “the hegemony of the state-centric mode of societal modernization remained unchallenged.”³ In the 1990s, the liberal economy and the overall emphasis on a politics of recognition made the putting of identity politics into practice possible. In Turkey, Turkey’s integration to the EU was as a third factor which promoted the growing importance of identity politics. In the 1990s, there has been a breaking point in Turkish politics when the identity-based problems led the questioning of the Turkish modernity as Keyman and Öniş write,

In fact, it was the identity-based conflicts, which have given rise to the process of the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question, marked the crisis-ridden nature of Turkish modernity and Turkish politics during the 1990s.⁴

According to Ebru Bulut, in the 1990s, the rise of a popular nationalist discourse among the governing elite overlapped with the upheaval of Islam and Kurdish nationalism, which were regarded as dangers to national and territorial integrity.⁵

The Kurdish question and the problem of the Southeast went along with the Kurdish identity problem in the Turkish nation-state and national security. On the other side, the Islamic revival, too, was regarded as a challenge to the national identity. Turkey’s Sunni identity was backed by the governing elite against the revival of the Alevi identity. The search for a motive behind domestic politics gave

³ E. Fuat Keyman, *Remaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p.xxii

⁴ E.Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations* (Istanbul Bilgi University Press: İstanbul, 2007), p.17.

⁵ Ebru Bulut, “The Social Grammar of Populist Nationalism.”In *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (London; New York: I.B. Tauris), p.125.

the opportunity to the Çiller government to present identity politics as a way to assure the European leaders that Turkey would take part in Europe.

Turkey's integration when the structure of the nation-state questioned by the demands of different identities in Turkey, as relations with the European Union came to a vitally significant stage. As is well known, Turkey's relations started with the Ankara Treaty in 1963, yet Turkey's European integration had been postponed due to the political and social atmosphere in Turkey until her application in 1987.⁶ After Turkey's application for full membership was rejected by the European Community in 1989, in the 1990s, the governing elites in Turkey welcomed the integration to the CU. 1993 became the breaking point in Turkey-EU relations. This time Turkey's aim was to join the Customs Union with the EU, which meant the completion of the Ankara Agreement of 1963. This topic is interesting since despite the huge literature on the Turkey's relations with the Union, the studies on Turkey's Customs Treaty with the Union have been discouraged due to the debate on the economic advantages and disadvantages of Turkey's CU integration.

In the 1990s, while Turkey's long history with the European integration continued with ups and downs, the idea of becoming part of the CU was introduced as the one step to full membership by the Turkish governing elite. The year 1993 was important in Turkey's relations with the Union.

In this period starting with 1993, the Turkish governing elite concentrated firmly on Turkey's becoming a member of the CU, the elites' vision of Europe was not clear or well defined. The internal dynamics in the European Union itself were also considerable factors that determined the EU process in the 1990s. The fact that there was no certainty about the future of European integration or whether Europe

⁶ Rıdvan Karluk, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası, 1996) pp.398-401.

would evolve into a confederation of nation-states or into a strong federation with political rights, made it questionable whether it was going to become a “citizens’ Europe” or “liberal Europe” with market integration.⁷ In the 1990s, European integration was expected to evolve towards the structure of a nation-state more than any other model with the help of the extending of democratic rights.

Habermas underlines both the merits of the European nation-state and the argument that the EU should evolve towards a nation-state model. He speaks of the benefits and necessity of the nation-state by emphasizing the shared European political culture⁸; in this case, the new member states and accession countries are expected to increase the demands for the recognition of different identities and the rights and liberties for different identity groups. Habermas writes that in the countries where the unitary state understanding is still dominant, the demands for recognition may not be acceptable and identity politics may be restricted. The harmonization tests that are practiced for the migrants in EU member states bring up the question of whether the EU will evolve into the assimilation model in the future. These questionnaires examine the migrants to guarantee they know the language, the rules and institutions, social norms of the host country and maintain their survival.

In 1993, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller who affirmed that her major aim was to pull off Turkey’s integration to the CU. This represented the high point among the governing elite who viewed Turkey’s future connected to joining the CU. Hence, in this thesis, the main aim is to look at the discourse of the governing elite in the period of the Çiller government about identity politics. In this connection, the Çiller government’s responses to the different identity demands in Turkish nation-state

⁷ Ahmet İnsel, “Avrupa Birliği: Nasıl Bir Kurumlaşma”, *Birikim* (May, 2002), p.11.

⁸ For a detailed discussion see <http://www.newleftreview.org/A2343> Available [online] at Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe Needs Constitution” *New-Left Review* 11 (September-October 2001).

during the process of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union and the responses and the discourse in the print media will be analyzed.

According to Erdoğan, the optimist group among European leaders claimed that the CU was a milestone in Turkey-European Union relations and that the Customs Union would lead to consolidation of Western values in society, which in the end would lead to the flourishing of the western democracy in Turkey. Erdoğan writes

As for political benefits, they argue that the Customs Union will lead to consolidation of Western values in Turkey, which in turn will contribute to Turkey's efforts to upgrade her democracy. It will also set firmly Turkey on the course of integration with Western Europe.⁹

Turkey's relation with the EU is an example of a special case since Turkey was the first country that became part of the CU before full membership. Turkey was the second country to apply for membership in the European Economic Community in 1959. The Turkish government was determined to become a member of the Community. The first impediment to Turkey's accession process came with the 1960 military coup. Especially the French President De Gaulle wanted the cancellation of the Community's relations, when the Turkish judiciary decided to execute three politicians. This development was the first sign to show Turkey that the continuity of the democratic regime was a crucial issue between Turkey and the Community.¹⁰ The Ankara Treaty of 1963 anticipated that Turkey's entrance to the Custom Union would be realized in three phases: In the Preparation process, Turkey would not undertake any responsibility towards the Union; in Transition, Turkey

⁹ Erkan Erdoğan, "Turkey and Europe: Undivided But Not United", *MERIA*, Volume 6, No.2 (June 2002).

¹⁰ Rıdvan Karluk, *Gümrük Birliği Dönemecinde Türkiye; Gümrük Birliği Ne Getirdi Ne Götürdü?* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1997), p.6.

would sign the Additional Protocol and by the functioning of the Customs Union agreement, in the Function Process, the integration would come to an end.

The Additional Protocol regularized the transition term between the European Economic Community and Turkey as had been written in Ankara Treaty. On March 12, 1971, the second military coup took place in Turkey was a blow to the democratization process. The second crisis between Turkey and the European Community occurred during the Nationalist Camp governments in Turkey. The Additional Protocol coming into effect in 1973 started the second phase.

In Turkey, from 1961 to 1973, the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) was the party in power. In 1973, when the coalition between the Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and the National Welfare Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*) was broken, the duty to establish a coalition was left to the Justice Party. The Justice Party, with the participation of the Republican Trust Party (*Milliyetçi Güven Partisi*), National Welfare Party and Nationalist Movement Party (*Milli Hareket Partisi*) formed the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*). The Nationalist Front government caused considerable instability and insecurity in Turkish politics so that the relations between Turkey and the European Community in the 1970s and until the later half of the 1980s could not continue in a healthy manner.

In the 1970s, Turkey experienced significant domestic, political, economic and diplomatic problems so that in 1979, the Turkish government had no choice but to suspend the relations with the Union for five years. By the start of the 1980s, the relations between Turkey and the European Community seemed on a shaky ground.¹¹

In 1982, the European Parliament cancelled the relations between Turkey and the Community until human rights and democratic freedoms were restored. The three

¹¹ pp. 6-12.

military interventions which had led to the interruption of democracy in Turkey were questioned in terms of the human rights and the rule of law. After completing the Union structure of the EU with the approval of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU's relations with the candidate states were set into a framework of political, economic and social rules. These factors, to a great extent, played a significant role in Turkey's relations with the EU.

According to Pınar Yörük Kavak, after the Maastricht Treaty, with the inclusion of common foreign and security policies to the EU pillars, the Community structure has changed to an economic integration model bringing an obligation to the member states. This obligation was the transfer of the member state's power on economic and political issues to a supranational body.¹²

After the military coup in 1980, Turkey's relations with the European Union were suspended until Turkey's application for membership in the European Community in 1987. In the 1990s, internal and external dynamics were considered more agreeable for Turkey's integration to the European Community. In 1993, after Tansu Çiller was elected Prime Minister, she pointed to the integration to the Customs Union as the one of priorities of her government. The discussion of the recognition of cultural rights for ethnic and religious groups, such as the Kurds and the Alevis, and extending the rights of non-Muslim minorities were the first items formulated by the European Union's Copenhagen Criteria and demanded by the Commission of the European Union in its regular reports.

In that significant era, Çiller explained her commitment to the Turkey's membership to the Union and speeding up the integration process by giving messages that would satisfy western public opinion and the EU leaders. She was

¹² Pınar Yörük Kavak, "An Evolution of Critical Approaches to the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union" (M.A Thesis, Marmara University, 2005), p. 52.

fully devoted to Turkey's accession to the Customs Union seeing it as the step of full membership to the EU.¹³ The government and the opposition camp mostly debated the integration in terms of possibilities and impossibilities about Turkey's economic liberalization, the privatization of State Subsidized Enterprises and such.

During the Çiller government, the developments in the European Union were remarkable. The European Community turned into the European Union the Copenhagen Criteria. In other words, the Community progressed to become a political, social and economic union turning itself into a supranational body and regulating human rights, rule of law, democracy and minority rights in the candidate states as well as economic issues.

The acts of Turkey's governing elite gained more significance during Turkey's integration since from the start of the negotiations to the completion of the CU Treaty; the debate was limited to only the elite. Especially during the period of the coalition government in which the True Path Party (DYP) and Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), came together in 1993 under the prime ministry of the leader of the DYP, Çiller. The centre-right and social democratic left ideologies were sitting in opposite corner, in the coalition as the DYP was more conservative and more capitalist, the SHP was more libertarian and favoring the welfare state. The attitude of the coalition government deserves attention in response to identity politics.

Given this historical background, it can be argued that before the 1990s, the Turkish governing elites did not act according to identity politics or did not feel the necessity of checking identity politics in its relations with the EU. Until the 1990s, the elites were tied to the European integration as a result of Turkey's overall commitment to westernization. The year 1993 was the breaking point that in helping

¹³ For more information see 50. Government Program of Turkish Republic Available [online] at, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp50.htm>

of Turkish elites' opinion that Turkey's integration to the Customs Union was inevitable. One of the significant motives behind that act was once again Turkey's overall commitment to Europeanization. According to İnaç, "the process of European Union has been perceived as the most concrete, indispensable and endpoint of the 200-year-old history of Turkey's modernization and westernization."¹⁴

According to Eralp, during the 1960s, the relations were "running smoothly."¹⁵ Turkey was moving closer to Europe in order not to be isolated in the international arena. The significant word to highlight Turkey's relations in the 1960s was "security."

Mehmet Murat Erdoğan agrees that for both parties, Europe and Turkey, the relation was concentrated on "security". After the Second World War, the European countries were in favor of sustaining a continent-wide peace.¹⁶

In the 1970s, Turkey's relations with the EC¹⁷ were shaped around the economic concerns of the Turkish politicians and the industrialists. According to Eralp, the new debate was based on protectionism in opposition to economic opening. Especially the Oil Crisis of 1973 challenged the opinion of industrialists that in the process of the entrance of the Common Market with the EC the economic advantages dominated political benefits. In 1980s, as cited before the relations were interrupted with the 1980 military coup.

¹⁴ Avrupa Birliği entegrasyonu süreci Türkiye' nin iki yüz yıllık batılılaşma sürecinin en somut, en nihai ve kaçınılmaz bir halkası olarak algılanmıştır. Hüsamettin İnaç, "Avrupa Birliği Entegrasyonu Sürecinde Türkiye' nin Kimlik Problemleri," *Doğu-Batı* 23 (2003), p. 186

¹⁵ Atilla Eralp, "Turkey and the EC in the changing Post-War International System" ed. C. Balkır and A. M. Williams (London, New York: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), p.25

¹⁶ For more information see, Mehmet Murat Erdoğan, "Turkey-EU Relationship after the Cold War: 1990-2005" (PhD. diss., Ankara University, 2006).

¹⁷ The European Community (EC) was replaced by the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty.

The 1990s came with new dynamics when Turkey's relations with the EU gained a new character, which can be defined as "political." As an Economic Treaty, the Customs Union brought a political meaning to the relations between Turkey and the EU. Heinz Kramer draws attention to the fact that "the final vote of the European Parliament depended completely on the political factors, not least on an evaluation of the moves towards the democratization and political liberalization in Turkey."¹⁸

The European governing elites' votes showed that the decision of the Customs Union was related not only to the future policies of Turkey's relations with the EU but also Turkey's future in general. This politicization of Turkey's integration to the CU highlighted the political issues, and lessened the economic character of the CU.

The first question that comes into the mind is whether identity politics mattered in Turkey's relations with the EU before the 1990s. In the 1990s, Turkey opened itself to globalization. The identity issues in Turkey did not have an effect upon Turkey's relations with the Community before the 1990s since Turkey never came that close to the integration. Moreover, identity politics of the Kurdish population were not shaped in terms of a democratic discourse until then. Before the 1990s, none of the parties which had been founded on the basis of bringing a political solution to the Kurdish problem had a chance to be represented in the Turkish parliament.

Öke highlights the importance of the 24 January decisions that started Turkey's globalization with the initiation of liberal economy. This turning point guaranteed Turkey's entrance to global economic politics. He also argues that the nation-state model began to transfer itself into a fully competitive model

¹⁸ Heinz Kramer, "The EC-Turkey Customs Union: Economic Integration Amidst the Political Turmoil," *Mediterranean Politics*, no.1 (1996), p.61.

successfully. Turkey's integration to the Customs Union was not a painless process.¹⁹ Hence, in Turkey's transition to the CU the privatization of the SEEs and the incompatibility of the Turkish firms became the main debate for the Eurosceptic side among the Turkish governing elite. Also in the Turkish economy, the capitalist entrepreneurial class, which will be discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, was not a monolithic structure. The Turkish capitalist classes were divided between those who were in favor of protectionism together with a strong state understanding were and those who were on the side of neo-liberal economic policies and privatization.

Öke claims that globalization gave rise to many social and political drawbacks in Turkey. The global governmentality problem which emerged after the Cold War led to the social and political drawbacks such as the rise of micro nationalist and religious movements, revivalist movements or the drug trafficking were counted as dangerous as criminal organizations.²⁰ The nation-state had to be protected against these expansionist global trends.

Öke, in his analysis of the four year Çiller government, seems to support the strong state model. According to him, Turkey's integration to the CU was not only an alternative, but part of the multidimensional foreign policy. According to him, during the Çiller government, the government paid attention to Turkey's relation with the EU as much as Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries, Caucasias and the USA. The book which is biased towards the Çiller government, overestimates the effects of Turkey's relations with the EU. This study argues that

¹⁹ Mim Kemal Öke, *Küreselleşme Sürecindeki Türkiye'de DYP' nin Kimlik Söylem ve Siyaseti* (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p.22.

²⁰ "Bir yanda büyük entegrasyonlar, diğer yandan da büyük birleşmeye insanın adeta kişiliğini kökünü geleneklerini kültürünü kendisini arama zorunda bırakan merkeze tepki" for Çiller's statement see Öke, p.23.

during the Çiller government, the integration to the CU was the main determinant in Turkey's relations with the neighboring countries.

Öke quotes the words of Çiller that “post-modern citizens turn to religion and ethnic origin for the solution of identity problem that stemmed from globalization itself.” He continues to justify Çiller's argument that she would not allow radical and neo-liberal openings. The membership in the EU was regarded as the thing that would lift Turkey's burden and overcome the deadlock in economy in the transition to the competitive model.²¹

According to Derviş, Gros, Emerson and Ülgen, at the start of the twenty first century, Turkey, like many nation-states struggled with the challenges of globalization, and against these trends the government had to balance “the local and national feelings of belonging with the interdependence that the modern world economy has created” in the framework of the neo-liberal trends.²² They argue that, it was an advantage that Turkey had had a market economy for decades and with the completion of the CU, it would be a part of the EU's internal market.²³

This study looks for the view points of the printed media organs by studying *Milliyet* (Nationality), *Hürriyet* (Freedom), *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) and *Zaman* (Time). My aim is to see whether the debate in the print media overlap with the discourse on national sovereignty of the governing elite and Çiller. Yusuf Yurdigül argues that there is a relation between the position of the media in the various issues and the discourse of the government in identity politics. He observes that both the

²¹ Öke, p. 24.

²² Kemal Derviş, Daniel Gros, Michael Emerson and Sinan Ülgen, *The European Transformation of Modern Turkey* (Brussels CenterFor European Policy Studies, 2004), pp.17-18.

²³ p.13.

pro-European and Eurosceptic side in the Turkish mass circulation media used the same arguments, such as dangers to the national integrity, national sovereignty, and the unitary structure of the nation state after Turkey has become a candidate country in 1999. Ali Ulvi Özdemir also argues that the Euroscepticism in Turkish public opinion and elite rhetoric developed drastically after the completion of the Customs Union with the EU.²⁴

Yurdigül makes a detailed analysis of how far the media goes beyond the discourse of the government and concludes that the perception of the media overlaps with the discourse of the government in identity politics.²⁵

Another point on the role of media is brought by Güreşçi who claims that the media is able to dwell on and even encourage the tension between the different identities.²⁶ In this view, the print media takes a position in identity debates according to its ideological leaning.

Another scholar, Demirdelen who saw Turkey's integration to the CU as a breakpoint in relations, argued that during the process of Turkey's integration to the CU, the approach of the newspapers were differentiated according to their ideological differences.²⁷

The archival documents of the thesis include both primary and secondary sources. News articles in four Turkish newspapers, *Zaman*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and

²⁴ For more information see, Ali Ulvi Özdemir, "Development of the Ideas against the European Union in Turkey" (After the Customs Union Treaty) (M.A. Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2007)

²⁵ Yusuf Yurdigül, "Avrupa Birliği'ne Uyum Sürecinde Ulusal Kimlik Olgusu ve Ulusal Kimliğin Televizyon Haberlerinde Sunumu" (PhD., İstanbul University, 2007) pp.191-192.

²⁶ For a detailed analysis, see Murat Güreşçi, "Medya Söylemi ve Yeni Siyasal Politikalar Çerçevesinde Kimlik Algılaması (Ermeni Konferansının Sosyo-Politik İncelemesi)"(Ph. D, İstanbul University, 2007) .

²⁷ For a detailed analysis, see Dilek Çopuroğlu Demirdelen, "Türk Basınında Gümrük Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkiler" (MA, Anadolu University, 2000).

Hürriyet were studied for an analysis of the print media attitudes. The publications of the political parties in the Çiller government, the DYP, the SHP and Tansu Çiller's own publications are used in the second chapter. As secondary sources, books, periodicals, theses and articles are used. Some sources are focused directly on Turkey-EU relations in the perspective of Turkey's Customs Union. Others present interesting information about the Customs Union and how it was related to identity politics of the Turkish governing elite.

In the second chapter, the intra-elite debate over the process of Turkey's membership to the CU taking place between the DYP and the other political parties. Here, TÜSİAD, as the representation of big business and the print media are studied in order to show how Çiller accelerated the process and went on to complete the CU treaty as a *fait accompli*. In the third chapter, the discourses of the Çiller government in identity politics are examined by focusing on the solutions that were developed for the identity issues and by analyzing the criticism of the other member of the coalition, namely SHP. In the last chapter, the relationship between the print media and policy making towards the different identity demands during the process of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union (CU) and the various discourses of print media towards the identity questions are studied.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INTRA ELITE DEBATE OVER TURKEY'S INTEGRATION TO THE CUSTOMS UNION

*The Turkish Republic was founded as a European state and aimed at European integration.*²⁸

This thesis examines Turkey's integration to the CU in terms of an intra elite debate. In this chapter, the debate among the different social actors as Turkey's integration to the CU will be discussed.

The significance of this period, as far as Turkey's long history with the European integration is considered, has to do with the reconciliation of the idea of European integration after the Community had cancelled Turkey's application in 1987. Apparently, the governing elite perceived membership to the Customs Union as a way to full membership of the European Union. The governing elite, Tansu Çiller, who was a candidate to be the leader of the center right; the DYP and democrat wing in the SHP, developed their own arguments for Turkey's integration to the CU in this process. According to the governing elite, Turkey's integration to the economic pillar of the EU was the only way which would lead Turkey to the full membership of the EU.

The Islamic revival, the Kurdish problem, the case of the DEP members and human rights issues became prominent topics which were cited by the EU

²⁸ *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti, Avrupalı bir devlet olarak kurulmuş ve Avrupa ile bütünleşmeyi hedef almıştır.* "Çiller ve Çiller" (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p.139

institutions in the process of Turkey's CU meetings. Just before the last meeting of the Turkey's integration to the CU, Çiller persuaded the member states that when and if they left Turkey out of the European enlargement, it would affect future development by encouraging the Islamic movement and Kurdish and Turkish separatism, and democracy. As Arıkan writes, in the end, the member states of the EU began to show constructive attitudes towards the integration of Turkey that a steady and secular country with a large market.²⁹

In this part of the study, the basic aim is to find out how the DYP and Çiller have managed the process of the completion of the agreement which depended on Turkey's success in fulfilling the EU demands.

