

Taming Demography
Actors, Dynamics, and Events in the Transition in
Population Policies of Turkey from Pronatalism to
Antinatalism between 1950 and 1965

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Declaration of Originality


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Abstract

Taming Demography: Actors, dynamics, and events in the transition in population policies of Turkey from Pronatalism to Antinatalism between 1950 and 1965...

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This dissertation analyzes the transition of Third World countries' population policies from pronatalism to antinatalism in the 1950s and 1960s, with a special focus on the Turkish case. The emergence of the idea of population control as part of global hegemonic interest, its dissemination and adaptation by the national government, and its internalization by women and the family are explored through three spheres: global, national, and individual. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to explore the key motivations, articulations, and reinforcements of the global, national, and individual forces that intervene in antinatalist politics, and to highlight the contradictions, resistances, and negotiations in between. The claim of this dissertation, based on a detailed analysis of primary and secondary sources, is that population control was not a unilateral hegemonic project, but an implicit and fragile intersection of these three spheres, whose only interest was to improve their "quality" by maximizing their own capabilities and functionings. In this sense, this dissertation is the story of the ideology of population control that became an instrument for improving the quality of life in the 1950s and 1960s.

103,908 words

Özet

Demografiyi Ehlileştirmek: 1950 ve 1965 yılları arasında Türkiye’deki nüfus politikasının pronatalizmden antinatalizme dönüş sürecindeki aktörler, dinamikler ve olaylar.

Serdar Furtuna, Doktora Adayı, 2023

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Bu tez, Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinin nüfus politikalarının 1950 ve 1960’lı yıllardaki pronatalizmden antinatalizme geçiş sürecini Türkiye örneği üzerinden inceler. Nüfus kontrolü fikrinin global hegemonik çıkarların bir parçası olarak ortaya çıkışı, yerel hükümetlere yayılışı ve benimsenmesi ve kadın ile aile tarafından içselleştirilmesi, global, yerel ve bireysel olarak üç katmanda ele alınacaktır. Buna göre, bu tez global, yerel ve bireysel güçlerin antinatalist politikalara geçiş sürecindeki temel motivasyonlarını, eklemlenmelerini, pekiştirmelerini araştırarak, ilgili katmanlar arasındaki aykırılıkları, gerilimleri, pazarlıkları vurgulamaktadır. Birincil ve ikincil kaynakların detaylı analizi ışığında bu tezin iddiası, nüfus kontrolünün tek yönlü bir hegemonik proje olmayıp, sözü edilen üç katmanın, “kalitelerini” arttırmak üzere kendi kapasite ve fonksiyonlarını maksimize etmesi şeklinde özetlenebilecek özgün çıkarlarının kesiştiği üstü kapalı ve kırılğan bir koalisyonun eseri olduğudur. Bu anlamda ilgili tez, nüfus kontrolünün 1950 ve 1960’lı yıllarda yaşam kalitesini arttırıcı bir araca dönüşümünün hikayesidir.

103,908 kelime

Résumé

Apprivoiser la démographie: Acteurs, dynamiques et événements de la politique démographique de la Turquie, du pronatalisme à l'antinalisme entre 1950 et 1965...

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Sous la direction de Blandine Destremau et Seda Altuğ

Cette thèse analyse la transition des politiques démographiques dans les pays du tiers-monde, du pronatalisme à l'anti-natalisme dans les années 1950 et 1960, avec une attention particulière pour le cas de la Turquie. L'émergence de l'idée du contrôle de la population en tant qu'élément de l'intérêt hégémonique mondial, sa diffusion et son adaptation par le gouvernement national, et son internalisation par les femmes et la famille sont explorées à travers trois sphères : mondiale, nationale et individuelle. L'objectif de cette thèse est donc d'explorer les motivations clés, les articulations et les renforcements des forces mondiales, nationales et individuelles impliquées dans la politique anti-nataliste, et de mettre en évidence les contradictions, les résistances et les négociations entre elles. La thèse de ce travail, basée sur une analyse détaillée des sources primaires et secondaires, est que le contrôle de la population n'était pas un projet hégémonique unilatéral, mais une intersection implicite et fragile de ces trois sphères, dont le seul intérêt était d'améliorer leur "qualité" en maximisant leurs propres capacités et fonctionnement. En ce sens, cette thèse est l'histoire de la façon dont l'idéologie du contrôle de la population est devenue un instrument d'amélioration de la qualité de vie dans les années 1950 et 1960.

103,908 mots

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to Özlem and Zeynep...

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AKP	Ak Party
AP	Justice Party
CENTO	Central Organization Treaty
CHP	Republican People Party
DP	Democrat Party
FPP	Family Planning Program
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
HUNEE	Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
ISI	Import Substitution-based Industrialization
KAP	Knowledge-Attitude-Practice
MBK	National Union Committee
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Developmental Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPR	Princeton University's Office of Population Research Division
PAA	Population Association of America
RAC	Rockefeller Archive Center
SEE	State Economic Enterprise
SMAM	Singulate Mean of Marriage
SPO	State Planning Office
TAPD	Turkish Family Planning Association
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
TL	Turkish Lira
IUD	Intrauterine device
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United State of America

VOC	Value of the Child
WHO	World Health Organization
WWII	World War II

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1

Introduction

Population thinking has a long and complex history in the governmental corpus since antiquity, while the notion of populousness continued to be generally accepted as an indication of strength and wealth until the nineteenth century. The organized idea of limiting the population has evolved in two main currents within the last two centuries; Malthusian fear of population growth that would exhaust scarce economic resources, and the eugenic anxiety of locals being outnumbered by immigrants and the poor which peaked between two world wars. Yet the attempts for population control rested on national, group and individual interests and were far from being a global movement until the mid-twentieth century.

In the mid-1960s, for the first time in world history, a global consensus was reached on population policy. The idea of reducing births through family planning was promoted primarily by international institutions, the United States (US) based private foundations, academics, and politicians as an essential tool for national development, poverty reduction, and modernization. Moreover, their intellectual, technological, and financial assistance to achieve this goal has been well received or even

solicited by most developing countries.¹ Even the Cold War rivalry seemed to have ceased to prioritize population control when Soviet Union demographers abandoned their insistence on Marxist rhetoric that resisted the Malthusian idea of population control.²

In Turkey, too, the long-standing pronatalist tradition was transformed into an antinatalist approach, first mentioned in 1963 in the first national five-year development plan. In the same year, the US-based Population Council was also asked to prepare a report on population planning, and two years later, in 1965, the Population Planning Law was adopted.³

§ 1.1 Turkey Turning to Population Control

Antinatalist thinking in Turkey was unimaginable in the first half of the twentieth century. Based on the reverse projection estimations, the population of the Anatolian peninsula in 1923 did not exceed 13 million inhabitants, which already meant a shortage of more than 2.1 million inhabitants due to the excessive mortality and the failure to achieve fertility during the ten years of war between 1912 and 1922.⁴ Not to mention, some 1.2 to 1.5 million Anatolian Armenians who had either perished or been expelled by 1915, and the net outflow of 0.7 million Anatolian Greeks during the population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923.⁵

The surviving population suffered severely from the infections, diseases, and epidemics. Half of the population had malaria parasite, one

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- 1 Turbay Ayala and Lord Caradon, "Declaration on Population: The World Leaders Statement," *Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 26 (1968): 1–3.
 - 2 Alfred J. Di Maio, "The Soviet Union and Population," *Comparative Political Studies* 13, no. 1 (1980): 97–136.
 - 3 Population Council, *Population Council'in Türkiye'deki Nüfus Planlamasına Dair Raporu*, no. 295 (Ankara, Turkey: T.C Sağlık Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1963).
 - 4 Frederic C. Shorter, "The Population of Turkey after the War of Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 4 (1985): 417–41.
 - 5 Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations 1922-1934* (London: Routledge, 2012), 88–89.

million were tuberculous, another 600,000 were syphilitic, and 250,000 had active trachoma.⁶ Therefore, the creation of a fertile and sanitary nation was a crucial part of the nationalization and modernization project of the nascent state in the 1920s and 1930s.⁷

The 1940s represent a political, economic, and demographic rupture due to World War II (WWII). Turkey was among the few countries that were not belligerent during the war but was deeply wounded by the harsh conditions. The mobilization of a huge reserve army of about one million soldiers had displaced 25% of the labor force, especially from agriculture.⁸ Besides, the increasing taxation to finance military mobilization and the black marketing due to the shrinkage in production had led to malnutrition.⁹ As a result, infant mortality and diseases caused by famine and epidemics were at record-high levels during the era.¹⁰

What, then, led Turkey to pursue an antinatalist policy and undo all efforts to repopulate the country within just 20 years after WWII? This question was the starting point of the dissertation, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 3.

The period between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s represents a series of dramatic changes in the world and in Turkey, which were also related to changes in population policy. The country was forced to change its neutral and balanced position after the Soviet threat to the Bosphorus and the Eastern Front at the end of WWII and sided with the US and joined global institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the meantime, the political system was democratized with multiparty elections and adapted more closely to Western standards.

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- 6 Ayhan Vergili, “Türkiye’de Modern Tıbbın Kurumsallaşması ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Sağlık Politikaları” (PhD Thesis, Istanbul University, 2012), 311.
 - 7 David Lee Baylis, “Governmental Narratives of Health, Gender, and Place in The Early Turkish Republic” (PhD Thesis, Michigan State University, 2015), 26.
 - 8 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye’si, vol. II*. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 173–78.
 - 9 Ibid., 264–72.
 - 10 Frederic C Shorter and Miroslav Macura, *Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Turkey, 1935-1975* (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1982), 95.

The elected ruling Democrat Party (DP), that governed between 1950 and 1960, accelerated the change of trajectory from radical modernity to populist modernity. Accordingly, the industrial based planning model was replaced by the investments primarily in road construction and agricultural mechanization guided by the foreign advisors and financed by Truman and Marshall aid, national savings, and foreign debt.¹¹

In the early 1950s, the country enjoyed relative prosperity as cultivation increased and agricultural export revenues rose as a result of the Korean War.¹² Conversely, the results of the second half of the decade were economically and politically disastrous. The decline in agricultural production due to unfavorable weather conditions, falling agricultural prices in the postwar period, and unsustainable debt and trade deficits culminated in the largest devaluation of the young republic in 1958.¹³ Yet, the government had no intention of following foreign advice on social and economic planning, including population control.

As for the demographics of the era, annual population growth between 1945 and 1950 initially reached prewar rates of 21.7‰ and gradually climbed to the historically highest rate of 28.5‰ between 1955 and 1960.¹⁴ Moreover, the growing population, the mechanization of agriculture, the facilitation of transportation and communication, and various other factors have triggered a massive integral migration, while the urbanization rate increased by a solid 27.5% between 1950 and 1960.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the leadership of the DP government continued to promote the higher population as an integral part of its program.¹⁶

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- 11 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'si*, vol. III. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 285–349.
- 12 Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*, 21st ed. (Ankara: İmge kitabevi, 2015), 95–108.
- 13 Ibid., 109–19.
- 14 Turkish Statistical Institute, *İstatistiki Göstergeler Statistical Indicators 1927-2009*, (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2010), 8.
- 15 Ibid., 6–10.
- 16 Adnan Güriz, "Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Nüfus Politikası Konusunda Görüşleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 28, no. 1 (1971): 13–40.

