

THE PHOTOCOPIED 1990S: YOUTH, CULTURE, AND FANZINES

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This thesis strives to elucidate the cultural transformation of a period, the 1990s, considering fanzines as products of youthful experiences. The 1990s are conceptualized throughout the thesis following the argument of “Society of the Spectacle” which is very fruitful to grasp the evolution of youth from a social category to a symbolic capital full of exclusionary concepts. With a different perception of youth in a historically constructed perspective, thesis seeks to negate a common public mood in the post-1980s years that claimed the apoliticalness and the silence of the non-adult members of society. In that sense, despite their anti-social and pessimist satire, the thesis takes fanzines as “social-texts” produced by youthful experiences to survive in a climate of cultural transformation that displaced all recognized social identifications. Therefore, the thesis stands on three main bodies, namely youth, culture, and fanzines in order to demonstrate the reciprocal process of the determination of historical context and the social text and its subject. On the other hand, although fanzines pinpoint a very small extent of youthful experiences, they may help to remember a history which is not merely full of repression and fragmentation, but also of possibilities and refusals which reckoned with their present, not a glorified past or promising future. As a consequence, fanzines as a spectacular response to the reign of spectacle, within a historicist framework, may present the clues to many in order to guide their struggle to survive in an everydayness that is collapsed and rebuilt by the new culturalist turn of global capitalism.

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Başlık: Fotokopi 1990lar: Gençlik, Kültür ve Fanzinler

Bu tez, bir dönemin yani 1990lar'ın kültürel dönüşümünü gençlik tecrübelerinin ürettiği fanzinleri dikkate alarak aydınlatmaya çalışmaktadır. 1990lar tez boyunca, gençliğin toplumsal bir kategoriden giderek dışlayıcı kavramlar silsilesi olan bir sembolik sermayeye dönüşmesini kavramak için son derece verimli olan “Gösteri Toplumu” savını izleyerek kavramsallaştırılmaktadır. Tarihsel olarak inşa edilmiş farklı bir gençlik algısıyla beraber, tez 1980ler sonrası gençliğin apolitikliğine ve sessiz olduğuna dair yaygın kamusal inancı bütünüyle olumsuzlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda anti-sosyal ve karamsar hicivlerine rağmen tez, fanzinleri bilinen toplumsal aidiyetleri yerlerinden eden kültürel dönüşümde ayakta kalmak için gençlik tecrübesi tarafından üretilen “toplumsal metinler” olarak ele alır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, tarihsel bağlam ile toplumsal metin ve onun öznesi arasındaki karşılıklı belirlenimi göstermek için 3 ayak üzerinde, yani gençlik, kültür ve fanzinler üzerinde durmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, fanzinler çok kısıtlı bir gençlik tecrübesini sabitlese bile sadece baskı altında tutma ve parçalanmadan ibaret bir tarihi değil; aynı zamanda yüceltilmiş bir geçmiş ya da umut vaat eden geleceğin aksine kendi güncellikleriyle hesaplaşan imkanları ve reddiyeleri de barındıran bir tarihi hatırlamada yardımcı olabilir. Sonuç olarak gösteri toplumuna yönelik görsel bir cevap olan fanzinler, historisist bir çerçevede küresel kapitalizmin yeni kültürcü sapağının yıkıp yeniden kurduğu gündeliklik içinde, birçoklarına ayakta kalmak için mücadelelerine yön verebilecek ipuçları sunabilir.

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*To my mother
Leyla Haciosmanođlu*

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Fanzine, in textual definition, means all publications produced “by fans for fans” or as it has been relentlessly – and stereotypically, of course – explained in the common language, let us say in mainstream news and articles, it is produced from the “fan” of “fanatic” and the “zine” of magazine. Not only do both of these short definitions content with the result and miss the reason behind “doing fanzines,” they say almost nothing about the context through which all these messy-in-appearance photocopied papers are disseminated. Confining in the terminology of the word “fanzine,” what should be kept in mind that although “fan” and “fanatic” have the same denotation, “fan” has a different connotation than that of “fanatic.” Craig Saper stresses the difference that “the term fan conjures an isolated pathetic character idolizing . . . genres of films, television, and literature like science fiction.” The etymological origin of the word fanzine, hence, in a precise textual sense, will bring us back to years, when it was first used by U.S. film studios in the 1920s as a part of the publicity machine.¹ Nevertheless, the fanzines produced by fans appeared in the 1930s and the main rupture came with the late 1960s’ and early 1970s’ conceptual art wave with the impact of science-fiction fanzines in the 1940s.² However, all these early Anglo-American roots have nothing to say us about the fanzines taken into account here.

¹ Craig Saper, "Intimate Bureaucracies & Infrastructuralism: A Networked Introduction to Assemblings," *Postmodern Culture* 7, no. 3 (1997): p. 11.

² Ibid.

Before saying what is meant by fanzine, it seems better to give the word to a Turkish zinester: “a sort of publication which just needs a few words to say, glue, scissors, papers, and a photocopy machine.”³ Search for a medium to document “a few words to say,” years in which fanzines became a part of cultural transformation, and finally the owners of these words, young people, are three grounds for this thesis: youth, culture, and fanzines.

While preparing a presentation about Turkish fanzines, I have noticed that the 1990s in Turkey and youth as a concept have to be considered first. All of the fanzines examined in this thesis can only be generalized on two points: First, they are precisely cultural products of the 1990s, both historically and mentally. Therefore, the cultural climate of the 1990s’ appeared as the web of social and cultural relations out of which fanzines sprang. For sure, in the fanzines examined here there is a strict condemnation and a pessimist satire of society and culture as a whole, yet they were, nevertheless, speaking in a subcultural language which can not be separated fully from the dominant cultural frame. As a starting point for many subcultural inquiries, what the fanzines of the 1990s did also was to use any cultural sign of the dominant culture by distorting its meaning, breaking its relations with its context and imposing new meaning on it. Second, they were, of course with exceptions, edited and released by young people – either by an individual or a small group of young people. In this regard, the concept “youth,” I think, has to be taken into account if fanzines serve as a means of cultural refusal for young people.

However, one should notice that I do not take “youth” in a full sociological framework. Especially in the first chapter, the term “youth” is examined as the processes through which it has been transformed from a modern social category of

³ *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no. 1 (1999). For original text see Appendix, p. 139.

transition to a postmodern prolongable fetish condition of being youth. Yet the resonation of all meanings attributed to youth or discourses of Youth – with capital “Y” – is by no means possible with the youth – small “y” – experiences. The tension between it and them, namely between Youth as discourse and youth experiences, extends and narrows in specific historical moments. Whereas this sliding ground of conflict, where cultural contestations occur, is always the place of power and struggle; the signs and cultural outputs of this conflict, whether they are hegemonic or not, transform into different forms according to economic, social and cultural turns.

As one can grasp, the term “youth” adopted in the first chapter, in addition to the Youth discourse, refers to the young people as they appeared in their contestation towards the hegemonic discourse on them in historical periods, like 1968 and the 1970s as Turkey’s vast political appearance of young people in the public space. Therefore the subject of the first chapter is the politically involved youth in history. I should admit that the usage of “youth” has a masculine tone. This is because of the deliberate effort by the zinesters to keep their personalities confidential and of my respect for this effort. Moreover, although I discuss how “youth” as a social category is historically constructed, even in a glance one can notice that it is still in use as if it is a given thing. The main argument beneath the usage of Youth (as discourse) and youth (as experiences) in a double sense emerges from this concern.

The reason beneath the need that just regarding the young people of the student activists of the 1968 and the more broadly participated ones of the 1970s as the scope of the youth experiences, is to understand a generational discourse, of 1968, that appeared in the post-1980s’ media language which extended in the public sense with the assertion that all youth after 1980 were nothing but apolitical

consumers. As Jean and John Comaroff suggest there is a strong relation between the transformation of capitalism in its millennial age and the feeling for a loss of social identities; new identifications, like the burgeoning importance of generation can be related to this feeling.⁴ Indeed, if the apoliticalness of youth is stated, it is therefore the apoliticalness of the whole society. For sure, a massive distancing from politics, not in the sense of the participatory representative system, but dismissing the social tensions and conflicts occurred in the post-1980s years. But before claiming that youth are apolitical, the new language, thanks to the new media, silencing many refusals and reactions against the new society especially of the 1990s, which I discuss in Chapter Three with references to “the society of the spectacle” argument, should be discussed. Through this perspective, two examples, one of which is the civil war engaged in the south-eastern Turkey during the 1990s with the recruiting of many Kurdish young people and the other of which is the “*Koordinasyon*”⁵ movement in the universities that started with the protests in 1995 against the increases in tuition fees, can be saved from their absence in the collective memory. Especially, the first still have a strong traumatic effect in the collective unconsciousness. Therefore, before labeling any experience or ways of refusal, in my case the youthful ones, such as revolutionary or apolitical, the devastating transformations that a society underwent must be understood because any transformation is located on the strategies of privileged classes intending to set a new cultural realm and on the flattening of many other relations and experiences. Thus, hegemony in the extended sense that Raymond Williams uses is not singular: “indeed its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be

⁴ See, Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," *Public Culture* 2, no. 12 (2000).

⁵ For the discussion of the *Koordinasyon* within the movement see, Kerem Ünüvar Bağış Ertem, and Foti Benlisoy, "Ama'lar, Fakat'lar, Keşke'ler (The "But"s, the "However"s, and the "If only"s)," *Birikim*, no. 109 (May 1998).

renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token, that they can be continually challenged and in certain respect modified.”⁶

In that sense, studying Turkey in the 1990s, more accurately all relationships between elements in a whole way of life, in a “structure of feeling”⁷ requires the clear-cut fact that the whole realm of contemporary culture is no longer a reflection of complex economic and social conditions, but it is the resonant of these conditions and vice versa. Although Williams’ definition of cultural theory occupies a key point, as “a theory of relations between elements in a whole way of life,” but furthermore, for a better comprehension of fanzines as cultural materials, in the social and economic conditions, it would be more appropriate to modify the definition of Williams with E.P. Thompson’s critique as “the study of relationships in a whole way of *conflict*.”⁸

Hence, in Turkey the 1990s, which were years of devastating transformations and the settlement of a new cultural climate introduced to the country after the military coup in 1980 with subsequent neo-liberal politics, the restructuring of the state and corporate media boom were to be comprehended from the “ways of conflict,” namely hegemony. Indeed, all my efforts to discuss the 1990s are more than to have a historical periodization, but rather to make a “diagnostic critique,” in the sense that Douglas Kellner introduced the term, which “uses history and social

⁶ Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London: Verso, 1980), p. 37.

⁷ For detailed arguments on “structure of feeling” see Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1965).

⁸ Dick Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style* (London: Routledge, 1979), p. 10. and Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms (1980)," in *Culture/Power/History: A reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Geoff Eley Nicholas B. Dirks, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1994), p. 525.

theory to analyze cultural texts – here fanzines – and uses cultural texts in turn to illuminate historical trends, possibilities, and anxieties.”⁹

While discussing the 1990s as years of hegemonic struggle, I adopt Guy Debord’s thesis on the society of the spectacle. Although he gave the guidelines of a (post)modern society “under the reign of capital accumulated enough to appear as images” in 1967 and in France, I strongly believe that his theses are very useful in understanding the diffusion of a class strategy through new media channels and cultural distinctions in Turkey, in the 1990s. A strategy in the heart of culture of neo-liberalism perceives persons – as “consumers in a planetary market” in Comaroffs’ sense – as the sum of identities, not as part of history and society but as entity of organic human qualities.¹⁰ And, of course, the space of this hegemonic struggle is cities, especially the ones that became ports of global capitalism. Furthermore, Debord underscores that the society of the spectacle as a stage of economic development constructs itself on the idealized condition of being young. In fact, in the 1990s in Turkey through the published and visual media the condition of being young was fetishized as a precious commodity. Therefore it became possible to prolong youth according to consumption patterns and tastes; hence youth no longer belonged to young people, but to others, which I insist that they can correspond to a particular new sort of middle class. From then on youth is not a social category, but an exclusionary concept; thus it is possible to assert that the “deconstruction of youth”¹¹ as a modernist social category was achieved by the new market (or cultural)

⁹ Douglas Kellner, *Media culture : Cultural studies, Identity, and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 125.

¹⁰ Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," p. 304.

¹¹ For “Deconstruction of Youth” see Claire Wallece & Sijka Kovatcheva, *Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

relations, and that this deconstruction coincides with the society in which spectacle is the mere reality.

For this unprecedented transformation, I suggest the use of a definition called *juvenilization*, which is inspired by the Romanian sociologist Fred Mahler's "juventicization" thesis, according to which societies are regenerated through the ideas and activities of young people in politics and youth culture.¹² However, a historical perspective will demonstrate the opposite of this thesis: the regeneration of the society of Turkey in the post-1980s was not through young people; on the contrary, by excluding many youth experiences, namely through a Youth discourse that (de)constructed youth as a concept in a set of cultural signs. In conclusion, *juvenilization* stands for a particular cultural class appearance of youth. This also requires a new and even broad understanding of youthful refusals.

While Chapter Two, as the discussion of the 1990s tracing Nurdan Gürbilek's study *Vitrinde Yaşamak* (Living on Display) on the 1980s cultural climate has the "pessimism of the intellect," Chapter Four has the "optimism of the will."¹³ That is to say, in contrast with its totalizing and besieging characteristics, cultural capital – mainly of the new middle classes – appeared in the 1990s, as well as any other one was not fixed and it had to be reproduced in its discourse every day. Here, fanzines stood for this everyday struggle against the efforts of hegemonic strategy, even as spectacular ways. Regarding the society of the spectacle thesis, it can be suggested that fanzines without any doubt were the "product of their time" which were to survive and struggle in their present. Therefore, all aim beneath discussing the 1990s is to stress, in Hall's words, that what is important is not cultural objects internally

¹² Ibid., p.218.

¹³ Stuart Hall uses Gramsci's phrase "pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will" in order to overcome the tension between structuralism and culturalism in the cultural studies. For the detailed discussions see Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms (1980)," p. 532.

and historically stable, but the situation of the game in the cultural (power) relations.¹⁴

However, one should bear in mind that as subcultural products, fanzines were neither counter-hegemonic nor did they produce any solution for social problems, such as the huge uneven income distribution and the civil war in the 1990s. As Meral Özbek defines arabesque music, as well as having a purpose of problem solving, fanzines were “cultural invention” as “energy sources” in everyday practices in order to support the strength of survival.¹⁵ They, meanwhile, can be assessed through offering solutions for the real contradictions of their social positions – albeit, as Hall and Jefferson put it, through a set of “imaginary relations.”¹⁶ Nevertheless, they were not stable objects, as mentioned above; therefore chapter four entirely deals with the change fanzines underwent during the 1990s and how the language inside them transformed into a more strict and uncompromising form.

All of the fanzines read here are mostly on underground music – punk music, for example – on other subjects that claim to be counter-culture publications. This does not mean that all other fanzines with alternative contents are useless; however, they are far from the concept of “fanzine” I have adopted here. Indeed, saying “fanzine” in general is not so different from saying “book” or “magazine,” because as a way of easy communication, like “photocopy,” fanzine-as-the-medium can be benefited by any cultural intention, from literature/poetry and even to football.¹⁷ So the fanzine investigated here is the one that makes an explicit call to its reader “to act” and produce his or her own fanzine, in that sense it also underscores that all of

¹⁴ Quoted by Meral Özbek, *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (Popular Culture and the Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 86.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁶ Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1976), p. 33.

¹⁷ For a detailed study on football fanzine culture, see Richard Haynes, *The Football Imagination: The Rise of the Football Fanzine Culture* (London: Arena, 1995).

the material of the fanzine, from content to lay-out, can be used without any permission. Eventually, for these publications creating a fanzine is not a means, but an end in itself.

In this regard, in a more materialistic sense, the form of these cultural products should be as important as their content for an analysis, since there were fanzines back in the 1990s that paid more attention to form with the awareness of McLuhan's "medium as the message" argument. The facts in the creation of a fanzine, namely easy reproduction, dismissing the intermediaries between the cultural creator and the receiver, therefore need to be examined through aesthetical analyses; yet these analyses are by no means searching from the receiver to the product, but rather searching from the production and product to the receiver in the social context.¹⁸ Therefore, the relations between a fanzine editor and a reader, and the reciprocal empowering process, that is, "how the very materiality of a cultural practices functions within an economy of everyday life"¹⁹ will appear in the efforts to understand fanzines and to construct a history of a decade – the 1990s – with possibilities within these underground publications.

¹⁸ Özbek, *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (Popular Culture and the Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay)*, p. 20.

¹⁹ Lawrence Grossberg, "History, Politics and Postmodernism: Stuart Hall and Cultural Studies (1986)," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 168.

CHAPTER TWO

YOUTH: FROM A SOCIAL CATEGORY TO AN EXCLUSIONARY CONCEPT

The organization of life according to cyclical age stages can be associated with nineteenth century Europe and modernity. Especially with the Enlightenment thought of progress, life-span began to be considered as a continuity and it was organized around age compartments. Even childhood, which had been regarded previously as a kind of miniature adulthood, began to be grasped as the first steps towards adulthood and categorized as a different stage of life.²⁰ In an adult-centered concept of life-span, whereas childhood was seen as the starting stage that would progress and lead to adulthood, youth was conceptualized as a social category of transition. Therefore, as a part of the modernist progressive way of thinking, it can be claimed that the social categorization of youth, irrespective of whether it has been conceived as a period of life or a state with certain psychological predispositions, has been defined by the transition process from childhood to adulthood.²¹ Hence all the matters of youth beginning with the nineteenth century in western societies have been shaped by adults as a transitional stage which must be passed through as quickly as possible. Therefore, though youth as a social category seems to be identified with a period of biological age, it is always defined and redefined by adults as and by relations with the social institutions.²²

²⁰ See Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (London: Penguin, 1979), pp. 95-96.

²¹ Erik Allardt, "The Current Context of Youth in Economy, Politics, and Societal Development: The New Subjectivism," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Youth*, ed. Janusz Kuczynski et al (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1988), p. 132.

²² Meltem Ahıska, "Genç Olmayan Gençler Üzerine Bir Deneme (An Essay on non-young Youth)," *Defter*, no. 37 (1999): p. 12.

Youth as a social category, in the sense I use here, is a “product of modernity.”²³ Modernity, here, can be associated with the need to divide people and to sustain these divisions with many theories, such as race and gender; and especially with universal education, young people are to be defined between unsocialized children and productive adults ready to compete for the labour market: therefore, modernization helped to define youth as a social category “between education and work, between unsocialized childhood and fully socialized adulthood.”²⁴

In this respect, the construction of the youth as a social category should be evaluated in a historical manner. Though, as mentioned above, the discourses on youth appears capable of capturing and fixing it universally, indeed there is always a distinction between the definition – the discourse – and young people’s way of living their everyday lives – the experiences. And the gap between the discourse and the experience historically narrows and extends. Otherwise, if a full resonance between the discourse and the experience were possible, there would be no room for politics and for a framework with which to understand the reactions of youth and its challenges to the hegemony.

Dismissing the historical approach to youth, which means not distinguishing the definitions and the ways young people view and represent themselves, would lead to examining all youthful reactions – self-conscious ones in the classical political sense of opposition, subcultural ones, delinquency and even self-destruction – as “deviant, uncongenial, and even crime, in which sense most of the twentieth century sociology has viewed youth.”²⁵

²³ Kovatcheva, *Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe*, p. 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.4

²⁵ Leyla Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 33 (2001): p. 413.

Literature on Youth

Sociological theories of youth relate the concepts and findings of their inquiries to other disciplines such as psychology and cultural anthropology. In that sense, youth as a category is understood as youthfulness – as an abstract construct of such characteristics as the quality of being young and demonstrating peculiar traits subject to social evaluation.²⁶ On the other hand, especially in studies regarding the youthful movements in the west beginning with the late 1960s, cultural anthropology, in fact, contributes to sociological theories of youth: the analyses of age groups and of ceremonies related to the change of social status in pre-literate societies has made it clear that youth is a social-cultural creation superimposed on universal physiological mechanisms.²⁷ More importantly, anthropological data has made it clear that the statements of developmental psychology are culture-bound and, as will be discussed below, they are also class-bound as subsequent sociological research has proved.²⁸

Efforts to explain youth from historical and culture-based perspectives within sociology and psychology mostly have aimed to comprehend the revelation of youth in the student movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. Even with fresh and challenging assertions that have stated that youth was at an intersection of life history with general history, there emerged studies on youth in order to understand it in a given society and history in relation with social and cultural processes.²⁹ For instance, though Sergei Eisenstadt was skeptical about the youth movements and

²⁶ Antonina Kloskowska, "Analysis of Sociological Literature on Youth," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Youth*, ed. Janusz Kuczynski et al (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1988), pp. 3-4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ See Erik Erikson, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," in *Youth: Change and Challenge*, ed. Erik Erikson (New York: Basic, 1963).

their ways of reacting in his simultaneous studies,³⁰ he argued that while age differences and youth were universal aspects of human life, their specific cultural and social manifestations depended very much on social, cultural and historical conditions.³¹

Nevertheless, on the issue of culture, many examples of this literature between the 1950s and 1970s were far from considering it as the realm of everyday practices where hegemonic relations are tested and adjusted through daily accomplishments. Although there were works inspired by Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Paul Goodman which evaluated youth identity as a response to the historical change and social context, such as the technocracy of the late 1960s,³² it is possible to state that they regarded the counter-culture and new injections of youth in old ideologies – i.e. Marxism and Anarchism – as merely clashes of generations. Even with their ambitious attempt to define the youth of the modern context in a structural-functionalist manner, the youth appeared as a “separate class-in-themselves” subordinated to adult society.³³ The functionalist view of youth, as it can be assumed, did not differ from their view of society: “as something stable and necessary, and something into which youth should eventually be integrated.”³⁴ The theory of youth as a class-in-themselves, so the stable society thesis, was severely criticized especially by the Marxist British cultural studies school.

Especially with the class-bound studies, youth and in particular youth subcultures were evidently examined by their relations with class culture. Many of

³⁰ Kloskowska, "Analysis of Sociological Literature on Youth," p. 16.

³¹ Sergei Eisenstadt, "Youth, Generational Consciousness, and Historical Change," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Youth*, ed. Janusz Kuczynski et al (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1988), p. 109.

³² See Theodore Roszak, *The Making of A Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition* (New York: Anchor, 1969).

³³ Kovatcheva, *Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe*, p. 32.

³⁴ Ibid.

these studies, beginning with the mid 1970s in a pessimistic stance with the economic crises in the west, described youth and their cultures as a way of symbolic resistance through style, music, and the everyday relations of class culture.³⁵ In contrast with the typical youth culture approaches that involved a preoccupation with problems specific to teenagers, the problems evoked by peer groups of high-school or even college students, and problems arising from cultural norms and patterns of behaviour; youth subculture studies that mostly equated cultural significance of youth with working class culture, worked on the both symbolic resistance against the “normalization” and commonsense of the hegemonic culture and sharp-edged boundaries of social status in a framework, especially fine-tuned version of Gramscian hegemony, which was extended by Raymond Williams’ theoretical contributions such as “determination,” “residual and emergent culture,” and “structure of feeling” in order to comprise subcultures. Although these studies, mostly by the circle of the Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies, gave important blueprints in order to conceptualize post-war European youth, they were explaining aptly and criticizing the “hegemonic culture of capitalist class society in general and divisions and contradictions within the working class culture in particular”³⁶ in a society like Britain in which class differences were reproduced more sharply in everyday life, both educationally and culturally.

³⁵ For distinguished examples of this field especially see: Hall and et al, *Resistance through Rituals*; Hebdige, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*; and Paul Willis, *Learning to Labour* (London: Saxon House, 1977).

³⁶ Ayşe Saktanber, "We Pray Like You Have Fun: New Islamic Youth in Turkey between Intellectualism and Popular Culture," in *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Sektanber (New Jersey: Rutgers University, 2002), p. 257.

They mainly argued that “youth as concept is unthinkable.”³⁷ What they did, therefore, was to demolish the aura around the youth concept, which had been regarded as class-in-themselves. However, as Wallece and Kovatcheva see, the deconstruction of youth as an age and social category was achieved by the later social, economic, and cultural transformations especially after the 1980s, when market relations raised as the “deconstructor” of all given social codes, such as youth. In brief, by these transformations, which will be discussed comprehensively in the next chapter, youth was extended upwards into older ages through the massive changes in the axis of economy and the culture. With the determinacy of consumption, Youth as a discourse was to appear to “encourage people to experiment with life-styles, subcultures and identities for longer periods.”³⁸ Even “leisure time,” which had previously been perquisite of young people, was encoded as a time piece in which the condition of being young can be prolonged by many commodities and activities. Wallece and Kovatcheva specifically exemplify this vast transformation by the de-standardization and erosion of age-status thanks to the postmodernity:

The use of fashion, styles, clothing, play and physical manipulation in the maintenance of the body (diet, exercise, and plastic surgery) can all be used to defy biological processes of ageing (Featherstone and Hepworth 1991). Thus, the youthful body is as desirable as ever the ideal, but unlike in Shakespeare’s time, it no longer belongs only to the young. It is an aspiration for everyone.

Although this new youth concept, seemingly a precious commodity, can be seen as an aspiration for everyone, it was indeed a part of the exclusionary mechanism of the market relations which exclude those who cannot afford the

³⁷ Kovatcheva, *Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe*, p. 33.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

exchange value. This change in the perception of youthfulness, though it will be examined in the next chapter, must be kept in mind in order to grasp Youth as a discourse and the youth experienced in Turkey in last four decades.

Considering Youth in Turkey

In Turkey, especially in the post-1980s, it is difficult to gather all youth subcultures within the strict lines of working-classness as in post-industrial countries which have no experience of rapid urbanization, large young populations or, most importantly, the re-emergence of cultural capital displays by the result of uneven income distribution in their recent histories. For sure, there are, and always have been, common general derivations shared by both post-industrial societies and developing countries, but objective barriers dividing youth according to class, ethnicity, sex and religion are sharper in societies less developed economically.³⁹

However, in spite of a fragmentation in appearance in youth identities, there is always a generalizing discourse on/of youth, as in Turkey and many other non-western countries that construct a youth concept which could be historically comprising and excluding, that is to say, which is always a tension bearer between the defined Youth and the youth experienced.

It is not hard to state that youth as a sociological concept, in the western literature, can be dated to the unique and dramatic experiences of the 1960s and later.⁴⁰ What is more significant, what demonstrates the historicity of youth concept is the emergence of the studies on the history of youth from a historical perspective of discontinuity that coincides with the period beginning with the late 1960s and the

³⁹ Kloskowska, "Analysis of Sociological Literature on Youth," p. 15.

⁴⁰ Unesco, *Youth in the 1980s* (Lausanne: Unesco, 1981), p. 14.

early 1970s.⁴¹ Therefore it should not be surprising that all of this early literature on western youth has captured the period of the rise of youth and student movements in the late 1960s such as the “end of adolescence,” which was a period when youth emancipated itself from its formerly dependant status and withdrew from the adult world.⁴²

However, for instance, while as a contemporary example of its period Gillis regards the major thrust of youthful discontent as directed not at family but outward, at social, political and academic institutions that were identified only indirectly with the older generation and explains the confrontation between young and old which was actually persons of different classes;⁴³ Eisenstadt argues, in a teleological manner, the rise of youth movements in the 1960s and 1970s as the second historical situation – in comparison with the 1950s – in modern societies in which general consciousness became very prominent.⁴⁴ As will be discussed later, here it is enough to mention that generation or generational consciousness is often invented in a historicist manner mainly after the lived experiences that facilitate the construction of a memory of generation; thus, though it provides many temporal conceptions in order to understand a period of youth, employing generation can obscure differences, i.e. class or sex, and put the burden of nostalgia over the present.

