

ONTOPARADIGMS:
A DE-STRUCTION OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
IN THE CONTEXT OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF TRUTH

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Dissertation Abstract
Özgür Aktok, "Ontoparadigms: A De-struction of Social Constructionism
in the Context of Heidegger's Conception of Truth"

This thesis de-constructs social constructionism in the context of Heidegger's conception of truth and develops the concept of *ontoparadigm* through this de-struction in order to deal with some basic problems arising within Heidegger's philosophy as well as within contemporary constructionist philosophy. While its main goal is a de-struction of social constructionism, in a Heideggerian sense, the thesis also develops a critique of the traditional sociology of science and a critique of Rorty's neopragmatism, presenting these two critiques as two moments serving the main goal.

The relation between nature and society is interpreted by social constructionism in a way that covers up and makes invisible the ontological structure lying behind the so called "constructive" interactions between nature and society. This thesis uncovers this ontological structure through the introduction of the concept of *ontoparadigm* while it employs a threefold phenomenological methodology taken from Heidegger: (1) Phenomenological reduction, (2) phenomenological construction, and (3) phenomenological destruction. In the first moment, the concept of *construction* as encountered in social constructionism is reduced to the concept of *constitution* in a Kantian sense by being bracketed and traced back to its Kantian source, which is taken implicitly as a ground by social constructionism. The second moment of the threefold methodology appears as the positive one, which is the phenomenological construction of the concept of *ontoparadigm* on the basis of Heidegger's conception of truth as *Alētheia* within the context of his interpretation of Plato's allegory of the cave. This phenomenological construction of the concept of *ontoparadigm* happens necessarily in the form of a *destruction* of the traditional concept of *social construction* as well as the doctrine of *social constructionism*, which cover up the ontological structure of *ontoparadigm*. After the construction of the concept and the phenomenon of *ontoparadigm*, the thesis applies the concept to the historical case of "the Galileo affair". Through this case study, the conflict of the modern/Galilean *ontoparadigm* with the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic *ontoparadigm* is studied as an example of how *ontoparadigms* function as coercive onto-ethical/onto-political regimes of Being and how ontological norms of *ontoparadigms* intertwine with social, political, legal norms and constitute certain conflicting models of nature, resulting in onto-political conflicts.

The task of the thesis appears as the uncovering of the structure of *ontoparadigm* without defending it in a philosophically normative sense. It marks a phenomenon belonging to the metaphysical tradition, which Heidegger characterizes as "the forgottenness of Being" (*Seinsvergessenheit*) and attempts to overcome. Following Heidegger, the thesis also *de-constructs* the concept of *ontoparadigm* after constructing it. This second destruction aims to reach the ontological source out of which the Being of the phenomenon of *ontoparadigm* arises. In this last step, "onto-paradigm" is reduced to the more original concept of *Seinsfuge* –which Heidegger introduces in his late philosophy– and reaches the original (*ursprünglich*) temporality of Being. The concept of *Seinsfuge* points to an alternative, non-*ontoparadigmatic* way of thinking, in which the *ontoparadigmatic* forgottenness of Being is overcome.

Tez Özeti
Özgür Aktok, “Ontoparadigmalar: Heidegger’in Doğruluk Kavramı Bağlamında
Sosyal İnşacılığın bir Sökümü”

Bu tez, sosyal inşacılığı Heidegger’in doğruluk kavramı bağlamında söküme uğratarak Heidegger’in felsefesinde ve çağdaş inşacı felsefede ortaya çıkan bazı temel sorunları yeniden ele almak amacıyla ontoparadigma kavramını öne sürmektedir. Ana amacı sosyal inşacılığı Heideggerci bir anlamda söküme uğratmak olmakla birlikte, geleneksel bilim sosyolojisinin ve Rorty’nin neopragmatizminin eleştirilerini, bu amaca hizmet eden iki uğrak olarak ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, doğa ile toplum arasındaki ilişki sosyal inşacılıkta öyle bir şekilde yorumlanır ki, bu yorum, doğa ile toplum arasında “inşa” olarak adlandırılan etkileşimlerin arkasında yatan ontolojik yapının üzerini örterek bu yapıyı görünmez kılar. Tez, bu ontolojik yapıyı ontoparadigma kavramı altında açığa çıkarırken, Heidegger’in felsefesinden devraldığı, üç uğraktan oluşan bir fenomenolojik yöntem kullanmaktadır: (1) Fenomenolojik indirgeme, (2) fenomenolojik inşa, (3) fenomenolojik söküm. İlk uğrakta, sosyal inşacılıkta karşımıza çıkan “inşa” kavramı ayrıca alınır ve sosyal inşacılığın örtük olarak kendine temel aldığı Kantçı kaynağına doğru izi sürülerek “oluşum” kavramına indirgenir. Tezin yöntemindeki ikinci uğrak, ontoparadigma kavramının Heidegger’in, doğruluğu *A-letheia* olarak ele alması ve Platon’un mağara benzetmesi bağlamında, fenomenolojik inşası olarak ortaya çıkan pozitif uğraktır. Ontoparadigma olarak adlandırdığımız ontolojik yapının bu fenomenolojik inşası, üzerini örterek onu görünmez kılan bu geleneksel *sosyal inşa* kavramının ve bunu kendi temel kavramı olarak kullanan *sosyal inşacılık öğretisinin* zorunlu olarak bir söküme olarak ortaya çıkar. Ontoparadigma kavramını ve fenomeninin *Aletheia* olarak doğruluk kavramı üzerinde inşa ettikten sonra, tez, bu kavramı “Galileo olayı” olarak bilinen tarihsel olaya uygulamaktadır. Bu *örnek olay incelemesi* yoluyla, modern/Galileocu ontoparadigma ile Aristotelesçi/Batlamyusçu ontoparadigma arasında ortaya çıkan çatışmayı betimleyerek ontoparadigmaların onto-etik/onto-politik varlık rejimleri olarak nasıl iş gördüğünü, ontolojik normların sosyal, politik, hukuki normlarla iç içe geçerek belli varlık modellerini nasıl inşa ettiğini ve bu modellerin onto-politik çatışmalara nasıl neden olduğunu göstermektedir.

Tezin amacı, ontoparadigma kavramını felsefi anlamda normatif bir kavram olarak savunmak değil, yalnızca bu kavramın işaret ettiği yapıyı açığa çıkarmak ve fenomenolojik olarak betimlemektir. Bu kavram, Heidegger’in “varlık unutkanlığı” olarak nitelediği ve üstesinden gelmeye giriştiği metafizik geleneğin temel karakterini dile getirdiğinden, tez, Heidegger’in bu eleştirisini izleyerek kendi inşa ettiği ontoparadigma kavramını da söküme uğratmaktadır. Bu ikinci söküm, bu yapının kendisinden ortaya çıktığı ontolojik kaynağa ulaşmayı amaçlar. Tezin bu son adımında, ontoparadigma kavramı Heidegger’in geç döneminde ortaya attığı *Seinsfuge* kavramına indirgenerek varlığın kaynaklı zamansallığına ulaşılmaktadır. *Seinsfuge* kavramı, ontoparadigmatik varlık unutkanlığının geride bırakıldığı, alternatif, ontoparadigmatik-olmayan bir düşünme biçimine işaret etmektedir.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Kant and the Paradigmatic Shift in Metaphysics: On the Way from the
Transcendent towards the Phenomenal

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;
the point is to change it.¹

Reading this provocative statement from Marx, which is criticized by Heidegger for being groundless,² one tends to think that it is perhaps one of the best statements ever which expresses the death of metaphysics as *theoria* so clearly: the end of the old, noble, absolute science, looking towards the heaven to find up there an “eternal resting place” consisting of unchangeable forms [*eide*], first principles [*aitia*] and causes [*archai*] of beings as a whole.

This sharp Marxian contrast between *interpreting* the world by *theoria* in its *stability and order* –as we find them in the original sense of the Ancient Greek concept *cosmos*- and *changing* its whole substructure, its *hypo-stasis* by *praxis* (re-revolution), however, should be traced back to Kant’s announcement of the fatal limits of theoretical reason, which loses its old transcendent power to emancipate man from the finite world

¹ Karl Marx, “The German Ideology”, *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), XI Thesis.

² See Richard Wisser (ed.), *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (Freiburg: Alber, 1969), pp. 69f, 73f, where Heidegger criticizes Marx by pointing out that a change in the world presupposes a change in the representation of the world, and this is possible only if the world is interpreted sufficiently.

of sensibility towards an “other-world” of eternal life.³ To the extent reason functions in Kant’s philosophy as *theoria*, it does not grant man secure access to the precious ideas of reason⁴, namely that of God, the soul, and the world anymore⁵ -as is the case in the older Platonic paradigm- but imprisons him in the middle of his phenomenal world as *situated being*.⁶ However, these greatest ideals of metaphysics are not abandoned by Kant and survive even if they cannot be made into objects of knowledge anymore. They gain now even a more radicalized form in practice: *wherever theory ends, practice takes over the traditional ambitions of metaphysics*.⁷ In modern thought, it is first Kant, who emphasizes that only *the practical use of reason (praxis in its pure form)* can endow man with genuine freedom, and save him from the finite universe, not theory anymore although theory, too, plays a crucial role in man’s access to these highest ideas. Looking from the perspective of the traditional ambitions of metaphysics, it would not be an

³ For a discussion of the roots of Marxism in Kant’s philosophy, see Kojin Karatani, *Transcritique: On Kant and Marx*, trans. Sabu Koshu, (MIT, 2003). Karatani’s book points to the ethical roots of socialism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason while discovering a Kantian critique of money in Marx’s Capital. Karatani interprets Kant here as a thinker who relocates metaphysics, taking it from the realm of theoretical dogma and situating in its proper place in the sphere of ethics and praxis.

⁴ We use the term “metaphysical ideals” as co-referential with the Kantian “ideas of reason”.

⁵ See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. & Tr. by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A297/B354. We will use “CPR” to refer to this work. Kant calls this groundless claim of metaphysics to have an epistemological access to the highest ideas “Transcendental illusion”, which he defines as “to take a subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts...for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves.”

⁶ This Kantian situatedness of man in the world of phenomena heralds Heidegger’s term of *Dasein*.

⁷ Kant’s strategy in taking these ideas from understanding and granting them to practical reason is to employ the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles and making the highest ideas, which cannot be proven theoretically, into regulative as opposed to constitutive ones, which produce knowledge. See Kant, *CPR*, A179/B222. In the section “Dialectic of Pure Reason” of CPR Kant refers to constitutive principles as those which “enable us to extend” a concept whereas regulative principles appear as “rules, postulating what we ought to do” See Kant, *CPR*, A508/B536-A518/B546. In the light of this distinction, for example, the idea of God, which is regulative, gives ground for the practical postulation even if we do not have theoretical proof of the existence of God. In this way, reason legitimizes the idea of God in and through its practical use, rather than in the theoretical.

exaggeration to say that the *theoria-oriented*, old metaphysics has transformed into a metaphysics of *will and praxis* in Kant's thinking. Theory as metaphysics does not offer us knowledge (synthetic a priori judgments in Kant's terminology) of the highest ideas anymore. One cannot do philosophy in a legitimate manner as long as he or she tries to produce knowledge about God, soul, and the world.⁸ However, just because we cannot "know" them, it does not mean necessarily that we have to give them up. Knowing is perhaps not the ultimate and only –and not even the best– way to have access to the most precious ideas of reason in a legitimate manner. At least this is what Kant implies by his famous sentence in the second edition to the first Critique: "I had to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*".⁹ Here, Kant clearly restricts the status of knowing against its rivals, faith and practice. Through this limitation of theory, critical philosophy gives a new direction to *theoria*: it takes the omnipotent sight of theoretical reason away from the heaven, and directs it towards the earth. This new directedness of theoretical reason appears in the form of the constitution of the phenomenal world; a world which it despised once. This constitution is the crucial work of keeping the world in the security of Being¹⁰ against the abyss of the Nothing, which belonged once to God. But since God is retired now, sitting in the heaven, watching passively how perfect his

⁸ As a consequence of what Kant calls *transcendental illusion*, the attempt to produce knowledge of the metaphysicians results in fallacies, which Kant examines in the section "Dialectic of Pure Reason" of *CPR*. See Kant, *CPR*, pp. Kant criticizes here rational psychology for producing paralogisms about the the soul, rational cosmology for producing antinomies, and rational theology for producing pseudo-proofs for the existence of God.

⁹ Kant, Bxxx, Introduction, *CPR*.

¹⁰ Throughout the dissertation, we will use the capitalized word "Being" as the English translation of the German "Sein", whereas we will use the uncapitalized word "beings" as the translation of "das Seiende". This is one of the most common ways of translating Heidegger's concept of "das Seiende" in the English speaking world. Actually, "das Seiende" is translated most correctly as "that which is", however, the use of this translation in sentences leads to some practical linguistic problems because it consists of three words. So, we will use the less correct, but more practical translation "beings" with the reservation that Heidegger does not mean a plurality here, but simply "everything, that which is".

clockwork design functions once he created -if he is not as dead as Nietzsche declared- then the hard work of keeping our world safe has been taken over by man, in whose subjectivity the old Platonic ideas are located. In this new order and distribution of the crucial metaphysical tasks, the most important one, namely that of reaching the highest ideals of metaphysics is given to man's practical reason under the guidance and regulation of the ideas of reason. Practice means in this Kantian framework not practice as conditioned by teleological ends in the phenomenal reality; it is rather practice in its form purified from empirical conditionings of pragmatical ends. This is *practice as the a priori achievement of reason*.

The common aspect between Kant's critical philosophy and old metaphysics is that they both do not give up reason as the ultimate ground of a legitimate philosophy. In Kant, it is still reason (*nous*), which can free us from the finitude of the phenomenal world.¹¹ The difference between Kant's philosophy and old metaphysics, on the other hand, is that in the old metaphysics, this task is achieved *via* theory while practice is in the service of theory. Practice was not unimportant or neglected in the old metaphysics at all. Plato and Aristotle emphasized the importance and necessity of it in reaching the *telos* of good life.¹² Aristotle made practical philosophy even into an independent discipline.¹³ However, this does not change the fact that in the history of metaphysics,

¹¹ In the history of metaphysics, we have to wait until Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who take one step further and subordinate even reason itself to the phenomenon of will. In their philosophy of will, reason turns out to be a moment in the willing of will as the essence of all beings in their unity.

¹² See Plato, *The Republic*, tr. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968; 1991). Through *Republic*, Plato takes departure from his position in his Socratic dialogues, which rely less on metaphysics, and develops an explicit metaphysics in *Republic*, which renders practice fully dependent on the idea of the Good and its theoretical grasp by man.

¹³ See Chapter 6 in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Rowe, Christopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) for Aristotle's criticism of Plato's idea of the Good and his emphasis on an ethics, which

practice has suffered for millennia under the yoke of theory.¹⁴ Practice appears in the old metaphysics simply as a *moment* in the ascendance of man towards the other world of ideas, whose main dynamic is *theoria*. In critical philosophy, on the other hand, the ascendance from the earth towards the heaven is still necessary and rational, -performed by reason- but theory is made now into a moment in this essentially practical movement. This means that the response of man to his finitude through metaphysics cannot be satisfied with pure “theory” anymore; man can make sense of his rationality and existence only to the extent that he can transform his attitude towards the Good *essentially* in practice. It is this inevitable Kantian radicalization of praxis and will, which prepares the anti-metaphysical reactions of late modernity against the metaphysics of *theoria*. This Kantian tension between the transcendental determination of phenomena by theoretical reason and practice (reason as pure will) as the transcendental emancipation from this determination heralds a philosophy of *aesthetics* in Schelling, a philosophy of *will* in Nietzsche as well as a philosophy of *praxis* in Marx. What we encounter in Kant’s philosophy is an explicit contrast (not a duality) which is not familiar to the previous, traditional metaphysics: on the one hand, some categories of metaphysics (like causation, substance) begin to function as “constitutive” elements, which imprison man in the phenomenal world through theoretical reason, whereas some other basic categories, which are the highest ideas of the same

does not necessarily go hand in hand with a metaphysics, as is developed especially in Plato’s *Republic*. The central concept in Aristotelian ethics is not the Good as idea; it is rather the Good as practiced by man as good man.

¹⁴ Aristotle seems to be an exception in this general tendency of metaphysics to subordinate practice to theory and occupies a special place in the history of metaphysics as the seemingly “least” Platonic thinker. He rejects the Platonic idea that in order to become virtuous one should first become a master in theoretical disciplines and study mathematics and the sciences. Accordingly, the theoretical study of the eternal, unchanging forms is not a requisite for a student of ethics, as opposed to Plato. However, even for Aristotle, it is hard to claim that practice gains an autonomy against theory.

metaphysics (like soul, God) *save* and *free* him from this determination by being *regulative*, through practical reason. *Reason in theoretical use imprisons and in practical use frees, at the same time.* Theoretical reason in Kant's philosophy, which has lost its old aristocratic, noble status of looking down to earth from the heights of the Platonic heaven, appears now as given the job of "*constitution*" (*Konstitution, Beschaffenheit, Verfassung*) of the sensible world, which it despised and neglected once. It is now a de-throned, old aristocrat who appears as a *construction worker* in the service of *aisthesis*, devoid of his old high status and privileges.

The Aim and the Structure of the Dissertation

In the previous section, we have shown roughly the Kantian philosophical background of a new philosophy shaped by a return from the *transcendent* to the *phenomenal*. Heidegger's conception of Being and truth marks a crucial point in the history of philosophy, which can be seen as a moment in this return. He brings Being down from the Platonic heaven to the earth by situating it in the very *ethos* in which we live. In Heidegger's philosophy, Being begins to use the language of our world; it is not a substance or an idea beyond phenomena, waiting out there for a theoretical discovery or presentation anymore; it is now rather the very phenomenal relationality of man to beings surrounding him, circulating in his everyday existence, in a network of social, political, historical possibilities. Therefore, the question concerning the meaning of Being (*der Sinn des Seins*), which is Heidegger's point of departure, cannot be a merely theoretical, linguistic or propositional meaning *hidden* behind the signifier "*Sein*"; it is

rather a meaning, in which we find ourselves in a multi-dimensional experience of Being, which includes the practical, the ethical, as well as the theoretical dimensions of our conscious and subconscious existence. This does not mean that the meaning of Being is *a-theoretical*. It means rather that it is *existential* prior to this duality between theory and practice and involves *not only* a theoretical and linguistic, but also an essentially practical and ethical/political dimension.

Because Being is not something like a substance or idea for Heidegger, which can be represented and mirrored through a language exterior to it, but rather something which cannot be thought apart from its phenomenal givenness, the traditional duality between a purely ontological conception of Being as opposed to a purely epistemological conception of truth does not exist in his philosophy. Heidegger's conception of truth is not an epistemological one; it is rather an ontological conception, in which truth is understood as the un-concealedness (*Un-verborgenheit*) of Being. In *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)*¹⁵, Heidegger revives the Ancient Greek word *A-letheia* in order to rethink the concept of truth in terms of its original meaning.¹⁶ Un-concealedness appears here as a *negation* of concealedness. In contrast to the epistemological conception of truth as correspondence, in Heidegger's ontological

¹⁵ See Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), pp. 219-227. Abbreviated hereafter as SuZ. During our text, we will refer sometimes to SuZ, and sometimes to its English translation. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row), 1984. Abbreviated hereafter as BT.

¹⁶ In *SuZ*, we do not encounter the word "Unverborgenheit" as truth as a central concept as in later works. Here, Heidegger characterizes truth more often as "*Erschlossenheit*" [uncoveredness] as "Unverborgenheit" and attaches this to Dasein. *Erschlossenheit* has in itself also a negation (*erschliessen*) something which is closed (*geschlossen*) is dis-closed. Heidegger repeats his interpretation that *A-letheia* as un-concealedness throughout the whole course of his thinking in many of his basic works; for example in *Wegmarken; Vorträge und Aufsätze*¹⁶ and in *Parmenides*, as well as in his lecture on *Plato*. See Heidegger, Martin, *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 299; *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009), p. 21, 36 ff, 332; *Parmenides*, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), p. 16. *Wegmarken*, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), pp. 203-239.

conception, truth appears as a characteristic of Being itself.¹⁷ This, however, does not mean that truth as correspondence between propositions and beings is rejected by Heidegger. On the contrary, propositional truth as correspondence is grounded in his philosophy even more than in the works of its opponents. In his *SuZ*, it is interpreted as derivative of a more original (*ursprünglich*) conception of truth as unconcealedness.¹⁸

If Being and truth are thought so radically against a metaphysical tradition and gain original meanings, then it is not surprising that they are *not understood* properly, or worse, *misunderstood* easily. This is the case for a considerable number of critics of Heidegger. The general problem with Heidegger's conception of truth appears with respect to its tension with the traditional conception of truth as correspondence. Truth is traditionally a *normative* concept, which seems to make sense to the extent we contrast it to falsity, or untruth. In other words, we expect the concept of truth to have a normative power, through which we can distinguish true statements, propositions, beliefs from the false ones. Moreover, truth functions even normatively when we use it ontologically it to characterize entities: we want to distinguish a true friendship from an untrue one; the true gold from the counterfeit; the true love from the fake one. So, the normativity characteristic of truth is not limited to the phenomenon of "correspondence" between subjective and objective states; it is found even in the phenomenon of "being-true", or "being-genuine" of entities themselves. When Heidegger identifies truth with

¹⁷ Later Heidegger conceives the truth of Being even by the more challenging concepts of ontological "event"(if literally translated) as "appropriation" (as better translated) (Er-eignis). The thematical and explicit characterization of Being (and the truth of Being) as an event (Er-eignis), belongs to later Heidegger, which we do not find in his earlier work *BT*. See Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989) for a detailed account of the concept of Ereignis.

¹⁸ See Heidegger, *SuZ*, pp. 219-227.

unconcealedness of beings, then is there any sense in which the normative character of truth is preserved, or does Heidegger give up completely this normative character?

I am sitting right now on a chair, writing these sentences at my computer in Cologne. The sounds of the city come to my ears and I see the famous Dom (the famous great cathedral of Cologne). Beings around me seem to be “unconcealed” to me: I understand them “as” this or that kind of a being; my table appears to me as a table. My neighbor listens to music, and the Being of my neighbor, as well as the Being of that music unconceal themselves to me “as what they are” as I understand them. Then, this is a way, in which the world and its beings are unconcealed to me. But at this point, one could ask: what do all of these have to do with truth? In all of these sentences I simply describe certain beings and point to their existence. Yes, they are there. But given Heidegger’s account, it seems that just in virtue of their “being there”, they seem to satisfy the condition of “being true” because Heidegger seems to equate the “is” with the “is unconcealed”. They are there because they are unconcealed, and because they are unconcealed, they are true. At first sight, it seems that Heidegger equates *mere Being* with truth and it turns out that everything which “is”, is automatically true, just in virtue of being there. Given these considerations, is the normativity we expect from truth here completely lost? Does the term “truth” appear as an empty concept which does not distinguish the true from the false anymore?

We can call this problem “the normativity problem of truth”. What we have pictured above is the “naïve” interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of truth, which is unfortunately popular among Heidegger’s critics, who complain severely about Heidegger’s “mysticizing” of the concept of truth by “playing with words and their

etymology” and destroying the normative character of truth. One of the most influential critiques in the German-speaking academic world comes from Ernst Tugendhat, one of Heidegger’s students. Tugendhat criticizes Heidegger for expanding the phenomenological conception of truth taken over from Husserl such that the critical difference between truth and falsity is lost in this expanded version. According to him, the concept of truth turns out to be a speculative and empty one in Heidegger’s approach, which cannot distinguish the true from the false.¹⁹ In this dissertation, we will not get into the details of Tugendhat’s arguments. Our goal in referring to his critique here is rather to point to a typical example of a misunderstanding of Heidegger’s concept of truth. Taking our departure from this misunderstanding, we will now clarify the aim, the methodology, and the structure of this dissertation.

There are two tasks of this dissertation. On the one hand, we will problematize Heidegger’s conceptions of Being and truth by bringing them face to face with social constructionism, classical sociology of science, and neopragmatism, in order to deal with the “normativity critique” we pointed out above. This task concerns the defensive aspect of the dissertation. On the other hand, we will also problematize and criticize the social constructionist and neo-pragmatist conceptions of truth from the perspective of Heidegger’s conception of truth, and offer a new account to deal with problems concerning truth in contemporary philosophy. This task concerns the constructive aspect of the dissertation. The ontical context of these two tasks will be nature and society, in which we ask the question concerning the specific ontological structure underlying them, and how these two beings are related to one another in the context of this

¹⁹ E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.: 1970), p. 405.

ontological structure. These two tasks are complementary and they need each other mutually. In order to be able to formulate this problem appropriately, we will introduce a new concept and formulate these tasks in the light of this new concept: the concept of *ontoparadigm*. The working out of the relation between truth as uncoveredness and the phenomenon of ontoparadigm aims to show that the introduction of this new concept is not arbitrary at all. It is rather a philosophical necessity to develop this concept in order to reformulate the problems faced not only within the limits of the critiques of Heidegger, but also within the framework of the general problems concerning truth faced in the context of the “post-modernly” motivated “anti-metaphysical” and “relativist” approaches of our time, as we encounter them in social constructionism and neopragmatism. Heidegger’s philosophy does not only offer to us a sound conception of truth, which can handle the traditional normativity problem arising within its immanent structure; it also has much to say about the problems we face in contemporary philosophy. Moreover, Heidegger’s conception can face these problems even in a richer and fruitful manner than the traditional conception of truth as correspondence. In other words, the range of this dissertation is not limited to Heidegger’s own philosophy as if it tries to defend Heidegger against his critics by an immanent counter-attack developed by his own texts; its main goal is rather the problematization of a general and essential phenomenon, whose symptoms we see clearly in social constructionism.

At the end of our inquiry, the phenomenon of ontoparadigm will show itself as the ontological structure behind the interaction of nature and society. The reason why we have chosen the social constructionist tradition as our main subject is that the phenomenon to be worked out makes itself visible in its most concrete form in and

through this approach as compared to many other schools. The subject we want to focus on reaches its maturity in this approach and shows itself as suitable for a phenomenological inquiry.

Roughly speaking, there have been two ways of approaching Heidegger's conception of truth. One way is to reject his conception in favor of a defense of the traditional conception of truth, a way followed by Tugendhat. Another way is to adapt his conception of truth into a pragmatic philosophy by overemphasizing the pragmatic dimensions in his philosophy, a way followed by Richard Rorty, for example.

On the one hand, following neopragmatism, we approve the priority of the pragmatical conception of truth over the theoretical one. On the other hand, following Heidegger, we aim to show that the pragmatic conception is not the ultimate ground of truth, and truth has an essentially existential characteristic irreducible to practice. The seeming pragmatist solutions to the problems we face in Heidegger's conception are simply pseudo-solutions, which neglect the existential dimensions of Heidegger's philosophy, and forget that for Heidegger, the ultimate determination of truth stems from our finitude as Being-towards-death. Dasein's practical dealing with the world and his pragmatical understanding of his own world is grounded and limited in his existential situatedness. Moreover, as we will see, not only within the limits of Heidegger's philosophy, but also in general, the causal relationship between nature and society is not the ultimate ground of their phenomenality. Neither is nature determined ultimately through practical and causal relations stemming from society as is suggested by social constructionism, nor is society determined ultimately by nature to have certain representations of it as is suggested by traditional sociology. This does not mean that

there are no such interactions. Behind these interactions, it is the understanding of Being by man that enables something like “society” and “nature” to exist in mutual practical and causal relations in the first place. Following Heidegger, we call the kind of methodological approach that examines the relation between nature and society exclusively through their causal relatedness “ontical” and contrast it to our “ontological” approach. Heidegger discusses in *SuZ* the contrast between the categories of the *ontical* and the *ontological*. The term “ontical” refers to a methodological attitude of a study of beings, which focuses on beings as beings without problematizing the meaning of their Being. We encounter this ontical approach especially in positive sciences. In contrast to the ontical, the ontological attitude questions into the *meaning* of Being of entities.²⁰ The relation between nature and society can be interpreted in an ontical way, as we encounter it in social constructionism, traditional sociology of science and neopragmatism, *which is not incorrect at all*. However, the *correctness* of this ontical interpretation does not guarantee the *truth* of it in the genuine sense of the word, because this ontical interpretation covers and suppresses the ontological structure lying behind causal interactions and makes it invisible. In this sense, although this ontical interpretation corresponds to some facts in the surface, it functions as an untruth to the extent it covers the origin of these phenomena.

The aim of this dissertation is to show that the normativity, which Tugendhat as well as Heidegger’s other critics expect from him, is missing in his conception only in the sense, which they want to find in his philosophy, not in a genuine sense. Tugendhat expects Heidegger’s conception to “work” just like a correspondence theory of truth, and he rejects it just because it “fails” to do so. However, this is not a failure. For truth

²⁰ Martin Heidegger, *SuZ*, pp.11-12.

as unconcealment is called “unconcealment” exactly because it differs from correspondence while grounding it. There is another way in which truth as unconcealment shows its normative character, which cannot be reached by forcing it to fulfill the requirements for being truth as correspondence. This means that Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger is ungrounded. On the other hand, truth as unconcealment does not need the rehabilitation of pragmatism in order to be defended against the proponents of the correspondence theory, either. It is not a “social” or “pragmatic” kind of normativity in the sense of social convention, or social construction, which we need to introduce in order to “save” truth from being an empty concept. The philosophical normativity for which we are looking lies rather in a characteristic of truth as unconcealment, which is neglected by Heidegger’s critics, namely, in its *characteristic of concealing*. Then where should we locate the phenomenon of normativity in Heidegger’s conception of truth?

In *BT*, Heidegger characterizes the Being of man as “Dasein”²¹ and the inauthentic mode of Dasein as *das Man*, which he characterizes as “a dictatorship” (Diktatur)²² and a “persistent mastery” (hartnäckige Herrschaft)²³ over man’s everyday Being, which “prescribe” (schreibt vor) the way of Dasein’s everydayness.²⁴ These phrases refer clearly to a normativity, whose essence is expressed in immodest terms like “domination” and “mastery”. In this context, our study aims to trace the normativity we find in the traditional correspondence theory of truth back to the normativity of *das*

²¹ For the definition of *Dasein*, see Heidegger, *SuZ*, p.7.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 126. I provide in this text the translation into English from the original German text. In this chapter, the references are made to the original text.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

Man. We encounter at this point a crucial question, which presents us the basic tension of this dissertation: *How should we understand the normativity of das Man?* The concept of *das Man* is in a close relationship to another concept of Heidegger, which he calls *das Mitsein* (being-with). The being of “society” announces itself in almost all of the *existential structures*²⁵ which have a function similar to Kant’s a priori categories. If Heidegger does not consider Being as an isolated substance beyond phenomena, and if its “transcendental ontological categories”, namely *existentials*, already involve those phenomena which we normally understand under “sociality” and “historicity”, then would this not mean that Being loses its old metaphysical purity by being made vulnerable to social and historical determination? If yes, then does this not invite *a kind of social pragmatism and conventionalism with respect to the truth of Being at the level of das Man?*²⁶ *Is the truth, as we encounter it in the inauthentic Dasein, not a kind of social product?*

The construction of the everyday-example we gave above (sitting at the computer and experiencing the city) in order to point to the normativity problem of truth, is based on a misunderstanding and misformulation, as we will see in detail. As we aim to show in this dissertation in detail, Tugendhat as well as many other critics make a typical mistake, which is to neglect *one of the two basic characteristics* of truth as unconcealedness (*Unverborgenheit*), and to misinterpret the *Alpha Privativum* “un” in the concept of un-concealedness (*A-letheia*). One should not understand

²⁵ Existentiality (Existentialität) means in Heidegger’s terminology the context, in which the ontological structures of Dasein are problematized. This term is contrasted to “existentiell” (existentielle), which concerns the pre-ontological (in the sense of pre-theoretical) understanding of Being by everyday Dasein. See *ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁶ We encounter this kind of a social pragmatism in Richard Rorty’s philosophy, for example.

unconcealedness as a *case* reached as a consequence of a negation of concealedness. In this misinterpretation, concealedness is considered to be “the case of being concealed” as if concealedness *subsists in time* as a present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) being. The negation of this subsisting case is seen then as an act of intervention, which produces a *counter-case*, in which the former case is completely overcome. This is an *ontical* interpretation of basic ontological categories and exactly the metaphysical way of thinking, which Heidegger sharply opposes. This ontical interpretation conceives Being and its two basic characteristics of concealing and unconcealing as entity-like phenomena; as if they relate to each other through causal interactions *in time*. In contrast to this ontical interpretation, the truth of Being should be thought rather as an onto-logical event, in which the un-concealing and concealing characteristics strive against each other in an interplay, which provides us with the conditions of possibility of the showing of something like “entity-hood”, or in less Heideggerian terms, “objecthood” out of this strife. So, it is certainly true that one characteristic of truth as *Aletheia* is the *opening up* of new ontological possibilities for entities, which we call the *unconcealing* characteristic of truth. However, *this is not a free-floating and arbitrary opening*: every unconcealing happens at the cost of a concealing and *suppressing* of some *counter-possibilities*, which are *incompatible* with the unconcealed ones. The concealing character of Being is not only not less important than the unconcealing one, but on the contrary, it is even more determinative with respect to the destiny of man in his relation to the truth of Being. We can understand this twofold character of truth also in the light of Spinoza’s basic tenet *omnis determinatio est negatio*, taken over by Hegel

as the principle that *every determination is a negation*. In this context, this dissertation aims to focus on the following three points:

- (1) The normativity demanded from us by the traditional conception of truth must be grounded in the twofold character of Being, which is not only an unconcealing, but also a concealing. Normativity appears as the way of Being, which shows itself from the juncture and interplay between the unconcealing and the concealing.
- (2) This grounding of the normativity in the juncture between unconcealing and concealing characters of Being requires the necessary introduction of a new basic concept into our lexicon, which we call *ontoparadigm*.
- (3) The twofold character of Being as normativity belongs to the inauthentic mode of Dasein, whose way of Being Heidegger calls *das Man*. As we shall see, this normativity appears as the Ought (*das Sollen*), which is not opposed to Being, but which is a way of Being (*Seinsweise*) we call *ontoparadigm*. Normativity in the form of the Ought, which appears as the phenomenon of *ontoparadigm*, however, does not make up the whole narrative about truth, because this is only a way, in which Being unconceals itself as the inauthentic truth. There is also an authentic sense of truth, which does not let itself be reduced to a paradigmatic characteristic, despite the fact that this characteristic makes up one of its two constitutive characteristics. The non-paradigmatic (and authentic) characteristic of Being lets itself be seen essentially in the finitude of Dasein as Being-towards-death [*Sein zum Tode*].

In the light of these three points, this work proceeds at two phenomenological regions of theme: On the one side, we problematize the concept of ontoparadigm within its roots in man's understanding of Being. This requires an interpretation of the normativity of the everyday existence of Dasein, called *das Man*. On the other side, we also work out the concept of "ontoparadigm" through an *interpretation* of the concept of truth as uncoveredness. Two of the basic texts, which our study refers to in this part especially, are Heidegger's *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Introduction to Metaphysics)²⁷ and *Zum Wesen der Wahrheit: Platon Höhlengleichnis und Theätet* (On the Essence of Truth: Plato's Allegory of the Cave and Theaitetos)²⁸ But before introducing the concept of ontoparadigm in the context of these texts, we will examine three ontical conceptions of how Being and sociality relate to one another, which we will contrast to our ontological conception. These ontical conceptions are social constructionism, traditional sociology of science, and Rorty's neopragmatism as pointed to above. Putting our phenomenological construction of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm into a contrast with these three ontical conceptions of the relation between Being and sociality will enable us to understand the essentially onto-logical nature of our inquiry.

The Methodology

This work employs in general a combination of phenomenological and critical method, which pays particular attention to analysis. At the analytical and critical level, we will

²⁷ See Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983).

²⁸ *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, Gesamtausgabe 34 (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988).

focus especially on philosophical argumentation and logical consistency and the correct applicability of concepts to particular beings. This concerns much more the ontical applicability of concepts to the pregiven phenomena. At the phenomenological level, on the other hand, we will employ the threefold methodology which we take from Heidegger's *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Basic Problems of Phenomenology), where he clarifies by distinguishing three moments in it: (1) Phenomenological reduction: this is the negative aspect of the method called the "leading the examining sight back from the naive conceived beings towards Being (*Rückführung des untersuchenden Blicks vom naiv erfaßten Seienden zum Sein*). (2) Phenomenological construction: this moment plays the positive role of "projecting of the pregiven beings onto their Being and their structures" (*das Entwerfen des vorgegebenen Seienden auf sein Sein und dessen Strukturen*). (3) Phenomenological destruction: consequently, the phenomenological destruction is formulated as the critical de-structuring of the concepts, which are reached and which are necessary, within the sources from which they are created (*der kritische Abbau der überkommenen und zunächst notwendigen Begriffe auf die Quellen, aus denen sie geschöpft sind*).²⁹

In this dissertation, we will use the term "reduction", "construction" and "destruction" not only as phenomenological acts directed at phenomena, but also at the concepts under which these phenomena fall. In other words, when we reduce the phenomenon of construction to the phenomenon of constitution, then this means that we reduce also the concept of construction to the concept of constitution, and vice versa. Following Heidegger's formulation of the phenomenological method in *Basic*

²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), p. 28ff. My translation into English.

Problems, in the 1st chapter, we will reduce the phenomenon of construction to the phenomenon of constitution by bracketing and tracing it back to its Kantian source, which is presupposed implicitly by social constructionism. Behind social constructionism, there is an implicitly presupposed and degenerated form of Kantian metaphysics which we have to bring to light. As we will see, the construction encountered in social constructionism is understood ontically by the authors from this tradition and is grasped in the sense of *causation, realization, and actual production*. In this picture, society and nature are taken as two beings in their ontical relation and the question concerning their Being remains unasked. *Once we ask this question appropriately, then the phenomenon of constitution in the Kantian sense show itself beneath the surface of construction, coming to the fore as the Being of construction: The Being of the phenomenon of construction shows itself as constitution.* Therefore, our tracing back of the phenomenon of construction corresponds to the moment of “leading the examining sight back from the naive conceived beings towards Being (*Rückführung des untersuchenden Blicks vom naiv erfaßten Seienden zum Sein*), which Heidegger calls “phenomenological reduction”. As we already indicated, it is not “incorrect” to claim that between society and nature, there are causal interactions; but to formulate these ontical interactions as the ultimate ground of the relationship between society and nature turns out to cover some crucial ontological structures, and prevents us from a problematization of these structures as the ontological conditions of possibility of such interactions. Therefore, our phenomenological reduction of construction to constitution happens necessarily in the form of a *destruction* of the traditional concept of construction as well as the doctrine of social constructionism, which interprets the

social, the natural, and their relation within the limits of this concept. At the end of this reduction, we will be able to deconstruct the concept of construction with the concept of constitution, which is the condition of possibility of the former, in order to describe the relation between Being and sociality in a proper way. As a third moment, we ask further what the *ontological structure* is, which enables constitution to appear as the phenomenon which holds between nature and society as an “ontological event”. To answer this question, the third part appears as the positive and constructive part of the dissertation: We will construct the phenomenon of ontoparadigm by projecting the phenomenon of constitution onto its Being and its ontological structure. This projection will show us at the end the Being of constitution as essentially “ontoparadigmatic” and that the ontological structure of constitution is “ontoparadigm”.

Sometimes nature causes social and natural phenomena to appear to us in certain ways, and sometimes we cause nature to appear to us in certain ways. Traditional sociology makes the former claim into an ultimate truth while social constructionism as a reaction to the traditional sociology makes the latter into an ultimate truth. In contrast to these two opposite ontical conceptions of nature and society, our account accepts causal relations between society and nature in both directions, and pays attention to the dialectics between them, while asking the further ontological (not ontical) question: how are such causal interactions ontologically possible? What is the ontological structure which enables these two beings to appear in a unity and interaction? What is the ontological nature of this relation? Note that by “ontological” we mean here an ontology in the Heideggerian/phenomenological sense, not in the sense of a substance

metaphysics, which would be interested in the question whether the relation between society and nature is something material/physical, or something ideal/mental.

As we have emphasized, social constructionism conceives the relationship between society and nature ontically. Moreover, social constructionism leads to serious problems even at the *ontical* level, let alone the *ontological* one: it fails to pay attention to the *resistance of nature* against man's so called "constructions". As we encounter in the examples of pseudo-science, not every social "construction" turns out to be so successful and nature does not let itself be constructed as easily as the social constructionists presuppose. This means that the ontical concept of construction fails to grasp the phenomenon it aims to bring into light even at the ontical level, which is another reason why it is a right decision to trace it back to the more primordial phenomenon, which we call constitution. In this sense, the 2nd chapter concerning reduction should be seen as a phenomenological description of the phenomenon of constitution, which is not described adequately by the flawed concept of construction.

The phenomenon of ontoparadigm is an ontological structure³⁰ which shows us how metaphysics functions and it is grounded on what Heidegger calls "the forgottenness of Being" (*Seinsvergessenheit*).³¹ Our introduction of this concept is simply for the sake of gaining an insight into the nature of truth under the yoke of

³⁰ We use here the term phenomenon in its broadest sense, in which we mean simply "the possible subject of phenomenological inquiry". If we use it in the narrower sense of phenomena in the Kantian sense, then an ontoparadigm is not a phenomenon, but rather the condition of possibility of phenomena as an existential structure.

³¹ *Seinsvergessenheit* is a concept, which Heidegger emphasizes in his later work. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* vol. 1 tr. D. F. Krell (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 22. It means man's oblivion of Being, but this oblivion is grounded not in a failure in man's will, but in the way, in which Being sends (*schicks*) itself as destiny (*Schicksal*). *Seinsvergessenheit* is closely related to another important concept, *Seinsverlassenheit* (abandonment by being), which Heidegger defines as "the absence of the unconcealing (*Entbergung*) of beings as such". See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* vol. 2 tr. D. F. Krell (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 28.

metaphysics as onto-theology. Therefore, our task in this dissertation is not finished by the mere construction of this ontological structure; we have to take a second step and *deconstruct* the concept of onto-paradigm in order to reach the ontological source, out of which its Being arises. In this second step, we will *reduce* “onto-paradigm” to the more original phenomenon, which Heidegger calls *Seinsfuge*³² in German and reach the original (*ursprünglich*) temporality of Being, in which presence-centered understanding of Being is overcome.