The most different characteristic of this period from the previous eras was the fact that the integration to the CU was tied almost totally to political factors. The argument that Çiller used was based on political reasons. This situation increased the significance of the analysis of the political developments in Turkey's internal politics and in her relations with the EU. The conditions of the European Parliament for Turkey's membership to the CU were leading Turkey to accept the existence of the different identities and to challenge its own domestic politics.

Çiller's government, which always specified the impossibility of giving any concessions to the limits of the unitary state, was faced with the requirement of making cleavages in its identity discourse.

²⁹ Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p.141

The Euroscepticism among the Turkish Governing Elite during the Process of Turkey's Integration to the CU

The scholarship on Turkey-EU relations put the debate in Turkish society by positioning “Euroskeptics”³⁰ against “Europhiles” or “Euro-enthusiastic.”³¹ The Euro-scepticism³² was a significant issue for the Çiller government to deal with during the Customs Union period. Since the debate over Turkey's integration to the CU was an intra elite debate, it is significant to look for the discourses of the governing elite from the perspective of the Eurosceptics since in this period the Eurosceptic side in Turkey was the left wing in SHP, the MHP, the RP, the BBP, the DSP and the ANAP.

A common argument that was brought by the Eurosceptic side was Turkey's unilateral commitment to the Customs Union, since the membership in the CU would not bring a say in the European Parliament or the EU Council of Ministers, and Turkey would not be represented in the EU Commission or the EU Court of Justice. Despite the fact that, with the membership of the CU, Turkey would take place in the CU without having a say in the decision-making, Turkey's foreign policy with third countries would be restricted during this process. Thereby, Turkey would not have

³⁰ The Euroscepticism in Turkey is studied by Ayşe-Güneş Ayata, “From Euro-scepticism to Turkey-scepticism: Changing Political Attitudes on the European Union in Turkey” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5, no. 2, August 2003; and also, Gamze Avcı, *Turkish Political Parties and the EU discourse in the post-Helsinki period: A Case of Europeanization*, ed. M. Uğur and N. Canefe (London; New York: Routledge, 2004).

³¹ This term is used by Ayşe Ayata.

³² According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, Euroscepticism is a term which is spread in the member states of the EU. There are two types of Euro-scepticism: hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as an opposition of the EU policies and idea of the integration whereas soft one is attached with the opposition to the special topics usually when they conflicted with the national interest. For more information see Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States”, *SEI Working Paper*, No.51 (April 2002), Available at [online] <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/wp51.pdf>

the same rights as the full members of the EU. This would leave Turkey dominated by the EU.³³

For the Eurosceptics, the other significant issue was Turkey's international representation. According to them especially Greece's objection to Turkey's membership, was a significant reason for not integrating with an organization dominated by the proponents of Greece.³⁴ Greece's blocking of the decisions of the Commission was a critical point.

Turkey's Customs Union with the EU was completed on 31 December 1995. The Customs Union Joint Committee oversaw the removal of the technical barriers to the free movement of the industrial products and tariff reductions of the agricultural components and also intellectual industrial and commercial property regulations (such as legislation on copyright and related rights, patents, trade marks, designs and models, geographical indications) Turkey's Customs Union included the free movement of goods by excluding the free movement of services, people and capital.³⁵

Its 36th Session, the Joint Committee decided to shape the conditions.

Turkey's membership to the CU, Turkey's Customs Union would be open to the free

³³ Tomris Çavdar, "Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu Gümrük Birliği Modelinin Siyasal, Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Sonuçları." *Mülkiye Dergisi*, No.240 (March 2008) Available at [online] http://www.mulkiyederigi.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=55&Itemid=61

³⁴ In 1963, Greece and Turkey became associate members of the European Community. The hostility between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus became problematic and reached to its peak with 1974 when Greece had a chance to carry the dispute to international arena when it became the member of the EC in 1981. In addition to the Cyprus problem, the continental shelf issue, small islands and air space. Greece's blockage acted on the approval of the Matutes Package. For more information, see Bahar Rumelili, "Turkey and Greece: An Anomaly in the Security Community of Europe," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, (2) (2003), pp.1-5.

³⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf [10 April 2009]

movement of the commodities but close to free circulation of people.³⁶ The Eurosceptics declared that one-sided regulations would be an abuse of the Turkish economy.

Eurosceptics were also against the CU and said that the EU's support of the members of the DEP and political solution to the Kurdish problem were a meddling in Turkey's internal affairs. The meddling which was fulfilled in the name of the democratization of Turkey was a pretext to encourage separatist powers.

The Europhiles, on the other hand, argued that membership would be a major step towards full membership. This one-sided integration to the EU that the opponents of the CU criticized was a matter of pride. As is written in the booklet of the DYP, "Turkey has become the first country which signed the Customs Union Treaty with the EU without becoming full member."³⁷

The DYP, which represented moderate and center right view in the coalition, indicated in the party's publication that, "We are integrating to Europe: The Customs Union" (*Avrupa ile Bütünleşiyoruz: Gümrük Birliği*), after the completion of the CU argued that:

"The Customs Union which covers the aim of becoming full member of the EU is an important step in fulfilling political and economic integration with Europe."³⁸

After the signing of the Treaty, the remarks of the Prime Minister were significant in that the Turkish government was hopeful that in the future the CU would be more than an economic integration.

³⁶ The official website of the İKV, Economic Development Foundation, (*İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı*), www.ikv.org.tr [14 May 2009]

³⁷ *Gümrük Birliği, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üye olma hedefini içeren, Avrupa ile siyasi ve mali bütünleşmesini sağlayacak önemli bir adımdır. Avrupa ile Bütünleşiyoruz: Gümrük Birliği* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın Merkezi, 1995), p.13.

³⁸ p.5.

“The Customs Union is a significant breaking point. However, it is not an aim by itself. The real struggle with Europe for Turkey is starting right now.”³⁹

According to Ayata, the mainstream social democrats, the SHP, which was later replaced by the CHP,⁴⁰ became more and more Euro-enthusiastic. Murat Karayalçın, the chairman of the SHP, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the deputy Prime Minister, took a pro-EU attitude in the government and played an active role in settling the disputes between Turkey and the EU and representing Turkey’s demands in the EU. His view on the CU did not contradict with that of Çiller. Also he agreed with Çiller’s policies regarding the Southeast problem, Turkey’s foreign relations, and identity politics. Especially his activist attitude in solving the problems between Turkey and Greece in this process was significant. Karayalçın’s duty was to settle the disputes between Turkey and Greece and represent Turkey’s interest to the EU where Greece’s veto was playing a significant role against Turkey’s membership to the CU.

Karayalçın, in January 1995, stated that the government was focused on the technical works and basic principles in the process of the CU and that they would start official visits to EU member states in order to overcome the veto of Greece.⁴¹

The main disagreement in the coalition stemmed from the economic policy and privatization. According to Karayalçın, the January 24 decisions, which initiated as liberal economy in Turkey, had created destruction in political, economic and social aspects. On the other hand, Çiller, who was against the existence of the DEP in

³⁹ *Gümrük birliği önemli bir dönüm noktasıdır. Ama kendi başına bir amaç değildir. Türkiye için şimdi gerçek Avrupa mücadelesi başlıyor. Ayın Tarihi*, 6 March 1995.

⁴⁰ The Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) the CHP and the SHP gathered together under the name of the CHP in February 18, 1995.

⁴¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 1 January 1995.

the Assembly, used the DEP antagonism of the parliamentarians when the DSP and Karayalçın attempted to stop her liberal approach.

Moreover, the SHP's sensitivity to individual rights in general made the European values more attractive for Karayalçın and the party. It was significant that Turkey was evolved European values and had achieved democratic, peaceful and transparent governance. The social democrats valued the functioning of democracy; therefore, from time to time they warned their coalition partners. ⁴²

Before the 1990s, the Years of the Political Instability and Turkey's Relations with the European Integration

Beginning with the Ankara Treaty in 1963, Turkey's social and political developments became the main determinant for its relations with the European integration. Turkish leaders in the government had to guarantee the stability of Turkey in the political, economic and social realms and the strength of the country's democracy in order to enter into more extensive relations with the European Community (EC).

The first problem stemmed from the Turkish military coup in 1960. Turkey's relations with the Community were suspended since the military coup was assumed to be Turkey's democratic failure. After the civil power regained its power, Turkey's relations with the Community became normalized and the Ankara Treaty came into effect in 1964. The "preparation phase" was completed and the conditions of the

⁴² *Ayın Tarihi*, 14 January 1994.

“transition phase” were set with the signature of the Additional Protocol on January 1, 1973.

The Additional Protocol regularized the transition term between the European Economic Community and Turkey according to the Ankara Treaty. On March 12, 1971, a second military coup took place in Turkey as a blow on the democratization process. The second crisis between Turkey and European Community (EC) was occurred during the Nationalist Front governments. The Additional Protocol by coming into effect in 1973 started the second phase of Turkey’s relations with the European Community. In Turkey, from 1961 to 1973, the Justice Party was in power. In 1973, when the coalition between Republican Party and the National Welfare Party was dissolved, the duty to establish coalition was left to the Justice Party. The Justice Party, with the participation of the Republican Trust Party, the National Welfare Party and the Nationalist Movement Party formed the Nationalist Front. The Nationalist Front government caused instability and insecurity in Turkish politics that the relations between Turkey and the European Community, in the 1970s and until the half of the 1980s could not continue in a healthy manner.⁴³

The Strengthening of Turkey’s Political Stability in the 1990s

After the military coup in 1980, a civil government was established in 1983 by Turgut Özal. In 1987, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) applied for full membership according to Article 237th of the Rome Treaty, the 98th article of the Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community, and the 205th article of Treaty of EURATOM.⁴⁴ In 1988, Turkey called for a meeting of the Association Council, the

⁴³ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye Tarihi*, trans. Y. S. Gönen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), p.380.

⁴⁴ <http://www.ikv.org.tr/en/tarihce.php> [10 May 2009]

gathering of which had broken up after the meeting in 1986 when the Council could not reach a decision due to Greece's objection. The meeting of the Association Council in Brussels in 1988 failed to reach a decision again because of Greece's objection.⁴⁵

After Turkey's application in 1987, Turkey's membership in the EU was mentioned in a positive manner in the Matutes Package in June 1990. The Commission adopted the Matutes Package, which consisted of the "completion of the CU, increasing financial cooperation and reinforcing political and cultural relations" between Turkey and the EC.⁴⁶

In 1992, at the Lisbon Summit, the significance of Turkey's role in the current European political structure was emphasized by the Union. The Lisbon Summit was important in bringing to light the normalization of the relationship between Turkey and the European Community. In February 1993, the European Commission put the technical subjects of Turkey's Customs Union Treaty on its agenda. The Commission also decided to establish a guidance committee called to scrutinize the developments between Turkey and the European Community. In June 1993, the European Community Summit in Copenhagen gave a place to Turkey specifying the content and the history of Turkey's relationship with the Union.⁴⁷

The Integration to the CU: A Political or Economic Decision?

The Customs Union was a kind of economic integration with the European Community, since the countries in the CU had to abolish all restrictions such as the

⁴⁵ Rıdvan Karluk, *Gümrük Birliği Dönemecinde Türkiye* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1997), p.18.

⁴⁶ David Barchard, *Turkey and the European Union* http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p093_turkey.pdf [23 April 2009] p.5.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

custom tax, other taxes, quotas and import and export limitations and determine a common tariff and external policy vis-à-vis third countries by restricting their independent foreign policy.⁴⁸ Turkey's story with the European Union started with that the Ankara Treaty in 1963, however it was only with the initiation of Turkey's Customs Union Treaty that the Ankara Treaty gained significant momentum. The aim of Ankara Treaty was stated in Article 2;

“To promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people.”⁴⁹
The Preamble of the Agreement foresaw the establishment of a close

relationship between the Community and Turkey with the potential to move the relationship from economic to political. The agreement reads:

The support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date.⁵⁰

Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty based on Turkey's advance in the CU integration in accordance with the Treaty, was critical for the Turkish side in order to foresee the future of the relations between Turkey and the European Community. Turkey's task was divided into three: the preparation phase, the transition phase and the final phase.

As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of

⁴⁸ <http://www.ikv.org.tr/en/gumrukbirligi.php> [12 February 2009]

⁴⁹ Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, 1 September 1963)
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2> [16 May 2009]

⁵⁰ Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, 1 September 1963)
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2> [16 May 2009]

the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.⁵¹

The need for the look for a change in the identity discourse stemmed from Turkey's internal dynamics and the requirements of the EP. In this period, it is necessary look for challenges to Turkey's nation state identity.

The Transformation of the Internal Politics in Candidate States of the EU

The transformative capacity of the EU membership has been studied by various scholars. The EU institutions were capable of affecting the domestic politics of the accession and candidate countries just as the governments of the states made efforts to merge the EU policies with their internal politics. The decision of the Commission, instead of reaching full membership with Turkey, suggested the conclusion of the Association Agreement by concentrating on cooperation by the year 1995. According to Erdoğan, the Commission guaranteed that the EC's *economic* and *political* concerns would be met by Turkey by granting CU membership for Turkey.⁵² After the re-shaping of Europe in the first half of the 1990s with the demise of communism, the security and strategy policy shifted political, economic and cultural concerns. Turkey's European integration process was not independent from these transformations in Europe and the EU.

The whole transformation would bring the effect to the involvements of the European Union in the domestic politics in the candidate countries. Obviously, the European integration transformed the domestic politics of the member states and

⁵¹ Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Signed at Ankara, 1 September 1963)
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2> [16 May 2009]

⁵² Erdoğan, 2002.

accession countries in a process called Europeanization.⁵³ The strategy of the Union is usually “reinforcement by reward” and operates on the principle of conditionality. This strategy, forces the government of a candidate state which wants to join the Union to comply with the conditions as full membership to the Union is attached to more definite and certain criteria defined by the Copenhagen criteria as the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” as the “sine qua non” political condition of EU accession.⁵⁴

However, the Union does not directly intervene in or coercively change the government. When the countries do not fulfill the required processes and the requirements of conditionality, the Union puts different mechanisms into effect such as cutting financial assistance or suspending its relations with the country.⁵⁵ Hence, a country which is a candidate for membership needs to agree to conditions and incentives and alter its domestic politics in respect of the powerful engine of democratization and economic transformation. For instance, the European Union worked to strengthen the democracies in the southern Europe through a mix of political conditions and economic incentives in a short period with the positive effect of foreign direct investment on democratization. Turkey would be put in a similar democratization program.⁵⁶

⁵³ M. Aydın and S. A. Açikmese, “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9, no. 3 (2007), p.263.

⁵⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, *JCMS* 41 no.3 (2003), p.497.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

The Turkish government's effort to put integration to the EU as a government priority led Turkey to respond positively to the political requests by the EU in order to fulfill the integration while the EP exerted pressure on Turkey. As Arıkan writes, "the member states appear to have made their policy approaches converge with that of the EP."⁵⁷ The EP's expectation from Turkey became certain and apparent in the decisions of the Parliament. On the vital days of the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Parliament, the EP putting forward three conditions that left Turkey no choice but to fulfill requirements in order to become a member of the CU. Turkey would make constitutional amendments to eliminate legal and constitutional restrictions in Turkey, change and abolish Article 8 of the Anti- Terror Law, and release the DEP MPs.⁵⁸

The Discourse of the Çiller Government during Turkey's CU Process

The era of the Çiller government can be seen as a breaking point in terms of party, state and society relationships. In this period, relationship with the EU was mostly determined by the course of events in domestic politics.

As far as the historical continuity of westernization was concerned, integration to the European Union was put on the agenda of the Çiller government as a foreign policy objective. Çiller explained her decisiveness about Turkey's integration to the Customs Union in her inauguration speech of the 50th and 52rd government.⁵⁹ Moreover, she did have a coalition partner which liked to embrace liberal and democratic values, and also the cadre of foreign affairs agreed with Çiller

⁵⁷ Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate For EU Membership?* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p. 121.

⁵⁸ European Parliament (1995a), Resolution on the Draft Agreement of the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union, DOC. PE 187.047.

⁵⁹ The Program of the 50th Government of the Turkish Republic, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp50.htm> [16 May 2009]

that Turkey should not lose the train of becoming a full member in the European Union. Therefore, integration to the Customs Union would move Turkey to full membership.

Çiller's decisiveness stemmed from the effort to complete the work of a series of governments on the right of which Çiller claimed to be the successor. It is well known that Turkey's relations with the Union went back to 1959 when the Democrat Party had applied for membership. One of the targets of the Democrat Party government had been membership in the Union. According to Öke, the Democrat Party's aim to become full member of the Community was clear.⁶⁰ However, the democracy gap in Turkey had affected the course of the relations between Turkey and the EU. In the 1970s, although relations with the Community had been affected by the unstable atmosphere in Turkey, the Justice Party had tried to re-establish relations with the Community. Turkey's application for the membership to the Community took place in 1987 again by a right wing party, the Motherland Party. All three parties were conservative and centrist; they had leaned to establish a relationship with the European integration process. These three parties, which formed the tradition of the centre right in Turkish political history, were regarded as the models of the DYP. Çiller did not hesitate to establish a relationship and take over their heritage.

Çiller's definition and imagination of Europe reflected the liberal right wing outlook. In addition to the perception that Turkey's integration to the Customs Union was a significant step for modernization, there was always the accompanying perception that Turkish values would contribute to European civilization. Çiller said:

⁶⁰ Öke, p.50.

“There is Asia in the origin of our culture. We will integrate to the European Union by protecting our religion, our unity of cultures, our identity and our historical background.”⁶¹

Çiller declared that the government’s priority to integrate to the EU was considered the completion of Atatürk’s ambition. According to Çiller, the Turkish Republic has already been a European country since Turkey had a modern law system, a constitution, modern morality codes, modern standards, modern education, multiparty and democratic system, and modern views on music, art and science.⁶² She always justified her argument by using Turkey’s modernization in every field of life for not being excluded from European integration.

It is beneficial to look at Çiller’s definition of globalization and Turkey’s membership in a newly founded regional integration system. She was aware of the increasing importance of the rights of individuals in a globalizing world; however, she did not want to accept the shrinking role of the nation-state.

“On one side, the world is integrating regionally, numbers of states come together, from politics to defense, and they come together. However, they are broadening the rights of the individual so much that the individual does not face a homogenous imposition. In his own liberty and individual rights, he can highlight and live his belief, his values.”⁶³

Çiller highlighted the principles of democracy, which had become prominent with globalization. The rights of the individual in belief, in thought and expression in this framework were protected against the state. When this framework was fully

⁶¹ *Ülkemizin kültür kökeninde Asya vardır, dinimizi kültür birliğimizi kimliğimizi ve tarihsel derinliğimizi muhafaza ederek Ab ile bütünleşeceğiz. Zaman, 7 March 1995.*

⁶² Çiller ve Çiller, pp.139-140.

⁶³ *Bir yanda, dünya bölgesel bütünleşiyor, bir sürü ülke bir araya geliyor, siyasetten savunmasına kadar bir araya geliyorlar. Ama bireyin hakkını öylesine genişletiyorlar ki, birey o bütünleşme içerisinde homojen bir yapıda dayatmacılıkla karşılaşmıyor. Kendi özgürlüğü içinde bireysel hakları içerisinde inancını, değerlerini öne çıkarabiliyor ve onu yaşayabiliyor. Tansu Çiller, *Demokrasi ve Değişim Söylemleri* (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p.63.*

founded in Turkey, nobody would suffer from limitations on the freedom of thought and faith.⁶⁴

The EC-Turkey Association Council decided that Turkey's Customs Union membership would be realized in 1995. After the Council's decision, Çiller declared that a historical step had been taken in the history of Turkey's integration to Europe that would bring changes in health and justice system, education and financial system. With the Customs Union, goods, capital and services would be cheaper by increasing the choices of the customers.⁶⁵

The new formation based on regional integration has defense, politics, and economy dimension; however, it has an individual dimension. That individual will not lose that the traditions, past, nationalist feelings, his moral side, or traditional values. And the platform that gathers all these is found inside democracy by highlighting individual rights.⁶⁶

The Differences in the Discourses

The government elite spoke of different approaches Turkey's integration to European integration. The hard liners argued that the membership train had already left for Turkey and so it could be postponed to the some indefinite time in the future. There were different reasons cited by the opponents of Turkey's Customs treaty with the European Union. The Motherland Party, as the principal party in the opposition, opposed the Customs Union simply for defying any acts of the government.

However, the leader of the ANAP was totally against Turkey's integration to the CU, despite the fact that his party program and that of DYP were overlapped in many topics.⁶⁷ In the 1990s, the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket*

⁶⁴ Ibid, 72.

⁶⁵ *Zaman*, 7 March 1995.

⁶⁶ Çiller, p. 67.

⁶⁷ *Milliyet*, 12 March 1995.

Partisi), MHP, took a more right nationalist stance vis-à-vis all recognition demands and regarded them as forms of separatism. The MHP was also Eurosceptic, and argued that Turkey's future route for integration should be with the Turkic states, and countries in Caucasia. Also, since the party's electorate was mainly owners of small scale industry, the party was against the CU. With the CU, Turkey's economy would be vulnerable to economic waves and endanger economic relations with the Turkic states. The EP decision's about Kurdish rights and the case of the DEP members were seen as the EU's intervention by restricting the sovereignty of the Turkish unitary state.

The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) RP interpreted the decisions of the European Parliament as the attempts to lead Turkey into destruction.