However, the assumption of the political role of the youth is not new in non-western countries. For instance, in Turkish history in the twentieth century, as in Latin America, youth identity has been fundamentally defined within the political context, yet until the 1980s; whereas in the same period in western countries youth

⁴¹ See John Gillis, *Youth and History* (New York: Academic, 1974).

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 201-204.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁴⁴ Eisenstadt, "Youth, Generational Consciousness, and Historical Change," pp. 102-03.

identity is based more directly on age distribution.⁴⁵ The arguments of Sigal for Latin American youth have many similarities with the case of the youth definition in the Turkish nationalist discourse, especially in the issues of dual role of education and hence the constitutive role attributed to youth: “More than in any other region education in Latin America has fulfilled a double role: the national integration of societies having different cultural features (which are due to international migratory movements or to the existence of various ethnic components), and basic, real (as well as symbolic) support to social mobility.”⁴⁶ The role of the, particularly educated, youth in the construction of the nationalist discourse is exemplified by Anderson in the context of Latin America that members of the youth were considered as the first representatives of the nationalist frame and youth was symbolizing the dynamism, progress, a self-sacrificing idealism and a revolutionary will.⁴⁷ In addition to the facts above, until the late 1960s, youth and student movements were peculiarities of the non-western countries.⁴⁸ And in Turkey the youth movement is roughly equated with the late 1960s and the 1970s since radical demands were enunciated by the youth in this period. The movements in the late 1960s seemed to feel closer ties with Latin American revolutionary movements starting with Cuba – in addition to Palestinian actions and anti-imperialist struggle in Vietnam against the United States – than with the student movements that started in 1968 in Paris.⁴⁹ Eventually, it can be said that what was determinant for both the Turkish and the Latin American youth was the

⁴⁵ Silvia Sigal, "On Latin American Youth," in *Perspectives on Contemporary Youth*, ed. Janusz Kuczynski et al (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1988), p. 216.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁴⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler (Imagined Communities)* (Istanbul: Metis, 2000), p. 135.; quoted by Ahıska, "Genç Olmayan Gençler Üzerine Bir Deneme (An Essay on non-young Youth)."

⁴⁸ Foti Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefetinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 97 (Autumn 2003): p. 284.

⁴⁹ Rıza Tura, "68 ile 71 Arasında Sıkışan Zaman: 70'li Yıllar (Wedging Time between 1968 and 1971: 1970s)," *Defter*, no. 37 (1999): p. 37.

capabilities imposed by the nationalist discourse and tension between this discourse and the experiences of the youth in general.

However, as this chapter would deal with the new categorization of youth, namely the deconstruction of it as a social category in Turkey after the 1980s, and its preceding periods as the 1970s and the late 1960s in order to go back to the “differentiating point and to its temporal extension,”⁵⁰ the early Republican nationalist discourse in the process of constructing the Turkish “young subject” as the vanguard of the regime will not be evaluated. Yet, it should be kept in mind that the late 1960s and 1970s were the periods when the youth constituted by the nationalist framework of Kemalism as innovative and revolutionary⁵¹ developed into pain for the nation-state whenever it tempted to act according to the characteristics attributed to it; the result was the accusation of the formerly revolutionary youth as counter-revolutionaries acting against the nation.⁵²

In conclusion, for the purpose of this chapter, as Sigal does for youth in Latin American, youth – as a social category or as a concept will be considered, that the age limits of youth, always vague and changing, are not to be defined a priori, but a posteriori, that is, after a symbolic construction of youth is made.⁵³ And the gap between symbolic construction, the discourse of youth and the youth experienced and lived, through reactions or submissions can only appear in this respect. Evaluating a social categorization historically, which has been universalized as a

⁵⁰ Sigal, "On Latin American Youth," p.212.

⁵¹ Every regime's attributions to youth in its modernization process, nevertheless, should be read through its purpose of economic and social mobilization. In the same manner, as Bağış Ertem et al. put it, the Kemalist stances of the youth of 1968 could not be detached from any purposes of the modern nation-states, like even distribution, industrial development and a strict discourse of “folk.” For detailed arguments especially see, Bağış Ertem, "Ama'lar, Fakat'lar, Keşke'ler (The "But"s, the "However"s, and the "If only"s)," pp. 105-11.

⁵² Ahıska, "Genç Olmayan Gençler Üzerine Bir Deneme (An Essay on non-young Youth)," p. 14.

⁵³ Sigal, "On Latin American Youth," p. 211.

biological given, would make it easier to grasp both the inevitability and the arbitrariness of its empirical indicator, age.⁵⁴ Last but not least, the adoption of biological/psychological qualifications in order to conceptualize youth as a social category is the reification of experienced youth as an essentialist approach in the sense of a-historicism; youth is a category defined in the specific contexts of different social relations which can acquire many meanings; as Benlisoy concludes by discussing the student opposition, youth is a human condition which is socially constructed, defined and constantly redefined.⁵⁵

Modernist Transition: Late 1960s and 1970s

The period beginning with the late 1960s was characterized by the widespread politicization of youth both in Turkey and in the rest of the world. Although they shared common points of discontent, it can be stated that Turkish youth had a legacy of having ousted a government by a military coup in 1960, in which it had played a significant role and benefited popular support. Whenever there was something seen by the youth as the betrayal of the Kemalist revolution, as just before 1960, youth, in particular students, made reference to Atatürk's controversial Bursa speech in which he had clarified that Turkish youth should be ready to protect the Republic as its duty by any means necessary.⁵⁶

Relatively democratic rights by the new constitution, of 1961, after the military coup and the birth of the TİP (*Turkish Labour Party*) immediately inspired the youth; and the tension with the United States over the Cyprus problem made any

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 214.

⁵⁵ Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefetinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," pp. 282-83.

⁵⁶ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 419.

anti-American tendency a rightful reaction; hence youth in late 1960s' Turkey in the late 1960s considered themselves as the heirs to youth of 27 May (date of the military coup in 1960).⁵⁷ In this respect, besides Atatürk's *Oration to Youth* and his *Bursa Speech*, it was not hard for the Turkish youth to legitimize their political actions. Nearly all of the actions or declarations during the late 1960s were constituted the subject with the self-claim of the "youth of the nation", such as "We, the representatives of the Turkish Youth..."; "Today, the Turkish Youth stand on the threshold of a rebellion..."; "The Turkish Youth will not allow the reversion of the history and the interruption of the positive flow of time..."⁵⁸ In addition, the leftist youth in particular felt unease about the universities, in which many young people thought that the "democratic" climate of the 1961 constitution had not infiltrated.⁵⁹ The main demands of the student movement were to change university bylaw, the social and economic conditions of the students, and the university education policies.⁶⁰ However, articulation to the regime's developmentalist purposes, in the last instance, was very specific in the complaints of the youth about the universities: "The information we learned does not contribute to the rapid development of our country."⁶¹ To claim that the information learned in universities was not relevant to everyday life was something the Turkish youth movement had in common with all

⁵⁷ Atıl Ant, "68, 21. Yüzyılın Habercisiydi (1968 Was the Messenger of the Twentieth Century)," in *Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü '68 (A Long Walk Was 1968)*, ed. Alev Er (Istanbul: Afa, 1988), p. 19.

⁵⁸ Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefetinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," p. 284.

⁵⁹ Ant, "68, 21. Yüzyılın Habercisiydi (1968 Was the Messenger of the Twentieth Century)," p. 19.

⁶⁰ Demands of the students from Ankara, *Yeni Gazete*, 22 June 1968, quoted by Doğan Hızlan, "Türkiye'de Gençlik Hareketleri (Youth Movements in Turkey)," in *Ne İstiyoruz? (What Do We Want?)*, ed. Rudi Dutschke & Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Istanbul: Altın, 1968), p. 221.

⁶¹ Toygun Eraslan (Istanbul University Occupation Committees Secretary), *Milliyet*, 8 July 1968, quoted by *Ibid.*, p.218.

the 1968 movements around the world. However, as seen in the examples, the demands of the Turkish youth resonated with the regime's developmentalist ideals.

On the other hand, whenever the youth tried to elaborate "being a revolutionary youth," not by the attributed Youth discourse of the regime, but by its plural experiences and ideologies out of the official one, the gap between the discourse of youth and the youth experienced widened.⁶² In Neyzi's terms, the late 1960s were the beginning for the youth when they evolved "from vanguards to rebels."⁶³ Nevertheless, the youth always had a self-realization of "saving the country" with references, in case of leftism, to the so-called revolutionary aspects of Kemalism and, in case of being rightist, to modified versions of official nationalism's more strict nationalist aspects, even in a racist and fascist mood.

If one aspect of the youth in the late 1960s Turkey was the extension of the gap between the discourse of youth and the youth experienced, the other was the polarization among youth as left and right, which would turn into violent confrontations beginning in the middle of 1970s. Nevertheless, both side, particularly before 1971, though to different extents, shared "significant features as being modernist, nationalist, anti-imperialist whose rhetoric emphasized the independence of the Turkish nation-state and the duty of youth to dedicate their lives for building the future society, whether imagined as the revival of the early Kemalist period, or a pan-Turkic haven."⁶⁴ Even, in some instances rightist youth, or *ülküçüler*, also participated in the same demonstrations and discussions with the leftist ones.⁶⁵ As one of the university occupation committees' spokesman mentioned, their movement

⁶² Ahıska, "Genç Olmayan Gençler Üzerine Bir Deneme (An Essay on non-young Youth)," p. 14.

⁶³ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 419.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 420.

⁶⁵ Müfit Özdeş, "Trende Var Üç Gerilla" (On the Train There Were Three Guerillas), pp.29-30; and İskender Odabaşoğlu, "Pembe Köşkte Bir 68'li", p.98., in *Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü '68*, ed. Alev Er (Istanbul: Afa, 1988).

was not inclined to be leftist or rightist.⁶⁶ Indeed, keeping the equal distance both from leftism and rightism, as the famous Kemalist discourse, and strong stress on interests of the “folk” helped the student youth of 1968 gain popular support.⁶⁷ Even a professor said that all the youth wanted was to bring back constitutional order.⁶⁸

Contrary to the nostalgia of 1968, as a romantic-idealist-revolutionary year evoked in the post-1980s, which will be discussed below at length in the second chapter; the main motive of the youth movements in Turkey in the late 1960s was to survive in the socio-economic conditions evolving into unpredictable times. The anxiety of unemployment, especially among middle class students, though it was uttered in a language of “drowning in theories and not being useful for the needs of the folk,”⁶⁹ was supposed to be very broad; hence, there were also declarations from student youth such as: “the struggle towards the university bylaw seems to have evolved into the demand of changing infrastructural institutions and the economic depressions of the youth.”⁷⁰ Therefore, it can be suggested that all refusal of the Turkish youth in 1968, whether cultural or not, was a struggle – especially of the urban, middle class, and educated youth – to survive.

On the issue of interrogating the tradition and being suspicious about the dominant culture it is possible to assert that the Turkish youth remained all but silent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is not surprising that the rightist youth conventionally embraced a tradition; however what needs to be discussed was the inclination of the leftists towards the countryside, in the name of *köylücülük*

⁶⁶ Akşam, 13 June 1968, quoted by Hızlan, "Türkiye'de Gençlik Hareketleri (Youth Movements in Turkey)," p. 215.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Bülent Nuri Esen, Ant, 9 July 1968, Ibid., p. 214.

⁶⁹ Bilal Moğol (President of Ankara University Student Union), Cumhuriyet, 17 June 1968, Ibid., p.223.

⁷⁰ Enver Nalbantoğlu (Istanbul Univerity, Student of Law), Cumhuriyet,18 June 1968, Ibid., p. 222.

(ruralism).⁷¹ Indeed, there was nothing purely peasant in the countryside since the indigenous culture had been repressed with the western anxieties of Republican elite's cultural perspective back in the early years of the Republic.⁷² On the other hand, the urban, educated youth were totally disappointed when they met actual common people, that of peasants and workers, who were far from the idealized revolutionaries; and then thought that they, the Turkish youth, could smash the power and make peasantry follow them as pioneers.⁷³ With an imaginary peasantry, concealing many of the contradictions of the countryside, many aspects – clothing, music, behaviour – which in fact had nothing in common with peasant's or worker's everyday lives, were adopted with the naïve thought not to make the common people suspicious and to gain their support for the so-called pioneers. With the impact of *köylücülük*, according to Ahmet Oktay, there appeared many novels about the countryside and the narrations on urban problems – i.e. alienation by the effects of rapid urbanization and import substitution industrialization, immigration from rural to urban – were disdained as the utterance of petit-bourgeois anxieties.⁷⁴ He discusses this cultural gridlock of the 1960s' and 1970s' leftist youth as not having paid prior attention to production and class relations and sticking to nationalism instead of explaining the specificity and peculiarity of Turkish society with Marxist cultural criticism.⁷⁵ A similar, more general, criticism comes from Hilav to the Turkish socialist thought that the failure of the socialist is that he did not constitute

⁷¹ Ahmet Oktay, "Türk Solu ve Kültür (Turkish Left and Culture)," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 78 (Autumn 1998): pp. 51-52.

⁷² Especially on the issue of music, in the beginning of 1930s, early republican administration commanded national radio station to broadcast just western classical music and selected folk songs recorded with western instruments. For detailed research of the music policy of the early republican especially see Özbek, *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (Popular Culture and the Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay)*, pp. 137-72

⁷³ Doğu Perinçek, "Tek Başına da Olsa (Albeit He is on His Own)," in *Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü '68 (A Long Walk Was 1968)*, ed. Alev Er (Istanbul: Afa, 1988), pp. 89-89.

⁷⁴ Oktay, "Türk Solu ve Kültür (Turkish Left and Culture)," p. 51.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

his own theory and independent from the ideologies and thoughts of the dominant classes.⁷⁶

This was particularly apparent in the situation of the youth of the late 1960s and 1970s towards a totally urban lower class culture; personified in the music of Orhan Gencebay.* Here, in order to figure out the cultural attitude of the leftist youth, it is better to cite Somay:

The generation of the 1960s emerged exactly when the Kemalist project could no longer be pursued...as a reaction to the popular culture based on foreign cultural (not French yet , but American) forms it embraced Kemalist populism. The generation of the 1960s did not love proletariat, which had not appeared alone as a power yet (or at least which this generation did not notice its existence), but loved the folk, "Anatolian people." They were listening to their music, trying to dress up and talk like them, and even to decorate their houses like the "folk"...The members of this generation...tried to send songs, *türkü*, by writing them revolutionary lyrics back to the "folk" who was the real producers of *türkü*. But the letter did not arrive at its address because *türkü* had not been come alive; the "folk" did not produce and listen to *türkü*. A new popular culture appropriating the new social structure was needed, however, the dynamic, revolutionary youth seemed reluctant to achieve this mission; and became conservative.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Selahattin Hilav, "Felsefe Yazıları", (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1993), quoted Oktay, Ibid, p. 53.

* Orhan Gencebay is a popular musician appeared in the late 1960s. He is believed to voice the experiences of the urban lower classes with metaphoric lyrics on love with new technics on playing traditional Turkish instrument, *bağlama*, and on recording songs in multichannels using western instruments. He is the inventor of the genre called arabesque. For a detailed work on Orhan Gencebay, see Özbek, *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (Popular Culture and the Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay)*.

⁷⁷ "1960'lar kuşağı tam Kemalist projenin artık yürümeye başladığı anda ortaya çıktı...yabancı kaynaklı (ama artık Fransız değil ABD) popüler kültüre tepki olarak Kemalist popülizme sarıldı. 1960 kuşağı henüz başlı başına bir güç olarak ortaya çıkmamış olan (ya ada en azından ortada olduğunu fark etmediği) proletaryayı değil, halkı, "Anadolu insanını seviyordu. Onun müziğini dinliyor, onun gibi giyinmeye ve konuşmaya, hatta evini bile onun gibi döşemeye çalışıyordu...1960 kuşağı üyeleri...türkülerle devrimci sözler yazarak, türkülerin gerçek üreticisi olan "halka" geri göndermeye çalıştılar. Ancak mektup adresine ulaşmadı, çünkü o türküler yaşamıyordu artık; "halk" türkü üretmiyor türkü dinlemiyordu. Yeni toplumsal yapıya uyacak yeni bir popüler kültüre ihtiyaç vardı, ama dönemin dinamik, devrimci kuşağı bu misyonu üstlenmeye hevesli değildi; muhafazakarlık yapıyordu." Bülent Somay, "Hamlet Kuşağı (Hamlet Generation)," *Defer*, no. 37 (1999)., pp. 62-63.

A Cultural Break

Ahmet Oktay argues that in a cultural realm which was reduced to the myths of revolution, figures like Aşık İhsani became labeled “revolutionary poets.”⁷⁸ This was something Cem Karaca complained about: whereas he was trying to produce a strong desire to create a distinctive Turkish contribution to the European and American counterculture movements and to establish a dynamic and radical musical counterculture in Turkey, simple lyrics, like “down with the fascism” and the simple *bağlama** riffs of many were becoming popular.⁷⁹ On the other hand, whereas Karaca openly identified with the labour movement, Gencebay was almost out of this camp.

The youth of both left and right in the 1970s differed from that of 1968, whose members were mostly from urban middle class families. However, as the politicization of youth expanded, and as more students of rural background began to attend universities, political activists of both the left and the right came increasingly from rural and working-class families.⁸⁰ Also, with the military intervention in 1971, the bounds of youth with the Kemalist regime were almost cut. They questioned the “alert forces” qualifications of the military forces for a possible revolution. Tension also emerged between the youth of the urban middle class who had grown up with Kemalist ideals, mostly of 1968, and the immigrants of the 1970s, who had been introduced to an urban everyday of harsh economic realities. While the first saw Gencebay and his music called *minibüs müziği* (minibus music), though he rejected this qualification, having Easternness within; the latter had more problematic

⁷⁸ Oktay, "Türk Solu ve Kültür (Turkish Left and Culture)," p. 53.

* A traditional Turkish instrument.

⁷⁹ Martin Stokes, "Sounding Out: Culture Industries and the Globalization of Istanbul," in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, ed. Çağlar Keyder (Lanham and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 133.

⁸⁰ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 421.

relations with it. Nevertheless, though Gencebay's songs, the first EP with the title *Bir Teselli Ver* (Give Some Relief) in 1968 and an LP with the title *Batsın Bu Dünya* (This World Should Go Down) in 1975⁸¹, underscored "the intense but quite abstract emotional states of alienation, separation, failure, and humiliation at the hands of a remote and manipulative lover,"⁸² both the radical youth of the 1970s and Gencebay songs were nourished from the same locality: especially the settlements of immigrants, the *gecekondular*, which were seen in those years as the "fortress of the left." Both the music of Gencebay and the world view of the left youth shared the same dramatic features: they voiced the absoluteness of the uncompromising contradictions and of the dissatisfaction of desire.⁸³

Also with the 1970s in the west there appeared subcultures among lower class youth, like European mod and punk, which resonated with the alienating atmosphere of the city full of unemployment and dissatisfaction; in that sense it can be claimed that the mods and early punks converged on some social notion that similarly gave way to the popularity of Gencebay, regardless of the facts of immigration and new urban experiences. Though early punk did not emerge as a political movement against the reign of Thatcherism in England, for example, but like many youth cultures in Europe it had "cut and mix"⁸⁴ many aspects of its predecessor youth cultures, thus it appeared in many incidents supporting working class demonstrations. For instance, however, the "culture" produced by Gencebay for the lower classes always sheltered ambivalence in its relations with the left youth. Besides the absence of a evident youth culture – namely aesthetic production, and daily practices – , with the exception of Gencebay's songs, any possible cultural

⁸¹ Özbek, *Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (Popular Culture and the Arabesque of Orhan Gencebay)*, p. 184.

⁸² Stokes, "Sounding Out: Culture Industries and the Globalization of Istanbul," p. 135.

⁸³ Nurdan Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)* (Istanbul: Metis, 2001), p. 93.

⁸⁴ For "cut and mix" see Dick Hebdige, *Kes/Yapıştır (Cut and Mix)* (Istanbul: Ayrıntı, 2002).

transition, “cut and mix”, from predecessor youth movements was crippled by two military coups. Especially the transition in 1980 opened the space for a new public of suppression, the construction of the recent past and the new youth concept in particular.

On the other hand, what made the Turkish youth of 1968 political figures was something they had in common with their contemporaries all around the world. Especially in the case of the middle classes, student youth in particular, according to the conventional consideration of the left, there is something, a position that can be called “being out of the relations of production.”⁸⁵ Indeed, in a social formation based on the division of labor, youth is synonymous with a being non-productive production unit; therefore one who does not functionalized in the division of labour is a youth.⁸⁶ Hence, in this social formation, in the welfare state of the 1960s in Turkey and the west, youth as a social category had the chance of looking inside the “system” from its margins and gathering many pluralities from different social and cultural strata.⁸⁷ Even though this argument was mostly valid in Turkey of the 1960s, albeit the fragmentation among the youth by class and cultural differentiation thanks to economic crises and the countryside-to-city immigration, it would be totally irrelevant in 1980s and later.

The reaction of youth in the west beginning with the late 1960s was the total rejection of the alienating aspects of the modern everyday life and the obstinate resistance against institutionalization, with impacts of anti-authoritarian socialist, anarchist, and situationist movements in student cadres that never found reflections within its contemporaries in Turkey; however, what was missed by them was the fact

⁸⁵ Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefetinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," p. 285.

⁸⁶ Şükrü Argın, "68: Evden Kaçış (1968: Running from the House)," in *Nostalji ile Ütopya Arasında (Between Nostalgia and Utopia)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 192.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

that youth is a social category and like all social categories, it can be redefined, even deconstructed; thus the result of western youth's "cultural revolution" was a profound domestication until the 1980s.⁸⁸

As mentioned above, the youth of 1960s' Turkey could not claim a cultural revolution, thanks to their strong bonds with the youth discourse of Kemalism, and reduced it to an output of the economic transformation. In the crisis climate of the 1970s, with the massive alienating dissatisfaction, even men tended to dominate women in the radical youth movements; therefore, over time, the political movement became divorced from many aspects of everyday life, and violence in the streets became a fact.⁸⁹ And in contrast with the hegemonic domestication in the west, the youth of 1970s' Turkey was brutally repressed by the military coup in 1980 and by its subsequent new cultural domain.

Beyond Transition: The 1980s

Youth in the late 1960s, both in Turkey and the west, was constructed, as discussed above, as a universal transition ending with adulthood, maturity, namely the future in the modernist, progressive sense. Similarly, youth movements took into account their condition as a transition, too, yet to a future of their own. Put simply, western youth opposed the culture of parental everydayness shaped in the realm of bourgeois society, but their counterparts in Turkey took "saving the country" as their urgent task and what they struggled against was governments, not governmentality.

However, as mentioned above, the 1970s were a break. In the west, since the middle of the 1970s there has been more pessimism; scarcity and unemployment

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 421.

have been emphasized, not only as present conditions, but also as problems for the future.⁹⁰ Therefore, it is not unusual that the 1970s in the west saw massive protest and important political movements transcending earlier themes of focusing on parental culture; the ecology movement, the women's movement, even revolutionary movements in the Middle East and Latin America, involved large numbers of young people, but not exclusively in the sense of a generational gap, therefore these movements were a sharp break with the visionary idealism of the 1960s; they took a defensive stance against the further deterioration in living and ecological conditions.⁹¹

Besides the economic crises, the other main determinant of the Turkish youth's experience in the 1970s was the military coup of 1971; the subsequent social climate was not democratic especially in comparison with the previous decade. This was also one of the facts that led widespread violence in everyday life; according to a famous figure of the 1968, the youth of 1970s were stunned (*kavruk*) in the antidemocratic climate of the 1970s that drove them into "street violence." For sure, there appeared violent actions in the west organized around the names *RAF* in Germany, *Action Direkte* in France, *Red Brigades* in Italy including young women and men, but in Turkey the axis of violence was also between left and right political views.

After the military coup in 1980, which was addressed in the declaration of military forces as the response to the ongoing "anarchy and terror" in the streets, the strict rule of the National Security Council (NSC) governed until the first elections in 1983. However, Turkey's first experience with neo-liberal politics accompanied the

⁹⁰ Allardt, "The Current Context of Youth in Economy, Politics, and Societal Development: The New Subjectivism.", p.133.

⁹¹ Unesco, *Youth in the 1980s*, pp. 22-23.

“*de facto* prohibition” that altered the official prohibitions of the NSC, which had succeeded their functions: the prohibitions of questioning the transformation process, the new order, and of repudiating some compromises and radical thinking.⁹² Especially beginning with 1985, with privatization, the rise of a consumer society, and the influx of new communication technology, the media became a major actor and would be more powerful, and hence, the prosecutor of these “*de facto* prohibitions,” with the first broadcasting of a commercial television network in 1990.⁹³ In a way it seems contradictory, but with the 1980s, whereas there were *de facto* prohibitions and sphere of life with no rights of speech, there was also an “explosion of words”⁹⁴ and images.⁹⁵

One of the most prominent outputs of this “explosion of words” was an interest in the recent past.⁹⁶ The logic of generations was created through this re-reading of the past, appropriating the needs of the present: As Gürbilek puts it, “an image arousing the fantasies, hence it becomes consumable.”⁹⁷ The subject of this new history was the youth of the late 1960s, notably of 1968, whose members in the 1980s began to be employed by fields in the new market, such as advertising and, most importantly, by new media and many other service sector professions.⁹⁸ And the popular history of the Turkish youth was constructed by an imaginary of “’68 culture.”⁹⁹ However, this idealization was accomplished by “the invention of the generation,” by distinguishing a privileged group in the 1980s whose members had

⁹² Can Kozanoğlu, *Cilalı İmaj Devri (Age of Polished Images)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 8.

⁹³ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 422.

⁹⁴ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 21.

⁹⁵ Kozanoğlu, *Cilalı İmaj Devri (Age of Polished Images)*, p. 8.

⁹⁶ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 23.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.23.

⁹⁸ Tura, "68 ile 71 Arasında Sıkışan Zaman: 70'li Yıllar (Wedging Time between 1968 and 1971: 1970s)," p. 45.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

been part of the movements of the late 1960s and partly the 1970s. This 1968 culture equated the pre-1980s years as the opposite of the liberalization and individualization discourses of its present; therefore the 1970s were popularized within a language of “lower aesthetics” and it helped this new privileged class to constitute itself as a generation a posteriori.¹⁰⁰ According to these brand new 1968 generation members, the 1970s were years when, as Kozanoğlu writes, “nearly all ruralites put forward themselves as revolutionaries and a period of violence confined by the ideologies which closed the way for critical thinking.”¹⁰¹ For sure, especially after the middle of the decade, violence was an inseparable aspect of the everyday life of the 1970s; however, reducing these years merely to violence and dismissing the social roots of violence removed the alternatives of the past that could have supported any possible criticisms of the 1980s’ hegemonic discourse. Indeed until the middle of the 1980s, the year 1968 had not been regarded as a turning point. Even the military intervention of 1971 was captured as the critical historical moment for the Turkish left; therefore with the invention of 1968 generation, beginning with the 1980s, all efforts of understanding the 1970s remained without a paradigm.¹⁰²

As discussed above, the youth of the late 1960s to some degree felt closer to the youth discourse of the regime. But the degree to which the youth of 1968 in Turkey considered themselves an heir to Kemalism increasingly became blurred by the attempts to mythologize the experience of 1968.¹⁰³ For instance, in books consisting of interviews with figures from the 1968 youth movements, the people interviewed refer to Kemalism and nationalism rarely, if ever.¹⁰⁴ However, the state

¹⁰⁰ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 24.