Before focusing on what we mean by the concealing character and how it relates to the problem of normativity, however, let’s clarify another crucial point to avoid a possible misunderstanding: one can legitimately ask the question why we call here the problem the “normativity” problem of truth: Is it not the case that we “invent” here an unnecessary terminology borrowed from metaphysics and impose it upon Heidegger’s philosophy just to face its unjustified critiques? Does such a problem really exist in his philosophy, or do we simply impose a metaphysical problem upon it, which is not necessary at all? Is this not a “metaphysical” way of formulating the problem of truth? It is one thing to use a philosophical concept as a legitimate one; and another thing to use it in quotation marks, in order to picture, describe a phenomenon and problematize it. Our determination of the fact that there is a normativity problem in truth does not necessarily mean that we approve or disapprove the existence of something like

³² Heidegger introduces the concept of “Fuge” in his later thought as a contrast to the concept of “system” in order to refer to a way of thinking, which does not make use of a system of metaphysics grounded on a supreme, ontotheological entity. This way of thinking is like a Fuge in music, in which each line of melody is heard distinctively in a plurality. See Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), section 39. See also Martin Heidegger “Der Spruch von Anaximander”, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 2003), pp. 321-375. Heidegger relates here the concept of *Fuge* to the Ancient Greek word “dike” (justice).

normativity in philosophy or in our daily life. That something exists as factuality does not make it automatically into a genuinely original phenomenon and it is the first duty of a phenomenologist to point to its factuality and describe it without necessarily approving it. This is what *phenomenological reduction* means. And if philosophers would ban from their lexicon all words just because they do not refer to originally true phenomena, which they want to overcome, then there would be no philosophy at all. Heidegger himself, too, used “subject” and “object” to refer to certain phenomena, which exist as handed down to us from the history of metaphysics. He had to accept first of all their truth, even though this truth was not as origin-al as the truth of Dasein, which is the ground and possibility of a subject-object duality. At the end of this study, we will attempt to deconstruct the phenomenon of “normativity” along within the destruction of the concept of ontoparadigm, which we have to construct first.

As mentioned already briefly, there is an essential reason why we have chosen in this dissertation social constructionism to contrast with our ontological conception ontoparadigm. Social constructionism is an explicit revelation of something that Heidegger problematizes in his late philosophy when he deals with technology. He warns us against the anthropomorphic conception of technology, in which we tend to conceive technology as a “means”, as an instrument to reach certain goals, determining it through our will. In contrast to such a man-centered, instrumentalist and voluntarist interpretation of technology, Heidegger insists on the fact that man is actually not a master over nature, and technology is not a choice of man: it is rather something, which happens to him because a certain epoch of Being has become dominant. With its naive conception of “social construction”, social constructionism seems to presuppose an

extreme form of anthropomorphism, which Heidegger criticizes. Man as social being appears in the social constructionist picture as the ultimate ground and source in the emergence of the phenomenon of nature as constructed and scientific theories about it. The social constructionist illusion that man constructs nature socially covers crucial ontological structures functioning in the background of social practice, and gives us the misleading picture, in which man seems to be the master over nature. Interestingly, social constructionism offers its philosophy as a critique of such constructions and invites us to a resistance against their oppressive nature over us. It appears on the scene as a thought of freedom, which attempts to free us from the determination of such constructions. However, despite this naïvely good intention, it fails to see that their own key concept of construction falls prey to a metaphysics, which turns out to function in the background silently as an implicit “construction” –if we would use their own jargon– without their awareness.

There are some important dimensions of Heidegger’s work which we have to exclude from this study because they do not contribute directly to our arguments and remain beyond the scope of our work. Although we relate Heidegger’s critique of scientific and technological understanding of Being to our project in the following chapters, this does not involve a detailed study of his relation to technology and science. Heidegger’s critique of technology does not relate directly to the arguments we develop in this dissertation. Secondly, we will not get into a discussion of Heidegger’s interpretation of *physis*, either, because, this, too, remains outside of the scope of our arguments. Thirdly, although our study involves both Kant and Heidegger, Heidegger’s

interpretation of Kant, too, remains beyond the limits of this inquiry because it does not relate to the arguments we develop here.

There is also a question which could be raised here: why do we choose the topics of “science” and “nature” as dealt by the social constructionist tradition, although there are plenty of other interesting topics like gender, politics, etc. The answer is simple: the anthropomorphic essence of the conception of construction can be brought into light in its most concrete and visible form only if we can project it onto a realm of being which we consider normally to be the most resistant to ontoparadigms, namely, that of *nature*. What if—contrary to our naïve assumptions—nature has become nowadays the way of Being which is most vulnerable to paradigmatic determinations? As known, there is a concern that *radical hermeneutics* tends to fall prey to some sort of a blind idealism when it claims that even the “physical universe” and “physical objects” are not immune to interpretation. According to Jean Searle, one of the most influential philosophers in social philosophy, it makes sense to claim that social phenomena are interpretation-laden, but there must be also some “physical facts”, which are simply “brute”.³³ One is not allowed to claim that even those brute facts are mediated through interpretation. However, we should overcome this idealism-realism dichotomy and defend ardently our radical hermeneutics, showing that such a radical hermeneutics is not a form of idealism. We will get into a discussion of the idealism/relativism-realism problem in the 6th chapter. In contrast to Searle’s so called “realist” account, we offer the concept of “ontoparadigm” as a concept, as general as possible, applicable to “every kind of being” (*das Seiende*) regardless whether it falls under the category of “physical”, “mental” or “spiritual”. Accordingly, nothing can exist outside ontological paradigms, as long as it

³³ See John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. 27.

“appears to us” in our phenomenal world as a being; not even God, to the extent it is part of our phenomenal reality through religion and culture. From this, however, it does not follow that we fall into an idealist position. We will discuss this issue in chapter 6 in more detail.

CHAPTER 2
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION
OF THE PHENOMENON OF CONSTRUCTION
AND ITS REDUCTION TO THE PHENOMENON OF CONSTITUTION

On the Distinction between Constitution and Construction

What do we mean actually when we say that something is constituted or constructed? How do these two concepts differ from one another? Constitution stems from the Latin verb *constitutus*, consisting of the prefix *com-* and the word *statuere*. *Statuere* stems from the root “sta” meaning “to stand”, or “place or thing, that is standing”. Since the prefix “con” has the sense of unification, a synthesis, *constitutus* should be interpreted as “letting something stand in a unity”. This etymology of the word suggests that Kant’s use of the word to characterize the basic achievement of understanding is not accidental. Reason brings phenomenal objects into Being through his basic act of constituting of the faculty of understanding; it enables them to *appear* as objects of experience and knowledge. The word object in Latin is *obicere*, meaning “to present, oppose, cast in the way of,” consisting of “ob” meaning “against” and “*iacere*”, meaning “to throw”. This Latin word is translated into German in two ways: as *Objekt*, as well as *Gegen-stand*, the latter of which means *that which stands-against*. It is not surprising that the projectedness character of the phenomenon of *object* gets blurred in this translation and that the “striving” and “resisting” characters of it come to the fore in the German word

Gegen-stand. This translation reflects the German spirit shaped by the subject-object duality problem and the conception of “object” in the sense of something which resists subject and needs to be taken under control. Kant’s philosophy seems to bring the medieval projectedness-character of the object to the fore by rendering it a constitution of the subject to overcome this metaphysical duality and solve the problem of transcendence.³⁴ The constitution of an object makes it for the first time into an object through an *a priori synthesis*. Reason brings then this a priori synthesis together with the sensible manifold coming from sensibility, and makes out of it something, which “stands” there as a *Gegen-stand*. The unifying prefix “con” in con-stitution in Kant’s terminology should be thought as characterizing this synthesis of reason whereas the “stitution” part of the word, stemming from the *statuere* and the root “sta” (to stand, or place or thing, that is standing), should be attached to the Kantian idea that objects are made into objects in the sense of “standing-against-us” as *Gegen-stände*, first of all through this basic act of synthesis. Accordingly, constitution in Kant’s philosophy should be interpreted as the “letting of ob-jects stand there” without which they would fail to stand in front of reason and there would be no experience and no phenomenal world at all. Letting something stand means positing something as something; the objectification of objects as objects, which do not exist prior to this objectification process. It is also something worth to be noticed that *constatuere* in its original meaning as the position is not only of things, but also of place. This is parallel to the fact that reason in Kant constitutes not only phenomenal objects as present-at-hand entities, but also opens up the realm for their existence, namely, spatiality.

³⁴ However, ob-ject in the medieval age was thought to be projected not by an independent subject, but on the contrary, by God himself: Nature was a projection of God himself.

In contrast to the concept of constitution, “construction” has a special emphasis on the idea of “building”. It is also a unifying phenomenon (because of the prefix -con) derived from the Latin verb *con-struere* and *struere* has also the meaning of “making something stand”, but this is a “making something” in the sense of *piling up, erecting* something on a pre-given ground, just like in the everyday sense of “construction”. In contrast to construction, constitution is mostly the positing of this ground itself as well; the first opening up of the possibilities upon which a being can stand up. In other words, construction cannot happen without a given ground, and it presupposes constitution as well as the pre-giveness of a ground by constitution. That is probably why Heidegger considers construction as derivative of constitution and sees the former as a further development of understanding, namely as *interpretation*, as we will see in the following paragraphs.

In phenomenology, the concept of construction has been used frequently in a negative sense, especially within the Husserlian tradition and constructions appear in this sense as doxatic ideas surrounding us, from which we should return back to the things as proclaimed by the famous phenomenological motto: *Zurück zu den Sachen!* Accordingly, we live in an age of constructions which manipulate our conception of the things and we should bracket them to reach their essences. In Heidegger’s 1927 lecture, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the concept appears in a positive methodological sense and turns out to function as the second step in the threefold method of phenomenology, as we pointed out in the 1st chapter. This positive and methodological sense of construction is also found in Heidegger’s lecture on German idealism and his

interpretation of Fichte, in which he relates the concept of construction to *phronesis* and his own concept of projection (*Entwurf*):

Fichte says that all philosophizing is a constructing. All philosophizing is construction essentially. This is what Plato said: all knowledge of the philosopher realizes itself in the *phronesis*. And Kant does not follow another method at all, when he asks the question concerning the inner conditions of the possibility of knowledge. But the inner structure and the presupposition of this kind of knowing is clarified very little. Constructing does not mean inventive-thinking of something by oneself [sich etwas erdenken], the essence of construction is based rather in the essence of this peculiar knowing, which we called understanding; that which is a projecting [Entwerfen]. Projection has the character of letting-see, disclosing [Enthüllen]. Constructing is essentially in this making-visible of that which is projected upon something. There must be something pre-given thereby, which is projected-there in a certain character: the projection-basis, that, through which I can gain a ground, and that which is taken into projection. And that which is projected upon, is the projection horizon. At the same time, the horizon of projection must stand together with the horizon-basis in the same context, and we call this the projection-dimension.

If I recognize something as a tree, in this way, that which gives-itself spontaneously is projected there so that it is something like a tree. Constructing as philosophizing is the explicit carrying out of a projection. Each philosophizing as explicit projection moves already in an unexplicit projection. Constructing is a springing-into [Hineinspringen] an already emerging projection, which is as such still dark and unrecognized, and it becomes thereby for the first time clear. And with this springing-into an already emerging projection, the first securing of the projection-basis is carried out.³⁵

³⁵ See Martin Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, ed. C. Strube (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), p. 282. I have translated the quotation from the original: Fichte spricht davon, dass das Philosophieren ein Konstruieren sei. Alles Philosophieren ist dem Wesen nach Konstruktion. Das ist das, was Platon sagte: Alle Erkenntnis des Philosophen vollzieht sich in der *phronesis*. Und Kant verfolgt keine andere Methode, wenn er fragt nach den inneren Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis. Aber die innere Struktur und die Voraussetzung dieser Art des Erkennens ist sehr wenig geklärt. Konstruieren heisst nicht, sich etwas erdenken, sondern das Wesen der Konstruktion gründet im Wesen dieses eigentümlichen Erkennens, das wir Verstehen genannt haben und das ein Entwerfen ist. Der Entwurf hat den Charakter des Sehlassens, des Enthüllens. Konstruieren ist also wesentlich in diesem Sichtbarmachen dessen, das auf etwas entworfen ist. Es muss dabei etwas vorgegeben sein, was auf einen bestimmten Charakter hin entworfen wird: die Entwurfs-Basis, das, wodurch ich Fuss fasse und was dann in den Entwurf genommen wird. Und das, worauf wir etwas entwerfen, ist der

These words from Heidegger support our introductory remarks about the etymology and senses of the two concepts, “construction” and “constitution”. Heidegger’s interpretation of Fichte’s concept of construction presents us clearly that he sees construction as derivative of the general act of constitution: it is a special development of a certain understanding, in which understanding as projection is transformed into an interpretation. This interpretation is a construction, which stems from a more original and general mode of constitution. We pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that constitution gives the ground for the first time of a being, whereas construction presupposes the pregivenness of such a ground, though a construction can be critical of its own ground and try to bracket it. These points show us that in principle, it is possible to reduce construction in the sense mentioned above phenomenologically to constitution.

As can be seen clearly, the concept of construction is used in the phenomenological tradition either in a negative sense, or if positively, then in a narrow and technical sense, as a theoretical and conscious act of the phenomenologist when he does phenomenology. This sense is obviously different and narrower from the sense of what the social constructionist tradition intends to mean. By “social construction”, the

Entwurfs Horizont. Dabei muss der Horizont des Entwurfes mit der Entwurfsbasis in einem Zusammenhang stehen, und diesen nennen wir Entwurfs-Dimension.

Wenn ich etwas als Baum erkenne, so ist spontan das Sich-Gebende dahin entworfen, dass es so etwas ist wie Baum. Das Konstruieren als Philosophieren ist ausdrückliches Vollziehen eines Entwurfes. Jedes Philosophieren als ausdrückliches Entwerfen bewegt sich schon in einem unausdrücklichen Entwurf. Das Konstruieren ist ein Hineinspringen in einen schon bestehenden Entwurf, der als solcher noch dunkel und unerkannt ist, und damit wird dieser zum ersten Mal selbst deutlich. Und mit diesem Einsprung in den schon bestehenden Entwurf vollzieht sich die erste Sicherung der Entwurfsbasis.

social constructionists mean the unconscious as well as the conscious, and much more the non-theoretical, practical, social actions or states of a society, which produce or shape nature, natural facts and science, as we will examine closely in the 3rd chapter. Actually, with respect to this wider applicability of the concept, what they want to mean by construction is closer to *constitution*. In Kant, as well as in Husserl, constitution is used in the wide sense of formation of an intended object in general and it is something which man does automatically in virtue of having understanding and consciousness. This sense of constitution is also found in Heidegger's concept of understanding as well as projection (*Entwurf*) in general, who replaces the Husserlian concept of intentionality with his concept of projection.

Up to now, there have appeared three senses of construction. One sense stems from the negative use of the term in the phenomenological tradition, which we do not employ in this dissertation at all. The other sense stems from the positive use of the term especially in the Heideggerian philosophy as pointed to above in detail. We used this positive phenomenological concept of construction already to characterize the second moment of our phenomenological method in our study; namely, in the sense of *phenomenological construction*. The third sense, on the other hand, is that which belongs to the phenomenon of construction we find in social constructionist tradition, which we characterize as ontical, and aim to criticize and reduce it to a more suitable concept to refer to the problematized phenomenon. The concept of construction as we find it in social constructionism leads to problems even at the ontical level, namely, in its very application to beings it aims to grasp. In other words, the concept of construction faces counter-examples; as a concept, it does not cover the beings it was

supposed to do. Beings (das Seiende) resist the concept and since the source of this resistance is beings, which makes up here a problem, this problem is an ontical one. An onto-logical problem, on the other hand, shows itself from a problematization of the conditions of possibility of these beings in terms of their ontological possibilities. In contrast to an ontological problem, in the ontical problem in social constructionism, we have a conflict between the concept and its own exemplifications/applications. This is a problem of *correspondence* between a region of beings and their concept. What we need to do, therefore, is first to try to establish this *cor-responsence cor-rectly*, in order to be able to describe the phenomenon soundly. This establishment requires a reduction of the phenomenon of construction to the phenomenon of constitution in a Kantian sense because the concept of constitution grasps the phenomenon to be described properly unlike the concept of construction.

Preparatory Remarks for the Reduction:

Uncovering the Implicit Kantianism of Social Constructionism

We pointed to the Kantian contrast between *theoria* as the transcendental determination of the phenomenal vs. *praxis* as the emancipation from this determination in the 1st chapter. This contrast has been one of the most influential dynamics, which shaped to a considerable degree the *Geist* of the contemporary philosophy. The second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century has been an age of *constructions*, as well as *de-constructions* in the history of philosophy. This Kantian contrast is taken over implicitly by a considerable number of “postmodernly” motivated approaches, and it survives in the form of the claim that *knowledge, science, sexual identities, physical*

reality, etc. are various kinds of “construction”. We encounter construction already as a popular “metaphor” as early as in the beginning and the first half of the 20th century. Bertrand Russell avoided existential claims about entities and wanted to replace such claims with “logical constructions”.³⁶ Following Russell, logical positivists had the “revolutionary” project of creating a totally new language by constructing the whole language anew upon a perfectly logical structure while eliminating all words, which are not verifiable through sense experience and condemned thereby completely meaningless.³⁷ The idea of “logical construction” of reality through an elimination of ordinary language had been quiet influential within the first half of the 20th century. In the second half of the 20th century, the term “construction” became more popular and applied to almost all regions of phenomena in a broader context in the titles of philosophical works.³⁸ In 1991, Donna Haraway described how dominant the social constructionist argumentation had become “for all forms of knowledge claims, most certainly and especially scientific ones”.³⁹ According to this constructionist perspective,

³⁶ Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays*, (London: Longman Green, 1918), p. 155.

³⁷ See Rudolf Carnap, *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996). In his famous work, Carnap radicalized Bertrand Russell’s project of reconstructing daily language through the discovery of the deeper logical structure it hides, which is mostly not common sensical. “Aufbau” means in English “construction”. Interestingly, this term is the antonym of the concept “Abbau”, which Heidegger uses to characterize the phenomenological method of “de-struction”, which is the antonym of construction. This work is mistranslated as “The Logical Structure of the World” because the English term “structure” does not give the original meaning of “Aufbau”, which means “con-structing” rather than a mere present-at-hand being called “structure”. See Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World* (Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 2003).

³⁸ To mention one famous name, who used this word explicitly, is Nelson Goodman, who named himself as “constructionalist”. See Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), p. 1. Goodman made there the provocative ontological claim that there are various ways of creating our world and all of these ways are equally justified.

³⁹ See Donna Haraway. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, technology and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century” in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 184.

we live in a world of constructions, which tend to stabilize and dominate our ways of being. The genuine task of the philosopher, then, is to arouse awareness of such constructions, or at best, to unmask and *de-construct* them.⁴⁰ This deconstruction means at least the first step in an emancipation process from the coercion of such constructions. Different approaches like that of *poststructuralism, feminism, gender studies, social constructionism, neo-pragmatism* have taken over the Kantian opposition between *the constitutedness of the world and a freedom from its constitutedness* and tried to resolve it in various ways. Surprisingly, despite their whole emphasis of their opposition to the modernist philosophy and enlightenment project; their critique of subjectivity; their “anti-metaphysical” and “anti-modern” tendencies, most of these “constructionist” perspectives have been moving within the borders of this basic contrast initiated by Kant between constitution of the phenomenal and freedom from it. But the basic problem with many of these “constructionist” attempts has been their unawareness of the fact that what they attempt to do is something very Kantian in spirit, in a peculiar and disguised way. They have simply avoided using the rich metaphysical elements of Kant’s thought due to their tendency of what we could call “metaphysical minimalism.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ While using the term deconstruction, we have to mention the name of the great French thinker Derrida, who used this term for the first time as an essential and unique way of doing philosophy. However, note that the development of the concept of deconstruction corresponds to a different context, in which Derrida responds to structuralism rather than to constructionism. Despite this difference of the context, we can see the same ethical rebellion in his works against the constructions of metaphysics in the form of a freeing oneself from metaphysical dichotomies and structures. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), where Derrida introduces his deconstructionist philosophy.

⁴¹ By metaphysical minimalism, we mean the tendency to avoid using any ontological/metaphysical components like the Kantian thing-in-itself, or the Heideggerian Being as opposed to entities, and trying to philosophize through a completely internalist and non-transcendentalist model of the universe.

How can we understand the philosophical motivation behind this new way of philosophizing in the 20th century? Kant attempted to rehabilitate metaphysics by *directing* a wide range of basic metaphysical categories towards phenomena and “internalized” them within the range of subjectivity. While expanding the power and realm of the subject, he left only one thing “outside”: the thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*). As Kant states, “...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.”⁴²

Through making basic metaphysical categories into forms of phenomena, Kant gave them an “intentional” dimension and transformed them into world-constitutive actors while heralding the phenomenological idea that there is no subjective act without an intended object. In Kant’s philosophy, the thing-in-itself remained as the last resistance point of metaphysics, remaining outside of the constitutive power of the subject. Kant’s new approach to the basic categories had also a crucial importance for hermeneutics: these categories, which were thought normally to be absolute and external to human subjectivity in the traditional metaphysics, were made into “ways” in which the subject gains an access to his/her own world, and through this, a hermeneutical mediation was put into play between the subject and his/her world even though this mediation was left inflexibly universal and absolute.

It is clear that the idea of *an active constitution of the world through interpretation* finds its pioneer in what we can call Kant’s *universal hermeneutics*. Accordingly, the

⁴² Kant, *CPR*, Bxxvi-xxvii.

subject's constitution of the world could be seen as a way of interpreting the world, which is universal and grounded in the absolute structure of reason. The explanation why the world appears to us in a certain way is that our reason makes an absolute and universal interpretation of it through its own categories, no matter how inflexible they are. It was this Kantian prototype of hermeneutics which was radicalized by Gadamer, and taken over by the constructionists, who took one step further and gave up the universalist, absolutist and rationalist characteristics of these categories while taking them away from the boundaries of a universal reason and putting them into the context of history and society. *In this contextualization of categories by opening them to social and historical determination, which means a further "loosening" of the mediation between the subject and the object, interpretation appears as something context-dependent.* What we get from this is a new Kantianism, whose a priori is now historical and social.

Here, the further "loosening" of the categories and their losing of their absolutely, universally transcendental status should be thought as an unavoidable logical consequence of the Post-Kantian, anti-metaphysical reactions which give up the project of founding human ideals like freedom, morality on something *extrinsic* to our world-of-phenomena. In other words, giving up of an omnipotent transcendent ground of the phenomenal world, which is already summarized in Nietzsche's famous word "God is dead",⁴³ and preserving the strictly universal character of categories together would lead

⁴³ We find the idea of the death of God in a number of places in Nietzsche's works. One explicit formulation of this provocative claim can be found in section 125 of Nietzsche's *Gay Science*: "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay*

to the implausible conclusion that man is imprisoned in an inflexible, absolutely deterministic universe, in which freedom does not exist at all.⁴⁴ For in such a mechanical universe, which has no “exit”, no gate to a transcendent world, freedom of man could not be grounded at all. We would be determined absolutely by a “machine” called “reason”, being a victim and a prisoner of our own reason. This is probably the path which Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy takes.

So, in the new world of relativized and historicized categories, the determination of the world, it is not the extrinsic thing-in-itself which constitutes the final point of resistance to this determination by being the ground of ultimate emancipation; the resistance point is now put within the phenomenal world, which resists an exhaustive determination by remaining as *a flexible network of possibilities* to be worked out, if one wants to free himself/herself from the determination. As opposed to Kant’s one and the same universe determined strictly in a mechanical manner through the universality of unchangeable categories, which one could call a version of “hard constructionism”, the contemporary constructionist approach appears on the scene as a kind of “soft constructionism”, in which the world offers to the philosopher a wide range of immanent possibilities to be de-constructed and re-constructed over and over again.⁴⁵ Kant’s *universalist hermeneutics* was replaced in this way by a *historicist hermeneutics*,

Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), section 125.

⁴⁴ As known, this mechanization and instrumentalization of of reason, which has has been seriously criticized by Frankfurt school members.

⁴⁵ Interestingly, this idea of a non-deterministic universe gained a victory not only in philosophy, but also in physics through the replacement of the universalist Newtonian physics by the relativist Einsteinian Quantum Physics. This is probably an indication that the history of metaphysics has undergone an ontoparadigmatic shift, in which Being is understood in most of the ontical regions in a revolutionary, new way.

in which interpretation turned out to shape our world actively and *contingently* in terms of what it is. And if interpretation has the power to construct our world, and if the way it constitutes our world is contingent, then it follows that *it could be otherwise*. In other words, our world is “real” only because once we made it into a reality through interpreting it in a certain way. In this new picture, then, reality turns out to lose the painful and omnipotent domination over our will, which it had once just in virtue of its being “real”. If things have certain characteristics because we interpreted them once in a certain manner, then we do not have to accept them as absolutely given, and we can change them by re-interpreting them. We can challenge reality just in virtue of its being a *contingent construction* and announce these constructions themselves as the primary target to fight against. In his book “The Social Construction of What?”, Ian Hacking points to this “it could be otherwise” character of the social constructionist argumentation by giving us a general structure of thinking:

Social construction work is critical of the status quo. Social constructionist about X tend to hold that:

- (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, and urge that:
- (2) X is quite bad as it is.
- (3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed.⁴⁶

In the previous paragraphs, we have tried to show how social constructionism takes over implicitly the Kantian contrast between *theoria* as determination vs. emancipation from this determination, and tries to resolve it by loosening and

⁴⁶ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 6.

contextualizing the categories. In this way, the universalist and necessary characteristic of Kantianism is abandoned and a Pluralistic form of Kantianism is adopted. By Pluralistic Kantianism, we mean the contemporary form of Kantianism, which gives up the universalist and absolutist status of Kantian a priori principles/categories while believing that certain principles play a relatively priori role in our experience of reality. These principles are relativized to social, historical conditions. Though in a different context, Murat Baç provides us with a definition of a version of “Pluralistic Kantianism”:

Pluralistic Kantianism can be defined as a contemporary version of Kant’s transcendental idealism where the normative constraints pertaining to human judgment or knowledge are said to be determined not merely cognitively but, equally importantly, by the linguistic tools and resources employed by actual human agents. It is, in a way, an attempt to synthesize the strongest intuitions of the Kantian and Wittgensteinian traditions in a coherent manner by explicating and illuminating the semantic and alethic norms that govern veridical discourse.⁴⁷

Although Baç’s article does not involve social constructionism, this definition gives us a good idea about contemporary forms of Kantianism, which do not restrict themselves to a narrow sense of universal cognition. We can say that the constructionists take over the constitutive aspect of reason, while locating it in a historical and social context.

After pointing to this Kantian heritage behind constructionism in general, now we will examine more closely some social constructionist theories and sort out “construction” as a phenomenon we encounter in their accounts. This will prepare us further for the reduction of the phenomenon of construction to the phenomenon of constitution in the rest of this chapter.

⁴⁷ See Murat Baç, "Pluralistic Kantianism," *The Philosophical Forum* (vol. 37, issue 2, 2006), pp. 184-185.

In Kant's philosophy, constitution is restricted through the postulation of the thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*). Actually, it is exactly this critical limitation which enables constitution to have any sense and concrete applicability at all. As we will see, lacking such a critical, limiting element, the concept of construction in social constructionism functions as a speculative concept, which does not have even an ontical explanatory power at all. Second, social constructionism is expected to deal with the more sophisticated problem of *freedom from constructions*, not freedom from pseudo-constructions of brute, political coercion. Otherwise, the whole technical jargon of "social construction" turns out to be supererogatory. However, since the concept of construction loses its sense and applicability in the social constructionist repertoire, the condition of possibility for a freedom *from such constructions*, too, disappears, because the unlimited, absolutist version of constructionism simply fails to distinguish between examples of genuine cases of the so called "construction" and of "pseudo-construction" of brut socio-political coercion. Before establishing the connection further between construction and constitution and completing our phenomenological reduction of the former to the latter, we should understand the philosophical motivation behind the rise of social constructionism and see the background and philosophical problems against which it reacted.

What does Construction mean in Social Constructionism?

Social Constructionism vs. Traditional Sociology of Science

The question of how sociality is related to physical reality brings up a *tension* between the conception of science as an *autonomous* enterprise and the conception of science as

one of the *cultural* products of society, interacting with other social phenomena: if scientific theories are some sort of cultural product, how does this *producedness* relate to our conception of physical reality? Roughly, there have been two approaches in the history of sociology of science offered to resolve this tension between autonomy and sociality. On one side, we encounter the classical sociologists like Mannheim, Merton, Polanyi, Bernal, who believe in the autonomy of science, which is supposed to picture the world as it is rather than constructing it. This autonomy is not even a problematized theme in their works; it is rather something implicitly *presupposed*. In other words, sociality ends where science begins to tell us what nature is. They believe that there is an undoubted autonomy of science under ideal social conditions, and epistemic as well as scientific norms are based on the *inner* dynamics of science (inner logical, linguistic relations), which are non-social in character. Therefore, their violation is seen as a *deviation* from their expected ideality, which is simply a problem with their proper *application* and *realization* in social context rather than being a problem with respect to their autonomous status.⁴⁸

This traditional picture of science and nature, however, has been seriously criticized by the social constructionist tradition including scholars like David Bloor; Barry Barnes, Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, and by the

⁴⁸ See Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974). According to Polanyi's liberalist conception of science, a liberal society provides the ideal institutional norms, which produces an *elitist* social sphere belonging to the specialized scientists; the ideal epistemic conditions are realized through what Polanyi calls "joint appraisal of an intellectual domain". Merton, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between (1) science as a set of characteristic methods, (2) the body of knowledge acquired by the application of these methods, and (3) a set of cultural values governing scientific activities and (4) a combination of these three definitions. As a traditional sociologist of science, he declares that he is interested *exclusively* in (3). See Robert K Merton, *The Sociology of Knowledge*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), p. 268. Bernal presents a *socialist* and *universalist* conception of science as a social institution. This time, socialist society is offered as the proper social context for the realization of ideal science. For further detail, see J.D Bernal, *The Social Function of Science* (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd. Press, 1943).

standpoint feminist theorists like Nancy Hartsock and Sandra Harding.⁴⁹ Unlike the classical sociologists of science who settle the tension between sociality and autonomy by establishing a sharp opposition between the content of theories and their context, social constructionists try to overcome this tension by rendering the content simply a function of social structures; something which is *caused* and *produced* by social phenomena directly. Consequently, they turn out to give up the autonomy in favor of the social character of science.

Bloor's *Knowledge and Social Imagery* can be seen as one of the key texts in the social constructionist critique of the traditional sociology of science. In this book, Bloor introduces "the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge." The main point of this project is that there should be no limits to the sociological studies of phenomena including the very content and nature of scientific knowledge: nothing can escape from sociology as an impossible material of inquiry; not even the content of theories that are traditionally conceived as non-social/non-sociological.⁵⁰ Although Bloor does not reject

⁴⁹ Nancy Hartsock is known as the founder of the standpoint theory, who bases her ideas largely on Marxist philosophy and psychoanalysis. Standpoint theory emphasizes that knowledge is necessarily socially located, and this leads to an ideological oppression of some marginalized groups, who are excluded from the production process of epistemological discourse. These marginal groups, which are normally excluded from the production process of discourse have standpoints, which should be privileged in acquiring knowledge. Since women offer such a privileged position in a male-biased society, they should be given such an epistemic privilege. The standpoint feminist critique of the traditional conception of science, too, can be seen as belonging to the social constructionist tradition in that the standpoint feminists seem to apply the basic tenet of social constructionism to a particular problem and try to show that the content of scientific theories are constructed by male-biased ideas. Since male-biased ideas have a social nature, the male-centric conception of science can actually be interpreted as a male-centric social construction of science. See Harding, Sandra. "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is 'Strong Objectivity'?", *Feminism and Science (Oxford Readings in Feminism)*. Ed. by Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen E. Longino. Oxford University Press. USA, 1996. and see Hartsock, Nancy, "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism" in *Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues*, ed. by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

⁵⁰ Bloor accuses classical sociologists of science like Ben-David, Degre, Merton and Stark for voluntarily limiting the scope of their inquiry. He characterizes this attitude as "a betrayal to their disciplinary

the existence of other causal factors in the formation of theories, the traditionally non-social epistemic content is radically *socialized*. In their influential work *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*, Latour and Woolgar seem to go even further than Bloor in their anthropological enterprise. Bloor makes an *epistemological* claim when he says that scientific *knowledge* is socially constructed, whereas Latour and Woolgar, propose an *ontological* claim when they argue that scientific *reality* itself is nothing but a laboratory production. They explain this idea by using Bachelard's concept "phenomenotechnique".⁵¹ Shapin and Schaffer, two other remarkable names from the constructionist tradition, aim at understanding the *whatness*, namely, the nature of experiments in relation to their *performance* in social context with respect to their "production" of "matters of fact. In order to do this, they contrast Boyle's and Hobbes's rival conceptions of natural philosophy since they believe that such a contrast could decipher certain implicit interpretations, presuppositions with respect to "what experiment means," which are taken for granted without being questioned by the historians of science belonging to the "experimental culture."⁵²

standpoint" See Bloor, David. *Knowledge and Social Imagery*. 2nd ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p. 3.

⁵¹ Bruno Latour, and Steve Woolgar Woolgar. *Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts* (Los Angeles: Sage, 1979), p. 64. Latour and Woolgar think that scientific facts should be seen as the final products of a long material production process, which they call "literary inscription" See Latour and Woolgar, *Laboratory Life*, p. 45. A scientific fact, which is established in a published scientific paper, undergoes a long construction process before it deserves its status of scientific facticity, which begins its long journey at a stage of "chaos" until it reaches the final stage of "order. Accordingly, we cannot make sense of "what a scientific fact is" unless we consider it in its connection to the whole process of construction between the very first stages of chaos which includes collecting and recording data by writing and reading and the last stage, when a fact appears on the scene of scientific community as a respectful account published in a paper.

⁵² See Simon Schaffer and Steven Schapin, *Leviathan and the Air Pump* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). In Shapin and Shaffer, too, we find the immodest ontological claim that facts of matter are produced.

Construction vs. Brute Political Coercion
and the Problem of Freedom

It seems that the social constructionist tradition rightly criticizes the assumption that nature as narrated to us by science is simply a representation of reality, which is ideally free from the influence of social factors. The internalism defended by traditional sociology presupposes a questionable existence of a purely ontical/epistemic sphere uncontaminated by sociality. The highly complex nature and intensity of the social relations of modern, or perhaps, postmodern societies, makes it today even harder to talk about clear-cut distinctions between pure spheres of reality. Therefore, the claim that there exists a sphere of purely epistemic as opposed to purely social reality is untenable. The traditional conceptual contrasts between science vs. technology, science vs. economical structure seem to be hardly applicable to the current situation where science is interwoven intensely with other social phenomena. This transformation in the relation between science and society is examined meticulously by Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew Webster (E&W). In their study of the relationship between science and property rights, they present us with a new picture of science and scientific and academic institutions, in which our traditional conception of science undergoes a great transformation.⁵³ The main dynamic of this transformation is that “science and property, formerly independent and even opposed concepts referring to distinctively different kinds of activities and social spheres, have been made contingent upon each other

⁵³ See Henry Etzkowitz and A. Webster. “Science as Intellectual Property” in *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. (eds.) S. Jasanoff (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995).

through the concept of intellectual property rights.”⁵⁴ Merton’s *disinterestedness* and *communism* principles give us the traditional conception of science, which is opposed to economical activities.⁵⁵ In Merton’s conception, science is considered as an autonomous activity, which is not directly related to the economic sphere, and it has only a mediated, indirect impact upon the economic growth. With what E&W call “the capitalization of knowledge,” scientific knowledge is being transformed into an economic activity. E&W point here to the fact that in our current world, the *mediation* and *distinction* between scientific practice and economic practice seem to disappear, and it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish science itself from the economic structure of society. Today, science appears not only as a “part” of the dynamics of economy, but also the locomotive of economic growth. All these developments show us that science and social structure are now so intensely and closely interwoven that social constructivists have a point for the current situation of the world, which should be taken seriously.

In this context, the virtue of the social constructionist tradition is to show us that sociality has *something* to do with our conception of nature, although this “something” is never worked out properly and in sufficient clarity. Social constructionists call this relation between sociality and scientific reality “construction” without elaborating on this concept and giving us a precise idea about its sense. So, one of the main problems with social constructionism is its lack of sufficient clarity with respect to its most important, basic concept, upon which its whole account is grounded. Interpreted as

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 481.

⁵⁵ There are four “institutional imperatives” which Merton presents as the four basic norms that should guide scientific activity: (a) *universalism*, (b) *communism*, (c) *disinterestedness*, (d) *organized skepticism*. See Merton, *The Sociology of Knowledge*, 1973.

fairly as possible, it seems that social constructionists in general use “construction” in the sense of “causation” or “actual production.” Bloor, for example, uses “construction” and “causation” explicitly as synonyms.⁵⁶ Latour and Woolgar use the term “construction” almost in the sense of *realization*.⁵⁷ Similarly, Shapin and Schaffer, too, talk about *the production of “matters of fact”* through three technologies. These three technologies are (1) *material*, (2) *literary*, and (3) *social*.⁵⁸ Here the production of matters of fact appears as social construction. As we will see, however, since there is actually no such *direct* and *brute* interaction between natural reality and its social context all the time, the concept doesn’t work at all when applied to make sense of concrete cases. This does not mean that there are not sometimes such causal interactions between the two. However, to consider construction as *actual production*, or *causation* while making this concept the ultimate ground for their relation, ignores the fact that nature has some sort of autonomy, and it is not immediately determined every time by social factors through *being constructed*. Consequently, social constructionists fail in general to provide us with convincing examples, which show how theories or natural phenomena are socially constructed.⁵⁹ *The fate of Lysenkoism in Stalin’s Russia*

⁵⁶ Bloor’s sociological approach employs four basic principles: sociological explanation should be *causal*, *impartial*, *symmetrical* and *reflexive*. See Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery*, 1996, p. 7. According to Bloor, the sociologist should study the causal relations between the content of scientific theories and social phenomena.

⁵⁷ Latour and Woolgar point to the process in which scientific ideas are turned into material reality, when they talk on construction: “Such a reality, which Bachelard terms the “phenomeno-technique,” takes on the appearance of a phenomenon by virtue of its construction through material techniques” See Latour and Woolgar, *Laboratory Life*, 1986, p 64). As I pointed out earlier, Latour and Woolgar think that scientific facts should be seen as the final products of a long material production process, which they call “literary inscription” See *ibid.* p. 45.
See Schapin and Schaffer *Leviathan*, 1985.

⁵⁹ Bloor offers a case study in which he intends to apply his theoretical account to a particular situation. However, he examines and compares two theories from philosophy of science rather than from natural science itself. He compares Popper’s and Kuhn’s philosophies of science, which is not an example of how

presents good evidence which falsifies such a brute and direct relationship. As known, Lysenkoism was a pseudo-science in the Soviet Union, which was supported by the Stalin regime just because it was suitable to the ideological doctrine of that time. It appeared as a campaign in the Soviet Union against genetics which was condemned as “bourgeois” science whereas Lysenko’s approach to agriculture, which denies genetic factors in favor of environmental factors, was popularized as good science from the middle of the 1930s to the 1960s. Consequently, however, Lysenkoism collapsed, leading to disastrous consequences for the Soviet agriculture. This is a perfect example of how nature resists ontically against “constructions”. It indicates that social, political factors do *not necessarily* produce or cause facts. Moreover, the kind of coercion which we face in such examples is brutally political, not constitutive at all, and the strategies and techniques to free oneself from such brutally political/social coercions are completely different from those used against the kind of coercions which results from genuine positive constitution. The latter requires a challenge to what we call “ontoparadigm” –as we will clarify in detail in the following chapters- in addition to a challenge to a political/social authority. In case of freedom from genuine constitution, the challenge to political/social authority is simply a consequence of a challenge to an already established ontoparadigm which enables a genuine, well established regime of a discourse on nature. We will examine in chapter 8 an example of a genuine constitutive coercion, which is the “socio-constitution of Geocentric Theory” and see in detail how it functions oppressive against Galileo in the context of the Galileo affair.

nature or scientific theories are socially constructed. See Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery*, Chapter 4. Shapin and Schaffer’s work *Leviathan and Air Pump*, too, cannot show us how the content of physical arguments from Hobbes and Boyle relate to their political arguments in terms of their content. These arguments remain as categorically and logically distinct.

Our preparatory analysis has enabled us in the first section of this chapter to decipher the Kantian metaphysics hidden behind the social constructionist arguments in general, which move within the horizon set up by the tension between transcendental determination of phenomena and the emancipation of man from it. In the second section, we examined more specifically some particular accounts in the social constructionist tradition in order to ground our claim that social constructionism relates sociality to nature in an ontical manner through its concept of construction. In the third section we pointed to the problem of freedom, as we encounter it in the social constructionism and have indicated that construction as a concept fails to distinguish between genuine cases where this problem really arises and cases of brute intervention with nature. These considerations present us a good reason why we should reduce this ontical concept of construction to a relatively more ontological one, which is constitution as we find it in Kantian philosophy.

The Phenomenological Destruction of The Concept of Construction and its
Reduction to the Concept of Constitution: A Kantian Reformulation of the
Problem between Sociality and Nature

Introduction

The philosophical problems pointed to in the previous sections can be overcome by reducing construction to the constitution in a Kantian sense. This reduction requires our making the *distinction* between “making possible” and “making actual” while offering “constitution” as *a condition of possibility* of the discourse on nature which is a more

prior and *foundational* ontological state in the so called “construction” of natural reality. According to this distinction which we propose, then, natural phenomena and scientific theories are made *possible* before being encountered as actual in the phenomenal world, and constitution has something to do with this prior ontological state of “making possible” as opposed to making actual/real in the sense of construction. We offer “making possible” or “enabling” as the basic characteristic of “constitution” and base our idea on Kant’s notion of “a priori synthesis”. To connect our account with that of Kant’s, his definition could be illuminating:

By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. Such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the content is concerned.⁶⁰

Looking from this perspective, constitution in our account as the phenomenon we reach through a reduction from construction, *appears* as a kind of *a priori synthesis*. Why do we call it *synthesis*? Because it involves a *unification*, a bringing together of elements (*legen*). It is not simply a *passive* structuring, but it is con-structuring, namely, a *unifying* and *organizing* kind of structuring. This means that constitution is an *active* formation; that is, *synthetic*. Second, why *a priori*? Because it makes something *possible* through synthesis rather than *actual*. In other words, it does not actualize, but makes something a *potentiality* able to gain an actual content. Remember Kant’s rejection of the empiricist doctrine that synthesis requires necessarily sensible elements. Before Kant, synthesis is thought by the empirical tradition in general as a synthesis of

⁶⁰ Kant, *CPR*, A77/B103.

sensible elements involving the actuality of the world. In this way, possibility is *contrasted* to synthesis. However, as Kant shows, there is also a kind of synthesis that is prior to experience; a synthesis, which happens at the level of possibilities, before an encounter with the phenomenal world. This is what he means when he says that “such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori.” This means that *synthetic a priori* concepts are the conditions of possibility of experience, and they are constitutive in this sense.