The rule of DP was ended by a coup d'état in May 1960, and the new military regime immediately changed direction to a development-oriented approach based on planning and forecasting. To this end, the State Planning Organization (SPO) was established shortly after the coup, with the mandate to prepare the first five-year national development plan (NDP).¹⁷ The concept of population planning was first mentioned in this plan in 1963 as a necessary tool to achieve aggressive development goals.¹⁸ After lengthy discussions and debates, the Population Planning Law was promulgated in 1965.

The main focus of the Turkish government's family planning services was the free insertion of intrauterine devices (IUDs) by medical doctors.¹⁹

The official target in the Second Five-Year Development Plan was an annual IUD insertion rate of 5% of married women under age 45. However, only 2.2 percent was achieved within three years.²⁰ Despite the weak implementation of family planning, the decline in the birth rate in both urban and rural areas had already begun in the late 1950s.²¹

Meanwhile, the longstanding policy of facilitating the immigration of Turks and Muslims living abroad was replaced by the promotion of labor emigration to European countries in the early 1960s. Since the first bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961, the number of legal emigrants increased within fifteen years to as many as one million.²²

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- 17 Maxwell J. Fry, "Turkey's First Five-Year Development Plan: An Assessment," *The Economic Journal* 81, no. 322 (1971): 306–26.
 - 18 Prime Ministry and State Planning Organization, *First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967)* (Ankara, Turkey: State Planning Organization, 1963), 67–73.
 - 19 Ned Levine and Sunday Üner, *Population Policy Formation and Implementation in Turkey* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1978), 68.
 - 20 Ferhunde Özbay and Frederic C. Shorter, "TURKEY: Changes in Birth Control Practices, 1963 to 1968," *Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 51 (March 1970): 1.
 - 21 Nusret H. Fişek and Frederic C. Shorter, "Fertility Control in Turkey," *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 578–89.
 - 22 Ahmet İçduygu and Sema Erder, "Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları 1923: Ulus-devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere," TÜBİTAK 1001, (2014), 181–95.

§ 1.2 Research Question

What were the dynamics and processes of change in public policy in the field of demography from pronatalism to antinatalism in Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s? And how was the ideology of population control produced, interacted, interinfluenced and interrelated between the lines of global hegemony, national interest, and individual claim? These are the two main questions this dissertation seeks to answer.

A change in public policy requires a radical change in the definition of an issue or problem.²³ In most cases, this change is triggered in the national or regional sphere, depending on changing local needs, demands, or power struggles among ruling elites. However, international agreements, global institutions, or global hegemonic powers can also have some influence on the definition of an issue, especially for policies that are closely related to universal norms, such as human rights, social protection, democracy, and environmental concerns.

In the field of demography, changes in public policy are usually pursued by two means: Changing the idea of what is desirable in terms of family size, old-age security, motherhood for women, securing the future of children, etc., and changing practice by promoting or restricting reproductive ideas and tools such as induced abortion, forced sterilization, family planning, reproductive rights, and assisted reproductive technologies by force or by nudge and conviction.

As for the population control movement in the developing world in the 1950s and 1960s, when twenty developing countries representing half of the world's population almost simultaneously introduced antinatalist policies and programs to reduce fertility,²⁴ the potential effects of that global hegemonic power are highly discernable. The academic literature dealing with the population policies of the era, is also almost in consensus on the global initiation, which is described as embedding the

23 Frank R. Baumgartner and Brian D. Jones, *Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1–39.

24 W. Parker Mauldin, "Assessment of National Family Planning Programs in Developing Countries," *Studies in Family Planning* 6, no. 2 (1975): 30–36.

antinatalist idea in developmental, environmental, and modernist discourses and funding the movement for the developing world.

On the other hand, population size and its continued growth have been a national concern in most developing countries including Turkey. Many Turkish politicians, journalists and academics of the late 1950s were preoccupied with high population growth and the complex problems it triggered, such as internal migration which was claimed to limit the governmental capacity to provide services for public health, education, housing and employment.²⁵ Moreover, the traditional security value attributed to the child, which is a strong incentive for parents to have another child, has begun to diminish due to rapid urbanization and transformation of society in the 1960s.²⁶

As a result, the population control phenomenon of the 1960s was seemingly a consensus between global, national forces and individual interests. However, like all the movements, it did not follow a clear path and had its own contradictions, contestations, and oppositions at the global, national, and individual spheres. Such as the hesitation of the US government and the UN Council to respond the requests from some developing countries for assistance with population control; long term resistance of the DP government in Turkey against the foreign pressure to adopt the population control; and the Turkish citizens achieving fertility decline beyond the government projections but without favoring the state sponsored family planning methods adequately.

Accordingly, the core theme of this dissertation is to explore the key motivations, articulations, and reinforcements of global, national, and individual forces in switching to antinatalist policies, and to highlight the contradictions, resistances, and negotiations in between. Thus, contributing to the ongoing literature on population policies in this regard.

25 Şerif Mardin, "İstikbalimizdeki kütle problemleri hakkında," *Forum*, August 1, 1957; Haluk Cillov, "İktisat ve ticaret 'Şehirlerimizde nüfus hızla artıyor,'" *Milliyet*, May 7, 1958.

26 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "Old Age Security Value of Children and Development: Cross-National Evidence," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 13, no. 2 (1982): 133–42.

§ 1.3 Literature Review

The literature review was organized to pursue the main research question of this dissertation: the dynamics and processes of public policy change in the field of demography from pronatalism to antinatalism, and the ways in which the ideology of population control was produced and diffused. The literature on the dynamics of change was also scanned into three headlines; the change in public policy overall, the change in public policy in the demography and the change from pronatalism to antinatalism. And each headline was analyzed at three layers; global, national, and individual.

Literary sources suggest three core elements on which any change in public policy can be based: individual or group claim, national interest, and global hegemony-security priorities. Change can be triggered by each of these elements individually or collectively. Yet, when a public policy has some links to universal norms, such as human rights and democracy, literary debates focus more on the priorities of global hegemony-security as a source of the change.

Chandler et al. discuss cases from all around the world on how human rights laws and aids are politicized by Western governments to create new regimes of control.²⁷ Evans adds that these human rights discussions are also an obstacle in investigating the causes of human rights violations, many of which might be attributable to the market discipline.²⁸ Similarly, Robinson argues, international calls to promote democracy, are nothing more than a symbolic shift in US foreign policy from straight power concepts to persuasion.²⁹ Cox and Sinclair assert that societal forces, international institutions, and civil society, through their

27 David Chandler, "Introduction: Rethinking Human Rights," in *Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics*, ed. David Chandler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1–18.

28 Tony Evans, "International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2005): 1046–68.

29 William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–13.

cooperation with elites in the periphery, form a historical bloc for global hegemonic penetration on a policy change.³⁰

In the literature on revealing the elements of public policy change that go beyond the global hegemony-security narrative, Baumgartner and Leech, place interest groups at the center of the public policy change, foreseeing these groups as central to the process of representation, both by stimulating the government toward policy change and by disseminating information from political elites to the mass public.³¹ Furthermore, Meyer emphasizes that social movements are source of influence on the policy change by altering the composition of the relevant policy monopoly through conversion, replacement, recreation, or reconfiguration.³²

This dissertation takes a more balanced and nuanced approach on the dynamics of the policy change between the lines of global hegemony, national interest, and individual claim, but also it considers ideas, interests, and institutions as Hecla did. In his attempt to uncover the dynamics of American politics, he tries to combine ideas, interests, and institutions to explore public policy change and seeks to connect macro-level forces with the micro-world of human action.³³ Moreover, in his “Agenda Setting Framework,” he addresses “Issue networks” as the main source of change, encompassing the informal alliances among interest groups, public and private organizations, highly active citizens, and especially

30 Robert W. Cox and Timothy C. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85–123.

31 Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 168–88.

32 David S. Meyer, “Social Movements and Public Policy: Eggs, Chicken and Theory,” in *Rout- ing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy*, ed. David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness, and Helen M. Ingram, v. 23 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 1–26.

33 Hugh Hecla, “Ideas, Interest, and Institutions,” in *The Dynamics of American Politics. Ap- proaches and Interpretations*, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (New York: Routledge, 2018), 366–92.

“technopoles” who specialized in technical knowledge and capable of forging the connection between policymakers and citizens.³⁴

Regarding public policy changes in the field of demography by means of influencing, promoting, or restricting the reproductive ideas and tools, the very same global, national, and individual lenses with different political, social, cultural, economic, religious, racial, gender and health rationales are evident in the literature.

For example, one of the most sensitive demographic tools, right for abortion, which is currently a hot topic in US with many states recently banning abortion rights,³⁵ and debated extensively in many areas. In the global political-scientific arena, it was praised by demographers at the 1954 World Population Conference in Belgrade as a significant tool for birth control,³⁶ but cursed in 1994’s World Population Conference in Cairo as an obstacle to the right for life, and states were urged not to promote abortion as a method of family planning.³⁷ It was also discussed as a dependent variable of national and individual elements. Binnet focuses on national biopolitics in her interpretive analysis of abortion in Turkey.³⁸ Grossman explores the activist groups in Weimar Germany that launched a movement for birth control and abortion.³⁹ Furthermore, the other aspects of abortion, including but not limited to its interrelation

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- 34 Hugh Hecllo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” in *The New American Political System*, ed. Anthony King (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2018), 87–124.
 - 35 Caroline Kitchener, “Abortion is now banned in these States. See where laws have changed,” *Washington Post*, September 15, 2022,
 - 36 United Nations, “Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Belgrade 1965, Volume II: Fertility, Family Planning, Mortality, ‘Demographic Effects of Abortion Legislation in Some European Socialist Countries’ by Andras Klinker,” E/CONF.41/3 (New York: United Nations, 1967), 89–93.
 - 37 United Nations, “Report of the International Conference on Population and Development: Cairo, 5-13 September 1994,” A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1. (New York: United Nations, 1995), Article 8:25, 58.
 - 38 Pelin Azer Binnet, “My Wife, My Choice: Reproductive Policymaking and Social Control in Turkey” (PhD Thesis, University of Minnesota, 2015).
 - 39 Atina Grossmann, *Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

with religious and moral views,⁴⁰ ethics,⁴¹ legal aspects,⁴² medical and health perspectives,⁴³ social and cultural dimensions,⁴⁴ and historical context,⁴⁵ have been discussed and debated extensively throughout the world without any major consensus.

Finally, regarding the population policy shift from pronatalism to antinatalism and the promotion of population planning laws in the 1950s and 1960s throughout the developing world, to which this dissertation aims to contribute, the scholarly debate on the global hegemonic configuration intensifies. And Scott's account that the nation-state is the primary driver of all national policies, including population policy,⁴⁶ has been refuted by many scholars.

These scholars, while acknowledging the historical roots of population control in Malthusianism and Eugenic thought, agree that the global population control movement is a byproduct of the global hegemonic configuration of the post-WWII world, in which developing countries and their citizens had virtually no agency. The differences in scholarly interpretation lie in the definition and scope of this hegemonic configuration.