¹⁰¹ Kozanoğlu, *Cıvalı İmaj Devri (Age of Polished Images)*, p. 107.

¹⁰² Tura, “68 ile 71 Arasında Sıkışan Zaman: 70’li Yıllar (Wedging Time between 1968 and 1971: 1970s),” p. 36.

¹⁰³ Neyzi, “Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey,” p. 420.

¹⁰⁴ Especially see Alev Er, *Bir Uzun Yürüşü ’68 (A Long Walk Was 1968)*.

was the blind spot, *tabula rasa*, for the leftist youth of the late 1960s on which they saw society and the future, but in 1971 this consideration was interrupted and radical youth grew more suspicious about the neutrality of the state.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, with the invention of the 1968 tradition in the 1980s, the contradictions of the 1970s, such as the inclination from Kemalism to authoritarian ideologies like Stalinism, remained out of discussion.¹⁰⁶ There appeared a leap from 1968 to the 1980s, and the period between these years was filled by any negative element – i.e. anti-individualism, dogmatism or being indifferent – of the 1980s' dominant language and this was accomplished, as discussed, by adopting a cultural-generational historicist paradigm.

On the one hand, this privileged class, namely part of the new middle classes, employed mostly by media corporations and advertising agencies did not strengthen its situation by solely referring to nostalgia and setting its culture as normal, but also by a new definition of Youth. The post-1980s period constituted a rupture with the modernist constructions of youth¹⁰⁷ – that is a transition or with the task of acting as a vanguard. First of all, with the 1980s, youth began to be defined not as transitory stage, but a position that could be prolonged as consumption patterns diversified and presented as spectacles. And being a yuppie was praised as the ideal form of being young as if all youth was being a “young-urban-professional” – but some part of it was more yuppie – even it did not hesitate to identify yuppies with all youth, as a leading yuppie figure remarked: “yuppies are the life and world-view of the youth”.¹⁰⁸ Apparently, a small privileged group claiming to speak for the rest of the people, this was not only possible by means of the empowering policies of new-right

¹⁰⁵ Tura, "68 ile 71 Arasında Sıkışan Zaman: 70'li Yıllar (Wedging Time between 1968 and 1971: 1970s)," p. 42.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁰⁷ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 423.

¹⁰⁸ Kozanoğlu, *Cilalı İmaj Devri (Age of Polished Images)*, p. 90.

causing uneven income distribution, but it was also related to the ability to reach the most effective apparatus of shaping public discourse: the media.

On the other hand, surprisingly and ambivalently, by the members of “invented” 1968 generation, youth in the 1980s was also defined as mere apolitical consumers, yet this categorization seemed not to include famous yuppies. Here “consumer” was synonymous with being non-reactive in the sense of deeds by the members of the late 1960s in their past experiences. However, if one consumed suiting the “taste” and could use the channels of new communication then one would catch the time. It is evident that this new concept of youth excluded many and dictated a symbolic capital of a class culture which would be more dominating in the 1990s.

Considering the *de facto* prohibitions, it should not be surprising that young people endeavoured to find new ways of expressing themselves. Here, it would better to exemplify with two cases. First, periodicals and magazines became spaces of uttering opposing arguments and demanded rose rapidly for them in urban areas.¹⁰⁹ Second, a weekly satirical which had been released in 1970s but been closed after the coup and reopened in the middle of 1980s featuring very young artists who drew caricatures with languages they deformed became very popular. *Gırgır*, which was presumed to have half million in sales, followed the world’s two top-selling humor magazines, American MAD and Soviet Crocodile. Its readers’ pages part was full of letters on problems with life, the environment, the state and the country: Kozanoğlu notes that “last letters, letters of suicide, letters on hopelessness and despair...the last thing that appeared on the readers’ pages of weekly satirical was satire itself”.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 100.

¹¹⁰ Can Kozanoğlu, *Yeni Şehir Notları (Notes on New City)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 97-98.

More important, besides the excluding aspect of the new concept of youth, was the concealing effect of the media in relation to the new discourse on youth's non-reactiveness. This was clearly observable in the armed Kurdish movement started under the banner of the PKK in 1984 and the civil war in the eastern region of Anatolia in the 1990s. Gradually in the 1990s, the Kurdish armed movement recruited many young Kurdish men and women. By not giving information about the ongoing civil war, the Youth discourse, mostly constructed around matching the nostalgia of 1968 and the "glamorous" cultural climate of the 1990s, totally dismissed the present and kept on claiming the apoliticalness of youth in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the media, thanks to the private broadcasting television networks, just appropriating the imaginary culturalist view of the new-right, beginning with 1980s, regarded the civil war and the Kurdish militancy as a matter of image and taste. As written in one of the early Turkish fanzines:

I am learning from the screen bug, new Turk Engin Ardiç, that men became terrorists because of being slang and women because of being colloquial. Even shaving his moustache for the liberal outlook, he is making this marvelous comment after he said, "look at their shots on TV"...I hope he has already ordered Faruk Geç to draw preliminary sketches of the terrorists of the new world order. Actually Ardiç is right. The terrorists who confront a policeman having a style, a brilliant face like Necdet Menzir's should be attractive like the "ciks" in the İş Bankası commercials...and be as "cool" as those in a jeans commercial; and it is a reason of preference if women have jumped out from Rejoice commercials and have had both side of their hair washed with the same shampoo. Additionally they must cry "wooavv" when they shoot and "oouvvv" when bullets of the green coats [worn by Turkish army forces] hit them, and must be psychically well-built in order to act in a detergent commercial which could clean the blood spots on their jeans if any of them are captured alive.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ *Mondo Trasho*, n.d., collaged in *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no.1 (1999). For the original text see Appendix, p. 120.

As quoted from an early fanzine, young people can find new means of refusal and criticism of the new cultural climate and its hegemonic image-based consumption discourse. In fact, this was also the negation of the so-called definitive, yet excluding, discourses which concealed their experiences and neglecting their identities. Fanzines can be evaluated through this perspective, but it would be better to analyze the social and cultural climate of the 1990s first.

CHAPTER THREE

SETTING THE SPECTACLE: NEW YOUTH APPEARANCE OF THE 1990S

In this chapter, briefly, the 1990s' cultural climate will be discussed. The impossibility of detaching Turkey from rest of the world will be the basis on which to conceptualize the decade in relations with the previous one. While the term *juvenilization* is adopted here to demonstrate the new Youth discourse, a new economy, namely "youth capital;" Debord's theses on society of the spectacle and other contemporary literature following it on postmodernism will be traced in order to grasp the "structure of feeling," in similar vein as Williams uses the term, from which fanzines as cultural products emerged out. Adopting "the society of the spectacle" thesis, not only a new economic age, a bulk of new media-centered government technics, and masked class differences will be on the agenda; but also the historical temporality that gave birth to fanzines, as spectacular youth refusals, will be discussed.

The 1990s were by no means a sharp break from the 1980s, neither for the world (notably the west) nor for Turkey; nevertheless, a new cultural climate and a socio-economic transformation that were introduced to societies, mostly under strict politics of neo-liberal governments, in the 1980s expanded to all aspects of everyday life by the 1990s; hence it is possible to discuss on a "new break"¹¹² in a continuity, but not a total differentiation.

In Turkey, the 1990s were also the years in which there remained almost no direct intervention of the military administration in the civil governmental issues.

¹¹² Tanıl Bora, "'Son Yirmi Yılı" Ayırıştırmak için Notlar (Notes For Analyzing Last Twenty Years)," *Birikim*, no. 152-153 (December 2001-January 2002): p. 55.

The main reason for this was the massive changes beginning with 1991.¹¹³ In the correlation by Bora, while the 1980s' Turkey was derived to market society, it was already the market that dominated all relations in the 1990s; yet, though emancipated from the authoritarianism of military coup and of the following so-called liberal governments and coalitions beginning with 1983, in the new era of the 1990s the aspects of the “civil – spontaneous – fascism”, thanks to the ongoing war engaged in the Eastern part of the country against Kurdish militants of the PKK, were more powerful than the in previous decade, which can be named “pre-media” times.¹¹⁴ The sovereignty of the media, in the 1990s, as the main agent for the circulation of the culture can only be comprehended if this fact is considered with the transformation of the economy.

New Economy, New Culture

In the essays commenting on his famous work “The Society of the Spectacle,” Debord defines his historical societal category as “the autocratic reign of the market economy which had acceded to an irresponsible sovereignty, and the totality of new techniques of government which accompanied this reign.”¹¹⁵ Even though the society of the spectacle, as Debord himself clarifies, historically elucidates a period, that of 1967, and specific societies – of western world, it seems to have many useful methods of assessment for the period thesis dealing with: in the short term 1991-1999, and in long term 1989-2001.¹¹⁶ In this respect, the period,

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 58.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp.55-59.

¹¹⁵ Guy Debord, *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* (1988 [cited 2005]); available from <http://www.situationist.cjb.net/>.

¹¹⁶ In their work “Empire”, which deals with capitalism in its new phase and strives to explain new socio-economic, political, and cultural relations and structures of the present

most notably between years 1990 and 1999, that of the expansion of private television networks and specialized magazines, or in a prolonged period between years that financial liberalization began in 1989 and crisis in 2001, will be the historical moment that my definition, *juvenilization*, strengthened itself by means of economy and culture – of new media in these years; namely these are years of “the spectacle which is capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images.”¹¹⁷

The expansion of the spectacle at the broadest level could not have been possible, if the culture did not declare its independence by simultaneously smashing the semi-autonomous rank attributed to it in its relations with economy and politics.¹¹⁸ Thus, it was a historical period which can be grasped if it is considered that now “culture and economic is not a one-way street but a continuous reciprocal interaction feedback loop.”¹¹⁹ This is not just the commercialization of culture, but also the culturalization of the economy.¹²⁰

Economy: Directing the Consumption

This process in Turkey, namely the rule of the spectacle, was inaugurated with the liberalization of banking, finance, and global speculation in 1989,¹²¹ and

with an interdisciplinary method, Negri and Hardt underscore that Debord’s “Society of Spectacle” has more validity today after its publishing of thirty years. Notice that *Empire*, as Negri and Hardt mention in the preface, was written in the period between the war in Bosnia and Kosovo, thus roughly 1991-2001. See Micheal Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harward University, 2001), pp. 184-205, pp.304-25.

¹¹⁷ Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (2002 [cited 2005]); available from <http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/debord/index.htm>.

¹¹⁸ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 7.

¹¹⁹ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University, 1991), p. xv.

¹²⁰ Slavoj Zizek, “I am a Fighting Atheist”, interview by Doug Henwood, *Bad Subjects*, no. 59 (February 2002). Available from: <http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2002/59/zizek.html>.

¹²¹ Yakup Kepenek & Nurhan Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi (Turkish Economy)* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2001), p. 365.

with the establishment of the new media corporations and progression of the old ones in 1990 (Television broadcasting and multiple-press – newspapers, magazines, and publishing); namely, the rise of new types of relations with the determination of the wealth and its display provided by newly functioned sectors. Without doubt, the patterns of consumption have been always displayed in order to emphasize social status and class positions; however, the change was the acceleration of those displays. The diversification of consumption patterns was multiplied in the world wide extent with the 1960s. However, for Turkey, years of import substitution and planned economy following 1960, though challenged with crises and bottlenecks during the 1970s, are to be considered as the age of consumption goods for the primary needs and even as the age of savings. During these years, the major characteristics of the economy were manufactured goods, from primary needs to machinery, hence a balanced planning with labor-intensified mode of production and relatively even income distribution and consumption. However, “as the consumption economy has developed, so the value of the commodities has been seen to drive less from the laws of the economic exchange governing the market or from the ability of products to satisfy primary needs than from the way they function culturally as signs within coded systems of exchange.”¹²²

Here, it is easy to see the main transformation in the social experience of consumption in the 1980s, in Turkey especially in the 1990s, just by taking a glimpse at material differentiation: Now it was faster to fill and change the consumption patterns, as leisure time and life style consumption were accelerated more rapidly than any consumption good, whether clothing, a refrigerator or a car. As it will be discussed below, it is enough here to label this change as a transition from an

¹²² Dick Hebdige, "After the Masses," in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Geoff Eley et al (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1994), p. 226.

understanding of the material that is adult, dim, and motionless to the one of cultural that is Youthful, glossy, and dynamic.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, nearly all countries experienced the rise of the neo-liberal economic responses of the new right governments to the crises of the fordist mode of production. However, the post-fordist modification of production did not restrict itself in the realm of economy as well as its predecessor organization had done, but it strove to restructure social relations as well, even to set itself as the socio-cultural fact before production. Fundamentally, with the new-right experience between 1983 and 1989, the Turkish economy's axis turned upside down: import substitution was replaced by export orientation. Yet this axis was possible by only repressing the salaries, and hence internal demand; so the economy could be articulated with the global markets. In these years, first, whereas a small part of the population was socio-economically strengthened, deficits in the trade rates forced the governments to adopt global financial openness in 1989; second, as an interrupted export orientation economy entails, internal demand was puffed up by a 100 percent increase in salaries. Here, it can be thought, in the first instance, that a type of "democratization of consumption" was realized through transition from luxury to mass consumption. However, the intensification of the financial development, related to information-intensive service production such as advertising agencies and mass media communication, caused a huge unevenness between incomes and demographic distribution in the service and the serving sectors. In brief, in Turkey, "shop windows have never been full before while people have had the least purchasing power" in the 1990s.¹²³

¹²³ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 39.

Consumption as the priority for economic development was not just the visible side of the social inequality; it also evolved into a set of cultural practices by the commodities full of signs; it is the same if we say culture evolved into a set of consumptual practices. What was unprecedented for Turkey's social life was not the cultural signs, as commodities, that were voicing some class positions but the fact that they were contributing to the process of excluding many others. This was, in fact, the contradiction in the core of neo-liberal capitalism's global manifestation as Jean and John Comaroff states it, that instantaneous riches to those who controls its technologies, simultaneously threatens the lives of those do not have them.¹²⁴ The welcome of this excluding process in Turkey, therefore, can be grasped through the importance attributed to leisure time and consumption patterns.

Culture: Motive of Consumption

For Turkey, briefly, everyday life was transformed into "consumption society," in the sense the term has been used for western societies roughly since the late 1960s and 1970s, especially after the mid-1980s, but structured in 1990s as "the society of the spectacle." In this process, mostly determined by the supply-sided policies of neo-liberal economic thinking, Turkey was not an exception of being introduced to the new trajectories of economy, that of the consumption-based, which began to be intensified on post-fordist organization in the real production level, financial speculation, and on marketing. However, this tendency leaped to the 1990s, as mentioned above, with the acceleration and diversification in the characteristics of consumption patterns, which is put by Harvey in two aspects: first, as an acceleration

¹²⁴ Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Alien-Nation: Zombies, Immigrants, and Millennial Capitalism," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, no. 101 (Fall 2002): p. 782.

in the pace of consumption by new fields of leisure time activities and life styles (sports, pop music genres, personal electronics, child industry – from toys to juvenile entertainment); and second, as an transition form consumption of goods to consumption services.¹²⁵

Importance of Leisure Time

In all modern social formations, different types of temporal frames exist in a permanent struggle that a particular class tries to end with the victory of its own temporal sovereignty, namely with hegemony.¹²⁶ Besides the determination of class roles, this struggle appears not stripped from the historical and cultural conditions. In modern times, capitalism's perception of time has dismissed leisure time as idleness that was wasted time for work; therefore, leisure time had been considered as outside of the work, of capitalism. However, in "postmodern times," leisure time began to be grasped by capitalism as something economically valuable and every type of activity that worked to "occupy" leisure time was gradually commodified; therefore many leisure time activities, whether they were modified or invented, requiring special equipments or guidance were marketed by the leisure time and culture industries that competed not just for money, but also for the "time" of the clients.¹²⁷ As Lefebvre ultimately suggests, "leisure time is not a Festival or the reward of labour any more, nor is it a free activity performing for itself. It is generalized spectacle: it is

¹²⁵ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), p. 285.

¹²⁶ Şükrü Argın, "Boş Zamanın Anlamı Üzerine Notlar (Notes on the Meaning of Leisure Time)," in *Nostalji ile Ütopya Arasında (Between Nostalgia and Utopia)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 142.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

television, cinema, and tourism.”¹²⁸ For sure, it is not as simple for the 1990s’ Turkey as Lefebvre states; nevertheless, it gives a general statement about, though suggested in another context, how information intensified service sector’s main product becomes mainly “culture” itself. A culture that occupies leisure time at an accelerated pace and diversification, as discussed above, of patterns of consumption economy.

The image origin of the society of the spectacle and its advertising actors, with shock effects adopted from the critical modern arts, particularly from surrealism,¹²⁹ primarily seek to direct consumption that has evolved into desires. More importantly any delay or interruption in the satisfaction of the desires – deprivation of the leisure activities – bears the possibility of having the feelings of being out of time or out-moded. Therefore, a deep gap, though it seems contradictory, between the abundance and diversity of the leisure time activities and the number of those who have lesser and even no opportunities to do these activities has emerged. In the 1980s, a strong stress in the mass media was placed mainly on the importance of programming leisure time – like a nationwide economic policy emphasized during the 1980s and the 1990s: tourism – and on sustaining “highly selective” consumption patterns – occupied with global imported brands – by all available medium. Hence, many things that seemed to be the outputs of rational economic thinking were at the same time cultural codes of social fragmentation.

However, the 1990s differed from the 1980s. The grotesque figures of a capitalist accumulation regime, yuppies, were harshly criticized; then a “global human” who would produce the symbolic capital of the new middle class appeared in

¹²⁸ Henri Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat (Everyday Life in Modern World)* (Istanbul: Metis, 1998), p. 59.

¹²⁹ Hebdige, "After the Masses," p. 224. and Şükrü Argın, "Tüketicinin Üretimi ve Benlik Promosyonu (Production of the Consumer and Promotion of the Self)," in *Nostalji ile Ütopya Arasında (Between Nostalgia and Utopia)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 121.

the 1990s.¹³⁰ Yet the most remarkable effects of exalting leisure time were achieved since its places and styles were, in particular that of new middle class, separated from any social confrontation: “income levels, lifestyles, consumption patterns, and increasingly space divided.”¹³¹ In other words, the 1990s were years of the “increase both in the amount of rubbish and the level of unemployment” ,n this process.¹³²

Eventually, leisure time and patterns of consumption in the 1990s did not arise as semi-detached areas of the everyday life of Turkey, but also as “fields of existence,” as the kernel of being, namely, hegemony, which had to be won and reproduced either by a cultural siege or by pretending the others did not exist. This strategy was so successful, though tested and challenged every time, that the lower classes in the city misperceived the failure – their class positions of being low: “what they misperceive is that the mysterious X that accounts for the true upper-classness cannot be pin-pointed to specific positive symbolic feature.”¹³³ The new middle class is in the upper rank as much as its members can violate the displays and images, while the lower classes are imitating the images or styles. However, they misperceive the main characteristics of the society of the spectacle that is based on the slippery ground of the bulk of images and words which are outputs of specific relations of production, on the one hand, and the inputs of a class strategy, on the other.

¹³⁰ Ali Şimşek, *Yeni Orta Sınıf ve Söylem Terminatörleri (New Middle Class and The Discourse Terminators)* (2002 [cited]; available from <http://www.yasamdersleri.com/yazi.asp?id=856>).

¹³¹ Çaylar Keyder, "A Tale of the Two Neighborhoods," in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, ed. Çağlar Keyder (Lanham and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 195.

¹³² Yaşar Çabuklu, "Sokak ve Ev (Street and House)," *Birikim*, no. 86-87 (1996): p. 94.

¹³³ Slavoj Žižek, "Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach," in *The Žižek Reader*, ed. E. Wright & E. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 100-01.

The main impact of this cultural strategy was the emergence of a society within which many things existed as much as they were displayed and appeared, and valued as much as they were exhibited and gazed.¹³⁴

The role of advertising in the 1990s was great in the transformation of almost all relations in Turkey into a kind of gaze.¹³⁵ Of course, presenting commodities was not new, but introducing the qualities of the commodity and its compatibilities with the needs, from then on, turned into constituting an image into evolving a spectacle into the real.¹³⁶ Modern advertising, which once aimed to conceal the fact of labour in the commodity production, in its postmodern form now aimed to conceal that it was a commodity.¹³⁷ As, similarly, Jameson suggests with the conceptualization as “logic of simulacrum” that not only are older realities (i.e. the role of labour in the relations of productions or any social conflict) transformed into television images or replicate the logic of the late capitalism, but they reinforce and intensify it.¹³⁸

Not surprisingly, the rise of the media corporations armed with any means, from newspapers to specialized magazines, and to television networks and advertising agencies in Turkey coincided with the 1990s. Regarding the accelerated and diversified consumption economy, then, it should be considered that the ground for an economy (or culture, or everydayness), like this, has to be visual. It was now “a life in Turkey in those years which was aware that the more it was gazed, the more it became valuable.”¹³⁹ Even this was valid for the styles considered conservative: the new middle class Islamic way of life also exhibited itself as fashion

¹³⁴ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 29.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ For a stunning historical analysis of the advertisements see Argın, "Tüketicinin Üretimi ve Benlik Promosyonu (Production of the Consumer and Promotion of the Self)."

¹³⁸ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 46.

¹³⁹ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 29.

and style, as a part of the spectacle just appropriating prerequisites of the 1990s.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, according to Jean-Luc Godard, a special, external evolution from lesser reader to a more gazing human race was the reality that everybody underwent.¹⁴¹ The last twenty years of the twentieth century could be marked as the domination of the photographic image, notably of the tele-visual.¹⁴² So, there appeared a global societal condition that Jameson determines it as “an entirely historically-original consumers’ appetite for a world transformed into sheer images of itself and for pseudo-events and as spectacles.”¹⁴³

Producing the Information, Manipulating the Consumption

What is to be considered in understanding the social transformation, whether for Turkey or another country, in which media is the bearer of the image-based culture is the fact that the rate of information service sectors multiplied within every national economy in the world extent especially in the post-1980s. Indeed, there is no inevitable or natural “march through the sectors” from agriculture to industry, and subsequently to the services as an economy develops.¹⁴⁴ As in the Italian instance of socio-economic change in the 1980s, conceptualized as “Third Italia,”¹⁴⁵ economic change did not appear in linearity, transiting from fully achieved industrialization to the second stage, that of “informational society.”¹⁴⁶ Similarly, for Turkey, and

¹⁴⁰ See Yael Navaro-Yashin, "The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities," in *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti & Ayşe Saktanber (New Jersey: Rutgers University, 2002).

¹⁴¹ Ulus Baker, "Pragmata," *Birikim*, no. 152-153 (December 2001-January 2002): p. 80.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 18.

¹⁴⁴ Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World* (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), p. 26.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-43.

¹⁴⁶ Negri, *Empire*, pp. 288-89.

probably for all “developing” countries, the rise of the service sector in the economy was more visible in the 1980s than it was in the 1970s; and this tendency kept the pace especially during the 1990s.¹⁴⁷ By the 1990s, services and manipulating information became the major components of the economy.¹⁴⁸

The manipulation of the information, which significantly contributes to the evolution of the exchange value into symbolic value and needs into cultural signs, is required if the new patterns of accelerated consumption economy addressing to ideas, tastes, and status is considered; therefore, commercials and media images gain a type of integrative role.¹⁴⁹ In this manner, the year 1990 appears as a “new break:” following this year, Turkey witnessed the establishment of the first private television network and the publication of many nation-wide distributed magazines – but probably not read to the same extent – which ranged from weekly news-periodicals to ones specialized in pop music, finance, child-care, and home-decoration. In fact, with the rise of the service sector and new specializations, especially in finance (international banking and stock change), media and entertainment, “a yuppie culture intensified in fields such as gentrification, fashion, design, and the city life;”¹⁵⁰ hence, as symbolic capital accumulation.

However, on the other side, if the thesis of the society of the spectacle is adopted, one should recall, as Debord writes, that “the spectacle...reunites the separated, but it reunites them only in their separateness...therefore, the unreal unity proclaimed by the spectacle masks the class division underlying the real unity of the

¹⁴⁷ While the rate of transportation and communication in total investments were 14,1 percent in 1973, it increased to 19,8 percent in 1983 and 20,9 in 1996. In Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi (Turkish Economy)*, p. 394.

¹⁴⁸ Negri, *Empire*, p. 280.

¹⁴⁹ Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, p. 320.

¹⁵⁰ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. xix., and Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, p. 332.

capitalist mode of production.”¹⁵¹ With the 1990s, whereas the service sector developed and expanded, stratification in the social structure gradually sedimented. In his work, on the transformation of two neighborhoods in Istanbul after its opening to the global capitalist network, Keyder suggests that a new professional middle class distinguished itself from the old middle class and the working classes with a stock of symbolic capital.¹⁵² In addition, in the world-wide extent, the 1980s and following years can be evaluated as the rise of the global cities as control centers – yet especially some distinct neighborhoods of them – in the non-western world with the industrial withdrawal, but also with the intensification of the financial and information sectors, thus whereas production was decentralizing, control was becoming centralized on the city scale.¹⁵³ These cities, including Istanbul, in the 1990s provided service sector control over information, the taste, and the flow of financial resources for global producers and consumers; namely a “dissemination of symbolic workers of status.”¹⁵⁴

However, information-intensified production always requires a highly specialized division of labor, yet with lesser need of employment. Thanks to the informational technologies and the new media, emerging fields of employment lost their capacity to absorb educated labour because of self-automation and therefore a little web of advantaged people, most notably the new middle classes, appeared ambivalently with a cultural economy that aimed to speak for all. Not only structural unemployment or underemployment, but also hegemonic struggle turned into the “real” of the everyday life. In this tension in Turkey, during the 1990s, all images and words were adopted and armed whether to “expand the global spectrum of

¹⁵¹ Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* ([cited].Theses 29 and 72.

¹⁵² Keyder, "A Tale of the Two Neighborhoods," p. 181.

¹⁵³ Negri, *Empire*, p. 297.

¹⁵⁴ Keyder, "A Tale of the Two Neighborhoods," p. 188.

consumption, of spectacle”¹⁵⁵ or to open “alternative and oppositional”¹⁵⁶ spaces to set and claim subject positions. Keyder argues these process underscoring interrelations and new pattern of conflict as:

This employment structure is shaped not only by the existence of sophisticated and well-paid positions in producers’ services but also by the second order effects of such primary employment: high-income earners in a post-fordist world tend toward labor-intensive consumption patterns that involve a differentiated range of productive and service activities...gentrified housing requiring specialized construction and care..., leisure and entertaining entertainment activities – all these employment is created because of existence of a new social stratum whose consumption habits are sharply differentiated from the old middle class of the fordist and the developmentalist era. The complicated social commerce between the new global class and those who cater to their luxury needs, on the one hand, and between these and the “old” middle and the working classes, on the other, makes for political and ideological conflict...¹⁵⁷

Hence, besides economic intensification in informational service sector, it seems more plausible to discuss the rise of a new mode of labour that can be called the “serving sector.” Therefore, the “homogenization of the laboring processes,”¹⁵⁸ in other words, the proletarianization in the labor process appears as one of the main arguments for efforts to comprehend the 1990s. Nevertheless, one can see the most

¹⁵⁵ Stokes, "Sounding Out: Culture Industries and the Globalization of Istanbul."