In the light of the Kantian framework, from now on, we will use the concept of “socio-constitution” instead of “social construction” in order to describe the phenomenon which social constructionism fails to describe. Accordingly, when we talk about the socio-constitution of scientific theories, or natural phenomena, we mean a social enabling of them via social structures as social possibilities.

This distinction between making possible and making actual puts a distance, an ontical mediation between the *enabling* of phenomena as *social possibilities* and the *appearance* of them as *actual social phenomena*, which saves us from the implausible idea that phenomena are determined by social factors *brutely* and *immediately*, while preserving the reasonable claim that there is a relationship of constitution instead of construction between the context and the content of natural phenomena in a more sophisticated and mediated manner. This mediation between content and context is achieved through what we call “socio-constitution”.

From a Kantian point of view, the problem of lacking the distinction between making possible and making actual/real, which is the lack of the distinction between constitution and realization/actualization, is closely related to the problem that social

constructionism ignores, or at least, does not explain at all, the role of *nature* in the formation of natural phenomena or scientific theories. If theories or phenomena are about nature itself, then the very *phenomenon* under investigation should at least play some role in their formation. Due to their immodest claim that facts as well as knowledge are social products, the question how social construction relates to nature itself remains untouched by the social constructionists, which renders their account a *reductionist* one: they seem to explain the origin and existence of scientific theories and natural phenomena exclusively by social factors, which gives the impression that sociality is the *main*, if not the only dynamic, in the theory formation.⁶¹ This dissertation aims at offering a *mutual* relationship between sociality and nature, rather than depicting a foundationalist and reductionist picture with respect to their role in the constitution (not construction) of phenomena. In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore more basic characteristics of Kant's transcendental idealism in contrast to empirical idealism and transcendental realism in order to sort out the common characteristics and differences between "socio-constitution" and "social construction" as we find it in Kant's philosophy.

⁶¹ Although Bloor emphasizes that social factors constitute only one set of causes with respect to the formation of their content, he does not say even one word how nature and social construction relate, when a scientific theory is produced. The clarification of this relation, however, is crucial for an understanding of what "social construction" means.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism in Contrast to
Transcendental Realism and Empirical Idealism

Kant's philosophy should be characterized as a reaction to two extreme positions, from which metaphysics suffers: on the one hand, empirical idealism as it reaches its peak point in David Hume's skepticism, which disposes of the basic metaphysical categories and ideas.⁶² On the other hand, transcendental realism abuses these basic categories by making existential claims about pseudo-entities, moving illicitly from the formality of concepts towards their material objecthood, even though this move is not supported by sensibility—as if there is a transcendent way of materiality.⁶³ This position proclaims that there are trans-sensible objects existing in reality independently of the subjective conditions of the human mind. In contrast to transcendental realism, which expands the notion of reality illegitimately, empirical idealism neglects it by reducing the ground of all knowledge to sense experience available in the mind alone.⁶⁴ What these two opposite positions share as a common premise is that the only legitimate way for metaphysical categories to exist is that they refer to actually subsisting entities. Empiricists do not find such entities falling under these categories in experience, and that is why they give up the attempt to ground them in experience and declare skepticism about them. In this way, we could say that the basic metaphysical categories

⁶² Hume explicitly condemns the basic metaphysical notions like substance, causation to be illusions stemming from our psychological habits based on repeated experiences of the same patterns. See David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 220 for his critique of the notion of substance, for example.

⁶³ See Kant, CPR, A369 for Kant's definition of transcendental idealism in contrast to transcendental realism. He characterizes there also empirical idealism as the counter-part of Transcendental Realism, and seems to claim that the two are two complementary doctrines.

⁶⁴ See Kant, CPR, A369-A379, where Kant discusses in detail empirical idealism as the twin doctrine of transcendental realism in contrast to empirical realism.

are proclaimed to be “dead” in the empiricist approach. Rationalists, on the other hand, claim to find such entities falling under these categories in a transcendental reality, but as Kant opines, these are pseudo-entities because actual entity-hood for Kant requires necessarily a ground in sensation if we are within the limits of theoretical philosophy. In this way, too, these categories are lost in the sense they turn out to be empty and speculative. Kant finds a middle way between these two extreme positions, namely between the giving up of metaphysical categories completely by empirical idealism and the abuse of them by suggesting that categories necessarily refer to real objects by transcendental realism. In his view, the legitimacy of the categories is restricted to their formal role either in the constitution of the phenomenal world (by categories of understanding) or in the regulation of this constitution itself (by ideas of reason). In contrast to the empirical idealism, to which Kant responds mostly in the sections Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic in the *Critique*, as well as to the transcendental realism, to which Kant responds especially in the Transcendental Dialectic, he develops a way of thinking, which is “transcendental idealism”, in which *ideality* and *reality* of phenomenal objects appear as *equiprimordial* conditions in the constitution of them, if we take “ideality” and “reality” in the transcendental sense.⁶⁵ This means also that transcendental idealism should be considered neither a form of realism, nor a form of idealism in the traditional sense of these terms; it is rather a new

⁶⁵ “*Equiprimordial* here is a translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson of Heidegger’s term “gleichursprünglich” in *BT*, which literally consists of two words: “gleich” here means “equal” and “ursprünglich” means “origin-al.” “Ursprung” here is “the source, “the origin” of something. So, I apply here the concept of equiprimordiality in order to characterize the equally original and foundational roles of ideality and reality. Accordingly, neither ideality nor reality can be taken as more original; they are equally original and fundamental terms, which cannot be reduced to one another.

approach which critically reconciles and balances, and *limits* the roles of the *ideal* and *real* conditions of objectivity and objecthood.

The basic problem with transcendental realism is that the conditions of objectivity and objects are mixed up, and these conditions are made part of reality, even though they should be located in human subjectivity. When these conditions are bestowed to reality itself, it gains a self-objectifying power, and the subject is left completely outside of this self-objectifying world while at the same time being deprived of any power, any activity, and any tool to reach this self-objectifying world. In the background of this *passivization* of the subject, an *access* to the world appears as completely accidental, if possible at all, and the question how the subject comes securely into a touch with the object remains unanswered. In this way, the subject turns into a passive, skeptic, solipsist monad, who can never be sure whether the “ideas” in his mind are really representations of real objects in the external world. Kant’s clever answer to the problem of how the subject reaches objects is that the subject has an access to objects because it is himself, who objectifies and *constitutes* them. Here, objectification/constitution appears as the very relation of accessibility to objects. By offering an “equiprimordial” status to ideality and reality, which appear as two irreducible fundamental aspects of empirical objects, Kant’s transcendental philosophy takes a big step in overcoming both the subjectivism problem of empirical idealism and the pseudo-objectivism problem of transcendental realism.

The Concept of Socio-constitution as a Kantian Critique
of Social Constructionism and Traditional Sociology of Science

Now, in the light of these remarks concerning Kant's transcendental idealism and empirical realism, we want to complete our phenomenological reduction of construction to constitution by relating this Kantian framework to the phenomenon of sociality, and social construction of nature and scientific theories. On the one hand, we observe that nature is independent from our social constitutions to a certain extent, and theories about nature are produced according to certain norms, which display a considerable resistance to direct social interference. These norms do not seem to be reducible to social norms. This is an intuitive observation concerning the independent characteristic of natural phenomena as well as of the science of nature. On the other hand, it would be unrealistic and unintuitive to exaggerate this observation and presuppose that this autonomy is absolute, and phenomena as we encounter them either via science or via our everyday experience, are simply "out there" and we represent them through language. To reject the idea of *absolute* independence of nature and science does not necessarily mean to abandon the idea of independence completely. It is one thing to make a *distinction* between the material content of a phenomenon and its social context, and another thing to *idealize* the content and claim that the content is completely immune to social factors. Similarly, to reject the idea of brute social determination does not necessarily mean to reject the essentially social characteristic of the content of natural phenomena. Our Kantian account preserves the distinction between phenomena and their context while weakening the contrast between the two without giving up it completely. Although there is a *distinction* between phenomena and their social context,

there is also a continuous *dialectical* relationship between the two. The traditional sociology of science resolves the tension between independence and sociality by excluding sociality completely from the realm of phenomena. It grounds the possibility of saving the independence of natural phenomena in the trans-social *purity* of the content of factual statements. The social constructionist tradition, on the other hand, resolves this tension by giving up independence and subordinating phenomena to sociality. In contrast to these two approaches, we offer in this study *a middle way* between the two opposites; a way, which pays attention to these two characteristics of nature, none of which should be given up in favor of the other: instead of preferring one pole of this dual characteristic of natural phenomena to the other, we attempt to reconcile them and characterize natural phenomena both as essentially independent and social.⁶⁶ The difference between our approach and that of the traditional sociology of science is to consider social factors playing a role not necessarily and only negatively in an opposition to their factuality, *but rather positively in the formation of their social form*. This means an expansion of the range of social factors with respect to their affectivity on natural phenomena: they play a *positive* and *constitutive* role in the formation of them. The difference between our approach and that of social constructionists, on the other hand, is that this affectivity played by social factors is not *unlimited*: it is restricted to the social *form* of natural phenomena rather than determining completely the whole form-matter unity of them as a whole. In other

⁶⁶ As I shall try to explain in greater detail, the *epistemic content* of a theory is socially constructed with respect to its metaphysical framework, which constitutes the metaphysical form of a theory rather than its empirical, material content. Here, one should not confuse the epistemic content of theories with the empirical, material content of this epistemic content. Material content is a second order content: it is the content of the epistemic content. Epistemic content, on the other hand, includes not only material components, but also metaphysical formations which organize these material, empirical components.

words, social phenomena play a role in the constitution of phenomena not in terms of their whole Being as a form-matter unity, but *only* in terms of their social form. The independence and particularity of phenomena, then, originate from their material content, which remains beyond the scope of socio-constitution.⁶⁷ Consequently, our account offers a version of socio-constitution, which attaches a *conditional independence* to natural facts: this independence is in a continuous interaction with social structure.

For Kant, too, the constitution of objects of experience by pure reason appears as a *constitution* of them in terms of their possibilities before they are filled with the sensible content coming from the outer world. This constitution produces the objects *first of all* at the level of possibilities, but unless this a priori synthesis is brought together with the sensible manifold, which comes from the outer world, these possibilities remain as empty forms lacking reality [*Wirklichkeit*]. In our account, too, socio-constitution gives phenomena only their form and shapes them only in terms of their possibilities. In order to be actual phenomena recognized socially and linguistically as physical reality, these forms have to appear with an “empirical” content of factuality. Traditional sociology of science appears in this context as a version of what Kant calls “empirical idealism”: it tries to explain everything about reality by reducing all of its components to a “brute” account of empirical reality as if scientific theories are just passive representations of collected empirical data. Just like empirical idealism, which ignored the active contribution of reason to the formation of empirical knowledge,

⁶⁷ In every social construction of theories, there are always some sensible elements that overwhelm the socially endorsed framework of a theory. The framework cannot cope with the richness of the empirical reality exhaustively, and that is why no social construction fully determines the ultimate form of scientific theories. Every social construction, when a better one appears, becomes de-constructed and replaced.

traditional sociology of science, too, ignores the active contribution of a “collective, historical reason”. This active, collective contribution appears in our account as “socio-constitution”. On the other hand, in contrast to traditional sociology of science, the attitude of social constructionism commits a mistake similar to that of the *dogmatism of transcendental realism* which exaggerates the contribution of reason to knowledge and postulates pseudo-objects just by deriving their existence from the pure activity of reason without testing whether these objects have a corresponding content in the sensible world. Social constructionism fails to distinguish between pseudo-theories just as transcendental realism fails to distinguish between metaphysical pseudo-objects and real objects of knowledge. Such pseudo-theories are empty constructions based upon whimsical social, political powers, as we face in the example of *Lysenkoism*. Kant’s transcendental idealism found a middle way between two positions and denied neither the active contribution of reason to knowledge, nor the necessary role of the empirical dimension in this process. Similarly, our account of socio-constitution, too, does not deny the active contribution of collective reason (sociality) to the formation of natural phenomena, but it also doesn’t go as far as the social constructionists do: it restricts this active role of constitution by positing *nature itself* as its limit just like the Kantian thing-in-itself.⁶⁸ Sociality constitutes phenomena, but only in terms of their social form. The material content of facts comes from *nature* itself, which remains beyond the scope of

68 The question, how my conception of nature differs from Kant’s *Ding an sich* is a separate, crucial question, which we cannot deal within the borders of this paper in detail. Roughly speaking, I employ a conception of nature, which is not as “undetermined” as Kant’s thing in itself in the sense that it has some naturally formal characteristics of its own in the minimal sense, which do not come from our constitution. But we can never know those intrinsic formal characteristics of nature as they are in themselves; we simply experience the consequences, which results from an inter-action of our conceptual frameworks with those intrinsic formal characteristics. This interaction process determines whether a scientific theory will be successful or not.

constitution. However, nature, which shows itself to society as a material of socio-constitution, is *not a pure materiality lacking form* completely; it is already ontologically framed. We call this framing “onto-constitution”, which is a precondition of “socio-constitution”. Onto-constitution is one of our key concepts, which we will clarify in chapter 4 in detail.

In this chapter, we have reduced the phenomenon of construction as we find in the social constructionist tradition to the phenomenon of constitution. However, during our reduction, *the ontological meaning of socio-constitution* is presupposed as given and at this level, the Being of the phenomenon of constitution is not problematized yet. What is the kind of Being which enables something like “socio-constitution”? We declared that socio-constitution is a “social-enabling” and “social-disabling” of phenomena. However, the question of how a social structure can enable a natural phenomenon is still in the dark and needs an ontological inquiry. The answer to this question can be given through the introduction of the concept of *ontoparadigm*. As we will see, the acts of socio-constitution cannot happen directly; they require the mediation of ontoparadigms, which are embodied in social structures. Onto-constitution is the basic act of these ontological structures we call “ontoparadigm”. Before elucidating how ontoparadigms relate to social reality, however, we have to construct phenomenologically the phenomenon of ontoparadigm on the basis of truth as *Aletheia* in the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s allegory of the cave. This is the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHENOMENON OF ONTOPARADIGM ON THE BASIS OF TRUTH AS *ALETHEIA*

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we have seen that the phenomenon of constitution, which is problematized by the social constructionist tradition, is not grasped sufficiently by their basic concept of construction. But the social constructionist tradition points to a very important phenomenon even though their conceptualization of this phenomenon remains poor. We have reduced the phenomenon of construction to the phenomenon of constitution in order to describe the phenomenon at stake appropriately. In this chapter, we are going to construct the phenomenon of onto-paradigm on the basis of truth as *Aletheia*, which is the ontological structure of the phenomenon of constitution. The context of this construction will be Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's doctrine of ideas.

Plato occupies a special place in Heidegger's critique of metaphysics because he holds Plato as the initiator of metaphysics in the history of philosophy. In his Freiburg lecture in the fall semester of 1931-1932, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, Heidegger works out the allegory of the cave from the 7th book of Plato's *Republic*⁶⁹ and the dialogue *Theaetetus* in order to problematize the essence of truth in the context of the historical "transition of truth as unconcealedness

⁶⁹ See Plato. *The Republic*. Translation and commentary by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, (1968) 1991), (514a-517a).

into truth as correctness.”⁷⁰ As Heidegger clarifies, *A-letheia* is a privative expression, which means something essentially different than correctness.⁷¹ With Plato, the double-sense [*Doppelbedeutung*] of the conception of truth begins to be formed such that the inner context of this formation was simply overlooked.⁷² Heidegger’s questioning can be seen then as a trial to bring a more original experience of truth back into language, which remained concealed to us over millennia because of the dominating and “self-evident” conception of truth in the traditional sense.⁷³

Heidegger’s lecture is based upon the tension between the concepts of truth and untruth. The claim that “untruth belongs to the essence of truth” plays a crucial role in it.⁷⁴ This togetherness announces itself already in the form of the ancient Greek word *A-letheia*, in which we see the tension through the *Alpha Privativum*. As we will see, the essence of this negation is an “overcoming” [*Überwindung*] of concealedness. Heidegger interprets the allegory as showing us what seeing and non-seeing in and outside the cave *ontologically* means, and how brightness and darkness relate to one

⁷⁰ See Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, Gesamtausgabe XXXIV (Frankfurt a. M: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), p. 17. Since in this chapter the interpretation of the German original words much more crucial than all other chapters, we prefer to give the original German first and our own translation of it after.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁷³ Of course, it is hard to claim nowadays that the traditional conception of truth as correspondence today as powerful as in the first half of the 20th century is. With the rise of postmodernism, constructivist philosophies, post-structuralism and neopragmatism, correspondence has lost its credibility to a certain extent.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

another, so that man's seeing is made possible. Through the whole allegory, the seeing of man is enabled through the *light* of the ideas.⁷⁵

The Clarification of Some Basic Concepts

We need here a clarification of some German concepts, which will play a crucial role in the following sections of this chapter. The meanings of these basic concepts are partly lost in the translation into English. To start, we should distinguish two senses of truth as *Aletheia* to avoid confusion: we can refer to truth as the very event of unconcealing (*Entbergung*), or we can refer to truth as the consequence of such an unconcealing, which we call "unconcealedness" (*Unverborgenheit*). In other words, by "truth" we mean sometimes the happening of the unconcealing, and something the result of this happening, which is unconcealment. Heidegger, too, uses truth in these two senses. We will use the term in both senses, too, depending on what the context demands from us.

One crucial concept, which is our key to develop the concept of ontoparadigm is "*Vor-bilden*". "*Bilden*" is a verb in German, which is close to the English verbs "to form, to produce, to create". For example, there is "*einbilden*", which means "to imagine; to represent something in your imagination". The prefix "*ein*" (one) in German has a unificatory function in the sense of "synthesizing something"; "to bring together". We have to emphasize a basic characteristic of "*Bilden*" which is unfortunately lost in the translation. "*Bilden*" stems from the noun "*Bild*" and "*Bild*" means "picture", "that which is seen". So, it is not accidental that Kant calls the faculty of imagination

⁷⁵ Heidegger makes a distinction between the light and the source of light. He seems to equate the ideas other than the idea of the Good with the light itself whereas he sees the idea of the Good as the source of this light See *ibid.*, p. 57.

“*Einbildungskraft*”. He uses the word as “a picturing; an imagining”. “*Bilden*” hides in itself the sense of “making something visible”. In other words, *Bilden* is not any kind of forming, or producing of something as such, but it is *a forming, which gives something also its visibility and accessibility for the first time through a form; its outer appearance, its eidos*. It is a forming, which bestows to a being its form. When *Bilden* is brought together with the prefix “*Vor*”, this combination gives the word “*Vorbilden*” which makes this forming into a “pre-forming”; a forming, which brings something into appearance in an “a priori” way. It is not accidental that *Vorbilden* means in everyday German “education”, “cultural formation”: human beings become ideal human beings in a society to the extent they are formed early enough so that they can gain the necessary characteristics to exist in a society properly. In other words, citizens are pre-formed to learn how to live in a civilized way. *Vor-bild* is the noun, which means paradigm, model, prototype.⁷⁶ Heidegger the term in this lecture in the sense of the ontological “pre-formation” of the Being of beings in general.

We need now some more clarification of the term “*Vorbilden*” as well as the relationship between *Vorbilden* and idea. We encounter each being through a form. I see this tree *as* a tree because it has the form of a tree. The “as” structure found in our perception and understanding of things gives us their way of Being, namely, their forms. The form of something is its way of appearing to us as a *phenomenon*; its outer appearance, put into the Platonic language, its *eidos*, or *idea*. Interestingly, the connection between “*Vorbilden*” and “idea” shows itself to us without taking pains: *Vorbilden* means in this context nothing else than the very a priori formation of beings in

⁷⁶ This *civilized* man, is actually nothing but the inauthentic mode of Dasein, which Heidegger calls “*das Man*” because *das Man* lives according to certain standards, models (*Vor-bilder*). Note that Heidegger does not connect his analysis of *das Man* to the concept of *Vorbild*.

terms of their ontological possibilities, in which the form of them is given to them for the first time, namely, originally. *Vorbilden* is then the basic achievement of ideas: they form (*bilden*) beings in advance (*vor; im Voraus*).

Another key concept in this lecture to notice is “*Erblicken*”. In German “*Blicken*” means looking. “*An-blicken*” is “looking at” whereas “*Er-blicken*” with the prefix “*er*” seems to mean in the context of this lecture an original-looking. *Erblicken* is not a looking *at* something which was already before the act of looking, as if it was there before already as a present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) being; it is rather an original-looking, which creates the looked at the same time through its look, brings into existence in its sight (*Er-blicken*); in its image. In this kind of looking, seeing is not a secondary consequence, but looking reaches its intended object just by its intentionality and *constitutes* it as that which is seen at the same time. Such a looking is so perfect that it cannot fail. It is the essence of *Erblicken* that it sees and reaches directly what it intends. The duality between looking and seeing collapses in “*Erblicken*” and the two become identical: *Erblicken* is a looking which already sees in and through its looking.

Another crucial concept is “*Entbergen*” and “*Entbergsamkeit*” in Heidegger’s terminology. Heidegger characterizes *Entbergsamkeit* as the essence of *Unverborgenheit*. *Ent-bergen* is actually also the verb form of *Unverborgenheit* because in German there is no such verb as “*un-bergen*”. If we examine the structure of “*Ent-bergen*”, we realize that the prefix “*ent*” in this verb means something more than the prefix “*un*” in the word “*Unverborgenheit*”. In the word “*Unverborgenheit*”, the negation of the *Alpha Privativum* appears just as a formal negation of “*Verborgenheit*”. But the nature of this negation is not specified. In contrast to the prefix “*un*”, the prefix

“ent” in “*Ent-bergen*” has the sense of “counter-“ and emphasizes an opposition, a strife. This op-position, however, is just the first moment in the happening of truth and it transforms itself into a *dis-position* of something, which stays as an obstacle on the way to that which is aimed to be unconcealed, and later into a “position” of something new as the third moment of *Entbergen*. *Ent-bergen dis-poses* of something, which resists as an obstacle on the way to truth and this resistance must first of all fought and overcome. We should think disposing here in its relation to its origin in Latin “disponere” as the combination of the prefix –dis meaning “apart” and “ponere” meaning placing. It is the counter-part of posing something. *Ent-bergen dis-poses* something already posed, in order to be able to posit something new in its place. In German, there is the word “*wegmachen*” which means in English “to make away”. This making away should be thought in its twofold meaning: *making away* of something means here at the same time a *making a way* for something else; opening up a way for something, which is supposed to replace something which was already there. This is what “letting-through” of a being mean: to put away an obstacle in order to build a way, and then also positing a being on this way with a direction. Letting something be (*Seinlassen*) by freeing for it a way as its ontological possibility. In this sense, *Ent-bergen* as a dis-position of something is at the same time a position of something else. *Every determination is a negation*, as Spinoza and Hegel teach us.

Heidegger introduces first of all unconcealedness [*Unverborgenheit*] as the most basic concept of the lecture in order to characterize truth.⁷⁷ Later we encounter the concept of *disconcealability* [*Entbergbarkeit*], through which Heidegger clarifies the sense of unconcealedness further. Disconcealability appears here as the further

⁷⁷ Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, p. 10.

characterization of truth: “the essence of unconcealedness is disconcealability.”⁷⁸ A couple of pages earlier, Heidegger also uses the term “pre-forming” [*Vor-bilden*], but just as a characteristic of the kind of “looking” [*Blicken*] belonging to ideas, namely, as a characteristic of the original-looking [*Er-blicken*].⁷⁹

As we will see in detail, there are good reasons to hold the concept of “*Vor-bilden*” as basic as the concept of “*Entbergen*” (disconcealing): the concept of disconcealing does not make sense at all if we do not see its holistic relation to *Vorbilden*. What we mean here by “holistic” is that “*Vor-bilden*” and “*Ent-bergen*” are so basic “concepts” that one cannot hold one of them more foundational than the other; and such basic “concepts” cannot be “explained away” by analyzing them into simpler concepts. What we are talking here about is actually not two “concepts” at all if we mean by concepts technically general terms which we use to classify certain tokens, beings, or phenomena. Such basic phenomena are rather relatively so “a priori” and unique that they ground something like the type-token or concept-individual structure. The only thing which we can do with such basic phenomena, is to describe them phenomenologically only partially and go around them with the help of some other basic descriptions (not definitions) to make them more visible without being able to exhaust their meaning in definitions. Such basic concepts resemble some archeological remains which are so fragile that the archeologist cannot uncover the earth completely, and bring them fully into light. They would be harmed essentially if he would dig and move the earth completely away. So, he just takes away some of the earth meticulously, to the extent the fragile nature of these remains allows him to do so, but some of their

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 73.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 70.

parts remain under the earth. The archeologist must show respect and be satisfied with these limits rather than behaving like a rapacious metaphysician, who tends to bring everything in a clear-cut clarity of definitions and reduces philosophy to such a *reductive* activity. Especially such basic concepts resist our definitions and conceal their genuine character and deceive us more to the extent we approach them under the influence of the metaphysical illusion that they can be absorbed into a rigid and formal language of definitions. That is the case with these two concepts, *Vor-bilden* and *Entbergen*. The latter relates to the former essentially and we should understand the negation in the concept of “un-concealedness”, upon which the togetherness between truth and untruth rests, as “pre-formation” [*Vorbilden*] of beings, at the same time.

Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Stages of the Allegory

After the clarification of some basic concepts in the previous section, now we are ready to focus on Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s allegory. The allegory of the cave is a problematization of truth in relation to the conditions of possibility of seeing of man, in which “seeing” means something else than a bodily capacity. As Heidegger explains, it concerns rather the understanding of the Being of beings.⁸⁰ The allegory presents us with a tension between different ways of seeing of man, who relates himself in different ways to beings based upon different ways and degrees of concealing and unconcealing. These are at the same time nothing else but the very different ways of the Being of beings for man. The distance as well as the closeness of man to the authentic source of light (the sun), which is the idea of the Good; his movements within and outside the

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 51-52.

cave; the place where man at that moment is, determine these different ways of seeing, namely, the ways of unconcealing of beings.

Heidegger expresses this tension between different degrees and ways of seeing through the concept of “the distinction between unconcealedness and concealedness”, which he introduces in his interpretation of the 1st stage.⁸¹ He also uses the term “the distinction between that which is unconcealed and that which is concealed” frequently in his lecture.⁸² As we will see in detail, this distinction and its relation to man –no matter whether he can master it or not- is decisive for the achievement of the happening of truth. In other words, the mastery over this distinction plays the crucial and basic role in the whole happening of truth. From now on, we will refer to this distinction simply as “distinction” if we do not specify another sense. We focus now on Heidegger’s presentation of the stages of the allegory.

The first stage is the description of a state in which man is chained. In this state, the distinction between the true beings and their shadows is neglected by man; in other words, man is not aware of the distinction between the unconcealed and the concealed⁸³, and similarly, of the distinction between brightness and darkness, which stand for unconcealedness and concealedness.⁸⁴ This oblivion leads to a situation, in which man cannot see the shadows *as* shadows, and consequently, he holds them as true beings themselves: “This “not-there” of the distinction leads to the case that man in the cave is,

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 27.

⁸² Ibid., p. 27, 37, 91.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 27.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

as we say, completely far from himself, -caught by something and fallen prey in it, chained”⁸⁵

The second stage presents us a failure of a trial to free oneself. The chained man in this stage gets rid of his chains and sees for the first time something else than the shadows; the beings and the fire in the cave. The beings and the fire are more unconcealed in comparison to the shadows because the shadows arise out of these two sources. But the unchained man cannot look at the more unconcealed beings for a long time since his eyes are used to look at darker beings, and they hurt because of the light of the unconcealed beings. He returns to his old state. As Heidegger points out: “it must follow the turning-around [Umwendung] and the turning-towards [Zuwendung] the light⁸⁶, which fails in this stage: the unchained has an unbearable pain in his eyes and moves his sight away from the more unconcealed things. As Heidegger also declares, this is the presentation of a failure.⁸⁷

The third stage characterizes the “ascendance of man from the cave to the light of the sun”.⁸⁸ In this stage, the chained can succeed not only to free himself from the chains, but also to leave the cave and then get accustomed to a new life in a new place outside the cave, under the sun. In this stage, the chained reaches a higher level of seeing of the beings belonging to the higher level: he can look even at the “most unconcealed being”, in other words, the sun, which is the idea of the Good. Heidegger calls this state “the being-free for the light, namely, being familiar with and towards the

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 27. The original: “Dieses „nicht-da“ der Unterscheidung macht es, dass der Mensch in der Höhle, wie wir sagen, ganz weg ist, -befangen von etwas und gefangen darin, gefesselt.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

light”.⁸⁹ This transition, this change of the place does not occur easily, but on the contrary, it requires hard work, a lot of struggle and pain. This means that the ascendance from the cave requires some sort of violence.⁹⁰

The fourth stage pictures not only an ascendance, but also a return to the cave. We encounter here the one, who returns to the cave as the philosopher, trying to free not only himself from the chains in order to enjoy the light of the sun outside the cave, but also tries to save his chained fellows by telling them the truth he saw outside the cave. As consequence, however, the others kill him because they find him dangerous.⁹¹

After presenting the four stages of the allegory, now we will examine Heidegger’s interpretation of some basic concepts of the allegory: he deals basically with the concept of idea and through this, he focuses on some other crucial concepts like light, brightness, darkness, original-looking (*Er-blicken*), dis-concealing (*Ent-bergen*), and pre-forming (*Vor-bilden*), which are the constitutive characteristics of the ideas. As we will see, through all the stages of the allegory, the seeing of man is made possible through the light of the ideas.⁹²

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 42.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 80.

⁹² There is an ambiguity with respect to the question whether ideas are themselves to be characterized as “light” itself or “the source of light”. It seems that Heidegger is not completely clear on this. The idea of the good is definitely the source of all light, and all other ideas barrow this light from this source and acting in this way partly as a source of light, and sometimes, Heidegger seems to mention of ideas as this very light itself.

Ideas as that which is Seen and as the Being of beings

When Heidegger deals with the concept of idea, he begins with the question whether idea is a kind of being. It is at least clear to us that it is something else than the kind of beings, we call “shadows” in Plato’s cave.⁹³ But moreover, one cannot conceive an idea as one being among others, either. Idea has rather something to do with the ability to see. As Heidegger points out, “idea” stems from the Ancient Greek verb “idein”, which means “to see”. We come across ideas in *idein*, seeing, and idea is nothing but *that which is seen* in this act of seeing.⁹⁴ But seeing here is not meant in an empirical or bodily sense, which happens necessarily through the physical sense organ of the eye; seeing is considered here rather as the essence of what we call “thinking” in the sense that reason “sees” essences of beings through its thinking. In this sense, seeing means any kind of accessibility to beings, in which they appear to us “as” beings in their different forms. Such a seeing enables man to have an access to beings in terms of their ontological possibilities as phenomena, as Heidegger remarks:

Idee ist also der Anblick dessen, als was seiend sich etwas darbietet. Diese Anblicke sind es, worin das einzelne Ding als das und das sich präsentiert: präsent und anwesend ist. ... Idea gibt also das, als was ein Ding anwest, d.h. was ein Ding ist, -sein Sein⁹⁵. ... Das Sehen der Idee, d.h. das Verstehen des Was- und Wie-seins, kurz des Seins, lässt uns überhaupt erst das Seiende als das jeweilige Seiende, das es ist, erkennen; mit den leiblichen Augen sehen wir nie das Seiende, es sei denn, dass wir dabei schon “Ideen” sehen.⁹⁶

⁹³ Ibid., p. 48.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 50.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 51.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

Idea is the sight of that which presents us something as existent. These sights are those in which the singular thing presents itself as this or that thing: in which it is present [präsent] and pre-sent [anwesend]. ... Idea gives us that which presences [anwest] as a thing, namely, what a thing is, -its Being. ... The seeing of the idea, namely, the understanding of the what-and how-being, -shortly- of Being, lets us know first of all the being as a certain being; that it is. With the bodily eyes, we never see beings, it is rather that we see there already "ideas".

What is remarkable in this presentation is that Heidegger does not characterize seeing as a subjective act or an epistemological ability of man, but as a happening of Being, although this happening needs people, through which it can happen. So, seeing is thought here ontologically and ideas appear as the Being of beings, which presents itself as that which is seen in the beings.

Ideas as the Passage for Beings

After these considerations concerning the relationship between idea and seeing, Heidegger clarifies the relationship between idea and light. The idea of the Good in the allegory of the cave is the sun, which is described as the source of light. This means that brightness is the essential characteristic of ideas. With the help of an etymological analysis of the word "hell" (Helle), Heidegger clarifies the essence of brightness as "penetrative-through" (durch-dringend), "trans-parent" (durch-sichtig) and "opening" (öffnend).⁹⁷ He characterizes the ideas as "that which lets-through (durchlassen) beings, calling this "letting-through" the "basic achievement (die *Grundleistung*) of the ideas."⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

Hindurch durch das Was-sein zeigt sich uns das Seiende als das und das. Nur wo Sein, Was-sein der Dinge, Wesen verstanden wird, ist ein Durchlass für Seiendes. Das Sein, die Idee ist das Durchlassende: das Licht. Was Grundwesen des Lichtes, das ist Grundleistung der Idee.⁹⁹

Through the what-being, being shows itself to us as this and this. Only where Being, the what-Being of things is understood, is there a letting pass for beings. Being, idea, is that which lets pass: the light. The basic essencing of the light: this is the basic achievement of the idea.

Ideas and Truth as Disconcealability

Heidegger characterizes then ideas as “that which is seen by a pre-forming original glance, which participates in the happening of unconcealedness. (die Ideen als das Gesichtete eines vor-bildenden Erblickens, das am Geschehen der *Unverborgenheit* beteiligt ist).¹⁰⁰ This last characterization of idea as “that which is seen of a pre-forming original-looking” is actually essential for understanding what ideas are and what role they play in the happening of truth. In this characterization, we encounter the concept of *Vorbilden* (preforming), and as our interpretation will show, this concept is actually an essential characterization of the basic performance of ideas, although Heidegger does not emphasize and bring this concept to the fore. Before we focus on *Vorbilden*, we

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 56.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 70.

need to work out the concept of disconcealability. Let's now focus on Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of "brightness" in order to make sense of "disconcealing".

„Helle“ („hell“) kommt von „hallen“ und ist ursprünglich eine Kennzeichnung des Tones (des Lautes) und das Gegenteil von „dumpf“. ¹⁰¹ ... Der Helle Ton und Laut, der noch seine Steigerung hat im „gellenden“ („Nachtigal“), ist der durchdringende: er breitet sich aus, mehr noch: dringt durch. Der dumpfe, gleichsam träger, bleibt gewissermaßen schwer zurück, vermag sich nicht durchzusetzen. Das Helle hat den Charakter des Hindurch-durch ... (Wo-hindurch). ¹⁰²

“Helle” stems from “hallen” and it is originally a characterization of the tone (of loudness), and it is the opposite of “flannely” ... The hell tone, the loudness, which has its growing in the “screaming” (Nightingale), is penetrative [*durchdringend*]: it spreads itself, and more than that: it penetrates. The flannely, which is the medium at the same time, remains to a certain extent at the background, cannot assert itself. Brightness has the character of “towards-through” (to where-through).

This means that unconcealing as disconcealing is actually a dis-positing of darkness by the penetration of the light into it. ¹⁰³ Heidegger calls this possibility of unconcealedness “Ent-bergsamkeit” and characterizes it as the essence of unconcealedness:

Die Unverborgenheit des Seienden geschieht in der und durch die Entbergsamkeit. Sie ist entwerfend-eröffnender Auftrag, der die Entscheidung stellt. Das Wesen der Unverborgenheit ist die Entbergsamkeit. ¹⁰⁴

The unconcealedness of beings happens in and through disconcealability. It is the projecting-opening mission, which poses the decision. The essence of unconcealment is disconcealing.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

The Alpha Privativum of *Aletheia* in the Stages

We have seen that Heidegger separates his lecture into four parts and interprets these four parts as the four stages of the happening of truth, namely of unconcealedness. In this context, one can see Plato's allegory as a way of teaching us what the essence of the *Alpha Privativum* in the concept of unconcealedness is, and how this negation itself realizes itself through an allegoric visualisation. In this negation of unconcealedness, the togetherness, the belonging to one another of truth and untruth dwells, which we also encounter in Heidegger's claim: *to the essence of truth belongs untruth*. Hereafter we will use the term "the negation which belongs to unconcealedness" in its shortened form, calling it just "the negation", if we do not make further specification of the term. Through the presentation of Heidegger's interpretation, we have seen what kind of a relation holds between the distinction and the first three stages. *Then, how does the negation itself relate to these four stages?* Heidegger does not provide an explicit connection of the negation to the allegory. In contrast to the first and second stages, the third stage presents us a success in terms of negation: man can leave the cave and reaches the highest being, which is the idea of the Good. And in contrast to the third stage, the fourth stage depicts a return to the cave, which results in death of the ascender. Which of these two stages should be considered as a success in terms of reaching the truth? Is it not a mistake of the unchained prisoner in the fourth stage that he reverses his direction back to the cave and returns to it, which results in his death? Is this reversal of the direction and its consequence of death not the unsuccessfulness of

the happening of truth? Is the idea of the Good not the last station of the “philosopher”, who craves throughout his whole life to reach the “most unconcealed”? If so, then should the third stage not be the stage in which truth is reached?

Not at all: the happening of truth does not only require a reaching of the most unconcealed, but also a counter-position of the most unconcealed with that which is concealed; not a staying of man on the side of the unconcealedness, but a decisive and loyal dwelling of him in the very difference itself between the unconcealed and the concealed. *The philosopher must make this difference into his dwelling place; into his ethos.* This means that the ascendance from darkness of the cave into the light of the sun is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the happening of truth:

Noch mehr verstehen wir jetzt. Wer nur aus der Höhle herausstiege, um sich ausschließlich in das „Scheinen“ der Ideen zu verlieren, der würde diese gar nicht wahrhaft verstehen, d.h. sie nicht als das Durchlassende, als das Seiende Freigebende, es der Verbergung Entreißende, die Verbergung Überwindende erblicken. Er würde die Ideen selbst zu einem Seienden machen, zu einer höheren Schicht von Seiendem. Die Entbergsamkeit geschähe gar nicht.¹⁰⁵

We understand now more. If he would just ascend from the cave in order to lose himself in the “shining” of the ideas, he would not be able to understand them truthfully; namely, he would not see them as that which let-through, as that which gives beings freely; as that which wrestles them away from the concealedness; as that which overcomes the concealedness. It would make the ideas into a being, into a higher layer of beings. The disconcealing would not happen at all.

The mastery over the distinction between the unconcealed and the concealed is not achieved by staying on the side of the unconcealed, but by a return back to the side of

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 91.

the concealed. This means that in the third stage there is no achievement of truth, no mastery over the distinction. This can happen firstly in the fourth stage:

Der Befreier bringt eine Unterscheidung mit. Sofern er sie, die Unterscheidung von Sein und Seiendem, beherrscht, dringt er auf eine Scheidung zwischen dem, was Seiendes ist und was das Schein ist, zwischen dem, was unverborgen ist, und dem, was, indem es sich darstellt, gleichwohl verbirgt (wie die Schatten).¹⁰⁶

The freer brings with himself a distinction. To the extent he masters over the distinction between being and beings, he forces a separation between that which is being and that which is appearance; between that which is concealed and that which at the same time conceals in the presenting of itself (like the shadows).

What does “the mastery over the distinction” mean here? In the citation before the last one, we have seen that Heidegger uses the expression “the looking which overcomes the concealedness”. The overcoming-looking belongs to the seeing of the philosopher in the fourth stage. This is the last level of seeing and the story here is about an overcoming kind of seeing. The mastery over the distinction means in this context nothing other than overcoming. But we can ask further: what does overcoming mean here? How can a seeing, a looking, be “overcoming”? We have already seen that the mastery over the distinction requires a return to the cave. Heidegger explains the mission of the philosopher as a necessity of his own being in the cave:

Er soll in der Höhle sein, -das sagt: der Mensch, der mit dem Lichtblick für das Sein des Seienden Erfüllte, soll mit den Höhlebewohnern und für sie seine Meinungen äußern über das dort und diesen Unverborgene, über das,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

was diesen das Seiende ist.¹⁰⁷ ... Er wird den Höhlenbewohnern gar nicht bestreiten, dass sie sich zu einem Unverborgenen verhalten, aber er wird ihnen zu zeigen versuchen, dieses Unverborgene sei solches, das gerade, in dem es sich zeige, also unverborgen sei, das Seiende nicht zeigt, sondern verdeckt, verbirgt.¹⁰⁸

He ought to be in the cave, -this means: the man who is filled with the light for the Being of beings, ought to express his own opinion there with and for the dwellers of the cave about that which is there and unconcealed to them; about that which is "that-which-is" (das Seiende) for them ... He will not discuss with them that they conduct themselves towards an unconcealed, but he will try to show that this unconcealed is such that, in the way it shows itself, it does not show that-which-is, but on the contrary, covers, conceals it.

Heidegger interprets all of the struggles of the philosopher as a "coming across of that which is open and that which is covered". In this picture, beings and appearance, the open and the covered, show themselves from a juncture, at the same time.¹⁰⁹ We can understand better what "overcoming" means in the light of the following words:

In diesem Gegeneinander-auftreten des Offenbaren und des Verdeckten zeigt sich eben, dass mit dem bloßen Dasein von Unverborgenheit überhaupt es nicht sein Bewenden hat; im Gegenteil: die Unverborgenheit, das Sich-zeigen der Schatten, wird sich auf sich selbst versteifen, ohne zu wissen, das es ein Verbergen ist, und die Offenbarkeit des Seienden wird als solche nur in der *Überwindung* des Verbergens. Also Wahrheit ist nicht so einfachhin Unverborgenheit von Seiendem, wobei die vormalige Verdecktheit irgendwo zurückgelassen würde, sondern Offenbarkeit von Seiendem ist notwendig in sich selbst *Überwindung* einer Verbergung; die Verbergung gehört wesensmäßig zur Unverborgenheit, -Wie das Tal zum Berg.¹¹⁰

In this coming across of the manifest and the covered, it shows that this does not end at all with the mere Being-there of the unconcealedness; on the contrary, the unconcealedness, the self-showing of the shadows, will stick to

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

itself insistently, without knowing that it is a concealedness, and the manifestation of beings as such is just in the overcoming of concealedness. This means, truth is not just the unconcealedness of beings, by which the previous coveredness is left behind somewhere, but on the contrary, the manifestation of beings is necessarily overcoming of a coveredness in itself; the coveredness belongs essentially to unconcealedness, -just like the valley to a mountain.