Connelly highlights the role of activists, scientists and mostly non-governmental organizations, (NGOs) which he believes are the first and

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- 40 Daniel C. Maguire, *Sacred Rights: The Case for Contraception and Abortion in World Religions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 - 41 Christopher Kaczor, *The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice* (New York: Routledge, 2011).
 - 42 Marge Berer, "Abortion Law and Policy Around the World," *Health and Human Rights* 19, no. 1 (2017): 13–27.
 - 43 Jane E. Hodgson, *Abortion and Sterilization: Medical and Social Aspects* (London: Academic Press, 1981).
 - 44 Vyacheslav Karpov and Kimmo Kääriäinen, "Abortion Culture in Russia: Its Origins, Scope, and Challenge to Social Development," *Journal of Applied Sociology* 22, no. 2, (2005): 13–33.
 - 45 Angus McLaren, "Abortion in France: Women and the Regulation of Family Size 1800–1914," *French Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1978): 461–85; Gülhan Balsoy, "Gender and the Politics of the Female Body: Midwifery, Abortion, and Pregnancy in Ottoman Society (1838–1890s)" (PhD Thesis, The State University of New York at Binghamton, 2009).
 - 46 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 91.

most persistent champions of the population control movement, as they lobbied through the US government and international institutions and funded developing countries through transnational coalitions.⁴⁷ Hodgson prioritizes the political orientation of the demographers' population theories, which were also funded by these NGOs, in legitimizing population control.⁴⁸ Escobar argues that population control became part of the developmentalist discourse for the developing world to sustain imperial globality and global coloniality after WWII.⁴⁹ Szreter adds that global security concerns due to the ideological threat of communism in contested areas, where it was feared that the masses would evolve into organized masses that would turn to the "dark side", were a major driver in promoting population control.⁵⁰

This dissertation acknowledges that, all of these global hegemony-security claims on creating population control ideology that would become a global movement, have some capacity to explore the simultaneous emergence and diffusion of the idea in the developing world, particularly for those countries bordering Soviet Union, such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea. In addition, it also helps to understand why the population control coalition had gradually faded after the end of the Cold War and finally ended at the World Population Conference held in Cairo in 1994.⁵¹ Although poverty, which had seemed to drive developing countries to shift to antinatalist policies a generation ago, remained unmitigated, and the Malthusian fears about the population of the developing

47 Matthew Connelly, "Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Past & Present*, no. 193 (2006): 197–233.

48 Dennis Hodgson, "Demography as Social Science and Policy Science," *Population and Development Review* 9, no. 1 (1983): 1–34.

49 Arturo Escobar, "Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalisation Social Movements," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 207–30.

50 Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*, *New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 30–47.

51 United Nations, "Report of the International Conference on Population and Development: Cairo, 5-13 September 1994."

world almost doubled in 30 years,⁵² the US led global population control alliance lost their desire for population control since there was no rival left to incite the masses of the developing world after the Soviet Union's collapse.

However, this global hegemony-security narrative ignores or even contradicts many country-specific facts: How could delegates from the Soviet Union who were believed to benefit from pronatalist policies, come to recognize the ideology of population control at the UN meetings in the mid-1960s? How could local concerns about the population in India have existed long before the hegemonic enterprise of the US?⁵³ Why were the constant pleas of India, Pakistan and Ceylon for assistance in solving their population problem repeatedly rejected in the World Health Assembly in the 1950s?⁵⁴ Why were US and UN legislations on the population control aid were so late in 1966, when many countries including Turkey had already legalized family planning at the local level?⁵⁵ How could China adopt the population control law without major US involvement, and why had Mao switched population policy of China twice in three years, just as Nasser did in Egypt? How could the Turkish government (DP) refuse to adjust population control throughout the 1950s, even though the country was largely in debt with US loans? Why did Turkey not sign the World Leader's declaration to adopt population control in 1966, even though the Population Planning Law had been enacted a year earlier and the local government was under intense pressure from global interest groups?⁵⁶

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- 52 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Population Prospects 2019: Volume I: Comprehensive Tables," ST/ESA/SER.A/426 (New York: United Nations Publications, 2019), 2.
 - 53 Matthew Connelly, "Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period," *Population and Development Review* 32, no. 4 (2006): 629–67.
 - 54 World Health Organization, "Third World Health Assembly," 28 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1950), 233–34.
 - 55 Ayala and Caradon, "Declaration on Population: The World Leaders Statement."
 - 56 Prime Ministry, "Milletlerarası Aile Planlaması konusunda Başbakan Süleyman Demirel ile John D. Rockefeller 3rd Arasındaki Yazışmalar" (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.1.0.0/ 9.52.1, January 31, 1967).

Undeniably, the global hegemony-security narrative on population control tends to ignore, or underestimate at least, national, and local conditions, such as public movements, cultural and religious values, political interests, power struggles and local resistance that should also be taken into account. It also ignores the discussions and debates during the local legalization process. In Turkey, parliamentary discussions on the population planning law lasted intermittently for almost five years and global pressures on accepting the law played little role in the debates, serving mainly to support the pronatalist rhetoric that population control is a hegemonic plot that must be resisted.

On the other hand, the local dimensions are covered by the country-specific studies, but most of them do not dialog with the global population control narrative and tend to describe the change in population policy as a purely local decision resulting from increasing local demographic, political and socioeconomic problems. This less communicative nature of the global and local population control literature, which can be described as a major shortcoming, is attempted to be minimized in this dissertation, by consolidating these global and local sources for the specific Turkish case.

The literature on the dynamics of population policy change in Turkey also reflects the local agenda. Nusret Fişek, a public health professional and undersecretary for the Ministry of Health who authored the first draft of the Population Planning Law himself, portrays maternal and infant mortality as the main reason for the shift to antinatalist policies.⁵⁷ Shorter, a pioneering demographer, highlights the country's rapid population growth in the 1950s due to declining infant mortality rates.⁵⁸ And scholars at the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (HUNEE) suggest that socioeconomic pressures due to population growth and rapid internal migration led the government to control the population either through a population planning law or through labor exports in the early 1960s.

57 Turkish Medical Association, *Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi* (Türk Tabipler Birliği Merkez Konseyi, 1992).

58 Shorter and Macura, *Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Turkey, 1935-1975.*, 56,95.

However, the resistance of the DP government to stop pronatalist policies in the 1950s and the reluctance of its political successor, the Justice Party (AP), to implement the Population Planning Law during its reign between 1965 and 1970 reveals other agendas and dynamics that have not been adequately discussed in the literature. Levine and Üner provide some insights in their detailed analysis of the parliamentary discussions before, during and after the passage of the Population Planning Law, with traditionalist, populist, religious and mercantilist views rejecting antinatalism colliding with the liberal, developmentalist and modernist views supporting the antinatalist approach.⁵⁹

This thesis attempts to add to the debate on the dynamics of population policy change other variables that have not been mentioned in the local literature but are barely visible in the state archives, such as the facilitating role of the military regime in population control and the growing security concerns related the 1958 Iraqi revolution and Kurdish autonomy on Turkey's southern border.

Another important goal of this dissertation is to uncover the hidden voices of individuals. Women and the family are at the center of the population control debate, yet without a proper agency in Turkish context. The vast literature, including monographs, surveys, and reports on changing fertility behavior, including the changing nature of the family structure from extended family to nuclear family,⁶⁰ the changing value of children,⁶¹ contraceptive use before and after the law,⁶² and changing gender roles, is analyzed, and conceptualized as individual motivations and responses to the population planning law.

As a result, in contrast to the separate and disconnected narratives of global, national, and individual dynamics and processes related to population change in the 1950s and 1960s, this thesis attempts to consolidate

59 Levine and Üner, *Population Policy Formation and Implementation in Turkey*.

60 Ferhunde Özbay, *Dünden bugüne Aile, Kent ve Nüfus* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015).

61 Kağıtçıbaşı, "Old Age Security Value of Children and Development: Cross-National Evidence."

62 Özbay and Shorter, "TURKEY: Changes in Birth Control Practices, 1963 to 1968."

these narratives and resources into a comprehensive theoretical framework, that offers a more inclusive perspective on the Turkish case.

§ 1.4 Theoretical Framework

This dissertation seeks to examine the power relations among global, national, and local actors in population control. And it proposes a multidimensional approach by combining and synthesizing several theoretical frameworks, including but not limited to Foucault's biopolitics, Agamben's forms of lives, Bradley's unbearable life and Sen's capability approach.

The point of departure is Foucault and his "biopolitics," in which he conceptualizes the relationship between the population and the state based on power and knowledge and examines the techniques of control. Foucault defines biopolitics as political rationality operating through the agency of individuals by means of quantification, categorization, and other formations.⁶³ It works in tandem with disciplinary power, which is the individualizing mode to create useful and docile bodies, while biopower aims to regulate the process of a living mass.⁶⁴ In this context, the population is the crucial object of modern forms of government that requires regulatory techniques. Therefore, processes such as fertility and mortality rates are both biopolitical objects of knowledge and targets to seek to control.⁶⁵

For Foucault, population represents an abstraction as a whole, meaning that the individuals have no agency, only a representation as a statistical unit, so that the population policies of governments, including population control are applied to the entire population without any individual

63 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 136–39.

64 Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76* (New York: Picador, 2003), 246.

65 Ibid., 242–45.

distinction.⁶⁶ However, as Schlosser notes, population control discourse is more about who reproduces than how many reproduced.⁶⁷ In other words, it is more about quality than quantity, which requires a more nuanced approach than Foucault's abstracted population.

Thus, this dissertation claims that the defining characteristic of biopolitics on population lies not only in its totality, but also in its practices that distinguish and separate what is inside from what is outside, who is self and who is other. The creation of "otherness" is essential not only for establishing group formation, but also for the determination of "quality" in the population, which requires duality or multiplicity between individuals or groups. In addition, various forms of otherness are also critical for observing and contextualizing the interests, interactions, and contestations of global, national, group, and individual forces in population control.

Agamben conceptualizes this duality between the self and the other in his "State of Exception" framework, in which he defines the original activity of sovereign power and the modern state as the production of a biopolitical body through inclusion and exclusion from sovereign space. And he divides these political bodies into two categories: the "bare life" as mere biological existence, and the "good life" as politically qualified life. Moreover, he adds that the sovereign/government has the distinguishing power to grant additional legal entitlements to those politically qualified and to let the others live only enough to preserve biological existence.⁶⁸ For Agamben, what is excluded is not completely excluded in relation to the sovereign but is maintained in relation to the sovereign's rule in the form of suspension, which is the inclusive exclusion.⁶⁹

66 Richard Togman, "The Third Modulation: Foucault, Security and Population," *Foucault Studies*, no. 25 (October 22, 2018): 228–50.

67 Kolson Schlosser, "Malthus at Mid-Century: Neo-Malthusianism as Bio-Political Governance in the Post-WWII United States," *Cultural Geographies* 16, no. 4 (2009): 465–84.

68 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, California: Meridian, 1998), 6–7.

69 Richard Ek, "Giorgio Agamben and the Spatialities of the Camp: An Introduction," *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 88, no. 4 (2006): 363–86.