¹⁵⁶ Raymond Williams puts a distinction between these terms and suggests that having alternative or oppositional practices, experiences, meanings, and values is subject to historical variations. Nevertheless, for him, there is a simple distinction between them, that is to say between one who simply finds a way to live and wishes to be left alone with it, and one who finds a different way to live and wants to change the society in its light. But it is often very narrow line, in reality, between alternative and oppositional. For detailed discussions see Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," p. 39-40.

¹⁵⁷ Keyder, "A Tale of the Two Neighborhoods," p. 188. Also for a detailed elaboration of the process see Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*, pp. 39-41.

¹⁵⁸ Negri, *Empire*, p. 292.

immediate and dramatic aspects not just in work and production, but in organizing leisure time and consumption.¹⁵⁹

Hence, the main memory of the 1990s was the sharp distinction between the new middle class of the services and the working classes and the old middle classes. But this distinction was observable mostly in the cultural realm, as culture declared independence and emerged as the only “definer” of the truth, thanks to the “newly emergent mass media and sectorized advertising that turned the city into a spectacle.”¹⁶⁰ And indeed, a spectacle that separately unifies, displays a society in which advantageous classes claim their symbolic capital not only speaking for themselves, but for all. This not only conceal the internal excluding aspect of the new “complicated social commerce” of which Keyder speaks, but features these advantageous classes in the hegemonic struggle by praising the new leisure time and diversified consumption patterns.

On the other hand, in order to understand *juvenilization*, besides leisure time and a consumption-oriented economy, a new perception of time (especially apparent in “prolonged youth” and in the invention of generations such as 1968 and the young-urban-professionals of the 1980s) that is based on an ahistorical present and culture as a given and the rise of the “house” (equating “street” as out-moded and filthy and “house” as young or dynamic) have to be taken into account. All will help to demonstrate how these arguments could be pinned on a new concept of Youth as symbolic capital in the 1990s’ Turkey, and to grasp how this new concept of Youth, as ideal consumer, could be constituted on the differences with the youth experienced.

¹⁵⁹ Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*, p. 155.

¹⁶⁰ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 120.

Time and History: A Crisis

According to Argin, discussing the 1980s and the 1990s is also thinking on the “present”; however, this is not only a temporal moment – in the modernist sense that present is the successor of the past and predecessor of the future – that one still experiences in the 2000s, but also a repetition of the same patterns in time.¹⁶¹ A new perception of time, detached from the burden of the past and the possibilities of the present, a prolonged present which could be grabbed in enjoyment if one had the abilities to join the flow of consumption images, was the dominant feature of the 1990s; as Jameson argues, this was a whole new culture of the images or the simulacrum, a consequent weakening of the of historicity.¹⁶² And this weakening was not just in new forms of private temporality that were occupied with leisure time, but also in the relationship to collective memory, public history. What should be discussed is how it was possible that a new perception of time reigned over historical thinking during the 1990s. In addition to economic changes, mainly the determinacy of consumption media in communication, especially the emergence of private televisions beginning with 1990; a type of psychological defensive strategy, which I take here as “cynicism,”¹⁶³ was the main attitude in mainstream media towards the present social tensions of the decade and the past experiences, especially, of the 1970s. By the middle of the 1980s, yet in particular during 1990s, multiple media channels (newspapers, specialized magazines, book publishing, and television networks) were the main bearers, both visually and literary, of this cynical way of

¹⁶¹ Şükrü Argin, "1980'lerden 1990'lara: Şimdiki Zaman Diktatörlüğü (From the 1980s to the 1990s: Dictatorship of the Present)," in *Nostalji ile Ütopya Arasında (Between Nostalgia and Utopia)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), p. 80.

¹⁶² Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 6.

¹⁶³ For detailed discussion on the concept cynicism adopted here see Slavoj Žižek, *İdeolojinin Yüce Nesnesi (The Sublime Object of Ideology)* (Istanbul: Metis, 1999).

keeping a distance from inequalities and social tensions. An escape from the present problems found its counterpart in the rise of nostalgic historicism and pop-history. Although in a naïve observation, this type of “diversification” in the collective memory can be considered as plurality. In fact it resonated with a specific politics which silenced many voices in favor some privileged ones. Besides cynicism, nostalgia and pop history, and in the term of Gürbilek, “explosion of words”, which was introduced in chapter two, should be discussed in order to grasp how a new perception of time stressing on the present and on being young was so relevant with silencing refusals and embodying conformity with sustaining youthfulness. In this process, the negation of the 1970s – as opposed to the youthful post-1980, especially by the invention of a generation – of 1968 will be examined to emphasize that the “explosion of words” was also a historicist strategy.

Distancing from the Present and Vengeance over the Recent Past: Cynicism

A shift in the perception of time and the ways to struggle with it are so relevant to the modification of capitalism. The ultimate acceleration in the pace and the diversification of consumption, as discussed above, are directly related to this modification that is from goods-for-needs to images and sign-loaded commodities. In the accelerated flow of commodities, namely the outputs of the network, consisting of advertising agencies and media corporations that turn products into spectacles, the only definition of the value is not just the one in the market, but also the qualification of being “brand new.” All efforts to sustain the condition of being new, namely *juvenilization*, therefore are possible if the temporal sense between the past, the

present and the future is abandoned on behalf of a “present” of a certain hegemonic temporality.

Through this hegemonic temporality, on the other hand, all inequalities that were the natural results of the post-1980 socioeconomic transformation and social conflicts, for instance, the civil war engaged in eastern Anatolia during the 1990s, got lost in the spectacle and did not have contact with the everyday accomplishments and places of the new middle class. Because, as Debord asserts, things only exist if they can appear in the society of the spectacle. If any confrontation happened with the “real” – a squatter neighborhood near shopping malls or news about deeds of Kurdish militants –, a “cynical” attitude would help to keep the distance towards the bitter experiences; hence, forms of enjoyment wrapped with anxieties were created – albeit unconsciously.

If the modern human, in its future-oriented temporality, can be evaluated as being in a rush to the future, then this cynical postmodern human can be regarded as feeling uneasy since it is stuck in the present.¹⁶⁴ This feel of unease is not contradictory with the psychological condition of the “ideal consumer” who is now a (symbolic) value on its own.¹⁶⁵ Because, in the super fast stream of images, to be content with the needs (in the shape of the old fashion) does not just make one who is out-moded and non-dynamic, but also a waste of the past. In an abundance of images, whether much is consumed by a minority, thanks to broad distribution by the mass media, every signifier refers just to other signifiers; a commodity-as-image gets a meaning if matched with another one. Hence, to grasp a social reality, the meaning of the signified, is crippled: “the meaning of the new view is generated by the

¹⁶⁴ Argin, "1980'lerden 1990'lara: Şimdiki Zaman Diktatörlüğü (From the 1980s to the 1990s: Dictatorship of the Present)," p. 86.

¹⁶⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, *Çalışma, Tüketim ve Yeni Yoksullar* (Work, Consumerism, and the New Poor) (Istanbul: Sarmal, 1999) quoted in Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefatinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," p. 290.

movement from signifier to signifier.”¹⁶⁶ Jameson describes this process, with reference to Lacan, as schizophrenia (not in the clinical sense), which is a break down in the signifying chain and drowning in unrelated signifiers: “illimitable vastness, brilliant light, and the gloss and smoothness of material things.”¹⁶⁷ Therefore, on the sliding ground of signifiers, it turns out to be a hard task for the subject to constitute coherence between the past, the present and the future.

This new cultural phenomenon – appears in the crisis of historicity that is defined by Jameson as “pastiche” – is also psychological and economic in the literary sense of the 1990s’ novel. Kozanoğlu criticizes this new axis of popular literature with the loss of realism and its focus on everydayness in novel.¹⁶⁸ Meaning, from that on, was in the mysterious, mystic, and sacred yesterday; and tomorrow turned out to be, again, a mysterious and mystic cosmic realm determined by special codes sent by the past.¹⁶⁹ Escaping from the present, keeping a “cool” and cynical distance from the real was then only possible in a crisis of historicity. Meanwhile, the present was crushed under the aestheticization of the past and a future without promises. Before suggesting the aestheticization of the past, namely nostalgia and pop-history, the strategy of silencing any other refusal or opposition with a new discourse which disdained them as useless and out-moded will be discussed. This is the “explosion of words,” of which the main lines were introduced in chapter two.

¹⁶⁶ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 26.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26-27.

¹⁶⁸ Kozanoğlu, *Yeni Şehir Notları (Notes on New City)*, p. 81-82.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Explosion of Words

It seems hard to deny that this psychic deregulation discussed above was not the case in 1990s' Turkey. Through the gate opened by the coup in 1980 the main thing that entered was rupture with the historical time. This was exactly the society of "the spectacle which is the reigning society's method for paralyzing history and memory and for suppressing any history based on historical time."¹⁷⁰ Mostly reinforced in the 1990s, this process had its setting moments in the 1980s. However, this was accomplished not only by the oppression of the military rule, but mostly in the secondary "surrounding" discourse, that Gürbilek uses, and in her "explosion of words."

The 1980s, as a turning point for Turkey, can be identified with many unprecedented social phenomena and political renewals of neo-liberal politics that could be read through the concepts used in chapter two, namely the "explosion of words" or "de facto prohibitions." Although Kozanoğlu's de facto prohibitions can, for sure, provide fruitful dimensions to analyze the 1990s' media discourse, Gürbilek's "explosion of words" will be a key concept, for my arguments at least, since she traces Debord's image-based society of the spectacle thesis for Turkey following the 1980s.

Gürbilek's "explosion of words," regarding the 1980s, is a cradle of two different power projects, of two discourses, and of two cultural strategies: The first one is repressive and prohibitive (that, historically, can be equated with the period of National Security Council – The NSC administration until 1983 and to 1986, when civil rights were freed), while the second targets not to prohibit but transform, not to

¹⁷⁰ Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* ([cited]).

destroy but to include, and not to repress but to seduce all repressed desires in a more (post)modern, constructive, and surrounding cultural strategy (again in a historical periodization beginning with the first elected government of explicit new-right rhetoric in 1983).¹⁷¹ In conclusion, it is period for “a society began in coercion, deceit and blood, but it promised a happy path.”¹⁷²

This rhetoric, of the second strategy, constituted the main body of vivid change in the 1980s with a promise of liberation and autonomy in the cultural realm. In fact, on the world scale, any member of the any class could predict a barely visible future that could promise a more “entertaining” life, however with the anxiety of losing the poles that one could position her/himself within.¹⁷³ Though the 1990s were years of the absolute victory of the latter strategy over the first, it was discovered that the promise of the second, indeed, was restricted for some classes. Thus, the 1990s were years of this emergent “new middle classes” and of the speech of their symbolic capital reaching almost everyone through the circulation of the new media discourse by the “explosion of words.” This circulation of the bulk of symbolic capital by new media discourse, in addition to consumption patterns and leisure time activities, claimed a cultural liberation by remembering the recent past, which was set on a dichotomy between the 1970s and post-1980s years and by forgetting it

¹⁷¹ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 8.

¹⁷² Debord uses this thesis in order to explain how infiltration of the spectacle occurs in any other countries out of France. Guy Debord, *Preface to the fourth Italian Edition of La Societe du Spectacle* (1979 [cited 2005]); available from <http://www.situationist.cjb.net>.

¹⁷³ Kıvanç Kılıç, "Kıyametin Bin Yılına Girenken (Welcoming the Millennium of the Armageddon)," *Birikim*, no. 152-153 (December 2001- January 2002): p. 202.

The 1970s versus post-1980s

Gürbilek examines the circulation of the new media discourse, in the post-1980s, as a strategy of a specific hegemony that sought to silence all efforts to construct a past with alternatives. She exemplifies how her “explosion of words” functioned in the *de facto* prohibiting of the utterance of “labor” and “exploitation” by equating them with the 1970s that paved the way for the military coup, thanks to immigrated ruralites and their in-depthness; therefore, the 1970s arose as the experience of the recent past which had to be forgotten as quickly as possible.¹⁷⁴ Not only did this process load new meanings, as out-moded and old-aged, to these words’ past utterance of signifying the inequalities, it also erased the search for the reality of the present from the language and declared all efforts for this search as naïve.¹⁷⁵

Henceforth, in the new media in the post-1980s years, the 1970s were targeted as the past to which any negative feature could refer, contradicting any positive present – naturally, young, urban, and professional – aspects. All tensions in the 1970s, through mass media images, articles, and rhetoric of the post-1980s, were stripped of their class and social backgrounds and equated with mere street violence; however, this was not achieved by any repression but by melting the political content in the explosion of words and labeling it as out-moded. Here, the “explosion of words”, namely a change in the language, made this process possible: a break between the language and the real, signifier and signified, that arbitrarily excluded the experiences of the recent past.¹⁷⁶ Therefore, in conclusion, Turkey witnessed, in the 1980s, the drowning of the 1970s with all alternatives and politicalization of

¹⁷⁴ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*., p. 24.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 24-26.

everyday life of those years, and without discussing their ambivalences. Thereafter, the present of the 1980s was cleansed the past; however, the 1990s was the oblivion of the past as a temporal category that could be recalled in the shock moments of the present.

It would appear in the next part that nostalgia and pop-history sprang from this gap created by the new language.

Nostalgia and Pop-history: A Generation Is Born

The most concrete result of the utterance of language of this sort was the nostalgia for a past by the name of a generation appeared that in the late 1980s which, then, became part of the dominant discourse during the 1990s. The invention of the 1968 generation was not tearing a past of its ambivalences, but rather creating an “imaginary in order to arouse the present needs – of images and styles – and fantasies.”¹⁷⁷ The loyalty of the members to their generation could be fulfilled whenever they were employed with high-salaries by the new networks of the mass media and advertising agencies. By remembering the past as nostalgia, an privileged class could both be emancipated from the past experiences and embrace the culture of the 1990s’ spectacle of the high-selective leisure time consumption. Hence, they could intersect with the young members of the new middle classes and altogether be colleagues of the similar “gusto.”

In fact, the inevitable result of the stabilized invention the 1968 generation in the 1990s was the hindering of the interrogation of the present. How this process worked on a youth discourse will be discussed below.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p.23.

In the emergence of pop history, in reciprocity, advertising had a great role; without it, the invention of the 1968 generation could not have been carried out in the late 1980s, but in the 1970s.¹⁷⁸ What advertising did was turn the past into images that could refer to each other and be marketed for the components of styles. This was the natural result of the “intensification of addiction to the photographic image which is itself a symptom of omnipresent libidinal historicism.”¹⁷⁹ Therefore, it is possible to evaluate 1990’s Turkey, in reference to Debord, as “a society in a crisis of historicity whose history is the commonly consumed item, spectacle or consumable image of an economic development.”¹⁸⁰

On the other hand, nostalgia did not just substitute the past, as the 1970s were equated with street violence; it also confined it in aestheticization. Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, especially after the middle of the decade, the process in the 1970s that ended with the coup was one of the main issues debated in many of the newly-emerging out-of-mainstream magazines. However, nostalgia filled the place that was occurred by excluding the “unhistorical kernel” (i.e. class antagonism or barbarism and regression in the Benjaminian historical materialist sense) from the historicity.¹⁸¹ Saying basically, the social struggles in the 1970s or even the coup in 1980 was dismissed in the 1990s, and the 1970s appeared aesthetically as wide collars and high-heeled shoes, and bright colors. Of course, the role of television, through releasing *Yeşilçam* movies of the 1970s, and the media’s spreading of “1970s’ style” were obvious. They all stood near new styles and were never replaced by them – even gentrification can be read through that sense. Therefore, by aesthetic effect and the “operator of a new connotation of pastness and pseudohistorical depth,

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p .49.

¹⁷⁹ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 18.

¹⁸⁰ Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* ([cited]).

¹⁸¹ Slavoj Zizek, *Enjoy Your Symptom* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 81.

the history of the aesthetic styles displaced real history.”¹⁸² This new temporality, on the other hand, can be regarded as the non-returning past of the society of spectacle if the spatial separation of the new middle class is interrogated in the 1990s, which appears as the “non-place of politics.”¹⁸³

Returning to House*

A type of the “present is ours” feeling which is achieved by invoking a past as spectacle does not aim only to “secure the present’s class-based comfort and privileges, but also excludes the representation of the real present, as past and as history”¹⁸⁴ regarding unhistorical kernel as discussed above.

Feeling of vengeance, as the one above, against the 1970s’ everyday experiences, reducing them to mere street violence mostly by immigrant “uncultured” ruralites, were so effectively carried out by mass media during the 1980s, then the 1990s were lived roughly with no past memories reminiscent of the 1970s. However, this process could not have been possible if a spatial restructuring during the 1990s, in addition to the crisis of the historicity, was sought. Indeed, this search was an indispensable mental support of the “present is ours.”

The fear and anxiety of losing a comfort and a set of privileges in the unconsciousness tend to make human think increasingly of in spatial terms: “privacy,

¹⁸² Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 20.

¹⁸³ For “non-place of politics” see, Negri, *Empire*, p. 188.

* Sezai Sarioğlu uses “returning to house” as a general redefinition of the “house” and the “places” in years following the coup in 1980. For him, even the whole political, sociological and humanitarian signs of the process after the coup can be read as “returning the house.” Sezai Sarioğlu, *Nar Taneleri: Gayriresmi Portreler (Grains of Pomegranate: The Unofficial Portraits)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), p. 32-33.

¹⁸⁴ Jameson uses “present is ours” in reference to Nietzsche, but in a negative stance. See Fredric Jameson, “Nostalgia for the Present,” in *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University, 1991), p. 286.

empty rooms, silence, walling other people out, protection against crowds and other bodies.”¹⁸⁵ Therefore, during the 1990s, in this respect, Turkey’s spatial restructuring beginning with the late 1980s, evolved into daily experiences with the proliferation of new middle class sites, house decoration, and house-based leisure time. Spatial restructuring, as the spatial dimension of unconsciousness corresponding to a particular class strategy, would not be confined just to city planning or architectural design in the geographical sense.

The term “house” adopted here is a general symbolization which captures not just buildings or decoration, but also all new isolated places such as suburbia (*site*), shopping malls, business centers, offices, and even micro-scale living rooms, hence every space that can reflect the styles of interiors. Therefore, uttering “returning to house” during the 1990s in Turkey is roughly similar to what Mulgan describes in the *New Times* as “transporting entertainment, work and democracy into the house.”¹⁸⁶ The title “Returning to House,” therefore, intends to capture how the transformation in the spatial sense extends to configure the place perceptions of everyday encounters among different social groups. In that respect, I will suggest that, “house” as the symbol of the secure and ambivalently “dynamic” insides was praised – also with the contribution of many facilitative home-centered technological and material renewals – against the outside, as I will use “street,” which is reminiscent of the political years of the 1970s in the collective memory. Certainly, such a fast transformation of the spatial perception did not just owe to restructuring of the cities but also to the new media language in the 1990s, which diffused this

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Geoff Mulgan, "Kentin Değişen Yüzü (Changing Façade of the City)," in *Yeni Zamanlar (New Times)*, ed. Stuart Hall & Martin Jacques (Istanbul: Ayrıntı, 1995), p. 220.

process in the public eye; therefore, the role of the mainstream media will be underlined.

Geography of the City: The Space of Hegemony

The 1990s for Turkey can be evaluated, in general, as years in which “the forces of the historical absence have been able to create their own landscape.”¹⁸⁷ However, the decade can be separated, though not sharply, from the preceding one: the emergence of private zones was simultaneously the “withdrawal of the energy in public circulation in the two decades following 1980.”¹⁸⁸ In fact, Gürbilek uses “withdrawal,” substituting “explosion” which she adopts to assess the flow of intimate experiences into public and how they “privatize” it almost entirely. Regarding the “explosion of words”, this appetite for speech, exposing previously repressed intimate relations into spectacle, was indeed not an explosion, but a withdrawal; because this was not merely an ideological choice and not caused just by the “explosion of words”: the city, in particular Istanbul, was restructured during the 1990s by operations separating different classes, that of new middle class on the one side, and the working and old middle classes on the other, without any possibilities of intersections disregarding a few occasions of “contact” in a day between members of the service and serving sectors.

Indeed, end of outside, namely leaving the street and returning to house, in the 1990s was an immediate spatial output in addition to other aspects – the consumption of leisure time and the crisis of historicity – of the new middle classes’ hegemonic struggle. The 1990s were years in which the symbolic capital of the new

¹⁸⁷ Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* ([cited]).

¹⁸⁸ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 119.

middle classes placed great emphasis on differentiation and separation in the spatial sense; suburbia and shopping malls were the most explicit structures of these efforts.¹⁸⁹

In the world during the 1990s, a transformation in the geography of the city evolving into closed shopping malls, highways and closed-to-the-outside suburbia was a total differentiation from the city as a space of public contact and common places.¹⁹⁰ Then, shopping malls and the highways connecting them to residences or suburbia and crowded streets parallel to the shop windows of global consumption patterns emerged as the significant architectural forms of the cities.¹⁹¹ Therefore, the rest of the city began to be perceived as the raw material that should be treated according to this planning. Plans during the late 1980s for the contaminated Golden Horn and Tarlabası neighborhood¹⁹² under the administration of Istanbul mayor Bedrettin Dalan, and all preparations before the United Nations Habitat II summit in Istanbul in 1996 should be read from this perspective. And in the 1990s, once in a more relatively harmonious relation with the city – especially in the 1970s, squatter (*gecekondu*) neighborhoods from now on were the places of the populations who were separated from the city, that is to say, who were watching it from the “outside.”¹⁹³

From suburbia (*site*) to gentrified neighborhoods and to shopping malls and private schools, the new spatial restructuring during the 1990s was not only a

¹⁸⁹ Sencer Ayata, "The New Middle Class and the Joys of Suburbia," in *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti & Ayşe Saktanber (New Jersey: Rutgers University, 2002), p. 29.

¹⁹⁰ Negri, *Empire*, p.188.

¹⁹¹ John Friedman, "Sokaksız Bir Şehir (A City Without Streets)," *Birikim*, no. 86-87 (1996): pp. 75-76. Previously released in *Society and Nature*, (may-august 1992).

¹⁹² Nearby the city center, Taksim, Tarlabası is a district comprising immigrants and notorious for crime, drug-dealing and prostitution.

¹⁹³ Oğuz Işık, "Denizli ve İstanbul Dersleri (Lessons of Denizli and Istanbul)," *Birikim*, no. 86-87 (1996): p. 46.

concern about city planning, but a symbolic loading of meaning to space and a massive rupture with the modernist sense of the separating outside from the inside, namely the public from the private.

Inside's Growing into Outside: Non-place of Politics

Negri and Hardt, in reference to Debord, suggest that spectacle, in their imperial society, is a virtual space, more accurately a non-place of politics: spectacle is so unified and diffuse that it is hard to distinguish inside from the outside, hence the private from the public.¹⁹⁴ In fact, the rise of the information-intensified capitalist mode of production coincided with the “withdrawal” of the interest from public space: the existence of cynicism, as mentioned above, and alienation in public life in general can be related to the privatization of the public space with corporate mass media and “political power-mongers.”¹⁹⁵ The most obvious result of the process was escaping into leisure time and the “house.”

However, before discussing the house as the symbol of the juvenilized non-place of politics, one should bear in mind that while discussing one of them, late capitalism, postmodernism, information society or the society of the spectacle, one should also realize that capital – accumulated enough to appear as images, namely spectacle – as the most private and even intimate thing, presents itself under this categorization as something social.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Negri, *Empire*, p. 188.

¹⁹⁵ Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*, p. 160. Political power-mongers can also be read as a term developed by Debord: he sees integration of economy and state as a sign of unified version of the society of spectacle. Debord, *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* ([cited]).

¹⁹⁶ Arın, "1980'lerden 1990'lara: Şimdiki Zaman Diktatörlüğü (From the 1980s to the 1990s: Dictatorship of the Present)," p. 100.

On the other side, if one discusses the 1990s in Turkey in the spatial sense, as a restructuring, under the terminology of returning to house, one should take the 1970s as its traumatic past repressed in the collective unconsciousness. The 1970s were the first and vast – in the sense of public space that is a place of encounter of many social differences – political years in Turkish history.¹⁹⁷ The most significant spaces of these years were the streets that witnessed, especially between 1974 and 1980, anti-fascist, neither cultural nor counter-hegemonic, but practical struggles and neighborhood-based organizations.¹⁹⁸ Therefore streets, as the space of any confrontations of different social and political subjectivities, were the outside, that is, a specific space of politics where the deeds of subjects are exposed in front of others and where recognition of the other is searched.¹⁹⁹ As in the examples of Los Angeles and Sao Paulo, or any metropolis like Istanbul, architecture and city planning tended to prevent public contact and any encounter between different people by creating a series of isolated spaces and “protected interiors.”²⁰⁰ To such extent that public spaces became privatized, therefore, it is impossible to understand social organization as dialectics between private and public spaces or inside and outside.²⁰¹ So, there is no inconvenience in recalling Turkey in the 1990s as insides growing into outside, hence an absence of actual politics. Thanks to the articulation of cities in global markets and to the mass media, this spatial restructuring expanded out of

¹⁹⁷ Ömer Laçiner, "Kapan(may)an Bir Parantez mi? [A (Non)closing Paranthesis?]," *Birikim*, no. 152-153 (December 2001 - January 2002): p. 14.

¹⁹⁸ Sezai Sarioğlu, "Değişmek de Değişmemek de Yordu Beni (To Change and not to Change, Both Exhausted Me)," *Birikim*, no. 152-153 (December 2001 - January 2002): p. 61-63.

¹⁹⁹ Negri and Hardt adopt Arendt's notion of public space that is the place of politics where very different social backgrounds encounter. See Negri, *Empire*, p. 187.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

Istanbul (*taşra*) during the 1990s and local insides were created excluding the filth of the local outsides.²⁰²

This type of attributions to the public spaces, as filth or out-moded as the opposite of the youthfulness in my arguments could be achieved only and diffused by the circulation of corporate/mainstream media images, both by publishing and televisions.

In the process of praising the house – and disdaining the streets – and restructuring space by erasing the distinction between the inside and the outside, mass media had a great role. Aliens that can be *gecekondu* settlers, ruralites or Kurdish militants, even urban figures, who should not be considered as aliens, such as blue-collars, public workers, and students, who was only visible in the 1990s when they were represented in television news while they were fighting against municipal officers, police or military forces, demonstrating in the streets, ceasing work or taking drugs.²⁰³ The privacy of the television watcher, the house, is always secure and “good” in front of the screen, that is, the public space of the death, terror, suicide and accidents; the anchor-man of the 1990s talked to this privacy.²⁰⁴

Restructuring the space, symbolized in the form of the house, both materially – in the sense of city planning and settlement – and psychologically – in the sense of media manipulation – not only demolished politics in the modernist sense that happens in public, but also rendered the house the only place of security and the negated the public as a place full of dirt and danger. This was also the house not only growing into the streets – both of past experiences back in the 1970s and of present of the 1990s – and invading it, but also the sole place of enjoying being “Young,”

²⁰² See Tanıl Bora, "Taşralaşan ve Taşrasını Kaybeden Türkiye (Türkiye Getting Rural and Losing its Rural)," *Birikim*, no. 86-87 (1996): p. 101-7. And see Işık, "Denizli ve İstanbul Dersleri (Lessons of Denizli and Istanbul)," p. 42-48.