“They say Turkey's being poor, chaotic and religious is an obstacle to Turkey's membership.Now, I am asking this, the Prime Minister, is saying again and again to the West, “If you do not take us to Europe, the fundamentalists in Turkey will threaten you.” What does ‘fundamentalist’ mean? Should we abandon Islam in order to enter Europe, my respected friends?”⁶⁸

The European Union, which was evaluated as the “Christian Club” by the RP readily, accepted the strong state model.

The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*) DSP was on the side of the Eurosceptics. The chairman of the DSP, Bülent Ecevit, was against Turkey's integration to the CU since the treaty resembled the Sevres Treaty. For him, the maladministration of Çiller put Turkey into a disadvantageous situation against

⁶⁸ *Türkiye' nin çok fakir olması, Türkiye'nin düzensiz olması ve Türkiye'nin dindar olması, Topluluğa üyeliğine engeldir deniyor. ...Şimdi burada soruyorum; Sayın Başbakan ikide bir, Batıdaki: “Efendim, bizi almazsanız, Türkiye’de köktendinciler kapımıza dayanır.” Ne demek köktendinciler: yani biz, Avrupa Topluluğu’ na gireceğiz diye Müslümanlığı mı terk edeceğiz? TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, D: 19, Y: 4, C: 79, (21 February 1995), p.388.*

European leaders. Çiller had compromised the sovereign rights of Turkey by accepting the economic embargo on Northern Cyprus.⁶⁹

Moreover, he drew attention to the peculiarity of Turkey's CU integration. He specified that Turkey was the only country which had been integrated to the CU without being a full member. He warned the government that he and his party could file a claim at the Constitutional Court.⁷⁰

The left wing in the SHP was against the accelerated privatization program. Especially those who were Eurosceptic, the left wing, agreed with the DSP. However, the Eurosceptic wing was not effective against the pro-Europeans in the party, who with the DYP-SHP coalition, showed great effort for the completion of the CU.

The Grand Unity Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi*), BBP, was the most Eurosceptic political party in this term. The representatives of the BBP were affected by the Bosnian War which was taking place in Europe. They thought Europe was indifferent to the violation of the human rights in the war just because the Bosnian people were Muslim. The European Union was believed to be a Christian Club by the BBP. The countries of the Europe would never want to see Turkey as a part of the EU.⁷¹ The losses that Turkey would have to face should be considered, according to the representatives of the BBP.⁷²

Tansu Çiller, both within coalition and in the Assembly, was left alone in Turkey's relations with the Union. The pro-European side was only limited to the

⁶⁹ A.J. Secor, "Ideologies in Crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s." *Political Geography*, no. 20 (2001), p.548.

⁷⁰ *Ayın Tarihi*, 21 February 1995.

⁷¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 5 December 1994.

⁷² *Ayın Tarihi*, 8 December 1995.

DYP and the social democratic wing of the SHP. This meant that Çiller had taken up a strategy emphasizing democracy and rights along with the defense of a strong state.

Governmental Actions for Turkey's Integration to the Customs Union

In the days following Çiller's election, developments showed that Çiller was in favor of regional integration. She and her government were determined in integration to Europe as a way of guaranteeing and strengthening the position of the government. Çiller also hinted that she would not exactly follow what the European Union demanded. For example, when the European Parliament decided to end the operations of the Turkish Armed Forces in northern Iraq, Çiller made a statement that the decision of the Parliament was not binding. She even argued that Turkey's Customs Union with the European Union, which was on the way to completion, would be impossible under those circumstances.⁷³

Moreover, Turkey's European integration was supported by the government as a foreign policy alternative. The agreement with the Union would create a precedent in the future agreements of Turkey. Çiller and her government declared that they were also open to the new regional integrations with Middle Eastern countries. Turkey could ally with Muslim states and the Turkic Republics against Russia.⁷⁴

After the initiation of the Customs Union Treaty, Çiller declared the strength of the Turkish nation-state and underlined the decisiveness of her government acted together in this success.

⁷³ *Zaman*, 7 April 1995.

⁷⁴ Çiller, p.67.

“For a long time, we have struggled for Turkey’s membership in the European Union. Perhaps many people did not understand, saying, why is Çiller so obsessed with the European Union? We actually have achieved Turkey’s entrance to the European Union. On one side, there was a terror struggle; on the other side, there was an economic crisis.”⁷⁵

In this formula, ironically, the accomplishment of the political and economic transformations according to the European Union’s requirements would help the creation of a different, democratic and strong Turkish state. In the political arena, the relations between the European Union and Turkey would lead to a democratic and pluralistic Turkey, by expanding the area of civil rights and liberties. In economic matters the European countries would be Turkey’s most significant and primary trading partner.⁷⁶

Moreover, the will of Çiller to represent Turkish cultural and moral values was a significant part of her view.

We could not present us to the world enough, our country which is a synthesis of civilizations and our people with their spiritual, moral and cultural values, with the help of future conditions. We will represent them to the rest of the world.⁷⁷

After the lift of the five DEP as the subject will be studied in detail in the following parts, MPs on March 2, 1994 and the DEP case for the closure of the party in September 1994, the relations with the EP ran into risk of the Essen Summit. After a couple of days, Çiller met with the president of the Turkey-EC Joint Parliament in order to discuss the decision of the European Parliament. Also, the Turkey-EC Joint

⁷⁵ *Uzunca bir zamandan beri Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliğine girme mücadelesini yaptık. Çoğu insan belki anlamamıştır, nedir bu Çiller’in Avrupa Birliği tutkusu? Diyerek. Gümrük Birliği’ne Türkiye’yi soktuk. Bir yandan terör mücadelesi vardı, bir yandan ekonomik kriz vardı. Çiller, p.66.*

⁷⁶ Fuat Keyman, *Değişen Dünya, Dönüşen Türkiye* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005) pp.48-49.

⁷⁷ *Zaman*, 4 January 1994.

Parliament agreed on a resolution for the peaceful and political solution of the Kurdish problem.⁷⁸

Moreover, the relations between Turkey and the EU became more complicated when the second Çiller government, which was a minority government that failed to receive a vote of confidence but remained in office from November 5, 1995 until November 30, 1995. This unstable atmosphere and the political ambiguity directly influenced the CU agenda for Turkey. The Europe wanted to see a stable politics. The inability of the government receiving the vote of confidence, the political ambiguity and instability disordered the calendar of the CU once more.⁷⁹

The opposition of the European Parliament continued during 1995. The DEP case and Article 8 led the Çiller government to make Constitutional changes. The European Parliament, pleased to see Turkey's advance in democratic implementations towards the Kurdish identity, however, was not satisfied with the progress.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Joint Parliamentary Committee in October 1994 concluded "a peaceful political solution to the Kurdish issue and progress in respect for human rights were a firm expectation of the new contractual relationship between the EU and Turkey." *Official Journal of European Communities*, 305 (31.10.1994), p.95.

⁷⁹ *Milliyet*, 17 October 1995.

⁸⁰ For further information, see the comments of the Chairperson of the Radical Group, Catherine Lalumiere. *Ayın Tarihi*, 19 November 1995.

The Crack in the Çiller Government: Privatization vs. Democratization

Economic privatization was cited as the main economic aim of the new government. In order to accomplish the completion of the Customs Treaty with the EU, the government had to prepare a full-fledged privatization program. The State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were taken into the speedy privatization program. The ones which were not privatized were to be sold.⁸¹ The SHP was against the privatization of the SEEs, which in this period along with the privatization law became one of the main arenas of disagreement between the SHP and the DYP.

Not only the SHP, but also the upper level bureaucrats were against Çiller's speedy privatization program. The SHP and bureaucrats argued that this kind of privatization would damage the Turkish economy. Privatization should not mean the selling of the SEEs below price.

The opponents of Çiller's privatization program who were also high level bureaucrats showed their displeasure by resigning. Rüştü Saraçoğlu, who criticized Çiller's economic plans strongly and resigned from the chairmanship of the Central Bank. He argued that by printing money, a country could not escape from inflation and resigned, declaring that the political authority could not make visionary future oriented policies. The undersecretary of the State Planning Agency, İlhan Kesici, left his office too, stating the same criticism.⁸² Despite the harsh criticisms, Çiller enacted the privatization law with her own efforts. Çiller's act arguing the draft on the privatization of bank was formed by the will of the cabinet. Murat Karayalçın

⁸¹The Program of the 50th Government of Turkish Republic, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp50.htm> [18 May 2009]

⁸² *Cumhuriyet*, 1 February 1994.

noted that, “whatever they want is fulfilled by us, however when we ask for something, they resist and object.”⁸³

According to Çiller, the opponents of the privatization law were responsible to the Turkish citizens for their wrong act.⁸⁴ The future of Turkey was tied to privatization. In her messages, Çiller included everything from privatization to the unity of people, from democracy to the call for Islam. She defended herself even she was isolated by the social democrats; she did everything she could for the benefit of the Turkish citizens. She sought to appeal to more nationalist and right wing masses by highlighting more religious, Islamic and nationalist messages. She was aware that the discourse would draw the support of the conservative classes who held important amounts of capital that were needed for the privatization of the SSEs.

There is God’s mercy in unity, there is pain in separation. I repeat the call for unity once more, I ask every one, every confident person, who is for holy war for Islam, every nationalist, everyone who believe in restructuring, privatization, democratization to shelter together. Let’s be together, so that the victory is ours.⁸⁵

⁸³ *Onlar ne isterlerse biz yerine getiriyoruz. Ama bizimde arkadaşların bir isteği olduğunda hemen direnip reste başlıyorlar. Cumhuriyet, 26 October 1994.*

⁸⁴ *Cumhuriyet, 5 October 1994.*

⁸⁵ *Birlikten rahmet doğar, ayrılıktan azap gelir, Birlik çağrısını bir kez daha bütün herkese yapıyorum bütün herkesi bütün inanmışları bütün mükeddasatçıları bütün milliyetçileri yeniden yapılanmaya özelleştirmeye demokratikleşmeye inananları hepsini bir çatı altına bir kez daha davet ediyorum; gelin beraber olalım güçlü olalım ki zafer bizim olsun. Cumhuriyet, 5 November 1994.*

The View of TÜSİAD during Turkey's Integration to the CU

In 1971, TÜSİAD (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*), Turkish Industrialist's and Businessmen's Association, a group of businessmen gathered to found the first voluntary business association in Turkey. According to Tuba İnci Aydın, The foundation of TÜSİAD in 1970s was a result of the development of the private sector through the 1950s and 1960s and aimed to contribute to the idea that business could benefit from the government authorities.⁸⁶ From the foundation onwards, the members of the TÜSİAD would present a united discourse towards the government. As cited by Öniş, TÜSİAD has had a pro-EU approach in recent years; hence, it has been contributed to be a part of the Europhile camp. Its attitude in Turkey's CU process was significant.⁸⁷

With the demise of communism in the post-cold war world, TÜSİAD followed the trends in neo-liberal globalization. Moreover, with the success of capitalism, the powerful actors in the world became sensitive about capitalist values such as democracy, individual liberties, and human rights. The powerful supranational and non-governmental organizations challenged the domestic politics of the nation states with the transnational trends. For the business and political elites in Turkey, being isolated from those trends would have meant to be isolated from international norms and values in politics and the economy.⁸⁸ TÜSİAD re-defined its role in Turkish society with the coming trends of globalization and Turkey's

⁸⁶ Tuba İnci Aydın, "TÜSİAD in the 1990 s: The Story of a Transformation" (M. A. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001), p.50.

⁸⁷ Ziya Öniş, "Entrepreneurs, Democracy and the European Union: the Changing Nature of State-Business Relations in Turkey." In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, ed. E.F. Keyman and A. İçduygu (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 174.

⁸⁸ Öniş, p. 176.

integration to Europe. According to Öniş and Türem, in the 1990s, TÜSİAD started to develop its political preferences by pointing to its priorities in the economy with the motive of Turkey's democratization.

Emre Soysal concentrates on the role of TÜSİAD on Turkey's relations with the EU at the start of the 1990s. Starting with the 1980s, TÜSİAD, by preparing reports and conferences, began to move the significant debates on the economy and politics in Turkey.⁸⁹ In the process of Turkey's CU integration, TÜSİAD founded direct relations with the counters in Europe. Through these channels, by 1990s, TÜSİAD was a candidate to take an active position in Turkey's relations with the EC. In 1993, when Turkey's entrance to the CU started to dominate Turkish politics, the position that TÜSİAD would take in Turkey's entrance to the CU was an issue of concern.

According to Gürpınar, the process in which TÜSİAD became the significant actor in the foreign politics overlapped the process of the CU. In the 1980s, after the import substitution industrialization was started to be abandoned, export oriented industrialization started to be adopted. In 1987, after Turkey's application for EU membership, the business circles began to be interested in the macro political and economic issues in Turkey with an outward attitude. Turkish businessmen were interested in the CU since they acknowledged that the high technology for which they were looking was in the EU and the effect of the EU's economy on the world trade. The foreign policy perspective of TÜSİAD developed vis-à-vis the economic

⁸⁹ For more information see, Emre Sosyal, "The impact of TÜSİAD on the European Union relations of Turkey (1995-2005)" (M.A. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007).

developments both in Turkey and in the world. The preference of the TÜSİAD was always the stability of the domestic market and firmness of the internal market.⁹⁰

Tuba İnci Aydın states that despite the general approach of TUSİAD of being committed to the Turkey's integration to EU membership, TÜSİAD did not display a monolithic discourse. One group in TÜSİAD argued that the Turkish economy was not ready to compete with the European firms.⁹¹ Especially after the 1994 economic crises, TÜSİAD was determined to protect the position of the business leaders.⁹²

Çiller was aware of the need to secure the support of the private sector in order to fulfill and initiate the economic reforms. As far as privatization was concerned, Çiller sought for the support of Vehbi Koç and Sakıp Sabancı, the owners of the two most prominent holding companies in Turkey, since she stated that she would make her first proposal about the privatization to big business groups. She continued to claim there was no other choice but to privatize the SSEs to compensate for the 70 billion Turkish liras deficit.⁹³

On June 18, 1993, right after Çiller's election, the representatives of the private sector, such as the Istanbul Chambers, (İKV) the Economic Development Foundation, (TOBB) the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges by organizing a meeting with Çiller, tried to propose a plan for Turkey's CU membership.⁹⁴ The President of TÜSİAD, Halis Komili, stated that from time to

⁹⁰ Bulut Gürpınar, " Türkiye Dış Politikasında Bir Aktör: TÜSİAD." In *Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika: Yeni Sorunlar, Yeni Aktörler*, ed. S. C. Mazlum and E. Doğan (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2006), pp. 235-236.

⁹¹ Aydın, p. 65.

⁹² Soysal, p.73.

⁹³ *Hürriyet*, 23 July 1993.

⁹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 June 1993.

time, in TÜSİAD's meetings "Turkey should become part of the CU Treaty with the EU."⁹⁵ Also, he visited Brussels in order to get in touch with the EU and EP.⁹⁶

With the economic crisis of 1994, the economic sectors were more skeptical about Çiller's economic policies. The owners of big businesses like Koç continued support Çiller. However, The Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce in the different cities and regions demanded the help of Çiller in order to live through the economic hard ships.⁹⁷ In 1995, the big business leaders like Koç and Sabancı supported Çiller by declaring that "Turkey had no other alternative except becoming the member of the CU."⁹⁸

In the critical days of Turkey's CU negotiations, cleavages within TÜSİAD emerged. According to Aydın, TÜSİAD separated into two camps one made up of the older-generation, which had strong ties with the integrity of the state; and the other, the younger-generation who had a more flexible attitude towards the state. The younger group was more open to economic reforms and had great concern about Turkey's democratization and Turkey's membership in the EU.⁹⁹ After the signing of the CU Treaty, TÜSİAD emerged as an institution which initiated "economic diplomacy"¹⁰⁰ in Turkey and opened an office in Brussels.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ *GB' ye mutlaka Geçilmeli, Hürriyet*, 16 October 1994.

⁹⁶ *Aydın Tarihi*, 16 July 1995.

⁹⁷ (*The Presidents of the TOBB, Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges*) *Hürriyet*, 5 September 1994.

⁹⁸ *Milliyet*, 14 July 1995, 5 September 1994.

⁹⁹ Aydın, p.65.

¹⁰⁰ Serap Atan, "Europeanization of Peak Business Organizations and Turkey EU relations," *In Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues*, ed. M. Uğur and N. Canefe, (London; New York: Routledge), p.105.

¹⁰¹ For more information see the official website of TÜSİAD available at [online] www.tusiad.org.

The Different Views in the Print Media in the Process of Turkey's Integration to the CU

The different viewpoints in the media will be grouped in three broad categories: the center/ the mass media with *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet*, the left media with *Cumhuriyet*, and the right media with *Zaman*.

When the outlook of the print media is examined in general, the antagonism vs. support of Turkey's membership to the CU seem to have depended on the developments in the EU and the decisions of the European Parliament related to Turkey. A rough separation can be made between the ones with a more flexible attitude towards the issues and the others with a more rigid attitude towards national integrity and the indivisibility of the Turkish nation-state.

During this period the attitude of the mass media, *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, was gradually moving towards a flexible attitude about Turkey's integration. The content of the news articles overlapped with the developments taking place in Turkish internal politics and in the EU. In this part of the study, the acts and decisions of the Çiller government and the decisions of the European Parliament about Turkey's politics will be discussed in terms of their reflections in the print media. For instance; when the European Parliament decided on a censure resolution for the PKK's activities, the mass media showed a more proponent attitude towards the Union whereas when the Parliament showed its opposition to the abolition of DEP MPs and criticized their trial, the mass media published news articles criticizing the comment of the European Parliament.

In July 1993, right after Çiller's election, a relatively positive atmosphere between the European Parliament and the Turkish government came to be in terms of the Kurdish identity problem. The Turkish government was preparing to enact a law

for PKK members which would give the general amnesty to the ones who given up illegal PKK activities. In this period, the print media in Turkey was more optimistic about the future of the Turkey's integration to the EU. The general view of *Zaman* seemed hopeful that in the future, the European Parliament would take Turkey's side on the Kurdish problem when this effort of the Turkish government did not go unnoticed by the EU that the European Parliament was getting ready for condemning the PKK.¹⁰²

The general view of *Hürriyet* agreed with the general outlook in *Zaman*.

The European Parliament is getting ready to contemplate a censure resolution for the PKK. The draft of Liberals in the Parliament was prepared by showing the PKK as the reason of the murders of the thousands of the people. In the draft of the decisions, it was denoted that the Turkish government had granted amnesty to the PKK militants had given up the violent actions whereas the terror did not end.¹⁰³

Especially after Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch and the Council of Europe, kept an eye on Turkey on human rights and reflected in their report the human rights record of Turkey, the news articles concerning the subjects widely took place in newspapers from different perspectives. The most significant issues for these international organizations were the violations of human rights in Turkey such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture in prisons.¹⁰⁴ The European Union drew attention to these reports directly related with the DEP case and Kurdish identity problem in Turkey.

Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE); decided to send a committee for the DEP case. The Council also declared to the

¹⁰² *Zaman*, 12 July 1993.

¹⁰³ *Hürriyet* 12 July 1993.

¹⁰⁴ For a full discussion of these points see, Human Rights Watch, *Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey*, (New York : Human Rights Watch, 1999).pp.51-70.

closure of the DEP had been a political mistake, that the Turkish Grand National Assembly should make Constitutional reform, and that the crimes that led to the imprisonment of the DEP members be questioned and their immunity status returned.¹⁰⁵

While these developments took place in Turkey, the European Parliament prepared a report based on giving Kurds autonomous rights. The report was expected to be prepared according to the observations of the reporter of the European Parliament, Marc Galle. Galle was making interviews with the former DEP members of the parliament who were kept in custody, state authorities, and attorney generals of the State Security Courts. However, the European Parliament did not wait for the end of the report in order to give the decision about Turkey. The decision argued that the restraint of the Turkish state of DEP members led the Kurdish people to embrace the PKK. The European Parliament proposed the release of the old DEP parliamentarians in order to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem.¹⁰⁶

The news article continued with the content of the decision that the DEP members of the Parliament who had been kept in custody should be released.

Shame on You, Europe!

After the European Parliament decided to send a committee to investigate human rights in Turkey, yesterday the European Security and Cooperation Conference, in which the USA and Russia are members, gave an advisory decision with heavy decisions against Turkey with a majority vote.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1994.

¹⁰⁶ *Hürriyet*, 11 March 1994.

¹⁰⁷ *Ayıp Sana Avrupa (Shame On You, Europe) Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun Türkiye de İnsan Haklarını incelemek amacıyla bir heyet gönderme kararının ardından dün de ABD ve Rusya da üye oldukları Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı toplantısında Tr aleyhinde oy çokluğuyla ağır kararlar içeren bir tavsiye kararı alındı. Hürriyet*, 9 July 1994.

The EU's censure resolution on Turkey was based on giving freedom to DEP members who had been kept in custody and giving the Kurdish people freedoms. After the case of the DEP, the DEP parliamentarians' imprisonment aroused the EP's reaction against Turkey. The EU decided to delay the signing of the CU with Turkey until March 1995.¹⁰⁸

The news articles about the development criticized the decision of the European Parliament. According to *Hürriyet* the decision was full of mistakes, one of which stemmed from mentioning the old DEP parliamentarians imprisoned. The Parliament also found the Turkish Grand National Assembly responsible for lifting the immunities of the DEP members of the parliament. The European Parliament characterized this act as endangering the political plurality. The political pressures and the denial of the rights of the peoples of southeast Turkey would only lead to the support of the PKK by the Kurdish minority.¹⁰⁹

This atmosphere started to become worse with the decisions of the European Parliament about the Turkish politics related to the Kurdish identity. The European Parliament kept an eye on the lift of immunities of the DEP members of the parliament and the DEP case. Especially, the harsh criticism of the Parliament was directed towards Turkey when the DEP members of the parliament were sued in the case for the closure of the DEP on September 28, 1994. This decision drew the attention of Parliament which was used to seeing the DEP as the only way for the political solution of the Kurdish problem. The European Parliament decided the

¹⁰⁸ Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy", in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. L. G. Martin and D. Keridis (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004), p. 290.