In addition to Agamben's distinction of self and other in biopolitical thought, Bradley adds a third category to this framework, the "unbearable life." It represents the theological, metaphysical, and political prohibition against being born because its birth would pose a potential challenge to the sovereign's biopolitical command over what constitutes life and death.⁷⁰ Moreover, he mentions that unbearable life passes under many different names and assumes many different forms in political modernity, such as states as enemies of human beings, missing or detached societies, or black units in black sites located in all around the world.⁷¹

In this dissertation, Bradley's assumption on changing forms of unbearable life is also extended to Agamben's good and bare life approach to utilize two main hypotheses of this study: First, governmentality is not a homogenized process to be decided for and implemented to the entire population as Foucault stated, but rather different political bodies/life forms are considered during the process of policy making and/or policy implementation. Schlosser adds that the distinction between these life forms, and the practices of inclusion, exclusion, and erasure often exist along lines of class, race, and gender.⁷²

This type of categorization was evident for the eugenic movement during the interwar period, where immigrants were deemed inferior, and the high birth rate of the lower classes and the low birth rate of the upper classes were the major concern especially in the industrial world.⁷³ Although the eugenic institutions disappeared after the WWII, many scholars argue that the population control movement is not totally detached from eugenic worry, evidencing the first donors to the movement had

70 Arthur Bradley, "'Untimely Ripp'd': On Natality, Sovereignty and Unbearable Life," *English Studies* 94, no. 7 (November 2013): 788–98.

71 Arthur Bradley, *Unbearable Life: A Genealogy of Political Erasure, Insurrections: Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 3.

72 Schlosser, "Malthus at Mid-Century: Neo-Malthusianism as Bio-Political Governance in the Post-WWII United States."

73 Dennis Hodgson, "The Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America," *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 1 (1991): 1–34.

eugenic roots, and some prominent eugenic figures became population control activists in the 1950s and 1960s.⁷⁴

The second hypothesis of the dissertation is that the three forms of life, based on self and otherness exist not only as a political body in a government, but also in micro and macro level relationships. Population policy cannot be understood without considering the individuals who are also the policy makers as procreators. The global hegemonic influence on population control in the 1960s was also so evident ideologically and operationally. Therefore, both global and individual forces had active agencies to be considered in addition to the government. And emancipating the forms of life approach from the governmental scope will provide common ground and multidimensional perspective to capture global, national, and individual interests and interactions in population control.

For instance, in the global hegemonic perspective, the citizens of each hegemonic powers and their allies represent good lives to be protected, while the citizens of the contesting power and its allies represent unbearable life, just like the position of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The Iron Curtain countries were unbearable for NATO allies and vice versa. The developing world and their citizens were the bare lives that represented the area of contestation, that should not be left to the occupation of the unbearable rival.

In the national sphere, the ruling elites and their habitat represent the good life, the individuals or groups who have no add value but a burden to government represent unbearable life, and the mass majority in between are the bare life. Among the groups, the unbearable life is the opposing part or threat, good life is the leading elites and their allies, and the bare life is what lies in between. This process can even be extended to the parents' childbearing decision, as they weigh whether it is good or unbearable for them to have a child (bare life).

This theoretical framework allows to reformulate the main question of this dissertation as; what stimulates these life forms to favor

74 Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 259.

population control and how these perspectives, qualifications and appreciations transform into a policy orientation depending on the institution that adopts them how they act and interact in the global, national, and individual spheres? The initial attempt of this study was to adapt the “hegemony-security narrative” to the life forms that could provide some fertile ground, especially at the global and national sphere.

Security is a self-evident condition for the existence of life, both individual and social. It is also the first and fundamental condition for the state, for the modern understanding of politics, and for international relations.⁷⁵ The negative connotation of the term, the state of insecurity, threat, fear, and danger helps to define not only to what to fight against but also where to exercise power. In his governmentality approach, Foucault mentions that the sovereign’s/government’s greatest fear is losing its hegemony, and therefore the object of power is the organized multiplicity of individuals of whom the counter-power of resistance is believed to spring from.⁷⁶ Applied to the terminology of forms of life; the fear of the government is that bare life (the public) will become an unbearable life (source of resistance) that threatens the hegemony of the good life (the ruling elites), and that it must be kept under control through disciplinary and biopower.⁷⁷

Gramsci adds the notion of “consent,” in which he defines hegemony as the power and pursuit of domination, by seeking legitimacy from shifting blend of coercion and consent of multiplicities (bare and unbearable life) that enables a ruling class (good life) to stabilize its rule and domination.⁷⁸ This legitimation, he adds, springs mostly from the social, political, or especially economic anxieties and insecurities of these

75 Graham Burchell, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Michel Foucault et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1–52.

76 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 219.

77 Michael Dillon, “Governing Through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance,” *Political Geography* 26, no. 1 (January 2007): 41–47.

78 Antonio Gramsci and David Forgacs, *The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 189–221.

multiplicities. Moreover, the success and longevity of a hegemonic project lies in its capacity to gain the consent that requires dynamic reciprocal, horizontal and vertical process formations.⁷⁹

In this respect, the introduction of the idea of population control as a precondition for development and modernization theories in the 1950s and 1960s was nothing more than a hegemonic search for the developing world's consent to population control. And this worked extremely well for some countries, as it seemed like an illusory cure for their greatest fears: poverty and backwardness.⁸⁰ Yet this cycle of hegemony-security has its shortcomings when it comes to capturing the intentions of and interactions among the global, national, and individual forces on population control. It gives very limited agency to the family and the individual, the ultimate decision makers on fertility behavior (at least in more democratic settings) and devalues the other intentions of actors and their capabilities.

Therefore, this dissertation utilizes another theory, the "capability approach," to provide a more balanced, flexible, and multidimensional account of population control. The theory was originated by Amartya Sen in 1979 as a normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being based on capability and functioning.⁸¹ According to Sen, functionings represent parts of the state of a person, in particular the various things that he or she is capable of doing or being over the course of a lifetime. Individual capability reflects the alternative combinations of functionings a person can achieve and from which he or she can select a collection.⁸² Consequently, "quality of life" depends *on an*

79 Ibid., 203.

80 Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958).

81 Amartya Sen, "Equality of What?," in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1979), 198–220.

82 Amartya Sen, "Capability and Well-Being," in *The Quality of Life*, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford [England] : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1993), 41–71.

individual capability to achieve valuable functionings.⁸³ And so, the rational decision about the fertility made by the woman and the family, should be based on the assessment of whether or not an additional child will serve the quality of life.

Similar to the attempt on forms of life, this study aims to extend the individualistic origins of the capability approach to the interstate, national and group relations and to utilize both Agamben's, Bradley's and Sen's methodologies to population control. The third hypothesis of this dissertation is that the ultimate goal of all these global, national, group, and individual agents is to improve the quality of the "good life" through their capabilities and functioning's. And population control policies are desirable for the global, national, and individual "good life," only if limiting the number of bare and unbearable lives increases their quality of life.

Accordingly, this thesis asserts that hegemonic powers in the global sphere tend to support population control when bare and unbearable lives threaten or diminish the quality of the hegemonic good life. (Such as burden for achieving scarce resources, security, and immigration concern etc.) Similarly, they might immediately stop supporting population control if these bare and unbearable life forms are utilized to expand the quality of the hegemonic good life (through new markets or cheap labor, etc.)

In the national sphere, the population policy of the governing elites (the good life) again depended on contribution of the bare and unbearable lives on their life quality. Governments support antinatalist policies when those lives restrain or diminish the government's capability to function (such as internal migration which worsens allocation of resources, ethnic or class conflict, political turmoil's, etc.). Or they might switch on to pronatalism when bare and unbearable lives are required to improve the quality of the good life (as voting power, cheap labor, for economic or military purposes for further expansion, etc.)

83 Ingrid Robeyns, "The Capability Approach in Practice," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14, no. 3 (2006): 351-76.

Regarding the family sphere, the impact of children on the parents' quality of life is crucial for the fertility decision. Parents may choose to have a child (based on the cultural, religious, and social norms, or security, economic, moral value) or may perceive it as a burden on their life quality (time-consuming, creating budget deficit, etc).

Another aspect is how these three spheres interact to produce and shape population control ideology and policy. The fourth hypothesis of this dissertation is that there is no straightforward diffusion between these spheres in population control, but rather a vibrant interaction, interrelation, and interinfluence in between with the existence of a relative autonomy. Thus, the global population control movement of the 1960s in the developing world and Turkey, this thesis argues, was not only a hegemonic project of a global sphere, but also an implicit consensus with the national and individual spheres, as they also believed that it served to improve the quality of their own good lives.

In summary, this study, in its quest to analyze the dynamics and processes of population policy change from pronatalism to antinatalism in Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s, constructs a tripartite sphere: the global, the national and the individual. In doing so, Agamben's and Bradley's "forms of lives" approach is applied to these spheres, claiming that population policies in each sphere emerge based on the relationship between these life forms. In addition, Sen's capability approach for individuals were applied to these spheres to reveal the stimulation of population control, which is claimed in this study as maximizing the "quality" of the good life in each sphere.

The following chapters of the study aim to explore the changing nature and motivations of these life forms in each global, national, and individual sphere that produced the antinatalist ideology in many developing countries, including Turkey, in the 1960s, and to highlight the intersections, interactions, interrelations, contestations and negotiations in between.

§ 1.5 Methodology

The narratives and methodologies used in the population control literature are far from holistic, not only because the topic attracts diverse academic interests ranging from political science, economics, demography, history, health, sociology, psychology, gender studies, etc., but also because each study addresses the issue with an isolated focus from a global, national, or individual sphere.

Moreover, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative works is common in historical demography, into which this dissertation may also be classified. The quantitative scholarship, which mostly has a demographic and statistical background, leans on numbers to reveal the relative “truth” derived from censuses and Knowledge Attitude Practice (KAP) surveys to analyze the global and national spheres⁸⁴ and uses questionnaires and local surveys to focus on the individual sphere.⁸⁵ The qualitative part, on the other hand, represented mainly by sociologists and historians, tends to use state archives, institutional reports or newspapers when the study seeks to find the answer in global and national spheres,⁸⁶ or utilizes the field works, face to face interviews, diaries, and archival materials on individual cases when it focuses on the micro-sphere.⁸⁷

84 The Population Council teams report from the 1960s fall into this category, as do Mauldin’s comparative analysis of developing countries KAP reports; *W. Parker Mauldin, “Fertility Studies: Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice,” Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 7 (1965): 1–10.

85 Özbay’s field survey and questionnaire on attitudes toward family planning in Etimesgut Province, Turkey, in 1968 is a study concerned with the individual sphere; Ferhunde Özbay, “Etimesgut’da Aile Planlama BTK Araştırması 1969” (3. Üniversitler Arası İstatistikçiler Konferansı, October 17, 1968).

86 Binnet uses an interpretive approach by analyzing the news of the era about the discourse on family planning; Binnet, “My Wife, My Choice: Reproductive Policymaking and Social Control in Turkey.”

87 Kağıtçıbaşı and her colleagues have conducted extensive interviews with some 360 families from nine countries to analyze the changing value of children; Kağıtçıbaşı, “Old Age Security Value of Children and Development: Cross-National Evidence.”

This study attempts not only to integrate these spheres, but also to confront qualitative and quantitative approaches and its methodologies to achieve a holistic approach for responding to the research question.

In the global sphere, the changing power relations after the WWII that repositioned the good, bare, and unbearable life in the hegemonic perspective are explored in the context of the reinvention and rebranding of the population control ideology and its diffusion to the developing countries.