²⁰³ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, p. 114-15.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

which now embodied the form of leisure time consumption, prolonged the present and of “leaving ethics to embrace aesthetics.”

Concluding the Chapter: New Youth Discourse

The 1970s can be evaluated as years when a vast number of young men and women, who had not absorbed by the patriarchal and adult-based public space, appeared in cultural realm, albeit partially.²⁰⁵ However, in the 1990s, what intensified the emphasis on the value of being young – differing from the 1970s – namely *juvenilization* as utilized here, or an accelerated pace of commodities as cultural products, were strongly related with a socio-cultural transformation under neo-liberal government technics and with the rise of the symbolic capital of a new middle class.²⁰⁶

Social disintegration in that sense can be illusive if it is not grasped that there is a “contrast between spectacles” of adulthood and youth, that is the base of *juvenilization*: Youth (as discourse), as the change of the existent, is no longer a characteristic of youth (experienced), but of a definite economic system and dynamism of capitalism.²⁰⁷ Therefore, Youth (as a discourse) appears as the personified form of accelerated and diversified consumption patterns. New commodities were not just motionless, stable and long-lasting products anymore, that of outputs of the import substitution economy, but they were mostly style and image-imposed things which were not the equivalent of production-motivated work time,

²⁰⁵ Betül Yarar, "Türkiye'de Yeni Kültürel Eğilimler (New Cultural Tendencies in Turkey)," *Mürekkep*, no. 16 (2001): p. 46.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* ([cited]).

but rather of consumption-motivated leisure time: namely services, hobbies, all entertaining components from arts to sports.

The tele-visual image is no doubt the ground for these super-flow, youthful, commodities. A television commercial motto from mid-1990s illustrates the situation accurately: “Young and beautiful, nobody can hold me.” In fact, Debord predicted this when he stated that “on all the other fronts of advertising bombardment it is strictly forbidden to grow old:” what gives the illusion that commodities are private-edition for each so-called independent taste, indeed, is the “capital of youth”²⁰⁸ – which is uttered here as *juvenilization*.

Leisure time, as the opposite of work, equated with being young, has been the main argument in defining anyone’s social category as being young in modern times. In the 1990s, however, the transformation of the leisure time, by “bureaucratically directed consumption society,”²⁰⁹ from being “other of work” to a main sector of the economy was carried out by coding Youth (as discourse) as a fetish. Benlisoy argues that the process of turning youth into a fetish was the same of being “brand new.”²¹⁰ The idealization of the state of being young and of the culture of consumption – essentially grounded on organizing leisure time – made Youth a best-selling commodity.²¹¹ Besides the identification of commodities’ values in the market with the state of being youth, Youth (as discourse) is praised as the ideal consumer: “Good consumer is someone who is impatient, uneasy, [and] quickly-excited...namely young. The Characteristics used in the past in order to explain the

²⁰⁸ Ibid.([cited]).

²⁰⁹ Lefebvre utilizes the termination “bureaucratically directed consumption society” in order to explain not a functional reason of a bureaucratic body, but a society in which consumption patterns are directed by consumer polls, surveys, and advertising searches on the grounds of enjoyment shaped bureaucratically, namely by many actors hierarchically positioned. Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat (Everyday Life in Modern World)*, pp. 65-112.

²¹⁰ Benlisoy, "Öğrenci Muhalefetinin Güncelliği (Actuality of the Student Opposition)," p. 290.

²¹¹ Ibid.

politicization of the youth are now the characteristics of the ideal consumer. The only good consumer is the young consumer.”²¹² Youth, with this double connotation – one as commodity itself the other as ideal consumer – converges on the sole intention of consumption, which is to prolong the state of being young, namely, the enjoyment of consumption in its most intensive period; therefore, the purpose of all sectors appears to pause this period.²¹³ Apparently, to prolong this period, to reproduce this hegemonic discourse is possible if the prizes of all those products and services are paid. Of course, what is underscored here is not just that a refined part of population was able to benefit from all of the images and excluded huge part of the society, but also the existence of a privileged minority that equated image-based-economy, namely spectacle, with being young and strove to diffuse this cultural strategy to all social relations.

A perfect example of this transformation came with the release of a newspaper called *Yeni Yüzyıl* (New Century) with its advertisement: “...Young, cultured, and different... luminous and western visual structure... Here is *Yeni Yüzyıl*. Your brand new newspaper.”²¹⁴ What was defended through the pages of *Yeni Yüzyıl* was a profile of the readers, as in the advertisement, which was “young, well-educated, members of the upper and upper-middle classes, and distinguished ones... briefly the pioneers of society.”²¹⁵

The state of being Young (as a discourse) was not just fixed as a symbol of class position and turned to be perceived as natural – yet not as biological, but also a reflection of the change in the perception of time, which was discussed above as the crisis of historicity. The modernist sense of time regards the present as the liminality

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Rıfat Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), p. 212.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 214.

between the past and the future: the present is the moment which should be salvaged from the burden of the past and will bear the future society. However, with the 1980s, the present was transformed from an uneasy transition to a prolongable enjoyment-loaded moment. Youth, now not a transitional stage from childhood to adulthood, is the sustainability of the new, of the present. Through that process, determined here as *juvenilization*, it did not symbolize only accelerated and diversified commodities, but also the ideal consumer, who just lived in the present, as the market, cleansed of the past experiences and probabilities of the future.

During the setting of the spectacle by inciting consumption, in the 1990s, the mainstream media did not just praise this excluding Youth concept; it also featured and expanded the public opinion that all post-1980s youth were apolitical. Even though it seems contradictory, both were equivalent in the sense of setting *juvenilization* in favor of some by excluding many youth experiences. Both intersected at the point of the past as nostalgia, mostly of the particular period, that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Famous *Soixante-huitards** employed in high-salary advertising agencies or media corporations undoubtedly were the actors in the process of setting the new Youth concept. As written by a leading member in a national newspaper: “Many of us believe in liberal economy, but sing these socialist songs. Life is changing. Ideology slips away, and the romanticism of the music remains. We are all making peace with our pasts.”²¹⁶ The aestheticization (of the politics) is obvious in the statement, but articulating this “new past” with the present – as historicism – appears in another statement: “They (the *Soixante-huitards*) were the comrades of the biggest mental revolution of our history. The generations of the 1980s extinguished the fire of this big revolution and magnificent youth legend and

* French equivalent of 1968 generation which is used in Turkish same as “Altmışsekizli”.

²¹⁶ Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 348.

broke the monopoly of being revolutionary. They indeed changed something...They created the renaissance of the Turkish economy.”²¹⁷

On the other hand, calling post-1980s generation apolitical is not as ideological as the statements above, but essentialist in the historical sense. And this contributed to the invention of the 1968 generation as a hegemonic discourse. In many interviews with the rest of the 1968ers or any other young leftists of the 1970s who were not part of the mass media, the main thing they complained about was the apoliticalness of the youth.²¹⁸ What they misconceived was the whole transformation in every socio-economic and cultural aspect of everyday life and the new concept of Youth symbolizing this transformation on behalf of a minority, as discussed above. Briefly, youth, both as a discourse and as experienced everydayness, were not non-adults of leisure time or non-functioned productive units of a production economy in the post-1980s as they were in the 1970s. They no longer had the chance to look and to criticize the system from the outside. In the post-1980s, Youth (as a discourse) was the form of the commodity and the ideal subject of the consumption economy, on the one hand; and youth experienced, mostly members of the old middle classes and working classes, were turned into a scapegoat and labeled apolitical if not appear as same as in the 1970s, on the other. So, leftist youth of the 1970s threw the baby out with the bath water while they were condemning the young role-players of the discourse of Youth. Therefore, calling the youth apolitical did not just serve the Youth as a hegemonic discourse but also helped to silence the youth experienced during the 1990s.

No doubt, this was occurred while spatial restructuring was taking place, as Bali classified it under titles such as: suburbia, residences, business centers (in

²¹⁷ Paranthesis mine. Ibid., p. 349.

²¹⁸ See Alev Er, *Bir Uzun Yürüyüşü '68 (A Long Walk Was 1968)* (Istanbul: Afa, 1988).

Turkish *plaza*), and shopping malls, all amalgamated here under the name “house.” All these places were not just spatial organizations appropriating the intersection of economy and culture, but they were in a city where “time is never enough [for leisure time]” and also were isolated “in a serene and tranquil environment, far away from those crazy crowds.”²¹⁹ Certainly, the negation of the streets as roads carrying crowds, a withdrawal from the public spaces of inter-class encounters, was also a part of the discourse that reproduced the house as a healthy and youthful place. Ayata describes this remarkable distinction as:

The good-looking body, increasingly a maker of middle class identity, is a source of pride and moral superiority, whereas its opposite in the city represents moral laxity. The city people are often described as worn-out, with signs of wear-and-tear on their bodies, the marks of pollution, disease and *early ageing*. Thus they are identified with ill-health, *the wear-and-tear of age*, and threats to the body from within. The city and its crowd thus symbolize *the very opposite of youth*, health and life. In this last respect, the suburb and suburban life are seen as bulwarks against that which the site people fear most: *old age*, illness and death. (Italics mine)²²⁰

It was mentioned that the main consequence of fear and anxiety among the privileged classes, here notably the new middle classes, in the 1990s was a spatial restructuring that ended with a type of inside-oriented restricted space. So, relating the inside with the state of being young was something totally new for the post-1980 years in Turkey. With the street-oriented political participation of the youth in the 1970s, public space had become place for many cultural and social differences; however with the 1990s, the insides’ growing into the outside both gave way to a youth-

²¹⁹ Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 122.

²²⁰ Ayata, "The New Middle Class and the Joys of Suburbia," pp. 39-40.

centered hegemonic discourse and a vast exclusion of many young people, who are called here youth experienced.

A public survey in 1998 gave conspicuous conclusions, through the methods carried out and quantitative results, that how the *juvenilization* was widely dominant and how it was also so excluding. In a survey called “Turkish Youth 1998: Silent Mass under Scrutiny,” the main variables to categorize youth are consumption/possession patterns and leisure time activities.²²¹ Whereas the first consists of private room, credit card, bank account, car and similar items, the latter comprises going to bars, concerts, theaters, reading magazines and using computer/Internet.²²² According to these two variables, the most crowded group gives the most negative averages: “No positive averages, both in consumption/possession patterns and leisure time activities, therefore, show that they have no life-styles peculiar for youth and no youth culture. Their consumption patterns are not diversified even in the modest sense. They do not appear in public space, their cultural activities are very restricted and their life-interior (which means dealing with arts, sports, reading and participating in social charity) is very poor. This group, therefore, will be called “non-young youth.”²²³

The second crowded group with the name “inclined-to-intelligentsia, are mostly students with modest patterns of consumption and leisure time activities and give relatively more positive averages of appearing in the public space. In addition to this one, there is also another category which is called “lonesome ones,” who are again mostly students, but are not interested in participating in public spaces. And

²²¹ Konrad Adenauer Foundation, "Türk Gençliği 98: Susukun Kitle Büyüteç Altında (Turkish Youth '98: Silent Mass under Scrutiny)," (Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1999), p. 120.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid., p. 122.

finally, the least crowded groups are the most sociable ones with diversified consumption patterns: “wealthy ones.”

Ahıska, in her article on this survey, underscores how variables and ideals are associated with capitalist ones.²²⁴ The least consuming groups – the majority, the least publicly appearing, ones can be kept out-of-model, such as the non-young youth, if places like the streets of neighborhood, coffee shops (*kahvehane*) and football club fan locations and stadiums are disregarded; and therefore their experiences would get smoothed, contradictions and struggles would be incomprehensible.²²⁵ In the end their relations with politics will be insignificant.²²⁶

Regarding this perspective, to claim youth in the 1990s are apolitical, therefore, should not be so difficult. Many everyday practices among youth experienced – from committing crime to drug addiction and violence towards property and individuals which constantly increased during the 1990s – and cultural efforts, of small-extent subculture, for instance, can be labeled as apolitical if the class positions and cultural search for survival and refusal is neglected.

Lefebvre states strongly enough to exceed his argument’s historical temporality how everyday practices and cultural opposition among youth is political:

The most explicit [refusal]...is the one comes from the youth against this society. This is a total, complete...absolute and steadily restarting refusal... Refusal entails to quit everyday life and to act in order to constitute another life in which producing work of art and adaptation are preeminent things. This “another life” is tested by any means: vagrancy, drugs, a language *sui generis*, crime and etc.²²⁷

²²⁴ Ahıska, "Genç Olmayan Gençler Üzerine Bir Deneme (An Essay on non-young Youth)," p. 18.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Lefebvre, *Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat (Everyday Life in Modern World)*, pp. 95-96.

With Lefebvre's feature, though seems too idealistic, it will be possible to evaluate how 1990s' Turkey, despite the fact that they were the years of the most totalizing cultural climate ever experienced, were meanwhile tested and struggled by an unprecedented medium adopted by a small group of young people. These were fanzines, with all their ambivalences and contradictions within, which seemed to be "convergence of conscience and technics" in the sense of Gürbilek that voiced some fragmented youth experiences.²²⁸

²²⁸ Gürbilek, *Vitrinde Yaşamak (Living on Display)*, pp. 92 -102.

CHAPTER FOUR

FANZINES AS SPECTACULAR RESPONSES TO THE 1990S

Setting a new cultural domain, a new web of social relations, in the 1990s prevents one to entitle the whole decade as the innocent years of “reform;” quite the contrary, as discussed in Chapter Three, they were years that corresponds to certain class strategies, especially to new middle classes. As we saw the role of new media and its success on imposing meanings with images was very essential in this process. Nevertheless, as conceptualized before, whole cultural transformation was more than a simple corollary of the hegemonic struggle of certain classes; it was indeed the transformation of capitalism in general. The development of the new media as the main actor for setting the “spectacle,” as the definition used in Chapter Three with references to the theses of Guy Debord, assisted in shaping public discourses and in disseminating the tastes of the new wealth that was produced by the finance capital, advertising, and new and modified media corporations, hence in general, by the newly emerged service sectors. On the other hand, what was unprecedented for Turkey was an effort to equate this new wealth with the condition of being young as a symbolic – Youth – capital. This was entirely a new cultural coding for youth as a social category in Turkey and it was proliferated to such an extent as a public perception of history, restructuring of the space, and, most prominently, constituting the identities on generations – especially the one created in the 1980s with the name “1968ers.” Therefore, it is not inappropriate to assert that the cultural crises, in particular the “crisis of youth,” following the 1980 were overcome by reproducing new identifications, like generations as Jean and John Comaroff argue in their

historical category Millennial Capitalism, or like leisure time and the spatial “choices” of consumption.²²⁹

Here, what makes the fanzines of the 1990s cultural outputs worth an analysis is the fact that they were also the means in the search to overcome the cultural crises of the decade. It is possible to argue that without the new corporate media language, there probably would have been no fanzines as we know them. In that sense, they can be treated as anti-media publications since they adopted the way of giving information with a combined bulk of “words and images;” and did so with a kind of satire by collages of détourned news and titles from mainstream newspapers. They were also signs of new identifications, mostly of subcultures; but on the other hand, they opened autonomous zones for young people to voice their refusals. Remembering Debord’s notification, “even with their qualifications of refusing the spectacle, they are creating the spectacle of refusal,”²³⁰ needless to say, they were spectacular responses to the society of the spectacle. This, indeed, recalls hegemony as Gramsci defines it, a “moving equilibrium”²³¹ which should make one think a historicity of everyday life, here as the society of the spectacle in the 1990s, not just as a time of repression, but also as alternatives and possibilities or, as Harry Harootunian underlines with references to Lefebvre, the “monotony of everydayness [that] constrains the new, [yet] in this explosive confrontations of repetitions, everything changes.”²³²

In this chapter, therefore, fanzines will be explored as cultural products within which the responses of youth, especially those of the old middle classes, take a

²²⁹ See Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming."

²³⁰ Greil Marcus, *Ruj Lekesi: Yirminci Yüzyılın Gizli Tarihi (Lipstick Traces: The Secret History of the Twentieth Century)* (Istanbul: Ayrıntı, 1999).

²³¹ Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals*, p. 40.

²³² Harry D. Harootunian, "In the Tiger's Lair: Socialist Everydayness enters Post-Mao China," *Postcolonial Studies* 3, no. 3 (2000): p. 340.

“distinctive subcultural form.”²³³ The stress on “form” is essential since the main question will be why young people chose to put their voices on photocopied “bunches of papers” and used collage to assemble irrelevant-at-first-sight signs, logos, and articles. Form or, as the early British cultural studies school uses the term, “style,” is full of meanings for one who aims to comprehend how subcultures work to form a collective language and, as Turkish fanzines in the 1990s did, a means of survival employed towards the devastating transformations through which their societies were passing.

Stating “subcultural” as a determinant of fanzines requires specifying which subcultures they were. The fanzines examined in this chapter are mostly on punk and other underground music genres like hardcore or metal. The reason behind selecting these ones is not just related to the introduction of these musical subcultures to the young people in Turkey in the 1980s, but also to the question of why the urban, educated, and mostly off-spring of the old middle classes who have access to English as a foreign language identified themselves with a particular subculture and, then, how this identification evolved in the late 1990s to an identification with their publications, namely fanzines. The peculiarity of the punk subculture is directly relevant to fanzines on two points: first, the early fanzines were created by British youth who were crushed by the second big coming of unemployment for western countries in an historical moment, after 1973, when neo-liberal politics radically transformed all social and cultural relations. Similarly, Turkish examples of fanzines appeared in the 1990s when simultaneous policies of neo-liberalism in the 1980s came to settle under a new cultural-economy, which was conceptualized in Chapter Two as *juvenilization*, as the society of the spectacle. Second, the form of fanzines as

²³³ Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals*, p. 16.

a set of spectacular meanings owes much to a so-called tradition which was inherited from the fanzines of the late 1980s, of which political engagement inspired the Turkish fanzines, by the early British punk fanzines. Therefore, discussing the “responsibility of punk” will be included in this chapter to comprehend the “form” which tells a lot about the meanings imposed by the youth in the history that of the 1990s.

One should also bear in mind that fanzines as subcultural responses were attempts to resolve “day to day problems that arise in constant struggle to survive by means of a set of imaginary relations,”²³⁴ like acting as if a devotee fanzine community exists. Yet, an “extended kinship network,” as Jefferson and Hall call it, referring to Phil Cohen, functions as a community feeling, albeit in imaginary relations, as mutual aid and support and “makes for cultural continuity and stability.”²³⁵ A search for cultural continuity and stability, a search that was outside of the slippery ground of the commodified consumption culture of the 1990s, makes Turkish fanzines a youthful refusal in opposition to the entitlements of the “apolitical youth of post-1980s.” Nevertheless, analyzing the form of fanzines within a framework of subculture, here that of punk, seems to be inadequate as Chambers warns “since punk confused the signs . . . in its self-parodying media-conscious collage we have learnt that the social metaphors a subculture employs can rarely be reduced to a single or unambiguous source.”²³⁶

All examples of Turkish fanzines cannot be reduced to a single sort, such as punk subculture. In addition to subcultures, the form of fanzines can be traced back to many artistic styles. Of course, again, punk is one of those of a musical form; yet,

²³⁴ Ibid., pp. 30-33.

²³⁵ Phil Cohen, "Sub-Cultural Conflict and Working Class Community," *Working Papers in Cultural Studies*, no. 2 (1972), quoted by *ibid.*, p. 30.

²³⁶ Iain Chambers, *Popular Culture: The Metropolitan Experience* (London and New York: Routledge, 1986), p. 207.

the form of fanzines as an entity of easily produced, reproducible image and article collages has an aesthetic value on its own. This is a form that can be evaluated with the interventionist perspectives in everyday life, as the space where art and life can be merged into each other, which was strictly adopted by “historical avant-garde”²³⁷ movements like Dada, Futurism and especially Situationism, which are openly mentioned in some fanzines as, in addition to punk, the main inspirations. Therefore, the argument of Jameson regarding punk as one of the latest critical modern art seems not so senseless.²³⁸ Nevertheless, one should recall that punk has not had a stable aesthetic and critical set of rules; the changes it underwent severely affected the Turkish fanzines in the 1990s.

On the other hand, what has merged art and life into each other has not been Dada, Futurism or punk, but capitalism itself²³⁹ – for example, take commercials and advertisements, and fanzines expanded in the world-historical context when this “mergence” happened. Hence, two legitimate questions are raised: first, how can an aesthetic response such as a refusal or satire of commodified everyday life and class-based distinction of the society of the spectacle be examined; and second, is it aesthetic indeed? In this chapter, possible answers to these questions will be given. But, again, prior attention will be on form, and also particularly on the production of fanzines. The chapter, thus, will consider fanzine as a form of “cheap” art which has an aesthetic value *sui generis* and is a medium of “act-ive” refusal. In the manner of being cheap, fanzines can, and also should, be considered as part of “democratic technics”: this is similar to when Lewis Mumford clarifies a means that supports the participation of vast numbers of people in creation, which is caused by the quality of

²³⁷ For the definition of “historical avant-garde,” see Peter Bürger, *Avangard Kuramı (Theory of the Avant-Garde)* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003).

²³⁸ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*.

²³⁹ Bürger, *Avangard Kuramı (Theory of the Avant-Garde)*, p. 26.

technique, like photocopying; as relatively democratic, cheap and easily-available.²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in the last instance, although fanzines have an “accessible aesthetics,”²⁴¹ which means openness for everyone, one must have an access to the codes of the particular subcultural form which fanzines involve, in order to comprehend them.

This became especially apparent at the end of the decade when the number of fanzines diminished – which can be related to the economic crises, too – but emerged with more explicit political language and issues. Also the name of the editors and writers, *zinesters*, disappeared from the pages of many fanzines. Besides art and subculture, therefore, for illegal publications like fanzines, “crime” can be another subject to examine in them. The rise of aggressive language and uncompromising attitude and the emergent discourse constructed on the dichotomy between “us” and “them” can be related to the struggle with the mainstream media’s efforts to commodify fanzines and to the enjoyment that the editors and writers felt as they “dynamited” capitalism with an underground cultural medium eradicating mediated relations between producer and receiver. In concluding remarks, fanzines as spectacular – youthful – responses to the spectacle will be analyzed throughout the chapter discussing whether they were pieces of art, subcultural products, publishing crime or all.

Fanzine as Work of Art: Aesthetics in Decay

The world-historical context of the 1990s as the inter-penetration of economy and culture, in Benjaminian terms the “aestheticization of politics,” does not just

²⁴⁰ Lewis Mumford, "Authoritarian and Democratic Technics," in *Technology and Culture*, ed. Melvin Kranzberg and William Daveport (New York: Schocken, 1972), pp. 52-59.

²⁴¹ For “accessible aesthetics,” see Paul Rosen, "İngiliz Müzik Sanayiinde Teknoloji ve Anarşi (Technology and Anarchy in English Music Industry)," in *21. Yüzyıl Anarşizmi (Twenty-first Century Anarchism)*, ed. Jon Purkis and James Bowen (Istanbul: Ayrıntı, 1997).

make us to think of any aesthetic evaluations in economy-political terms, but also encourages a literature concerning how people “resist” in commodified everyday life through consumption. Coding Youthfulness, both as an ideal consumer and a purchasable identity of the free market place, in this respect, puts forward a minority which can be related to Comaroff and Comaroff’s definition of the “mutant citizens of the new world order” for the new Youth identity,²⁴² and their consuming patterns for the vast part of the population. Henceforth, consumption came to be considered as the main definer of the youthful resistance.²⁴³ However, the inconvenience here is the exclusion of those unable to consume according to the determined patterns and shadowing the other spaces of refusal out of consumption, like the fanzines as an “act-ive” and aesthetic way. By “act-ive” what is meant is the searching for (re)productive techniques – like publishing by photocopy – to voice (subcultural) reactions and satisfying the need to communicate with others. Not that consumerism is wholly a passive, a mere manipulation; however, it is not act-ive since it is the inseparable presence of commodified everyday life. Regarding individualization and market intensified leisure time in the 1990s, to take consumption as a mere resisting tactic is to admit indirectly that the “spectacular rule of the market economy” was victorious over collective act-ive ways.²⁴⁴

By uttering “aesthetic”, on the other hand, signs that a spectacular product sent and meanings perceived by an ordinary eye out of subcultural circle are intended to be caught. Before turning back to 1991, the date the first fanzine *Mondo Trasho* appeared, it is, I think, necessary to recall that a work of art, as Jameson suggests, emerges within the gap between the meaningless materiality of nature – body and the

²⁴² Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming," p. 309.

²⁴³ See part three, “Youth, media, postmodernity” in Angela McRobbie, *Postmodernism and Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 135-77.

²⁴⁴ Harootunian, "In the Tiger's Lair: Socialist Everydayness enters Post-Mao China," p. 345.

meaning of the particular history and of the social.²⁴⁵ Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that, in the context the 1990s, nature was the commodified city, and the history and the social are that of the society of the spectacle. Therefore, the aesthetic values that fanzines bear will be grasped through this point.

Trashy World: Mondo Trasho

1991 can be remembered as having been second year of Turkey's first private television network (Magic Box-Star 1); or with the arrival of the Turkish edition of *The Economist*; or with the first publishing of *Aktüel*, the weekly of the corporate media group of the 1980s, *Sabah*;²⁴⁶ or yet, with the launch of the first fanzine: *Mondo Trasho* (MT). However, it is difficult to give an exact date or chronological data on fanzines as many of them were started simultaneously, yet without having information about each other – many of them were released with no dates. Therefore, *MT* can be considered as the first Turkish fanzine since it clusters the points, components of a fanzine as a piece of art, that will be discussed below.²⁴⁷

The first issue of *MT* was released – or photocopied – in May 1991 with the motto “the chief enemy of creativity is good taste,” a statement by Picasso on the cover under the collaged *MT* logo. All of these motto-like phrases became very common following 1991 and it is still hard to conceive whether zinesters use them

²⁴⁵ Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 7.

²⁴⁶ Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayattan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, p. 364.