¹⁰⁹ *Hürriyet*, 11 March 1994.

Turkey-European Parliament Joint Committee would suspend relations with Turkey by using the pretext of the DEP and members of the DEP trial.¹¹⁰

When the Turkish government continued the same identity politics towards the Kurdish identity and closed the political channels for the solution of the Kurdish problem, after the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the European Council at the Essen Summit expressed the expectation of the EU regarding Turkey's advances in Turkey's Kurdish problem.¹¹¹

In 1995, both the government and the print media were preoccupied with the Turkey's integration to the CU more than ever. The proponents and supporters of Turkey's integration strengthened their arguments as the date for Turkey's entrance approached. The articles in the newspapers pointed out the possibilities and impossibilities of the membership in the CU and how important it was to use the time efficiently in which could be the last chance for Turkey.

Zaman wrote "The Twelve Barriers for the CU; the evaluation which was prepared by Murat Karayağın and submitted to Tansu Çiller was based on the principles that the European Union asked from Turkey. Three of the twelve conditions have been discussed by the news article in *Zaman*: "To fulfill the legal regulations for the freedom of thought; to realize the regulations for guaranteeing the human rights; to release the DEP members of parliament."¹¹²

As the meeting of the Joint Council on March 6 approached the discussion between the newspapers intensified. *Zaman* and *Cumhuriyet* gave the harshest

¹¹⁰ *Ayın Tarihi*, 29 September 1994.

¹¹¹ Harun Arıkan, "A Lost Opportunity? A Critique of the EU's Human Rights Policy towards Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no.1 (2002), p.35.

¹¹² *Düşünce özgürlüğü için yasal düzenlemelerin gerçekleştirilmesi, İnsan haklarını güvenceye alacak düzenlemelerin hayata geçirilmesi, DEP milletvekillerinin serbest bırakılması, Zaman*, 10 January 1995.

criticisms about certain drawbacks that Turkey should come across. The news articles in *Zaman* warned the government not to accept the CU under those circumstances.

Without being a full member of the Union, being only the partner of the Customs Union Treaty, meant a unilateral transfer of the sovereignty of the state. The government was criticized for playing the card of secular Turkey as opposed to Muslim Turkey. *Zaman* was particularly offended by the comment of Jacques Delors, who stated that “the EU is a Christian club.”¹¹³

The era of concession for the CU started”.¹¹⁴ No matter how much we consider ourselves European or include ourselves in the European geography, because they do not see us as being of them, they have found excuses to reject our requests.¹¹⁵

In this period, *Cumhuriyet* started the year by discussing of the drawbacks of the Union itself. After the fourth widening wave of the European Union in 1995, which fulfilled the integration of Austria, Finland and Sweden, *Cumhuriyet* claimed that the wider the Union became, the greater the disagreements that emerged between the countries came into the existence.¹¹⁶ The general outlook of *Cumhuriyet* aimed to call attention to the drawback of the full membership such as transferring the sovereignty of the state to a supranational body by restricting the role of the state.

¹¹³ *Zaman*, 5 March 1995.

¹¹⁴ GB için taviz devri başladı. *Zaman* 29 January 1995.

¹¹⁵ *Biz ne kadar kendimizi Avrupalı saysakta Avrupa coğrafyasına dahil etsekte onlar bizleri kendilerinden saymadıkları için binbir çeşit sudan ve mahirane bahanelerle bizim isteğimizi geri çevirmek isterler ve geri çevirmişlerdir.* Selçuk Özçelik, “Gümrük Birliği Hakkında (About Customs Union)” *Zaman*, 18 March 1995.

¹¹⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 1 January 1995.

Turkey's integration to the CU was discussed through its reflections on the international arena by its opponents. "The CU will bring trouble to Turkey,"¹¹⁷ *Zaman* declared. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Greece claimed that for Turkey the real difficulty would start after joining CU. Turkey had to face the European Parliament, which was a sensitive institution in human rights.¹¹⁸ "We are entering the CU with our eyes closed,"¹¹⁹ *Zaman* wrote. If Turkey entered the CU without being included in the political decision-making organs, it would not have the veto right in Brussels. Turkey would be forced to take part in an international organization even though it could not represent itself.

However, the proponents of Turkey's integration to the CU like *Milliyet* drew a different picture, saying,

Yes to the CU. Defending the CU means to defend the new world, the new life and the new Turkey. The strategic step, the CU is the station where the train of the EU stops.¹²⁰ Customs Union will change our lives. After the lift of the veto of Greece, the Customs Union with the Turkey and the European Union seems certain.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ *GB Türkiye'nin başına iş açacak. Zaman*, 15 March 1995.

¹¹⁸ *Zaman*, 15 March 1995.

¹¹⁹ *GB'ye Gözü Kapalı Giriyoruz. Zaman*, 12 March 1995.

¹²⁰ *GB'yi savunmak yenedünyayı, yeni hayatı, yeni Türkiye'yi savunmak anlamına geliyor. Stratejik basamak, GB, AB treninin durduğu en son istasyon. Hürriyet*, 2 March 1995.

¹²¹ *Gümrük birliği hayatımızı değiştirecek. Yunanistan'ın vetosunu kaldırmasından sonra Tr ile Ab arasındaki Gümrük Birliği kesin görünüyor. Milliyet*, 1 March 1995.

The Dilemma of Privatization in the Print Media

The print media discussed the economic side of the Customs Union Treaty in terms of costs and benefits. *Milliyet* did not position itself against liberal economy whereas it criticized the governments' failure in handling the economy. On the anniversary of the January 24 decisions, the economic imbalances, inflation and poverty of low classes were discussed.¹²² At that point, by criticizing the current situation of the economic drawbacks, *Milliyet* was not against the liberal economy although it was against the government's improper decisions about handling the economy.

Zaman supported the economic liberalization and also economic integration in general. Alternative economic integration models were discussed. Economic liberalization would mean finding sources for strengthening the economy; in the end, the Turkish state would be stronger towards and in the European integration. *Zaman*'s argument was not against and did not compromise the stronger and unified Turkish state. An alternative integration partner was given in Pacific countries, with mainly Japan as follows

Why should relations with Japan stay in the Toyota production of Turkey? Turkey can be a significant trade partner in the Middle East with Japan. Although the visit of the Prime Minister aims to make treaties with Japan, the main aim is able to be formulated as Turkey's westernization by getting power from the East, which is on the eve of entering the Customs Union.¹²³

¹²² *Milliyet*, 24 January 1994.

¹²³ *Pasifik ten Güç Alarak GB ye girmek; Türk-Japon ilişkileri Neden Türkiye'nin Toyota üretiminden ibaret kalsın, Türkiye özellikler orta doğu da Japonların çok önemli bir partneri olabilir. Başbakan'ın Japonya ziyareti Japonya ile antlaşmalar yapmak olsa da asıl amaç Gümrük Birliği'ni imzalama eşliğinde olan Türkiye'nin doğudan güç alarak batılılaşması şeklinde formüle edilebilir.* (Integration to the Customs Union by taking heart from Pacific) *Zaman*, 4 March 1995.

The general outlook in *Cumhuriyet* was not against Turkey's integration to the Union. This stance, however, was challenged when the government first declared its foreign policy elements. The government's priority to lead the Turkish economy into liberalism through a speedy privatization without fulfilling the needs of the internal market was the main doubt according to the general view. Especially *Cumhuriyet* held that political disadvantages would come along with the economic advantages. Also, the Union's effect on member states' foreign policy decisions were discussed in terms of giving the states' independence to a supranational authority. For this reason, Turkey's Customs Union Treaty was seen by the left wing viewpoint in the *Cumhuriyet* as a form of capitulations.

Cumhuriyet regarded privatization immoral in countries like Turkey where the gap between the regions were high. Privatization was starting to become the policy of the state just to make some people richer. Especially the SEEs were founded with the taxes that had been gathered from the Turkish citizens. The general opinion of *Cumhuriyet* was based on examinations of the socioeconomic aspects of the liberal economy. The association of its argument with unfair and unequal earning was for the benefit of owners of large scale industry.¹²⁴

Milliyet declared 1995 significant for the accession to the Customs Union; the government should organize the economy and market before accession.¹²⁵ Economically, the most integrated level of society, the owners of large scale industry, would benefit from the free trade with European countries through the Customs Union. The cooperation of the government, especially Çiller's close relationship with the owners of large scale industry, was criticized by *Milliyet* daily.

¹²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 14 February 1995.

¹²⁵ *Milliyet*, 27 January 1995.

Especially, in the first days of Çiller's prime ministry, when the origins of the cooperation were seeded, *Milliyet* reflected its discomfort. Çiller's preference to create personal and close relations through dinners held on her yacht was a criticized act.¹²⁶

From the economic side, the integration to the CU was discussed in terms of the damages it would bring to the Turkish economy. Without being a member of the EU being the member of the CU was seen as being problematic. *Milliyet* cited the social disadvantages in terms of unemployment, new taxes, and cheap labor force.¹²⁷

We are being indexed to the EU in foreign policy. Since Turkey would not become a full member of the EU, it would not have a say in political decisions. Turkey would close its alternative markets.¹²⁸

Zaman known for its Islamic leanings published an article titled "The Dreadlock of Turkey and the EC" where the daily reflected the general inefficiency of the Turkish economy.¹²⁹ After a while, the newspaper discussed the same issue on the news article titled "the hard days of Çiller," which highlighted the disagreement between the SHP and the DYP on the privatization of the SEEs.¹³⁰

The bargaining started in the CU. The treaty between the Joint Council and Turkey came to an irrevocable point. The private sector wanted the deficit which would stem from Turkey's membership in the CU to be compensated by the government."¹³¹

¹²⁶ *O da iş adamlarını yatına bindiriyor, Milliyet, 17 August 1993.*

¹²⁷ *Milliyet, 22 February 1995.*

¹²⁸ *Zaman 18 January 1994.*

¹²⁹ *Türkiye-AT Çıkmazı, Zaman 8 June 1993.*

¹³⁰ *Çiller' in zor günleri, Zaman 20 June 1993.*

¹³¹ *GB' de pazarlık başladı. Türkiye ile Ortaklık Konseyi arasında imzalanan çerçeve antlaşması GB'ye geçişi geri dönülmez bir noktaya getirdi. Özel kesim Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği de uğrayacağı zararın telafisi için AT ile Başbakan Yardımcısı düzeyinde yapılmasını istiyor. Hürriyet, 11 November 1993.*

Cumhuriyet drew attention to the economic problems of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union such as the increase in the foreign investment, inflation, and the problem of the external debt.¹³²

The sale of the SEEs first came on to the agenda during the office of the departed President Özal. However, SODEP¹³³ was against the privatization. Çiller is the first Prime Minister who had wanted privatization the most and showed the greatest effort. Like ANAP, Çiller wants to fulfill the privatization through decree laws...In the end, yesterday the privatization law was enacted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly after 11 year effort.¹³⁴

The general view of the *Milliyet* was not satisfied with Çiller's regulation of the Turkish economy. In January 1994, the news was related to the ineffectiveness of Çiller's economic decisions. The privatization program to supply the deficiency of the public expenditures was criticized due to the unprofitable discharge of the SEEs. The newspaper also published a news article to show its harsh criticism on how the January 24 decision had led the way to a liberal economy.¹³⁵

In conclusion, the entrance of the Customs Union, Turkey's membership was interpreted in terms of democratization, the Kurdish problem as a minority problem, the rule of law, human rights and its negative impacts on Turkish economy; where as liberal trends in the Turkish economy and privatization were encouraged. The Customs treaty, signed on March 6, 1995, was the last phase of Turkey's candidacy process as foreseen in the Ankara Treaty.

¹³² *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1993.

¹³³ Social Democracy Party (Social Democracy Party) was established after the 1980 military coup in order to own the base of Republican People Party which was closed by the same coup.

¹³⁴ *Özelleştirme Yasası Tamam, Kitlerin satışı ilk merhum Cumhurbaşkanı Özal zamanında gündeme getirildi. Ancak SODEP özelleştirmeye kaşı çıktı. Çiller ise özelleştirmeyi en fazla arzu eden ve bu konuda en çok uğraş veren Başbakan oldu. Çiller ANAP gibi özelleştirmeyi Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerle yapmaya çalıştı. ... Sonunda özelleştirme yası TBMM den dün gece yarısı 11 yıllık bir uğraştan sonra nihayet yasaladı. Hürriyet, 24 November1994.*

¹³⁵ *Milliyet*, 24 January 1994.

In this chapter of the study, the intra-elite debate over Turkey's integration to the CU was examined. The major significance of the period was the existence of a strong Eurosceptic view among political parties. The general discourse of the parties was very sensitive about the unitary state model. Even the Euro-enthusiastic segments of the elite were fragmented in terms of the need for democratization of Turkey. Çiller, in this structure, with no option but to increase the tone of the strong state concept in her discourse, promised all levels of Turkish society to integrate in the CU while protecting the unitary essence. Of course, as the leader of the center right party, she owned this flexible discourse together with the will to lead.

It is observed that in the process of the integration to the Customs Union, TÜSİAD, despite having no monolithic discourse, agreed with the government. The Çiller government benefitted from the pro-EU approach of TÜSİAD together with that of other business associations. The mass media did not display a monolithic or stable discourse; however *Zaman* and *Cumhuriyet* had more rigid attitudes towards the Union. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* chose to emphasize the benefits of integration to the EU. In addition, Turkey's membership in the Customs Union, despite its disadvantages, would be the first step in its becoming a full member. Despite the different points of view of the Turkish media studied in the chapter, it was seen that the actions of the Çiller government were not criticized and, more important than that, the discourse of the print media overlapped with the discourse of the government. The print media, with its different leanings, were against only Çiller's economy program of privatization, which was the most, criticized governmental action of the period.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DISCOURSE OF THE ÇILLER GOVERNMENT IN IDENTITY POLITICS DURING THE PROCESS OF TURKEY'S INTEGRATION TO THE CU

*We do not permit or tolerate anyone who has his eyes on our territory, livelihood, bread, flag, ezan, freedom, sovereignty, peace, security and unity or integrity.*¹³⁶

This part of the study focuses on the discourse of Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller on identity issues in domestic politics. The period is particularly interesting as DEP was in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). As discussed earlier, Çiller did not want to compromise the strong unitary state in domestic politics. The dichotomy in her discourse stemmed from the fact that she insisted on democracy, liberalism and European values when she used her European card while insisting on security and a strong state in domestic politics. This chapter will reflect on this dichotomy in Çiller's discourse.

The Discourses of the Coalition

The Outlook of the DYP: The Continuity of the Center Right Tradition in Turkish Politics

The democratization of Turkish politics started with the transition to the multiparty political system in 1946. Until 1946, the Republican People's Party (CHP) was the only party in power. The ideology of the CHP was based mainly on Kemalist principles and social democracy. Kemalism was the essence of principles which the

¹³⁶ *Toprağımıza, aşımıza, ekmeğimize, bayrağımıza, ezanımıza, özgürlüğümüze, egemenliğimize, huzurumuza, güvenliğimize, birliğimize, bütünlüğümüze göz dikene izin ve aman vermeyiz.* Çiller ve Çiller, p.143.

Turkish nation-state was founded on. The party's ideology was based on establishing an independent country in an evolutionary way and was against imperialism and colonialism. Due to its statist features, the ideology of the party can be seen as a move to the left. In time, the CHP became a party of the center left.

The Democrat Party (DP) led the party change in Turkish political history by winning the 1950 elections, yet it was closed with the 1960 military coup. The DP separated itself from the Republicans by putting emphasis on religious freedoms, populism, and different economy policies. The party claimed that it would be respectful to Islam. With all its characteristics, the party was a candidate to be the voice of the right, of the conservative people who had not been able to voice their demands during the Republican Party period.¹³⁷

After the absence of democracy for three years as a result of the military coup, the Justice Party was founded by claiming that it was the continuity of the DP. After the 1980 military *coup*, the AP changed its name to *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party) DYP. The DYP's line was declared to be the protection of the integrity of the Turkish nation-state, which was defined as a democratic, secular, social and legal state. Also in the party program, the party explained its commitment to Kemalist principles, to boost the national welfare, social justice, social security, the protection of national, moral and spiritual values and democracy.¹³⁸ Given these characteristics, the party was a candidate to represent the center right in Turkish politics.

¹³⁷ Binnaz Toprak. "Dinci Sağ." In *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* ed. İ. C. Schick, E. A. Tonak (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), p.237.

¹³⁸ Sedat Akay, *12 Eylül Darbe Yıllarında Bir Kurucu Üyenin Anılarından: Bir Partinin Kuruluşu: DYP ve Kurucular Albümü* (Istanbul: Prestij Matbaacılık, 2008), p.109

The Outlook of the SHP in Domestic Politics

In the 1970s, the CHP challenged its political view as the democratic left or the social democracy. After the 1980 military coup, the CHP was closed down like the other political parties. After civil order was re-established, the cadre who defined themselves as social democrats split from the democratic left. By this act, two parties became active in Turkish political life, the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*) SHP and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*) DSP.¹³⁹ In fact, the SHP was established by the combination of two parties the People's Party (*Halkçı Parti*) HP, and the Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*) SODEP in 1985. The parties were joined in the general elections in 1983 just after the establishment of the political order.¹⁴⁰

The SHP, under the leadership of Erdal İnönü, argued for individual, civil, social and political rights while realizing the rule of law, democratization, and changing the state-centric 1982 constitution to empower the individual against the state.¹⁴¹ After the retirement İnönü from office, Murat Karayalçın became the chairman of the party, and a minister of state and deputy prime minister in the Çiller government.

The ideology of the SHP was based on the promotion of the cultural rights of the Kurds and the Alevi identities since the SHP version of social democracy brought the need for liberal economic reform together with increasing the welfare of every

¹³⁹Sencer Ayata, Ayşe Güneş Ayata, "The Center-Left Parties in Turkey", *Turkish Studies* 8, no.2 (June 2007), pp. 211-212.

¹⁴⁰ Akay, pp.45-47.

¹⁴¹ Akay, pp. 216-217.

citizen and the expansion of the liberal state. This liberal approach of the SHP also affected the identity politics of the coalition, bringing the ethnicity demands of Kurds, religion and identity matters such as minority rights as well as a search for political solutions to the Kurdish problem to the center of national politics.¹⁴²

The Party Program and the Formation of Çiller Government

The 50th government of the Turkish Republic, the first Tansu Çiller government, was a coalition of the DYP and the SHP. The Prime Minister was Tansu Çiller, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister was Murat Karayalçın after the retirement of Erdal İnönü on September 12, 1993, and the State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister was Hikmet Çetin. The first Çiller government remained in office from June 25, 1993 until October 5, 1995.

As was discussed in the second chapter, together with the international trends, Turkey's membership to the EU brought significant requirements. The first Çiller government also had to face many significant problems such as inflation in economy, the change in the constitution, and privatization, and the opening of the private radio and television channels.¹⁴³

The most identifying characteristic of the Çiller government was the emphasis on the concept of the unitary state. According to Çiller, a strong state was related to security and strategy considerations. The program of the government was based on the foreign and internal policy objectives of the newly founded coalition in light of "a strong state concept". The program of the first Çiller government guaranteed the integrity of Turkish nation state's territory and nation.

¹⁴²Ayata and Ayata, p. 217.

¹⁴³ *Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1993.

In today's democracies, the most significant threat to the rights and liberties come from violence and terror. We moved forward against the terror in the Southeast Anatolia which has been going on for years. Nobody should have any doubts; this problem will be solved by respecting to the rule of law. This problem is our problem, it is the problem of our state, and everybody should contribute.¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, she was devoted to Turkey's integration to the EU; she argued that Turkey would have a place in European integration while protecting the national and religious values.¹⁴⁵

We think that putting a well grounded security and cooperation in the continent-wide is necessary for the success of the European integration movement. The future of the European Union will be fulfilled only if it includes Turkey. Our government will show the greatest effort for developing the full membership perspective with the EU and also being a full member of the Union in terms of European security and its defense identity. The Customs Union between Turkey and the Community which will be planned to come into effect in 1995 will be a significant part of our effort.¹⁴⁶

Turkey's activism was connected to the existence of a strong state, according to Çiller. In her government program, Çiller drew a picture of Turkey's multidimensional relations with the neighbors and regional integrations in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Black Sea. The establishment of friendly

¹⁴⁴ *Günümüz demokrasilerinde hak ve özgürlüklere yönelik en önemli tehdit, şiddet ve terörden gelmektedir. Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgemizde yıllardır devam eden teröre karşı önemli mesafe alınmıştır. Hiç kimsenin kuşkusuz olmasın, bu sorun hukuka saygılı kalınarak mutlaka çözümlenecektir. Bu hepimizin sorunudur, devletimizin sorunudur ve herkesin katkısı gerekir.* Tansu Çiller, 50th Government Program, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp50.htm> [16 May 2009]

¹⁴⁵ Ümit Cizre, "Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy." In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* ed. M. Heper and S. Sayari (Lanham, Md. : Lexington Books, 2002), p.208.