The reports and diaries of US based foundations, especially the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, offer illuminating insights. Yet similar traces can also be found in the official sources as well. A critical reading of the official reports and panel discussions of the World Population Conferences held in Rome in 1954 and Belgrade in 1965 reveals many instances from participants around the world of the changing perceptions of the bare and unbearable lives. Furthermore, the proceedings and the reports of the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, UN's Population Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) on population control are critically examined for that purpose.

Another key indicator is political and economic pressures and incentives for population control, which are tracked from various sources including loan agreements, annual reports and country specific reports from the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and special missions.

The diffusion of the global population ideology in Turkey is observed from several sources: from the activities and reports of international foundations, especially the Population Council, established by the Rockefeller Foundation, which also produced an official population control report for Turkey in 1963 at the request of the Turkish Ministry of Health,⁸⁸ organized the first nationwide KAP survey in the same year and sponsored the establishment of Turkey's only population institute in 1967. In

88 Population Council, *Population Council'in Türkiye'deki Nüfus Planlamasına Dair Raporu*.

addition, the key foreign mission reports prepared for Turkey, and taken seriously by the DP, government namely the Thornburg Report of 1949, the Barker Report of 1951, the Chenery Report of 1953, and the Baade report of 1959 are evaluated in terms of their population policy recommendations.

In addition, the global hard and soft power exerted on Turkey to switch to a planned economy and population control, especially after the 1958 devaluation and the 1960 coup d'état, is examined through the standby agreement with the IMF in 1959 and subsequent loan negotiations, minutes of meetings and correspondences with NATO, global advisory and consultancy on establishment of the SPO in 1960,⁸⁹ and the First National Development Report of 1963 which mentioned population control for the first time.

In the national sphere, the criterion of the governing good life to determine which lives are worthy or not and the changing roles of the bare and unbearable lives that paved way to accept population control in the 1950s and 1960s, are briefly analyzed for the twenty developing countries whose antinatalist policies were officially accepted before 1970, and then for the case of Turkey extensively.

The analysis for developing world aimed to highlight some of the major common political, social, and economic disorders of the era, such as military coups, ethnic conflicts, rapid urbanization, economic crises, and famines that had undermined national capabilities and functionings (quality of the good life) and forced governments to switch onto antinatalist policies.

To this end, the secondary literature on key political, social, and economic issues is tracked for each country, and the major differences and commonalities that paved way for these countries to change their trajectory on the population policy are comparably categorized. The striking

89 The Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen was brought into the country in early 1960 at the urging of the OECD and the IMF, against the will of the DP government. After the military coup in the same year, he played a key role in founding the SPO and shaping its institutional structure.

similarities and differences in the leadership and implementation of the population control program are also briefly elaborated.

As for Turkey, the changing political, economic, and social climate that have caused the bare and unbearable lives to become a burden for the governing elites are explored from several dimensions including the change in political system to multiparty elections, massive internal migration, economic turmoil, the military coup, and revival of the Eastern Question.

The transition to multiparty elections in 1946 immediately transformed the bare masses into voting stocks and led the competing parties to pay special attention to public values. This was especially the case for the governing elites of DP, who seemed to rival not only their political opponent, the Republican People's Party (CHP), but also the state bureaucracy. Thus, they ignored the growing economic and sociocultural tensions between urbans (good life) and rural (bare life) who migrated en masse to the cities in the 1950s. Furthermore, they also resisted warnings from international institutions to take economic measures and control the population even during the economic turmoil of the late 1950s. All these events, discussions and debates are tracked from the headlines and articles in the prominent newspapers (*Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*) and periodicals (*Forum*, *Kadın Gazetesi*).

The military coup of 1960 turned the tide in terms of the perception of the bare life and their sentiments. Similar to military regimes in other developing countries such as South Korea, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia, the military junta in Turkey was bolder than local governments and applied radical measures, including population control, also requested by the local and global developmentalist coalition.⁹⁰ Moreover, the Turkish generals' security concerns were on the agenda because of the "Eastern Problem," which resurged after the Kurds in Iraq gained semi-autonomy

90 Another major milestone of population control in Turkey, "abortion," was also legalized under the martial law of the 1980 military coup, in 1983.

in 1959.⁹¹ On the other hand, the population planning law was barely passed in 1965 after four years of interrupted discussions, and the right-wing party AP, seen in many ways as the political heir of DP, was again reluctant to implement the population control law after winning the elections that year.

This dichotomy of Turkish population policy and key debates and discussions within the governing bodies are tracked through a variety of primary sources including official government documents (Official Gazette, Parliamentary Archives, Prime Ministry Republican Archives, Ministry of Health Database, Turkish Grand National Assembly online database), official reports (SPO Development Reports, Ministry of Health Reports, State Institute of Statistic Reports), and nonofficial reports. In addition, a quantitative approach, primarily the results of the 1945-1970 censuses, the 1963, 1968 and 1972 fertility survey, and the periodic reports on the demographic characteristics of IUD acceptors is utilized to determine whether ethnic or regional differences have been taken into account in the implementation of the Population Planning Law.

In the individual sphere, the changing value of having children (bare life) on the life quality of the family (good life) is elaborated together with the interrelation with the law on population planning. The implementation of the law by the Turkish government and local cooperation was not only weak, as mentioned earlier, but one of the weakest among the twenty developing countries.⁹² However, the censuses and the periodical KAP survey results of the period clearly indicates a decline in fertility that exceeds the SPO's most optimistic projections, indicating individual support for the population control but the way it was promoted by state officials.

91 Secondary sources and memoirs provide a secret Eastern Report prepared for Army General Gürsel in 1959 and of a special Eastern Team established under the SPO in 1961 to deal with the Easter Question.

92 Robert J. Lapham and W. Parker Mauldin, "Family Planning Program Effort and Birthrate Decline in Developing Countries," *International Family Planning Perspectives* 10, no. 4 (1984): 109-18.

The changing attitude of the Turkish family toward children is analyzed at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the change in some key figures is observed, including family structure, actual family size, desired family size, age of marriage, marriage and divorce rates, dependency rates, and the use of birth control practices in urban and rural areas.

Furthermore, the changing status of women, particularly in terms of occupation and education is explored. The periodization of this research was not limited with the 1950s and 1960s but extended until the mid-1980s to grasp the long-term relationship between fertility and the changing women's status. For that purpose, data on social indicators from the census results are paired with results from KAP surveys on fertility decisions on a spatiotemporal basis. The KAP surveys, begun in 1963 at the initiative, guidance, and with the financial support of the Population Council and continued every five years to this day by HUNEE, are the oldest surviving statistical series on nationwide fertility attitudes.

At the micro level, the attitudes of various interest groups such as women, doctors, religious groups, and public and village opinion leaders toward population control are tracked through the various surveys conducted during the era.⁹³ For instance, a plot region in Etimesgut Province was assigned by the Ministry of Health for population control research and the region became the epicenter of population surveys.⁹⁴ All of these surveys and studies are critically observed due to their potential biases to be used for state propaganda.

The public hesitation to use some 500 family planning clinics established after the Population Planning Law is also discussed through the personal interviews with many public health officials who have experienced birth control practices, as well as newspaper accounts, memoirs,

93 J. Mayone Stycos, "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (1965): 120–30.

94 Özbay and Shorter, "TURKEY: Changes in Birth Control Practices, 1963 to 1968."

novels, panel discussions of family planning seminars, and IUD follow-up surveys.⁹⁵

§ 1.6 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of four chapters covering the introduction of global, national, and individual forces on changing population policies, as separate chapters.

The second chapter analyzes the global population control ideology, and its circulation to Third World in the 1950s and 1960s through global and national dimensions. The global part explores the transformation of the Malthusianist, eugenic and individualist ideology of population control into a global hegemonic project through demographic transition, modernization, and developmentalist theories and its circulation to the Third World countries after WWII. The national section briefly analyzes the major political, social, and economic events in these twenty countries where population control policies were legalized before 1970, and which have affected their national capabilities and functioning to cope with the bare and unbearable lives.

The third chapter elaborates the case for Turkey. The country's political, economic, and social turning points that affected population policy are discussed under the following headings: political transition to a multiparty system, economic and political alliance with the US, the local government DP, and its economic expansion and collapse, internal migration flow, and the 1960 coup and transition to a planned economy.

In addition, the intellectual and constitutional discussions, and debates about the Population Planning Law before, during, and after its release in 1965 are examined, as are the content and execution of the law by the newly created institutions: the Family Planning Directorate, the Family Planning Clinics, the Mobile Clinics, the Family Planning Association, and the scientific data processing unit, HUNEE. Furthermore, the

95 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *1969 Yılı Rahim İçi Takip Araştırması* (Ankara: Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971).

governmental motivation for population planning investment and the individual contraceptive choice is analyzed through descriptive variables.

The fourth chapter analyzes the individual forces of population control in terms of changing family structure, women's empowerment and changing value of children to the life quality of the family and women both in urban and rural areas during the 1950s and 1960s. And further expands the period until the mid-1980s to explore the long-term trend.

Macro and micro data are utilized to track the transition of women and the family and their changing attitudes toward fertility decisions and population control. In addition, individual and public response to the government's family planning program is questioned through interviews with health professionals, and a variety of primary and secondary sources. Last but not least, the association between changing fertility behavior and other variables such as education, employment, and urbanization are analyzed in a spatiotemporal context with a broader periodization.

The dissertation concludes with a summary of the arguments presented in the aforementioned chapters and a response to the research question.

Global Population Control Ideologies and their Transfer to the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s.

This chapter seeks to understand the evolution of the population control phenomenon in the governmental corpus and its transformation into a useful tool for a hegemonic enterprise in the developing world after WWII. It also attempts to interpret the switch of the developing countries to antinatalist policies from their own perspective. Therefore, it consists of three subtitles, namely: genealogy of population control ideology, population control as a global movement and population control at the national level.

The genealogy section analyzes the roots of population control ideology within two main currents: Malthusianism and Eugenic Movements. The changing material conditions, physical and intellectual environment that led these ideas to emerge and diffuse in the industrialized world are examined in the forms of lives approach. To this end academic literature on these movements and scientific debates are drawn upon.

In the global movement section, this dissertation utilizes the same forms of life approach, but on a global sphere. The transformation and rebranding of the population control idea to the developing world by demographers funded by US based foundations is explored in academic

debates and discussions. Furthermore, the process of institutionalization, first by private organizations, then on the world stage, and its interaction with the developing world is tracked through official reports, minutes of meetings, and conference proceedings.

At the national level, the political, social, and economic burdens of the twenty developing states which switched on to antinatalism before 1970 is analyzed to grasp how the bare and unbearable lives became an obstacle to the quality of the governmental good life. It also helps to demonstrate how the national sphere interacted and interconnected with the global population movement. To this end, this study assembles the secondary literature of each country along with collective works and country reports on population policy.

§ 2.1 Genealogy of the Population Control Ideology

The idea of birth control and its traditional techniques have a long history dating back to antiquity. Yet their legitimization as public policy is, as Hartman puts it, a drama played out over two centuries by many actors with two radically different scripts written by the Malthusians and the eugenicists.¹ This dissertation claims that the script of these two ideologies, that had direct impact on the population control movement, were not that different, as they arose but from a similar anxiety of the governing good life, to preserve their life quality, threatened by the bare and unbearable lives.