²⁴⁷ Chronologically speaking, fanzine of Ali Recan, *Ar Çizgi Roman*, dated back in 1987 was the first appearance of a fan-based publishing, for a detailed work on comic fanzines see Levent Cantek, "Türkiye'de Çizgi Roman Fanzinleriyle İlgili Kısa Bir Değınme (A Short Statement on Turkish Fanzines)," *Serüven*, no. 6 (2005): pp. 77-83.; and *Laneth*, released between 1991-1994, was a photocopied music magazine, but not a fanzine since the editor mentions that they had no such intentions to remain as a fanzine, just kept it as the cheapest way; for interview see Ali Akay, *İstanbul'da Rock Hayatı: Sosyolojik Bir Bakış (Rock Life in Istanbul: A Sociological Approach)* (Istanbul: Bağlam, 1995), p. 66.

deliberately or just go after a subcultural “tradition.” Esat Başak, one of the two editors of *MT*, seemed to take a side on more clear-cut, let us say conscious, position against the “good taste” of the 1990s: the idea behind making the fanzine, for him, was almost the same, while Wilhelm Reich notes that what is to be explained is not why the starving one does not steal, or the exploited ones do not strike; therefore, it should be, also, not why people are content with the media information, but why they do not detach themselves from its language or steal, or strike; then the reason for making a fanzine came out of the need for an “urgent [new] conception and practice of life” (*acil bir hayat tasarımı ve pratiği*).²⁴⁸ Then, how might a concrete form of this will, or intention, of “creating an urgent conception and practice of life” be? In the second issue, the reason d’etre of *MT* was elucidated as: “Kossinsky wrote that he thought writing as a kind of salvation...Uncle İlhan Berk [famous Turkish poet] wrote that he saw earth as a very boring place. You should probably do something. Well, this is ours.”²⁴⁹

Considering fanzines as a means of survival – like in the quotation above, in the 1990s’ “life,” Başak’s suggestion – for an urgent conception and practice of life – was to establish an anti-media organization out of the mainstream media – yet without underestimating it – which is the web of entrepreneurship, celebrity (*magazinsel*) ethics, and freedom of speech under capital.²⁵⁰ As a better way to grasp this strict critique of the settled media-centered everyday life of the 1990s, more importantly, with a suggestion of an alternative, the form of pioneering *MT* is to be examined comprehensively.

²⁴⁸ Interview with Esat Başak, *Disguast*, no. 12 (1995). For Original text see Appendix, p. 121.

²⁴⁹ *Mondo Trasho*, no. 2 (1991). For Original text see Appendix, p.122.

²⁵⁰ *Disguast*, no. 9 (1995).

The Meaning of Collage

Given the name, in English “Trashy World,” it is not surprising how disturbing the form of *MT* was at first glance. First of all, although there was the intention for an urgent new conception and practice of life, there was no instantaneous politically-charged content appearing in the first issues *MT*. *MT*, indeed, sought to disturb and turn upside-down the widely known and internalized image-addicted gaze of the media-consumer who was familiar with the smooth screen of television and rigorously laid-out magazines or newspapers. In that sense, in content for instance, Esat Başak and Naki Tez and their colleagues compiled subjects out of the dominant cultural frame; and the so-called layout was constructed entirely with handmade collages (letters, icons and figures) and reproduced by photocopy. Messy in appearance, thanks to collages détourned from mainstream newspapers, magazines, and comic books, became an established practice among fanzines – despite a few exceptions. Even, pieces détourned from newspapers and media’s unawareness made zinesters proud of their work: “thanks to our sucker media since they have not sued us for the things we have cut out.”²⁵¹ Indeed, the more the media reacted, the more they proved that they were impotent, in spite of their power; similar to Žižek’s exemplification of punk, this was not a tendency of copy-right crime, but rather sending the message to the power structure that: “You may have power, yet you are impotent. You cannot hurt me.”²⁵²

In this respect, the correlation between punk and collage aesthetics should be underlined as the “responsibility of punk.” First of all, it would be misleading if the emergence of fanzines on the world extent was separated from the birth of punk

²⁵¹ *Disguast*, no. 7 (1992).

²⁵² Žižek, *Ideolojinin Yüce Nesnesi (The Sublime Object of Ideology)*, p. 172.

music. Regarding the economic and social condition of the world in the 1970s, there appeared a generation in Western countries who believed that their lives had been defined already and were administrated by a “society of experts.”²⁵³ High unemployment fed pessimism about the future and feelings of boredom if they were employed at low-waged work. Therefore, it was no coincidence that punk emerged with the motto “no future.” British Punk bands, generally young and self-consciously proletarian, emerged as a way of embodying a historical voice of frustration. Punk achieved this by reproducing the entire sartorial history of post-war working-class youth cultures in “cut-up” form, combining elements which had originally belonged to completely different epochs.²⁵⁴ Especially punk moved back to an earlier, more vigorous form of rock (i.e. to the 1950s and mid-1960s, when the black influences were strongest) and forward to contemporary reggae (Bob Marley) in order to find a music which reflected more adequately their sense of frustration and oppression.²⁵⁵ Caribbean culture, and reggae attracted the punks, who wished to give tangible form to their alienation; it carried the necessary conviction, the political bite, so obviously missing in most contemporary music.²⁵⁶ In the crisis conditions, Punk adopted the threatening “alien” existence of black ethnicity for the mainstream British culture. So, Punk aesthetic can be read in part as a white translation of black ethnicity. Not surprisingly, much of the twentieth century sociology has viewed youth as deviant anti-citizens, often imagining them as black males in the process.²⁵⁷ In fact, this was what punk really enjoyed. Contrary to other youth subcultures, punk had the ability of mirroring the crisis of Britain; that is to say, regarding unemployment, poverty,

²⁵³ For the “society of experts,” see Roszak, *The Making of A Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*, pp. 1-42 and pp. 205-39.

²⁵⁴ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 26.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.69.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.63.

²⁵⁷ Neyzi, "Object or Subject? The Paradox of Youth in Turkey," p. 413.

the high rate of crime and implicit racism, it was fitting that the punks presented themselves as “degenerates.” In Hebdige’s terms, punk had the ability to symptomatize a whole cluster of contemporary problems.²⁵⁸

The first fanzine form as discussed here appeared, as described above, as an apparatus of information exchange within the punk community.²⁵⁹ Besides constructing a web of opinion exchange, fanzines created a graphical aesthetics of punk’s underground-oriented anarchic tendency. This was collage, the “cut and past” technique that was identified with the early fanzines and has been carried out by many fanzines in order to underline being part of a “tradition.” Cutting letters and images from magazines and especially from newspapers formed the basis of collage. However, this style has more than a simple artistic choice of bringing together of irrelevant and amorphous objects, which was a frequently employed method by Dada and surrealism. Breton, as the equivalent name for Surrealism, theorized collage aesthetics as an assault on the syntax of everyday life, which dictates the ways in which the most mundane objects are used.²⁶⁰ Like Duchamps’s “ready-mades”, i.e. his famous Dadaist manufactured materials just carrying his signature, everyday life items could be brought within the province of punk (un)aesthetics. Punk, as well as other sub-cultural styles, can be qualified as art, but as art in particular contexts; not as “timeless objects judged by the immutable criteria of traditional aesthetics, but as appropriations, thefts, subversive transformations, as movements.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 87.

²⁵⁹ Tricia Henry Young, *Punk: Bir Altkültürün Oluşumu (Punk: The Making of a Subculture)* (Ankara: Dost, 1999), p. 17.

²⁶⁰ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 105.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Thus, in Britain, with pioneering Mark Perry in the summer of 1976, fanzines were born with *Sniffin' Glue* (SG).²⁶² SG and other fanzines, by calling on readers to start their own fanzines, to form their own bands, conceptualized the term “*accessible aesthetics*,” the notion that emphasizes the necessity of accessibility for everyone to make and write music and culture.²⁶³ They combined the accessible aesthetics of punk, which opposed the comprehension of the elitist “artist” and strove to destroy the obstacles between the music producer and receiver with “do-it-yourself” (DIY) ethics that challenged the relations of production in the music industry. They seemed to capture the fact that the “seizure of means of distribution” with DIY attitude allowed a new positive spin on cultural production which reciprocally caused mainstream media, “the monopoly of distribution,” to comment on them as a “scourge, threat, or oddity.”²⁶⁴

This apparent concern about culture and distribution in the attitudes of the punks who were bound to a Britain which had no foreseeable future demonstrates that aesthetic ways of expression are strictly bound to the ongoing social transformation and this makes punk fanzines’ peculiar as a youthful involvement. Punk was forever condemned to act out alienation, also with their fanzines to manufacture a whole series of subjective correlatives for the official archetypes of the crisis of modern life: the unemployment figures, the Depression, the western way of life.²⁶⁵ As seen in the editorial of SG: “Punks have been telling us we’ve got the best mag around. Well,

²⁶² Rosen, “İngiliz Müzik Sanayiinde Teknoloji ve Anarşi (Technology and Anarchy in English Music Industry),” p. 146.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Saper, “Intimate Bureaucracies & Infrastructuralism: A Networked Introduction to Assemblings.”

²⁶⁵ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 65.

of course we have ‘cause we’re broke, on the dole* and live at home in boring council flats, so obviously we know what’s goin’ on!”²⁶⁶

Like *SG*, *MT* sprang out in a period of neo-liberal reign, when Thatcherism’s contemporary in Turkey, Özalism, rooted and transformed the cultural space. Nevertheless, the explicit working-class rhetoric of *SG* cannot be compared with the blurred “class position” of *MT*. First, *MT* was by no means a punk fanzine, though Başak admits the traces of *Sniffin’ Glue* with Dada magazines and photocopy artist Munari in *Mondo Trasho*.²⁶⁷ Second, he seemed to be aware of the literature on punk aesthetics and subculture and of how to use “medium as message,” the concept developed by Marshall McLuhan. Hand-script quotations from Hebdige’s famous *Subculture*’s Turkish translation published in 1989 and the détournement of Hebdige’s citation from Genet, and not-mentioned article piece from McLuhan with the title “Message of McLuhan” (in English) which is accompanied with a collaged radio image with two, again written in English, words “Understanding Media,”²⁶⁸ apparently exhibits that this was not a reaction alike of an angry, unemployed, and proletarian punk of 1976 Britain. Therefore, it can be assessed that *MT* was, probably, an aesthetic reaction by a few educated, not working class, young males who had accesses, with the help of having foreign language, to critical readings and out-of-mainstream writers, artists and films. They were “conceptual” artists, as Başak emphasizes, who strove to create “a mental imaginary by means out of ordinary materials and techniques.”²⁶⁹ Then, an essential question is to be posed: how can

* “To be on the dole” means in British slang to receive unemployment benefits by social security system.

²⁶⁶ *Sniffin’ Glue*, no.4 (1976), p. 2; quoted in Young, *Punk: Bir Alt kültürün Oluşumu (Punk: The Making of a Subculture)*, p. 131.

²⁶⁷ *Disguast*, no. 9 (1995).

²⁶⁸ *Mondo Trasho*, no. 1 (1991). For details see Appendix, p. 123 and 124.

²⁶⁹ *Disguast*, no. 9 (1995).

producing a fanzine as a work of (cheap) art be associated with the cultural climate of the 1990s?

Given the discussions in the Chapter Three, on the comprehensive and unprecedented cultural transformation and its consequent psychic (de)regulations to manage this brand new world in a time-space compression: such as cynic distancing, labeling gaze, and “pastiche,”²⁷⁰ which Jameson calls a way to overcome the “crisis of historicity,” namely the loss of the sense of time; the adoption of collage in fanzines as an aesthetic way of refusal is worth explanation. However, while Jameson thinks pastiche as a substitution for the word collage which remains feeble to explain the new (postmodern) turn,²⁷¹ others like Harvey and Chambers use it as the name of a condition – of postmodern time and space compression – and the transformation – from culture to collage.²⁷² Then, how can collage, considered here as fanzines’ aesthetic determinant, be a way of expressing the refusal?

Take, for instance, the fact in the 1990s of the extension of new leisure time investments as the main sector of the economy and culture: consuming outdoor gear, for example, an exclusive interest in nature tracking, the enjoyment of nature-friendly commodities – yet in cities. This is an urban phenomenon which also attracted quite a lot of attention in Turkey in the 1990s. And, indeed it is an ideology²⁷³ on the grounds that ideology is not a dogma or a “world view”, or demands a full identification for itself, quite the contrary; it lets one to pass its borders, to violate it and encourages to be loyal in public, yet subversive in the private space. Therefore, having leisure time compatible with nature, yet in the city, just helps one to endure the boredom and

²⁷⁰ For pastiche see, Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31

²⁷² Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, p. 301. Chambers, *Popular Culture: The Metropolitan Experience*, pp. 190-95.

²⁷³ I use the term in correlation with Zizek. See, Zizek, "Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach."

inequality of city life; however, at a moment when the line between public and private diminished and when subversion-in-private was encouraged by the market, hence, by consumption, to be played in the public eye. In this sense, the encounter with the factual city becomes unbearable; and in turn a search for nature in the city scale becomes psychologically more tolerable.

As such, it is the same for collage – albeit in an opposite stance. Collage is like the city in the instance above. If collage was the cultural fact confronted in the 1990s, as the society of the spectacle, which means, for Jameson which is nevertheless feeble, cultural arbitrariness that pastes things removed from their historical and social bounds and make them easily marketable; then it is not surprising if anything that discloses the cultural arbitrariness, togetherness of culture, would make it intolerable for the (public) psyche that searches for monolithic, complete existences – identities – in a total social fragmentation. Is not this accurate for the Youth (as a discourse); is not it yet a collage?

Thus, the disturbing form of the fanzine, as collaged aesthetics, reminds us of the fact of everyday life, a flow of diversified and accelerated consumable signifiers which can never amalgamate a steady meaning. This is, in fact, what an ideology cannot tolerate: it is over-identification, an excessive mode of identification with what an ideology sets,²⁷⁴ which is indeed at the core of avant-garde art. Like what the Soviet artists of the futurist and constructivist movements did in the 1920s: Meyerhold, Mayakovski and others endeavored to give birth to a new man, just part of an industrial machine; that is to say, they were over-identified with Soviet ideology. Not abolishing private property, but this cultural revolution was the worst thing to

²⁷⁴ For over-identification, see Slavoj Žižek, *Can Lenin Tell Us About Freedom Today?* (2001 [cited 2003]); available from <http://lacan.com/freedom.htm>.

imagine for the western liberal psychology, so was Stalinism.²⁷⁵ Collage aesthetic, as quoted above from Breton, as an attack on the syntax of everyday life can, thus, be read as an effort to struggle with the real world, to intervene into it, not to produce mere aesthetical forms.²⁷⁶ This radical, anarchic rhetoric, which was also apparently at stake in Dada, as an intention “to collapse logical categories and oppositions”²⁷⁷ was taken by Situationism as a mission to be completed in order to de-throne the reign of the spectacles, yet it was punk that seized the banner, not consciously but as a youth subculture. This is why, probably, in an unpublished text written for the *Internationale Situationist* (periodical of Situationist movement), “the juvenile delinquents [i. e. punks] – not the pop artists – [were considered as] the true inheritors of Dada.”²⁷⁸

This is precisely what *MT* strove for, intentionally. Photographs of a minimalist office chair, a folded ready-to-sell Lacoste t-shirt, Andy Warhol’s famous Campbell soup can, the cover of Marshall McLuhan’s “The Medium is the Message” book, even its own cover with an huge “501” logo (of Levis’ denim) glued on the top could be seen in the pages of *MT*.²⁷⁹ Though they seemed to be collaged randomly; a message beneath can be read, that the position of the Levis 501 logo – a well-known clothing of a global brand which was renewed in Turkey during the post-1980s as a commodity to be identified with – on top of one’s work of art (*MT* here) implies a historical moment that consumptional patterns and their signifiers positioned themselves over every concept and form. On the other hand, this over-identification detaches these mundane objects from their contexts and inverts them as new signifiers

²⁷⁵ Ibid.([cited]).

²⁷⁶ Bürger, *Avangard Kuramı (Theory of the Avant-Garde)*, p. 21.

²⁷⁷ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 105.

²⁷⁸ Timothy Clark and Christopher Gray, *The Revolution of Modern Art and the Modern Art of Revolution* (1967 [cited 2004]); available from <http://situationist.cjb.net/>. In a similar vein, Greil Marcus writes secret history of the twentieth century as a turnover from Dada to Situationism and, subsequently to Punk. See, Marcus, *Ruj Lekesi: Yirminci Yüzyılın Gizli Tarihi (Lipstick Traces: The Secret History of the Twentieth Century)*.

²⁷⁹ *Mondo Trasho*, no.1 (1991). See Appendix, p.123 and 124.

of routine and commodified everyday life; that is to say, their power is recognized but loses their omnipotence. Therefore, on the other hand, the receiver of this collage is left with the mimicry of fragmentation and alienation, and then it is his/her job to solve “the contradiction between the thing [collaged] and the thing real.”²⁸⁰

A very clear and satirically striking example of over-identification, as a written text, comes from the so-called editorial by Esat Başak:

I want to watch [TV] commercials. In the evenings [however], I see that the commercials, that of Aunt Ayşe carrying 3kg of bleach and of my bank delivering plastic credit cards for a credited life, I eagerly watch after I escape from my vulgar and boring everyday life based on competitive ethics and sheltered under the cathode lights of my TV, are “distorted” by news, sport games, police serials legitimizing violence; and then I am very irritated. It really makes me worry that my television, whose goal is to present commercials and who has to afford its life with these incomes, must occasionally broadcast serials, competition shows, public discussions, and erotic (!) shows. . . I want to watch the dandruff problem of Neşe. When I drop off to watch the new, high-profitable interest rates of my bank, the anchorman appears with his never-ageing face presenting from the battle ground of realities [*gerçeklerin er meydanı*] and asks a high-ranking [military officer] who “fights against the guerilla in the south-east” [of Turkey] that “does not our heroic army fight against the separatist and treacherous guerilla to his last drop of blood?” The commercial in which humans rise in the air joyously, thanks to the oil they fry their potatoes in, is brutally interrupted; the police shoot a robber and after a short show of conscience, goes to lunch with his friends from the squad. Then, I zap to another channel. I just want to watch commercials.²⁸¹

This text, full of fragments and snapshots from TV commercials, news, and police serials, also charges its reader with the task of cohering of these fragments to construct a meaning. Besides, the task of the reader is not confined to conceiving a meaning, but also to “acting”, namely to producing his/her own fanzine. However this was not entirely unique, as Hebdige

²⁸⁰ Bürger, *Avangard Kuramı (Theory of the Avant-Garde)*, p. 147.

²⁸¹ *Mondo Trasho*, n.d. collaged in *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no. 1 (1999). See Appendix, p. 120.

underlines: this is an endeavor to demolish the barriers, which is the metaphor that stands for the revolutionary aesthetics (Brecht, Dada, Surrealism, Situationism) as the separation between art and the dream from the life under capitalism. On the other hand, in spontaneity with *MT*, fanzines involved in underground music genres – punk, hardcore, metal and so forth – were disseminated during the 1990s, yet they called readers to act not for that aesthetic priority, but rather to voice particular subcultures.

Fanzine as Subculture: A Matter of Choice

Not only a strict military rule or subsequent neo-liberal polities entered through the gate opened in 1980. The big cities, which set economic relations with the global markets, became centers for many subcultures, therefore for fanzines too. There was also an observable interest for these subcultures from the mainstream media as they can be equated with the “winds of liberalism” or freedom of choice – of the Youth. Nevertheless, the media’s equation of subcultures was limited almost entirely on consuming global brands’ clothing and music genres – rap, metal – supported by MTV and new private enterprise Turkish TV networks. Here, in contrast with the claims of completed “neo-liberal siege” or “consumption democracies,” the rapid dissemination of these photocopied papers and their strict distancing with disdain from the media demonstrates the fact that even in its most pretentious purpose, i.e. financial control and stability, neo-liberal polities were far from reaching their goals and restructuring the cultural frame in the cities where economic and cultural illegalities were cultivated. The lack of consistent fiscal control during the 1990s helped illegal means and ways to proliferate. Although there was an explicit

enthusiasm in the mainstream media for the global popular culture, from McDonalds to pop music, it was still not easily affordable for many to have them. During the 1990s, there emerged sales of illegally copied cassette tapes by peddlers; and when these peddlers evolved into small shops in passage ways, with their commercial counterparts second-hand book shops, they became sales points for fanzines. This conspicuous underground economy attracted those who did not, or could not, be involved in the dominant cultural frame and mainstream media channels. For instance, those who did not have a chance to be employed in mainstream comic and humor weeklies attempted to do their own publishing or to use hand-drawings in their subculture fanzines.²⁸² One of them was *Disguast*.

Disguast was released in 1992. With the sub-title “all underground punk-death fanzine” on the cover of its second issue, a call to readers to contribute to this so-called journalism was striking, especially regarding how they mocked mainstream magazines with editorial, press ID with representatives and *deyli diskast* (daily disgust) news section.²⁸³ Almost at the same moment with the broadening of the media discourse that disseminated to “the distinguished readers,” they were, consciously or not, mimicking this language with scornful self-parody: “dear distinguished disgust readers, even though we start with this phrase, let us admit that the magazine does not have many readers. But, though we have been disdained and not attracted attention, we will release this magazine until we are dead!” Indeed, as a demonstration of support between colleagues, an interview in *Gorgor* (another fanzine) with Barış Timurlenk of *Disguast* elucidates this sort of importance of releasing a fanzine for a zinester. Publishing a fanzine was something that a zinester

²⁸² See, Cantek, "Türkiye'de Çizgi Roman Fanzinleriyle İlgili Kısa Bir Değınme (A Short Statement on Turkish Fanzines)."

²⁸³ *Disguast*, no. 2 (July 1992). For details see Appendix, p. 125.

could not renounce on the grounds that it was whole a matter of choice: “this is not like writing in *Aktüel* or *Blue Jean**, but putting all money to loss, instead of hanging around in McDonalds in a pair of Levis.”²⁸⁴

Therefore, not a working class subcultural youth resistance, but mostly a refusal of the culture and identities emerging out consumptional goods and tastes what we have here. As such, this was similar for the western zinesters when punk surrendered its roots of style and engaged in sharp-edged political issues in the 1990s. With the 1990s, punk began to refuse their advantageous positions in the western countries since it was an urban, middle (service) class phenomenon. As quoted from the U.S. fanzine, *Profane Existence* which diffused the *engagé* punk attitude world wide:

We are the heirs of white-superior, patriarchal, and capitalist world order. We are, by our parents, trainings, culture, and history, endowed with the mission of being capital-protectors of the governor class and managers of the lower classes. . . We are rejecting our inherited racial and class positions, because we know that all these are ridiculous.²⁸⁵

A passage from subculture to counter culture in the rhetoric of the fanzines was relevant to the transformation of the social structure in the western world. Even the early punk bands signed contracts with global recording companies.²⁸⁶ Bands like *Crass* gave up famous punk “disgusting” public acts – to spit, vomit, and urinate – and style in order to build up a network to spread their thoughts and cultural products like

* Youth culture and music magazine of the largest media group, *Doğan*, in Turkey.

²⁸⁴ Interview with Barış Timurlenk, in *Gorgor*, no. 6 (May 1993).

²⁸⁵ Joel, *Profane Existence*, no. 13 (February 1992), in Craig O'Hara, *Punk felsefesi: Gürültünün Ötesinde (The Philosophy of Punk: More Than Noise)* (İstanbul: Çitlenbik, 2003), p. 38.

²⁸⁶ Jameson exemplifies the end of “critical distance” in postmodern times with The Clash’s loss of political interventions and how they were disarmed and reabsorbed by a system from which they lost the distance, however instances like *Crass* always remained invisible since they saved this “distance” discreetly. See Jameson, *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, p. 49.

recordings, fanzines, newspapers, films, and books. Punk fanzines, *Profane Existence* and its predecessor *MaximumRock'nRoll*, who inspired the zinesters world-wide during 1990s did not hesitate to underline that their main sources was second stream political – anarchist – bands like *Crass*, *Conflict*, and *Discharge* from the U.K. and *Dead Kennedys* from the U.S..²⁸⁷ Although there was concrete evidence that they were followed by Turkish zinesters or underground musicians,²⁸⁸ it is difficult to point out instantaneous relations between these two American fanzines and their contemporaries in Turkey. Yet it is more convenient to examine the political mottos and symbols that appeared in Turkish examples through a subcultural frame, not a full counter-cultural one. Nevertheless, there were fanzines that could collapse this type of generalization regarding the fact both western and Turkish ones were born in countries over which clouds of a global cultural transformation gathered without any visible future considerations.

Tracing *Disguast*, one can connect its intention of “being an anti-media” to a “tradition” of fanzines and *Mondo Trasho* also. This, on the other side, helps us not to be confined in artificial categories like aesthetic, subculture and criminal fanzines and generalizations. Take, for instance, pretending to be a devoted TV commercial watcher: with a collage sentence, “how quick the dandruff problem of Neşe was forgotten.”²⁸⁹ This is, in fact, a sentence that achieved the over-identified text of *MT* above; in addition, one can interpret it as a text parodying how the history perception based on the flow of tele-visual images –commercials. In the same issue, the feel of

²⁸⁷ O'Hara, *Punk felsefesi: Gürültünün Ötesinde (The Philosophy of Punk: More Than Noise)*, pp. 63-64.

²⁸⁸ “I do not even read a book. Just read magazines on music and political stuff, like *Profane Existence*. . . I intend to take a look at some of the philosophers’ book, but you need some fundamental to do that, you know” : Answer of a member from Turkish “socio-political hardcore” band *Turmoil*, interview in *Disguast*, no. 8 (1993). Reviews of *Profane Existence* also appeared in fanzines. See *Eblek Hardcore*, no. 16 (1995).

²⁸⁹ *Disguast*, no. 4 (1992). For details see Appendix, p. 126.

sympathy for *MT* was admitted that they had recently come across it and introduced it such as: “it is really interesting to introduce one underground magazine in another one. Because all work for the same goal are supposed to be rivals. But, pals, [what you have read] here is not Turkish [mainstream] media and we are not one of those columnists (I hate writing, though). Who wants competition and slandering, go and read newspapers. What I mean to say is that *Disguast* is an anti-competitive [media].²⁹⁰ It was, in Timurlenk’s words, just a “publication that helped to see reality and to mock all of life.”²⁹¹ Then, how and why did the purpose of making a subcultural amateur comic fanzine idea turn into a counter-cultural stance?

Hall’s and Jefferson’s arguments on the contradictive social grounds of subcultures and counterculture, that while first is strictly working class using forms of a visibly organized cultural response, latter is originally middle class, more diffuse, less-group centered, thus individualized, give specific prerequisites about youthful reactions and their class roots.²⁹² However, regarding the fanzines explored here it seems hard to make a strict separation whether they were counter cultural, therefore middle class, or working class subcultures. First of all, fanzine as a subcultural form was introduced, partly by young male Turkish immigrants from Germany – *Alamancılar*, by musical genres like punk and metal which were not widely known before the late 1980s.²⁹³ However, their western contemporaries had already evolved into strict counter-cultural, middle class, positions – like the American examples below. And symbols irrelevant to Turkey’s social contexts, like anti-Nazi icons – albeit there appeared hatred in fanzines towards the racist violence against Turks in Germany, and against the racist-nationalist humiliation towards Kurdish people in

²⁹⁰ Ibid. See Appendix, p. 125.

²⁹¹ *Gorgor*, no. 6 (May 1993).

²⁹² Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals*, p. 60.

²⁹³ Cantek, "Türkiye'de Çizgi Roman Fanzinleriyle İlgili Kısa Bir Değınme (A Short Statement on Turkish Fanzines)," p. 78.

mainstream music magazines' readers pages – became commonly used; or phrases like “Racists, fascists, homophobics, sexists, and capitalists cannot read this ‘zine’”²⁹⁴ and symbols like capital letters in a circle – A for anarchy and E for equality²⁹⁵ – do not only show a specific political ideology, but rather a subcultural set of signs. All these signs, as Hall and Jefferson argue, help to express an identity of a collective group, here zinesters, not a mere collection of individuals, and to communicate among each other.²⁹⁶ For them, this collective identity by subculture separates it from counter cultures' individualized middle classness. However, the fanzines discussed above considerably spoke of subcultures, yet their in-betweenness with a counter cultural stance is very obvious.