¹⁴⁶ *Kıta genelinde güvenlik ve işbirliğinin sağlam ve kalıcı emellere oturtulmasının, Avrupa bütünleşme hareketinin başarısı için de zorunlu olduğu görüşündeyiz. Geleceğin Avrupa Birliği ancak Türkiye'yi de kapsayan doğal boyutları içerisinde gerçekleşebilir. Hükümetimiz, Avrupa Topluluğu ile ilişkilerimizin, tam üyelik perspektifi doğrultusunda geliştirilmesi ile Türkiye'nin Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma kimliği bağlamında da tam üye olarak yer alması yönünde azami çaba gösterecektir. Türkiye ile Topluluk arasında 1995'de yürürlüğe girmesi öngörülen gümrük birliğinin gerçekleşmesi, bu çabalarımızın önemli bir aşamasını oluşturacaktır.* Tansu Çiller, 50th Government Program, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/hp50.htm> [16 May 2009]

relations with all countries was cited, but Turkey's European integration was put at the center of the foreign policy aim. This notion of establishing strong relations with all of the neighboring countries and the EU was again a reflection of the strong state vision.

Her attitude towards religion was remarkable to cite here. From the start of her office, in her messages, she distanced herself from religion by saying the clue that she would be respectful of religious values. During her term, while giving messages which advocated laicism and secular view, as will be seen in the Alevi identity problems in this chapter, Çiller displayed a pro-Sunni view.

The existence of the religious people, or different religious groups and Atheists are not the business of the "laic state." The duty of the state is not to be a part among these groups, however, is to protect the freedom of religion and conscience. The partiality is the destruction of the laicism by the state.¹⁴⁷

Towards the end of 1995, the government change led to many problems. Especially when the government could not be founded due to the conflicts in the coalition parties, the political instability was a matter of questioning. The Second Çiller government was a minority government that failed to receive a vote of confidence and remained in office only between November 5, 1995 and November 30, 1995. The Third Çiller government which was the 53rd government of the Turkish Republic was founded with a coalition between the CHP and the DYP under the Prime Ministry of Tansu Çiller and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Ministry of Deniz Baykal. This coalition stayed in power from November 30, 1995 to March 6, 1996. In February 18, 1995, SHP and CHP came together under the name of the CHP. The third Çiller government was significant in terms of

¹⁴⁷ *Toplumda dindarların, çeşitli inanç gruplarının veya inançsızların varlığı "laik devleti" ilgilendirmez. Devletin görevi bu gruplar arasında taraf olmak değil, herkes için din ve vicdan hürriyetini korumaktır. Tarafgirlik, laikliğin devlet eliyle tahribi demektir.* Tansu Çiller, *Demokrasi ve Değişim Söylemleri*, p.185.

Turkey's relationship with the EU, with a fact that the coalition government signed Turkey's Customs Union Treaty with the European Union.

Çiller's political understanding was to be liberal and right wing. From the first day of her prime ministry she was devoted to uniting the center right, giving significance to economic liberalism as a continuity of Özal's vision of the economy and entering intergovernmental organizations as she specified her will to complete the Ankara agreement with the EU.

Turgut Özal, the founder of the ANAP, had always exerted the interests of the middle class and conservatism with a Sunni-Islam understanding, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy. Çiller aimed to be the leader of the center right in domestic politics with a view to the DYP resembling Turgut Özal's ANAP party instead of Demirel's DYP. In terms of economic vision too, Çiller's position resembled Özal's economic model advocating a competitive market economy.¹⁴⁸

As Çiller expressed her ideas about nationalism right after her election, she had formulated a populist nationalism which was a continuity of Özal's definition of nationalism. "My nationalism is the love of my country and making reforms which will put Turkey in a modern place. This is not related to any other approaches. That is no more than the love of my country."¹⁴⁹ In that definition, Çiller seemed to have had an embracing and a hopeful attitude towards all identities by defining her nationalism apart from ethnicity and territory. Çiller very often used the common

¹⁴⁸ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party", In *Political Parties in Turkey* ed. B. Rubin and M. Heper (London ; Portland, 2002) p.45

¹⁴⁹ *Benim milliyetçiliğim ülke sevgisi, Türkiyeyi çağdaş konuma sokacak reformların yapılması, bunun başka yaklaşımlarla ilgisi yok, ülke sevgisinin dışına taşan bir taraftı yok. Milliyet*, 16 June 1993.

cultural values of Turkish citizens and Anatolian culture. She denoted the common cultural values and shared cultural life of the Kurds and Turks as both were the cultural inheritance of Anatolia. Çiller, in the early days of her office evidenced an embracing attitude towards Anatolian culture. She cited the significance of Anatolian culture and the culture of living together and she spoke about giving the freedom of education and permission for Kurdish TV. When she declared that she would strive to make *Newruz*¹⁵⁰ an official celebration, her explanation was noteworthy since she said that the traditional values of Anatolian culture should not be forgotten.

The SHP, the coalition partner, specified the decisiveness of the program of democratization in the government protocol.¹⁵¹ The program covered the basic rights and freedoms, the abolition of political bans, improving the freedom of the judiciary, strengthening the civil authority and abolition of the state of emergency.¹⁵²

As is cited in the protocol, the government program both included strong messages related to the unitary state and a full-fledged democratization program.

The Turkish Republic is an indivisible whole with its nation and state. The character of the Turkish unitary state reflects the idea of the historical and traditional unity and cooperation. This unity and cooperation is the outcome of common “political culture”. We are determined to protect it. The official language, the flag, the symbols, borders of the state and the sovereign rights of the Turkish Republic are the above of all the debate. The obstacles to the democratization and modern values including the articles of the constitution will be abolished right away.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ A traditional festival which is widespread in Anatolian communities points the coming of the spring.

¹⁵¹ Kemal Saybaşı, *DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Üç Yılı* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1995), p. 61.

¹⁵² I.Çiller Government (DYP-SHP) Coalition Protocol, Available at [online] <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/KP50.htm>

¹⁵³ *Türkiye Devleti, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütündür. Türkiye'nin üniter devlet niteliği, toplumsal yapımızdan kaynaklanan tarihsel ve geleneksel bir beraberlik ve birlik fikrini yansıtmaktadır. Bu birlik ve beraberlik, ortak bir "siyasi kültürün" sonucudur. Bunu korumaya kararlıyız. Devletin resmi dili, bayrağı, simgeleri, sınırları ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin egemenlik hakları her türlü tartışmanın üstünde ve dışındadır. Anayasa Hükümleri de dahil demokratikleşmenin ve çağdaş değerlerin önünde duran bütün engeller*

The Çiller Government and Its Governmental Actions

After the death of Turgut Özal in 1993, the chairman of the DYP, Süleyman Demirel, was elected as the President of Turkey on May 16, 1993. The main question was who would replace the seats of the Prime Ministry and the chairperson of the DYP which had become emptied by the end of term of office. The candidates for the chairperson of the party were Minister of Internal Affairs, İsmet Sezgin; Minister of Education; Köksal Toptan and Minister of State; Tansu Çiller. It was a significant event for the history of the party when Çiller eliminated all of her male rivals to be the president of a right-wing party and then become prime minister.

According to Cizre, the DYP was in contact with global electoral trends and rode the wave of the “Americanization of political competition.”¹⁵⁴ The electoral process took place with the close attention of the media. The election process reflected the cutthroat competition between the supporters of Çiller and the followers of the other candidates.

Çiller and her supporters avoided using the symbolism of “the new face” and “new formation” for Çiller’s period of policy-making. Instead, they used the concepts of “vision” and “experience.” The vision would be brought by the first woman Prime Minister, the experience would stem from the familiarity of the DYP.¹⁵⁵ This experience sometimes was associated with the heritage of the DP and

ayıklanacak ve bir an önce kaldırılacaktır. I.Çiller Government (DYP-SHP) Coalition Protocol, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/KP50.htm>

¹⁵⁴ Cizre, p.83.

¹⁵⁵ Doğru Yol Partisi, “Çiller ve Çiller” Ankara (Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p. 23.

Adnan Menderes' leadership beyond the foundation of the DYP. It was consistently argued that "serving the nation was more important than serving the party".¹⁵⁶

It is significant to evaluate the discourse of the DYP and the distinction in Çiller's strategies to bring DYP to power. She defined democracy in economic terms. When the state intervention was reduced through privatization and the local administrations gained power, and when perfect market competition was supported by the state and the state was out of the competition, the transformation to the liberal economy would be completed, according to Çiller.¹⁵⁷

Also, her election to the position of prime minister reflected in the European media as proof that "a country could be both Modern and Muslim" and she embodied the modern, European character of Turkish citizens in that she was a fluent English speaker, a professor and had given her husband her surname which was against Turkish traditional and cultural moves.¹⁵⁸

The government that Çiller was elected to join as prime minister was a coalition of the SHP whose chairman was Erdal İnönü, and DYP. In the 1991 elections, the People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*) HEP made an alliance with the SHP and twenty six DEP members entered the Parliament. In 1991, when the party was closed down for violating the constitution and the political party's law, the Democracy Party, (*Demokrasi Partisi*) DEP was established. Instead of HEP, Çiller's coalition now included DEP members.

The aim of our government is to make the required reforms rapidly in stability, and catch up with the modern era. The aim both for the state and for the individual is to create a society of the 21st century by reaching better and truer. To answer the public demands with the dynamism of the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.69.

¹⁵⁷ Tansu Çiller, *Değişim ve Demokrasi Söylemleri* (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p.97.

¹⁵⁸ *The Economist*, (June 19th -25th 1993).

participatory democracy. This is the basic condition of democracy. We can not go on without changing.¹⁵⁹

In domestic politics, in terms of individual rights and liberties, Çiller was more authoritarian, conservative, and nationalistic, closer to the right emphasis on the strong state enabled her to embrace and utilize rightest discourse. Her conservative stance showed itself in the debate over the change of the Constitution and mainly in the debates over the anti-terror law, the DEP case, and the Sivas and Gaziosmanpaşa events. In those developments it was seen that Çiller explicitly used a rhetoric built upon a strong state.

Now, the discourse of the government and the position of the coalition in the light of the governmental actions will be discussed since during the process of the Turkey's integration to the CU, in internal politics, the effect of the EU decision makers forced Turkish domestic politicians to take certain decisions in terms of the democratization of Turkey

The Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law

An Anti-terror law was passed in 1991, with that included the articles 141, 142, and 163 of the penal code, which punished those who engaged in communist and anti-secular propaganda and organizations. This has been one of the most disputed articles in the Turkish Penal Code.¹⁶⁰ During the 1990s, these articles

¹⁵⁹ *Hükümetimizin temel amacı, istikrar içinde süratle gerekli reformları yapmak, çağı yakalamaktır. Amaç, hem devlet olarak, hem de birey olarak daha iyiye daha doğruya erişerek 21. yüzyılın toplumunu yaratmaktır. Katılımcı demokrasinin dinamizmi ile halkın isteklerine cevap vermektir. Bu, demokrasinin başlıca koşuludur. Yenileşmeden, değişmeden devam edemeyiz.* Tansu Çiller, "Değişim ve Demokrasi Söylemleri" (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p.266.

¹⁶⁰ The Anti-Terror Law was passed in 1991 replacing the notorious articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Penal Code in the Turkish Constitution. For more information, Ergun Özbudun, "Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004" *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 2007), and Human Rights Watch, *Turkey : Violations of Free Expression in Turkey* (New York : Human

together with Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which made any kind of separatist propaganda a criminal offense regardless of method or intent, was criticized for putting restraints on the different identities.¹⁶¹ Especially, the issue was debated when heated by the three expectations from the European Parliament included a change in Article 8 together with the restoration in human rights and democratization, by a change in the constitution.¹⁶²

The Anti-Terror Law enacted in 1991 brought with it a great deal of trouble. The discussions of the draft of the article continued in the Çiller government. Article 8 of the draft of the Anti Terror Law stated

Regardless of the method and intent, written or oral propaganda along with the meetings, demonstrations and marches that have the goal of destroying the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation of the Republic of Turkey is forbidden.¹⁶³

If Article 8 was enacted and put in the Penal Code, this act would lead to the strengthening of the strong state understanding, although restricting individual freedom. With the draft, the main target was the restriction of freedom of the Kurdish and Islamic identities. During the process of the CU, the draft of the Anti-Terror Law became significant since the EP wanted to “change and abolish Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law”¹⁶⁴

The discussion over the enactment of the anti-terror law lasted a long time. Çiller stated that this law could be extracted from the rough draft if necessary and later represented to the government; however, she needed ways to take significant

Rights Watch, 1999) and also Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p.144.

¹⁶¹ Ergun Özbudun, “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004” *Turkish Studies*. 8, no. 2 (June 2007), p.184.

¹⁶² *Hürriyet*, 17 February 1995.

¹⁶³ *Zaman*, 11 November 1993.

¹⁶⁴ *Financial Times*, 25 July 1995.

steps to end terrorism. Ultimately, Çiller had to make some changes in the draft due to the pressure coming from the EU.¹⁶⁵

Security Issues in the Southeast

In the 1990s, the Kurdish question, with the identity demands for the recognition and ethnic-based violence, were addressed by the “low-intensity war”¹⁶⁶ between Turkey and the PKK. In the first day of her office, Çiller stated that she favored the democratic solutions for the Southeast problem where a military solution was undesirable. “In Turkey, the civil power is not able to control the military power. Today, Turkey’s democracy picture has a half democratic image.”¹⁶⁷ She seemed to accept the reality that undemocratic implementations were impeding Turkey’s democracy. Hence, in her opening speech, after she stated that “the attack against the existence of the state and the its democratic regime by violence and terror is unacceptable in the framework of individual rights and liberties,” she continued to argue that the abolition of the state of emergency could only be realized after satisfactory regulations had been carried out against the PKK terror. “The state of the emergency which has been continued since 1987 will be abolished after the issuing of regulations not creating any authority gaps.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ For a full discussion of these points see, *Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey Human Rights Watch* (New York : Human Rights Watch, 1999).p.70

¹⁶⁶ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformation*. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University, 2007), pp.291-292.

¹⁶⁷ *Türkiye’de sivil gücün askeri gücü kontrol edemiyor.Bugün, Türkiye’nin demokrasi resmi yarı demokratik şekildedir*. Tansu Çiller, *Değişim ve Demokrasi Söylemleri* (Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p. 68.

¹⁶⁸ *1987 yılından beri süren Olağanüstü Hal uygulaması, yetki ve otorite boşluğu yaratmayacak yeni yasal düzenlemelerin yapılmasıyla birlikte yürürlükten kaldırılacaktır. The Program of the 50th Government of Turkish Republic*, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp50.htm>

Çiller gave priority to the solution of the Southeast problem among the domestic problems. In her discourse, although she claimed there was no Kurdish problem, there was a problem of terror. Çiller later defended herself as follows;

We have one answer to them: “We will sacrifice our lives for every, any stone in these lands. We will not cop out.” It does not matter how negative the conditions are and how bad it is reflected, whichever power groups exploit this negative picture and these conditions, and whoever come up with offers to ignore the basic principles of the Republic. It is not only about the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey it applies to, it is in this country within the limits of the National Pact.¹⁶⁹

Çiller, as she declared in her inauguration speech, was called for participatory democracy and individual rights and liberties, and argued that her government’s approach to the Kurdish question was democratic.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the aims of the coalition were declared as lifting all the impediments before the democratization, guaranteeing basic rights and liberties, widening the political rights, lifting the political ban, realizing the freedom of the courts, and strengthening the civil authority.¹⁷¹

Despite emphasizing the democratic solutions, she did not mean to find political solutions to the Southeast problem; instead she tried to show the significance of solving the problem with military means. Çiller seems to have been against military interventions and was for civil authority, yet she was in favor of military solution in the Kurdish uprising. For her, if the parliament and the

¹⁶⁹ *Sadece Doğu ve Güneydoğumuzun değil; Misak-ı Milli içinde, vatanın her köşesinde olursa olsun, bu koşullar ne denli olumsuz ve zor bir görünüm yansıtırsa yansısın; bu olumsuz görünüm ve koşullar hangi güç odakları tarafından istismar edilirse edilsin, hangi güç odakları (iyi niyetle veya kötü niyetle) Cumhuriyet’in temel ilkelerini göz ardı eden öneri ile önümüze gelirse gelsin; onlara vereceğimiz tek bir cevap var: Bu memleketin her bir çakıl taşı için, bin kere canımızı veririz... Oyuna gelmeyiz.* Çiller ve Çiller, 159.

¹⁷⁰ Sedat Akay, *12 Eylül Darbe Yıllarında Bir Kurucu Üyenin Anılarından: Bir Partinin Kuruluşu: DYP ve Kurucular Albümü* (İstanbul: Prestij Matbaacılık, 2008), p.266

¹⁷¹ Kemal Saybaşı, *DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Üç Yılı* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1995), p. 61.

government decided to solve the Southeast problem by military solutions, this was a democratic measure.¹⁷² She just aimed to be the main decision maker in the military fields. In the days following that decision, Çiller took action for the regional planning in the Southeast. Development plans for the region included the bettering of the life conditions socially, economically and taking forward steps in human rights.¹⁷³

The first constitutional reform of the Çiller government was to initiate the abolition of the legal barrier against the opening of private television channels and radios. The openings of Kurdish TV and radio and permission for Kurdish education in schools were questions that occupied the agenda. According to Çiller, the opening of Kurdish TV was one of the significant aims of the newly founded government.¹⁷⁴

We are going to talk about whether there would be Kurdish in schools, radios and TVs and Kurdish education. I do think that the ethnic richness and regional richness of Turkey is a diversity and color of a mosaic. I do not see any harm in expressing this cultural differentiation. Is there any meaning to say “No, you are not” who says “I am Kurd.”¹⁷⁵

Çiller’s embracing attitude towards the Kurdish identity demands could be evaluated as a move forward to a limited kind of multiculturalism; however she was well aware of the limits of this sort of a multicultural model, did not take it too far.

Normally, the government associated the demands for the recognition of the Kurdish identity with PKK activities. The critical term that was commonly used by the governing elite of the period was “security.” The reflection of the problem with

¹⁷² *Hürriyet*, 24 July 1993.

¹⁷³ *Hürriyet*, 7 July 1993.

¹⁷⁴ 50. Government Program of the Turkish Republic Available at [online] <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hp50.htm>

¹⁷⁵ *Okullarda radyolarda ve TV’de Türkçe eğitim olacak mı onları görüşeceğiz. Türkiye’nin etnik zenginliklerini, bölgesel zenginliklerini, bir mozağin çeşitlenmesi renklenmesi olarak görüyorum. Bu kültürel farklılıkları ortaya koymada hiçbir zarar görmüyorum. Ben Kürdüm diyen bir adama Hayır sen Kürt değilsin demenin anlamı var mı? Hürriyet*, 20 June 1993.

the security terms would justify the military solution by strengthening the strong state against the “national threat”. According to the governing elite, the Kurdish problem was a one of security in the Southeast region.

The important thing for us is to move with our territorial integrity, it is an indispensable element, here it is significant how far the classification will be and with which aim the classification is used.¹⁷⁶

In the first day of her office, Çiller decided to make a visit to the Southeast of Turkey in order to get familiar with the demands of the people and tell the regional people about the DYP program. She repeated that she was in favor of democracy and the development of the region economically while also highlighting the security of the region. “I am here with my soul and heart. If there is someone who turns the pistol on my citizens, he should shoot me first.”¹⁷⁷ Here, by opposing the terrorist activities in the region, she also clarified her position in the future conflict.

Çiller’s attitude could be explained as showing a great effort to own the heritage of the father image of the former leader of the DYP. She used traditional expressions such as the mother *ana* and sister *bacı* in the visits to the Southeastern region. According to Cizre, the image was extensively used especially when Çiller addressed the mothers of soldiers who were killed in armed struggle against the PKK.¹⁷⁸ Çiller’s discourse was fostered with traditional and historical values.

I visited the Çanakkale war cemetery. There, the people who became martyr are lying from all regions of Anatolia. Their bones can not be separated.

¹⁷⁶ Önemli olan bizim toprak bütünlüğümüzün vazgeçilmez bir unsur olduğunun bilinciyle hareket edebilmek, burada derecelendirmenin nereye kadar ve hangi amaçla kullanılacağı önemli. *Hürriyet*, 20 June 1993.

¹⁷⁷ Gönümle yüreğimle buradayım eğer vatandaşımın zerine namluyu çevirenler varsa vatandaşımın can güvenliği için ilk önce beni vursun. *Hürriyet*, 24 July 1993.

¹⁷⁸ Ümit Cizre, “Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy.” In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. M. Heper and S. Sayarı (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2002), p.207.

They were buried together. We are going to suffer together and also be happy together.¹⁷⁹

The Major Threat Is Separatism

The threat of “separatism” was cited as leading issue by the National Security Council on June 30, 1992. However, during the Çiller government, there was a move from the perception of the external threat to the perception of internal threat. In other words, it was a new that the government interpreted the Kurdish separatist activities as an internal security problem. By discussing the terror with terms such as security, national security, separatism and divisiveness, the government moved the terror issue to the internal sphere, away from the interference of any foreign state and international organization. The government also showed a great effort to reflect the terror problem as the problem of the Turkish citizens and Turkish nation-state. The year 1993 was a turning point in that low-intensity war techniques against the PKK started to be used and when the DYP-SHP coalition decisively agreed to enhance its struggle against the PKK by cooperating with the Turkish Armed Forces.