We have already pointed out that there is a negation in the third stage. As we have seen, the *Alpha privativum* belonging to unconcealedness is in no way a mere “No” to concealedness, but an “overcoming” of it.¹¹¹ Heidegger characterizes the nature of this overcoming as the being wrestled from the unconcealedness of the concealedness, and the “being won” (in fight) of the unconcealedness.¹¹² This means that a mere negation of darkness and the cave is not sufficient to reach unconcealedness and freedom in its fulfillment. Truth cannot be accomplished without making this negation into an overcoming.¹¹³ The kind of negation *Aletheia* possesses, which we call “overcoming”, is not just “negative” in the sense of being opposed to something “positive”, but on the contrary: *the Alpha privativum in un-concealedness not only negates the concealedness, but also “posits” a way of being, which posits itself against concealedness and replaces it.* Because of the reasons above, the last stage of the cave appears as the necessary last step in the happening of truth. For the light of the sun can overcome the darkness of the cave only through the return of the philosopher to the cave, and this is the only way in which the light of the sun can come across the darkness of the cave in

¹¹¹ Ibid..

¹¹² Ibid., p. 125. *Abgerungenheit der Unverborgenheit der Verborgenheit, und die Gewonnenheit (im Kampf) der Unverborgenheit*

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 11. Heidegger connects here the problem of truth again to the problem of freedom through the concept of overcoming (*Überwindung*). The fight against concealedness here appears also as a fight for freedom from the chains and darkness See *ibid.*, p. 91.

order to negate and overcome it. Man in this picture appears as the bridge, as the very medium, through which light passes from its sphere of brightness to darkness. *The sunlight shines then through the eyes of the philosopher in the cave and reaches through his eyes the darkness to penetrate into and overcome it.*

We can see better how truth and untruth belongs together through the concept truth as overcoming. This “belonging together” is a characteristic of truth and untruth, which Heidegger emphasizes in the lecture repeatedly.¹¹⁴

Erst jetzt, aufgrund der Scheidung von Wahrem und Unwahrem, wird sichtbar, dass das Wesen der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit in der Überwindung des Verbergens besteht, was besagt, dass die Unverborgenheit wesensmäßig bezogen ist auf Verborgenheit und Verbergen. Das sagt: die *aletheia* ist nicht nur Offenbarkeit des Seienden, sondern sie ist (so können wir jetzt das *Alpha Privativum* deutlicher fassen) in sich selbst eine Auseinander-setzung. Und so ist in der Tat in dem fraglichen Abschnitt von der Wahrheit die Rede, nämlich hinsichtlich ihrer wesentlichen Angewiesenheit auf das Verbergen und Verborgenen. Zum Wesen der Wahrheit gehört die Unwahrheit.¹¹⁵

It is on the basis of the distinction between the true and the untrue that truth as unconcealedness consists in the overcoming of concealing, which means that unconcealedness is essentially related to concealedness and concealing. This means: The *Aletheia* is not only the clearedness (*Offenbarkeit*) of beings; it is rather (in this way, we can now grasp the *Alpha Privativum* clearer) a counter-positing [*Auseinandersetzung*] in itself. And this is indeed the way in which the question about truth is in the questionable paragraph; namely, with respect to its essential reference to concealing and that which is concealed. To the essence of truth belongs the untruth.

In the light of that which we determined up to now, it wouldn't be wrong to read the whole allegory of the cave as a didactic presentation of what the *Alpha Privativum* in the concept of *Aletheia* means, which teaches us its meaning step by step. The first

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 91-92.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 92.

stage pictures concealedness. The second stage pictures an unsuccessful attempt of a negation of concealedness. The third stage pictures a successful attempt of a negation of concealedness, but this negation is not the kind of negation which truth as unconcealedness demands. The negation starts from a state of concealedness, but it ends too early, outside the cave. The negation starts first as a negation of the darkness in the cave, which leads to an ascendance from the cave, but it should then return to the cave in order to negate the darkness once more to make the brightness prevail there. Truth can happen only through these two moments of negation in reverse directions. Therefore, it is the fourth stage, in which truth happens finally: *the negation that starts in the darkness of the cave which is a symbol of concealedness, should return to this darkness itself in order to negate it once more and posit the brightness of the light in the cave.* So, the Alpha Privativum of the unconcealedness does not mean a mere negation of darkness and reaching the source of truth; it means rather a position, which has in itself two moments of negation. Only through this positive characteristic, which involves a second negation of darkness in the return, can truth happen as an overcoming of darkness by brightness.

Pre-Forming (*Vor-bilden*) as the Essence of Unconcealing

Disconcealing [*Entbergen*] as Opening up.

of New Ways of Being.

Now, how should we understand the concept of *Entbergen* (disconcealing) in the context of the meaning of the Alpha Privativum, which is not merely a negation, but a negation which posits? What we normally tend to understand from “disconcealing”

presupposes something like to get rid of an obstacle, which prevents our access to a being we want to reach. For example, suppose that one digs the earth to find a treasure and finally reaches it. The dug earth in this example is something which covers and conceals the treasure at the beginning, and the treasure to be reached lying under the ground is that which is concealed. Through digging, the earth is put away and the concealed treasure is brought into unconcealedness. Here, the treasure is the being which is disconcealed. Now, can we say that this example an example of unconcealing? Is the digging of the earth in this example an example of *Entbergen*? Not at all. This example presupposes the presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) and givenness of the treasure. But we already pointed out that the kind of looking which belongs to *Entbergen* is not a "looking at" (*An-blicken*) of something, which is already there as a present-at-hand entity; it is rather an original-looking (*Er-blicken*), which creates that which is looked at the same time through its act of looking, in its own sight. In this kind of looking, seeing is not a secondary consequence, but looking reaches its intended object just by its intentionality and constitutes it as that which is seen as a way of its looking. *Ent-bergen* happens through such a kind of seeing, which Heidegger calls "*Er-blicken*":

Aber was für ein Blicken ist das? Kein An-blicken, etwa so, wie wir ein Vorhandenes angaffen, nicht ein blosses Vorfinden und Aufnehmen in den Blick, sondern ein Blicken im Sinne des Erblickens, das will sagen durch das Blicken und im Blickendes Erblickte (den Anblick) allererst bilden, -im voraus bilden, vor-bilden. Dieses vor-bildende Erblicken des Seins, des Wesens, bindet sich auch schon an das in solchem Entwurf Entworfenene.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

But what kind of a looking is this? Not looking-at, just like in the case in which we catch a present-at-hand thing; not just a mere finding-before and perceiving into the look. On the contrary, it is a looking in the sense of original-looking, which means that through looking, and that which is looked at originally in this looking something is formed –formed in advance, pre-formed [*Vor-bilden*]. This pre-forming original-looking of Being, of essence, connects itself already to that which is projected in such a projection.

When Heidegger determines the double characteristic of the ideas, namely the fact that they are the most unconcealed and the most perfectly existent beings, he characterizes them as the “fore-fighters, which prepare the way for others”:

Bei allem Unverborgenem stehen sie voran, sind die Vorkämpfer; sie bereiten vorangehend den Weg für das andere. Inwiefern? Die Ideen sind das Seiendste; und das Seiendste am Seienden, das, was das Seiende eigentlich ausmacht, ist dessen Sein. Das Sein aber gibt, wie wir sahen, erst den Durchlass für Seiendes. Die Ideen bereiten den Weg. Das Licht macht es, dass vor dem Verhüllten jetzt sichtbar wird. Die Ideen beseitigen die Verborgenheit.¹¹⁷

At all of the unconcealed, they stand in the front, they are the fore-fighters, they prepare the way for others in advance. How far? Ideas are those which “are” the most; and the most perfect beings among others, is actually that which makes up their Being. Being gives, however, as we have seen, through a letting-through for beings. The ideas prepare the way. The light does it so that, in front of the covered, it turns out to be visible. The ideas remove the concealedness.

In the light of the citations above, we can understand now better the connection between the concept of *Disconcealing* [*Entbergen*] and the concept of [*Preforming*] *Vorbilden*, which will help us also to understand the two moments in the happening of truth.

Preforming is not a preforming in direction towards a present-at-hand being; it is rather a preforming, which forms for the first time the very direction to this being and this

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 70.

being itself. This means that preforming does not follow an already formed and present-at-hand way towards an already formed being; it builds rather this way for the first time, originally. Preforming open up a new way for a being and bestows it its direction to be, its way to be, namely its form in this way. And the being follows this way opened up in front of it. Now, we can understand the twofold meaning of disconcealing as negating and as positing we referred to at the beginning better. *Disconcealing as pre-forming makes a way in two senses: it not only takes the darkness away, which stands on the way to the formation of a being; but it makes also a way positively for something to go through, by opening up for it a possibility of Being as its way to be.*

The Derivation of Truth as Correspondence
on the Basis of Cor-rectness(*Richtigkeit*) from
the Di-rectedness (*Ge-richtetheit*) of Truth as Unconcealment

Now we are able to gain a more essential insight into the essential connection between *Vor-gebildetheit* and *Unverborgenheit*. *Unverborgenheit* as *Entbergsamkeit* is a taking away (also in the sense of making a way for something else), an opening up of a new way in front of a being. The allegory of the cave shows us that truth is not a present-at-hand state or a consequence to be achieved; it is not a state to be possessed. If the freed man reaches the sun and stays there outside without the return, the brightness, too, remains outside of the cave. It cannot come across the darkness in the cave and overcome it at all. Truth is this very coming across of the brightness of the sun with the darkness of the cave and the overcoming of the darkness by the brightness. The question here is: how does this coming across happen? Normally, brightness and darkness prevail

in different places. They are opposites, which normally cannot meet one another. This means that their natural inclination is to remain in two different realms. A force; an insistence; a violence is needed even to bring them together. Secondly, a bringing together must happen in a way in which the places of brightness and darkness are really transformed and their areas of power are reconstructed. This replacement, this reconstruction happens through a passing-through (*Durch-dringen*) of the brightness through the darkness. *Such a passing-through presupposes a direction-towards of that which passes-through, which is a projection, or a projective intentionality.* The return of the philosopher to the cave represents this directedness of the brightness towards the darkness. This direction is not given ontically, but ontologically, it is pre-given because the idea of the Good functions here as the highest “a priori *Vor-bild*” to be followed by all other ideas and beings. This means that even though the being which is pre-formed is not present-at-hand, the way, how it is going to be pre-formed, is actually pre-given as a *Vor-bild*, which is its idea. This means that the unconcealment happens under the yoke of an idea, which prescribes the howness and direction of the happening of truth. Now, we can understand for the first time in detail the sense of the overcoming, of the *Alpha Privativum*: disconcealing is always and already directed ultimately by the idea of the Good, which is the highest *Vorbild*, as a pre-forming (*vor-bildende*) achievement. Through unconcealing, what is unconcealed is not pre-given in its Being. That is why there is no ontical pre-giveness of it. However, it is ontologically pre-given in the sense that its Being is ordered (*bestellt*) by its idea. Therefore, unconcealedness happens according to a model, a paradigm, which prescribes how a being ought to be. This is what Heidegger’s diagram means, in which the Ought as *Agathon* is put above Being.

Being is unconcealed under the yoke of a model, in accordance to it. Therefore, *in the word "unconcealedness" "being already directed" [Gerichtetheit] conceals itself.*

Unconcealedness is always an unconcealedness *in a certain direction*, which is pre-given by a model. It follows from this: the essence of unconcealedness is being pre-formed from and in a certain direction.

Correctness and Truth

If directedness, or "being-directed-towards", is found already in "unconcealedness", this means that the concept of truth as correctness/correspondence announces itself already in the more original conception of unconcealedness. In German, "correct" means "richtig", which is derived from the verb "Richten". "Richten" means "directing" and accordingly, "richtig" means "directive". Something which directs us is directive, namely, correct. But every direction has something as that towards which we are directed. Towards what does a correct proposition direct us? Towards beings. That is why Heidegger defines propositional truth as "being-uncovering" (Entdeckend-sein) of beings *in themselves (an sich)* in the section 44 of *SuZ*, where he problematizes the traditional conception of truth as agreement/correspondence (Übereinstimmung) of propositions/judgments with beings (*adaequatio intellectus et rei*).¹¹⁸ Heidegger attacks here the obscurity and groundlessness of the idea that propositions, or our mental states, *resemble* beings, which they correspond to.¹¹⁹ According to Heidegger, the idea of

¹¹⁸ Heidegger, *SuZ*, p. 219.

¹¹⁹ In this critique Heidegger has in mind classical empiricists like Locke, who defended the view that ideas are similar to the experienced sense objects. In contemporary philosophy, correspondence theory of

resemblance lies at the heart of correspondence. In this picture, propositions can correspond to beings because there is a likeness; a resemblance between them. Heidegger questions further into this alleged resemblance and remarks that there is no ground to assume such a likeness relationship because the two kinds of beings at stake (subjective states, propositions, beliefs vs. objective states, facts) are completely different kinds. Therefore, while rejecting the view that propositions correspond to beings by themselves, Heidegger attaches to them an intentional directedness, through which he grounds the correctness of propositions. The propositions uncover beings at themselves only because this uncovering has its ground in a more original kind of truth, which Heidegger calls the disclosure (*Erschlossenheit*) of Dasein, which is grounded even further in the more original truth of Being, which is unconcealedness (*Unverborgenheit*).¹²⁰ This means that propositions do not correspond to beings by themselves; it is rather that they uncover beings only because we use them as actual agents. Here, the phrase “they uncover beings” should be thought as “we uncover beings through them in our projection”. They uncover, only because we let them uncover in our understanding of Being.

At this point, we have to distinguish two concepts from one another: (i) truth as correspondence/correctness, (ii) truth as unconcealedness. At first sight, Heidegger seems to reject correspondence/agreement in *SuZ* right after he gives his definition of the truth of assertions:

truth is no longer defended along these mentalist lines. After the development of modern logic by Frege and Russel and logical positivism by Carnap, the focus of interest in epistemology has shifted towards the correspondence relationship between language (propositions, statements) and facts.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-227.

To say that an assertion “is true” signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering. Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement (*Übereinstimmung*) between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object).¹²¹

Note that we used here the translation of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, who translate *Übereinstimmung* as agreement, but this can be translated also as correspondence, and Heidegger means by *Übereinstimmung* actually what is meant by correspondence in literature. Does Heidegger reject here the idea of a correspondence (*Übereinstimmung*) between propositions and beings? Not necessarily if we pay sufficient attention to the sentence: “Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object)”. Here, what Heidegger repudiates is not correspondence or likening as such, it is rather the idea that the subject likens itself to entities, beings. Moreover, Heidegger distinguishes and makes use of these two concepts frequently in his works. For example, in “Die Frage nach der Technik”, he states that seeing technology as an instrument to achieve goals is correct (*richtig*), but it is not true (*wahr*) in the genuine sense of the word.¹²² Here, he views correctness as a kind of truth with a lower status in comparison to the truth as unconcealedness, which is more original. He characterizes correctness as the “determination of something appropriately” (*Feststellung etwas zutreffend*), which is not necessarily the unconcealing of its essence.

¹²¹ Heidegger, *SuZ*, p. 219.

¹²² Note that we use here “correctness” and “correspondence” as co-referential terms, which refer to one and the same relation between propositions and beings. Heidegger, too, does not distinguish them and use them interchangeably.

Truth requires the additional condition of unconcealing of the essence of something.¹²³ We characterized correctness as being-directive. A correct proposition directs us *appropriately* to a being. *It simply repeats its givenness to us in the very way it is given without changing or questioning it.* That is why Heidegger calls the truth of propositions uncovering (dis-covering if translated literally) rather than unconcealing, which means that in this case, we simply point to the way a being is given, which is already there as present-at-hand. We find another use of these two concepts of truth in his article “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (On the essence of Truth), where he offers unconcealedness, the openness of Being, as the condition of possibility of correspondence.¹²⁴ In this article, he gives examples from everyday life, in which there is correspondence between propositions and things, or between things. Then there is a section called “the inner possibility of correspondence” in which he asks the question how correspondence is possible. Here, too, he suggests that to try to understand correspondence on the basis of the idea of likening (Angleichung) does not lead to anywhere as long as we try to capture this likeness in the characteristics of beings.¹²⁵ Such a likeness can be understood only on the basis of the relation of *representation* (Vorstellung) between the proposition and the thing at stake. Then Heidegger shows that the idea of a correspondence relation between statements and facts presupposes a realm of openness preceding such a correspondence relation. Such a relation requires representation

¹²³ See Martin Heidegger, “die Frage nach der Technik” *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009, pp. 9-41. Heidegger, *Technik*, pp. 10-11.

¹²⁴ See Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth” in *Pathmarks*. Edited by William (McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-155. The German original is “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”, *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), 177-203. We will refer to the German text.

¹²⁵ Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 185.

(Vorstellung), and in this representation, the represented must traverse (durchmessen) an openness between itself and its counter-part. This traversal presupposes a representedness. Heidegger characterizes this openness as the freedom which lets beings be (*Seinlassen*).¹²⁶ This means that Heidegger refuses the idea that the subject likens itself to objects so that correspondence happens. Instead, the subject represents the objects actively through a transcendence, through an open region of unconcealedness, and only in this representation, through the objectification of objects by understanding, does the likening between subject and object happen. Heidegger seems to think here in a Kantian way and rejects the empiricist, Lockian idea that the mind of the subject passively mirrors beings by resembling them. Instead of this model, he seems to endorse the Kantian view that the subject constitutes actively his/her objects through representation, and because it gives them their forms through projection, their form and the forms which we have in our understanding “resemble” each other.

Now, in the light of these considerations, we formulate the two moments of truth:

- (1) Proposition X corresponds to C (X is correct) because it uncovers C in itself.
- (2) The “in-itselfness” of C is already disclosed (*Erschlossen*) by *Dasein*.

(1) is derivative from (2), This means that (2) refers to a relatively more original truth than (1). After characterizing these two layers of truth, we return now back to the allegory of the cave to finish our analysis of the relation between unconcealedness and pre-formation. It seems that we come closer to the essence of the truth as correctness and correspondence to the extent we try to understand the essence of the truth as

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

unconcealedness. This understanding reveals to us first of all that the being-directed-towards (*das Gerichtetsein*) of unconcealedness presupposes the original moment of this directing (*Sich Richten*) of the brightness of the sun to the darkness of the cave. The former is an ontological (not ontical and chronological in the sense of sequentiality in time) consequence of the latter. That is why the latter is more original (*ursprünglich*) than the former. Second, correspondence happens only because of the being-already-directedness of the unconcealedness. After a being is given a certain form, we tend to make its form into a metaphysically obstinant presence in the way of a continuous direction, which tends to resist changes: the original direction turns into a “being-already-directedness” and gains power over that being in our experience of it. The truth as correspondence presupposes the pre-giveness of direction already, and the propositions, beliefs, etc. are “true” in the sense of correspondence to the extent they correspond to these directions which are already given. These directions are the ways of Being; ways of being seen (*ousia, idea*) of the beings. What makes correspondence work in a regular and non-arbitrary way is that these ways are always and already formed, namely, pre-formed (*vor-gebildet*) and function according to/under the rule of paradigms (*Vor-bilder*), or put more precisely, under *the regime of ontoparadigms*. These ways are the ways, in which man sees beings. These ways of Being-already-opened presuppose an original directing-itself-upon, which solidify as persistent ways of being, so that propositions, beliefs, “subjective” states of the “subject” can correspond to them. Although we use assertions, propositions in order to uncover beings in the world, since we submit ourselves to the solidified ways of understanding beings and their Being, which we take over from tradition, propositions gain independence,

through which they seem to uncover the world by themselves. We forget the fact that they uncover beings only because there is an intentional network behind their seemingly independent uncovering, which is grounded in our understanding of Being. The verb “*Vor-bilden*” is then made into the noun “*Vor-bild*” just as the verb “*Sein*” is made into a “*Seiend*”. Therefore, the opening up of the new ways of Being does not happen easily; these new ways must fight against the old, persistent, conservative ways of Being, which originate from traditions, social norms based on the mode of *das Man*.

The Onto-constitution of Ontoparadigms as Unconcealment

Our analysis of the equiprimordial nature of *Ent-bergen* and *Vor-bilden* has shown us that truth as unconcealing happens as a pre-formation. In our destruction of the concept of construction, and reducing it to the concept of constitution, we have made the crucial distinction between the enabling of phenomena as possibilities before they appear to us as actual, natural phenomena in our experience of nature. We related this enabling, this making possible to Kant’s conception of a priori synthesis and called this enabling “constitution”. Clearly, the enabling of natural phenomena as possibilities without necessarily their being actual, is nothing but a pre-forming of them; they are given a certain form, but this giving is a pre-forming because they lack actuality at this level of their constitution. This means that constitution determines phenomena in terms of their ontological possibilities rather than it relates to them as actual, finished products we experience. That is why constitution is a pre-forming. This pre-forming is at the same time a “bringing into Being of a being for the first time, originally”: natural phenomena

gain their form, their *eidos*, namely their visibility as a potentiality even though this potentiality is yet not actualized. They are made into possible beings of sight; ready to be uncovered, experienced, when an actual sight encounters them as possibilities. In other words, natural phenomena are made ready to be met; their “gates” are opened to the possibility of being penetrated by our eyes, which means that they are “unconcealed” now by having gained their form. This could also be formulated as gaining a certain “approachability/counterability from certain angles. This relates to the howness of their Being rather than to the thatness of it. The “that-Being”, namely, their presence/actuality is missing at this transcendental level of possibilities. Constitution is in this context nothing but the most original penetration of the *Erblicken* (original-looking) of the ideas, just like the sunshine penetrates into the darkness of the cave, in order to “objectify” from this darkness beings. Just as a sculptor carves beings out of a stone, ideas carve beings out of darkness while penetrating it. Onto-constitution can be thought in this context as this “carving” of phenomena in terms of their possibilities. *Accordingly, constitution is an unconcealing, which pre-forms (vor-bildet) according to an ontoparadigm (Vor-bild).*

The Meaning and Etymology of the Concept of

Ontoparadigm and Truth as Unconcealment.

Ontoparadigm as Self-Unconcealedness

It is crucial to our project that we are clear about the key concept of this dissertation and see its essential connection to the concept of truth as unconcealedness. In German, this connection is seen directly through paying sufficient attention to the words themselves

at stake: one way of translating *paradeigma* into German is to translate it as “Vorbild”. In the translation of Plato’s dialogues, we encounter the word *paradeigma* often as “Vorbild” in German. Vorbild means in German something like a model, a prototype; it might be an entity, or a person who is taken as a model. On the other hand, as we will see, Heidegger characterizes the basic achievement of ideas as “*vor-bilden*”, which is the verb form of the noun “Vorbild”, even though he does not thematize and work out this concept as a basic concept. We can consider this verb just as the verb form of “paradigm”. In German, we could say “Ein Vorbild bildet vor”. The exact English translation of this would be: “A paradigm paradigms” if there would be the verb “to paradigm” in English. Moreover, as we already pointed out, *idea* stems from *idein*, which is “seeing”, and *idea* means “that which is seen”. This is exactly the same meaning of the German “Bild”, given the wide use of this word in philosophy. For example, Kant uses the term “*einbilden*” to refer to the basic achievement of the faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*).

The concept of uncoveredness announces itself already in the concept of paradigm and their essential connection waits for our attention to be brought to light. As known, paradigm stems from Greek *παράδειγμα* meaning “pattern, example, sample”. The verb form *παραδείκνυμι* (*paradeiknumi*) means “to exhibit, to expose”. This verb consists of two parts: “*πάρᾱ*” (*para*), “beside, at” and “*δείκνυμι*” (*deiknumi*), “to show, to point out”. Hence, *para-deigma* refers to a being, whose being-shown happens “at” or “by” the very act of showing itself such that the distance and *mediation* between that which shows and that which is shown disappears. We can compare it to a similar Ancient Greek word “*paraousia*”. *Ousia* means essence and *para-ousia* means the essence of an

entity, which is “at” the very appearance of the entity itself: the distance and mediation between *essentia* and *existentia* disappears and the two collide with one another: we call this collision the “pre-sence” of something temporally – and also spatially if it is a physical entity- and in the present time. Something is present in the mode of *paraousia* if its appearance is *at* its essence (*an-wesend* in German), and this is actually what “*Aletheia*” means: The uncoveredness of a being is its *presence*, in which its *essentia* and its *existentia* meet one another and turn into a unity (logos). This unity of essence and existence gives rise to a being, which is not merely an appearance [*Schein*], but a phenomenon [*Er-scheinung*]. This unification of the essence and the existence is the *happening of truth*, in which the being shows itself from its unconcealedness.

Now if we return to our concept *paradeigma*: normally there is a distance and mediation between a signifier and a signified. For example, you are looking for a room in a building and you follow the signs to reach the signified room, you find yourself in a *detour*. There is a way, a distance, a mediation between that which shows (signs) and that which is shown (room). A *paradeigma*, on the other hand, is a kind of sign, which signifies *itself* and nothing else because what it shows is already “at” itself: the *paradeigma* is both the signifier and the signified, which means that it is *self-referential*. Signifying is a showing; a letting see, namely, it is a way of unconcealing. It follows that a paradigm is both the unconcealing and the unconcealed. *Therefore, we call the essence of the phenomon of paradigm “self-unconcealing”*.

These remarks show us that the concept of unconcealedness announces itself in the concept of paradigm: the essence of paradigm is its self-unconcealing character. A paradigm is a model; as a proto-type: it is so perfect that it does not need to refer to

anything other than itself. It is an example, which is exemplified by itself; it is *self-exemplifying*. We can say, then, that a paradigm is a way of unconcealing, namely a way of happening of truth, in which the *mediation* between the negation of the unconcealing and the position of the unconcealed is covered and lost.

An Answer to a Possible Objection to the Concept of Ontoparadigm and
A Defense of Heidegger's Interpretation of *Aletheia* against Its Critiques

We have based our phenomenological construction of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm on the basis of Heidegger's interpretation of *Aletheia* as unconcealment. Therefore, our conception of ontoparadigm can be seen as vulnerable to the critiques directed at Heidegger's interpretation of *Aletheia*. We pointed out that Heidegger translates the ancient Greek word *Aletheia*, as *Unverborgenheit* [unconcealedness]. In paragraph 44 of *SuZ*, he analyzes the word etymologically by interpreting it as a negation of *lethe* [concealedness] and conceives the "a" in the word as the Alpha Privativum.¹²⁷ Later, Heidegger repeats his interpretation that *A-letheia* is a negation of *lethe* throughout the whole course of his thinking in many of his basic works; for example in *Wegmarken*¹²⁸; *Vorträge und Aufsätze*,¹²⁹ in *Parmenides*,¹³⁰ as well as in his lecture on Plato.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Heidegger, *SuZ*, p. 219, p. 222, p. 223.

¹²⁸ See Heidegger, Martin, *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 299.

¹²⁹ See Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009), p. 21, 36 ff, 332.

¹³⁰ See Heidegger, Martin. *Parmenides*, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), p. 16.

¹³¹ See Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), pp. 203-239.

Accordingly, truth is something to be “wrestled away [entrissen] and robbed [geraubt] from concealedness” [PLW, 32].¹³² In his lecture “*Aletheia*”, in which Heidegger problematizes Heraclitus’s fragment, he also connects lethe with *lanthano* and *elathon* and interprets *lanthanein* as “concealedness” [*Verborgensein/Verborgenbleiben*]. *Lanthanein* is related mostly to knowledge and translated traditionally in an epistemic sense. To mention some important scholars; Capelle, for example, translates it as “knowing almost nothing” [ebensowenig wissen]¹³³ while Mansfeld translates it as “to escape” [entgehen]¹³⁴. Diels prefers to translate it as “remaining unconscious” [unbewusst bleiben].¹³⁵

It is certainly a philosophically important question how far Heidegger’s interpretation of *Aletheia* in Plato’s philosophy as well as in ancient Greek philosophy in general is sound. However, a detailed inquiry into this question would exceed the limits of this dissertation. This would require an independent and serious study of Plato’s dialogues and the history and meaning of *Aletheia* in Presocratics. But even though we won’t be able to get into a detailed discussion, we can point to some reasons why we see Heidegger’s interpretation to be taken as a sound ground to work out the concept of ontoparadigm.

One problem pointed out in literature is based upon the linguistic fact that statements concerning *Aletheia* are used in Ancient Greek mostly as *verba discendi*;

¹³² As we have seen in the previous chapter, this challenging characteristic of truth as a “wrestling away” is also emphasized in the Freiburg lecture. See Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, p. 91 and p. 125.

¹³³ Wilhelm. Capelle, *Die Vorsokratiker* (Stuttgart: Kröner), p. 136

¹³⁴ Jaap Mansfeld, *Die Vorsokratiker I* (Stuttgart: Reclam), p. 245.

¹³⁵ Herrmann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Hamburg: Rowohlt’s Klassiker, 1957), p. 23.

namely as “verbs of speech”, or at least, *Aletheia* is related either directly or indirectly to a declaration, a statement of confession about a fact, or a situation. In the texts from Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, Solon we encounter a lot of such examples. This seems to suggest that *Aletheia* in these Presocratic texts and everyday life was used in the sense of “being loyal to what happened”; “confessing something exactly the way it happened”. This fact is taken as a reason to criticize Heidegger. Accordingly, *Aletheia* is used in the sense of “correspondence” rather than “unconcealedness” in the Pre-Socratic dialogues. One of the most powerful critiques which argues along this line, comes from one of Heidegger’s students, Paul Friedländer, who claims that there is no sufficient etymological evidence to conclude that *Aletheia* was used etymologically as *A-letheia* by Ancient Greeks; as a negation of *lethe*. In order to support his point, Friedländer points to other Greek words used frequently as antonyms to *Aletheia*. *Pseudos* and *Apate* are such two examples which play the counter-part to *Aletheia* in these texts. According to Friedländer, if *Aletheia* were really felt and experienced as a negation of *lethe* or *lanthanei* in the Ancient Greek culture, then it would be opposed to them, when antonyms were needed. However, as Friedländer give some examples as antonyms to *Aletheia*, words which mean “falsity” or “fakeness” are used rather than “concealment”.¹³⁶ This seems to be also an explanation, why *Aletheia* appears mostly in relation to *verba dicendi*; as statements of frankness and correctness. Friedländer gives one more reason to criticize Heidegger’s interpretation by referring to the word “*an-aletheia*”; a word which is used as a negation of *Aletheia*. He proclaims that normally a

¹³⁶ Paul Friedländer, *Platon I* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1954, 1964), p. 234.

negation is not negated a second time, and this is an indication that *Aletheia* is used simply as a positive term, without being thought as a negation of *lethe*.¹³⁷

As a response to his critiques in his later work, Heidegger took this problem into consideration and made a change in his position. In most of these critiques, unfortunately, only the following sentences are used isolatedly without taking the larger context into consideration:

It is pointed out more frequently and legitimately that by Homer the word *Aletheia* was used always and already by *verba dicendi*, by propositions, and therefore, in the sense of correctness and reliability, and not in the sense of unconcealedness.

But we should read this and the following paragraphs together in detail to make sense of what Heidegger really means in this paragraph:

This consideration, however, means only that neither the poets, nor the everyday use of language; not even philosophy have assigned themselves the task of asking how far truth, namely the correctness of the proposition remains given only in the element of the enlightening of presence. In the context of this question, we have to accept that *Aletheia*, the unconcealedness in the sense of enlightening of presence was experienced at the same time, and only as *orthotes*, as the correctness of representation and proposing. But then, the claim about an essence-transformation of truth, namely a transformation from unconcealedness to correctness is untenable. Instead of that, we have to say: *Aletheia* as the enlightening of presence and presencing in thinking and saying ends up at the same time in terms of *homoiosis* and *adaequatio*, in other words, in terms of the adjustment in the sense of correspondence between representation and the presencing. Alone this procedure demands the question: what is it up to that for human being's natural experience and saying, *Aletheia*, the unconcealedness appears [*erscheint*] only as correctness and reliability? Is it because that the ecstatic dwelling of man in the openness of presencing is directed [*zugekehrt*] only towards that which is present and the present-at-hand presencing of the present? But what does this mean other than that the presence as such and along with it, the enlightening which bestows the

¹³⁷ Ibid. p. 235

presence as such, remains unattended? What is experienced and thought is only that which *Aletheia* as enlightening bestows; not what it is as such.¹³⁸

What is the change here in Heidegger's interpretation of *Aletheia*? These sentences show us that Heidegger does not hold the "historical" claim anymore about *Aletheia*: he accepts that his previous historical claim that *Aletheia was experienced exclusively as unconcealment* in opposition to correctness is untenable, and seems to give it up. Accordingly, the experience of truth as correctness does not begin necessarily with Plato; it is rather available even by the Presocratics. Therefore, Heidegger also seems to give up the claim about the transformation of the essence of truth from unconcealedness to correctness he developed in his Plato lecture from 1931: if truth as *Aletheia* has been experienced always and already as correctness from the beginning on, then the claim about transformation does not make any sense anymore. However, even though Heidegger gives up the "historical" aspect of his interpretation of *Aletheia*, he sticks to the "philosophical" aspect of it by preserving the idea that the essence of *Aletheia* is not correctness even though it was experienced so even by the Pre-socratics; it is rather still

¹³⁸ "Man weist öfter und mit Recht darauf hin, dass schon bei Homer das Wort *alethes* immer nur von den *verba dicendi*, von Aussagen und deshalb im Sinne der Richtigkeit und Verlässlichkeit gebraucht werde, nicht im Sinne von Unverborgenheit" Allein dieser Hinweis bedeutet zunächst nur, daß weder die Dichter noch der alltägliche Sprachgebrauch, daß nicht einmal die Philosophie sich vor die Aufgabe gestellt sehen zu fragen, inwiefern die Wahrheit, d.h. die Richtigkeit der Aussage nur im Element der Lichtung von Anwesenheit gewährt bleibt. Im Gesichtskreis dieser Frage muß anerkannt werden, daß die *Aletheia*, die Unverborgenheit im Sinne der Lichtung von Anwesenheit sogleich und nur als *orthotes*, als die Richtigkeit des Vorstellens und Aussagens erfahren wurde. Dann ist aber auch die Behauptung von einem Wesenswandel der Wahrheit, d.h. von der Unverborgenheit zur Richtigkeit, nicht haltbar. Statt dessen ist zu sagen: Die *Aletheia*, als Lichtung von Anwesenheit und Gegenwärtigung im Denken und Sagen, gelangt sogleich in den Hinblick auf *homoiosis* und *adaequatio*, d.h. in den Hinblick auf Angleichung im Sinne der Übereinstimmung von Vorstellen und Anwesendem. Allein dieser Vorgang fordert gerade die Frage heraus: Woran liegt es, daß für das natürliche Erfahren und Sagen des Menschen die *Aletheia*, die Unverborgenheit, nur als Richtigkeit und Verlässlichkeit erscheint? Liegt es daran, daß der ekstatische Aufenthalt des Menschen in der Offenheit des Anwesens nur dem Anwesenden und der vorhandenen Gegenwärtigung des Anwesenden zugekehrt ist? Was bedeutet aber dies anderes, als daß die Anwesenheit als solche und mit ihr erst recht die sie gewährende Lichtung unbeachtet bleiben? Erfahren und gedacht wird nur, was die *Aletheia* als Lichtung gewährt, nicht was sie als solche ist." (Zur Sache des Denkens), pp. 77-78.

unconcealedness in the form of enlightening, which gives itself in the form of correctness. As can be seen, the difference in the position between the early Heidegger and the late Heidegger is the following: according to the Heidegger of the Plato lecture, the essence of truth as unconcealedness was experienced by the Presocratics as unconcealedness in a transparent way: they were experiencing *Aletheia* as unconcealedness, but not as correctness. According to the Heidegger of the *Zur Sache des Denkens*, however, the Presocratics were experiencing *Aletheia* both as unconcealedness and as correctness, but they were aware only of the “correctness” aspect of this experience while the unconcealedness aspect remained hidden even to them.

This modification in Heidegger’s position does not lead necessarily to a philosophical problem. It might be seen rather as the acceptance of an “empirical” or “historical” mistake, which does not affect the philosophical arguments in favour of interpreting *Aletheia* as unconcealedness. One could maintain here that the serious problem would be the seeming contradiction in his claim that truth is experienced both as unconcealedness and as correctness at the same time. How is this possible? Do such two experiences not exclude one another? It should be noted that if Heidegger should have a problem with this seeming contradiction, then this problem appears already and independently from his interpretation of the Presocratics; as a general problem with his interpretation of Western philosophy as being based upon the Platonic metaphysics, which favours correctness by forgetting Being and its truth as unconcealedness. If truth is unconcealment and if a considerable number of people understand and experience truth in our age mostly as correspondence, then how can truth be both unconcealedness

and be still experienced as correctness? How is truth unconcealedness *despite* the fact that modern (or postmodern) people understand truth as correspondance? The “despite” in our sentence points to a “resistance” of truth to be exhausted by the experience of men as correspondence. Truth remains as unconcealedness; it resists being reduced to correctness despite all of the forgottenness of Being: *Being and its truth cannot be forgotten despite the fact that they are forgotten so much*. One traditional way to explain this resistance is to hold a realist position and explain this resistance away by claiming that there is something “real” out there about truth, which makes truth basically unconcealedness and this “reality” resists the experience of men. However, Heidegger is not a realist in this sense and does not tell us that truth is unconcealedness independently from the experience of people of it. Truth “is” not unconcealedness as a “truth out there” and it does not possess its essence as unconcealedness independently of the people who experience it. But does this “unrealist” assumption not suggest that the experience of truth “as” correctness should lead us to the conclusion that truth “is” correctness? Here is a possible solution to this puzzle: for Heidegger, an experience or a certain interpretation is not a subjective act or state remaining within the realm of an inter-subjectivity; they are rather always and already reified within a network of a concrete world; they are always and already “out there” in the world, circulating, surrounding and structuring our world. That is why he rejects the use of traditional metaphysical categories such as “subject” and “object” as well as the “duality between subject and object”, and employs instead “Da-sein”. Now, Heidegger’s persistent conviction throughout his whole path of thinking is that the understanding of Being in terms of its truth as unconcealment is such a primordial and original one, that although

truth as correctness was derived out of the original one and suppressed its own origin, the original understanding is still there in the background, and the derivative and the original “co-exist” in Dasein, while the derivative is continuously “enabled” through this more original one, while suppressing its origin. The source, the origin, which enables that which is derived, is covered by the derivative, and man is “estranged” from this origin. So, the reason why truth as unconcealedness resists the understanding of truth as correctness is not that it is real and independent of man, but rather that it is the source, the a priori condition of possibility, out of which the latter arises and continues to be. Truth as correspondence can only suppress and cover truth as unconcealment, but it cannot “replace” it completely, for this would mean that something replaces its own condition of possibility. If such a replacement would be possible, then this would mean a destruction of the derivative as well.

As can be seen, we can interpret the “despite” in our sentence by applying the idea that one understanding is so a priori and so much at the ground of everything else, that this ground cannot be removed by a derivative of it; the former is necessarily operative whenever the latter tries to reach and destroy this ground. At the moment where the latter suppresses the former, the former is already operative in this suppression; even the suppression itself is always and already an act of the truth as unconcealedness. *This means that truth as unconcealedness is self-suppressive in the final analysis; it is self-reflective. It leaves; negates itself by putting a difference. Interestingly, we can see a parallel between this modification in Heidegger’s historical view with respect to truth as *Aletheia* and the modification of his views concerning truth in general through *Kehre*¹³⁹:*

¹³⁹ *Kehre* means “turn” in English. This demarks a transition from early Heidegger to late Heidegger. It is a change in Heidegger’s way of formulating the question of Being, beginning from the beginnings of the

the concealing character of Being is attached directly and even more essentially to *Aletheia*: concealment is thought to be the most essential way of happening of truth. This seemingly contradictory characterization of truth as untruth, at the same time, seems to be a justification for the view that the experience of truth as correctness, which is untruth to a certain degree, already includes and presupposes the experience of truth as unconcealedness, which is the genuine truth: untruth and truth “co-exist” in man’s understanding.

It should be noted that especially towards the end of the 20th century, Heidegger’s interpretation of *Aletheia* has found a considerable support among important etymologists and in a number of dictionaries in comparison to the previous years. *Hesychii Lexicon*, the dictionaries from Erwin Metzke, Pierre Chantraine, and de Vries, and *Etymologicum magnum genuinum* are the well-known examples to mention. As one of the most relentless critics of Heidegger, even Paul Friedländer, implies that we can find actually also an independent support for Heidegger’s etymological interpretation in Sextus Empiricus’s fragments, while accusing Sextus Empiricus for being “too subjective”¹⁴⁰. Sextus Empiricus says, “truth let itself be derived from concealedness” (*to me lethon*)¹⁴¹. Referring to this statement, Karl Bohmann suggests that the *Alpha*

1930’s, in which Heidegger thinks Being not from an explicit Dasein-guided phenomenology, but rather in a way, which considers Being more independently and contrasts to beings and Dasein.

¹⁴⁰ Friedländer, Paul. *Platon II* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1930, 1957), p. 90

¹⁴¹ Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, VIII. Kapitäl 8. For English translation, see *Sextus Empiricus II: Against the Logicians*. R.G. Bury (trans.) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935/1997).

Privativum interpretation of *A-letheia* is not an arbitrary invention of Heidegger at all; Sextus Empiricus' text is good evidence for the validity of this interpretation.¹⁴²

The etymology of *Aletheia* is discussed in detail in one of Plato's dialogues, *Cratylus*, where the etymology is said to be *Ale-theia*. Otto Apel translates this word as "godly extravagance" (göttliches Herumstreifen) whereas Friedländer translates it as "godly burble (göttliche Wirbel). The classical and respected translator of Plato's dialogues, Schleiermacher, on the other hand calls it "hilarious Bestowing" [heitere Währung], which is godly. *Aletheia* is also written sometimes by Homer and Hesiod as *ale-thea*. We find in all of these texts the idea that truth is something which a human being can hardly bear; it is so powerful and violent that it is seen as a kind of overwhelming and destructive insanity, which is holy, at the same time.

This textual evidence points to the fact that the etymology of *Ale-theia* and *A-letheia* are not exclusive and contradictory; these two different ways of using the word points rather to the richness of the meaning of this term. We have indicated that the linguistic fact that *Aletheia* is related mostly to *verba dicendi* is used to reject the meaning of it as unconcealedness. However, we could –and actually we must– use this fact as a reason to support the opposite; namely the interpretation of truth as unconcealedness. In all of the textual examples from the Pre-socratic period, when the person questioned is expected to tell the truth, truth appears in two ways: it is either an adverb or an adjective, which characterize a verb or a noun, as is the case with "talking truly" or "true statement". In this use of truth, it appears as a characterization of statements or beliefs, etc. So, it is used in these examples in the sense of the correctness of sentences, propositions. But it is also used not less frequently in the noun form, when,

¹⁴² Bormann, Karl. *Platon* (Freiburg, München: Karl Alber, 1973) p. 54.

for example, one says: “tell me the truth!” When one demands from someone else the truth, then according to these critiques, this person should mean by “truth” the “correspondence” between the proposition to be made and “that which happened” expressed by this proposition. However, obviously one does not mean by “truth” this correspondence relationship; nor does he want to talk about truth as a characteristic of propositions, statements, etc. When we say “tell me the truth” then we do not mean “tell me the proposition, which corresponds to what happened”; we mean rather the very event, which *matters* to us. From the mere linguistic fact that *Aletheia* is used in the context of *verba dicendi*, it does not follow necessarily that truth is correspondence.