They were released by an individual or by a few, a fact that one can get from given names on the first pages. Therefore, they nevertheless could not be separated from the gradually increased “power of the individual” feeling in post-1980s years, like Thatcherism's reminiscent “there is no society, but there are individuals.” Levent Cantek argues the relation between fanzine and individual as its producer such as:

. . . I want to underline the emphasis on “I.” Fanzines are mostly youthful works; they, in general, have a language that one can define with garrulous and boring teenage years and unconcerned discourse of freedom. They speak by yelling out their voices towards a monotonous and blurred photograph of Turkey . . . on the other hand one can say that they voice a passive – and perhaps nihilist – but absolutely introverted reactions. Because in publications like this sort, it is a very common way of reaction, namely to distance from social acts, to detest politics and politicians or to ignore them all.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ *Gorgor*, no. 6 (May 1993); *Eblek Hardcore*, no. 16 (1995). For details see Appendix, p. 127 and 128.

²⁹⁵ See, *Gorgor*, no. 7 (May 1994).; *Liberation*, no. 1 (1995).; *Goblin*, no. 2 (1994). For details see Appendix, p. 129 and 130.

²⁹⁶ Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals*, p. 47.

²⁹⁷ Cantek, "Türkiye'de Çizgi Roman Fanzinleriyle İlgili Kısa Bir Değınme (A Short Statement on Turkish Fanzines)," p. 79.

Before evaluating how this stress on “I” evolved into “We” and the relations of zinesters with politics in the next part, it would be appropriate to discuss the tension on defining them as subcultural or counter cultural products. As they helped to communicate among the members of subcultures discussed above, which were known in the 1990s by the urban, educated and mostly young males, one can call fanzine production a subcultural activity. Indeed, it is not fully inaccurate since the strong interest in other fanzines and in local bands in the “scene” were the parts of the many fanzines that coincided. There was a “fanzine community,” around a set of imaginary relations as Hall and Jefferson define it. According to them, imaginary relations, organized around a visible, or spectacular, form as cultural response – take fanzines here – work:

in ways which reproduce the gaps and discrepancies between the real negotiations and symbolically displaced “resolutions”. They “solve”, but in an imaginary way, problems which at the concrete material level remain unresolved . . . [and] can not be resolved at that level or by those means. There is no “sub-cultural career” for the working class lad, no “solution” in the sub-cultural milieu, for the problems posed by the key structuring experiences of the class. (emphasis by author)²⁹⁸

However, one must notice that our zinester lads most likely did not experience working classness; quite the contrary, as editor of *Disguast* stressed above, it was mostly a matter of choice either to enjoy new material – consumption – culture or to survive in alienating and fragmenting experiences of society of the spectacle in which socio-cultural aspects of the old middle classness, therefore the ways its young members live them, had dissolved; hence, they admittedly enjoyed facing these experiences in an over-identification way. In the end, the subcultures which have been

²⁹⁸ Jefferson, *Resistance through Rituals.*, pp. 47-48.

already politicized in the western countries and became middle class phenomena attracted young people to identify with them. They, thus, evolved into an unprecedented countercultural milieu towards everydayness with the self-claim of being the only culture. In that sense, what they did can also be evaluated as a criminal act since, in the late 1990s, they self-consciously came to be aware that their photocopied papers were nothing but an illegal means of distribution.

Fanzine as Crime: A Slap on the Face of the Order

Making fun of daily life and language, and setting subcultural communicative, imaginary, relations through fanzines should not make one interpret zinesters merely as young people's search for enjoyment. Although it is a fact that they were hedonistically involved in "fanzine business," to voice their subcultural identifications and unheard "talents" of writing and drawing, there, nevertheless, were signs of reaction: a collaged cover from newspaper headlines on political corruptions,²⁹⁹ a photograph which showed a Turkish police man kicking a woman appeared with the collaged words as "no more *delikanlı* police – dogs on duty (*köpekler iş başında*)" and hand written words like as "do not join army, anti-militia (*askere gitme, anti-militia*)³⁰⁰, or over-identified newspaper collages like "one of the victims of torture is just fourteen."³⁰¹ Many of reactions against the social tensions, like rising Turkish nationalism in touch with militarism related to the civil war in south-eastern Turkey in the 1990s could find places in the pages of many fanzines, albeit not as full text but mostly on a small scale randomly pasted collages and hand scripts at the pages' edges.

²⁹⁹ *Disguast*, no. 6 (November 1992). For details see Appendix, p. 131.

³⁰⁰ *Yeraltı*, no. 2 (1995).

³⁰¹ Torture (*İşkence*) is the name of the fanzine at the same time. See, *Pest/ İşkence Split Fanzine*, no. 2 (1996).

Nevertheless, instances like the one below can be read as a peculiar response of zinesters satirically directed towards the civil war, and its equivalent in the mainstream media language, terror:

EB: What is Disguast used for?

D: It is used for many things! Now, our people did not need to go to the thermal springs, brothels, groceries, baths or the south-east. Terror is experienced in Istanbul by Disguast!

EB: Well, have you completed your military service?

D: Catch us if you can. Although we want it a lot, they put us rotten*, do not recruit us. Oh dear, we do not leave here without slapping a few from the PKK [acronym for armed Kurdish guerillas – Kurdistan Labour Party]³⁰²

More than supporting each other in order to stabilize a culture – like the one above, namely interviewing each other and reviewing peers' fanzines; they provide a particular language, a map of meaning, as a means to be visible. A language which seemed to belong garrulous teenage-ness, yet gradually evolving into a socially-biting path, became very explicit in fanzines, especially towards the millennium.

Recalling Gürbilek's striking argument that the lower classes could only be visible when they committed crimes and their mugshots were shown on the mainstream media,³⁰³ what fanzines did was to reverse this: they pretended to be criminals as a mimicry of the crime in everyday-life – to be visible and to communicate with each other – since they were now aware of what they did was publishing without permission. Meanwhile, this gives a sort of feeling, like to encounter the state in everyday experience; and zinester derived great enjoyment from experiencing its impotence. In this process, doing fanzines turned into an end on its own; saying in Hegelian terms they were now not fanzine-in-itself, but fanzine-for-

* "Being rotten" (*çürük çıkmak*) is synonymous with to be discharged as unfit for military duty in case of stable health problems and homosexuality.

³⁰² Interview with Disguast's editors, in *Eblek Hardcore*, no. 16 (1995). For the original text see Appendix, see p.132.

³⁰³ See page 53.

itself. Thus, the zinester began to believe his/her work had a potential to quake the order; whether it was the state or consumerism, or even the mainstream media. To discuss producing a fanzine as a criminal production demonstrates that the zinester consciously or unconsciously considered that refusing these three separately, aesthetically or not, were by no means possible.

The emulation of criminal acts, as the shocking impacts they bear and to underline the proletarian roots, was essential in early punk subculture. With collage, the juxtaposition of letters resembling a “ransom note” and using faces whose eyes are masked with black bars like criminals in the public press aimed to keep the editor anonymous and implied that what had been done was a crime.³⁰⁴ Similar attitudes were also apparent in Turkish examples tracing the early punk aesthetically: The Zinesters of *MT* represented themselves with the photographs of exhibited criminals in custody.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, while there were many examples dedicatedly following the collages in the artistic and political manner of over-identification, there were also explicitly counter cultural examples; that is to say, some searching for alternative ways of distribution and communication. Yet, rather than a sharp distinction, there were many intersecting examples.

First, what zinesters intended by ranking crime in the pages of fanzines was basically to shock the public eye with real social tensions. The collages of headlines belonging to the ordinary crime pages of newspapers and of rising nationalism, thanks to the civil war in the 1990s, were one of the most frequently applied techniques. Assembled and pasted words like “nationalism... hatred... exclusion... weapon... war and death...terrifying”³⁰⁶ poses reader to experience whole social facts in a

³⁰⁴ Hebdige, *Subcultures: The Meaning of Style*, p. 112.

³⁰⁵ *Mondo Trasho*, no. 2 (1991). For details see Appendix, p. 122.

³⁰⁶ *Liberation*, no. 1 (1995). For details see Appendix, p. 133.

fragmented bulk of signifiers; and in a similar vein, daily crime, violence, and all experienced unevenness were remembered by assembling words such as “homicides increased... public workers in lines for bread...dead...who was killed by police fire... 3 dead, 14 injuries... panic of poisoned water... war made sick.”³⁰⁷ Therefore, it can be stated that subcultural fanzines became a means to remember the bitter facts of life in the 1990s. Considering the discourse of the Youth in the decade, this was not an expected attitude of young people while a new middle classness was calling them to the divergent options of leisure time and subcultures. Nevertheless, this collage aesthetic did not aim to resolve any particular social matter experienced, like uneven income distribution, social fragmentation or rising violence. Yet it was still radical in its signifying practice; as Hebdige argues, punk with reference to Kristeva, “they gestured towards a nowhere and actively sought to remain silent, illegible.” Therefore, it can be stated that what zinesters identified with was by no means a class or a culture, but the whole alienating and fragmented aspects and social decadence of the decade. Since they did not seek to escape the facts they were entangled with, they did not hesitate to reveal every unwanted side of the everyday life – albeit, frequently in an anti-social mood. No doubt, this was precisely the opposite of a quality of the cultural climate in the 1990s, namely the cynic distancing, discussed in Chapter Three, from the social tensions.

The change *Disguast* underwent was noteworthy. In the eighth issue, the fanzine’s subtitle on the cover became “not a music mag!” in addition to the collaged mottos “it is time to talk” and “the shitty symbol of resistance.”³⁰⁸ As such, the change had been present in the previous issues, like the collaged pages on consumption of global brands for identities – “if you do not have 501’s, do not read this” – and on the

³⁰⁷ *Goblin*, no. 2 (1994). For details see Appendix, p. 134.

³⁰⁸ *Disguast*, no. 8 (1993). For details see Appendix, p. 135.

presence of intimate, especially sexual, experiences in mainstream media – “ what intimacy.”³⁰⁹ Regarding the private spaces’ excessive growth into public ones and allowing no space for politics, this explicit reaction from a zinester can also be read as a social criticism of the cultural climate of the 1990s by a youngster. Distancing from social tensions and politics in general, in a cynic way as discussed in Chapter Three, was a phenomenon in the 1990s that one can relate to the entire cultural transformation. The zinester was not so immune from the social ignorance, even hatred, to politics. However; there was, nonetheless, something incomparable, that their apathy towards and detestation of politics was concerned the institutional part of it. Hence, a space could be opened for politics in the everydayness, as an ethical attitude. The cited interview by a zinester with a hardcore band member can be taken as a stunning example:

G: What are your political views? Do you want to tell us briefly?

Y: Actually, the word “political” seems a little ridiculous to me. Because any of our views are not political, they are world views that everyone should think about. They are natural and they are things that should exist. They can be listed generally as anti-war, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism, anti-animal slaughter . . . friendship, not abusing women as sexual commodities, and anti-media. We can proliferate those things.

G: We have the same ideas as you . . . any words to add?

Y: I hope you will keep on doing your mag and stay underground. The fanzine’s job is indeed very difficult, wish you success...and I suggest anyone reading this page . . . to take a look around just in a moment and to join in the struggle by confronting realities.³¹⁰

A similar attitude towards politics in a review of a socialist magazine, *Voice of Youth* (*Gençliğin Sesi*), by a zinester: “read these magazines as they are alternatives to the idiot, nationalist, and pop-star magazines. Read them since you are an anti-fascist

³⁰⁹ *Disguast*, no. 7 (1992). For details see Appendix, p. 136 and 137.

³¹⁰ Interview with Necrosis. Ibid.

youngster, if not a socialist.” If one takes into account that the questions were posed by a subculture fanzine and answered by a musician and the critique took place in a fully collaged photocopied paper, the dominant aestheticism in the 1990s, that of “leaving ethics for aesthetics,” was inverted and ethics as an everyday engagement put back into aesthetic (re)production. This is what Benjamin celebrates when he saw the reproducible work of art having the potential to collapse the fascism’s rendering of politics in aesthetic forms and to assist the politicization of aesthetics.³¹¹ Note that, no doubt he does not mean to say only Nazi Germany by fascism. His main stress is on the peculiarity of historical moments when politics masks the inequality within itself by aesthetics. Therefore it is useful to interpret the 1990s when the gap between the culture and the economy diminished and the distance between the work of art and a commercial was lost.

Emulation of crime was relevant to this aesthetic attitude. Fanzines began to treat artistic materials, such as poetry, as nothing different from a detoured image or text. What mattered for a zinester was the togetherness of these fragmented parts, not who “they belonged to.”³¹² The same was true for another fanzine: the matter was to be read by the one – yet of the scene; hence zinesters began to call on their readers to steal their fanzines;³¹³ even, recalling the over-identification with the consumerism, to consume and to throw them away.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Production," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Collins, 1979), pp. 224-42.

³¹² *Disguast*, no. 4 (1992). For details see Appendix, p. 138.

³¹³ *Eblek Hardcore*, no 16 (1995). For details see Appendix, p.127.

³¹⁴ *SpastikEroll*, no. 2 (2001).

* First utterance of Do-it-yourself can be related, in case of analyzing fanzines, to the 1950s’ American ready-made household sets. Probably, the student movements and hippies in the West used as a counter-cultural way of autonomous small scale artistic production and distribution. Nevertheless, its resonance with political ends can be related to second stream punk bands and fanzines like *MaximumRock’n’Roll* and *Profane Existence*. Turkish fanzines translated it as “Cook-it-yourself” (*kendin pişir*) as an everyday utterance for grill restaurants outside of urban areas. For ethical and political aspects of do-it yourself especially see Geoff

On the other hand, the sign of evolving into a counter cultural stance was to encourage readers to do their own fanzines by glorifying the so-called “do-it-yourself”^{*} ethic, like putting “do you want to join us, then you do it too!!!” after a list and communication addresses of fanzines.³¹⁵ Regarding the fact that many fanzines were produced mainly by collaged – used without permission – images, texts, words from any medium necessary, to call reader to do his her own fanzine was nothing but a call to be guilty parties, a violation of copy-rights, but, meanwhile, exceeding the intermediaries between the producer and the receiver:

Reason d’etre of this fanzine . . . is to reveal the sentence “I can do it, too” and to remove it from any concept, like style or manner, which recalls journalism and professionalism. Do not be a viewer, join. Break a brick from the wall of viewed-viewer.³¹⁶

To target the culture of consumption and mainstream media language, fanzines began to take crime in its most concrete form and to act like criminals. Like exhibiting illegal means, weapons, and drugs by police after a raid, the photographs of fanzines, glues, scissors, and type-writers were published pretending like it was a piece of

Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University, 2002), O'Hara, *Punk felsefesi: Gürültünün Ötesinde (The Philosophy of Punk: More Than Noise)*, pp. 151-64. As mentioned in fanzine *Aparkat*: “DIY: Means; Do It Yourself, namely a sort of “cook yourself serve for all” ...Bands, fanzines, and other activists who have the mentality of DIY consist of people who reproduce their products by self-financing without having relations with record companies, distributors or big and commercial mail orders and construct their web of distribution by giving the product to the listener in concerts by hand and by distros or by delivering via letter, fanzine and mail. An anecdote for the ones who use the word DIY wrongfully; if you add profit on the product that you release, disregarding the purpose of helping an institution or an individual, it is no longer a DIY activity. You should know this...” See, *Aparkat*, no. 2 (2003). As a similar example: D.I.Y.: 1) . . . essence of fanzine culture. Though its equivalent is ‘do it yourself’, it means ‘cook yourself, serve the dudes.’ 3) All of the individual and collective actions which are done, in the commercial sense, amateurishly and out of legality.” In *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no. 1 (1999); see Appendix, p. 139. In recent, advertising motto of global sporting corporation Nike, *Just Do It*, is being used by zinesters globally to encourage reader to do something.

³¹⁵ *Medya Tavırs*, no. 1 (1999). For details see Appendix, p.140.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

intelligence from a mainstream newspaper.³¹⁷ The place of this mock-up news was an old squatter district, a lower class neighborhood of Istanbul (Bağcılar). An implicit eulogy and emulation of lower class districts and crime was photocopied as a collaged page: “More Gazi!”* In an attached paper called *Prolefan* (Proletarian Fanzines) press bulletin, *Zararlı Neşriyat* (Harmful Publication) (ZN) used an aggressive language and a tone of voice resembling illegal leftist manifestos and declared that “what is to be done is to blow up a periodic fanzine [*fanzinsel*] terror.”³¹⁸ More than that *ZN* gave an open call for illegal releases to get in touch in order to be introduced.³¹⁹

All of these efforts, seemingly, to ally and even to identify with an imaginary – criminal – lower classness can only be read as if a zinester was a threat to the order, proof of its weakness – namely its impotence. Since *ZN* strictly underlined that “all fanzines should be a slap in the face of the order.” Therefore, one can claim fanzines worked as an empowering apparatus of young people, a psychological weapon to be visible, towards the cultural transformation in the 1990s.

As an another example of encouragement for crime which consisted of “poisonous ideas” and with the motto of the “anti-substance of consumption society,” *Medya Tavırs* (Media Towers) developed the art of destruction projects, like the one “to destroy McDonald’s as a millennium project” and encouraged people to send their “creative destruction” suggestions.³²⁰ The call to destruction, at this time, towards corporations and media monopolies, with the title the “anti-capitalist destruction project” was obviously violence action against private corporate properties which

³¹⁷ *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no. 1 (1999). For details see Appendix, p. 141.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.* For details see Appendix, p. 142.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

* Gazi Neighborhood was renowned in 1995 by uprisings and demonstrations against the police forces after café houses of Alaouites had been put under drive-by fire through civil cars. In demonstrations during a week seventeen people was killed by the police. For details see Appendix, p. 143.

³²⁰ *Medya Tavırs*, no. 1 (1999). For details see Appendix, p. 144 and 145.

“can collapse [with] the system by breaking a glass or pulling out a screw” since they were the ones who said “we have no intention to change anything and no alternatives. We have no hope for the future! Our war is today! Direct and immediate!”³²¹ Since reactions of this sort, which are obviously ambivalent, reflect the youthful uneasiness towards the social structure under capital and despair about the future, it was the negation and the refusal of identity of Youth that had cluster the symbolic capital of a discourse. This can be grasped in a more concrete manner, as a call to steal:

Stealing is an action. It is indeed a serious action against the status quo, the laws of the state, and more importantly the bourgeoisie. Stealing is the strongest anti-dote to the economic and the cultural gap between the wealthy and poor which is (intentionally) rendered to become unable to exceed and was supported consciously by the power to grow. . . . Steal. . . . Do not stop. . . . Do not be afraid. . . . Do not be ashamed. . . . If you are out of money, but you desire and need to have some, do not hesitate to steal. . . . we will not die because we are broke. . . . The class war will go on.³²²

This citation, nevertheless, is followed by a collaged phrase, “I have an orgasm when I steal.” Similar enjoyment, in calling for crime or when the order is threatened, appears here. Probably all these threats and encouragement for crime remained as texts, as spectacular – yet very creative – responses to the society of the spectacle. But they were also useful for young people by doing fanzines in order to survive while they were surrounded by an unbearable economy-culture working on their existence. As a zinester said in a piece under the title “Fanzines is the need”:

The common concern that I hear . . . from people doing fanzines is a need to create, to produce. Production is a need [on its own]. Many

³²¹ *Spastik Eroll*, no. 2 (2001). For details see Appendix, p. 146.

³²² *Medya Tavırs*, no. 1 (1999). For details see Appendix, p.147.

fanzines are boring, but you can do something to be part of the ten per cent; devote all your life to it and discover yourself.³²³

³²³ *Spastik Eroll*, no. 2 (2001). For details see Appendix, p. 148.

CONCLUSION

As an effort to voice experiences and to construct a web of communication by trying to open autonomous zones via photocopied papers, fanzines with a strict and uncompromising language, like *Spastik Eroll*'s "no hope for the future," appeared with the millennium. The discourse of creating a "counterculture," which is a term that insistently appears in recent copies, are uttered by plural subject, not by "I":

Our war is against those who make non-ethics [*etiksizlik*], ignorance, apoliticalness a life style and live with them!.. Our war is for constituting a counter-culture, making punk an insult again for capitalists, against culture and degenerated subcultures, which are presented as alternatives, yet, which are by no means the tricks of the capitalist system. Our war against all! Against all, all alone! . . . Therefore we fanzines should release; not fan (fan magazines), but "counter" publications full of rationalism that would make a molotov [cocktail] impact; distribute them by our own strength; try to bring out new ideas . . . embrace photocopy not as a means, but as an end; and [finally] turn fanzines into weapons, the barrels of which are directed at this capitalist system.³²⁴

A similar "call to act" for "us against them" is very clear in the quotation such as: To act without being organized has made us weak against them. The counter culture movement works by experiencing these [facts]! We will make counter culture in Turkey together! By being organized, noticed, and continuously in struggle."³²⁵

How can one read, then, this strict emphasis on the need to constitute a counter culture and its subject "we?" The diffusion of the spectacle in the 1990s extended to subcultures especially at the end of the decade, this is indeed what the editor(s) of *Spastik Eroll* become aware of. Today there is an explicit interest in mainstream

³²⁴ *Spastik Eroll*, no. 2 (1999). For the original text see Appendix, p. 149.

³²⁵ *Katran*, no. 2 (2000).

media towards the fanzines, the satirical language they utter, and their collage aesthetics. In recent years, zinesters have witnessed catalog-alike-books solely consisting of front covers of fanzines,³²⁶ the introduction of fanzines which were photocopied less than a hundred copies in nation-wide television networks, the appearance of zinesters with their glossy collage work in mainstream pop-music magazines like *Blue Jeans*. Even today, one of the most stunning examples of collage work recalling one the technique of the fanzines of the 1990s are exhibited as an advertising brochure and account contracts – for the distinguished university Youth – of a bank.³²⁷

In this process, therefore, it should not be surprising to see fanzines take an aggressive, even authoritarian-in-tone language (for example, take *ProleFan*) and the consciousness of being a medium of underground communication – namely evolving from fanzine-in-itself to fanzine-for-itself. Hence, the substitution of “I” with “we” is the indirect result of what Situationists called as “recuperation.”³²⁸ Acting more underground and engaging with a narrow circle, whose actors are this “we” helps fanzines to stay away from recuperation and marketing risk towards their products. In a similar vein, the names of the zinesters and their open postal addresses have disappeared from the pages of the fanzines. A small underground group of zinesters who are aware of who is who, therefore, has underpinned the feeling of a coherent subject “we” among the circle and of being criminals since all personal information

³²⁶ His books, *Şeytan Aletleri* (The Tools of Satan) and *101 Fanzin*, and Altay Öktem himself have become the main targets in fanzines in the 2000s. See, *Spastik Eroll* no. 2 (2001).

³²⁷ The credit card account “Uni-card” is a noteworthy example. As folded papers, one side is full of collaged letters, words, and images – even including the moniker of the Bank; and the other is a regularly and vigorously laid out account contract. For details see Appendix, p. 150 and 151.

³²⁸ Sezgin Boynik, “Gösteri Toplumu İktidarına Karşı Avant-garde Hareketlerin Geliştirdikleri Estetik-Politik Stratejiler (Aesthetic-Political Strategies Developed by Avant-garde Movements Against the Power of the Society of the Spectacle),” in *Sanat ve Sosyoloji (Art and Sociology)*, ed. Aylin Dikmen Özarlan (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2005), p. 129.

has vanished. This is comparable with what the Situationists did by keeping the distance with from the channels of capitalism and remaining underground to constitute a different public space.³²⁹

However, what one should bear in mind is that the all of the Situationist mottos, graffiti, posters, and partially their theories in their journal *Situationist Internationale* (SE), historically became “aboveground” and counter cultural on the eve, moment and afterwards of the May incidents in 1968 in Paris. Although the efforts to remain underground against the recuperation effect of the new economy-culture of the 1990s seems quite reasonable, this also cripples all claims of fanzines’ being a counter-cultural response on the grounds that any counter-cultural effort simply requires contesting the dominant culture. Their existence, of course, offers an alternative, in Stephen Burt’s words, a way of understanding and acting in a public-ness with rules and values different from those of consumer capitalism.³³⁰ They may, at least for now, be far from a vast political impact, like the one of SE. Nevertheless, fanzines, as an underground cultural production, exhibit a medium for everyone to be intellectuals-cultural creators without the need of expertise; moreover “[they] encourage . . . readers to think about who they are and what they believe in.”³³¹

Regarding the cultural transformation in the 1990s, as the quoted examples here indicate, fanzines seem to grasp the essence of the new societal condition – that of spectacles. Putting the mainstream media and the culture of consumerism as points from which to be distanced provides fanzines a critical position. Nonetheless, as spectacular responses of the experiences of some youngster, zinesters had a negative identity since they strove to constitute it in “reliance upon the in-authenticity” of the

³²⁹ Ibid., p.131.

³³⁰ Stephen Burt, "Amateurs," *Transition*, no. 77 (1998): p. 150.

³³¹ Ibid., p. 153.

dominant culture – yet this is at the core of their refusal. As discussed Chapter Four, even fanzines demonstrate that their producers identify with some particular subcultures; in the social environment that the stable identities’ lose their ability of coding a long lasting selfhood, zinesters suggest an identification with what commonsense shows is an unwillingness to confront – like cynicism towards social tensions, identities around commodities, loss of historical sense, rising everyday violence. This is why, I think, to call the zinesters’ ambivalent position an over-identification, namely identification with the unwanted realities of their present, is not so improper. A zinester reminds us that the whole task of fanzine work as leaving a trace in history to survive in it: “Now here is my reason. I have this idea that a lot of fanzines exist, at least in part, for reasons of documentation. I just think that a lot of us [fan]zine kids want a record of all the . . . stuff that happens to us; because for some reasons we think we’ll want to have some way to remember it all for a long time.”³³² I can say that all of the fanzines here were selected with a similar concern and with their discreet potential of documenting the 1990s’ cultural context from a critical distance.

What about the transformation of the “youth,” from a social category to an investment for symbolic capital for the new middle classes, therefore for an exclusionary concept – which I call in Chapter Four *juvenilization* (of the economy) – and the responses of zinester, as they can be classified as young people. Admittedly, there is no explicit and expected refusal or condemnation of the new discourse of Youth in the pages of fanzines. However, there are, of course, stunning instances mocking the discourse that Youth is an advantageous value and making fun of the so-called “apoliticalness of youth,” unsurprisingly in an over-identification with this

³³² *Superette*, n.d. quoted by *Ibid.*, p. 152.

claim. As an example of the first, the title of *Zararlı Neşriyat* is to be noted: “New Choice of the New Generation.”³³³ The equation of Youth with the ownership of distinguished taste – recalling the Pepsi commercials – as an summary of the 1990s cannot be disclosed better. A second one comes from a punk fanzine: “Degenerated Youth is coming! To eat mothers and fathers in Salvation Fest . . . by the enjoyment for the human flesh, we are the cannibals of capitalist order.”³³⁴ As an undetectable quality of the discourse of Youth, the unlimited consumerism, the quotation above erases any possible humane avoidance of not consuming: the turn to be consumed – indeed by devouring – is now humans’. As some fanzines remind us, again, it is actually human lives that were devoured by everyday life transformed by capitalism’s new turn in the 1990s. Subtitles – from the notes left behind – of the simultaneous death news of four young people collaged from a mainstream newspaper with the title “boom of suicides” summarize how a zinester feel and see about the social world he/she has to live within: “life became unbearable . . . I can not be the one you deserved . . . depression of unemployment.”³³⁵

The newspaper collage is from the vegan/anarchist fanzine called *Veganarşi*; yet the point here is not that there are now fanzines ranging from punk culture to veganism, but rather the fact that as the editor of *Veganarşi* puts it, “life is the entity of irrelevant parts . . . we can find the solutions starting from one of them.”³³⁶ The editor insists that all his/her effort in four issues of the fanzine is to discuss the alienating expects of the everyday life, not only the specific alienation by means of the deprivation of means of production. Therefore, I think, all of the fanzine “business”

³³³ *Zararlı Neşriyat*, no. 1 (1999). For details see Appendix, p. 141.