Since 1987, the Southeastern cities had been in a state of emergency.¹⁸⁰ Çiller, in the government program, claimed that the government would end the implementation of the state of emergency in the southeastern villages by regulating the law with decree laws. The decree laws were pragmatic solutions which were

¹⁷⁹ *Ben Çanakkale şehitliğini ziyaret ettim. Orada Anadolu'nun her yerinden şehit yatıyor. Kemiklerini bile ayıramamışlar. Birlikte gömülmüşler. Biz acıyı da birlikte çekeceğiz, mutluluğu da birlikte kutlayacağız. Hürriyet, 15 March 1994.*

¹⁸⁰ In the 1982 Constitution, the articles numbered 119, 120, 121 and 122 defined the conditions for the state of emergency such as natural disasters, dangerous epidemics and serious economic depressions. The same articles also defined the duration of the state of emergency as not more than six months. Zafer Üskül, *Olağanüstü Hal Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: Büke Yayıncılık, 2003), pp.88-89.

totally based on the security aim by leaving the local citizens in a restrained atmosphere of pressure and control.¹⁸¹ As the SHP cited in the Coalition Protocol, the government was expected to change the regulations related to the state of emergency and martial law in line with the principles of the state of law.¹⁸²

By highlighting the security concerns Çiller's government sought to justify the implementations of her government. According to Saybaşılı, the sensitivity of the Turkish Armed Forces in using the concept of "low-intensity war" stemmed from the change of the defense concept of the Turkish army, especially after the Gulf War. The internal threat would call off the attention away from Syria, Iraq and Iran, and only the Southeast region would be in the scope of the defense strategy.¹⁸³ In this way, the government could strengthen its argument to show that the terror problem in Turkey especially in the Southeast region was a Turkish national problem. From this point of view, the Çiller government could pose a more nationalist attitude in regards to the Kurdish problem. The Çiller government tried to defend itself by showing the existence of the PKK as not being related to Kurdish identity problem, but to the terror problem.

¹⁸¹ Üskül, pp.88-89.

¹⁸² *Olağanüstü hal ile sıkıyönetim, seferberlik ve savaş halleri ile ilgili düzenlemeler hukuk devletinin ilkeleri ile uyumlu hale getirilecektir.* I.Government (DYP-SHP) Coalition Protocol <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/KP50.htm>

¹⁸³ Saybaşılı, p.75.

The DEP and the Southern Problem

In the first days of the new coalition government, the chairman of the DEP, Ahmet Türk, proposed that the primary aim of the new government should be to deal with the Kurdish problem in the form of a step forward towards a long-lasting solution. He proposed that “Çiller should sit at the same table with Abdullah Öcalan.”¹⁸⁴

The event which led to the first crack between Çiller and the DEP occurred when Çiller decided to discuss terror issue with the party leaders. By giving the clue of her decisiveness about ending terror inside and outside of Turkey, Çiller started to seek the political solutions to the Southeast problem with the leaders of the political parties. They were the leaders of the ANAP, RP, CHP, MHP, and DSP. The exclusion of the DEP party from Çiller’s meeting list is noteworthy.¹⁸⁵ Later, the DEP felt degraded because Çiller was visiting other party leaders while she wished to host DEP delegation in her own office. None of the DEP member of the parliament came to Çiller’s call. One DEP MP, Orhan Doğan, explained the feeling of the DEP members towards the act of Çiller as such;

Prime Minister visited all of the parties. She did not come to us. She discriminates. Although she visits everyone else, she calls us into her presence. We evaluate her attitude impolite and we protest it.¹⁸⁶

On August 1993, the chairman of DEP, Yaşar Kaya, organized a meeting in Sultanahmet calling for peace saying that there was an unnamed war between Kurds

¹⁸⁴ Çiller, Abdullah Öcalan ile aynı masaya oturmalı. *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 1993.

¹⁸⁵ *Hürriyet*, 12 July 1993.

¹⁸⁶ *Başbakan bütün partileri ziyaret etti. Bize gelmiyor. Ayrımcılık yapıyor. Herkesin ayağına giderken bizi kendisine çağırıyor. Bu tutumu nezaketsiz bulduk ve protesto ettik. Hürriyet*, 14 July 1993.

and Turks. According to Kaya, efforts had been made to solve this issue by military politics for nearly 70 years, but, it had not succeeded. Kaya called everyone to attend the discussion of the panel organized by the DEP on September 1, 1993 which called “Peace and Media” for the recognition of the Kurdish identity.¹⁸⁷

Moreover, as these developments were taking place, international organizations were forcing Turkey to take action on the Kurdish problem. The Helsinki Watch had been reporting on the ill-treatment of Kurds by the Turkish state. In one report, it was demanded that both the PKK and Turkish state stop the activities against civilians and fulfill the requirements of international human rights law.¹⁸⁸ In the same days, the statements made by one of the governors in the Southeast were noteworthy to evaluate the view of the local administration. Diyarbakır’s state of emergency governor, Ünal Erkan stated that,

Whatever you give them, radio, TV, etc..., the organization has a target. What benefit can you get from these? Kurdish TV or radio is not the end of the world, but in terms of the activities of the organization, these measures will not make any difference.¹⁸⁹

The other catastrophic event was lived in Batman. The DEP commission in Batman sought the unidentified murders which was lived through in the region was assaulted by unidentified attackers and Mardin DEP MP, Mehmet Sincar, and the DEP member of the administrative board in Batman were killed. The Batman governor did not allow any ceremony for the killed DEP members since the administration thought it would lead to a crisis. This event was an example that the

¹⁸⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, 2 August 1993.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Sadece radyo-televizyon değil, ne verirsiniz verin örgüt bir hedef çizmiştir. Bunların terörle mücadelede ne faydası olabilir? Kürtçe radyo-televizyon dünyanın sonu değil, ancak terör örgütünün eylemliliği açısından hiçbir şey fark ettirmez. Ayın Tarihi*, 4 August 1993.

Kurdish problem was not only a security problem but also a problem of human rights and security.

After the murder of the DEP MPs in Batman, Demirel's explanation demonstrates how the Kurdish identity problem was exclusively linked to the security problem for the governing elite. "The problem is the same; the event should be analyzed in terms of the Southeast problem."¹⁹⁰ The government used the discourse that whether Kurd or Turk, everybody suffered from the terror so the terror should be conceived as a national problem. Namely, the Kurdish problem within the security framework were connected with human rights violation, human trafficking, drug trafficking and assassinations and the protests of anti-PKK groups by Turkey's and DYP's elites.

The discomfort of the Parliament was reflected in the statements of some of the members of the parliament. Especially after the claims about the DEP MPs financial aid and assistance to the PKK, the discomfort turned to hostility. The President of the Assembly, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, declared that the Parliament had applied to the State Security Court for investigation, by highlighting the rule that the members of the DEP should not overestimate the immunities of the DEP MPs.¹⁹¹ Çiller later said, "DEP, was acting like a political organ of the PKK in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This was unacceptable. They were warned many times."¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ *Problem aynı problem olaya Güneydoğu sorunu içinde bakmak gerekir. Milliyet*, 18 July 1993.

¹⁹¹ *Zaman*, 24 July 1993.

¹⁹² *DEP, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde PKK'nın siyasi organı gibi hareket ediyordu. Bu kabul edilebilir birşey değildi. DEP milletvekilleri defalarca uyarıldı. Çiller ve Çiller* (Ankara : Doğru Yol Partisi, 2002), p. 311.

On February 1994, the Turkish Grand National Assembly Constitution removed the immunity's of the DEP MPs, Leyla Zana and Orhan Doğan.¹⁹³ Before the lifting, Çiller gave the message that there was nothing left for them to continue with the political solutions in the Kurdish problem. She said,

There is a shadow existing in the Assembly that we are responsible for abolishing. If the immunity leaves the judiciary unsolvable and makes the conscience of the public uncomfortable, the necessary action should be taken. The investigation of the criminals is the duty of the state. The abolition of the immunities is the appropriate action.¹⁹⁴

The view of Karayalçın was different from that of Çiller in some respects. He specified that the interference of the National Security Council was unacceptable since the issue was political. As the Deputy Prime Minister, Karayalçın, pointed to the significance of civil powers.

We should handle the sides, respects, dimensions of the issue outside the security one. The National Security Council (MGK) should discuss only the issues about security.....We will take up for debate the problem in political parties, in labor unions, in universities, on every level of the society, we will discuss it.¹⁹⁵

After the lifting of the immunity, the tension between the government and the DEP rose. After the Tuzla attack of the PKK when Hatip Dicle stated “in times of war, these kinds of events are normal,”¹⁹⁶ Demirel criticized Dicle by saying

¹⁹³ *Ayın Tarihi*, 17 February 1994.

¹⁹⁴ *Meclis'te PKK'nun barındığı bir gölge vardır, bunu Meclis'in üzerinden kaldırmakla yükümlüyük. Dokunulmazlık yargının önünü tıktıyorsa ve bu da kamu vicdanını rahatsız ediyorsa, gereğini yapmak lazımdır. Suçlamaların araştırılması hukuk devletinin gereğidir. Dokunulmazlıkların kaldırılması yerinde olacaktır. Ayın Tarihi*, 2 March 1994.

¹⁹⁵ *Konunun güvenlik dışındaki yanlarını, yönlerini, boyutlarını biz ele almak durumundayız. MGK'nun tartışma gündeminde bu konular olamaz, olmamalı. MGK yalnızca güvenlikle ilgili konuları tartışma durumunda olmalıdır. ...Sorunu siyasi partilerde, sendikalarda, üniversitelerde, toplumun her kesiminde tartışmaya açacağız, tartışacağız. Hürriyet*, 27 October 1993.

¹⁹⁶ *Savaşta bu tür olaylar normaldir. Ayın Tarihi*, 18 February 1994

Five of our innocent young people have been destroyed. Nobody should say this is normal. Nobody should like blood. These people are the children of this country; they are our brothers and sisters.¹⁹⁷

The Sivas Events and the Discourse of the Government

In the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, the Alevi identity was not recognized officially. It was regarded as a sect of Islam the pillars of which had been modified or marginalized from Islam. The establishment of the Director of Religious Affairs led to the dominance of the Sunni Islam in the nation-state.¹⁹⁸

The Sivas Events (The Sivas massacre) has the chain of events which led to the killing of 37 Alevi intellectuals who had gone to Sivas for the celebration of the Pir Sultan Abdal festival in June 1993, at stayed at the Madımak Hotel. At the start of the celebration, the Sunni demonstrators came together in the centre of Sivas. The demonstrators were against the participation of Aziz Nesin to the celebration Aziz Nesin who was not an Alevi had received wide criticisms of the Sunnis, when he declared his intention to translate Salman Rusdie's book called *Satanic Verses*.¹⁹⁹ They put the hotel where the participators of the celebration were staying in fire and led to the notorious Sivas events with the killings of the 37 people.

¹⁹⁷ *Beş tane masum gencimiz parçalanıyor. Buna kimse normal dememeli, kandan kimse hoşlanmamalı O insanlar da bu ülkenin çocuklarıdır, kardeşlerimizdir. Ayın Tarihi* 18 February 1994

¹⁹⁸ Tahire Erman and Aykan Erdemir, "Aleviler ve Topluma Eklemlenme Sorunsalı." In *Türkiye' de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları, AB sürecinde Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Tartışmaları*, ed. A. Kaya and T. Tarhanlı (Tesev Yayınları: İstanbul, 2005), p.161.

¹⁹⁹ Aziz Nesin before the Sivas Events disturbed the Sunni Orthodox people in Turkey when he came up with his demand to translate the Salman Rusdie's *Satanic Verses* into Turkish. The *Satanic Verses* was based on the group of apocryphal Qur'an verses that led the opposition of Sunni Muslims, when Rusdie argued that the possibility of the Satan influence on some of the verses in Qoran yet it is a contradictory issue. Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadelesi*, trans. Hakan Yurdakul (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p.125.

In the Sivas events, the most significant thing was the involvement of the local police and civil authorities in that violent event. Moreover, the central government, Çiller and her coalition failed to reduce the impact of the lack of the local administration by taking further action.²⁰⁰ Tansu Çiller did not accept the lack of initiative on the part local administration and stated that during the Sivas events the governor had done what he had had to do. The Minister of State, Yıldırım Aktuna, declared that the police authorities in Sivas had taken the necessary measures by sending the demonstrators away from the hotel.²⁰¹

The government generally agreed that the Sivas events had been caused by provocations. The Deputy Prime Minister, Erdal İnönü, organized a visit to Sivas after the events and declared the events had been provocation.²⁰² The opposition, on the other hand, argued that the most of the responsibility was on the government.

The political had different views of the events. The leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan stated that “the events are the result of the provocation of the group of people who went to Sivas.” The leader of the Republican People’s Party, Deniz Baykal, argued that “the government should take responsibility. It should not legitimize the acts that led to the events.” The nationalist party leader, Alparslan Türkeş was agreed with Erbakan that “in Turkey, the people who live in the same place and share the same destiny should not be deceived by views which sought to make them enemies by saying that everybody has the equal rights.”²⁰³ The

²⁰⁰ Bruinessen, pp.125-126.

²⁰¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 2 June 1993.

²⁰² *Ayın Tarihi*, 3 June 1993.

²⁰³ *Muhalefet katliama farklı bakıyor; Erbakan; Olaylar Sivas’a gitmiş bir ekibin halkı tahrik etmesinin sonucudur. Baykal, Hükümet üzerine düşen görevi yapmadı. Olaylara neden olan davranışları meşrulaştırmamalı. Türkeş, Türkiye de herkesin eşit haklara sahip olduğunu kaydederek aynı yerde yaşayan ve aynı kaderi paylaşan insanların birbirinden ayırmak ve*

chairman of the Pir Sultan Abdal Foundation cited the general view of the Alevi citizens and the Alevi foundations, which was that the extent of the massacre was related to the lack of intervention by the government.²⁰⁴

The Çiller government also expanded the Sivas events by arguing that there had been a provocation against laicism by pro-Islamists. Therefore, after the events, Çiller claimed “today is the day everybody should be careful.”²⁰⁵ According to her, people should be careful of threats against the separatism of the national integrity.²⁰⁶ The Çiller government by highlighting national security more than ever, established excuses for not giving the freedom to demand identities.

After the Sivas events, Demirel participated in the Hacı Bektaş Veli festival. There was a great support for the aim of reconciliation of Alevis with the rest of Turkish society. The government was worked to change the article in the constitution which forbade the schools and institutes for education of Alevi scholars, and the opening of *Cemevis* (places of prayer). The Minister of State, Yıdırım Aktuna, wanted the demands of the Alevis to be fulfilled without any delay and that the lgal changes are made to the regulations.²⁰⁷

birbirine düşman yapmak isteyen mihrakların oyunlarına gelinmemesi gerektiğini istedi. Cumhuriyet, 4 June 1993

²⁰⁴ *Aydın Tarihi* 5 June 1993.

²⁰⁵ *Bugün herkesin dikkatli olmaı gereken gündür. Aydın Tarihi* 6 June 1993.

²⁰⁶ *Bugün çok dikkatli olunacak zamandır. Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1994.

The Gaziosmanpaşa Events and the Discourse of the Government

The Gaziosmanpaşa events are significant in that they show the lack of any government initiative towards the Alevi identity after the Sivas events. Another tension between the Alevi and Sunni identities appeared in the Gaziosmanpaşa events. In the Gaziosmanpaşa district, where the population was mainly Alevi, coffeehouse that mostly Alevis frequented was attacked with guns, leading to the deaths and injury of many people. The inability of the police officers again escalated the violence in the Gaziosmanpaşa events. By using their will to protect people as their pretext the police started firing at the crowd.²⁰⁸

After that Çiller in a meeting of the Council of Ministers, declared there were internal and external focuses which wanted the divide Turkey that wanted an Alevi-Sunni dispute.²⁰⁹ According to Bruinessen, the Gaziosmanpaşa events, again, showed that the state apparatus was on the extreme right and anti-Alevi.²¹⁰ Despite the Sivas events nearly two years earlier, the discourse of the government and the approach of intervention had not changed and the government had not taken any action towards protecting the Alevi identity.

In this part of the study, Çiller's discourse in the domestic politics was elaborated Çiller used the domestic arena to strengthen her discourse of unitary view leaving identity problems unsovable. In the Kurdish and Southeast problems, she never opted for political solutions; Despite the catastrophic events took place, her government did not take the steps necessary for the recognition of the Alevi identity.

²⁰⁸ Bruinessen, p.127.

²⁰⁹ *Başbakan Çiller, Bakanlar Kurulu toplantısında Türkiye' nin bölünmesini isteyen iç ve dış mihrakların bir Alevi-Sünni çatışmasını hedeflediklerinin "açık" olduğunu söyledi. Ayın Tarihi*, 13 March 1995.

²¹⁰ Bruinessen, pp.127-128.

In the period when Turkey's openings up to Europe were aimed, the deadlock in identity politics was significant.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DISCOURSE OF THE PRINT MEDIA IN IDENTITY POLITICS DURING TURKEY'S INTEGRATION TO THE CU

The center right, which was represented by the DYP and Tansu Çiller, was dominated the intra elite debate as Çiller benefited from what was going on in internal politics in order to strengthen her discourse. The Sunni-Alevi cleavage showed itself at the Sivas and Gaziosmanpaşa events, the Kurdish-Turkish cleavages showed itself in the PKK case and the Southeast problem and the DEP case.

In order to view the relationship between the print media and policy making which affected identity politics in the process of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union (CU), a look at the discourse of print media in 1990s is necessary. After the military intervention in 1980, the atmosphere in the media was, in general, a reflection of the mistrust felt towards democratic institutions and procedures. Simultaneously, there was also a deep hope for a more democratic regime. In this dichotomy, the newspapers were closely involved in the discussion of Turkey's problems in the process of democratization.

There were different approaches and common grounds between the newspapers in terms of identity politics as reflected in the discussions about the rise of political Islam and the increase of the appearance of Islamic identities, the Kurdish identity and the Alevi identity. All these issues in the process of the integration to the CU led to a debate over threats against the unitary state or abiding by the European Union's demands. Normally, it is expected that the democratic print media was weighted to be critical against the discourse of the Çiller government in terms of

identity politics. However, the position of the media during Turkey's integration to the CU seems to have been quite receptive to governmental discourse.

According to Chomsky, the significant majority of the media is expected to reflect the interest of the current powers, such as in the government and its ideological institutions.²¹¹ The democratic media is defined and supposed to be the supporter of free elections, political freedoms, equality, minority rights, representative government and the freedom of the judiciary. In a democratic society, the media should remove the gap between the elite who know everything and the others who knows nothing.²¹²

This situation creates a dichotomy between the democratic functioning media and the media in practice. The media is not successful at situating itself out of the ideology of the state by creating a different discourse from the government. At this historical moment, in the process of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union, the position of the media as a leading factor is important. Whether the media would take a centrist attitude became a vital question.

This part of the study focuses on the term starting with 1993, when the discussion about the Turkey's entrance reached its peak when the issue came to a climax in the media. With the start of the 1990s, Turkey's relation with the Union has started to be discussed multilaterally. Apart from elites' and politicians' level, many political parties, associations, institutions and non-governmental organizations developed their view points, interpreted them and shared them with the public

²¹¹ Noam Chomsky, *Medya Gerçeği*, trans. Abdullah Yılmaz (İstanbul: Tüm Zamanlar Yayıncılık, 1993), p. 23.

²¹² Yasemin Giritli İncelioğlu, *Uluslar arası Medya* (İstanbul: Beta Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 322.

opinion. In this study, the aim is to reflect the different views in the print media which had different political identities.

The aim of the study is not to go back to the origins of the events and cite the reasons; it will discuss mostly how these political events were interpreted in the print media. In order to have a fair approach to these events, the representative view of the different ideological stance will be investigated by analyzing *Zaman*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*. In the 1990s, despite not having a fixed line, *Milliyet* was closer to the voice of the Kemalist Republican understanding. Moreover, *Hürriyet* together with *Milliyet*, as the most widely circulated mass newspapers will allow us possible for this study to analyze the view point of the mass media and the voice of the center. The liberal/conservative, right and conservative/democrat outlook will be reflected by the daily *Zaman*, which had more leanings towards Islamic identity and liberal values. The daily *Cumhuriyet* will be used to analyze the view of the left wing, left Kemalist and social democratic viewpoints. During my research I have checked 148 news articles from *Cumhuriyet*, 111 news articles from *Hürriyet*, 108 news articles from *Milliyet*, 148 news articles from *Zaman*. The news articles which were related to the topic of the study were scanned and given in the study.

In this way, this study will compare and contrast the different opinions in the print media, which directed the public opinion with their own interpretation of political events. Especially these interpretations are expected to shed light on the acts and discourses of the governing elites, about their view on the nation-state and identity based problems. In the 1990s, the unity of the differences that in the country was questionable and showed itself in different sociopolitical events. In this part of the study, the print media will be evaluated according to their own interpretation of

the events. In this way, the “identity issue” and the reaction and interpretation of the print media to the government act will be understood.