This section starts with a brief sketch of changing Western thinking about the population until the late eighteenth century. It then covers the emergence of Malthusian ideas among the ruling elites of the industrial world, who were under pressure from the French revolution, industrialization, rapid urbanization, and poverty between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. And finally, the eugenic idea, which was accompanied by the fear of the ruling elites (representing the definition of

1 Betsy Hartmann, "Population Control I: Birth of an Ideology," *International Journal of Health Services* 27, no. 3 (1997): 523–40.

the good life mentioned in the theoretical framework) of being demographically displaced by the highly fertile poor masses (representing the definition of the bare and unbearable life) is analyzed in two parts: first, the emergence of the idea in the industrial world in the late nineteenth century, and then its transfer to other parts of the world between two world wars.

2.1.1 *Population and the state*

The subjects of ancient Greek and early modern European states had a hierarchical formation in which full citizens were in the minority and the masses, including women, children, servants, laborers, and slaves, were commonly considered as followers of the elite fraction.² Agamben categorizes these subjects on the basis of their political participation: a good life if they are politically qualified, and bare if not.³ In this system, the central task of ruling elites is to create regulatory mechanisms that would sustain a balance between subpopulations and order among them to establish legitimate and lasting governance.

Plato suggests a figure of 5,040 (full citizens only) as the ideal population size for a city, while anticipating that uncontrolled population growth would create a disruptive element in his harmonious and well-ordered city-state.⁴ Nevertheless, higher fertility was the norm in an ancient and medieval agricultural setting, not only part of a religious doctrine but also a necessity to replace the extremely high mortality rate caused by wars, epidemics, poor hygiene, malnutrition, high infant and maternal mortality.⁵

In mercantilist thought, the degree of populousness was an indicator of military strength and commercial wealth. Various measures were

2 Philip Kreager, "Population Theory - A Long View," *Population Studies* 69, (2015): 29–37.

3 Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 8–10.

4 Yves Charbit, *The Classical Foundations of Population Thought: From Plato to Quesnay* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), 13–38.

5 Johannes Overbeek, *History of Population Theories* (Netherlands: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), 24–27.

taken into consideration in European countries to discourage celibacy and childlessness. In the seventeenth-century France, Finance Minister Colbert promoted a tax exemption for fathers of ten living children and for those who married before the age of twenty, who would enjoy the tax exemption until the age of twenty-five. The nobles who had ten living children were to receive an annual allowance of 1000 livres.⁶

Prominent figures of the Enlightenment also endorsed the pronatalist ideology. In his *Social Contract*, Rousseau portrays the best government as that in which its citizens most flourish and multiply.⁷ Hume, too, takes it for granted that happiness, virtue, and the wisest institutions are found where people live most.⁸ Adam Smith equates wealth and greatness with the population's progress and its improvement.⁹ By increasing the number of people, one can increase the goods in trade, circulation of money, and thus augment the national treasury.¹⁰

Within this long pronatalist trajectory, the subjects (bare life), once neglected by the European states of the early modern period as they prioritized only on the territory and the community, became the object of knowledge in the modern states due to its capacity to enhance the capabilities and functionings of the state.¹¹

Foucault relates the changing population thinking about the state from sovereign authority to governmentalized rule, which decentered the state under liberalism. Yet, the new ideology also had practical uses

6 " Ibid., 28–33.

7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Political Economy and the Social Contract* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 117.

8 David Hume, "On the Populousness of Ancient Nations," *Population and Development Review* 3, no. 3 (1977): 323–29.

9 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1977)

10 Mitchell Dean, "A Genealogy of the Government of Poverty," *Economy and Society* 21, no. 3 (1992): 221.

11 Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, 51–52.

in the empires and colonies, not only to expand tax collection and conscription but also to create or manipulate imagined communities.¹²

Another fundamental factor in changing political thinking was the political-economic consequences of the demographic transition in the eighteenth century. Declining mortality rates in the Northern Hemisphere due to better sanitation, nutrition, vaccination, and increasing health care led to an incremental increase in population that required new techniques to incorporate them into the production process and to control them closely. Thus, the population, with its variables of number, spatial and temporal distribution, longevity, and health, no longer appeared merely as a theoretical entity, but as an object of surveillance and analysis aimed at intervention and modification.¹³

In the conducive climate of rising statistical thinking and centralized bureaucracy, the periodical modern population censuses emerged in the beginning of the nineteenth century as a strategic government technology for the gathering, categorizing, and manipulating individual knowledge.¹⁴ Not only liberal states, but also empires of the time immediately adopted the census. Ottoman Empire was no exception, actively conducting censuses to classify and manage its diverse subjects beginning in 1831.¹⁵

2.1.2 *Population, Poverty and Malthus in the nineteenth century*

In the last decade of the eighteenth century, mercantilist creed for the positive correlation between population and wealth was shaken as the population of migrants and peasants grew along with poverty and

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- 12 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. ed (London; New York: Verso, 2006), 168–69.
 - 13 Bruce Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 27, no. 4 (2002): 505–33.
 - 14 Theodore M Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820-1900* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986), 17.
 - 15 Cem Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun ve Türkiye’nin Nüfusu, 1500-1927* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1996), 68–70.

agrarian radicalism, especially in the United Kingdom (UK).¹⁶ Furthermore, French Revolution's optimism for perfectibility of man, and an egalitarian world for all human being without status distinction sparked some dangerous thoughts that could be directed against the ruling elite.

In his *Sketch*, Condorcet offers a social compensation scheme for the society as a whole, to eradicate poverty. According to his vision, the perfection of social art through the improved intellect could in the long run replace representative bodies, governments and even nations.¹⁷ Godwin, carries the egalitarian vision too far in his *Enquiry*, outlining an anarchist vision of society based on sincerity, simplicity, and respect for privacy and individuality, rejecting any form of government or legal coercion.¹⁸ They both speculated about what might happen if population pressures threaten their visions and concluded that such pressure is not likely in the near future and could become a serious concern only when the whole world is cultivated like a garden.¹⁹

Malthus took a radical stance in this debate, and sharply attacking in his *Essay*, as a direct response to Godwin and Condorcet, the egalitarian vision on human perfectibility and distribution of wealth, which he believed would bring nothing but further vice and misery to society.²⁰

Unlike his predecessors, including Adam Smith, who also conceived the relationship between population and subsistence in the form of an unstable but self-adjusting equilibrium, Malthus saw at the heart of the natural order an ontological imbalance, an insurmountable situation of

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- 16 E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 185–258.
 - 17 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, *Condorcet: Political Writings*, ed. Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 125–47.
 - 18 William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (London: Printed for G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1793).
 - 19 Donald Winch, *The Riches, and the Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834* (Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 236.
 - 20 Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of MR. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers* (London: Printed for J. Johnson, in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1798).

scarcity.²¹ In his view, the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man, while the population, if uncontrolled, grows in a geometrical ratio and subsistence only in an arithmetical ratio.²²

He further claims that any attempt to improve the living conditions of the poor, whether in the form of poor relief or a salary increase, would lead to an increase in the population of the poor, making the lower classes much poorer than before.²³ The danger, as to Malthus, was far from being remote, but imminent and immediate that “positive checks” such as war, famine, and epidemics to maintain the balance might lead them to experience the unbearable savage life of the colonized in the future.²⁴

In other words, Malthus constructed a world in which physical laws, impervious to human agency or legislative fiat, dominate the condition of the poor.²⁵ This gave the ruling elite the intellectual justification to gain ground against the peasants and working class, who had distracted them in the eighteenth century with food riots, strikes, and revolts, limiting their capabilities and functioning. Furthermore, the rapid population growth in England, 80% between 1801 and 1841, and the influx of poor masses to urban centers intensified the hostility in between. As a result, the British government enacted the controversial “Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834”, which terminated all outdoor poor reliefs.²⁶

Expectedly, the Malthusian doctrine had attracted vehement criticisms. E.P. Thompson accuses both Smith and Malthus of demoralizing

21 Dean, “A Genealogy of the Government of Poverty.”

22 Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of MR. Godwin, M. Condorcet and Other Writers*, 4.

23 Ibid., 23–31.

24 Mitchell Dean, “The Malthus Effect: Population and the Liberal Government of Life,” *Economy and Society* 44, no. 1 (2015): 18–39.

25 Donald Winch, “Robert Malthus: Christian Moral Scientist, Arch-Demoralizer or Implicit Secular Utilitarian?,” *Utilitas* 5, no. 2 (1993): 239–53.

26 Patrice Bouche, “The Post-Malthusian Moment: Some Responses to Population Explosion in Britain 1840,” in *From Malthus’ Stagnation to Sustained Growth: Social, Demographic and Economic Factors* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 160–79.

and disastrously disinfesting the intrusion of moral economy by attempting to remove the safety valves protecting people from the free market economy.²⁷ Furthermore, Marx accuses the capitalist mode of production of fuelling both poverty and population. Capitalist production, he adds, is by no means content itself with the quantity of disposable labor power to generate more capital accumulation, that can only be achieved with the relative surplus population which he calls the “industrial reserve army.”²⁸ Marx was also confident about the scientific progress would lead to expansion of the level of subsistence and thus the “Malthusian trap” was nothing more than a pretext to defend the interests of the landed aristocracy.²⁹

In addition to the scientific progress in land cultivation, that Marx accurately predicted, Malthus could not have foreseen the “fertility decline” in the industrialized world. This phenomenon, latterly theorised as “demographic transition,” indicates a gradual shift from high mortality and high fertility regime to low mortality and low fertility during the industrialization process.³⁰ As to the theory, first the mortality declines due to decline of infectious and contagious diseases spread by water or air. However, the response to fertility decline takes time due to its complicated social, economic, and cultural interactions. Thus, the time interval between the mortality and fertility decline represents “excessive population growth.”

Indeed, Malthus’s fear of overpopulation and the Poor Law coincide with the first phase of the demographic transition; decline in mortality, which had already begun in Northern Europe around 1800. A century later, however, virtually all countries in the North underwent the second phase as they experienced a fertility decline about 50% between 1870

27 Thompson, *Customs in Common*, 201–202.

28 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Volume 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1995), 445.

29 Yves Charbit, *Economic, Social and Demographic Thought in the XIXth Century: The Population Debate from Malthus to Marx* (Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2009), 121–53.

30 Ronald Lee, “The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no.4 (2003): 167–190.

and 1940.³¹ Additionally, Malthusian positive checks; the First World War and the Spanish Influenza caused the European continent to become desolated. This time the population debate was about depopulation and the differential fertility levels between the different classes. and the Malthusian ideology was not only rendered obsolete, but also cursed as the cause of this "undesirable" result.

Although Malthus, who was an Anglican clergyman in his earlier life, considered "contraception" immoral, it was accepted by neo-Malthusians as a key method of solving the population problem. Apart from the religious controversy it generated, the contraception, which was used much more frequently by the elites and the higher classes than by the lower classes, was blamed as the main cause of the declining fertility of the higher classes compared to the poor and migrants.

The fear of the ruling elites of being outnumbered by the much more fertile immigrants and the masses from the lower classes has revived the "eugenic movement,"³² which proposes not only to lower the "inferior" population but also to increase the number of the "superior" through pronatalist measures. In the Malthusian theory, however, there was no place for pronatalist measures to support any form of population increase.