³³⁴ *Yelloz*, no. 1 (n.d.).

³³⁵ *Veganarşi*, no. 4 (2003). For details see Appendix, p. 152.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

can be interpreted, as Burt interprets it, as a non-alienating labor – which becomes a must to survive in the years that are the heirs to the 1990s.

In conclusion, all interpretations and analyses of the fanzines by me probably are not shared by some zinesters. Many of them may also disagree with an effort like this one and take it as a recuperation of their works. If so, they will not be fully wrong in the sense that academic works are an apparatus to carry secretly sustained works to aboveground. But nevertheless, to expose the claims that the 1990s were nothing but years in which neo-liberal siege was completed and youth remained totally silenced, fanzines should be remembered as traces in history proving the opposite. Moreover, as one zinester reminds us, they serve as the means of some who have something to speak about, even to yell out about in times when “it is so worrying that we live in the age of information and technology and we have the ultimate tools of communication mankind ever had; but do not have something to speak about.”³³⁷

³³⁷ *Spastik Eroll*, no. 2 (2001).

APPENDIX

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The chief enemy of creativity is 'good' taste.
-Pablo Picasso

GENET
ABOUT NOTHING

Underground'un süperstarlarından

EDIE
(1943-1971)

Jack KEROUAC:
NOSFERATU

AJAN PROVAKATÖR
divine

"Özgeçmiş,
baskı tekniğinin bulunuşuyla ortaya
çıkış tehlikeli bir sanattır."

McLUHAN



esat v. başak



naki tez



yahya madra



murat ertel

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The chief enemy of creativity is 'good' taste.
-Pablo Picasso

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KAFASINA GEÇİRDİĞİ TORBADA
BULDU ...BANYODA ...
İLHAN BERK AMÇA DÜNYAYI PEK
SİKİCİ BOLDUĞU İÇİN YAZARMIŞ...
SİZİNDE BİR "MIŞ"INIZ
YARDIR HERHALDE...
BİZİM Kİ BU....

FANTEZİLERİNİZİ DEĞİL
PARTNERİNİZİ BAĞLAYIN!..
YUKARIDAKİ ADRESE
YAZIN..




BU
SAYFA KATEGORİSİNDE BULUNANLAR.....

Mondotrasho
The Best of anarchy & Punk
SAVIL 1 Eylül 1991
Yeni Farklı ve Güçlü Akademi
SERAT'ÇI BAŞKAN
NAKİ TEZ
Yazma Adres:
Buyukdere Cad. No 10 Şişli

"İnsan hiç de 'sanat' yapıtı olmayan yapılar yaratabilir mi?"

- Yazma mahluluğu diye bir şey var mıdır? Böyle bir düşünce taradınız mı hiç?
- Bir lere.
- Neyi yazarken?
- "Paravanlar", Garip beni çok sırtmış, ama hapisten çıktıktan için onları yazmam gerekiyordu.
- "Paravanlar", sonuç olarak ölüme pek önemli sayılmayan bir ölü olaraktı sunar. Bu sözümüz mü?
- Hayatın ölüme geçiş barış pek hüzünlü venci gelmiyor. Sonuçta, kullanıtan keimelere bağlı bu. Önemli olan dramalize etmemektir.
- Dramatize olmayan bir drama yazan mısınız yani?
- Tamamına bşyle. Bir tür dramaturji denemesine giriştiyse bu, topluma olan hesabını görmek içindir. Artık fark etmez, hesap görülmüştür.

İGENET



Mondotrasho
The Best of anarchy & Punk
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EDİTÖR
KUTUP
NOSFERATLI
MCLUHAN

The Medium is the Message
Marshall McLuhan
Çiğdem'in

CONDENSED
CHICK
WITH RICE

Brillo
KOC ADIYAN
24.000
TRADE MARK
HEBDEGE

EN STRADA MESNEKLER BİLE YENİ BİR ANLAMI YÜKLENİP GİZLİ VE AYKIRI BİR KİMLİĞİN TEMİNATI HALALE GELEBİLİR-AMCAK DİHA SONRA, MESNEKİN ÖTESİNDE BİR ALTKÜLTÜRÜN İFADESİ OLAN BU İKİNCİL ANLAMIN KENDİSİ DİYASAYA DÜŞEBİ LİR. HERHANGİ BİR ALTKÜLTÜRÜN BAĞINISIZ BİR "HAVA" BİR STATÜNÜN SEMBOLÜ OLAR- LIR. BU BİR ANLAMDA ALTKÜLTÜRLE EGEMEN KÜLTÜR ARASINDA GÜZELLİK ESYANIN TAMAMI HALKINDA, HIÇ DİNMEYEN BİR ÇELİŞ- KİNN İFADESİDİR.



Message of Marshall McLuhan


"Sanat yalnızca bir oyun değil, insanoğlu duyarlılığının kosullanmış ve geleneksel biçimlerden öteye bir gelişimi sayılmalıdır. Sanatsız kişiler ve halk oyunlarından yoksun topluluklar, çağımızda makineleşmeye ve otomatikliğe itilirler."

'İçinde yaşadığımız dünya, herşeyin bir anda olup bittiği yepyeni bir dünyadır artık. Zaman gerçekten durmuş ve uzay yok olmak yolundadır....

Yaşantımız anında oluşan bir yaşantıdır.'

"Elektrik akımı insanların birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini kuvvetle pekleştirmiştir. Bilgi ve haberler sanki üstümüze anında ve sürekli olarak yağmaktadır. Bilgi ve haberler öğrenildiğinden pek kısa bir süre sonra, bunların yerini yeni bilgi ve haberler almaktadır. Elektrikli araçların aracılığıyla biçimlenmekte olan dünyamız, artık eskiden olduğu gibi istatistik bilgilerini değerlendirme yöneliminden çok, örnek ve üslup tanıma eğilimine zorlanmaktadır.'

'Nasıl modern bir eğitim sistemi ya da günlük öğretim düzeni, yoğun bir yaratıcılık çabasıyla sürekli buluş kaygusunu önermekteyse, biz de artık tüm çevre ve yörelerimizi bir sanat yapıtı üzerinde çalışır gibi düzenleyebileceğimizi kavramış bulunuyoruz.'



'Yüzyıllar boyu süregelen yazılı kanunların ve kurumların etkileri çağdaş gelişme olayları karşısında doğal bir terslikte kalmaktadır. Bilgi akımı bizlere tüm yönlerden ulaşır nitelikte olunca, yeni bir kültür türü duysal özelliklere yönelerek gelişmektedir. Günümüzde, eğitim sistemlerinin içine düştüğü panik ve saskınlık, değişik evrelerle iş ya da sanat dünyamızda da ortaya çıkmaktadır.'

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GİLECEĞİ, EVREKİ GÖNÜ, ONDAN
SONRAKİ GÖNÜ DE TANIŞILACAK
İŞİN EN İLGİNÇ TANIDAKİ PANELE
ŞEYİLE OLMAS DA YANLIŞ KENİ
İL OLAN ARDAHAN VE İĞDIR DAN.
SAHEE FANLARININ ALINACAGI.
PİRİNÇİ BAŞIMIZA !
DE-İNDE ÖZ OLSUN.

MONDO TRASHO

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BAŞKA BİR ÜNDE. DERGİYE YER VERİLMESİ,
NEDEN İLGİNÇTİR. ÇÜNKÜ ATINI AMACAK. HO
NELİK ŞE-İLER DAIMA RAKİP OUMALIDIR. KANLI
CANLI REKABET YAŞANMALIDIR. (Genel kanı
byjedir.) AMA BURASI TÜRK BASINI DEĞİL
DOSTLAR. BİDE TABAKA İZİMİ FİTAN DEĞİL
(Uİ durum yaşı jomaya ~~izim~~) REKABET VE CA-
RALAMA İSTEHEN. GAZETE ÖZÜSÜN. BURADA A-
SİL BELİTMEK İSTEĞİĞİME DISOUAST'IN ANTI
REKABETKAR OLDUĞUDUR
YAŞASIN UNDERGROUND MEDYA!
GELELİM BAHSİMİZE GÖPÜLÜĞÜ GİBİ. KÖ-
NU MONDO TRASHO ÖNCELİKLE BU DERSİNİN
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GİBİ BENDE İSMİNİ İLK DUYURĞUMDA BİR
MÜZİK DERGİSİ OLDUĞUNU SANHIŞTİM. YANIL
MIŞIM. İĞERİĞİNDE MÜZİĞİN YANISIRA SİNE-
MA, FELSEFE, EDEBİYAT VE GÖZ GAZİP
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yeyim!

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Ceynizi tohmin
edebiliyorum.
ON A.S.U

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ve sevgini a
Caldonak zed
Silen var mı?

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Bakis kalesi oldu. Alina
o çu karması kato onakles
dopşyor. ALENNI!

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DISGUAST

8000 para


no:8

karsı gelmenin boktan simgesi

Afrik

ko nu şma

Zaman








İKİNEİN
KAZ ZİHNİ
EALTIK
KÖY AK-
PABRİNİN
Mİ BAĞI
Kİ YA DA RU
İZLA AK UÇ
OĞU OĞU
SİZİZ BÜ-
VAST 40
ZİHNİ ÜC
ŞİHİRİNİN
HÖRDAR GÜD
HAR RİJ.
KADIKÖY
İST
ŞİP
ŞİP
MİT

POLİS OLMAKTAN BİR ÖNCE BU GÜDÜD YAPMAYAN
İSİMDE EN GÖZ YOLUNCA VE KİM, SİĞİTİ KİM DİNEYİN
ALAKİS TOPLARINA YAKIŞIMLARI BİTİR. EĞİTİMDE İSİMİN
AĞRIKLANMAYAN İSTİKRAFLI BİR K. GÖRÜMÜ SÜM
ASOSYAL İSİMİ DEĞİTİMİ GÖZ DİKİR. YEMİN TOPLAR
PÖKREYİNİ KİRDİ. KÖMÜŞ KİM BİRİSİNİN ALDI.



BU ZÂTIN NE YAPTIĞINI
BİLEN VAR MI LİZENİN....!

KLOZET İKİ NASIL GÖRÜYÖR
DÜYE BİLİRSİNİZ.
BU KLOZET "ŞEFFAF" DİYEN-
CELER DEĞERLİSİNDE SEFFER O-
LARKAN DİYENİ EDİLMİŞTİR.

STANDIŞ AKIUNCA
KİŞİSİNİ DİSİPLENE-TE
LİŞİHÖRE!

NO TV

Sürner'e bakın, o bütün sırtlamaların kendisi
halinde düşünmeye bakın
Sımdı bira içiyor, yakında suymuşçasına kan
içecek.
Ötekiler "kahrolsun kral" diye vahşi gıhikliklerini
atar almaz.
Sürner hemen "yasalar da kahrolsun" diye
tamamılar.

sen bir ozan kırsızın,
ve deşışiklikten,
gelişmesi için
nimmüş bir göğüs

Biz talebeyken seydidik
İyi arkadaşlık şeylen
Biliyoruzuz şeylen şey olunuzuz
Ben şeyi bitirmeye babam
Sey dedi: Sey: Partisine giririm
Zaten Seyvie evlenmistim
Şey sevie içelim dedi, gittik
Şeysiz de oluyorum abductik
İki şeyim oldu büyücüler
Doktor sende bir şey var diyar: simü.
Tabiiy sende bir şey var: savamadıdır. KAGGİT
Kimse dokunamaz benim: sevimie
Çünkü ben bir sevim
Hersey de bir sevdik ama
Ben başka bir sevim
Ben: sevim
ŞİRLERİN KİMLERE AIT ODUĞU
ÖZELMİ DEĞİL. (BİZİM İÇİN.)
MERAK ETTİSENİZ TAZİN!
Johnny Kellon C... D. 1.

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fanzin dersleri

fanzin nasıl yapılır?

Fanzin yapmaya başlamadan önce ilk olarak hazırlamak istediğiniz fanzinin boyutuna karar vermelişiniz. Fanzininizi fotokopi ile çoğaltacağınız için fotokopi kağıtları standartları içinden bir seçim yapmak zorundasınız. (A3, A4 veya çok kullanılmamakta beraber B4 gibi) Normalde hem estetik açıdan hem de çalışma kolaylığı açısından fanzininizi A5 boyutunda hazırlamanızı öneririz. A5, 148,5x210 mm boyutunda bir kağıt olup fotokopi çektiğiniz A4 ebedindeki standart kağıtları yansıtır. Fakat tabii ki illa bu standart boyutlarda çalışmanız gerekmez. Örneğin 200x200 mm boyutunda kara bir fanzin hazırlamak istiyorsunuz. Öyleyse derginizi A3 fotokopi kağıdına çektiyip, kenarlardan artan kısımları kestirmeniz ya da kesmeniz gerekiyor. (Sadece fotokopi işi ile uğraşan yerlerin çoğunda çok sayıda kağıdı bir seferde kesmek için kullanılan özel bıçaklar bulunmaktadır) Bu arada unutmamanız gereken nokta, bir dergi karşılıklı iki sayfadan oluşur (önemli bir tespit!) yani A5 boyutunda bir dergi hazırlıyorsanız, yanyana iki sayfanın A4 boyutunda olacağını, bu yüzden fotokopinin A4 boyutunda bir kağıda çekileceğidir. Aynı şekilde derginiz A4 boyutundaysa, A3 boyutunda bir kağıt kullanmanız gerekmektedir. Yapacağınız fanzinin boyutunu belirledikten sonra, karar vermeniz gereken şey fanzinin içeriğidir. Bu konuda oldukça özgürsünüz. Bu tamamen ne yapmak istediğinize bağlıdır. Fanzininizde sadece gazete ve dergilerden alınan yazılar kullanabileceğiniz gibi, sadece kendi hayat hikayenizi de(!?)

yazabilirsiniz. Bunun dışında, sadece devekuşu resimlerinden oluşan devekuşlarına özel bir fanzin de çıkartabilirsiniz. (SITEM: Fanzinlerin içerikleri sınırsız olmasına rağmen, çıkartılan fanzinlerin çoğu müzik ve edebiyat ağırlıklıdır) Fanzininizin içeriğini de belirledikten sonra, çözmeniz gereken sorun kendi yazmak istediğiniz yazıları nasıl yazacağınızdır. Aile başına düşen bilgisayar ve daktilo sayısı vahim durumlarda olduğu için, bu imkanları olmayanların kullanabilecekleri yöntem, elyazısı veya oldukça uğraştırıcı olmasına rağmen görsel olarak oldukça hoş olan gazete ve dergilerden tek tek harf keserek kolaj yapma yöntemidir. Bunun dışında pahalı olmasına rağmen oldukça fiyatlı olan bir yöntem de letreset kullanmaktır. (Harfler şu kazıyınca kağıda yapışan harf ve semboller. Çok hoş ve fakat pahalı şeylerdir kendileri) Yazılarınızı el yazısıyla yazarsanız, el yazınız diğer insanların yazdıklarını okumasını istemek gibi bir derdiniz varsa, okunaklı ve düzgün olmalıdır. Ayrıca fotokopilerde yazıların silik çıkmasını önlemek için kurşun kalem veya tükenmez kalem kullanmamalısınız. İnce uçlu mürekkepli kalemler en iyi tercihtir. "Fanzin nasıl yapılır?" köşesi diğer sayılarda devam edecek, içiniz rahat olsun!..

fanzin sözlüğü

D.I.Y., i. 1. Do It Yourself. 2. Aslında punk, hardcore kültürüne ait bir terim olan D.I.Y., aynı zamanda fanzin kültürünün de özüdür. D.I.Y.'nin tam karşılığı "kendin yap" olsa da anlam "kendin pişir, eşe dosta yedir" şeklindedir. 3. Ticari anlamda

aratörce ve yasalık sınırları dışında, bireysel ya da kolektif olarak yapılan faaliyetlerin tümü.

Fanzin, i. 1. Bir veya birkaç kişi tarafından çıkartılan, fotokopi gibi hızlı ve doğrudan müdahale edilebilecek amatör yollarla çoğaltılıp elden dağıtılan, periyodik olanağa şu ana kadar pek rastlanmayan yasal olması gerekmeyen yazılı yayım türü. 2. Belli bir altkültüre seslenen iletişim aracı. 3. Her türlü reaksi, yasal, partik yayınlara alternatif yayım organı. 4. Yapılması için sadece söyleyecek birkaç söz, uhu, makas, kağıt ve fotokopi makinası gerektiren yayım türü. Fanzin, i. Fanzin çıkartan kişi.


İlanle, i. 1. "Her fanzin, düzene atılacak bir tokattır" düşüncesini benimseyen fanzinlerin tüm maruzatlarına (dergi, afiş, çıkartma v.b.) verilen ad. 2. Bu görüşün yetersiz olduğunu düşünüp, "bu düzene tokat yetmez; kafa, kol girişmek lazım" düşüncesini benimseyen fanzinlerin tüm maruzatları.

Zimba, i. yaptığınız fanzinin sayfalarını tutturmaya yarayan zimbarta. Fakat öncülü olan sayfaların tutturulması değil, sayfaların tutturulması nasıl becereceğinizdir. zimbalamak, f. "alete bak, gavur yapmış" dediyecek bir zimba makinanız yoksa, standart zimba makinalarıyla dergilerin zimbalanması fiziksel olarak mümkün değildir. Bunun için yapmanız gereken zimbalaacağınız sayfaları altına bir silgi koyarak, dergiyi silgiye zimbalamak, sonra silgiyi çıkartarak zimba tellerini korumaktır. Eğer zimba makinanızla aranız iyi değilse, ikinci bir fanzin zimbalama yolu, çengelli iğne ile zimbalaacağınız yere zimba teli boyunca iki delik açarak zimba tellerini klinizle takmaktır. Tabii bu yöntemle çengelli iğneyle bi-yerinize delik açma ihtimalide epey yüksektir! (bkz. disguast elemanları)



Her Fanzin Düzene Atılacak Birer Tokattır!

Bağcılar'da bir eve
yapılan baskında...



Bağcılar'da bir eve yapılan baskında Eblek Hardcore adındaki yasadışı dergiyi çıkardıkları belirtilen iki kişi yakalandı. Yakalanan kişilerle birlikte çok sayıda fotokopi yoluyla çoğaltılmış yasadışı yayın, dergi yapımında kullanılan falçata, makas, yapıştırıcı gibi aletler ve çoğaltılmak üzere hazırlanmış dergi orijinaleri ele geçirildi. (Zürriyet 21.10.1998)

Yeni Neslin Yeni Seçimi!

ZARARLI

NEŞRİYAT

fotokopi rehber
sayı 1

FANZİNLER
FANZİNLER
politik yayımlar

POLİTİK
YAYINLAR
POLİTİK YAYINLAR
muzik dergileri

MUZİK
DERGİLERİ
MÜZİK DERGİLERİ
siber yayımlar

SİBER
YAYINLAR
SİBER YAYINLAR
hardcorepunk

HARDCORE
PUNK
HARDCORE PUNK
"fanzin dersleri"
"röportajlar"
album kritikleri

PROLETER
FANZİN
BÜLTENİ
HEDEVELİ!!!

SÜPERMEN FANZİNÇİ AVINDA!!!
Bu dergiyi 250binTL'den daha fazla para ödemeyin. Akısi takdirde dergiyi çalın!

PROLEFAN Basın Bürosu tarafından bize posta yoluyla gönderilen PROLEFAN Fanzin Manifestosu'ndan bölümler sunuyoruz.

...Yapılması gereken periyodik olarak fanzinsel terör estirmektir. Bunun için düzen yanlısı dergilerin oyunlarına kanmamak, çalışmalarımızı örgütsel bağlamda devrimci bir ruhla yürütmeli; ekinsel ve etiksel bir takım faaliyetler içerisinde yer almamız; mücadeleye katılmamız; saflarımızı genişletmemiz gerekir...

...Düzen tarafından kontrol edilen düzen dışı sistemin bir parçası olan, kendilerini "marjinal", "punk", "anarşist", "hevi metacı, rokçu" gibi isimlerle adlandıran küçük burjuva-ların bizleri kısırlaştırmalarına kesinlikle izin vermeyip, bu insanların "politik" görünen, aslında apolitik tavırlarını iyi bir şekilde analiz etmeli; bu tip insanların, bizlerin emekçi halk kitleleriyle buluşmamızı olumsuz yönde etkileyecek; bizleri devrim yolunda yavaşlatacak etkenler olduğunu unutmamalıyız...

...FE moduna geçmek, düzenin dergilerine karşı verilmekte olan savaşın en önemli noktalarından birini teşkil etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu göreve getirilecek kişilerin oldukça dikkatli bir şekilde seçilmesi

gerekmektedir. Düzen dergilerine sızan PROLEFAN militanları kendileri deşifre edecek tavır, davranış ve yazılardan kaçınmalı; kitleleri hedef alan propagandaların yerine, bireye yönelik teketek propagandalar yapmalıdır. Kitlelere yönelik propagandalardan güvenli olmaması nedeniyle kaçınılmalıdır. Bireye yönelik propaganda, yoğun bir çalışmayı ve uzun bir süreyi gerektirebilir. Bu amaçla PROLEFAN yanlısı fanzinler ücretsiz olarak dağıtılmalı, çeşitli yazılar ve bildirilerle kişileri, PROLEFAN saflarına çekmeye çalışılmalıdır!

PROLEFAN

TÜM FANZİNLERİ UYARIYORI

Bizler PROLEFAN yanlısı fanzinler olarak bundan böyle "marjinal", "hevi-metacı, rokçu" gençlerin, milliyetçi kafatasçılarının toplandıkları mekanlardan biri olan Kadıköy Akmar Pasajı'na fanzin bırakmama kararı almış bulunuyoruz. Tüm fanzinleri PROLEFAN'ın bu tavrına destek olmaya çağırıyoruz..

YAŞASIN PROLEFANI

YAŞASIN DEVRİMCİ FANZİNLERİ

PROLEFAN YANLIŞI FANZİNLER ADINA EINTRACHT FCG DERGİSİ



YAŞASIN

1 MAYIS!

PROLEFAN ALANLARDA!..

İki yıldır 1 Mayıs İşçi Bayramı için hazırladığı çıkartmaları ve afişleriyle proleterlerin yanında olduğunu gösteren PROLEFAN, 1999 1 Mayıs'ını kitlesel olarak, proleterlerle birlikte alanlarda kutlayacağını belirterek PROLEFAN yanlısı fanzinleri, 1 Mayıs 1999'da ve diğer tüm kitlesel muhalif eylemlerde PROLEFAN bayrağı altında toplanmaya çağırıyor..



TİTRE MEDYA PROLETERLER GELİYOR!



YIKIM SANATI 1

BİR MİLLENİUM PROJESİ mcdonald's 1 YIKMAK




Geliştirilen yaratıcı yıkım projeleri kapitalizmin tüm abidelerine uygulanabilir, UYGULANMALIDIR

Sizde mcdonald'sı yıkmak proje yarışmasına yaratıcı yıkım önerilerinizi tüm detayları ile iletin ve bu sayfalardan paylaşın.

gerçekleştirmememiz için hiçbir sebep yok.

Anti-Kapitalist Yıkım Projesi



anti kapitalist yıkım projesi kapitalist sistemin ve düzenin bel kemiği olan büyük ve çok uluslu şirketlere, bankalara, büyük medya tekellerine yönelik maddî araçlar. Vermeyi amaç edinmiş bir araçtır. bizler kendimizi bir örgüt olarak görmüyoruz sadece bir avuç "bilinçli vandalist"leriz örgüt değiliz çünkü en "özgürlükçü" örgütlerde bile var olan yapısal hiyerarşik yapının ve örgütlerin büyüme, kitleselleşmeye yönelik "yıldız" popülist politikalarının karşısında durmaktayız. bizim savaşımızda kazanılması gereken "üçüncü şahıs" yani kitleler yoktur. bu savaşta "iki şahıs" vardır. Biri biz, diğeri de düşman olarak nitelendiğimiz şirketler, medya tekelleri... eylemlerimizin devrimci nitelik taşımasını çok eylem sonucudur bizler için önemli olan eylemlerimiz küçük ama anlamları büyüktür! bir cam kırmak, bir vida sökmek yeter bu sistemi yıkmaya!.. birşeyi değiştirmeye niyetimiz, alle natifimiz yok, yarınlar da umurumuz yok!.. bizim savaşımız bağış! dalaşsız direkt! bizler bu sistemin içinde kaptır! tek bir hücreyiz... ve inanıyoruz ki bizler gibi bağımsız hücreler arttıkça yıkılır bu sistem!.. bir vida da sen sökl!..



Kendilerine sunulanla yetiniyorlardı...



'Klavuz'ların izinde gidiyorlardı...




Ya...maları gereken tek şey "tüketmek"di...



hayatın anlamı, sahip olmaktı...

herkese karşı tek başına!



nyetiniz bozuktur!
herkese savaş açtık!
savaşımız, kimliklerini tükettikleri markalarla belirleyen, özgürlüğü tüketimle eş gören, alışveriş dışında kolektif herhangi birşey yapamayan, üretimden aciz tüketim robotlarına, tüketim toplumuna karşı...
savaşımız, tüketim toplumuna alternatif "alternatif tüketim"i oluşturan, insanları sistem karşıtı hareket ve düşüncelerden uzaklaştıran, bilinçli ya da bilinçsiz bir şekilde pasifize, apolitize eden sistemin "yaramaz çocukları"na, müzik ve edebiyat dergilerine ve sanatın her dalındaki tüm diğerlerine karşı!..
savaşımız, "ekrân olarak gören ve "ekrânı kapısı" olarak gören ve iletişim ağını meşgul eden emek hırsızı asallıklara karşı!..
savaşımız, etkisizliği, duyarsızlığı, apolitikliği bir yaşam tarzı haline getirenlere ve yaşayanlara karşı!..
savaşımız, alternatif olarak sunulmuş fakat kapitalist sistemin bir aldatmacasından ibaret olan kültür ve delenere ait kültürlere karşı KARSİ-KÜLTÜR oluşumuk ve punk'ı, kapitalistlerin ağızında yeniden kültür yapmak içindir!..
savaşımız herkese karşı!
herkese karşı tek başına!

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hayallerle alakalı?
Sarımsın kullanılırsın,
kullanılırsın...

Yüklenildiğinde uyarılar kullanılarak
yapılırsın...
Sarımsın kullanılırsın,
kullanılırsın...

Hayallerle alakalı?
Sarımsın kullanılırsın,
kullanılırsın...

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