The General Atmosphere of the Print Media in the Start of 1993

Zaman

The atmosphere of the mass and center, right and left leaning media is significant to start with in order to grasp the outlook of the newspapers towards identity politics. *Zaman*, as the one of the most widely read newspapers in the right print media was affected by the Solingen events where five Turkish people living in Solingen, Germany, had been set on fire by extreme nationalist German groups on June 1993. This brutal event fostered the anti-western feelings in the right media. Together with the Solingen event, the Bosnian war was interpreted as the one of the major impediments for integration with Europe.²¹³ Especially the insensitivity of the EU and belated intervention to the Bosnian war as commented upon by the newspaper was the most significant thing to show the future of the European integration, and the impossibility of the European integration. This political impossibility according to *Zaman* continued until Turkey’s integration to the CU.²¹⁴ According to *Zaman*, Turkey should need to be skeptical in integrating to the EU. However, full membership could be accepted for two reasons alone: the opening of new markets for Islamic capital, which was declared by giving references to the expression of European leaders,²¹⁵ and the freedom of the Islamic identity that

²¹³ *Zaman*, 2, 3, 8 June 1993

²¹⁴ *Zaman*, 5 March 1995

²¹⁵ *Zaman*, 13 November 1995

Turkey would be forced to be more embracing for human rights, democracy and the freedom of ethnic and religious identities.²¹⁶

Cumhuriyet

In the first days of the government change in Turkey, *Cumhuriyet* drew a negative picture of the events in Turkey and the world. After the peace messages which were given to the world in the liberal atmosphere, the general view of the *Cumhuriyet* was surprised and shocked to see the murders of the five Turkish people living in Solingen in Germany was interpreted as the reappear once of the old disease of Europe, racism. According to the general view of the daily, this brutal event inside Europe sent economic signals like *Zaman*. The demolition of the Berlin Wall and the positive atmosphere were blamed by the daily. The political integration which would be fulfilled after the economic integration by the lift of the tariff and duties of the customs between countries was defined as impossible by articles in *Cumhuriyet*. As cited in one news article on June 7, 1993, after the brutal events took place, was showing which factors were making the integration impossible.²¹⁷

After the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989, an extreme optimism surrounded the world. In 1992 when the custom barriers were lifted, Europe was getting ready to make the greatest advance of its history. In 1993 the Maastricht, in 1993 GATT, Uruguay...However, the all dreams collapsed one by one.²¹⁸

“The collapse of dreams” for unity, integration and harmonization was tied to the act of the European people, who had increased their hatred of the foreigners.

²¹⁶ *Zaman*, 18 January 1994, 10 June 1995

²¹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 7, 12 June 1993

²¹⁸ 1989 da Berlin duvarının yıkılmasıyla Avrupa'yı aşırı bir iyimserlik kapladı. 1992 de gümrük duvarlarının kalktığında Avrupa tarihinin en büyük tarihinin en büyük hamlesini yapmaya hazırlanıyordu. 1993 Maastricht, 1993 GATT, Uruguay. Ancak hayallerin hepsi teker teker yıkıldı. *Cumhuriyet*, 7 June 1993

Hürriyet and Milliyet

Hürriyet and *Milliyet* were chosen in this study to represent the mass and mainstream media. The anti-western feelings were continuing, however, these anti-western feelings were either not connected with the support of Islam or the protection of religious feeling against Christian Europe, as seen in *Zaman* or favoring of Turkishness against the rise of nationalisms in Europe, as seen in *Cumhuriyet*, in the discussion after the racist attacks against Turks in Germany. The mass media seemed to be pleased to leave behind the unstable atmosphere of the 1980s and increase the image of strong Turkey with a woman prime minister as they attributed Çiller being democratic and western. The mass media would appear to agree with Tansu Çiller's political vision about Turkey's membership in the EU and integration to the European Union.

The stability in Turkish politics and the continuation of the strong state understanding were the key words for the mass media. From this perspective, Çiller's identity politics did not contradict the mass media, even sometimes the two overlapped as it will be underlined in the following parts of this study. According to *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, the terror problem was more important than the discussion of the recognition of the different religious and ethnic identities. The mass media protected the relatively positive attitude towards the strengthening of Turkey's nation state.

Çiller's Election

Tansu Çiller was Prime Minister during Turkey's integration to the Customs Union when becoming a member of the CU was regarded as the priority issue on the agenda of the print media. From the start of Çiller's election, the print media cited different reasons for the possibility of her victory. The proponents of Çiller regarded her election as a success for the democracy in Turkish politics. The first woman prime minister, she was a good representative of Turkey's western face since she had a western and modern education.

After Süleyman Demirel took the seat of the presidency of the Turkish Republic following Özal's death, the seats of the chairmanship of True Path Party *Doğru Yol Partisi*, (DYP) and the prime ministry became empty. Debates between the candidates of the positions of the prime minister from the DYP discussed every day by the media. Çiller was devoted to a liberal economy and western values. She had a vision about human rights, civil society and western democracy and she gave great importance to taking part in European organizations especially aiming to enter the Customs Union. The mass media, the general outlook of *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet* was supported Çiller due to her vision regarding westernization and Europeanization.

The general view of *Milliyet* was supported Çiller's candidacy basing its position on the argument that the image of Turkey in Europe would be better. *Milliyet* seemed to support Çiller's candidacy since she was believed to reflect the modern and European face of Turkey.²¹⁹ After Çiller had secured the prime ministry seat, *Milliyet* published news article underlining Çiller's election. While İsmet Sezgin and Köksal Toptan, the rivalries of Çiller, were described as "the most

²¹⁹ *Milliyet*, 14, 16, 18 June 1993.

defeated,” the “women and change” were defined as “the most victorious” denoting Çiller’s election.²²⁰

The breathless race has resulted in Tansu Çiller’s triumph. A University professor with a MAs from the USA, 47 year-old Çiller ascended to the chair after being chosen as the first woman prime minister in Turkey.²²¹

In *Milliyet*, despite being on a small scale, the criticism of Çiller’s prime ministry stemmed from the possibility of her being unsuccessful when she could not fulfill her government priorities. Especially, an article published with the title of “the trap that is waiting for Tansu Çiller”²²² questioned her promises about improving the Turkish economy in a short time.²²³

Hürriyet stated the importance of the support of Demirel and highlighted Islamic notions together with westernization and the triumph of a female figure.

They could not block her! 47-year-old Tansu Çiller has become the first woman prime minister by beating a thirty year old giant like Demirel and İsmet Sezgin, Cavit Çağlar and Köksal Toptan. Some significant names who have worked in different levels of the True Path Party since its foundation were not successful in blocking Tansu Çiller.²²⁴

The mass media seemed to support Çiller’s Islamic and nationalist leanings. Çiller’s nationalist sentiments which were defined as the love of her country to make

²²⁰ *Milliyet*, 14 June 1993.

²²¹ *Nefes nefese yarış, Tansu Çiller’in zaferiyle sonuçlandı. Kolejli, ABD masterlı, ekonomi profesörü 47 yaşındaki Çiller Türkiye tarihinin ilk kadın başbakanı seçildikten sonra kürsüye çıktı. Aynı anda tezahürattan adeta yer yerinden oynadı. Milliyet*, 14 June 1993.

²²² *Tansu Çiller’i Bekleyen Tuzak, Milliyet*, 18 June 1993.

²²³ In this news article, Çiller’s election was compared with the election of Bill Clinton as the President of the USA. The news article denoted that Clinton was succesful to get the support of the great majority of American citizens by giving promises of bettering the American economy however, his job was more difficult than he thought. *Milliyet*, 18 June 1993.

²²⁴ *47 yaşındaki Tansu Çiller Demirel gibi 30 yıllık bir dev ile İsmet Sezgin, Cavit Çağlar ve Köksal Toptan gibi kurt politikacıları ezerek Dyp nin Genel Başkanı oldu. DYP kurulduğundan bu yana çeşitli kademelerinde görev yapan birçok önemli ismi Çillerin önünü kesmek için blok oluşturduğu halde başarılı olamadı. Önünü Kesemediler!(They could’nt block her!) Hürriyet*, 14 June 1993.

reforms to develop Turkey and the “Çiller’s Storm,” would bring “the god willing and our national unity will embrace everyone from the same distance.”²²⁵

Also, articles in *Zaman* highlighted Islamic and nationalist notions by referring to Çiller’s own remarks. Çiller, more than the other candidates in the election, gave religious messages. Every day, different news about Çiller’s nationalism and her statements about the uniqueness of Turkish culture and Islam were reflected in *Zaman*.

The first woman prime minister; her duty is difficult. Inflation and domestic terrorism, the events in Germany, the Cyprus Issue, the Bosnian tragedy, painful developments in Central Asia, and the external problems are waiting for her...Çiller who used Islamic themes in her speeches, said “ the Koran and ezan will be sacred for us. Our flag and our country will be before us.”²²⁶

Cumhuriyet was not enthusiastic about her western values and her being the first woman prime minister. One of the criticisms of *Cumhuriyet*, as the voice of the left media, was Çiller’s Islamic tendencies, which were seen in her interviews and her press releases when she was a candidate for prime minister. The articles said “Çiller was resigned from the Ministry of State and became the candidate for the DYP chairperson is a candidate with god’s willing.”²²⁷ The other criticism from *Cumhuriyet* was that Çiller’s economic policies were open to the liberalization of the economy and privatization of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). The general view in *Cumhuriyet* pointed to the existing issues that waited to be solved by good

²²⁵ “Çiller Fırtınası” Allahın izniyle ve bizim beraberliğimizle ve herkesi aynı mesafeden kucaklamamızla DYP yeni damgasını Türkiye tarihine vuracaktır. *Hürriyet*, 9 June 1993.

²²⁶ İlk kadın başbakan; Çiller’in işi zor. Çiller’i içerde enflasyon ve terör, dışarda ise Almanyadaki olaylar, Kıbrıs Meselesi, Bosna dramı, Orta Asya’daki elim gelişmeler bekliyor... Konuşmalarında İslami temaları da işleyen Çiller Kuran ve ezan bizim için mukaddes olacaktır. Bayrağımız ve ülkemiz canımızın önünde olacaktır.” dedi. *Zaman*, 14 June 1994.

²²⁷ Devlet Bakanlığından istifa ederek, DYP genel başkanlığına aday olan Çiller, Allahın izniyle aday. *Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1993.

leadership. The winning of the Prime Minister's office by Çiller was described as follows.

The duty of the prime minister who will be deployed to form the cabinet is hard. Huge problems await her. Inflation, the opening of private radio and television channels and meeting with Kohl about the racist attacks in Solingen in Germany.²²⁸

The Perception of the Print Media in the Events Related to the Alevi Identity during the Process of Integration to the CU

The Sivas Events

The viewpoints of the newspapers were united about the threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. The rise of Islamic movement, the lack of administrative intervention, the belatedness of the regional police authorities and the provocation of the local citizens before and during the Pir Sultan Abdal Ceremony took place were cited as reasons for the Sivas events by the print media. The events brought into question the acceptability of the Alevi identity in society and at the government level. The newspapers discussed the issue by referring to the issues as the Alevi identity within the majority Sunni Muslim identity and religious freedom in Turkey.

Cumhuriyet drew the attention of the public to the regional balance of power that affected the course of events. According to an article in *Cumhuriyet*, the local media in Sivas had provoked people many days before the Sivas events. The events had started right after the Friday prayer, when the group was under the influence of religion and open to being manipulated.

²²⁸ *Bugün yeni kabineyi kurmakla görevlendirilecek olan Başbakan'ın işi zor. Çilleri dağ gibi sorunlar bekliyor. Enflasyon, özel radyo ve tvlerin açılması, ırkçı saldırılarla ilgili Kohl ile görüşecek. Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1993.*

The Massacre in Sivas: 35 Dead, 60 Injured

In Sivas, the Islamic extremist rebelled used the pretext of the Pir Sultan Abdal Celebration to rise up. The violence was provoked by the local media. The bloodshed in Sivas started when the reactionary local media assumed an attitude against the Pir Sultan Abdal Celebration. Especially the local print media which published against Aziz Nesin wrote that they would not allow to the atheist propaganda.²²⁹

Cumhuriyet explained the lack of the regional police force as the reason to the Sivas events as “the police was late to intervene.”²³⁰ There was a clash between *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman* about whether “Sivas Events” was based on Islamic extremism or the provocation of other groups.

For a New Military Coup?

It was turned into an anti-state and an anti-religious demonstration. Now, there is instigation at the funerals; Anonymous announcements were handed. ...The Provocateurs’ are on the stage. The attackers were not furious attackers since Aziz Nesin was saved.²³¹

According to *Zaman*, powers inside and outside which wanted to separate Turkey acted adversely at Sivas, as they had in the past. *Zaman* pointed to the historical continuity of that kind of separatist activity by giving all the separatist movements in a chronological order: student movements, and workers movements’ and Turkish-Kurdish separation, and now “the provocation of sects would start quarrelling between the children of the homeland.”²³² By this way *Zaman* reflected the general view of the right wing, which had been uncomfortable with the students

²²⁹ *Sivas'ta Katliam; 35 Ölü, 60 Yaralı, Sivas'ta aşırı dinciler Pir Sultan Abdal Şenliklerini bahane ederek ayaklandılar. Şiddeti Yerel Basın Kışkırttı. Sivas'taki Kanlı Olaylar kentteki yerel gerici basının Pir Sultan Abdal Şenliklerine karşı tavır almasıyla başladı. Özellikle Aziz Nesin Aleyhine yayın yapan yerel gazeteler dinsizlik propagandasına izin vermeyeceklerini yazdılar. (The Massacre in Sivas: 35 Dead, 60 Injured) Cumhuriyet, 3 July 1993.*

²³⁰ *Polis Müdahalede Geç Kaldı. Cumhuriyet, 4 July 1993.*

²³¹ *Provoke Edip Suçluyorlar: Provokatörler Sahnede; Saldırganların gözü dönmüş katil olmadıkları Aziz Nesin in kurtarılmasından anlaşılıyor. Zaman, 8 July 1993.*

²³² *Vatanın evlatları birbirine düşürülmek isteniyor. Zaman, 5 July 1993.*

and workers' movements in the 1960s and later and the awakening of the left movement, which saw the movements as the anti-regime movements and anarchic.

Zaman found a historical continuity to the threats that came to the nation-state by positioning itself in the right view. According to its general view, threats to the Turkish nation-state could act with different ideologies, sometimes they were anti-religious and sometimes they were separatists. As *Cumhuriyet* interpreted the Sivas events had been against Aziz Nesin, who was a prominent leftist writer in Turkey, and blamed the extreme Islamic groups and also *Zaman* for assuming an attitude of protecting the people in the events. By doing this, *Zaman*'s view was to shift the public opinion's attention to the more dangerous threats to Turkey's unity.

After the Friday prayer, the events started with the overreacting of the Islamic extremists during the speech of Aziz Nesin during Pir Sultan Abdal Celebration, which had been organized with the support of the Sivas governorship. Nesin, who was harassed when he was signing his books, was saved by the journalists.²³³

In the mass media, the reason for the Sivas events was stated as the act of separatist powers for the dissolution of the Turkish Republic. The news did not give any indication of whether the Sivas Events were originated from an anti-Alevi provocation; however, the events were discussed extensively by claiming the protestors in the Pir Sultan Abdal celebration were anti-secular.

After Friday prayer, the crowd left the mosques especially Paşa, Kale and Central Mosques and various others, and arrived at the governorship. Here, they shouted "resign government; resign governor; there is no place for infidels in here"! While the crowd whose majority was young shouted as they walked to the government centre. "The hands that stretched to Islam are broken!" the opponent group in the Culture Centre shouted "long live

²³³ *Şeriatçılar ayaklandı. Cuma namazından sonra Olaylar Aziz Nesin'in Sivas Valiliği'nin desteğinde yapılan Pir Sultan Abdal Şenliğindeki konuşması aşırı dincilerin tepkisiyle başladı. Kitaplarını imzalarırken tartaklanan Nesin'i gazeteciler kurtardı. (The Islamic revivalist rebelled!) Cumhuriyet, 3 July 1993*

laicism!” The Islamic revivalist group looted the book fair and knocked down the Sultan Abdal sculpture in the garden.²³⁴

Milliyet blamed the RP’s organization in Sivas, saying that the party had acted in the organization of an illegal demonstration and also overlooked the possibility that the chain of reactions could lead to a massacre. An interview with the governor of Sivas, whose responsibility in Sivas events was stated by *Milliyet*, was in which he admitted his guilt “I wish I had been the 38th dead person”²³⁵ in Sivas events.

One day after the Sivas events took place the *Zaman* published a statement by the governor of Sivas blaming Aziz Nesin for the Sivas events. The daily also gave the statement of the governor of Sivas, Temel Karabilgin, which the reason for the anger and hatred in massacre had been “not the clash of sects, the reaction was against Aziz Nesin.”²³⁶

Unlike *Cumhuriyet*, *Zaman* showed Nesin as the one of the reasons for the Sivas events. In the following days, one article in *Zaman* daily explained why it showed Nesin as the criminal:

It was the first time the Pir Sultan Abdal ceremony was to be held in Sivas. When it stated stand in silence for the memorial of the revolution and Atatürk, he himself wanted to stand and join it. After the events, he used inflammatory statements.²³⁷

²³⁴ *Cuma Namazının ardından Paşa, Kale ve meydan Camileri başta olmak üzere çeşitli camilerden çıkan kalabalık polis barikatını aştılar, ve Vali konağı nın önüne ulaştılar. Burada hükümet istifa vali istifa burada kâfirlere yer yok diye bağırıldılar. Daha sonra hükümet merkezinin önüne yürüyen ve çoğunluğunu gençlerin oluşturduğu grup İslama uzanan eller kırılın şeklinde sloganlar atarken Kültür Merkezinde bulunanlarda Laiklik ölmez laiklik yaşayacaktır diye sloganlar attılar. Kitap standlarını yağmalayan aşırı dinci kalabalık bahçede bulunan Pir Sultan Abdal heykelini kazmalarla parçaladı. (The Revolt Towards Aziz Nesin in Sivas) Hürriye, 3 July 1993.*

²³⁵ *Keşke ölen 38. ben olsaydım. Milliyet, 16 July 1993*

²³⁶ *Mezhep Çatışması değil, tepki Aziz Nesin’e idi. Zaman, 4 July 1993*

²³⁷ *İlk defa Pir Sultan Abdal şenliklerini Sivas ta yapmak istedi. Devrim Şehitleri ve Atatürk adına saygı duruşu dendiğinde bizzat ayağa kalkarak duşa katıldı. Hadiselerden sonra halkı tahrik edici ifadeler kullandı. Zaman, 6 June 1993.*

The criticism of *Zaman* sometimes became harsh, as given in the example towards the one who argued that Alevi citizens had been attacked by the Islamists.

The SHP, the CHP and the media which had the parallel view with them are trying to hide the democrat make-up under the ugly despotism. They are trying to show Islam and Muslims as the source of the terror as they are trying to put laicism above the nation like the sword of Democles.²³⁸

The Gaziosmanpaşa Events

During the Çiller's prime ministry, another significant event which was related to the Alevi identity was the Gaziosmanpaşa events. On March 12, 1995, a district in İstanbul inhabited mainly by Alevi citizens was attacked by unknown armed. The Gaziosmanpaşa events brought a grief to Turkey and reminded everyone of the Sivas events nearly two years earlier. In *Cumhuriyet*, the bloody events were given in the headlines, "they want to divide Turkey"²³⁹

In *Zaman*, the events were reflected as provocation. *Zaman* warned Turkish citizens that everybody should be careful about any provocative acts. The attack, which aimed to hurt the peace and brotherhood of the country, had not been carried out by unknown attackers. *Zaman* blamed mainly the socialist and communist organizations and parties for arranging such separatist events.²⁴⁰

According to *Hürriyet*, the Turkish state and its citizens would not fall into this ambush. The Turkish citizens would recognize that trap with democracy. The attackers sought to upset the existing the system. The news articles in *Hürriyet* did not go beyond questioning if whether the existing system was democratic or not. It only regarded the attack as separatist and interpreted the issue with security

²³⁸ *Zaman*, 12 June 1993.

²³⁹ *Alevilere Saldırı*, (Attack on Alevi), *Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1995.

²⁴⁰ *Kışkırtmaları Durdurun*, (End the Provocation Now!) *Zaman*, 18 March 1995.

concerns.²⁴¹ The Mayor of Istanbul, Hayri Kozakçıođlu, was blamed by the news articles due to his inability to carrying out his duty or lack of fulfillment of the security of his administration.²⁴²

According to general view of *Milliyet*, the fight between different sects would not be allowed. The Gaziosmanpaşa events provocation had led to such bloody events. *Milliyet* agreed with the governing elite when Süleyman Demirel, the President of Turkish state, declared:

There is provocation. The fight between sects can not exist in Turkey, we can not allow that, this is provocation, this is terror. No one says anything to either Alevis or Sunnis. What is the thing that they can not share?²⁴³

Security Issues

“The Southeast Problem” was another topic that dominated the agenda of the print media. Turkey’s Southeast problem continued with the clash between the security and political solutions in Turkish politics. The Çiller government favored the security-dominated solutions which necessitated militaristic measures almost without exceptions. The stance of the media, whether it would be in favor of military solutions or tolerate identity politics, became significant.

Milliyet’s view was to handle with the problems with urgent measures. This response was attached to the news about the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army. The urgent measures were counted as the urban planning scheme of the region, decreasing the unemployment, economic and social development with

²⁴¹ *Tuzađa Düşemeyeceđiz.* (We Will not Fall Trip) *Hürriyet*, 14 March 1995.