We should ask further the question: why does a person not prefer the word “the event itself” and instead the word truth (*Aletheia*) to refer to that event? The reason is simply that he does not only want to be told about the event itself in general; he rather wants to be told about the event itself *as it shows itself to him* from a certain point of view; namely, in a way, in which it happened, which matters to him. This expression “as it is” might sound trivial at first sight, but in this expression, the whole reason lies why we use the word “truth” so intuitively and frequently to refer to things, events in our world, instead of using simply phrases like “the event” or “that which happened” most of the time. One example could help us further:

Suppose that I discover accidentally that my girlfriend has met her ex-boyfriend, and that she has hidden this from me. This makes me suspicious of the possibility that she has cheated on me. And when I ask her about the details of this meeting, I utter the sentence: “Tell me the truth!” And she answers: “Well, I just met him, you know.”

Actually she simply tells me what happened, and it is “correct”: the event at stake is really a meeting. But this meeting itself is not a truth in virtue of its being a meeting for me; that is why I cannot be satisfied with her answer. I am rather interested in the specific way in which this event has taken place, and this still lies in darkness. *This way is concealed to me.* The meeting is the event, namely, that which happened, but I am interested rather in the way of its Being: was it a meeting which was a cheating, or not? Did this meeting as an event unconceal itself as a cheating? So, my question here concerns the way in which the event of meeting “shows itself”. What matters to me in this example is not a sentence and whether it corresponds to a fact; it is rather the event itself, which shows itself to me from a certain angle, which is a way of its Being. And the event comes into the light only from and on this way; it reaches my question as an answer only from that angle with respect to the tension between truth and untruth. Unconcealment happens not in a free-floating manner; it has rather an intentional structure imposing a certain direction, and we call this direction its “way” to be (*Seinsweise*). Why do we have to use the term “unconcealment” rather than “correspondence” here? Because *“correspondence” of a sentence does not specify the dimension of an event, towards which our questioning intentionally directs itself*; it refers to that event without making a distinction between the event as such and the event as it shows itself from a certain angle, which is opened up by our questioning. In our example, the condition of correspondence is satisfied, and the sentence is correct, but still not “true” in the demanded way, which intends a certain dimension of the event. The intention of the questioner wants to penetrate into the event of meeting and unconceal there something, which remains concealed at the beginning. So, in contrast to

the use of “correspondence”, if we use the term “unconcealment” for truth, then in this word “un-concealment”, the event is brought to a horizon, in which it is problematized in terms of the particular dimension questioned and intended: the event is a meeting, and this is an unconcealedness of the event, but its being a meeting is still a concealment in a more specific sense, it has its dark side: whether this meeting was also a cheating, or not, lies still in darkness. And the questioner here is interested in this “concealedness” of the event in order to negate it and penetrate into its details by overcoming this darkness. That is why I do not stop with the mere “correct information” about the factuality of this meeting and ask further: “Tell me the truth!”

Our example shows us that truth is here not a mere correspondence to a fact; it is rather something which resists at the beginning an intentionality of uncovering, and this resistance, this persistence to stay in darkness, this tension of the “between” of the light and the darkness makes it into truth. “Tell me the truth” means “expand the area of unconcealedness towards me and let me join in it”. Because of these reasons, the truth in the sentence “tell me the truth”, can be expressed much better by the concept of unconcealedness, than by the concept of correspondence. Without having an intentionality directed towards the aspect questioned, the mere propositions do not go and find facts by themselves. Truth appears only there, where facts matter to us from certain angles, certain ways of Being, and without such a mattering, they also do not become an object of truth or falsity.

We have dealt with the problem concerning the “verba dicendi” status of truth statements, but there are some sentences in this text from Heidegger which seem to

suggest that Heidegger gives up his conviction that truth is *Aletheia*, which he held insistently throughout his whole life:

In any case, one thing is clear: the question concerning *Aletheia*, unconcealedness as such, is not the question concerning truth. Therefore, it was not appropriate and consequently misleading, to call the *Aletheia* in the sense of enlightening (Lichtung) truth.¹⁴³

But this seeming “giving up” the idea that truth is *Aletheia* is not the case, if we realize that in this text, in the previous page, Heidegger uses the term “truth” already in the traditional sense of *Veritas*, and tells us that *Aletheia* cannot be identified with truth if truth is thought as correspondence:

To the extent truth is understood in the traditional “natural” sense as the correspondence of knowledge (Erkenntnis)¹⁴⁴ with beings, as designated at beings, but also, to the extent truth is interpreted as certainty of knowing of Being, one is not allowed to identify truth with *Aletheia*, unconcealedness in the sense of enlightening. It is rather that the *Aletheia*, the unconcealedness, which is thought as enlightening, which bestows the possibility of truth¹⁴⁵

From this sentence on, for four paragraphs, Heidegger uses the term “truth” in this sense of the “natural”, “traditional” conception of truth and contrasts it to *Aletheia* without specifying that it is truth as correspondence anymore. He employs the term “truth” as if he means truth in general, and this gives the impression that he gives up totally to identify truth with *Aletheia*. However, he does not give up his old philosophical interpretation; he simply points to the fact that if one insists on restricting truth to correspondence, then we cannot claim the identity of truth and *Aletheia*. This can be

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁴⁴ Here, Heidegger uses the concept of knowledge in a problematic way, which leads to a circularity: Knowledge already includes truth, and Heidegger characterizes here truth as the correspondence of knowledge with beings.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 76.

seen as a trial to disclose in a challenging way, why his critics mostly criticize him unjustifiedly for equating *Aletheia* with truth.

CHAPTER 4
ONTOPARADIGMS AND SOCIALITY
AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM:
THE SOCIO-CONSTITUTION OF NATURE AND
SCIENTIFIC THEORIES BY ONTOPARADIGMS

Introduction

In this chapter, we will develop our conception of ontoparadigm further by relating it to the phenomenon of sociality and show how ontoparadigms appear in social context. In this way, we will be able to answer the question we asked in the second chapter: how does socio-constitution relate to natural phenomena ontologically? During this inquiry, we will use the phrase of “onto-constitution of phenomena” in two senses, without specifying their difference, if not necessary: (1) Natural phenomena can be constituted as part of a scientific theories, through the content of them, or (2) natural phenomena can be constituted as part of non-scientific ontical regions belonging to everyday life, or other cultural contexts like that of religion, arts, etc. Onto-constitution can happen in a social structure as a socially framed act, but also without it: it does not require necessarily a social institution and can occur also in an authentic, original understanding of an individual, for the first time, who experiences truth as unconcealment in an original way.¹⁴⁶ To such a person, nature shows itself from a fresh perspective in its

¹⁴⁶ By the absence of socio-constitution, we do not mean here the absence of the minimum social requirements like having a language. A person who constitutes a phenomenon ontologically in the absence of a socio-constitution performs already a “social constitution” in this minimalist sense. In contrast to this minimalist sense, socio-constitution is used here rather in the sense of an act having a

origin-al shining, which means an original onto-constitution. Note that we do not attach to the terms “natural phenomenon”, “natural fact” a specific, “technical” sense and use them interchangeably as objects of onto-constitution and socio-constitution in general.

One philosopher who made the concept of paradigm into a basic concept in his works, is Thomas Kuhn, who defines a scientific paradigm as “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers” whose characteristics are (1) “sufficiently *unprecedented* to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity” and (2) “sufficiently *open-ended* to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners (and their students) to resolve, i. e., research”.¹⁴⁷

In his definition, Kuhn identifies paradigms with “achievements”, which means that for Kuhn, paradigm is not distinguished from social practice categorically. Kuhn does not problematize the concept of paradigm itself philosophically in terms of its meaning, he rather seems to presuppose its clarity, and applies it to a region of beings, which is science. In this picture, paradigm is one among many other social phenomena and it is thought as a being among others. In our account, on the other hand, we inquire into the meaning of the phenomenon of paradigm and distinguish it meticulously as an ontological structure from social practice, which cannot be identified with something like “achievement”. Despite this essential difference, however, it might be helpful to establish some parallels between Kuhn’s concept of paradigm and ours: whereas

normative social structure relating to the onto-constitution of a phenomenon. This social structure can be an institution like the Christian church in the Galileo affair, for example. We will clarify this non-minimalist sense of socio-constitution in detail in section 4.4.

¹⁴⁷ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1st. Ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1962), p. 10.

scientific paradigms include practices of scientists, as well as theoretical dimensions like propositions, which express the meanings of scientific terms and relations between certain technical concepts like mass, velocity, acceleration, etc., ontoparadigms are concerned with *the more basic and formal structure of all beings and their relations in general*. They express the highest formal structures of Being and the most general phenomenal regions of it. These formal relations are mostly not expressed by the technical language of science, but implicitly presupposed. On the theoretical side, ontoparadigms consist of a huge set of ontological propositions, which are connected to each other. On the practical side, ontoparadigms are embedded in social practice and function as pre-theoretical structures guiding everyday practice.

Kuhn's "scientific paradigm" can also be seen as a *subspecies* of ontoparadigm, which is the paradigm of the *metaphysics of the scientific interpretation of nature*. Whereas an ontoparadigm constitutes the most general framework of *language* which is not necessarily expressed scientifically, a scientific paradigm constitutes the framework of *scientific* language. An ontoparadigm concerns the structure of the larger context of beings expressed by language in general, which includes, but also transcends *scientific* reality expressed by scientific language. Ontoparadigms can construct nature, sociality, or both of them at the same time, depending on the level of its generality. And every ontoparadigm involves more specific sub-paradigms, depending on the specific regions of beings, at which these sub-paradigms are directed. An ontoparadigm involves the conditions by which something is called "nature", "sociality", or "scientific theory" whereas a scientific paradigm deals with the conditions of what counts as "good science."

As we pointed out, ontoparadigms can appear as structures concerning theoretical expression of phenomena, or they can appear as structures concerning practice in everyday life. Let's focus now on a petit example of an ontoparadigm, which concerns the framework of the theoretical expression of nature:

The universe consists of two substances: mind and matter. These substances have nothing in common. The basic characteristic of mind is that it is "thinking" whereas the basic characteristic of matter is that it is "extended." All other characteristics of objects, which seem not to belong to the category of extension, can actually be reduced to extension. Matter is completely calculable in terms of the quantity of its extension; it is expressible in a purely mathematical language.

One assumption we hold in this work is that there is an ontologically *interpretative mediation* between us and reality. In other words, we are not in an *immediate* touch with brute facts of natural reality; we live rather always in an –or more than just one- ontoparadigm, which *tends* to shape our *approach* to nature and imposes certain ontological norms about how to produce a picture of nature. The so called "brute facts" are always and already framed by one, or more than one ontoparadigm. As a result, natural phenomena, which are given to us either *via* everyday sensory experience, or *via* scientific theories, are always and already ontologically framed. Scientific theories are based on ontological presuppositions either explicitly or implicitly, and these presuppositions constitute their *form*, which is *ontological*. These ontological presuppositions are the embodied form of an ontoparadigm in natural phenomena as well as a scientific theory. This body of ontological presuppositions tells us "what it *means* to be natural." In other words, an ontoparadigm concerning nature

can be considered as a discourse, which narrates to us the Being of nature. Since this set of propositions presents a *model of nature*, which is expected to be used by modern scientists as a *basis* for their theories, they can be said to constitute the content of an “ontoparadigm.”

By presenting a model of nature, an ontoparadigm functions as a *normative* system of ontological principles. For example, the modern ontoparadigm includes the proposition that nature is devoid of characteristics like “intention”, “tendency”, “spirituality”, which we can find in the older Aristotelian metaphysics. Accordingly, nature is not a self-moving and organic phenomenon; it is rather passive, mechanical, and devoid of the power to produce motion through its inner dynamics. So, a scientist who lives in this (early) modern ontoparadigm and observes natural phenomena like physical objects and motion, is expected to produce theories which are *in accordance* with the modern ontological assumptions we pointed to above. For example, when he explains the motion of two colliding balls, he *ought to* presuppose that these balls lack any sort of inner, spiritual powers, and the first ball, which hits the second one hits it not because it *intends* to hit it, but only because it has a kinetic energy, which it got from some other object, and which caused its motion before. The Aristotelian conception and explanation of motion is excluded, namely, made *ontologically impossible* by the modern ontoparadigm, and the scientist is not allowed to use these kinds of explanations in his theory whereas the second kind of explanation of motion, which makes use of the idea of *mechanical interaction*, is *made possible* by the modern ontoparadigm. In the modern ontoparadigm, the first explanation produces legitimate knowledge whereas the latter produces a speculative, outdated discourse, which cannot be counted as

knowledge in modern scientific discourse. The scientist who still uses the old paradigm is not taken seriously and is excluded from the scientific community sphere, which is actually a “social sanction”. As can be seen, an ontoparadigm has a normative function and power to demarcate science from non-science and decide on what counts as “scientific knowledge.”

At this point, one can realize a similarity between what we mean by “ontoparadigm” and Foucault’s *episteme*:

I would define the *episteme* retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The *episteme* is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific.¹⁴⁸

Despite this seeming closeness between Foucault’s concept of *episteme* and that of our concept of ontoparadigm, Foucault never worked out his conception explicitly from an *ontological* point of view, which draws the borders between sociality, Being and nature so clearly. There is no distinction in Foucault’s account between social and ontological operations. In our view, ontoparadigms deal exclusively with the *ontological* possibilities of entities; which is even prior to the social and political objectification of them as “objects of knowledge” by an *episteme*. Foucault’s interest was much more the *social and political production* of possible objects of science (more specifically, of social sciences), that is, the scientific objectification of beings integrated into social

¹⁴⁸ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, edited by Colin Gordon (London: Harvester, 1980), p. 197

power relations, rather than the prior ontological *enabling* of them in general, which starts the problematization only after they pass the socialization process in society. It is what we call the actualization stage of *socio-constitution*, where science is problematized and becomes visible in “power relations” for the first time in Foucault’s philosophy, not earlier in the prior stage we will call “onto-constitution”.¹⁴⁹ However, from this, it does not follow that onto-constitution is something pre-social or trans-social, which happens in an ideal, isolated sphere, either. As we will see, constitution either as an ontological or social act can happen only in and through the understanding of Being embodied in the actual existence of human beings. The ontological structure of ontoparadigm is dependent on the ontical condition that there is something like an understanding of Being by actual agents, which Heidegger calls *Dasein*.

Onto-constitution as the Basic Act of Ontoparadigms.

The Onto-constitution of Nature and Society

Now we introduce the concept of *onto-constitution*, which characterizes the basic act of ontoparadigms. A constitution is called “onto-constitution” if it is done by an ontoparadigm, which *enables* and *frees* certain ontological possibilities and imposes them upon phenomena as ontological norms. While *enabling* certain possibilities, an onto-constitution also *disables* certain others. The enabling of a set of possibilities is necessarily a disabling of another set, at the same time, which are in *conflict* with those that are enabled. Through enabling, the paradigm *affirms* some possibilities whereas through disabling, it *negates* and *suppresses* some. In this way, an ontoparadigm

¹⁴⁹ We will define and discuss the concept of onto-constitution in contrast to socio-constitution in the following section, 4.2.

produces a *regime* of ontology, namely, a normative ontological discourse, which excludes some sets of possibilities, that is, ways of thinking and talking on phenomena as well as experiencing and practicing them ontologically.

Now, let's connect this twofold enabling-disabling character of ontoparadigms to the concept of truth as unconcealment. The enabling of ontological possibilities by ontoparadigms should be seen as instances of truth as *Aletheia*, in which certain ways of Being are unconcealed and freed by being made into possibilities. However, following the principle from Spinoza and Hegel that every determination is a negation, every instance of truth as unconcealment brings with itself an instance of concealment, which is a disabling and suppressing of certain ways of Being, which are in conflict with the unconcealed ones.

We call this normative enabling and unconcealing of ontological possibilities through ontoparadigms "onto-constitution". All reality, no matter whether it is natural or social, is always and already ontologically constituted by one or more than one ontoparadigm. For example, the Aristotelian ontoparadigm constitutes not only nature from a geocentric point of view, but it also constitutes the non-secular Christian Church as the proper social institution which corresponds to such a conception of nature. This means that the most general ontological principles, which are valid for all beings, are divided into more specific principles for certain regions of being. One of the most general principles of metaphysics is "*ex nihilo nihil fit*". This principle P constitutes not only scientific theories and nature, but also the more specific kinds of being belonging to different ontical regions like that of religion, politics, economics, everyday life, social structures and social institutions: it is a very general principle, which is the form of any

possible thing regardless of whether it is natural or social. But the principle P (1) that “man is a thinking being, who is not determined by the mechanical order of the universe, and who has a free will by which he teleologically determines his own being” is an ontological principle, which constitutes only the more specific region of “sociality” in contrast to nature. In contrast to this, the principle P (2) “everything is caused necessarily by a mechanical cause” is another specific ontological principle, which constitutes the specific region of nature. In comparison to these two specific principles, P is the general *form* of both P(1) and P(2) because P(1) and P(2) already presuppose this more general principle as their own form. In this example, P is a general, unifying ontological principle, which constitutes at the same time two different regions of being; sociality and nature.

The Socio-constitution of Nature vs.
the Onto-constitution of Nature and Society

The constitution of a natural phenomenon is *social* iff it is done by a social structure, through social norms. If a phenomenon is produced by Dasein as Being-with (*Mitsein*), which cannot be reduced to the sum of the activities and states of individual subjects, then it is social. A social phenomenon is produced out of the activities and states of Dasein, and it is ontologically dependent on the existence of Being-with. The difference between onto-constitution and socio-constitution can also be observed ontically/empirically through the negative consequences of their violation: when a scientist violates the rules of an onto-constitution, then he turns out to violate just ontological norms, which does not necessarily lead to social sanctions, whereas, when

he violates the rules of a socio-constitution, then he turns out to violate not only ontological norms, but also social norms, which causes social sanctions.

The Conditional Socio-constitution of our Account vs.
the Absolute Socio-constitution of Social Constructionism

A phenomenon is always and necessarily ontologically constituted. In other words, onto-constitution of phenomena is not a conditional, but an absolute feature of them, in virtue of their being phenomena. Every scientific theory has an ontological framework, which is based on an –or more than one- implicitly or explicitly presupposed ontoparadigm. Ontoparadigms can construct phenomena either directly, or indirectly. If an ontoparadigm is not embodied in social structure and constitutes a theory through its content *internally*, then we call this “direct onto-constitution.” For example, a scientist can introduce a revolutionary scientific theory for the first time, which comes with its own original ontoparadigm that is not available in the social structure before. In this case, the ontoparadigm is alien to society, and it is born within the same time period as the scientific theory itself. Actually, this is probably partly the case with Galileo, who is known as the father of the modern heliocentric system. In the case of Galileo’s theory, the ontoparadigm it is based upon does *not* make *use* of the social, institutional structure for constituting the natural fact that the sun has spots on it; it constitutes the fact only directly through its form that does not subsist in the social sphere directly. It is a *ontological*, but *not social* constitution. This was also the case, when the theory of

relativity showed its first systematical structure to Albert Einstein, before he made it to a public announcement and gained social acceptance. An original ontoparadigm can arise within the realm of science, or other region of beings or methods, or approaches to phenomena, like that of arts, philosophy, social sciences, or religion.

Here, a legitimate question arises: how can a constitution be ontological, but not social? Is it not real human beings, who live in a society, through which something like “onto-constitution” happens? Or does it happen in an ideal, non-temporal sphere like Kant’s pure reason? But we have already abandoned Kant’s a priori, a-historical structures and stated that ontological and social paradigms are open and vulnerable to social and historical determination. This question emerges only because of an ambiguity in the use of the term of “social”. Of course, every onto-constitution presupposes a *socio-constitution* in the trivial sense that Copernicus makes use of a language, a logic, or certain very basic ontological principles, which are for millennia socially constituted, but he also reaches a “new” synthesis, new ontological principles, which cannot be reduced to this material, which is a social heritage he makes use of. When we say that Copernicus’ theory is not socially (but only ontologically) constituted, “socio-constitution” is used here not in this minimalist sense, which tells us nothing more than the trivial fact that every scientist makes use of a social heritage. If we put this in Heidegger’s terminology, in this minimalist sense, every onto-constitution is based upon *das Man* and *das Mitsein* (Being-with), which are constitutive for the understanding of Being by Dasein. But we use socio-constitution not in this minimalist sense, but rather in the sense that there is at least *some normative institution-like structuring*, which dictates certain social norms in order to preserve certain ontological principles. Of

course, it is another crucial question, how we should draw the border to distinguish the point, at which a theory is labeled as “socially constituted”. What is the minimum condition for socio-constitution? Is the common perception/understanding of phenomena of two people sufficient for making a certain way of Being a socio-constitution? Does it necessarily require a formal, wider acceptance in the public? These questions exceed the limits of this study, but this ambiguousness appears only in these middle, grey areas, and in principle, it does not present a threat to our assumption that there is at least a clear difference between an onto-constitution which has a considerable root in a social structure, and a theory, which lacks in this social, normative support. When Einstein came to realize his own theory of relativity, it was not socially constituted at the beginning in this non-minimalist, institutional sense; it took some time, until its implicit ontological ground gained a socially accepted status in the scientific community. In this non-minimalist sense, socio-construction means a “conservation” of an already embodied, paradigmatic way of thinking.

After this clarification of “socio-constitution”, now we can go on with the elaboration on our definitions. Apart from a direct, non-social way, ontoparadigms constitute theories also *indirectly*, that is, *via* social structure, by being supported by social norms. If an ontoparadigm constitutes a natural fact indirectly, through social structure, then we call this an “onto-constitution” in the form of a “socio-constitution.” As can be seen, onto-constitution can happen in two ways: *first*, directly, without using social structures. *Second*, indirectly, by making use of social structures. This means that “indirect onto-constitution” is another name for socio-constitution, and socio-constitution is a *subspecies* of onto-constitution. Such a mediation of ontoparadigms

through social reality renders ontological principles a *social reality*. In this juncture of the social and the ontological, the onto-logical meets the ontical and shows itself through the phenomenon of “the social”.

According to our interpretation of our basic terms, onto-constitution can happen without socio-constitution, whereas socio-constitution happens *always* and *necessarily* via onto-constitution. In a socio-constitution, ontological norms appear as *interwoven* with social norms, and these two sets of norms *co-operate* in the constitution of a theory. Social norms *support* ontological norms of the paradigm, and therefore, a violation of ontological norms automatically leads to a violation of social norms.

We have seen that social constructionists in general hold a brute and absolute conception of social construction, which implausibly denies the partly independent character of nature. To avoid such ontical problems which social constructionists face, one of the basic claims of this dissertation has been that social determination of nature is *possible* only when it is *mediated* through ontoparadigms, but not directly. Therefore, as opposed to “absolute social constitution,” we call our conception “conditional social constitution.” This means that a theory is constituted *socially* only if the social structure embodies an ontoparadigm, which constitutes the content of natural facts, not directly. But this does not rule out the possibility that there are causal interactions between society and nature.

Form and Matter

Our analysis of *Aletheia* has shown us that unconcealing is a pre-forming; giving to something its form, its *eidos*. We have seen in detail how and why onto-constitution should be understood as unconcealment and how the concept of paradigm means a self-unconcealment. Now, we have to problematize the concept of formation again, and this time in relation to materiality, to understand how ontoparadigms function in relation to natural facts, which we understand as a form-matter synthesis. The form/matter distinction characterizes the ontological nature of social reality and the content of facts. Accordingly, natural reality and social reality have an ontological form, which is imposed upon them by the ontoparadigm they belong to. We strip the Aristotelian term “form” from its teleological, intentional function, and attach to it a Pluralistic Kantian sense. The pluralism means here: whereas Kant’s “form” has a universal, necessary and objective character, what we call the “ontological form” is vulnerable to local, contingent, and relative to social and historical conditions. These ontological forms can be de-formed and re-formed. This makes the conception of form a pluralistic one rather than a universalist one. The reason for this is the fact that the origin of ontological forms is ontoparadigms, which are flexible, *deconstructable* and *reconstructable* structures. An ontoparadigm is either synthesized for the *first time* out of the ontological possibilities available to an individual or to a group of people, or it is found already *embodied* in a society. In this context, we use the term “form” as an ontological characteristic of the content of natural and social reality, which is imposed upon them

by a/some ontoparadigm(s). Here, form should be thought simply as that which shapes a material content by structuring, framing it without any *telos*.

Lastly, let us finish this part of the chapter by giving the final definition of “socio-constitution of a phenomenon.”

The Phenomenon X is socially constituted *iff*

- (1) X is *constituted* by ontoparadigm A
- (2) Ontoparadigm A is *embodied* in social reality and its norms are supported by social norms.

Weltbild and Ontoparadigm in the Light of Heidegger’s Conception of Technology and Science

As we pointed out earlier, a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s relation to science and technology exceeds the limits of this study, however, this is not an obstacle to our pointing to the ground of the concept of ontoparadigm in his critique of technology and science. Heidegger uses a concept which seems to be very close to what we mean by “ontoparadigm”: this concept is *Weltbild* (world-picture), which we encounter in his essay “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”.¹⁵⁰ Before focusing on his concept, and sorting out to what degree it is close to ours, however, we need to clarify some aspects of Heidegger’s work on science and technology. In his *Weltbild* essay, he writes about the modern age

¹⁵⁰ See Martin Heidegger, “die Zeit des Weltbildes”, *Holzwege* 6th edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 1980), pp. 73-111. This is the reviewed form of a speech Heidegger gave in 1938 at the society for fine arts, study of nature and medicine (Kunswissenschaftliche, Naturforschend, medizinische Gesellschaft) in Freiburg.

as an age, in which science as determined by modern technology has become so dominant, that it leaves no room for other kinds of understanding of Being. According to him, the essence of science is *machine-technology*, and it cannot be seen simply as an application of the modern mathematical science. It is rather the other way around: the machine-technology¹⁵¹ is such a transformation in praxis, that it demands from the beginning the use of modern science.¹⁵² We find the same argument in a more developed form in another essay from Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik” (The Question Concerning Technology), which is known as one of his basic works, in which he interrogates into the essence of technology in detail.¹⁵³ In this essay, Heidegger clearly states that although modern science emerges chronologically earlier than the modern technology, the essence of modern technology is found already in modern physics in a “concealed” way.¹⁵⁴ Then Heidegger explores the basic characteristics of modern science by contrasting it to the *episteme* of the premodern Greek science, and sounds here like Kuhn, when he remarks that it makes no sense to see modern science as a truer or more developed form in comparison to the Ancient Greek one, because they rest on different ways of interpreting, seeing and questioning natural phenomena.¹⁵⁵ The Greek science was not an “exact” science in the modern sense because it did not need to

¹⁵¹ Although the literal translation of the term “die Technik” Heidegger uses is “technic” in English, we translate it as “technology” because Heidegger means by this term more a way of understanding rather than an instrumental dealing with nature. In English, the word “technic” and “technical” remains too weak to emphasize this dimension in comparison to the German word “Technik”.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁵³ See Martin Heidegger, “die Frage nach der Technik” *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009, pp. 9-41.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 75.

be one.¹⁵⁶ Heidegger seems to think that these different ways of interpreting natural phenomena rest on different *paradigms* of Being even though he does not employ the term “paradigm”. According to Heidegger, the basic characteristic of modern science reveals itself as *research* (Forschung), which is totally alien to the science of ancient and medieval times. This approach projects upon nature a certain framework of nature-events (Grundriss der Naturvorgänge).¹⁵⁷ Heidegger’s crucial claim here is that this projection of modern science opens a certain region of objects (*Gegenstandbezirk*) based on this projected framework, which nature has to *fit*. This framework makes nature visible only to the extent it shows itself in accordance with its basic characteristic of exactness and calculability so that scientific understanding can represent (*vorstellen*) this nature in accordance with its demand.¹⁵⁸ This implies that nature is already pre-formed (vor-gebildet, im Voraus gebildet) according to a certain model (*Vor-bild*) so that science can represent this pre-formed nature through its calculative language. In the light of these last remarks, we can understand better Heidegger’s claim that technology comes prior to modern science if we interpret it in the light of terms of actuality and potentiality: the way of understanding of Being of modern technology is already available in the emergence of modern science, however this thought is not transformed into a material reality yet as in the 20th century, and it hides itself there as a potential, which is not actualized yet. Although it is an unactualized understanding of Being, it

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 75. I translate “Grundriss” as “framework” although the more literal translation is “outline”. “Framework” is closer to what Heidegger means in this context because it fits well another basic concept translated from Heidegger’s lexicon into English. The German word is “Ge-stell”, by which Heidegger characterizes the essence of modern technology, and which is translated into English commonly as enframing.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

already governs and determines man in the rise of modern science, and before actualizing itself as technology, it actualizes first of all the objectification of nature according to its own framework. This prior objectification of nature is a necessary first step in the materialization, actualization of technological understanding as technology itself.

In this picture, nature is unconcealed only to the extent it satisfies the demand of exactness and pure calculability of modern science while it remains concealed with respect to certain ways and angles of Being. We encounter this idea of being concealed of nature with respect to alternative ways as an explicitly developed and discussed theme in another essay on modern science: in *Wissenschaft und Besinnung* (Science and recollective-thinking), Heidegger states clearly that the essence of nature remains concealed to science because the scientific objectification of nature is just *a way*, in which it emerges.¹⁵⁹ These remarks indicate that Heidegger sees the technological way of understanding as ontoparadigmatic, in the sense we use the term: An ontoparadigm unconceals a set of ontological possibilities while it conceals other sets of ontological possibilities. It is the basic trait of an ontoparadigm to impose itself as the most perfect way of Being in one or more than one region of beings and this imposition shows itself mostly as a denial of the existence of other possibilities. The target of Heidegger's critique of technology lies in the *occupying* characteristic of technological understanding, when he talks about the danger of technology as the danger that "everywhere, the raving of technology installs itself, until one day through everything technological, the essence of technology essences (west) in the appropriation/event

¹⁵⁹ See Martin Heidegger, "Wissenschaft und Besinnung" *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009), pp. 41-67.

(*Ereignis*) of truth.”¹⁶⁰ What Heidegger means here can be interpreted as a pointing to the possibility that technology becomes so dominant everywhere that one day its essence turns out to shine through everything technological as the very appropriation, happening of Being itself. A couple of pages earlier, Heidegger points to this danger as the possibility that the essence of technology as enframing (*Gestell*) prevents man from a more original unconcealing and experiencing the original truth of Being.¹⁶¹ These remarks show clearly that Heidegger conceives the technological way of understanding Being as ontoparadigmatic.

Towards the end of his *Weltbild* essay, Heidegger clarifies the meaning of *Weltbild* (world-picture) when he proclaims that we should not understand the term like a picture of an already existing world as if we make a copy of it (*Ab-bild*). World-picture means here rather the fact that the phenomenon of picture (*Bild*) has become the way, in which the world exists.¹⁶² Heidegger maintains that the identification of the world with a picture is a necessity for the modern *repraesentatio*, and this could not happen in the ancient or medieval times. The way in which the world exists as a picture is connected to the way in which man exists as the representing subject against objects expressible in purely qualitative terms. This mutual relationship between man and the world necessitates the world to be a picture to be represented.¹⁶³ This implies that a perfect picture can be exhausted by a calculative representation because it leaves no room for the indefiniteness of materiality: in a world as picture, its materiality melts down in its

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Die Frage nach der Technik*, p. 39. My translation.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁶² Heidegger, “die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 87.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

formal structure, being swallowed by the purely quantitative mathematical language. Materiality is expected to act like a perfect formal structure, which leaves no room for the imperfection of an Aristotelian matter as a concealed and uncontrollable resistance element. Heidegger finds the roots of this transformation of our world into a representable, mathematical picture in Plato's identification of the Being of beings with *eidos* which means "the outer appearance of beings".¹⁶⁴ However, he also opines that this transformation of the world into a picture is something distinctively modern, and this is not the case in the ancient and medieval times. Remember that for Plato, idea means "that which is seen", which is actually the prototype of a Bild. We can say in the light of this connection that the world is made into a Platonic idea to be represented with the highest efficiency. In this way, all beings are completely exhausted in the network of a purely calculative framework, which is projected upon nature by modern science. Nothing is allowed to remain outside of this formal system.

What are the implications of Heidegger's concept of world-picture for our concept of onto-paradigm? Heidegger suggests that the world is made into a Bild, but this is not a *Vor-bild* (paradigm, model) in the sense of an onto-paradigm. The concept of Weltbild is used by Heidegger not as an existential structure, but rather as a way, in which the modern way of Being of the world is characterized. That is why it is restricted to the modern age as the peculiar way of Being of our modern world. Ontoparadigm as an existential/ontological structure, on the other hand, is not restricted to a certain age; it is rather the ground, by which we can make sense of the differences between ages. This implies that the concept of Weltbild already presupposes the concept of onto-paradigm.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

After pointing out the difference between the concept of world-picture and the concept of onto-paradigm, we have to emphasize that Heidegger's way of thinking of phenomena like nature, man, technology, moves already within the horizon of what we call "ontoparadigm". By deciphering certain essential characteristics of different ways of projecting and interpreting of Being in different ages, comparing and contrasting them, Heidegger thinks Being in an ontoparadigmatic manner. He presupposes that there are different models, paradigms of Being belonging to different ages or to different ways of understanding. We have examined above one example of such an ontoparadigmatic characterizaion as his conception of the modern world as world-picture. This characterization shows us how the modern age with its basic ontological assumption differs paradigmatically from the pre-modern age. They presuppose different models of Being, in which beings are arranged according to different hierarchical relations, and one cannot judge these models by an accumulative or progressive point of view. We find another example of such a paradigmatic thinking in Heidegger's analysis of late modern technology, where he characterizes the essence of it as *Ge-stell*, which is translated into English commonly as "en-framing". In "Wissenschaft und Besinning", Heidegger examines the shift from the premodern to the modern/scientific understanding of nature as calculable objectivity put against the subjectivity of man. In "Question Concerning Technology", however, he analyzes what we can call *a second shift from the modern towards the late modern age* –even though he does not use the expression "paradigmatic shift". The time, which he problematizes here that in which the classical subject-object duality collapses, where the Newtonian physics is replaced by the Einsteinian Quantum physics. This is the age of the atom

bomb, where the subject-object structure is replaced by another structure. In the 20th century, technology reaches such a peak point, in which neither man is a subject, nor nature a region of objects. Nature as *Gegen-stand* gives now place to a nature as *Be-stand* because it turns now into a raw material to be ordered (*Be-stellen*). It cannot stand-against (*gegen-stehen*) man anymore as *Gegen-stand*; it is vulnerable to technology as raw material. *Be-stehen* in German means to be made out of something; to be produced. *Bestand* means, “stock” while *be-stellen* means “to order” or “to reserve”. The way in which nature exists in the later modern age is mainly a *resource* to be used and transformed by technology. In the same way, man, too, is made partly into a *Bestand*. That is why Heidegger calls the basic achievement of technology “enframing”, which is a much more powerful act than the mere objectification of nature, where “being used as a resource” is not dominant yet. Technology does not let human beings and nature stand as subjects and objects anymore; it enframes them as resources to be exhausted by an ordering. As can be seen, in the “Technology” essay, Heidegger develops a new model of Being, which describes phenomenologically the modern way of Being of man and nature. This model differs from the model belonging to the earlier modern age. He examines here two different ontoparadigms and gives us the basic traits of the ontoparadigm of the later modern age.

In this section, we have examined the roots of the concept of ontoparadigm in Heidegger’s thinking and contrasted our concept to his concept of *Weltbild* by sorting out the differences. On the other hand, we have also shown that Heidegger presents us different models of Being based upon different ways of interpreting and projecting of Being. Heidegger’s way of thinking makes use of ontoparadigms even though he does

not use this concept explicitly. In the previous sections of this chapter, we have related our conception of ontoparadigm to sociality by distinguishing it from socio-constitution and showing how it works complementary with socio-constitution. However, the kind of everyday Being which ontoparadigms have needs still clarification, so that we also understand the ontological meaning of “sociality”, which is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5
ONTOPARADIGMS IN EVERYDAY EXISTENCE¹⁶⁵

Introduction

Ontoparadigms are rooted in Dasein's understanding and their onto-constitution is also a way in which Dasein exists. In other words, ontoparadigms constitute the Being of beings only through and in Dasein's understanding; as a way of Being, in which Dasein understands himself and his own possibilities. Therefore, it is our task to bring into light the answer to the question: how do ontoparadigms function through and in Dasein's understanding of Being, and how do they relate to its Being?

In *BT*, Heidegger aims at a destruction of the traditional ontology, which remains within the borders of an ontical inquiry as opposed to a genuinely ontological one.¹⁶⁶ In other words, traditional ontology thinks Being (*das Sein*) as "that which is" (*das Seiende*)¹⁶⁷, and passes over some crucial distinctions between different ways of Being of beings by reducing them to mere presence. Ontical and scientific study of beings circulates within the borders of certain ways of understanding of Being, which are implicit.¹⁶⁸ But this implicit understanding is never problematized, and beings are

¹⁶⁵ The ideas I develop in sections 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4 are based partly on section 4.3. of my master thesis. See Özgür Aktok, *An Ontological Analysis of the Ought: Towards an Ethics of Being* (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2005), pp. 71-74.

¹⁶⁶ See Heidegger, *BT* and Martin Heidegger, *SuZ*. In this section, while giving page numbers, we will give first the numbers of the English translation of *BT*, and then of the German original because we will use the English translation.

¹⁶⁷ As we already pointed out, we translate "*das Seiende*" as "beings" for linguistically practical reasons although the more literal, correct translation is "that which is".

¹⁶⁸ Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 30-31/10-11.

studied in isolation from their Being. In contrast to this, in an onto-logical study of beings, they are studied in their relation to Being through an explicit thematization. Heidegger interprets Being as that which let beings show themselves as beings; that in terms of which beings are understood.¹⁶⁹ Onto-logical inquiry problematizes the conditions which enable something like the understanding of beings with respect to *what it means to be* for them. In other words, it problematizes the conditions of possibility which enable something like the understanding of beings with respect to what it means to be for them as opposed to the ontical inquiry which takes beings in their actuality, as actualized and finished products in language.

We encounter beings mostly not as non-relational substances, and in our continuous everyday dealing with them, we do *not* make them into meaningful totalities in a second move after we encounter them as isolated units. On the contrary, we encounter them *always* and *already* in a relational, meaningful context of worldhood, in which most of them are connected in a referential totality.¹⁷⁰ So, Heidegger's conception of *Being* in *BT* appears as a destruction of the *substance ontology* of Western metaphysics. His fundamental ontology is a critical response to this traditional ontology, which takes the Being of entities in a decontextualized mode, which Heidegger calls *presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit)*.¹⁷¹ In contrast to presence-at-hand, for example, beings we use in our everyday life, namely, *equipment*, have the way of Being of

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 96/pp. 67-68.

¹⁷¹ See for the definition *ibid.*, p. 67-68/42. Note that while Heidegger's whole life of thinking is marked by a destruction of the Western tradition, *BT* is mostly devoted to a struggle with Cartesian/modern version of this whole tradition, which has its roots in ancient Greek thought.

readiness-to-hand (BT, 98).¹⁷² Beings can show themselves as *present-at-hand* only if we approach them in a certain manner; if we observe their outward appearance. This can happen, for example, through an interruption in our usual practical dealing with them. Suppose that one uses a bicycle and suddenly one of his tyres blows out. While riding the bike, he is *absorbed* in the work of riding and the bike does not stand as an object (Gegen-stand) in front of him as if he is a subject. The bike is rather “ready” for the rider to be used to achieve a goal. It can be said that the rider and the ride do not stand against each other in a subject-object duality; they appear rather two moments of one and the same intentionality of what Heidegger calls the “in-order-to” structure.¹⁷³ The bike can be thought here as *a continuity of the bodily structure* of man; it functions as a juncture to his hand, legs, eyes and takes its functional role in the whole context of the work produced: riding itself. Riding appears here the activity, around which the body of the rider and the bike are organized in a meaningful unity, which is governed not by a propositional, theoretical kind of “know-that” understanding of riding, but by a practical know-how understanding of this activity. The whatness of the bike unconceals itself genuinely only in and through this practice, and this whatness is not translatable into a whatness of propositions: in this case, the meaning of the Being of the bike as equipment is *practical*. The work produced here, namely riding, intends a larger context of work, which is “reaching the library”, which refers further to a larger context of work; for example, writing a dissertation. But even here, the first step of this intended work is just a small part of it: writing the dissertation for a couple of hours at that day is

¹⁷² See Section 15 of in *BT*, pp. 95-102/67-72 where Heidegger discusses readiness-to-hand as opposed to presence-to-hand in detail.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 97/68.

the closest goal, which intends further the whole of the doctoral work going on for years. And this chain of the *in-order-to structure* certainly does not stop there and goes on to larger contexts like being an academician, for example. In this whole network of as-signments, the rider and the bike contribute to something beyond their particular Being, which is the Being of the work, and the worker is in a state through which he and his ride are not separable from one another through a duality of two opposed kinds of beings called subject and object. Heidegger calls the kind of “seeing” which appears in this practical way of understanding seeing-around (*Um-sicht*) and the way of Being of the hammer is then “ready-to-hand” (*zuhanden*).

Only when the bike is broken and riding suddenly stops, is this intentional structure of work disturbed, and the rider can encounter his bike as something which *stands against him* (like an ob-ject) in this situation; which is merely *present* at this hand over against him, standing on his way as an obstacle to the achievement of the work. In this case, the bike is no more “ready” to his hand for producing the work it was supposed to do, and it fails to progress in the everyday teleology of means-goal structure. This standing on one’s way as an obstacle is actually what “Gegen-stand” means; the world shows its resistance as a resistance explicitly and powerfully as a “standing-against” (*Gegen-stehen*). Let’s suppose that the rider had a bad accident and his bike is harmed so much that he comes to think that there is no possibility to fix it again, and he begins to observe it without any practical purpose. The bike loses its functional character within the realm of a concerned, teleological dealing with the work to be produced and the rider begins lingering for a while just looking at the bike in a purely theoretical manner. In this case, the bike turns into a present-at-hand being. As

seen, *readiness-to-hand* (*Zuhandenheit*) as a mode of Being is more original than *presence-at-hand* (*Vorhandenheit*) because the latter is reached as a modification of the former, and the former cannot be reached phenomenologically from the latter. The problem with the Cartesian interpretation of man's world is that it is based on the substance ontology of presence-at-hand and tries to understand the more original state of worldhood by this substance ontology, which is derivative. What is *derivative*, however, cannot be used to interpret *the original* from which it is derived. It is rather the other way around.