Nevertheless, Malthusian thinking, which Dean summarizes as the biopolitics of population, the bioeconomics of scarcity, and the biogeography of territory, gained momentum after WWII and had a profound impact on such diverse areas as international development and aid, national social policy, family planning and birth control, immigration issues and national security, and post-1960s environmentalism.³³

31 Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline* (Orlando: Academic Press, 1985), 14.

32 Richard A. Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth Century Britain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 7.

33 Dean, "The Malthus Effect," 25.

2.1.3 *Rise of Eugenic Movement in Industrial World until WWII*

Inspired by Malthusian biological determinism, Charles Darwin developed the idea of evolution based on heritable, transferable traits, allowing the better-adapted species to survive and evolve. This theory sparked a fierce controversy between religious and secular circles that continues to this day. The crux of the debate was encapsulated by Darwin's mentor Adam Sedgwick, who expressed his fear on the theory's brutalizing and degrading effect on human being. In his opinion, the moral and metaphysical connection of human creation was ignored and replaced by physical law. Consequently, man was degraded to an ordinary species.³⁴ This critic also reveals the reason why the idea immediately flourished half a century later, in the era of Taylorism and totalitarian governments.

Darwin's cousin Francis Galton applied Darwinian analogies into human beings, claiming that not only mental and physical but also moral traits were inherited, providing a "scientifically" grounded justification for white supremacy over other races.³⁵ In contrast to the long-term fatalism of Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest, Galton did not intend to wait for the lengthy natural selection process to find the "fittest" race. He envisioned that humans would use their intelligence to modify external factors so that only the most gifted would reproduce.³⁶

In this regard, the term "eugenic," meaning "noble in heredity" or "good in birth," was redefined by him to refer to the "science" of improving racial quality through the selective breeding of genetically superior individuals (positive eugenics) and restricting the reproduction of those deemed inferior (negative eugenics).³⁷

Ideologically, eugenic thought sought to provide further justification for Western supremacy over the "inferior" race of the colonial world, but

34 Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2004), 1–3.

35 Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity*, 4–20.

36 Stefan Kühl, *For the Betterment of the Race* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 12.

37 Francis Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1883), 25–27.

the colonizers had no intention of limiting the reproduction of the natives in the colonies. On the contrary, populated colonies were desired for tax collection, labor, and military recruitment purposes.³⁸ Furthermore, the British, French, and other European colonizers provided sanitation and health services to their colonies in Africa to solve the problem of depopulation on the continent.³⁹ In densely populated India, the British government also found it inconvenient to implement a population control policy.⁴⁰

Ironically, it was the mainland of imperial states and the industrial world where the eugenic idea germinated, as the alterations brought about by industrialization, urbanization, migration, and immigration gradually led to a more negative social interpretation at the dawn of the twentieth century, creating very fertile ground for the eugenic idea.⁴¹

Meanwhile, the new scientific works of Weismann and Mendel on the autonomous hereditary characteristics of germplasm and plants recirculated the eugenic thought around academic circles of the industrial world. And a series of eugenic conferences organized by Galton and Pearson in UK, Weismann in Germany, Davenport in US during the era attracted public attention.⁴²

The eugenic idea found many advocates from vastly different political spectrum, not only reactionaries and conservatives, but also Marxists,

38 Karl Ittmann, "Where Nature Dominates Man: Demographic Ideas and Policy in British Colonial Africa, 1890–1970," in *The Demographics of Empire: The Colonial Order and the Creation of Knowledge*, ed. Karl Ittmann, Dennis D. Cordell, and Gregory Maddox (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 59–88.

39 Dennis D. Cordell, Karl Ittmann, and Gregory Maddox, "Counting Subjects," in *The Demographics of Empire: The Colonial Order and the Creation of Knowledge*, ed. Karl Ittmann, Dennis D. Cordell, and Gregory Maddox (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 1–22.

40 T. J. Samuel, "The Development of India's Policy of Population Control," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (1966): 49–67.

41 Nancy Lays Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 21–32.

42 Deborah Barrett and Charles Kurzman, "Globalizing Social Movement Theory: The Case of Eugenics," *Theory and Society* 33, no. 5 (2004): 487–527.

feminists, and democrats. It became an integral part of widely debated issues such as degeneration, evolution, civilization, and modernity, and touched many emerging fields like psychiatry, maternity, criminology, public health, and sex education.⁴³

The totalizing, organizing, and optimizing nature of eugenic thought was also immediately embraced by organized capitalism together with its industrial bureaucracies and industrial conglomerates. Fordism, Taylorism, and scientific management appeared as the new modes of production in the first quarter of the twentieth century, aimed at utilizing the labor force as a work producing machines for mass production, and the role of eugenics in this process was to sustain the reproduction of the “best” human resources.⁴⁴

The eugenic movement in the industrialized Western world had succeeded in building up an impressive organizational network before World War I. The eugenics societies first mushroomed on the national level, chronologically in Germany (1905), England (1907), the United States (1910), and in France (1912). Furthermore, the First International Eugenics Congress was held in London in 1912, at which some 750 participants from Europe and the US, delivered thirty papers about the eugenic virtue and its interpretation in biology, education, sociology, and medicine.⁴⁵ As a result of the congress, a number of new national eugenic associations were established, as well as a Permanent International Eugenics Committee which was aimed to coordinate the transnational cooperation among eugenic organizations.⁴⁶

Eugenic motivation, articulation, and implementation were not the same in all Western societies. Northern industrial countries such as US,

43 Frank Dikötter, “Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics,” *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 2 (1998): 467–78.

44 Sheila Faith Weiss, “The Race Hygiene Movement in Germany, 1904-1945,” in *The Well-born Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia*, ed. Mark B. Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 38.

45 The Eugenics Education Society, “Problems in Eugenics” (First International Eugenics Congress, London: The Eugenics Education Society, 1912).

46 Jakob Tanner, “Eugenics before 1945,” *Journal of Modern European History* 10, no. 4 (2012): 466.

UK, and Germany, were concerned with race and class issues and more inclined with the negative eugenics. In the case of the US, boosting alien immigration and the tortured race relations were the primary sources of the eugenic anxiety. In UK, where racial and ethnic homogeneity had long prevailed, the predominant concern was the influx of the Eastern European immigrants, mainly Jews.⁴⁷ In Germany, too, the seemingly hostile, uncontrollable, and ever-increasing industrial proletariats were the origin of eugenic motivation of many middle and upper-class Germans, which made them the catalyst for the movement before the First World War.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Catholic countries, including France and Italy, were traditionally on the positive side of the eugenic movement, seeing abortion and sterilization as inferior. Thus, the agenda was not to reduce the fertility of the “inferior” races, but to increase the “superior” races through incentives. The trauma following the German invasion in 1870, prompted the French government to impose familism promoted by Le Play few decades earlier, to halt the declining birth rates.⁴⁹ The Italian case was particularly different from the others as the source of positive eugenic activism was neither decreasing population nor class or racial conflict, but the justification for hegemonic aspirations, especially during the Mussolini era.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, as the welfare state intervention on politics were gaining popularity, Western governments began to enact eugenic laws for a more “rational” organization of human reproduction and selection.⁵¹ In 1907, the Swiss parliament passed a national civil code which came into force in 1912, included an article motivated by eugenic philosophy to restrict

47 Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration*, 60.

48 Weiss, “The Race Hygiene Movement in Germany, 1904-1945,” 12.

49 Maria-Sophia Quine, *Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 52–88.

50 Carl Ipsen, “The Organization of Demographic Totalitarianism: Early Population Policy in Fascist Italy,” *Social Science History* 17, no. 1 (1993): 71–108.

51 Thomas C Leonard, “Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 4 (2005): 207–24.

marriage. This law would later become the model for many other countries.⁵²

That same year, the state of Indiana became the first state to enact a sterilization law in the US. Within ten years, fifteen other states enacted similar legislation to eradicate the "social defect" by preventing the reproduction of the eugenically feeble-minded, poor, drunkard, criminal, and insane classes.⁵³ In California alone, approximately 6,000 surgical forced sterilizations were performed between 1909 and 1929.⁵⁴ Following, the Immigration Re-striction Act was passed in 1924, which provided for a national quota system to prevent the immigration of Asians, Latin Americans, and Southern and Eastern Europeans.⁵⁵

The eugenic movement in the US was actively pursued and supported in Germany, and various sterilization laws were soon adapted to Nazi practice with an extraordinary undertaking in terms of scale and impact.⁵⁶ In 1933, the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases Law had passed, mandating the forced sterilization of the "hereditarily sick" people. By 1945, about 360,000 German's had been sterilized and by adding the illegal sterilization of foreign workers and ethnical minorities, the number would rise as many as 1.2 million people.⁵⁷

However, the more recent implementations paved the way for the calamitous genocide acts. By 1939, the elimination of handicapped infants under the age of 3 and mentally ill people, estimated at some 70-90,000,

52 Tanner, "Eugenics before 1945," 465.

53 Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity*, 100.

54 Alexandra Minna Stern, *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 159.

55 Ibid., 16-17.

56 Stefan Kühl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 37-52.

57 Paul Weindling, *Health Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism :1870 1945* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 533.

continued with the systematic 'euthanasia' program for the old poor, sick workers, anti-socials, and concentration camp inmates.⁵⁸

In contrast to the conservative and racist agenda of the Northern Bloc, mainstream eugenics in the Scandinavian countries had liberal tendencies, and the sterilization laws enacted in Denmark (1929) and Sweden (1934) were presented as an essential feature of an ideal welfare state. By 1960, well over 50,000 people had been sterilized by the Swedish government, initially on medical grounds and later for social reasons.⁵⁹

After WWII, the eugenic movement in the West collapsed with the murder of hundreds of thousands of victims under Nazism and in the name of eugenic ideology. The term "eugenics" was dropped from the population policy vocabulary and, after the 1970s, was completely equated with Nazism. Nevertheless, negative eugenic tools such as abortion, sterilization, and birth control continued to prevail under various names, organizations, and packages to maintain white supremacy, such as the medicalization of human genetics. Likewise, eugenics found a new field of activity in the fight against the problem of overpopulation in the Third World and merged with the "population control movement."⁶⁰

2.1.4 *Eugenics in other parts of the World*

In the interwar period, many of the nations defined by the Western world as inferior developed their own eugenic plans. By 1930, more than thirty countries adapted various forms of eugenic practices to reflect their own specific social, cultural, political, ethnic, and economic anxieties about their own populations, which were classified as inferior (poor, inferior, ethnically, or religiously different from the ruling class, etc.).⁶¹ Yet, the

58 Quine, *Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies*, 124.

59 Dikötter, "Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics," 468–69.

60 Kühl, *For the Betterment of the Race*, 148–56.

61 Mark B. Adams, "Eugenics in the History of Science," in *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia*, ed. Mark B. Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 5.

nationalist context was much apparent eugenic drive especially for those newly emerging nations.