²⁴² *Milliyet* 17 March 1995.

²⁴³ *Tahrik var; Türkiye de Mezhep kavgası olamaz, buna müsaade etmeyiz, tahrik var, bu terör. Aleviye bir şey diyen yok Sünni ye bir şey diyen yok neyi paylaşamıyorlar.* *Milliyet*, 17 March 1995.

taking care of the disrupted balances. When the head of the government decided to arrange a Southeastern visit, *Hürriyet* proposed that Çiller bring her motherly sympathy to the citizens.²⁴⁴

Cumhuriyet agreed with the security concerns of the mass media. Moreover, it added the development side by citing the significance of improving the region in economic terms. The state should make investments to that region and the citizens of the southeast of Turkey should be protected through those investments. Development would thus be realized on a mutual relationship. *Cumhuriyet* added the existence of *Hizbullah* as another threat to the security of the Southeast region.²⁴⁵ The general view of the newspaper was that terror emanated not only from racist separatism, but also from religious fundamentalism.

For *Zaman*, the southeast problem stemmed from the lack of security; therefore, the government should give importance to the special and strengthened security teams. An article about the social devastation of the existence of the security forces of the Turkish army and threat of the PKK had caused the forced migration of ten thousand Turkish citizens. With this interpretation *Zaman* showed its view on terror by arguing exaggerated security concerns of the government victimized mostly the regional people. The citizens in Southeastern cities were forced to move.²⁴⁶

The DEP Turns into a Identity Problem

The government was determined to handle the terror problem as a security problem. On that point, the views of *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Zaman* and *Cumhuriyet* and

²⁴⁴ *Hürriyet*, 14 June 1993

²⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 13 January 1994.

²⁴⁶ *Zaman*, 6 November 1993.

the discourse of the government overlapped. The approach of casting the Kurdish problem as a terror problem which could only be solved with security terms put the identity question into an unsolvable position. The decisions of the European Parliament related to Turkey's identity politics and the developments in Turkey about the Kurdish problem were met in light of "security concerns."

On March 2, 1994, the immunities of DEP members of the parliament, Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, Ahmet Türk and Orhan Doğan, were lifted by unanimous vote. Orhan Doğan was taken into custody using force. At the exit door of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, where he was captured by the police. It was the first arrest of a Turkish parliamentarian by the police as he exited the Assembly.²⁴⁷

Hürriyet took a critical stance while reflecting on the force of the police. However, in the mass media, the outlook to the DEP problem was challenged with the lift of immunities of the DEP members of the parliament. On June 1994, the headlines in *Hürriyet* said. "Here is the reality of the DEP." Below the headline appeared a picture of one of the DEP MPs, Nizamettin Toğuç, who had fled to a foreign country, with the PKK flag. The article criticized the connection of the PKK and DEP and Toğuç's call of Abdullah Öcalan as the President of the Kurds.²⁴⁸

On March 27, 1994, the decision of the DEP to not join the local elections of March 27, 1994 was interpreted as an "escape tendency of the DEP."²⁴⁹ It was argued that since they would be unsuccessful in the elections they had decided not participate. Moreover, *Hürriyet's* view about the military solutions the Kurdish problem became stronger before the local elections, saying that the Social

²⁴⁷ *Hürriyet*, 2 March 1994.

²⁴⁸ *Hürriyet* 18 June 1994.

²⁴⁹ *Hürriyet*, 26 February 1994.

Democrats' protection of the DEP members of parliament was a significant reason to create a crack in the coalition after of the six DEP MPs were and taken into the custody.²⁵⁰

After Zana's interview with a German newspaper, *Hürriyet* carried the headline "Thank you Friends, Shame on You, Citizens."²⁵¹ Zana declared her uneasiness in "here, (in the Turkish Parliament) the decisions are taken in terms how a community could kill and behave cruelly towards Kurds".²⁵² *Hürriyet* also gave interviews that were televised on the same German TV. The newspaper pointed in Jupp Derwall, Toni Schumacher, Karl Hainz Feldkam, the three sportsmen' said "we learn friendship and humaneness in Turkey."²⁵³ The PKK activities were regarded as terror and evaluated in security terms in all kinds of media in the 1990s. In that period, the mass media was against the DEP and the appearance of Kurdish identity in parliament and in public.

In the following days, *Hürriyet* published an article with an interview with Sedat Yurttaş and Selim Sadak who were DEP members of parliament. The owning of all the offences which had been directed to the DEP by the two DEP members were greeted by the news article. Sometimes by giving references to the interview of the two DEP members, *Hürriyet* reflected the general view of the newspaper on the closure of the DEP. Yurtdaş; "I am speaking frankly. Our being new as the cadre, our

²⁵⁰ *Hürriyet*, 3 March 1994.

²⁵¹ *Hürriyet Teşekkürler Dostlar, Yazıklar Olsun Yurttaşlar Hürriyet*, 10 March 1994.

²⁵² *Burada bir halka nasıl zulüm edilir nasıl yok edilebilir diye kararlar alınıyor. Hürriyet*, 10 March 1994.

²⁵³ *İnsanlığı ve Dostluğu Türkiye' de öğrendik. Hürriyet*, 10 March 1994.

being inexperienced, and impatient, and the hard conditions led us to make many mistakes.”²⁵⁴

Despite this, *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet* wanted to see Kurdish people as part of Turkish culture. Their view was based on allowing the Kurdish people to live their culture to some extent. Hence when Çiller talked about the right to allow Kurdish television, *Hürriyet* evaluated this as the “great attack of Çiller.”²⁵⁵ The mass media was in favor of seeing when the government would include Kurdish television on the agenda.

The Rule of Law and the Anti-Terror Law

The European Parliament considered the abolition of Article 8 of the anti-terror law as the necessity for Turkey’s membership to the Customs Union. It is appropriate to look at the content of the Article 8 which was charging every act and propaganda regardless of method or intent that aimed to break the integrity of the Turkish state.²⁵⁶ Çiller, with the suppression of the risk of losing Turkey’s chance to enter the Customs Union, in October 1995, forced her government to ratify the law by making amendments in the law.²⁵⁷

The coalition was divided into two. The DYP sought to ratify the article whereas SHP was against it. During the discussion of this law, *Zaman* agreed with the coalition parties, and usually published the views which were against the anti-

²⁵⁴ *Bizim Kadro olarak yeni olmamız, deneyimsizliğimiz, tezcanlılığımız, koşulların ağırlığı nedeniyle hatalar yaptık. Hürriyet*, 18 June 1994.

²⁵⁵ *Hürriyet*, 13 July 1993.

²⁵⁶ Ergun Özbudun, “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 2007), p.184.

²⁵⁷ In the last version of the law the phrase “regardless of method of intent” was removed. For more information see, *Turkey : Violations of Free Expression in Turkey* (Human Rights Watch, 1999)

terror law. *Zaman* criticized the law because the draft of Article 8 aimed to bring the Article 163 of the Penal Code. The draft regarded terror activities and religion the same as religious freedoms.²⁵⁸ *Zaman* criticized Article 8 since it was open to manipulation. Every kind of meeting and demonstration could be regarded as against laicism.²⁵⁹

The content of the draft aimed to prohibit every kind of meeting or propaganda that was aimed to damage the Turkish state and its integrity. This was to some extent was acceptable for *Cumhuriyet* although “whatever method, aim or thinking” was open to be manipulated.²⁶⁰

The general view of *Zaman* criticized Article 8 since for being open to manipulation. The criterion to regard any act, meeting or demonstration against laicism was the main disputable thing for the general view of *Zaman*. *Zaman* also established the continuity with Article 163 of Turkish Penal Code which had been lifted during the Özal government.²⁶¹ The revival of the 163 was reacted by the general view of the *Zaman*.²⁶² Article 8 would sabotage the brotherhood of Islam in the east and southeast of Turkey.²⁶³ Finally, Article 8 got its last shape by deciding to reform the article as anti-laic acts which included the violence element.²⁶⁴ After

²⁵⁸ *Zaman*, 11 November 1993.

²⁵⁹ *Zaman*, 10 November 1993.

²⁶⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 11 January 1995.

²⁶¹ *Zaman*, 10 November 1993.

²⁶² *Zaman*, 11 November 1993.

²⁶³ *Zaman*, 16 November 1993.

²⁶⁴ *Zaman*, 24 November 1993.

that regulation in the article, *Zaman* discussed “what is the relation and connection of the article with laicism” and also “terror can not be laic and anti-laic”²⁶⁵

According to *Zaman*, the social democrats considered laicism as being irreligious and atheist especially it would sabotage the Islamic brotherhood in the southeast. *Zaman* reflected that the DYP traditionally supported Islam and religious freedoms so that the draft was the work of the SHP mostly.²⁶⁶

The discussion of Article 8 was on the agenda of the Assembly for a long time. Therefore, *Zaman* gladly met the news of the recession of Article 8 by the DYP and the Parliamentary Committee of Justice under the headline “Triumph of Common Sense.”²⁶⁷ This common sense according to *Zaman* belonged to the DYP’s respect for Islamic identities. *Zaman*’s attitude was too harsh when the draft of Article 8 was ratified by the DYP and the parliament.

Before, the members of the DYP who said the draft would be ratified neither by the Commission nor by the General Assembly shouldered the responsibility of the anti-terror law before law. The SHP reached its goal. Yesterday, the DYP had to accept anti-terror law by submitting the blackmail of the SHP. When the draft is accepted as it is, every separatist discussions will be free. Article 163, which was abolished from and its Turkish Penal Code will be raised again. The PKK terror will not decline. The associations could be made guilty with blaming and aspersion.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ *Tasarıda laikliğin işi ne? ; Terörün laiki anti-laiki olmaz. Zaman, 27 November 1993.*

²⁶⁶ *Zaman, 11 November 1993.*

²⁶⁷ *Zaman, 18 October 1993.*

²⁶⁸ *Daha önce, Tasarı ne Komisyondan ne Genel Kurul’dan geçmez diyen DYP’liler, tarih önünde Terörle Mücadele Kanun Tasarısı’nın sorumluluğunu omuzladı. SHP muradına erdi. DYP dün bir kere daha SHP’nin şantajına boyun eğerek Terörle Mücadele Kanun Tasarısı’yı kabul etti. Tasarı bu şekilde kabul edildiğinde her türlü bölücülük tartışmaları serbest hale gelecek. Türk Ceza Kanunu’ dan kaldırılan 163. madde ciddi şekilde hortlamış olacak. PKK terörü zayıflamayacak. Vakıflar iddia ve iftiralarla terör suçlusu yapılabilecek. Bu Ayıp Size Yeter! (This Shame Is Enough For You!) Zaman, 18 November 1994*

At the end of November, *Zaman*'s criticism increased and its news *Zaman* pointed to the SHP's effort to get the article approved by the DYP although the SHP's own group had not accepted it yet.²⁶⁹

Cumhuriyet highlighted the dilemma of the Constitution, saying that the individual rights and liberties which were brought by the constitution were again restricted by the articles in the Constitution like Article 163 and the Anti-terror law of the Penal Code. The most prominent example of this dilemma was the existence of the Anti-terror law which had entered to the Penal Code with the abolition of the articles restricting freedom of thought (140, 141, 142, and 163), which sabotaged the freedom of thought again.²⁷⁰

Hürriyet pointed out the dilemma that while Çiller wanted Europeanization on the outside and tried to show the European face of Turkey, she tried to ratify the draft of the Anti-terror law which restricted the freedom of thought inside Turkey.

It is the turn of Democratization: The democratization package which was prepared by the Çiller and Karayalçın explained the details of the package. The package decreases the age of the voter to 18, and the age of the candidate to 25. The Undersecretary of human rights is going to be open. The rights to open trade unions and labor agreement which were accepted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) would be accepted.²⁷¹ In the draft of Anti-Terror Law, political crimes and terror crimes are separated.²⁷² The Assembly could not have a common ground for the changes in the 12 September Constitution in one month.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ *Zaman*, 29 November 1993.

²⁷⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1993.

²⁷¹ *Sıra Demokratikleşmede; Koalisyonun günlerdir üzerinde çalıştığı demokratikleşme paketi Başbakan Çiller ve yardımcısı Karayalçın tarafından dün basın toplantısıyla açıklandı. Pakette güneydoğu sorununa ilişkin bir düzenleme yapılmadı. Anayasa'daki değişikliklerle seçme yaşı 18'e seçilme yaşı 25 e indiriliyor. İnsan hakları müsteşarlığı kurulacak. ILO nun sendikalar ve toplu iş sözleşmeleri grevlerine ilişkin kabul ettiği kararlar yasalara yansıtılacak. Hürriyet*, 19 May 1994.

²⁷² *Hazırlanan Terörle Mücadele Yasa Tasarısı taslağında siyasi suç ile terör suçları birbirinden ayrıldı. Hürriyet*, 4 September 1994.

²⁷³ *12 Eylül anayasasının değiştirilmesi için Meclis te bir aydır süren mücadele fiyaskoyla sonuçlandı. Hürriyet*, 7 July 1995.

There was a reaction from the ANAP and RP MPs against the SHP's work to awaken the soul of Article 163.²⁷⁴ *Zaman* increased its harsh criticism through the news articles in the coming days,²⁷⁵ showing its great effort to give place to the expressions of the parties and political leaders which had the same direction as its ideological leaning during this process. The expressions of the chairman of the BBP and ANAP were published.²⁷⁶ The security teams in the East and Southeast thought that the separatist organization was favored by the Draft of Anti-Terror Law. The news article evaluated this as a step for the political solution of the terror problem which *Zaman* found unacceptable.²⁷⁷

In this chapter, an analysis of the print media in the span of the process of Turkey's integration to the CU was presented. Attention was given to how the domestic issues were used and interpreted in this significant process. The print media, despite their different ideological leanings, were united in their views about unity and a strong state. The print media, which was supposed to be questioning governmental actions in a democratic society, was actually helping, identifying with the government discourse, and leaving the identity problems unsolved.

²⁷⁴ *Zaman*, 11 November 1993.

²⁷⁵ *Zaman*, 16-17 November 1993.

²⁷⁶ For the expression of the chairman of BBP see *Zaman* 17 November 1993, the draft is exerting pressure on the religious belief and values.

²⁷⁷ *Zaman*, 30 November 1994

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

*Turkey's integration to Europe will be a big step for the world peace. However, not including the only laic and Muslim democracy in the European Club will send wrong the message to all of the Muslims in the world. Moreover, the message will not be taken right by the ones who are in the struggle among the moderation and extreme laicism and fundamentalism.*²⁷⁸

This thesis examined the discourse of the political elite during Turkey's integration to the CU by focusing on the argument that Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and the government regarded identity politics as the only way not to miss the critical opportunity of becoming a member of the CU. The two-sided discourse, one strongly defending unitary state in domestic politics, and the other using the European, democratic and secular image in order to persuade the European leaders determined the process of Turkey's integration to the CU. At this point, Turkey's adventure to join the CU became a prominent point in the history of Turkey-EU relations. The debate among the Turkish governing elite was to prove the Europeanness of Turkey by successfully managing the government priority, to complete Turkey's integration to the CU.

The joining the Customs Union has been the focal point in Turkey's relations with the EU. As is known, the first step was taken with the signing of the Ankara Treaty in 1963. The Customs Union with the EU was a complementary step the

²⁷⁸ *Türkiye'nin Avrupa ile entegrasyonu, dünya barışı için büyük bir adım olacaktır. Ancak, dünyanın tek laik, Müslüman demokrasisini Avrupa kulübüne dâhil etmemek tüm dünya Müslümanlarına yanlış mesaj yollayacaktır. Ayrıca ılımlılık ve aşırılık laiklik ve köktendincilik arasındaki mücadelede yer alanlara da mesaj doğru gitmeyecektir.* Öke, p. 69.

meaning of which was more than that. It was significant that the signing of the CU clashed with the atmosphere of the 1990s when the unitary state model was questioned with the different demands from society. For instance, the Kurdish people were able to organize a party, the DEP, and represent themselves in the Assembly. In the conclusions drawn from those chapters, Turkey's membership to the CU was a restricted debate only among the governing elite level; the unitary state model was the only way that could convey Turkey to Europe. In this way, the discourse of Çiller, which was supported with the unitary state model, was also restricted by it in the process of joining the CU.

In the second chapter of this study, the intra elite debate over the process of Turkey's membership in the CU that take place between the DYP and the other political parties, TÜSIAD, as the representation of the big business, and the print media was studied in order to show how Çiller was isolated in this process and in return she went on to complete the CU treaty as a *fait accompli*.

The third chapter dealt with the discourse of the Çiller coalition in the identity problems of the period in the light of the existing domestic issue by focusing on the solutions that were developed for the identity issues and by analyzing the criticism of the coalition. The conclusion drawn from that chapter was that the DYP, under the leadership of Çiller, used the discourse of the unitary state and strengthened it by benefitting from the identity problems taking place in internal politics. Identity politics left the government maneuvering space and a significant strategy.

In the fourth chapter, the relationship between the print media and policy making towards the different identity demands during the process of Turkey's integration to the Customs Union (CU) were studied by the different discourses of

the print media in the identity problems. I demonstrated how these discourses agreed in the strong defense of the unitary state model in terms of identity politics during the process of Turkey's membership to the CU. This thesis is found out that during the process of Turkey's integration to the CU, the approaches of the four major newspapers, *Cumhuriyet*, *Zaman*, *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet*, were not able to go beyond the discourse of Çiller government.

In the 1990s, the atmosphere was shaped by globalization and the transformation of Turkey in terms of economy, politics and social and the membership to the CU, or Turkey's European integration. In 1989, the negative answer from the EU led the Turkish government to embrace a plan which was the only and remaining alternative, economic integration with the CU.

As various academics put it, the 1990s witnessed the hegemony of the state-centric model in Turkey. Habermas states the vision that the European integration was evolving towards the union of the nation-states guaranteeing the democracy, and recognition of the different identities. This characteristic of the 1990s differentiated Turkey's relations with the EU from those of the previous decades.

In this period, the relationship between the Europhiles and Eurosceptic determined the discourse of government. The study elaborated the conflict between the Europhiles, who supported CU membership for Turkey by arguing that Turkey was the first country to complete the CU conditions with the EU without becoming a full member. This study showed the arguments of the Eurosceptic, which were Turkey's unilateral commitment, not having power in decision-making unlike member states, Greece's dominance of the other member states, Turkey's inclusion in only one part of the CU, and the EU's aim to bring Turkish politics into an unsolvable arena by encouraging Kurdish separatism.

The CU was, of course, an economic integration into the supranational pillar of the EU; however, this study put that the Preamble of the Ankara Treaty foresaw the establishment of political integration. At that point, the transformative power of the EU was elaborated. The EU is able to transform the domestic politics of the candidate states through not changing the state coercively or intervening, but putting mechanisms and conditions. Therefore, the EP put three conditions for Turkey's integration to the CU: eliminating the legal and constitutional restrictions, changing and abolishing the Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law, and releasing the DEP members.

Çiller argued that Turkey's relation with the European integration was aimed from the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Her discourse, which had been mainly nourished by the unitary state model, insisted on the continuity of the center right tradition by closing herself prominent right wing leaders, mainly with Özal.

The Eurosceptic side was ANAP criticizing of Çiller; The RP regarded the EU as a Christian Club, the left wing in the SHP was against the privatization program, the BBP criticized the EU's partiality in the Bosnian war and the DSP regarded the article of the CU as the Sevres Treaty. Moreover, privatization was criticized by the political parties in terms of giving up the monopoly of the state in the economy. At this point, Çiller's discourse should be inclusive of all the elements of the unitary state model in order to eliminate the doubt of the political parties. Çiller used a popular discourse linking it with individual rights, popular nationalism, and populist and Sunni Islamic discourse.

In TÜSİAD, despite not having a monolithic discourse in this process, the pro-EU side became stronger in the end. Especially with the opening of the office in Brussels after Turkey's integration to the CU, TÜSİAD became a pro-EU institution.

During the process even the doubts inside TÜSİAD, legitimized Çiller's discourse that she should put more emphasis on the strong state model.

The process of Turkey's integration to the CU was elaborated in the light of polarization of the media. The center and mass media were studied with *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, the left media with *Cumhuriyet*, and the right media with *Zaman*. Print media with three different points of view did not give up the unitary state model in this process. Especially, the decision of the EP was regarded as a restriction of the sovereignty of the nation state and answered back with the nationalist, Islamist and sometimes with laic messages. Privatization was not acceptable in order to compromise the economic sovereignty. The democratic media waited to criticize the governmental actions which were built on the strictness of the unitary state; however, the discourse of the print media became a complementary arena for the discourse of the government.

In the process of Turkey's integration to the CU, the governing elite regarded the CU membership as the only way to convey Turkey to EU membership. In domestic politics, efforts were made to solve the problem of the terror, which was regarded as the only main threat, a low-intensity war. The political solution to the Kurdish problem which was brought by the DEP clashed with the military solutions, which were forced by the political parties and the DYP. The tension between Alevi-Sunni identities and the events that took place in Sivas and Gaziosmanpaşa were not answered rational politics back. On the one hand, the welcoming of the CU was the most practical way to catch up the West, and the economic integration would bring political closeness and full membership. On the other hand the government faced huge problems which would impede Turkey's integration to the CU. The study showed that the government, in order to solve the domestic problems and protect the

image of Turkey in its relations with the EU benefitted from the strategy of two-sided discourse which was the most appropriate and balancing way.

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