Traditional ontology considers our Being, too, as a present-at-hand being by formulating it as "subjectivity". Heidegger uses the concept of *Dasein* only for the characterization of the Being which has essentially a "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*) with an understanding of Being unlike other kinds of beings in the modes of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. *Dasein* is ontically specified in that it has –and must have– an attitude towards Being; its Being as well as Being in general *matters* to it.¹⁷⁴ It is impossible for a being to be *Dasein* and not to have a situatedness with respect to Being; *Dasein* always and already understands what it is to be, and this is actually the essential and only possible way it exists: under-standing of Being is Da-sein. The reason why Heidegger uses the concept of Da-sein is that he wants to emphasize this necessary situatedness of this special being; *Dasein* always and already understands itself as the "there"; as somewhere and at some time; namely in a spatio-temporal openness of worldhood. This is not the case for a being like a chair, for example: the chair is neither in space, nor in time, in the sense we are in space and in time. We "have" spatiality and temporality, in which we encounter the chair in a world, which is disclosed *at* and *out of*

¹⁷⁴ Heidegger, *BT*, p. 32/ 12

us. In contrast to this, the chair does not open a world out of itself, in which it can situate itself *as* a being-there. Of course, in the sense that the chair belong to “our” world, it is in space and time. But this “being inside” it not self-reflective as is the case with Dasein, who has a peculiar kind of *Being-in-the world* ¹⁷⁵ and it is closed to the chair itself. Dasein is neither ready-to-hand; nor present-at-hand: it has rather *existence* as its own mode of Being. ¹⁷⁶

What is the larger ontological context of the existence of Dasein, which uses equipments as ready-to-hand beings? In the work Dasein produces, the Being of others is encountered: the dissertation to be written is submitted to a thesis committee consisting of professors and both the doctoral student and the professors belong to the social institution called “university”, consisting of hundreds of other people and standing in the openness of the publicity, interacting with society. Heidegger calls this essential mode of Being of Dasein with others, namely its essentially “social” character, *Being-with* (Mit-sein). ¹⁷⁷ This way of Being cannot be reached by adding isolated present-at-hand individual beings to one another. This implies that *the Being of the phenomenon we call “sociality” is “Being-with”*.

Heidegger calls the ultimate unity of our Being which relates beings to one another in a referential totality in an intense network, ‘Being-in-the-World’. Each worldly being plays its role in this whole context of significance, and none of them appears as a non-relational atomic unit of substance. Heidegger introduces some

¹⁷⁵ See Heidegger, BT, pp. 91-102/63-72, where Heidegger introduces the concept of Being-in-the-World as an *existential* of Dasein and discusses the difference between it and the ontical conception of “Being-in”. The encounter the ontical sense in the example we gave about the chair above.

¹⁷⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 67- 68/42-43 for a discussion which clarifies the difference between “existence” and “presence-at-hand”

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 154-155/118-119.

ontological concepts, which we normally use ontically, to refer to some psychological states or some feelings of us in everyday life. In contrast to their ontical meanings, he uses them as ontological terms unique to his philosophy. One such essential concept is the concept of *concern* [*Besorgen*].¹⁷⁸ It refers to a way of Being of Dasein, when it deals with the ready-to-hand beings. Another way of Being of Dasein is *solicitude* [*Fürsorge*], which we find ourselves in, the being we are relating to another Dasein.¹⁷⁹ Solicitude does not mean that we are necessarily in an actual, interaction with another person at a given time. Even when we would be cast away and had to live alone in an island, we would understand ourselves as one of the many others. Our Being is always and already essentially determined as solicitude no matter whether we are performing a collective, or on the contrary, the most private action. *Concern* is the way of Being while using equipments whereas *solicitude* is the way of Being with others, socially: the Being of sociality is solicitude (*Fürsorge*). Finally, the *existential* of *Care* (*Sorge*) connects all of these other *existentials*.¹⁸⁰ The general name of our dealings with the world, which involves concern as well as solicitude, is called “care”.

At this point, we should repeat one of our central questions we formulated in the introduction part. On the one hand, Heidegger gives a priority to the practical mode of equipmentality called “readiness-to-hand” over the theoretical mode of “presence-at-hand”. Heidegger’s ontological categories, namely *existentials*, already involve those phenomena which we normally understand under “sociality” and “historicity”. Do these

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 83/56-57.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 157-161/121-124.

¹⁸⁰ See *ibid.*, 225-273/180-230 for Heidegger’s discussion of care as an *existential*. He uses this term as a noun which refers to the existential structure unique to Dasein.

two essential characteristics of his philosophy –namely, the priority of practice over theory in the determination of what it means to be; and that *Dasein* is essentially *Mitsein*; namely as a “social being”- not suggest that *there is a kind of social pragmatism and conventionalism with respect to the truth of Being at the level of das Man? Is the truth, as we encounter it in the inauthentic Dasein, a kind of social product?*

We will develop our answer to this question through and as a critique of Richard Rorty’s social pragmatism in order to see how the pragmatist elements in Heidegger’s philosophy differ from those in a neopragmatist conception. There are two reasons why we choose Rorty in order to contrast his neopragmatism to the pragmatist elements in Heidegger’s thought. Rorty’s neo-pragmatism with its essentially social and historical character based upon a critique of metaphysics and Platonism seems to fit well Heidegger’s phenomenology of everydayness of *Dasein*. Rorty’s critique of metaphysics inspires a lot from Heidegger’s work. If there is a pragmatism, which could get into a dialogue with Heidegger’s work, then Rorty’s seems to be the best option. However, even this seeming accordance of the best candidate is simply an illusion. In the following section, we will deal with Rorty’s pragmatism in order to contrast the pragmatist conception of the relation between Being and sociality to Heidegger’s account.

A Critique of Rorty's Neo-pragmatism

Rorty's Criticism of the Representationalist Philosophy

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Richard Rorty formulates epistemology ultimately as *representationalism*, and characterizes philosophy as “a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into areas which represent reality well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretence of doing so).”¹⁸¹ What Rorty has in mind when he talks about traditional philosophy is not very modest; a whole Platonic tradition, the Cartesian tradition as the continuity of Platonism beginning from Descartes, and the mainstream Anglo-American philosophers of the 1970's.

In order to be able to re-present, or mirror something, the very thing to be represented must *already* be there; it must have the occult power of making itself *what it is* through some sort of self-activity of presentation. In the light of this implicit assumption hidden in the concept of “representation,” we might understand Rorty's reaction to traditional philosophy as a questioning of this alleged *already-presentedness-in-itself*. Rorty accepts that there is a world out there, but to claim that this world has the mysterious power to *make* our statements true is an implausible idea:

The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as a creation of a being who had a language of his own. If we cease to attempt to make sense of the idea of such a non-human language, we shall not be tempted to confuse the platitude that the world may cause us to be justified in believing a sentence true with the claim that the world splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped chunks called “facts.” But if one clings to the notion of self-

¹⁸¹ Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1979), p. 3. We will use the abbreviation *PMN* to refer to this work.

subsisting facts, it is easy to start capitalizing the word “truth” and treating it as something identical either with God or with the world as God’s project. Then one will say, for example, that Truth is great, and will prevail.¹⁸²

At this point, we can detect an interesting parallel between Rorty’s critique of the representationalist tradition and Heidegger’s diagnosis that Western tradition in general has understood Being as production (*Herstellung*).¹⁸³ The Ancient Greek word for production is *poiesis*, which means *bringing-forth*. In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger shows that for the Ancient Greeks, not only the events which are produced by human beings, but even *physis*, where natural events happen, is understood as a bringing forth, namely, *poiesis*:

It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth in its full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing forth, *poiesis*. *Physis* is indeed *poiesis* in the highest sense. For what presences by means of *physis* has the bursting open belonging to bringing forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself. In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another, in the craftsman or artist.¹⁸⁴

In *BP* as well as in *QCT*, Heidegger shows how Aristotle’s understanding the Being of entities in general in terms of his account of four causes leads to an understanding of “what it means to be for entities” as the production of an artifact. Nature and natural events are self-productive; they have the autonomous power to produce themselves. But this production is certainly always according to some criteria, which we encounter as

¹⁸² Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 5. We will use the abbreviation *CIS* to refer to this work.

¹⁸³ Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p 108. Abbreviated as *BP*.

¹⁸⁴ Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Translated by William Lovitt. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) pp. 10-11.

the ideality of ideas in Plato¹⁸⁵, whereas in Aristotle such criteria are found in the intrinsic form of entities towards which they are supposed to evolve. In any case, "what there is" appears as some sort of *production*.

Now if we return to Rorty's criticism of representationalism into the context of Heidegger's diagnosis, we can see that the idea that we represent things that are already presented by the world itself can be expressed as the idea that we can *re-produce* something already *produced* by the world itself. If we did not think the world as a *self-producing* mechanism, we would not be able to make sense of the claim that we can *copy the products* through our mind. If there are *products* we encounter in our experience, then these should be produced either in a transcendent realm *before* they enter our domain of human existence, or they should be produced in and through our domain of human existence. In other words, this productive power belongs either to our existential sphere of inter-subjectivity, or to an ontological realm beyond it. The latter option is what we can call Platonism in the broadest sense. The cost of taking human mind as a passive mirror devoid of productive power is to choose to attach this power to

¹⁸⁵ It is a quite debatable issue, how we can reconcile Plato's doctrine of ideal forms with Heidegger's interpretation of *physis* as self-productivity. The idea of self-productivity seems to be more appropriate for Aristotle's understanding of cosmos because in his account, the forms, which constitute the criteria for production, subsist in entities themselves. However in Plato's doctrine, the ideal forms do not seem to be intrinsic to entities, but they belong to a transcendent realm which is beyond the sensible reality. So, the criteria how to be produced seem to be not in natural entities themselves, but in some other realm, which means that entities do not seem to have a self-productive power. A possible solution to this problem might be to remember that in Plato's philosophy, to be beyond the sensible worldly entities for the forms does not mean to be "external" to them even though the forms are not in particular entities themselves like in Aristotle, they can still be considered to have an essentially "inner" relation with entities such that the "selfhood," namely the *identity* of entities always and already belong to the divine realm of ideas. What matters here is not the location of the forms or whether they are placed within the sensible realm of entities themselves. It is rather that even when the forms are not in particular entities, in other words, even though they are beyond them, they can still have an immediate and inner relation to entities because Plato's universe does not consider transcendence of the sensible world as exteriority. Since the internal-external duality is alien to the Ancients, the idea of the self-productivity can be preserved within the Platonic framework, which does not confine the identity of sensible entities to some sort of interior/intrinsic structure of them.

a Platonic transcendent realm, no matter whether this realm appears as Plato's ideal world of ideas, Hegel's *Geist*, or as the material world of the modern realist. As long as this realm is beyond our existence, and endowed with some sort of mysterious power of self-production, self-creation, it is still Platonic, even when it is materialist.¹⁸⁶ This definition of Platonism gives us Rorty's criterion to reject the conception of a world as presented by representationalist philosophy. Rorty finds it more plausible to attach the power of productivity to human beings instead of the world itself.

Rorty's Pragmatist Conception of Truth

Once the idea that the world is self-productive is abandoned and the power of productivity is attached to man, one can go in two directions. One can either claim that the world itself is our production, which would be an ontological interpretation of man's productivity, or one can claim that knowledge is our production, which would be an epistemological interpretation. Rorty doesn't seem to go in the former, but in the latter direction:

We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ This conception of Platonism can be found on page xv and xvi of the introduction section of Rorty's *Consequences of Pragmatism*. In this section, Rorty explains in detail what he understands from Platonism in contrast to pragmatism.

¹⁸⁷ Rorty, *CIS*, p.5.

Understanding the two claims (1) that knowledge, or truth is ultimately production, and (2) that production is man's capacity rather than that of the world, as the key claims of pragmatism means to understand what lies at the heart of pragmatism in general, and Rorty's pragmatism more specifically. In *PMN*, Rorty attempts to abandon "the notion of knowledge as the assemblage of representations" and introduces "epistemological behaviorism" as his pragmatist conception of knowledge. There are two basic characteristics of Rorty's conception of knowledge: first, it replaces the correspondence theory of truth with a coherentist/holist conception. Propositions are not causal products of an external reality. Propositions can interact only with other propositions, when beliefs are to be justified.¹⁸⁸ In *Truth and Progress*, justification is characterized ultimately as an inner affair between beliefs.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, truth is actually nothing more than our justification within a system of beliefs, which can be formulated as "warranted assertability".¹⁹⁰

The second crucial characteristic of Rorty's conception of truth is that the context of his coherentist/holist justification of truth is *social* and *practical* rather than being purely individualistic or mental. In other words, beliefs circulate in a sphere of social community and form their coherence in this communal network rather than in the pure mental spheres of isolated individuals. Justification "is not a matter of special relation between ideas (words) and objects, but of conversation, of social practice."¹⁹¹ There is

¹⁸⁸ Rorty, *PMN*, p.183.

¹⁸⁹ Richard Rorty, "Truth and Progress" *Philosophical Papers, Volume 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 141.

¹⁹⁰ Rorty, *PMN*, p.176.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

no *outside* of this communal existence to which we can appeal in order to justify our beliefs; justification is always within this *inner* sphere and *intrinsic* relations of community. In other words, we should face the inevitable situation that “nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence”.¹⁹² Consequently, we can summarize Rorty’s conception of truth as the logic of our organization of our beliefs which help us in a community to cope successfully with our environment.¹⁹³

As Charles Guignon and David R. Hiler point out in the Introduction section of *Richard Rorty*, since the mid-1980’s, Rorty devotes more attention to moral and social philosophy. But from the very beginning of Rorty’s career, Rorty’s concerns for epistemology cannot be separated from his concerns for political and moral philosophy.¹⁹⁴ It is not hard to notice that behind Rorty’s whole criticism of the epistemology-centered philosophy tradition, there lies *the ethical theme of freedom*. As Guignon and Hiler declares, according to Rorty, “traditional philosophy’s search for final accounts of knowledge, if achieved, would result in the “freezing-over” of culture and the “de-humanization of human beings”¹⁹⁵ In his later works Rorty seems to develop his conception of truth in an increasingly political and moral context such that

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁹³ As Guignon and Hiley states, as time passes by, Rorty turns out to hold a “minimalist” or “deflationist” approach to truth. In TP, we can encounter this relatively new conception. According to this approach, there is no way to give a definition of truth, and Rorty seems to give Tarski’s Convention T, which says that for any sentence S, “‘S’ is true in language L if and only if S” See Charles Guignon, and Hiley, David R. ed. “Introduction” in *Richard Rorty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹⁹⁴ Charles Guignon, and Hiley, David R. ed. “Introduction”, pp. 21-22.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

his reasons for criticizing traditional philosophy becomes much more explicitly political and moral. For example, in "Solidarity, or Objectivity?," Rorty states that solidarity is a much better goal to be desired than objectivity. In this article, by contrasting solidarity to objectivity, he expresses his worries about the oppressive characteristic of objectivist conception of truth, and wants to replace "objectivity" with "solidarity."¹⁹⁶ Rorty believes that trying to find an ultimate, an objective ground for social practices bears the danger of destroying the possibility of conversation and communication, and such a foundationalism tends to lead to a totalitarian society in which social practices are shaped by pre-given, pre-established, strict rules, and creativity and freedom cannot survive in such a society. In this context, Rorty's later conception of truth gains more explicitly a kind of "freeing" function, which renders it explicitly moral and political. Truth is something which contributes to conversation, communication and growth of a society. Truth appears as a kind of setting-free. Putting it into Heideggerian terms, truth is a kind of letting-be (*Seinlassen*); caring about the growth of human beings by developing solidarity. We can observe an astonishing parallel between Rorty and Heidegger in that they both interpret truth as a freeing phenomenon. In section 3.8.3., referred to "On the Essence of Truth",¹⁹⁷ Heidegger shows that the idea of a correspondence relation between statements and facts presupposes a realm of openness preceding such a correspondence and likening relation, in which a representation (*Vorstellung*) as a relation occurs. This openness is the possibility for statements and

¹⁹⁶ See Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity" *Nanzan Review of American Studies*/6 (1984), pp. 1-19.

¹⁹⁷ See Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in *Pathmarks*. Edited by William (McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-155. The German original is "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit", *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), pp. 177-203. We will refer to the English translation.

facts to meet each other. Statements have to *traverse* a field of openness so that they can get into a correspondence relation with their linguistic partner, which are things, and during this traversing, they should preserve their whatness in this open region.¹⁹⁸

Heidegger characterizes this openness as freedom, which lets beings be (*Seinlassen*).¹⁹⁹

When man engages himself with beings, he *ek-sists*, which means that he stands in the openness of Being. He can free entities through taking them to the open when he deals with them. Here, Heidegger attempts to show that without a previous human comportment towards entities, without the emergence of a worldly context which is already opened up; something like correspondence would not take place. First of all, man should *allow* things to appear to himself in certain ways; he should be open, receptive for an encounter with entities. This means that man should *let* entities *be* so that they can appear as this or that kind of entity. Only such a previous free relation to entities, which is already a truth-event of freeing, can enable them to get into a relation of correspondence. We will return to the problem of freedom in the last section in order to compare Rorty's and Heidegger's conceptions of freedom.

In one sense, Rorty saves truth from epistemology by setting it free from its enchainment to the correspondence relationship between statements and facts and letting it freely circulate in the whole network of social relations. Beliefs turn out to be true as long as they serve the *continuity* of conversation, as long as they actively contribute to the *growth* of social communication, rather than being the passive reflections of self-subsisting facts. Truth is no more representation, but it is the characteristic of things that work efficiently in the practical flux of society. Rorty is

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 144.

successful in seeing the problematic assumption of traditional philosophy that the world has some sort of self-productive power in itself which endows us the original products of knowledge, which we reproduce through representation, and he takes it away from the world, and gives it to man. In other words, the productive power *change hands*.

But one can feel legitimately uncomfortable with this sharp “either-or” duality, which seems to be naive and superficial: it is either *we* who possesses the power, or the world. It is either *us* who determines truth and imposes upon the *world*, or the opposite. Is there nothing to truth beyond this power struggles over the question “who has the power?” We can propose a middle point here which can avoid these two extremes to a certain degree: perhaps we should distinguish the following two claims: it is one thing to say that (C1) the world has the power to make our statements true, and another thing to say that (C2) the world has this power *by and in itself*. Rorty does not necessarily deny C1; what he denies seems to be rather the second one, namely, C2. The following quotation from *CIS* seems to support this “middle point” interpretation: “the world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak.”²⁰⁰ According to our interpretation, Rorty rejects C2 whereas he accepts C1. The difference between the two is that in the first one, even though the world has some sort of power to operate upon our beliefs, this is only because we *allow* it to do so. Only when “we program ourselves with a language,” does the world turn out to cause us to hold beliefs in certain regular ways. In this way, the world *borrow*s its power from our human possibilities to act upon our agency. In other words, we deliver our power of productivity to a world and attach to it some sort of authority to act upon us. But the

²⁰⁰ Rorty, *CIS*, p. 6.

point here is to be “aware” of this situation and not pretend as if this is not our power we deliver to the world and our language. Unless “we” do not agree upon certain criteria either explicitly or implicitly to which we deliver ourselves, then the world could never have the power to make our statements true by itself. But once we rely upon certain criteria, we make them into regularities through our social practices, and regularities gain some sort of “objectivity,” but this objectivity is not *in itself*; it is an *inter-subjective* objectivity. It is an objectivity upon which we agree. We can analogically consider our relationship to the world as some sort of social contract, which we encounter in Hobbes and Rousseau. We give up some of our power and rights in front of the world surrounding us, and allow the world to operate as a consistent mechanism through which we can test our individual truth statements. So, this appears as an agreement between us and the world, but when the world as we conceive it turns out to harm us and make us unhappy, we break this contract, and begin to look for a new agreement.

But at the end, even if we allow the world to have some sort of power, man is taken as the ultimate authority to say the last word. *Rorty seems to be satisfied with this replacement of authority, and he presupposes that Platonism is overcome by the triumph of man's unlimited productive power.* This productive power is so creative that man can invent a world which has some sort of borrowed authority. But is this story not already told us before by the religious discourse? Replace God with man, or the world/reality with man, then you seem to get Rorty's story. These considerations indicate that Rorty's

discourse sounds like a theological narrative, which makes man into a God. But the religious narrative is something which Rorty takes pains to escape.²⁰¹

We can also ask the question why a mere replacement of authority should be celebrated as an overcoming of Platonism and Cartesianism? Does Platonism end where man's authority begins? If Rorty is unhappy with attaching occult powers to certain entities like Platonic ideas, or to an external material world, then why does his unhappiness end, when it comes to man, who is endowed with the power of unlimited creativity? What is so special, so privileged with man such that his community and the conversations he carries out there constitute the only and ultimate criteria for truth and justification? Is Rorty's pragmatism not a form of anthropocentrism? Is the deepest problem with Western philosophy who the legislator of productive power is, or could the problem perhaps be found in the very essence of the idea of *productivity* itself? These questions necessitate us to bring Rorty face to face with Heidegger.

Heidegger against Rorty

At the beginning of his article "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," Rorty states clearly where he parts his way from Heidegger:

One of the most intriguing features of Heidegger's later thought is his claim that if you begin with Plato's motives and assumptions you will end up with some form of pragmatism. I think that this claim is, when suitably

²⁰¹ The claim that Rorty replaces God with man and creating a new form of theism in the sense of an anthropomorphism might sound like an oversimplification and unfair due to the fact that he is a contingentist and atheist. However, his overreliance on man's social conversation as the last authority questions supports this seemingly oversimplified interpretation.

interpreted, right. But unlike Heidegger, I think pragmatism is a *good* place to end up.²⁰²

According to Rorty, Heidegger's reason as to why he takes pragmatism as the last form of Platonism is that "this potted history of Western philosophy stretches from the Greek conviction that the point of inquiry is apprehension of *archai*, principles, things greater and more powerful than everyday human existence, to the American conviction that its point is technological contrivance, getting things under control."²⁰³ Rorty thinks that Heidegger's diagnosis correctly discloses the hidden Western philosophy assumption "that truth is somehow a matter of the stronger overcoming the weaker".²⁰⁴ In other words, the Platonic invention of truth as the most powerful, indestructible, necessary archaic principle is actually a way in which man attempts to master the contingency of entities and the finitude of his own Being. Consequently, we can think of setting truth as an overwhelming principle as an implicit form of man's desire for power. Rorty sounds at this point exactly like Nietzsche:

Suppose that this desire to be overwhelmed is itself just a sublimated form of the urge to share in the power of anything strong enough to overwhelm you. One form such sharing might take would be to become identical with this power, through a purificatory *askesis*. Another would be to become the favored child of this power.²⁰⁵

According to Rorty, it is this understanding of Being and entities in and through power relations, which Heidegger worries about. Pragmatism is the last form which makes this

²⁰² See Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism" *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*. Edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 209.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

desire for domination of man over Being much more concrete through its explicit formulation of truth as an efficient instrument to make man happier. There is no way out of the tendency to be part of power relations and reproduce them. If so, what should we do? Rorty's solution can be summarized in one of his sentences: "one might as well be a self-conscious, rather than a repressed, and self-deceived, power freak".²⁰⁶ According to Rorty, from the very beginning until now, Western philosophy has always been a *power struggle* of man with what surrounds him as his world. This power struggle is essential to any sort of philosophy no matter whether it is Plato's or his. The problem is not with the fact that philosophy is a power struggle, but it is with our deceiving ourselves by rejecting this inevitable and essential characteristic of philosophy. As long as we do not deceive ourselves and be aware of the contingency of these power struggles, we are doing the right thing. Pragmatism is the best way of doing this. Rorty thinks that Heidegger simply could not see the fact that pragmatism is inevitable and the best possible form of philosophy. If he could do so, he would end up by being a pragmatist:

Pragmatism has, so to speak, turned out to be all that the West could hope for; all we had a right to expect once we adopted a "technical" interpretation of thinking. Plato sets things up so that epistemological skepticism would become the recurrent theme of philosophical reflection, and pragmatism is, in fact, the only way to answer the skeptic. So if the only choice is between Platonism and pragmatism, Heidegger would wryly and ironically opt for pragmatism.²⁰⁷

What Rorty does not accept seems to be Heidegger's definition of Platonism. Heidegger seems to employ a wider definition of Platonism, which includes pragmatism. Rorty thinks that pragmatism and Platonism are two forms of power struggles, but it is

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

plausible to defend the pragmatist version of it. The difference between the two is that the pragmatist is aware of the power game he plays, and therefore, he tries to be as less cruel as possible.²⁰⁸ He is aware that what he does is inevitably a form of imposing power, and what he imposes is fragile and contingent. This awareness of contingency makes the pragmatist an ironist, more specifically, a liberal ironist, who never says the last word and never imposes his own convictions as necessary. The liberal ironist does not try to defeat others through arguments; he rather avoids argumentative discourse and leaves a room to play with others with the possibilities of an ironic, poetic language, a room for mutual communication and conversation. He can reach his own justified beliefs only in the context of conversation, which are always open to revision. What makes a philosophical approach Platonic is the lack of this flexibility, this awareness of contingency. In other words, Rorty defines Platonism as the lack of awareness of the contingency of its own philosophical activity and its production. That is why he rejects the Platonic conception of truth and replaces it with the contingent, pragmatist conception of truth.

Heidegger's reason to reject Platonism overlaps with his reason why he sees pragmatism within the borders of Platonism. We already gave Heidegger's definition of Platonism and his reason to reject it. As we indicated, Platonism ignores the fact that Being has a twofold characteristic: while Being gives itself as presence and makes entities present, it also withdraws and remains in the background as non-present possibility. Being itself can never be considered as a being which is fully visible and

²⁰⁸ Rorty calls his ideal pragmatist "liberal ironist" and he takes over the definition of "liberal" from Judith Shklar, who defines a liberal person as one who considers cruelty as the worst thing human beings do. By "ironist," Rorty means the kind of person who is aware of the contingency of his central beliefs and desires, and who does not look for a foundation for them in a non-historical, transcendent ground. See Rorty, *CIS*, p. xv.

controllable because it is actually time itself; it is the condition and possibility of our encounter of beings in time. This twofold characteristic of Being appears in its truth as *Aletheia*, namely, *uncoveredness*. Here, we can see the crucial difference between Heidegger's conception of truth and that of Rorty. Truth is for Heidegger uncoveredness of Being itself even though man does this uncovering. So, it is correct that what is given by the uncoveredness of Being is contingent, and overcoming Platonism certainly includes an awareness of this contingency and finitude of man's own situation. Rorty is fully right in pointing to the importance of such awareness. However, looking from a Heideggerian perspective, what is missing in Rorty's conception is that an awareness of the contingency is only a *necessary* condition, but it is far from being *sufficient*, as long as one cannot grasp the *ontological* meaning of *contingency*, that is, without relating contingency to Being and its truth. For Heidegger, as much as for Rorty, if there were no man, there would be no truth. But moreover, for Heidegger, there would be no Being, either.²⁰⁹ However, the fact that man *uncovers* something like the Being of beings does not mean that truth is man-made as it is the case in Rorty.²¹⁰ Once uncovered, once initiated its history, Being somehow turns out to draw a border between itself and man

²⁰⁹ Heidegger, *BT*, p. 272.

²¹⁰ In "Heidegger, Contingency and Pragmatism," Rorty seems to interpret Heidegger as supporting his claim that truth is man-made. Heidegger never says something like this either in his earlier or later period. Let's leave this implausible interpretation aside, there is something more surprizing about Rorty's interpretation of Heidegger: Rorty prefers later Heidegger to the earlier one of *BT* because he thinks that later Heidegger is more historical and poetical, and this brings him closer to Rorty's hero model, which is the liberal ironist. However, later Heidegger is actually much less suitable to be exploited for Rorty's pragmatist purposes because in his later period Heidegger seems to leave his previous Dasein-centered understanding of Being behind, and he does not seem to talk from an inner sphere of Dasein-relative existential world realm anymore. The early emphasis on phenomenological loyalty to the very place of openness of Being; the emphasis on the privileged entity, which is us, Dasein disappears in the later period, and Heidegger begins to emphasize that it is Being itself which has *given* itself to man in a certain way through the history of metaphysics. Rorty seems to be choosing the wrong Heidegger because Heidegger gradually seems to abandon the idea that man makes history and the truth when he comes to his later period. Truth is the sendings of Being (*Seinsgeschick*) rather than being made by man.

by distancing itself to man though what Heidegger calls "ontological difference."

Ontological difference puts an impassible distance between Being and man, Being and community. Truth in the last analysis belongs to the side of Being rather than to that of man, or his/her community even though it is man who initiates all the story and history of Being. Rorty, however, lacks the ontological difference, or any kind of difference which could save him from a man-centered understanding of truth. He ends his story of Platonism when he comes to man, and accepts man as the ultimate measure of truth and justification. As we pointed out earlier, Rorty simply seems to replace the authority of power by taking the productive power of the world away and bestowing it to man. To the extent it is man who produces truth, contingency, too, remains as the contingency *of* man. Heidegger would reject this conception of truth and contingency for remaining too anthropomorphic and ontical, which is far away from an *ontological* conception of truth and contingency, that is, the truth and contingency of Being itself and its happenings.

Consequently, Heidegger is more consistent in his criticism of Platonism in that he consistently rejects the centrality of any being no matter whether it is Plato's ideas, or the medieval God, or man himself. Rorty, on the other hand, seems to privilege one being among others arbitrarily and does not question what kind of consequences this would bring to mankind. If the forgottenness of Being is a dangerous phenomenon which leads to a technological alienation of Dasein to his/her world, and if modern subjectivism is a more developed form of this forgottenness, then it follows that pragmatism, as making truth a tool in the service of man, too, is a dangerous phenomenon by being a peak point in man's mastery over the earth and himself, which can bring irreversibly destructive, and even fatal consequences to humanity.

Despite the fact that Heidegger and Rorty both relate their concepts of truth to freedom, and mention the freeing characteristic of truth, Rorty's conception of freedom suffers from his anthropomorphism. In the original word of truth as *uncoveredness*, we can hear the theme of freedom. For Ancient Greeks, as much as for Heidegger, Being does never present itself as a complete openness and clarity, on the contrary, it tends to sink into its own darkness and mystery; to remain hidden from man's sight. In this picture, we have to struggle in order to understand the truth of Being of beings; we have to un-cover the veil in order to look for what lies behind it. In this sense, truth as unconcealing, is a kind of setting free the Being of entities from the distortion and oppression of man's inauthentic understanding. As we pointed out earlier, this inauthentic understanding belongs to the everydayness of Dasein, in which the average, public understanding of Being prevails. This way of average Being is *das Man*.²¹¹ What Rorty takes as "community," to which he attaches the ultimate authority of justification, falls under Heidegger's concept of *das Man*. For Heidegger, community cannot be the ultimate ground for justification, which can determine the status of truth because it is inevitably under the manipulation of average, ordinary values and common practices. Another interesting point is that what Rorty calls "conversation" falls under Heidegger's concept of "idle talk (*das Gerede*)".²¹² Idle talk for Heidegger means everyday useless conversation mode in which nothing is really questioned and challenged, but simply words are exchanged in the superficiality of chatting. In idle talk, everybody has some opinion and is willing to express it, and but there is not a real content, no genuine context of communication and mutual understanding. It seems that Rorty naively

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 164.

²¹² Ibid., p. 211.

presupposes that when people have conversations, when they form discussion groups freely, this is sufficient to serve the growth and progress of mankind and its freedom. This is probably a necessary condition for reaching a better community, but it seems to satisfy only a formal prerequisite of freedom and fails to be sufficient at all. It is perfectly possible that in a community people come together and make long conversations, declare their opinions through public devices like papers, books, television, internet, etc, but all this process can perfectly fit what Heidegger calls “idle talk,” and it can fail to contribute to the growth of the community. This is the case nowadays. We witness lots of TV programs, read thousands of articles and news in the newspapers, participate in lots of open forums, activity groups on the internet. Can we honestly say that all this “conversation” helps us gain a deeper understanding and sight into serious problems of our current world? Can we really reach something like “truth” as a result of joining this chaotic crowd of “opinions?” Or, on the contrary, do we gradually lose the possibility of taking a critical attitude towards social practices by being exposed to a plenty of chunks of information? Rorty’s minimalist definition of truth as conversation and solidarity is too broad and too general to satisfy the conditions of being true.

Consequently, according to Heidegger, truth and freedom are things for which one has to wrestle for against the oppression and distortion of what Rorty calls “community.” Heidegger’s ontological difference between community and Being always leaves an open space for an individual to withdraw to in order to criticize the community she belongs to and its truth claims. Community is not an ultimate sphere of existence for Heidegger, and an individual has the freedom to make herself non-present

(absent) in terms of its prevailing values in that community by withdrawing into authentic possibilities of Being which are not *immediately* available in a community.²¹³ This, however, doesn't mean that authentic possibilities are found outside the community. No immediate availability of possibilities in the form of actual social practices does not necessarily mean the non-existence of possibilities. Heidegger's term *Dasein*, which he uses to refer to the Being of man in specific, is not a solipsistic term, but it analytically includes what he calls "Being-with" (*Mitsein*).²¹⁴ The authenticity-inauthenticity distinction does not correspond to the "individuality-sociality" dichotomy, but it undercuts it. Authentic possibilities can be found even with the whole of a community; an individual can disclose an authentic possibility, which is previously not explicitly and immediately visible, and this disclosure can remain within that individual. That individual can disclose this possibility to a group of people, and later/or to the rest of a community. It is also possible that a group of people, or a whole community can uncover an authentic possibility in a public mood and experience this authentic possibility as a community. All of these are different possibilities of uncovering Being authentically, and Heidegger's conception of authenticity embraces all of them. Rorty, however, seems to confine freedom to the ontical sphere of

²¹³ Heidegger defines the state of being *authentic* as being of its own (see Heidegger, *BT*, 68) and contrasts this to the inauthentic mode of Being in which *Dasein* loses itself. Authenticity is related to the *mineness* of *Dasein*'s self, and to the extent this originality of the mineness, this uniqueness disappears, *Dasein* turns out to behave like "someone," like an average person who satisfies certain social standards. On page 167, he contrasts authentic self to the they (*das Man*) and says that in the mode of the they, the self is taken away from itself, and it is not of its own. Here *inauthenticity* appears as a kind of *depersonalization*; losing one's unique *mineness* by being absorbed by the daily average existence. In the 2th and 3th parts of second division of *BT*, Heidegger connects authenticity to *Dasein*'s temporality and possibility of death and shows that an authentic self is one who is aware of his own finitude and its directedness towards death. All these analyses of the contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity show us that there is nothing in Rorty's account which prevents his individual from being inauthentic in a Heideggerian sense who is part of conversations going on in her community.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

community and leaves no room for escaping into and taking a critical distance towards one's own community. Ontological difference in Heidegger's philosophy appears as a possibility of taking a critical distance towards oneself and one's community.

Rorty seems to be successful in saving truth from epistemology and giving it back to man's Being, but he seems to fail to save Being from man and give it back to him as his freedom; a freedom not only from ultimate grounds, metaphysical foundations, transcendent worlds of Platonism that dominate social practices from an exterior holy heaven, but a freedom that saves him also from being imprisoned by himself; from being locked in the very community he belongs to and social practices he performs.

In this chapter, we have contrasted Richard Rorty's pragmatism to the pragmatist elements in Heidegger's philosophy and seen how radically Heidegger's project differs from a postmodernly motivated neo-pragmatist approach. This critique of Rorty's pragmatism has led us into a problematization of the inauthentic mode of Being of Dasein, which Heidegger calls "*das Man*". As we pointed out earlier, the phenomenological construction of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm demands from us a detailed analysis of "*das Man*" so that we can understand how ontoparadigms function through and in man's understanding of Being in his everyday life as a social Being. We will deal with this task in the following, where we go on with our phenomenological construction of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm.

The Onto-constitution of Phenomena

by Ontoparadigms as the Everyday Inauthentic Existence of Dasein:

das Man as the Ought

While Heidegger makes an everyday phenomenology of Being in *BT*, he in the background of his works, there are also the Neo-Kantian and positivist views he criticizes. He criticizes for example the fact-value dichotomy, in which value, as an extra, second stratum of presence-at-hand is added to the Being of beings which is supposed to be natural and devoid of value predicates:

Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand.²¹⁵

As can be seen, the Being of “equipments” is constructed in a second move, and in this way, equipments are seen as *things invested* with value.²¹⁶ We can say that the main problem with this substance ontology is that first there is a *de-contextualization* of modern ontology of entities, and the discourse of values appears then in order to *re-contextualize* beings by an extra attempt to unify them in value relations. But this attempt to add value characteristics to value-free factuality of beings appears as a subordination of relationality to substantiality, and it never gives us a proper understanding of equipmentality and our practical Being. Let’s think of our experience when we use an equipment. There is no second move of making sense and evaluating things while we use them; relationality is not a secondary, but on the contrary, the

²¹⁵ Heidegger, *BT*, p. 132.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

primary characteristic of beings. In the very recognition of beings as this or that kind of being; in our understanding of a being in our practice, the so called “valuation” process is always and already there as a constitutive moment in our ontological understanding, it is implicitly background, and we do *not* encounter beings in a neutral manner and then value them. During our whole everyday experience of beings, we never direct our *concern* first of all to the perceptual properties of beings and then to their practical importance, our concern is directed always to the larger contexts of significance, in which our perception of these beings is shaped by our concern. This context of significance is always and already “value-laden” and obligatory. The Being of beings always and already bears certain goals to be achieved, and values are already intrinsic to the whatness and howness of beings. For example, when I accidentally meet a friend at a bus stop, I don’t say that I am waiting for the bus, but rather I refer to the complex action as a whole; to the fact that I am going to the library at the university. Going to the library is here the complex action which involves a set of actions such as walking to the bus stop, waiting there for a while, sitting in the bus while it is driven to the university, walking to the building, etc. All of these actions are expressed in the single phrase “going to the library”. The action that is the telos of my intentional directedness towards praxis determines the Being of what I am doing. When we analyze this complex action into its components, we reach simpler and atomic actions which together make the whole. For example, “waiting for a bus at the bus stop” is relatively simpler than “going to the library”. It is never the case that we first think each simple action or state and then unify them into more complex structures, but we are directed to the most complex states and actions at once as a whole and we can go to the atomic units only from the whole

itself by abstracting and isolating them. We do not add parts to each other and reach the whole as a consequence of this; the whole is always and already “pre-given” in our understanding. For in order to be able to focus on parts, to bring anything to the fore and thematize and problematize it explicitly, the background of beings should be pre-given to our understanding, otherwise, there would be no *fore-ground* at all without a background. It is this totality in the background consisting of means and goals, from which we are able to derive beings and actions as “present-at-hand” substances, isolated from their relational network. Pre-theoretical valuation –if we want to talk about something like a valuation- is more origin-al than that of the theoretical, explicit valuation. Such a valuation is pre-scribed into our Being as “do’s and don’t do’s.” which for the most part comes from the tradition.²¹⁷ But this affirmative and negative valuation is not transparent to ourselves; we do it as a way of Being which appears as a set of social reflexes. In other words, the *intentionality of action* does not appear as the consequences of a theoretical cognitive process of deliberation according to a set of ideal values, but rather, as the very original constitution of any way of Being in daily life. What do we mean whenever we say “I *am* a student”? What is the kind of Being which we express in all these phrases? As Heidegger emphasizes, it is a *way* we are is a continuous, never-ending “pressing ahead into our possibilities” rather than being a passive occurrence of a presence-at-hand state. We are who we are to a great extent through what we do. We actively *make* ourselves out of our possibilities; we bring

²¹⁷ The determination of the tradition is never strict and mechanical since each of us, as particular persons, interpreted what is given to us, and tradition determines our Being in different ways in different people. But this flexibility has its own limitations even if there is always the possibility to challenge the tradition. Even this challenge does not originate from an arbitrary, subjective rebellion against tradition, but arises out of an original interpretation of what is already given as tradition.

ourselves into what and who we are by our *understanding* of Being as our possibilities to be. This *making oneself one's own* is *appropriating*: the mineness character of our Being. In this sense, the phrase "I am" refers to our capacity, our competence of being this or that kind of a person. The *I am* is a disguised form of the *I can*. But not less than that, the "I am" is a disguised form of the "I ought". The possibilities of the "I can" are not free-floating, most of them are rather already laid bare *in front of us* and they are *ready to be chosen* as the possibilities handed over to us by tradition. The world is always and already disclosed; the possibilities are always and already articulated which open up a space for man to *dwell* in. Heidegger warns us against a *categorical and ontical* misunderstanding of the "In" of the "Being-in-the-world"; the "in" here means "habitare", "to be familiar" with something.²¹⁸ And this *givenness* of the world to us in its familiarity is possible only because we are born into a tradition which predetermines our understanding according to certain standards, and this restricted and pre-formed (vor-gebildet) way of Being is what Heidegger calls "*das Man*". Beings can be accessible only in a common, public vision rather than a private one:²¹⁹

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as one (man) takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as one sees and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as one shrinks back; we find shocking what they find shocking. The "one", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 80.

²¹⁹ In, Heidegger's term "*das Man*" is translated as "the they" in Macquarri and Robinson's translation. However, this translation is misleading because it gives us the impression that there is an opposition between the I and the they; and the latter is thought as "the others". Although in the quotation we examine we use their translation, we have changed here one term, "the they" to "the one".

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 164.

The German phrase “Man raucht hier nicht” is translated into English as “one doesn’t smoke here”. This phrase implicitly means that “one ought not to smoke”. In this word, the is-ought dichotomy collapses, while the Ought is not lost. On the one hand, the simple present tense appears here as the temporality of this kind of Being: one *does not* smoke here. This temporality would remain abstract and the sentence would lack its normative power if did not show itself to us as the mode of Being temporalized in the simple present tense, namely as an average, indefinite individual, who is expected to behave always the same pregiven and prescribed way: “the one (*das Man*).” The conflict between the Being of man and obligations not only disappears in the phenomenon of *das Man*, but it also turns out to be two moments of one and the same way of Being, which necessitate each other mutually. *In the phenomenon of the One, the more a way of Being is normative, the more it shows itself in an apparently pure way of Being.* Interestingly, this unexpected coming together of *the is and the ought* can be detected in the word “normal” clearly. We use the term “normal” continuously while forgetting that norm-al derives from the concept of “norm”. The word norm stems from the Latin *norma*, which means “carpenter’s square, rule, pattern”. According to Ernest Klein, it is borrowed from the Greek “gnomon” which means “carpenter’s square”.²²¹ The word “norm-al” is a characteristic which is formed according to the carpenters square; according to rules and standards. The interesting thing about this word is that we use “normal” mostly in the sense of “natural”. What makes something natural rather than unnatural? For a tiger, it is natural that it hunts a deer. But it is not natural for him to play chess. The more a tiger behaves in accordance with the presupposed essence of

²²¹ Ernest Klein, *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1971).

“tigerness”, the more normal (natural) it seems to us; that tiger exists as a (normal) tiger. The tiger is a more perfect example of a tiger, the more she fits the paradigm, the model of tigerness, determined by ontological norms of tigerness. So, to the extent a way of Being is determined by a normativity, this obligatory characteristic is expressed by a necessity of beingness; the necessity of a correspondence of the existantia with a prescribed essentia; rather than being expressed in the form of an explicit obligation which is opposed to Being. But the lack of such an explicit expression of the Ought is not an indication of its absence. On the contrary, in the phrase “*das Man*,” we encounter Being as a disguised Ought, which has its most powerful and subtle form: the form of neutral Being. We understand our Being via and in certain identities; we are students, workers, professors, businessmen, men, women, Turkish, German, American, Greek, etc. What and who we are is always practiced and mediated through these identities at each moment we *are* ourselves. We are ourselves by understanding of our Being in and through these identities, which are grounded in the implicit and subtle Ought of *das Man*. We make our Being accessible to a public realm by adopting norm-al ways of behaviour and render our Being via these norm-al ways of Being (Seinsweise) recognizable as this or that kind of a being. All these ways of Being belong to the network of the possibilities of “*das Man*” and these ways of Being are reproduced only if they comply to certain obligations, norms which define what *it means to be* a doctoral student, a male, a Turkish citizen, etc. in a pre-given and pre-scribed social world. In everything we are doing in daily life with beings, there are always certain prescribed ways of doing all of these things; the possibilities of our understanding of our Being are not only opened up (unconcealed) in front of us how to deal with beings; more than that,

they also closed (concealed) by the public and social norms of the inauthentic “*das Man*”. In this picture, the *Ought* restricts our *possible* ways to relate ourself to the world and beings in it. Through the pregivenness of the Ought, we have certain habitual ways and repeated regular patterns of understanding ourselves and our world taken over from the tradition. What we mean by *the Ought* here, is to be taken in its broadest possible sense; it is not restricted to a particular region of beings as opposed to others. It is the Ought in its utmost possibility; the Ought in its most general sense as directed to the totality of beings as a whole, as we encounter it in Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s idea of the Good, *Agathon* as the Ought put over all of the beings.²²² This implies clearly that the Ought underlies all human existence; it posits and determines our everyday existence at each moment we exist in the world.

Our problematization of Heidegger’s concept of *das Man* has led us to an inquiry, in which the concept of the Ought (*das Sollen*) announced itself as directed to the Being of all beings rather than merely to man. We need here to analyze the Ought further in order to see its metaphysical ground in Plato’s philosophy so that we can turn this analysis of the Ought into a constitutive moment in our construction of the phenomenon of Ontoparadigm.

The Ought as the Idea of the Good and as Ontoparadigm

Heidegger characterizes metaphysics essentially as “onto-theological. By “onto-theological”, Heidegger means that metaphysics looks for an ultimate ground for all

²²² Heidegger, Martin. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by Ralph Mannheim (Virginia: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 197.

being as a whole, which brings them forth and unifies them. This ground is thought as a highest, divine being like God.”²²³ Jacques Taminioux gives us a good idea what this twofold character of metaphysics means in his article “Heidegger on Values:”

Trying to express what can be said about any being as such, metaphysics inaugurated something like a logic of beings, a theory of their predicates, of their essence, of their beingness, in one word, it became onto-logy. Simultaneously trying to gather the totality of beings, metaphysics likewise set itself to the task of discovering which is in the highest possible manner, the supreme being which is the ultimate foundation of all beings. Thus backing beingness with a supreme entity, metaphysics inaugurates itself as theo-logy.²²⁴

As Taminioux points out clearly, the ontological and the theological characteristics of metaphysics are inseparable, and together constitute metaphysics as a unitary discourse. In Heidegger’s own terminology, the *ontological* and the *theological* aspects of metaphysics are “equiprimordial” (*gleichursprünglich*). This means that by definition, metaphysics *necessarily* employs a supreme, transcendent being put above all other beings. This *highest* being as the *prototype* directs its *obligatory* power to the Being of all other beings as a whole. In the previous chapters, we have characterized the essence of this highest being as “ontoparadigmatic”, whose basic way of Being is self-unconcealing.

Why is it crucial to our project to understand the metaphysics of the Ought for the construction of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm? The reason for that is that our conception of ontoparadigm rests on the concept of *das Man*, which is the inauthentic way of Being of Dasein. And our analysis of “*das Man*” has shown us that the Ought

²²³ See Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics”, *Identity and Difference* tr. K.F. Leidecker (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1960).

²²⁴ Taminioux, Jacques. “Heidegger on Values,” in *Heidegger Toward the Turn*. Edited by James Riser (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 226.

conceals itself in it, moreover, in its most effective, saturated, perfect form as a seeming “neutrality”. The Ought as *das Man* is prior to the is-ought duality, namely, it is more original, and the is-ought duality is derivative of this more original way of Being of the Ought. *Das Man* is a way of Being, in which the Ought is not opposed to Being; it is rather the most subtle way in which it realizes itself in the world. This means that to the extent *das Man* is constitutive of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm, the Ought is also constitutive of it. Ontoparadigms can circulate within the social network only because they are understood by Dasein as “norm-al” ways of Being based upon models (*Vorbilder*), and these models are actually nothing but a disguised form of the Ought in the guise of neutral, standard Being. Every model, every paradigm is actually the expression of a saturated obligation, which points to itself as the ideal state of Being.

Normally, there is a certain distance and mediation between an obligation and the ideal state of Being, which it points to. For the ought opposed to Being is unsaturated and it lacks in Being; it is the expression of this lack and the intentionality towards a state which would fill this gap between the ideality demanded and the reality of the current situation. In a paradigm, this mediation, this gap is lost and the Ought appears us as a saturated moment of Being: it is an Ought which has realized itself fully and completely, and that is why it does not need to change anymore towards an ideal state. It is the limit of temporality, where time stops. This is the case with Plato’s idea of the Good as well as the medieval God: they are forms of the Ought, whose essence coincides fully with their Being. In other words, in them, their *existentia* and *essentia* are the same.

After establishing the connection between the Ought and the concept of ontoparadigm in this chapter, in the next chapter, we will deal now with the question, what our account of ontoparadigm implies in terms of the realism vs. idealism/relativism debate.

CHAPTER 6

ONTOPARADIGMS AND THE PROBLEM OF IDEALISM/RELATIVISM VS. REALISM

We pointed out in the introduction part already that ontoparadigms involve all of the whole ontical regions of beings, and no being is immune to the constitution of ontoparadigms. Accordingly, there are no beings –not even physical phenomena or facts, which we consider to be brute-, which remain beyond the scope of the constitution of ontoparadigms. But then, does this not mean that we endorse with our conception of ontoparadigm a strong version of idealism and relativism? If everything is constituted onto-paradigmatically, and if such paradigms can function only through and in our understanding of Being, then from this, does it not follow that if we did not exist, then there would be no things, facts, or a world independently from us? To answer this question, a paragraph from Heidegger's *BT* could be helpful:

In the order of the ways in which things are connected in their ontological foundations and in the order of any possible categorical and existential demonstration, *Reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care (Sorge)*. But the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself it is.

Of course only as long as Dasein *is* (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself'. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within the world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But *now*, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be.

As we have noted, Being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being; that is to say, Reality (not the real) is dependent upon case. By this dependency our further analytic of Dasein is held secure in the face of an uncritical Interpretation which nevertheless keeps urging itself upon us –an Interpretation in which the idea of Reality is taken as the clue to Dasein.²²⁵

If the reality of something is dependent on my understanding, then does it not follow, that the thing at stake itself, too, should be dependent on my understanding? Not at all. Let's try to understand these phrases by an example. I see a tree, and the reality of this tree is dependent on my understanding. Should this mean that the tree would disappear, if I, or all of the intelligent beings in the universe with an understanding of Being, died just because our understanding disappears with our disappearance? If yes, then this conclusion would seem to contradict our observation that even if a human being dies, then the world still continues to exist, at least for other people alive, without being affected. Beings are not dependent on human existence in this sense, and beings do not cease to exist just because an understanding of Being disappears. If all beings with understanding would become extinct, then the tree would still continue to be.

²²⁵ See Heidegger, *BT*, p. 255; *SuZ*, p. 255. The translation belongs to Macquarrie and Robinson. The original: *Realität* ist in der Ordnung der ontologischen Fundierungszusammenhänge und der möglichen kategorialen und existenzialen Ausweisung auf das Phänomen der Sorge zurückverwiesen. Dass Realität ontologisch im Sein des Daseins gründet, kann nicht bedeuten, dass Reales nur sein könnte als das, was es an ihm selbst ist, wenn und solange Dasein existiert.

Allerdings nur solange Dasein *ist*, das heisst die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, "gibt es" Sein. Wenn Dasein nicht existiert, dann "ist" auch nicht "Unabhängigkeit" und "ist" auch nicht "An-sich". Dergleichen ist dann weder verstehbar noch unverstehbar. Dann ist auch innerweltliches Seiendes weder entdeckbar noch kann es in Verborgenheit liegen. *Dann* kann weder gesagt werden, dass Seiendes sei, noch dass es nicht sei. Es kann *jetzt* wohl, solange Seinsverständnis ist und damit Verständnis von Vorhandenheit, gesagt werden, dass *dann* Seiendes noch weiterhin sein wird.

Die gekennzeichnete Abhängigkeit des Seins, nicht des Seienden, von Seinsverständnis, das heisst die Abhängigkeit der Realität, nicht des Realen, von der Sorge, sichert die weitere Analytik des Daseins von einer unkritischen, aber immer wieder sich eindringenden Interpretation des Daseins am Leitfaden der Idee von Realität.

Obviously, this cannot be what Heidegger means by the “dependence of Being on understanding”. Then what does he mean?

The kind of understanding which is grounded in the physical structure of our brain falls under the category of “ontical”, and when Heidegger talks about the dependence of reality on understanding, he does not mean this ontical conception of understanding. Of course, without having a sufficient brain activity, which is the ontical condition of possibility of an onto-logical understanding, the latter, too, would not exist, but this does not affect the fact that the two are distinct. Now, Heidegger uses the term “understanding” not as a psychical or physical event going on in the world caused by a being called a brain; he uses it rather as a world-constituting, a priori characteristic of worldhood itself; as the condition of possibility, in which a world, men, brains, psychical or physical events can appear to us as what they are. If we problematize understanding as a brain activity of Dasein, which is ontical, then we have already presupposed a world opened up by a more primordial sort of understanding; otherwise we would not be able even to refer to a brain by using language. The tree itself is not dependent on my ontological understanding because my ontological understanding of Being does not interact with the tree itself as if my psychic act of understanding of my brain causes the way it is, or whether it is. No matter how hard I try to understand and interpret the tree in different ways, the ontical characteristics like its shape, its colour, etc. would resist change. That is what Heidegger means when he proclaims that “the real is independent of Dasein’s understanding”. It is only the real, which is independent, but not its reality. This means that without a prior opening of the real being through the ontological category of reality, it would not appear at all. But once reality is understood,

the real unconceals itself from the reality to us as something resisting. Reality is the openness of the region out of which the real shows itself. In other words, once the tree “is”, then it has an “in-itself” characteristic, which cannot be mastered by Dasein. But that the tree “is”, on the other hand, is dependent on Dasein’s understanding of its way of Being as presence. Without Dasein, there is no world, because there is neither transcendence towards a world, nor a resistance to this transcendence and accessibility. But once this disclosure happens, which is dependent on Dasein, *then, and only then*, the characteristics of beings, which show themselves from and within this resistance, appear as independent from Dasein. *Resistance, which is the independence of worldly beings, presupposes the dependence of resistance on Dasein’s existence; it is a characteristic of Dasein’s existence to encounter the phenomenon of resistance.*

Heidegger clearly states that “beings would neither be, nor not be”, which means that “*whether there are* beings or not” is dependent on Dasein. The independence of beings from Dasein appears only afterwards; as a second moment, once the “that-being” in its most general sense (Es gibt/it gives) is already given. Only on the ground of this most original givenness, which is dependent on Dasein’s receptivity, does the independence of beings appear.

As can be seen, the “that-being” of beings as a whole as worldhood (not the that-being of this or that particular being in an already given world) is dependent on Dasein. Moreover, and strikingly, the “what/how-Being” of beings, is also not completely independent from Dasein’s understanding, either. This means that the what-being/how-being of entities, too, depends on our ontological understanding of them. The “in-itself” characteristic of an entity does not tell us necessarily anything about how it appears to

us through its ontical properties, for even these properties themselves are partly relative to the ontological framework a certain ontoparadigm imposed upon us. So, we make here a minimalist ontological claim that “resistance” and “independency” of beings is a way of their Being, which we experience and cannot deny; but this resistance by itself does not impose upon us how our understanding of the whatness and howness of entities would result. It is only in this immanent sense in which Heidegger sounds like a realist, and his realism is then very close to the empirical realism of Kant. Heidegger takes partly a new form of a Kantianist position by introduction of the concept of *earth* (*Erde*) as a resisting element against the world, which are in strife. The concept of earth resonates with the Kantian thing-in-itself in the sense that it marks the limit of our projections, constitutions.

The understanding of the original that-Being is the minimalist understanding “that there is Being” (dass es gibt). But it can give only if there is a receiver of that which is given. And once this “Es gibt” is operative and the world is constituted, we encounter there a second, derivative, and independent “that-Being” of beings, which is given to us mostly as our *Geworfenheit* (thrownness), as Heidegger puts it. As Being-in-the-World, the whatness/howness of Being is much more about our projection while the that-Being is much more about thrownness. We find ourselves exposed to Being in the world; we realize “that it is”. It gives us itself (es gibt). This givenness is one essential moment in our experience of Being. And this givenness does not tell us anything about its howness; it is our projection which constitutes beings out of this givenness. But as we pointed out, we have to emphasize that this thrownness already presupposes a world; there is also a more original thrownness, or givenness: the “that-being” of understanding, which is

even prior to world-constitution. Once the world is constituted, we meet these ontological modes anew, seeing them as the structures of this world. Resistance is one of them. And Heidegger exhibits in his sentences we already quoted above this original “that-being” of understanding: the pure “Es gibt”:

When Dasein does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within the world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. *In such a case* it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.

That the world is, is the minimal ontological condition for my penetration into that world, and this does not say yet anything about how this world is. That I understand that there is Being (dass es gibt), is the minimal condition for Being-in-the-World. But once this minimal condition is satisfied, then independence appears as a characteristic of Being in this world. But even this independence is itself dependent on my understanding.

This might cause a legitimate question: if the fact that entities are independent from our ontical interpretations is dependent on our understanding of their Being, then does this not imply that this independency of entities could vanish in a totally different kind of understanding of Being? Do entities have the way of Being of reality because we interpreted their Being in the past in a certain way and this way of understanding has become dominant? Let’s ask this question with the basic concept of this study: could we have beings in a different ontoparadigm, in which they do not have reality as their mode of Being because we do not understand them as real at all?

It is very hard to give an adequate answer to this question, but there is a crucial point to be indicated here: that the independence of entities is dependent on our

understanding does not mean that it is necessarily flexible; it can be also something inevitable. In other words, there might be some ways of understanding of Being by Dasein, which cannot be otherwise although they are also historical. Whether independency of real things and their ontological modus of reality are absolute or not, is another big question, which exceeds the limits of our inquiry. So, we move on now to work out the implications of these considerations above on our concept of ontoparadigm.

To sum it up, we follow Heidegger in general, when we say “nothing exists outside of the range of ontoparadigms; not even brute physical facts”. An ontoparadigm organizes and rearranges the borders, differences, divisions between the ontological categories, which determine what it means to be for beings, and in this sense, the Being of all beings is dependent on ontoparadigms. However, beings themselves have certain characteristics, which resist ontoparadigms and a constitution of the Being of beings arises out of a combination of this *earthly resistance and our worldly projection*. The “product” we get out of this, is the phenomena, beings, and facts in our world, as we encounter them within the “as” structure of interpretation. We will sort out the character of this resistance further in the section 8.7 in the last chapter, where we will give a final formulation of our conception of truth.

Our account implies that the epistemological normativity we find in correspondence has its ground in the ontological normativity of the inauthentic mode of Dasein, which is *das Man*. This means that the truth of a proposition, which corresponds to a fact, a phenomenon, or state of affairs, or a being, is possible only because this correspondence is constituted, namely made possible, by an ontoparadigm. One can ask

at this point the crucial question, what makes certain ontological paradigms become dominant against others and succeed in being embodied in *das Man*, in social structures, so that they function as the ultimate criterion of truth? We have explained the normativity of correspondence away by referring it back to the ontological normativity of unconcealment as truth of Being, which is the inauthentic truth belonging to *das Man*. But now what about this ontological normativity itself? We have to explain further, why do only some ontoparadigmatic normativities prevail, while some others fail to do so? We will give the answers to these questions in the last chapter of our dissertation because our answers require that first we examine an example of a conflict between two ontoparadigms and see how this conflict results in a paradigm shift. This is the topic of our next chapter, in which we examine the Galileo affair.

CHAPTER 7
A CASE STUDY: HELIOCENTRIC THEORY VS. GEOCENTRIC THEORY OF
THE UNIVERSE
AND THE GALILEO AFFAIR

Introduction

In this part of the dissertation, we apply our concepts of ontoparadigm, onto-constitution and socio-constitution to a particular historical case and compare two rival theories, which are based on two rival ontoparadigms: the heliocentric vs. the geocentric theory of the universe. We will show (1) how the modern ontoparadigm constitutes the *heliocentric* theory as an example of *direct onto-constitution*, and (2) how the Aristotelian ontoparadigm constitutes the *geocentric* theory as an example of *socio-constitution*, which is an example of an *indirect onto-constitution*. As we will see, the socio-constitution of the geocentric theory by the Aristotelian ontoparadigm functions *coercively* against Galileo and this coercion has not only a brutally political, but also an essentially ontological/metaphysical nature. Therefore, Galileo's struggle for freedom against this coercion takes a *socio-ontological* form, in which he fights against the Church authorities, public figures and philosophers through a defense of the *content* of his own scientific theory as well as its ontological framework. This example is in a clear contrast to *Lysenkoism*, which is not a social constitution at all, but a brute, political coercion in the form of a pseudo-science. As we pointed out earlier, since social constructionism fails to distinguish genuine social determination from pseudo-

determination, it also undermines its own motivation for freedom from *constructions*. In contrast to this, our Kantian conception of onto-constitution not only describes a phenomenon appropriately and gives to it a concrete sense and applicability, which is an ontological task, but also points to the possibility of an account of freedom against “constructions” as opposed to a freedom against brute political and social coercion, which is an onto-ethical task.

The Onto-constitution of the Heliocentric Theory of the Universe by the Modern Ontoparadigm

Copernicus’ “On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres” was published in 1543, the year of his death, which he began to write in 1506 and finished in 1530. This masterpiece introduced the modern heliocentric model of the universe against the Ptolemaic geocentric model.²²⁶ Copernicus’ model was based largely on a mathematical and geometrical reasoning, which aims at a complete and elegant model of the universe, and was experimentally not better than Ptolemy’s. As Edwin Arthur Burtt points out in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*,

First of all, there were no known celestial phenomena which were not accounted for by the Ptolemaic method with as great accuracy as could be expected without more modern instruments. Predictions of astronomical

²²⁶ According to the geocentric model, the earth is stable the center of the universe, and all heavenly bodies revolves around it whereas according to the heliocentric model, the sun is stable at the center of the solar system and universe, and the earth with other heavenly bodies revolves around it. Ptolemy’s geocentric theory is based on Aristotelian metaphysics of nature, which distinguishes the earthly bodies from the heavenly bodies sharply and attach a centrality to the earth with respect to its place in the universe.

events were made which varied no more from the actual occurrence than did predictions made by a Copernican.²²⁷

Then what was the main motivation behind Copernicus' introduction of a new model of the universe, if not explanatory and predictive power? Moreover, *Ptolemy's model was in greater accordance with the everyday common sensical experience that the sun revolves around the earth*: we experience that the earth is stable, whereas the sun rises, reaches a peak point in the sky, and then sets. All other heavenly bodies, too, seem to move around the earth, if we stick loyally to the brute sense data we receive. This means that Copernicus' model was in conflict even with common sensical observation. If so, what reasons could Copernicus have to defend his alternative model? Burt continues:

... his conception threw the facts of astronomy into a simpler and more harmonious mathematical order. It was simpler, since in place of some eighty epicycles of the Ptolemaic system, Copernicus was able "to save the phenomena" with only thirty-four, all those which had been required by the assumption that the earth remained at rest being eliminated. It was more harmonious, in that the major part of the planetary phenomena could now be fairly well represented by a series of concentric circles around the sun, our moon being the only irregular intruder.²²⁸

It is highly surprising to discover here a will to simplicity and harmony, which overcomes even the will to common sensical experience of the world. What is quite remarkable here is that *simplicity* and *harmony* function as two ontological and epistemic norms at the same time, which seem to play a leading role in the formation of Copernicus' heliocentric model. They are *ontological/metaphysical* because these characteristics are attached to nature itself: Copernicus believes that the universe

²²⁷ Edwin Arthur Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*. Anchor Books Edition. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954) p. 36.

²²⁸ Ibid.

consists of a simple, harmonious order. Simplicity and harmony are features of natural *reality*. On the other hand, these are also epistemic norms because they impose a “model of scientific theory” as an ideal. If natural reality is simple and harmonious, then a theory which aims at grasping this reality, too, should be as simple and harmonious as possible. In this manner, while the heliocentric model is a model of nature which is based on a new ontology, it brings with itself also a model of scientific theory; a *model of theoretical models* that prescribes how to demarcate good science from bad science, a successful theory from an unsuccessful one. In this way, heliocentric theory is more than just a scientific theory: it brings with itself (1) an ontoparadigm which imposes simplicity and harmony as metaphysical characteristics on natural reality itself, and (2) a scientific paradigm; a new conception of scientific theory and scientific knowledge that prescribes how to construct “models” of nature. Note that with (1), we do not imply that it is first Copernicus who invents these criteria; these belong already to the Cartesian conception of nature initiated by Descartes.

Copernicus produced a hypothetic model, which was brilliant in simplicity and mathematical elegance, but which also lacked sufficient experimental basis. *It was Galileo, who corroborated Copernicus' hypothesis to a considerable degree by using more developed observational and experimental techniques.* For example, his observation of the phases of Venus provided observational support for Copernicus' model. Let us now point to some other claims of Galileo, which undermines the geocentric model independently of its positive support of Copernicus' heliocentric model. *Starry Messenger*, which Galileo published in 1610, included his ideas based on

the observations made with his recently invented telescope.²²⁹ One of the most challenging claims Galileo suggested in this book was that the surface of the moon is not smooth, and there are mountains on the moon. He based this idea on his observations of the irregularity of the line separating the lunar day from the night on the bright areas of the moon. Moreover, when Galileo trained his new telescope to observe the sun between 1610 and 1611, this time he detected some *spots on the surface of the sun*, which regularly moved from west to east. He interpreted these sunspots as belonging either to the surface of the sun itself, or if not, then as being in an ignorable distance to it. These ideas were clearly in conflict with the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model, which makes an ontologically/metaphysically *categorical* distinction between the earthly and the heavenly bodies. Aristotle's universe consists of two ontological realms, separated strictly from one another, and the heavenly bodies are considered as perfect figures with uniform, perfect circular motion. Heavenly bodies exhibit a stable, geometrical perfection and precision whereas all motion on the earth is vulnerable to discontinuity and change; their motion is linear rather than circular, and circularity is considered as more perfect than linearity. The idea that the surfaces of the moon and the sun are not smooth was undermining the Aristotelian assumption that heavenly bodies are smooth, perfect figures. Steven Schapin emphasizes that Galileo had to challenge the orthodox framework of the Aristotelian geocentric conception:

Within that orthodox framework the sun could not conceivably have spots or blemishes. Galileo was well aware of the sort of a priori reasoning that inferred from the traditionally accepted belief that the sun was immaculately and immutably perfect to the conclusion the spots could not be on the solar

²²⁹ Galileo made his own telescope in 1609, which he called "perspicillum". He is known as the first person who uses a telescope for astronomical purposes.

surface. He argued against an Aristotelian opponent that it was simply illegitimate to take the sun's perfection as an undoubted premise in physical argument. Instead, we must move from what Galileo took as the observationally supported fact that the spots were on the sun's surface to the conclusion that there might be as much imperfection in the heavens as on the earth.²³⁰

At this point, let us consider a possible objection to our claim that the perfection-imperfection dichotomy between heavenly and earthly objects is an ontological one. One could challenge this claim by pointing to the fact that whether heavenly bodies are perfect figures or not is not a metaphysical, but an empirical issue, which can be decided upon by empirical methods. After all, wasn't Galileo using his telescope to challenge this Aristotelian idea? This would mean that Aristotle made simply a false empirical claim about heavenly bodies, and Galileo corrected this mistake. Thus, there is no ontological proposition about heavenly bodies at all. Despite its seeming charm, this objection simply projects and imposes the Galilean, modern paradigm upon the Aristotelian paradigm and distorts the essentially ontological senses of the basic concepts like "earth", "heaven" and "perfection". This objection ignores the fact that there is a distinction between the *metaphysical* conception of perfection in Ancient Greeks, and the *sensible* perfection of heavenly bodies. The sensible perfection is simply an auxiliary component in the constitution of a *cosmological* perfection, which is based upon an onto-theological hierarchy between heaven and earth, transcending the sensibility of the bodies included in it. Moreover, neither "heaven", nor "earth" stand in this context for merely physical entities, although they have a physical representation, as

²³⁰ Steven Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 17-18.

well; they refer rather to the most basic onto-logical²³¹ regions of enabling the very cosmological order in its unity, which is irreducible to the merely “physical” presentation of earth and heaven as we encounter them in modern metaphysics. So, if the “physical” structure of heavenly bodies is proclaimed to be imperfect by Galileo, then this determination presents a problem for the Church authorities not because of its empirical significance, but only because it shakes the foundations of the more important cosmological perfection of the whole metaphysical order and hierarchy. Consequently, the perfection-imperfection dichotomy and its collapse at stake here, is not simply an empirical, but ultimately an ontological and metaphysical one.

In his study of the universe, Copernicus preferred the heliocentric model because it satisfied the norms of simplicity and harmony. Galileo, too, turns out to defend the idea that the universe is simple and harmonious by making an interpretation that undermines the perfection-imperfection dichotomy, which separates the universe into two ontological realms. If the heavenly bodies have nothing special, and have similar characteristics with those of the earth, then the dualistic characterization of the universe turns out to lose its whole sense, and the heavenly and the earthly bodies belong to one and the same reality, and can be studied with one and the same method. Accordingly, all natural objects, no matter whether they belong to the heaven, or to the earth, have the same metaphysical characteristics expressible in one single mathematical and geometrical language. These ontological considerations seem to stem from the new, ontological norms of simplicity and harmony. In this context, we can understand better why Galileo preferred to attach the spots to the sun whereas his contemporaries, *whose*

²³¹ Onto-logical means here the conditions of possibility, which enable an understanding, a phenomenal appearance of the being of entities.

observations were based upon on exactly the same sense data, “reckoned that the spots were small planets orbiting the sun at some considerable distance from it (ibid., 15). Galileo was the defender of a new ontoparadigm, which enabled the ontological assumption that *the universe consists of one single substance expressible by one single mathematical language*. Let’s call this assumption (P). (P) is an ontological impossibility in the Aristotelian ontoparadigm. In the modern ontoparadigm, (P) appears as an ontological possibility. That is why Galileo, who had already abandoned the Aristotelian paradigm and adopted the modern paradigm, could *interpret* the sense data and *produce* the factual proposition that the sun has spots on its surface without worrying about undermining the old metaphysical heaven/earth and perfection/imperfection dichotomy. Let’s call the factual proposition “There are spots on the surface of the sun” (F). (F) is an observational consequence logically *deducible* from the modern ontoparadigm. The contemporary observers, who were still employing the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, rejected (F) because it expressed a physical fact, which is rendered *ontologically impossible* in the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, which they belonged to. Observational consequences like (F) are logically not deducible from the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, but on the contrary, they are in logical conflict with the Aristotelian metaphysical assumption that the universe consists of two metaphysical realms, which is based upon the perfection-imperfection duality. The kind of factual propositions like that the sun has spots, or that the moon has mountains were *ontologically illegitimate* and therefore, excluded from the scientific discourse by the Aristotelians. The defenders of the geocentric model rejected Galileo’s factual claims, which are particular observable consequences deducible from the modern

ontoparadigm, *not* because of empirical reasons. They rejected them without checking the empirical reality, but *categorically*. Let's call the theoretical proposition "A sunspot is caused by intense magnetic activity, which inhibits convection, forming areas of low surface temperature" "(T)". By excluding deducible observational propositions like (P), the Aristotelian ontoparadigm also *excludes* some other propositions like (T), which yield observational propositions like (P). As can be seen, the modern ontological assumption (P) *constitutes* the *content* of the natural fact concerning sunspots by *enabling* the observational proposition (F) as a *possible* deductive consequence, as well as the theoretical proposition (T) as a possible proposition which *belongs* to the content of such theories. This is just one example among many other observational and theoretical propositions that are *enabled* by the modern ontoparadigm, which were *ontologically impossible* in the Aristotelian paradigm, and could not even enter a scientific theory because of their *exclusion* from the legitimate ontological discourse. In this way, the modern ontoparadigm *frees* a set of ontological possibilities, which consequently *enable* the formation of a set of observational and theoretical propositions. These enabled theoretical propositions are now *possible* generalizations about natural reality that are *allowed* to compose the content of a theory. The observational propositions, on the other hand, are now possible propositions that express particular facts deducible from the theoretical generalizations. Once a set of theoretical propositions is made possible, then the scientist begins to form hypothetic models that can yield more observable deductive consequences. To the extent that further observation and experimentation corroborates these deduced consequences, some of the possible theoretical propositions turn into actual theoretical propositions, which gain

now a real, material content. These propositions constitute the epistemic content of the theory, and they have an ontological form, which is expressible in the form of an ontological proposition. For example, (P) (*that the universe consists of one single substance expressible by one single mathematical language*) can be considered as the ontological form of (F) (*that there are spots on the sun*). (P) as an ontological possibility enables a set of possible theoretical propositions, let's say, (T)²³², (T1), (T2), (T3). These four possible theoretical propositions have the ontological form expressed in (P). (T) expresses the fact that a sunspot is caused by intense magnetic activity, which inhibits convection, forming areas of low surface temperature. Let's say that (T1) expresses the fact that the sunspots are *caused* by the activities of UFOs that move around the sun. Both (T) and (T1) are ontologically possible in the modern paradigm, but only one of them, namely (T), can gain a physically real content by producing considerably *more* true deductive consequences. (T) is ontologically constituted by (P) as a possible theoretical proposition. There are many other theoretical propositions in a modern scientific theory, which are constituted either by (P), or by some other ontological principles. This is what we call "constitution" of natural facts via theories. The question whether (T) will be transformed into a *real, actual* theoretical proposition depends on whether it will be successful in yielding sufficiently true observational consequences. This process of empirical testing of hypotheses belongs to what we called the "realization" stage of facts. At the ontological (*not necessarily* temporally sequential) level of realization, nature plays an important role in the determination of whether a possible fact can also be an actual one. Therefore, *constitution* and *realization*

²³² That a sunspot is caused by intense magnetic activity, which inhibits convection, forming areas of low surface temperature.

as two essential ontological stages in the formation of facts, and the two are in a dialectical relationship, in which ontoparadigms and nature respond, that is, cor-respond to each other continuously and form the content of theories and facts mutually.

Up to now, we have tried to show that Copernicus and Galileo have a set of normative ontological assumptions, which enable them to offer the heliocentric model of the universe. Simplicity and harmony are two basic norms of a new ontoparadigm, which conflict with the older pluralistic Aristotelian paradigm embodied in Ptolemaic geocentric theory of the universe. In Aristotle's metaphysics we meet *a plurality of substances*, each of which requires a separate, meticulous study by the scientist. As known, Aristotle sees each particular object as having a particular substance of its own, which renders it in one sense unique and autonomous. While studying science, one should be sensitive to this diversity and richness, and pay attention to the variety of *qualitative* dimensions, which cannot be studied by one single method. This ontologically pluralistic and crowded universe makes a categorical distinction between the heaven and the earth, and separates natural reality into two ontological realms, which is inappropriate for the "economy" of the "parsimonious" ontology of the modern ontoparadigm. The distinguishing characteristic of the modern ontoparadigm is its tendency to get rid of *qualitatively* separated categorical metaphysical distinctions between phenomenal spheres: reality should be as simple and uniform as possible because it consists of one and the same universal mathematical structure. In the modern ontoparadigm, all natural phenomena are reduced to one substance, which has the only characteristic of "extension." Not only are the number and variety of Aristotelian substances reduced to one single substance called "matter," but also this single

substance is very poor in qualities: all we can know about it *qualitatively* is that it is extended, and if we want to know more about it, then we can know more about it only *quantitatively*. Reality consists of purely quantitative, mathematical relations. If we remember Locke: qualities of objects, which are secondary, on the other hand, are simply our subjective affections caused by the primary ones. The Aristotelian richness of substances and qualities is replaced by a qualitatively poor, but quantitatively rich universe in which the traditional, qualitative distinctions like that between the earth and the heaven, collapse. *Simplicity* and *harmony* are quite new standards more appropriate for the epistemic purposes of the modern ontoparadigm.²³³

The Socio-constitution of the Geocentric Theory

by the non-secular Christian

Church and the Galileo Affair

What we examined up to now was an example of “the direct onto-constitution of science.” We showed how a natural fact is ontologically constituted by contrasting two rival scientific theories, which presuppose two rival ontoparadigms. We examined two basic ontological norms of the modern paradigm, simplicity and harmony, and showed how these norms function as “internal” norms in the formation of the content of the heliocentric theory by Copernicus and Galileo. This contrast also enabled us to present

²³³ Neither in ancient Greek, nor in medieval times, harmony, mathematical/geometrical precision, uniformity were characteristics of the earthly natural phenomena directly. Harmony had something to do with the transcendent, eternal heavenly sphere, which excluded the earthly bodies.

this case study as a “paradigm shift”, if we are allowed to use Kuhn’s exact phrase.²³⁴ This was an example of a direct onto-constitution of a scientific theory, not an example of socio-constitution. The heliocentric, modern ontoparadigm was *not* embodied in the social structure and *preserved* through social norms. That is why it was rejected and excluded for a while from the legitimate scientific discourse in society. On the contrary, as we shall see, the ontoparadigm of its rival, namely, the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, was socially embodied. This social embodiment took the form of the *non-secular Catholic Church*. As we pointed out earlier, the only difference between socio-constitution and direct onto-constitution is that, in the former, an onto-constitution is embedded/embodied in social reality, and in this way, it gains a *social* normative power in addition to its *ontological* normative power. This social normative power is actually a way in which the ontological normative power realizes itself in and through concrete social relations. In case a scientist violates the rules of an ontoparadigm which is not embodied in social structure, he turns out to violate purely ontological norms. As opposed to this, if he violates the rules of a socially embodied ontoparadigm, then he turns out to violate not only ontological norms, but also social norms which support those ontological norms. The violation of social norms leads to political, ethical and legal sanctions. The Galileo affair is a perfect example of such a violation and its following legal sanctions. Therefore, after having examined the heliocentric theory as an example of *onto-constitution*, now, let us examine its rival, geocentric theory in the context of “Galileo affair” as an example of *socio-constitution*.

²³⁴ See T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1st. ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1962), p. 10.

When Copernicus published his masterpiece “On the Revolution of the Celestial Spheres,” he was already in the year of his death. Copernicus was getting along well with the Church authorities, and he dedicated his book to Pope Paul III. Moreover, the book included a preface by Osiander, the German Lutheran theologian, who stated that Copernicus’ work is simply a mathematical construction that does not aim at representing reality. As we have seen, Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the universe was lacking a sufficient experimental dimension, which seemed to approve Osiander’s statement. This lack of experimental support prevented it from being a strong rival against the Ptolemaic geocentric model. If we take all these factors into consideration, we can guess why the heliocentric model had to wait over six decades for the accusation of being a *heresy* against the Catholic Church. Although Copernicus was never seen as a real threat to the Aristotelian paradigm, Galileo undermined Osiander’s statement by developing the experimental dimensions of the heliocentric model considerably. Unlike Copernicus, who could not have the chance to corroborate his abstract, mathematical model of the universe by empirical evidence, Galileo made rich observations with his recently invented telescope, which indicated that the heliocentric model is not simply an abstract mathematical construction, but can also produce observational consequences, which can be reached through a plausible interpretation of sensible data. Soon Galileo’s experimental defense of the heliocentric model and his ideas became part of the public debates among different social groups including theologians, natural philosophers, church authorities. This time, the Church authorities were disturbed by the presence of a natural philosopher who feverishly defends the heliocentric model on an experimental basis, which was much more convincing for people than the book of a dead man,

Copernicus, who presented an abstract mathematical system at his time. The Jesuit astronomers in Collegium Romanum in Rome, for example, were able to repeat Galileo's observations, and were influenced to some extent by his ideas. In the hands of Galileo, Copernicus' model became a real danger to the Aristotelian paradigm.

Galileo got his first serious attack from a Dominican friar, Tommaso Caccini, who preached a sermon in Florence at the end of 1614. In this sermon, Caccini criticized Galileo for heresy using the biblical text Joshua 10, in which Joshua made the sun stand still. New attacks followed this, and Galileo had to go to Rome in order to persuade the Church authorities. In February of 1616, the Inquisition convoked a commission of theologians called "Qualifiers." This commission was formed in order to examine Galileo's heliocentric view, and it delivered a report, which denounced Galileo's ideas for being foolish and heretical. This was a legal decree, and Pope Paul V ordered Galileo to abandon the Copernican opinions. Otherwise, he would face stronger sanctions. For some time, Galileo tried to stay away from the debate. Later, in 1632, Galileo published *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* with the permission of the Inquisition. It was expected that Galileo would present a middle-way between two rival theories. However, since Copernican theory was used as a more basic component of the work, he was ordered to appear before the Inquisition for trial. As a result of this trial, Galileo was sentenced to spend the rest of his life under house arrest.

As can be seen, in this example, the Catholic Church appears as a social structure which unifies and organizes a set of social norms, values, standards, and practices around itself. By embodying the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, the Church constitutes *socially* the content of the geocentric theory of the universe by *enabling* only the kind of

theoretical and observational propositions that do not violate the Aristotelian principles. It constitutes the geocentric theory through its social norms. The Aristotelian ontoparadigm makes a *qualitative* and *categorical* distinction between the earth and the heaven. But the heliocentric model undermines this distinction by claiming that the earth, too, is one of the many heavenly bodies in the universe. There is a dialectical, mutual relationship between the Church of that time and the Aristotelian paradigm. The pre-modern Aristotelian ontoparadigm *constitutes* the geocentric theory of the universe as well as the Church as a pre-modern social institution with its social, political, cultural characteristics whereas the Church *embodies* the Aristotelian ontoparadigm through a huge set of social norms, values and standards, which are realized in practice, so that this ontoparadigm constitutes geocentric theory. *This means that the Aristotelian ontoparadigm is the ontological possibility of the non-secular Catholic Church whereas the non-secular Catholic Church is the social actuality of the Aristotelian ontoparadigm.* That is why the social norms of the Church *support* the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, which is the ontological precondition of its material and social existence. These ontological norms regulate the social, political, cultural practices by giving them their ontological/metaphysical framework. When the ontological norms of the Aristotelian ontoparadigm are challenged by the modern paradigm, then the ontological *regime* of the whole body of practices of the Church, and the metaphysics, upon which this institute is built up is shaken. This is a threat to the whole social structure of the Church, which in turn reacts to the new ontoparadigm *conservatively* in order to preserve the older metaphysics which justifies its social existence. In order to preserve the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, which it embodies, the Church applies social, religious

and legal sanctions over Galileo, who defends the rival scientific theory of the rival ontoparadigm. The fight of the Church against the new ontoparadigm appears in the form of political, religious, and legal events like Tommaso Caccini's *sermon*, or the meeting of the *commission* of the theologians known as the Qualifiers, or the very *trial* and *punishment* of Galileo by the Church. As can be seen, the geocentric theory is socially constituted by the Church by being *enabled* through the social norms which support the Aristotelian ontoparadigm. We can interpret all of the social sanctions imposed on Galileo as empirical evidence for the socio-constitution of geocentric theory. While *enabling* the geocentric theory, it categorically *disabled* the heliocentric theory via *social* norms. And this social enabling and disabling were related to the conflict between two great ontoparadigms. This ontological conflict, which was embodied in the social structure, contributed at least partly to the misfortune and sufferings of the great scientist, the father of modern astronomy, Galileo.

CHAPTER 8²³⁵
OVERCOMING ONTOPARADIGMS THROUGH *SEINSFUGE*

Introduction

In this chapter, we will show that the phenomenon of ontoparadigm arises out of the forgottenness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), and it is a basic characteristic of metaphysics, which equates Being to a supreme being (as is the case in Plato's philosophy, who grounds the Being of beings in the idea of the Good), whose temporality is *constant presence*. By tracing this phenomenon back to its metaphysical origin and uncovering the contingent interpretation lying behind it, which is its condition of possibility, we will destruct it through offering an alternative way of thinking as opposed to an "onto-paradigmatic" one, which we call "onto-ethics". In this context, Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's *Agathon* as the Ought in "Introduction to Metaphysics" as well as the *Anaximander Fragment* will help us to analyze the temporality of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm. Our main concern here will be to search into the condition of possibility, in which something like an ontoparadigm comes into existence through a certain temporal modification of original (*ursprünglich*) temporality of Being.

²³⁵ The ideas I develop in Section 8.2., 8.3. and 8.4. are based partly on Section 1.1. and 2.1. of my Master's thesis. See Özgür Aktok, *An Ontological Analysis of the Ought: Towards an Ethics of Being* (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2005), pp. 69-84.

The Ought as *Agathon* and Its Etymology

The German word “Sollen” derives from the Proto-germanic word “skal-“ and “skul-“ and we find in middle Dutch “sullen”, and in old high German *solan*, which evolved into “Sollen” in the German language. “Skal” means “to owe”, “to be under obligation”. The Ought in English, on the other hand, is the past tense of “to owe” coming from the Latin *debere*, and it bears the meaning of “being indebted to someone/something.” The verbs which express the Ought in Spanish (*deber*), French (*devoir*), and Italian (*devore*), stem from from the Latin *debere*. The Germanic word *scyld*, which is the past tense of the word means “guilt”, and this led to the German word “Schuld” as well as the English word “should”. Obligation as the substantive form of the Ought comes from the Latin *ob-ligare*, which means to *bind*. In this sense, obligation means a binding force, which has been attached to God in the medieval age, and identified with God’s will in the form of a divine law. It is not accidental that Kant later attaches to the Ought the character of a law dictated by pure reason.

Heidegger interprets Plato’s Idea of the Good as the Ought (das Sollen) in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. What is striking here is that the Ought appears as one of four fundamental concepts of metaphysics. It is considered to be on the same level of importance as three other basic concepts of metaphysics: “becoming,” “appearance,” and “thinking.” Heidegger uses a diagram at the beginning of this section in which he puts “the Ought” above Being:

No elaborate discussions are now needed to show that in this differentiation, as in others, what is set apart from Being, the ought, is not superimposed on Being from somewhere outside. Being itself, interpreted as idea, brings with it a relation to the prototypical, the exemplary, the ought. As Being itself

becomes fixated as idea, it strives to make good the resulting degradation of Being. But by now this is possible only if something is set above Being, something that Being never is yet but always ought to be.²³⁶

In this interpretation, we should pay attention Heidegger's characterization of the Platonic idea as "prototypical" and "exemplary", while bringing these two characterizations together with the "obligatory" character of them. In this picture, *Agathon* appears as *the Ought* whereas Being is the *possibility* of the Ought. The Ought arises not from some external source; it originates from the immanence of Being itself as an *interpretation* of it. The second phenomenological moment to emphasize here is that Being is that which the Ought *directs* itself towards. First, Being is interpreted as idea, which is the prototype. Second, through this idea-lization, a *degradation* of Being, too, appears inevitably. This diagram suggests to us that once Being is idealized, it withdraws from the ontological realm of idealization and does not let itself be completely identified with idea, the Ought. At this moment of the fixation of Being as idea, it turns out to be in need of improvement. In this way, an intrinsic tension is placed within Being itself; Being is forced to a tension between *what it is*, and *what it Ought-to-be*. Heidegger's characterization of the Ought as "something that Being never is yet but always ought to be" expresses the necessarily ontological and intentional characteristic of the Ought. There is no such thing as an Ought in an abstraction from Being; it is *always* an *Ought-to-be*. In other words, it is not the case that *Agathon* as the idea has a primary mode of neutral Being, and that in a second moment, this primary mode gains a prescriptive, normative content of obligation. The most original way of the Being of the idea of the Good has always and already this intentional directedness in

²³⁶ Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 197.

the form of an obligation. In other words, the Good is essentially and necessarily obligatory; the Ought constitutes the phenomenon of the Good.

Heidegger's Interpretation of the Anaximander Fragment.

Seinsfuge as the original Temporality of Being.

Unfuge as the Forgivenness of Being

Now, we need to combine Heidegger's interpretation of the idea of the Good with his interpretation of the Anaximander fragment in order to clarify how the Ought originates from Being as a modification of an original temporality we find in what Heidegger calls "*Seinsfuge*". This modification results in an "Un-fuge", which is a distortion of this original temporality and leads us to a derivative conception of time as a presence-centered temporality. At the end of this analysis, we will connect our findings with the concept of ontoparadigm and see how ontoparadigm rests in what Heidegger calls the "Unfuge" as opposed to *Seinsfuge*.

At the beginning of the text, Heidegger gives a literal translation, the words of which he discusses step by step while challenging the translation and replacing its words with his own terminology. This literal translation is the following:

Aus welchem aber das Entstehen ist den Dingen, auch das Entgehen zu diesem entsteht nach dem Notwendigen; sie geben nämlich Recht und Busse einander für die Ungerechtigkeit nach der Zeit Anordnung.²³⁷

But that from which things arise also gives rise to their passing away, according to what is necessary; for things render justice and pay penalty to one another for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.²³⁸

²³⁷ Martin Heidegger, "der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 325.

²³⁸ We use here the translation of David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. See Martin Heidegger. "The Anaximander Fragment" in *Early Greek Thinking*. Trans. David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 20.

Here, *the arising of things* is interpreted as coming into presence by Heidegger. This is the arrival of things at the unconcealment of Being. On the other hand, passing away means to take departure from presence and move into nonpresence; namely, into the concealment.²³⁹ So, when something “is” in unconcealment as present, namely, when something stands in its truth as *Aletheia*, then this leads to a concealment at the end. Concealment is a necessary moment in the happening of truth as *Aletheia*. In other words, there is an inter-play between unconcealment and concealment when something appears in the world in the temporal mode of presence. In this context, Heidegger translates *adikia* as *Unfuge (disorder)* rather than the more moral term *Ungerechtigkeit* (injustice) of the standard translation. Note that Heidegger employs *Seinsfuge* (joint of Being) as a basic concept in his later philosophy. For example, we encounter it also in *Contributions to Philosophy*.²⁴⁰ Here *Seinsfuge* appears again as the opposite of “*aidikia*” (disjuncture, injustice), and it means *ontological joining, or juncture*. In music, *Fuge* refers to a plurality of voices each of which can be heard distinctively without a domination of any of them over another. In *Seinsfuge*, presencing appears on the scene in a *while* between past and future. As Heidegger proclaims in the *Anaximander Fragment*, this *whiling* turns into disjuncture (*adikia*): “when what lingers awhile delays, it stubbornly follows the inclination to persist in hanging on, and indeed to insist on persisting; it aims at everlasting continuance and no longer bothers about

²³⁹ Heidegger, “Anaximander Fragment”, pp. 40-41.

²⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65. Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1989.

dike, the order of the while".²⁴¹ Now, let's remember the words Heidegger uses to characterize the inauthentic way of Dasein, *das Man*. As already pointed out earlier, in *SuZ*, *das Man* is seen as "a dictatorship" and a "persistent mastery" over man's everyday being, which "prescribes the way of being of Dasein's everydayness". It is not hard to see the close connection between the *Unfuge* and *das Man*: on the one hand, we encounter *Unfuge* in the *Fragment* as something which results from the fact that something present "insists on persisting; it aims at everlasting continuance and no longer bothers about dike". The basic characteristic of *das Man*, on the other hand, is its tendency to impose itself as an unquestionable, everlasting, normal way of Being through a conservative attitude. *This close connection suggests that Dasein as das Man as the inauthentic mode of Being corresponds to a state of Being, which is Unfuge.* The establishment of this connection is even more justified if we remember that Dasein in its inauthentic mode of *das Man* cannot appreciate its own finitude and clings to religious or cultural ideals like an eternal life, which avoids facing death as its ultimate possibility. Dasein as *das Man* lives in a forgetfulness of Being and conceives beings in a presence-centered temporality, which corresponds to *Unfuge*, in which beings which arrive at presence insist on staying present forever: this could not happen if Dasein would not have a presence-centered understanding of Being, which denies the original temporality of Being. Therefore, it would not be wrong to proclaim that *Unfuge* as disorder, disjuncture, is grounded in *das Man*.

In *The Other Heidegger*, Fred Dallmayr distinguishes carefully the metaphysical hierarchical systems from Heidegger's *Seinfuge*. The former refers to what we call the

²⁴¹ Heidegger, "Anaximander Fragment", p. 42.

onto-theological essence of metaphysics which subordinates beings to a supreme entity as the highest value in a hierarchical system:

As one should note and as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, *Seinsfuge* must not be confused with a totalizing system or framework, that is, with a structure encompassing a set of empirical elements (or subsystems). What prevents such totalization is the present-absent status of being, implicit in being's withdrawal, which entails that grounding is also an ungrounding and the leap also the leap into nonbeing, or the abyss (*Abgrund*). In terms of the *Beiträge*, being as displayed in *Seinsfuge* is not an entity or essence but a source of agon, or contest, between presence and absence, revealment and concealment –or else, the interplay of “world” and “earth”.²⁴²

Now we can relate this conception of disjuncture, or injustice to Plato's positing of the Idea of the Good as the highest, supreme being over all other beings. The Idea of the Good, which is interpreted as the Ought by Heidegger at the same time, is the supreme idea, and it brings all other beings under its rule by being their prototype, their model, which dictates the normative regime of *what it means to be*. The eternal, never-ending presence-at-hand state of the Idea of the Good appears here as what Heidegger characterizes as “*the stubborn inclination to persist in hanging on no longer bothering about the order*” Here, the selfish stubbornness (*Eigensinn*) of persistence of presence is a disorder, which is derivative of *Seinsfuge*. A supreme being attempts to replace *Seinsfuge* by presenting itself as the most perfect being; as the everlasting model over all beings.

²⁴² Fred Dalmayr, *The Other Heidegger* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 111.

Ontoparadigm as *Unfuge* and the Ought

At this point, we can catch an insight into the temporal meaning of the phenomenon of ontoparadigm: we analyzed *para-deigma* as a self-exemplifying perfect example. A *para-deigma* is a signifier, which signifies itself; it is self-referential and self-grounding while all other beings owe their Being to it and have to refer to it in the referential totality. These beings lack in Being and are ontologically imperfect because there is a discrepancy between their essence and existence: their existence lacks in essence, which they can have only in a mediated way, and in and through another higher and more perfect being. These beings experience this discrepancy; this gap between their essence and existence in the form of an *Ought*, which they have to satisfy. Their existence is *guilty* in front of their essence, which they do not possess in themselves; this essence is in the highest, supreme Being, which is what we have called an “ontoparadigm”.

Therefore, the existence of these beings directs itself towards their essence through a strife which is located somewhere other than in themselves, namely in their ideas. This directedness of the existence of beings towards their essence is the only possible way in which they can exist; in which their imperfection is tolerated within a hierarchical system of Being. Plato calls this way of the Being of beings “*methexis*” (participation). Accordingly, beings exist as beings only to the extent they participate in their own ideas, and finally, in the idea of the Good put above all beings.

We could interpret this participation as some sort of a tragic tension put into the intrinsic structure of beings to catch up with their model. This lacking in Being and being imperfect makes beings “guilty” (*schuldig*) in front of the eyes of the ideas and

they pay their debt by opening themselves to the painful penetration of the light coming from their ideas; they “let themselves be” by exposing themselves to being formed and shaped by their ideas. On the other hand, their imperfect state of Being, which is a lacking, constitutes the very ground of their directedness to ideas as a trial to fulfill the gap; to catch up with their model. Never being able to catch up to their ideas and always falling back to their imperfect earthly existence, these beings can never transcend fully the impassible distance between their existence and their essence; that is why they remain guilty and imperfect in contrast to the highest supreme being. If they succeeded in catching up with their ideas and make up the distance, then the Ought would disappear for them since they would become fully “saturated” just like the idea of the Good, whose essence coincides with its existence. *The Ought as opposed to the is prevails only there, where existence lacks in essence, and the real, as that which exists, is subordinated to the ideal, as that which ought to exist.* The temporality, which has these three dimensions of past, presence, and future, appears only there, where the current state of reality of a being is negated by a state of ideality. This ideal to be reached, this *telos*, constitutes the futuricity for a being in a presence-centered manner. The idea of the Good is so saturated that there is no strife in itself anymore between its essence and its existence; it is an Ought, which has realized and actualized itself completely, and that is why the idea of the Good does not need a temporality anymore to exist. It is beyond time, a perfectly actual Ought. That is why it has nothing to point to other than itself; nothing to unconceal other than itself: it is self-unconcealing, namely, an *onto-para-deigma*. The ground of its Being, lies in its own Being, and nowhere else.

However, even the Idea of the Good as ontoparadigm is nothing but a contingent interpretation of Being itself, which has its roots in the history of Being. In this sense, even an ontoparadigm is not immune to the inter-play between unconcealedness and concealedness despite the whole appearance of the opposite: it has to be a moment in the finitude of Being in general. *In an ontoparadigm, the self-unconcealing is transformed into a state of absolute unconcealedness, in which the moment of the negation of the concealment is lost.* Even an ontoparadigm –no matter how perfect it seems to be- comes into existence out of the darkness of concealment and even it has to return back to concealment. This means that even an ontoparadigm is subject to the “law of *Seinsfuge*” in which everything belongs to a finitude. The problem with ontoparadigms is that they are a denial of this finitude and a claim to eternal presence while they conceal this denial and show themselves as eternally present. In this covering and concealing of their temporally finite origin, ontoparadigms rest on what Heidegger calls the forgottenness of Being. In this way, the actually transitory *presence* of an ontoparadigm is imposed upon us as the norm-al way of Being we have to follow. In this case, the ontological gap between the transitory characteristic of the reality of presence and the *ideality* of the projected future appears as an *unsaturated* violence in the form of the Ought for all other beings. Consequently, an ontoparadigm in this scene appears as the *forgottenness of Being* in favour of presence, in favour of beings in their present-at-hand mode: as the *Un-fuge*. Once Being is identified with a model of Being (an ontoparadigm), then the interplay between unconcealment and concealment as *Seinsfuge* is seen as some sort of *ontological defect* which should be got rid of, which should be replaced with an eternal presence. This onto-theological structure of

metaphysics as *Un-fuge* is the way in which an ontoparadigm functions in the inauthentic way of Being of Dasein. As we've seen, Plato's system presents a good example of such an *adikia* which results from a modification of *dike*.

We encounter here a contrast between letting be (*Seinlassen*) and not letting be (*Nicht seinlassen*) if we formulate the situation through late Heidegger's terminology. The Idea of the Good attempts to control the *futuricity* of beings by imposing itself upon them an Ought; as an *ideal* which they ought to obey. It does not let the future be an undetermined openness to new possibilities by performing its power over the ontological possibilities of *the is*. It renders the future to be a derivative of the present as fast as possible; it forces the possibilities to be actualities in the prescribed ways rather than leaving them as open possibilities. The Idea of the Good doesn't let the possibilities be possibilities. It demands from each being completely the full control in the visibility and reliability of *pure presence*. Here, the will to transform *the can* into *the is* in an accordance with *the Ought* appears in the form of an *ontoparadigm*. The darkness of possibilities appears in this picture as a danger to be overcome completely by the light of the Idea of the Good. In this context, *Seinsfuge* refers to a return to the forgotten Being and appreciating the finite nature of our existence by opposing the presence-centered hierarchy of beings in the form of onto-theology. Ontoparadigms as we encounter them as the highest supreme being as in Plato's philosophy, and later as God in the Medieval Ages, and later in the superiority of the subject over nature, have shown themselves in many different faces. The history of political systems, states in our world, for example, refers to a history of *Un-fuge* (disjuncture) in which *the is* is

subordinated to the violence of the ideality of ideas; to the ideality of ideologies, can be seen also as a history of political “systems” of our world.

That all of metaphysics is grounded upon the ideal of overcoming the biological demise of the body through the idea of an immortal soul is not accidental: it is a way for man to problematize and overcome his contingency and finitude. We can detect in this picture a disjuncture, in which man appears on the scene as the master over temporality and his finite destiny, by transforming himself into an eternal being. After the death of God and the soul, and later also the subject, it seems that man attempts now to catch immortality by reaching a post-biological state of Being, in which he overcomes his finitude with his technology. There is, for example, a technology developed in U.S since the 60s, which is called *Cryonics*, in which people let themselves freeze with the hope that in future they are going to be unfrozen with the highly developed technology for a much longer life; or maybe in a post-biological way of Being, in an eternal life undisturbed by natural, biological processes.

Ontoparadigms in the Everydayness of Dasein. Four Conceptions of Truth:

Truth as Correspondence, Pragmatical truth, Onto-Pragmatical Truth, Existential Truth

In this chapter, first we have tried to work out the possibility of a destruction of the concept of ontoparadigm from the theoretical aspect by examining Plato’s idea of the Good and Heidegger’s interpretation of it as the Ought. But a destruction of this concept has also its roots in the everyday phenomenology of Dasein and must be carried out in terms of Dasein’s understanding of Being, as well. We have reduced the normativity of

truth as correspondence to truth as ontoparadigmatic unconcealment, which belongs to the inauthentic way of Being as Dasein. However, this cannot be the last word about truth because the ontoparadigmatic way of unconcealment remains within the limits of metaphysical systems of ontotheology, which we attached to *Seinsvergessenheit*. Even if this conception of truth is “more ontological” than the correspondence conception, it remains still metaphysical in the sense that this conception is under the yoke of paradigmatic structures, which are onto-theological systems in a metaphysical character. *This means that in the ontoparadigmatic conception of truth, a proposition, an action, an attitude is true if and only if it fits a paradigmatic structure in a holistic manner and functions properly in this structure.* Taken in this sense, ontoparadigmatic truth remains still within the limits of a *pragmatical conception of truth*: something is true only to the extent it “works” within a given paradigmatic system efficiently; only to the extent it serves to the well-being of a model of Being. We have seen such examples of such an onto-paradigmatic truth in our study of the Galileo affair. The proposition that “the spots observed through the telescope belong to some space objects other than the sun” is in this sense true only because it functions successfully in the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, which is internalized by a publicity whose understanding of Being belongs to the inauthentic *das Man*. In our conception of ontoparadigmatic truth, we overcome the naive, ontical pragmatism of social constructionism as well as Rorty’s; however, our conception of truth in the ontoparadigmatic sense remains still dependent on an ontological version of pragmatism, if not ontical.

Let us elaborate on the distinction between pragmatical truth and ontopragmatical truth. Pragmatical truth is an ontical truth in the sense that the ground

of it lies in a success of coping with beings in the world. For example, Lysenkoism as a theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics led to disastrous consequences in Soviet agriculture, and therefore, it was false in a pragmatical sense. Lysenkoism attempted to explain inheritance exclusively by environmental factors while opposing genetics. In contrast to it, the assumptions of genetics about inheritance yielded successful outcomes, and they were pragmatically true. Galileo's claim that there are spots on the sun was false (because impossible) in the Aristotelian ontoparadigm, and this falsity was an ontopractical falsity relatively to the Aristotelian ontoparadigm because it was due to its failure to "work" or "function" in it. However, Galileo's claim was pragmatically "truer" in the sense that it enabled man to cope with nature more efficiently and successfully in general, by offering more control over nature in the long term. In the light of these examples, the distinction is now clear: Ontopractical truth is the kind of truth, whose condition is determined by its proper function within a given ontoparadigm. An onto-practical truth does not serve directly practice in society in the narrow sense of ontical coping with the earth, but it serves the "efficient functioning" of an ontoparadigm, and as a result of this, also the efficient functioning of social practice in a mediated manner. This means that pragmatical truth and ontopractical truth can be in conflict.

Through the analyses we carried out up to now, we have encountered four different concepts of truth, which correspond to four layers:

- (1) Truth as correspondence of propositions
- (2) Pragmatical Truth

(3) Onto-pragmatical Truth as *Aletheia*

(4) Existential truth as *Aletheia*

In section 3.8.3, we worked out the distinction and contrast between (1) vs. (3)&(4). In section 5.1, on the other hand, we focused on the distinction between (1) and (2), and provided an analysis how propositional truth as (1) in general is derived from pragmatical truth as (2) in the light of Heidegger's concepts of "readiness-to-hand" and "presence-at-hand". In this section, we have worked out the distinction between (2) and (3). In section 8.6, we will work out the distinction between (3) and (4). The order from the top (1) to the bottom (4) marks also the level of originality of these four concepts. Accordingly, the most original truth is (4), which is at the bottom, and which grounds all three other concepts. (4) grounds (1), (2) and (3); (3) grounds (1) and (2); (2) grounds (1). (1), (2) and (3) are inauthentic truths whereas (4) is authentic. This means that truth as *Aletheia* can be either authentic, or inauthentic. If it is inauthentic, then it serves a pre-given ontoparadigm, and it is under the yoke of a supreme model. If it is authentic, on the other hand, it is not dependent on a paradigm and through it, Dasein faces its own finitude as Being-towards-death and unconceals the Being of beings creatively, as we encounter it in works of art, for example.

These remarks clearly show us that truth cannot be reduced to its ontoparadigmatic as well as pragmatical character. Truth can appear as correspondence, as pragmatical truth, or as onto-pragmatical truth, but it is always something more than these: it is "existential truth" most originally.²⁴³ But then, what do

²⁴³ In *Being and Time*, Heidegger calls authentic truth as the "truth of existence", which can be found in Dasein's authentic disclosedness [*Erschlossenheit*]. See Heidegger, *SuZ*, 221.

we mean by “existential truth” itself more than that, which is correspondence, practical success, or ontoparadigmatic unconcealment?

As we pointed out, the ontoparadigmatic unconcealment of Being belongs to the inauthentic way of Dasein, which we call *das Man*. At the beginning, we also indicated that the ontoparadigmatic character of Being belongs to the juncture between unconcealing and concealing characters of Being. This juncture is parallel to Hegel’s principle taken over from Spinoza: *every unconcealment (determination) is a concealment (negation)*. This means that the ontoparadigmatic unconcealment is a way in which Being conceals itself at the same time because an ontoparadigm imposes a regime of Being which closes and suppresses the counter-possibilities as opposed to the possibilities which it opens up. Now, this conception of unconcealedness in its ontoparadigmatical sense is the inauthentic truth and that is why we cannot let this conception say the last word about truth. Then what is the authentic truth as opposed to the inauthentic one, which is ontoparadigmatic? The authentic conception of truth as unconcealment refers to an unconcealment, (i) which happens independently of ontoparadigmatic structures, and (ii) which happens at a moment prior to the stabilization of that which is unconcealed; prior to making the unconcealedness into a *persistent state* of endurance. It is the making of an original unconcealedness free of ontoparadigms into a model; a prototype, namely, into an ontoparadigm, which results in the inauthentic truth: A truth, which subsists in time as a presence-at-hand state, and which claims to be the ultimate signifier as well as the ultimate signified. In this way, truth as a presence-at-hand state of Being is made into what we call “reality”. Objective

reality, as we conceive it as an “external reality” out there is nothing but the inauthentic and solidified way of concealment.

Existential (authentic) truth is then not something which can be possessed as a present-at-hand state—as is the case with the inauthentic, onto-paradigmatic truth as *Aletheia*—it is rather a moment in which a previous solidified way of Being is negated (unconcealed) and overcome through the position of an alternative and original way of Being. And once this moment, this happening of truth, is left behind, the posited way of Being is mostly not abandoned and made into a persistent measure, a criterion, a model of truth for future. If this moment of position is made into a persistent positedness, then an onto-paradigm (*Vor-bild*) replaces the moment of pre-forming (*Vor-bilden*), and *the authentic existential truth becomes now an inauthentic one through this moment of solidification of the moment of unconcealing*. Thereafter, an onto-paradigm, which is an alethic inauthentic truth, functions in two ways: (1) it predetermines instances of *unconcealment* (*Unverbergung/Entbergung*) during the very formation of beings by prescribing the ways in which beings ought to be formed. This means that unconcealment is not free and it happens according to a model, and every instance of unconcealment produces a new instance of inauthentic truth. (2) It predetermines the *unconcealedness* (*Unverborgenheit*) of beings after they are formed and stabilizes them in a temporal mode of presence by giving them an unchangeable essence. *In this moment, the inauthentic production of the instances of unconcealment is made into products.*

In the light of the remarks we pointed to above, Galileo appears in our study as relatively *authentic Dasein*, who originates a fresh and new understanding of Being

whereas the Aristotelian metaphysicians, theologians and scientists appear as the inauthentic *das Man*, who stick to the regime of an old ontoparadigm conservatively. However, once this authentic unconcealment of Being is left behind and natural science has become “Galilean” and “Newtonian”, this moment of authentic truth is lost and the authentic truth of Galileo and Newton has become inauthentic *relatively* to the Einsteinian conception of nature and science. For this time, the modern ontoparadigm behind Galilean and Newtonian physics reacts conservatively against this new Einsteinian physics for a while. As can be seen, authenticity and inauthenticity are context-dependent. A truth is authentic only relative to its historical position in contrast to other truths. Aristotelian physics is authentic in comparison to the previous Ancient physics whereas it is inauthentic in comparison to Galilean physics. Galilean physics is authentic in contrast to the Aristotelian, whereas it is inauthentic in contrast to the Einsteinian physics.

One essential way and perhaps the best way of authenticity for Heidegger happens certainly through works of art as a way of coming into touch with authentic truth of Being.²⁴⁴ We can also realize here a parallel between Heidegger and Nietzsche in that Nietzsche also saw the close relation between arts and metaphysics and how metaphysics originates from a moment of distortion of the finitude and contingency of what is created as *Poiesis*: Every great initiator of a great paradigm is an artist just at the moment of this unconcealing and giving birth to a new way of Being for beings, but at the moment this new way of interpreting becomes a dominating model in history, the work produced turns into a metaphysical residue; a residue which was once a metaphor,

²⁴⁴ See Martin Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 1980), pp. 1-75.

but which is forgotten afterwards to be once a metaphor. Nietzsche sees the great initiators as such creative artists. Galileo would count in this picture as a kind of artist in the broader Nietzschean sense of the term. So, if the unconcealed being is not made into such a model of truth, namely, into a paradigm, then *Seinsfuge* is respected and the future is left open to the plurality of new ways of unconcealing. The difference between inauthentic and authentic truth consists in that the former does not see truth as the original moment of unconcealment and is not satisfied with this happening; it wants to go further and rectify this moment, make the unconcealed being into an ultimate truth. It wants to stick to this moment and to the being it unconcealed. In this way, the inauthentic truth arises as a distortion in the *Seinsfuge*, which is “Unfuge”.

In this picture, authentic truth means this opening of oneself to the finitude of Being and allowing the Nothing to play its role in this interplay between concealedness and unconcealedness. It means to overcome the fear of darkness and Nothing; the fear of disappearing forever from the earth, becoming Nothing -as if one did not exist at all. It is not accidental that in his later thought, Heidegger replaced his Dasein-centered conception of truth, which connects truth closely to projection. Instead of projection, he offered an alternative attitude towards Being, which is “*Seinlassen*”²⁴⁵, in which Dasein “listens to the call of Being” and tries to cor-respond to the sendings of Being. In his earlier thought, truth is grounded mainly in the activity of Dasein, in which Dasein opens up a world by his projection. That is why, in *BT*, Dasein’s authenticity is connected to the idea of “decidedness” (*Entschlossenheit*)²⁴⁶, which is closely related to the phenomenon of will. The unconcealment has the direction from Dasein towards

²⁴⁵ For a discussion of *Seinlassen*, see Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 188.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

Being. In his later thought, however, Heidegger seems to reverse this relation by changing the location of this opening: Dasein should expose itself to Being and try to hear what Being tells him. In this new conception of truth, the unconcealment happens much more from Being towards Dasein. We can interpret this change in Heidegger's position as his attempt to change the place of the emphasis from the projective character of Dasein towards its affectedness (*Befindlichkeit*)²⁴⁷, which is also characterized as Dasein's thrownness (*Geworfenheit*).²⁴⁸ It seems that the late Heidegger thinks that he has stressed the projective character of Dasein too much. By its calling us to listen to the order of *Seinsfuge*, *Anaximander fragment* seems to demand that we expose ourselves more to Being and listen to it while understanding beings not in a presence-centered way, but as beings, who appear and disappear in the interplay between unconcealment and concealment.

What makes Ontoparadigms into Truthmakers²⁴⁹?

The Dependence of Ontopragmatical Truth on Existential Truth

Ontopragmatical truths concern the inner justification of ontoparadigms and they do not provide societies with reasons for a certain ontoparadigm to change. But ontopragmatical truths act as a reason for people to stick to an ontoparadigm. By "being

²⁴⁷ For the definition and discussion of the concept of affectedness, see Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 171-172. In contrast to understanding as projection, which characterizes Dasein's relatively more active aspect, affectedness and thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) characterize its receptivity, in which it finds itself in an already given situation, over which it does not have control.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁴⁹ In contemporary analytic philosophy this term specifically makes a reference to ontic facts or states of affairs, but we use it here not in this narrow, technical sense. By truthmaker, we mean here the condition of possibility, which enables something (a being or a proposition, etc.) to be true.

a reason” we do not mean here a transparent consciousness of “being aware”; such truths function for the most part in the background of practices and they are internalized subconsciously. The dynamic of change comes rather (1) from the pragmatic interaction between the ontoparadigm and earth and (2) from the relation of the ontoparadigm to the meaning of Being. Through (1), an ontoparadigm either offers to that society a better coping with the earth, or it fails to do so. The former is a reason to stick to an ontoparadigm. (2) is ontological/existential: that an ontoparadigm offers to people an ethos, a dwelling, which provides it with a satisfying response to the question of the meaning of Being. Here, neither the question, nor the answer should be thought as theoretical; they are embodied in practice and uncovering themselves in existential/ethical attitudes. *The pragmatical reason can be valid only to the extent it serves the existential reason.* Moreover, it might also be the case that the existential reason requires a society to do the opposite of what the pragmatist truth suggests. In other words, it is possible that the existential reason is in conflict with the pragmatical one. Societies forget for the most part the existential/ontological reason and stick to the ontopragmatical and the ontical/pragmatical reasons. To the extent that an ontoparadigm prevails in a forgetfulness of the existential/ontological reason by a society and in a blind clinging to the ontopragmatical and pragmatical reasons, Dasein has the inauthentic mode of Being as *das Man*, in which truth of Being is experienced inauthentically. To the extent that in such a society the existential reason is remembered and problematized, the authentic mode of Being comes to expression. This authenticity can be experienced by an individual, or a group of people, or even by the majority of a society.

We have already seen that practice is one way in which Being unconceals itself to Dasein, and it is even prior to theoretical attitude. However, Dasein's essence -which is its existence- does not let itself be determined by any pragmatical conception of truth - either ontologically (ontopragmatically), or ontically (pragmatically)- because the truth of Being as unconcealment does not show itself to Dasein ultimately in practice. The fact that practice cannot be the ultimate way in which Dasein understands itself and its world in terms of the truth of Being, can also be understood by getting deeper into the ontological structure of practice. Practice is always located in a teleological intentionality, which is directed to a set of achievements in the world, and it presupposes a teleologically directedness towards goals. However, because Dasein understands its own Being as Being-towards-death -no matter whether this is inauthentic or authentic- such an understanding of this finitude as its own possibility should not allow Dasein to stick to practice, which cannot give Dasein the meaning of Being exhaustedly. However, since Dasein lives in a forgetfulness of Being, it sticks mostly to practice by being alienated to its own Being-towards-death. To the extent Dasein understands the ontological fact that all of its teleological intentionality is going to be cut off completely and throw it violently into the Nothing via death, it²⁵⁰ cannot exhaust the meaning of its Being by his *overall performance or success* in life in its pragmatical dealing with the world. This suggests that the ultimate horizon of Being does not show itself within the practical possibilities available to Dasein; it always and already understands its Being through its existential possibilities, which transcends not only its practical possibilities, but also grounds and enables the latter by being its

²⁵⁰ The reason why we use the pronoun "it" rather than "he" or "she" to refer to Dasein is that in German, Dasein has the neutral article of "das", which lacks a masculine or feminine character. It is the neutral characterizaion of Being, which preceeds ontical characteristics like femininity and masculinity.

condition of possibility in terms of their “making sense” to Dasein. *The whole pragmatical network of readiness-to-hand in Dasein’s world would have collapsed, if upon this network would not be shed the light of a “meaningfulness” projected from the ultimate horizon of Dasein’s intentionality towards death, which is the bridge between Being and Nothing.* Without negation, which leaks from our Being-towards-Death into our life, there would be neither position, nor negation. Just like Being itself, Nothing, too, is a possibility of Dasein: it is something which can be thought only as something happening to the “mineness” character of us. Even the possibility of a post-biological Being, which overcomes death through technology, is grounded on the possibility of the complete thrownness into Nothing

Dasein can interpret its own intentionality towards death and Nothing in various ways, depending on the ontoparadigm it lives in, either authentically or inauthentically. To be religious and believing in the idea of an after-life and an immortal soul is one way of interpreting of Dasein’s its own possibility as Being-towards-Death; or to be an atheist and believing in the non-existence of God, too, is another way of interpreting this understanding of Being-towards-death. These are just two examples of so many possibilities *to respond to finitude. In any case, ontoparadigms dwell mostly upon such an existential/ethical response, which opens up spaces/contexts of meaning.* Remember that Heidegger interprets the Greek word ethos as “dwelling place of man” in his “Letter on Humanism.” Accordingly, ontology can be seen as an “original ethics” if we think ethics on the ground of its relation to ethos,²⁵¹ because ontology in Heidegger’s sense is an attempt to call man back to his own dwelling place, to his own

²⁵¹ Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 271.

origin, which he stems from, but which he has forgotten. This forgotten origin is Being itself. In the light of this characterization of ontology as an original ethics, we can see that ontoparadigms include an *ethos* as their ground, upon which they are built up, and this *ethos* results from a genuine “coming face to face with finitude” of Dasein; as a result of a fight against Nothing in favour of Being. It was not a naive wondering about beings surrounding them, but rather the fatal challenge of finitude and Nothing, which led the Ancient Greeks to ask the question of Being: “Why are there beings, rather than nothing?” They were aware of the fact that without a serious problematization of finitude, practical life consisting of teleological intentionality would remain completely groundless. Why so? It is only because Dasein does not direct its intentionality directly to practice as if a subject “attaches meaning” from an internal sphere towards something external to it; Dasein has an practical intentonality only because it dwells always and already in a larger context of meaning, which is beyond its will and practice, and only because it comes “back and forth” between these contexts and focusrd over and over again on its narrower context from the range of the larger one, which constitutes its horizon of intentionality, or “projection” (Entwurf) in the Heideggerian sense.²⁵² Dasein can make changes and affect its environment surrounding him in this narrower context of practice, but this is possible only because its understanding of Being circulates always and already in the largest context of meaning, which is the meaning of Being itself, and this meaning is determined by the border and tension between Being and Nothing. Dasein’s *practice* as practice cannot penetrate into such a large context of Being whose border is drawn by Nothing. *The larger the context of meaning becomes,*

²⁵² Heidegger replaces mostly Husserl’s notion of intentionality with his concept of Entwurf and uses it as an operative term, however we will make use also the Husserlian term of intentionality if the context demands it from us.

the smaller becomes the affectivity of Dasein's will and practice. And Dasein does not dwell primordially and firstly in this narrow *changable* environment and it does not direct its care first to that which is ontically closest to it, and then in a second move to the larger context of worldhood; it dwells rather always and already in the largest context of meaning at once, from which it comes back to the narrower one and focuses on this narrower context of practice by deriving and individuating it from the larger context of meaningfulness. Of course, this dwelling in the largest context of meaning remains hidden for the most part from Dasein because it lives in a forgetfulness of Being as *das Man*. But this does not change the fact that the meaningfulness of the practice in the narrow context is only derivative of a meaningfulness of the larger, which is not practical at all. Dasein is not located in the narrow context of practice and it does not have a location at all. "Dasein" as a term characterizes much more *the moving of back and forth between these different contexts, spaces of meaning*; and between the narrow contexts of practicability and the larger contexts beyond this practicability. Since Dasein dwells always and already within the largest space opened up in front of it circumscribed by the ultimate horizon of the juncture where Being meets Nothing, it is this ultimate horizon, from which Dasein determines its practice through a *mediation*; through a *detour*. In other words, Dasein's practical projection does not direct itself directly to practice; it is mediated first of all through its understanding of its own existential possibilities, most of which are not practical. This largest space of meaning of Dasein's possibilities is circumscribed by its impossible possibility, namely that of death, and Nothing. That is why truth cannot be reduced to Dasein's practical projection. Such a practical projection is derivative of a more original, primordial one,

which is Being-towards-death. Being does not stop to send its unconcealment—as well as concealment—to Dasein just because Dasein finds itself in a hopeless situation where its practical possibilities are completely exhausted. To give one example, we can think of a prisoner, who is going to die after a couple of minutes in an electric chair. He does not have any practical options left except from yelling, crying, trying to get rid of his chair, or simply waiting silently the moment of death. Even in this situation, the meaning of its Being is not less unconcealed to this prisoner than in a normal everyday practice; on the contrary, to the extent the prisoner understands his situation in a sufficiently authentic manner, these last minutes could be for him the best chance to take a genuinely ethical attitude towards his death *for the first time in his life* by responding to this situation with an authentic feeling and understanding. This exhaustedness of practical/pragmatical possibilities of Dasein is not only not an obstacle to respond to its “unpractical” situation in a meaningful way; on the contrary, it is perhaps even the best condition of possibility, in which Dasein can respond to its own situation in a genuinely authentic and ethical manner, which could disclose even a higher form of meaning.²⁵³ This meaningfulness stems from the question, which Heidegger asked throughout his whole life, namely: the question concerning the meaning of Being. It is not a merely theoretical question, and it does not have a merely theoretical answer, either. Asking this question is rather an existential as well as an ethical, aesthetical attitude towards the world. This existentiality does not exclude the

²⁵³ Here one could object that we use a narrow sense of practice, and even in that case, where the seemingly more explicit practical possibilities are exhausted, the very “attitude” of the prisoner is practical. However, such an expansion of the term of “practice” would render the distinction between “activity” and “passivity” redundant and practice as a concept needs this contrast so that we can make sense of it in its distinction to theoretical attitude. Of course, if one wants to use the term “practice” in such a broad sense, then we would have to reply that even if there is this broader sense of practice, our target in this context is a narrower phenomenon, and the soundness of our arguments are unaffected by such an expansion of the term.

theoretical questioning; it rather includes and enriches it. Without asking the question of Being, one cannot ask the question of good life appropriately. *The question of the meaning of Being includes, but transcends even, the question concerning the meaning of life.*

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have clarified the distinction between authentic truth as unconcealment and the inauthentic truth as unconcealedness. What we mean by “onto-ethical” thinking should be made clear in the light of this distinction: An onto-ethical thinking is a thinking which *cares* (*sorgen*) for the *Seinsfuge* and the plurality of beings, and which resists any attempt of making certain ways of Being into onto-paradigms. In other words, onto-ethics is a way of thinking in which man dwells in the ontological difference, reminding himself and his fellows of the finitude of Being and guards on the borderline between Being and Nothing.

Our inquiry has led us in a way in which we formulated our philosophical attitude as an onto-ethics, which directs itself to *Seinsfuge*. *Seinsfuge* characterizes a pluralistic and non-hierarchical unity of beings as opposed to the suppressive systems of metaphysics in the form of ontotheology. In the light of Heidegger’s change of the point of emphasis, we should rethink now one of the most basic concepts we use in philosophy in general, which we used also throughout the whole of this dissertation: *the concept of constitution*. We characterized onto-constitution as the basic achievement of ontoparadigms. In our inquiry, constitution has shown itself as the basic way in which

ontoparadigms act: an ontoparadigm constitutes beings in terms of their ontological possibilities. The way in which an ontoparadigm constitutes is onto-constitution. If we deconstruct the concept of ontoparadigm and return to *Seinsfuge*, then this implies that we cannot continue our thinking with the concept of constitution, which belongs to the ontoparadigmatic thinking. Constitution is the basic way in which ontoparadigms act as ontoparadigms. Ontoparadigms do not subsist in some transcendent realm of Being and act by themselves like independent systems: they act in the *very projection of our understanding of Being* although their acts cannot be reduced to the mental states of particular individuals. This suggests that constitution is a way of projecting, a way of taking an attitude towards the Being *of us*, and even such a basic act of understanding rests on an interpretation of the Being of beings.

What is this interpretation? We have deciphered the essence of constitution to be ontoparadigmatic, in which a being is given a form according to a model, a prototype. In this sense, constitution is a production, an act of *poiesis*. It produces beings by synthesizing them out of a given set of possibilities and making from their pre-giveness some new sets, combinations of them as possibilities. In a metaphysical attitude, *production is always a movement from a relatively lower ontological status towards a higher one*. It is a synthesis, a gathering of elements which show themselves as the relatively raw material, out of which something is produced with a new form. This is a movement from the relatively non-existing being, which is the raw material relatively to that which is produced as the outcome of paradigmatic formation, and this outcome, this product, is a relatively *more* existing being, which is richer in *form*. If we want to free ourselves and our understanding of Being from the domination of ontoparadigms, then

it is necessary that we put an end to this one-sided movement from the materiality of beings towards their formality, because it belongs to the onto-paradigmatic, onto-theological, hierarchical structure of metaphysical systems, which we try to overcome through what Heidegger calls "*Seinsfuge*". If we want to think in the light of *Seinsfuge* instead of under the yoke of ontoparadigms, then we should ask: how would these two phenomena, namely matter and form, be placed and related in *Seinsfuge*, which is a plurality of voices of beings, lacking a hierarchical systematization of them? If matter is always and already subordinated to form throughout the history of metaphysics, then this has been an *Unfuge* in terms of their relation, which is *adike*. How can we provide matter²⁵⁴ with a return to a state of dike, a state of "justice", in which it gains a free relation to form, instead of being dominated by it? What is the "penalty" which the phenomenon of form has to pay to the phenomenon of matter?

Perhaps, a word could give us some idea in which we could hear the possibility of *Seinsfuge*: we call it *de-stitution*. We should not think this word in its usual, everyday meaning of "poverty", although this everyday meaning is also closely related to what we want to mean by it. We should think this word in its original meaning stemming from Latin. Destitution derives from *destituere*, meaning "to abandon", "to forsake" "to put away". *Destitute* as adjective means "lacking resources, impoverished, deficient", which presents a clear contrast to "*paradigmatic*" meaning "perfect" and "completely saturated as a model, as a prototype". We offer this word as the complementary counterpart of *con-stitution*. Whereas con-situation refers to a movement from Being towards

²⁵⁴ We mean here certainly not matter in the materialist sense as opposed to idea; we use here 'matter' more in the sense of the Heidegger's concept of earth.

beings through production, de-stitution characterizes a movement from beings towards Nothing, which is a return to the uttermost origin of our Being.

But then, how is it possible to take a *de-stitutive* attitude towards of the Being of beings in contrast to a *con-stitutive* one? What does de-stitution mean? The answers to these questions demand from us a separate inquiry into the meaning of Nothing, which exceeds the limits of this study. But a clue can be found in the words of the thinker, who made us aware of our forgetfulness:

Wie aber, wenn das Seyn selbst das Sichentziehende wäre und als die Verweigerung wüste? Ist diese ein Nichtiges oder höchste Schenkung? Und ist gar erst kraft *dieser Nichthaftigkeit* des Seyns selbst das "Nichts" voll jener *zuweisenden* "Macht" deren Beständnis alles "Schaffen" (Seienderwerden des Seienden) entspringt?²⁵⁵

But how would it be if be-ing itself were the self-withdrawing and would hold sway as refusal? Is this something insignificant or the highest gifting? And is it even above all by virtue of this not-character of be-ing itself that the "nothing" is full of that allotting "power" whose steadfastness gives rise to all "creating" (the becoming more-being of beings)?²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), p. 246.

²⁵⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 173. We have changed only the last phrase in the paranthesis, which we find incorrect. The original translation is "a being becoming more-being".

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