Central and Eastern European countries including Turkey, were aspired to strengthen their newly created nation-states demographically and biologically for further legitimation. They considered eugenics and racial nationalism the best strategy not only to achieve a healthy body politic but also to preserve the "biological capital" of the nation's ethnic majority. In the interwar period, the idea of a homogeneous national community in Central and Southeastern Europe was envisaged in the sense that the ethnic majority therein represented the whole nation, and its protection was the core of the eugenic debate.⁶²

In China too, the eugenic thought mingled with racial nationalism, which was propagated soon after the fall of the last dynasty in 1911 as the restoration of the purity of the Chinese race. Members of professional classes, intellectuals, academicians, medical professionals in particular and politicians pioneered medical and eugenic discourses dealing with heredity, descent, sexual hygiene, and race. Although eugenics in China never achieved legislative expression, or institutional organization, the idea of race improvement was widespread and pervasive in society. Cheap textbooks, primers, self-study manuals and pamphlets on heredity and society explaining the danger of racial degeneration, were widespread in the 1920s.⁶³

In India, the most vocal proponents of eugenics were the upper caste members who feared differential fertility rates that would increase the relative size and power of the lower caste and Muslim communities. In this regard, the Congress Party, which dominated Indian politics until the end of the Emergency in 1977, had its concerns about population quality even before independence. In 1940, its National Planning Committee

62 Marius Turda and Paul Weindling, *Blood and Homeland: Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900–1940* (Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 1–16.

63 Frank Dikötter, "Racial Discourse in China: Continuities and Permutations," in *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, ed. Frank Dikötter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015), 12–25.

commissioned a report on the gradual domination of the lower social classes and warned the government to remove barriers to intermarriage among the upper castes and to launch a birth control campaign for the lower castes to prevent the deterioration of racial makeup.⁶⁴

In Latin America, growing concerns about poverty, migration, immigration, unemployment, strikes, and social tensions among the rapidly growing urban population during the 1920s and 1930s revived the eugenic idea of a healthy and fit population of the nation.⁶⁵ Although sterilization, abortion, and birth control were never legalized as eugenic measures mostly due to the condemnation by the Catholic Church, Latin American eugenicists applied their own form of negative reproductive eugenics through matrimonial selection based on the principles of heredity and adaptation to maintain the gap between various ethnic and racial groups.⁶⁶ In that sense, the premarital medical examinations had been prescribed by law in Mexico (1928), in Argentina (1937) and in Brazil (1934).⁶⁷

Furthermore, the immigration once desired to increase European heredity in the 1920s, was restricted in the 1930s in many Latin American countries due to the mass migration from Eastern and Oriental origins whose physical or cultural characteristics they believed might disturb the process of racial homogenization at home.⁶⁸ Ironically, they applied the same Immigration Restriction Act to “inferior” nations, that the US had enacted in 1924 to prevent immigration from “inferior” Latin American countries.

After WWII, the eugenic movement was transferred to the new, decolonized states as part of their nation-building process, especially in the areas where ethnic tensions accumulated. Positive eugenics was

64 Connelly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,” 631–32.

65 Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America*, 36–39.

66 Ibid., 102–35.

67 Nancy Lays Stepan, “Eugenics in Brazil 1917–1945,” in *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia*, ed. Mark B. Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 110–52.

68 Ibid., 142–45.

encouraged to preserve national purity by increasing the ethnic majority in quantity and quality, while negative eugenics was intended to control and limit the ethnic minority.

Summary of 2.1

In this section, the genealogy of Malthusian and eugenic ideas was revealed and interpreted in terms of the forms of life approach. In addition to the natural connection between these ideas, where eugenics was inspired by the ideas of Darwin, who already had capitalized on Malthusian thought, the similarities between two movements were tracked in terms of the anxieties of the governing elites to retain their life quality against poor, migrants, and lower classes.

During the Malthusian era, the French Revolution and its egalitarian vision were at the heart of elite anxiety, along with the increasing numbers of urban poor and migrants as a result of rapid urbanization and the chaotic nature of industrialization in the Western world.

A century later, eugenic anxiety was fed not only by the flooding migrants and the higher fertility rates of the lower classes, but also by the declining fertility levels of the upper classes. Again, colonization, increasing industrialization, World War I, and economic and social unrest provided further justification for the ruling elites of the industrial world to adopt eugenic ideas. In other parts of the world, the impetus for eugenics was rising nationalism and the desire to protect the ethnic majority.

This dissertation further claims that similar Malthusian and eugenic concerns also existed in the global population control movement, but with quite different scopes and scales.

§ 2.2 Population Control as a Global Movement

Concern for world population has been a well-known phenomenon since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, a series of international meetings such as the International Malthusian Conferences (the first was held in Paris in 1900) and the International Genetics Conferences were organized to discuss

population issues.⁶⁹ However, these movements had exhausted themselves on the brink of WWII; eugenics was cursed, and the Malthusians were marginalized for their advocacy of birth control.

After WWII, a new and a much appealing formulation for population control was developed by the academicians and institutions funded by US based private foundations. Furthermore, they were determined to spread the antinatalist idea throughout the developing world through their flexible structure, well-connected networking hub, and newly created institutions.

This section will cover the inception of these ideas and institutions on population control after WWII and the way they interacted with hegemonic powers and the developing world to trigger a global population control movement. But beyond that, it deals with the changing definition of the bare and unbearable life of the non-Western world to sustain the quality of the hegemonic governing elites (US interest) from the late 1930s to the 1960s and how these changes redefined the ideas and institutions on the population control in the global sphere. In this respect, the global population control movement is explored in two main areas: the conceptualization of the population control idea for the non-Western world, and the process of its institutionalization that enabled the diffusion of population control in the developing world.

The conceptualization is covered in three sections. First, the growing interest of individual philanthropists and industrial conglomerates in the demographic studies of the non-Western world prior to WWII is analyzed through the secondary literature, along with the academic works of the era, such as the expansion of the demographic transition theory onto the non-researched non-industrial world. Then the sudden change of the demographic works from the social scientific perspective to the policy-oriented approach, as a dedication to demonstrate the “unmet need” for contraception in the various parts of the world to convince the governments to switch to antinatalism, is discussed with the different views of

69 Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History Geopolitics and Life on Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 9–10.

the academic literature. Finally, the theorization of population control as a key for development and as a solution to poverty, which had a profound influence on the non-Western nations to embrace antinatalist policies, is analyzed from Coale and Hoover's original thesis.

The part dealing with institutionalization process of global population control movement, consists of four sections; first, the initial steps for the post WWII population control policy discussions and the reestablishment of the international organizations are covered through the digital archives of UN and the minutes of the meetings of the World Population Conferences. This section, then analyzes the key figures of the movement, the US based private initiations and the demographic research in terms of their changing motivations for population control and their efforts not only to spread and initiate antinatalist thought in the developing world but also to convince ruling elites to address the issue. To this end, various sources are consulted, including the memoirs of the main initiators, their own works, and those of scholarly critics.

Furthermore, the hidden international pressure groups such as the IMF and World Bank, and their potential attempts to promote population control are critically tracked through borrowing negotiations, minutes of meetings and parliamentary discussions. And finally, the full support of the US government and UN organizations for population control and their connections to the developing world are revealed to demonstrate the changing circumstances in both global and national spheres.

2.2.1 *Conceptualization of Population Control Idea before WWII.*

There was little evidence on the earlier scientific work on the world population in any part of the world before the First World War,⁷⁰ and very first persistent calls for demographic studies on the issue came from US based philanthropists in the early 1920s, presumably motivated by

70 Simon Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History," *Population and Development Review* 19, no. 4 (1993): 659–701.

eugenic concerns over “unbearable” migration flow, while some 21,6 million immigrants poured into the country between 1881 and 1915.⁷¹

Triggered by the “yellow peril” in the US, Edward S. Scripps, owner of a newspaper chain, has decided to invest in scientific research on the global population problem, particularly in Eastern Asia, and established the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems as early as 1922. During his research on population literature, he came across Warren S. Thompson’s dissertation on Malthus and hired him as director of his foundation.⁷² After Scripps’s sudden death in 1926, the Rockefeller Fund continued to support the project from its experimental subdivision, the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund.⁷³

Thompson, proved to be the right choice, publishing a seminal article in 1929, in which he extended the scope of the “Demographic Transition” theory on to non-industrial and non-researched world.⁷⁴ His vision was to inspire all demographic studies of population control conducted in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. As mentioned earlier, the theory itself was a deduction of a century long demographic data of the industrial world (Northern Europe and the US) observed in regular censuses, indicating the gradual transition from high mortality, high fertility regime to a low mortality, low fertility system during the industrialization process, but never tested in the other parts of the world.

The very few studies for Russia, India and especially Japan inspired Thompson to make generalization on the negative correlation between industrialization/modernization and fertility behaviour globally. And he divided all societies in the world into a tripartite demographic typology based on their elevation on industrialization and modernization. Group

71 A G Kenwood and A L Lougheed, *The Growth of the International Economy 1820–2000*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 46.

72 Frank W. Notestein, “Demography in the United States: A Partial Account of the Development of the Field,” *Population and Development Review* 8, no. 4 (1982): 651–89.

73 Donald Fisher, “The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony: Rockefeller Foundations and the Social Sciences,” *Sociology* 17, no. 2 (1983): 206–33.

74 Warren S. Thompson, “Population,” *American Journal of Sociology* 4, no. 6 (1929): 959–75.

A countries (Northern Europe) with low and declining rates of population growth due to rapidly declining fertility and already low mortality;⁷⁵ Group B countries (Southern and Central Europe) with high population growth due to still high fertility but rapidly declining mortality; Group C countries (the rest of the world) with fluctuating but relatively low population growth with higher fertility and mortality, not subject to significant human control.

The theory had scientific and ideologic shortcomings. First, the necessary demographic data set to make such a generalization, especially for the Group C countries were not present. Furthermore, this new global demographic transition theory was based on the evolutionary view of societal development within the framework of modernization theory. Inevitably, the Eurocentric view, foreseeing Western type of lifestyle is superior, progressive, and ultimately good for everyone was fully embedded. Societies were imagined moving along a single continuum of demographic development from primitive to advance, from traditional to modern, until they unified. Accordingly, the fertility transition was perceived as a unidirectional, progressive, irreversible, homogenous, lengthy, and phased process that depended on the degree of industrialization and modernization and did not take into account the spatiotemporal dimension or local power relations and cultural values.⁷⁶

Private interest in the US for global population research took another level after Milbank Memorial Fund decided to establish a research division for the population studies, as a result of urgent calls of one of its trustees, Thomas Cochran, who shared the same concerns about

75 Beginning in the late 1970s, “low mortality” become the key demographic concern being referred to as “aging.” The very first World Assembly on Aging was gathered in Vienna in 1982. Nevertheless, the literature on aging can be traced back to the 1940s. Alfred Sauvy, “Social and Economic Consequences of the Ageing of Western European Populations,” *Population Studies* 2, no. 1 (1948): 115–24.

76 Susan Greenhalgh, “Anthropology Theorizes Reproduction: Integrating Practice, Political Economic, and Feminist Perspectives,” in *Situating Fertility*, ed. Susan Greenhalgh (Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3–26.

migration and its potential socioeconomic impact as Mr. Scripps had earlier.⁷⁷ They immediately hired demographer Frank W. Notestein, who would become the principal figure for the global population control activities with his colleagues in Princeton University's Office of Population Research Division (OPR) established in 1936 also with the initiation of another Milbank trustee; a forefront eugenic Fredrick Osborn.⁷⁸

In the meantime, a number of activities and organizations were organized to draw attention to the growing world population. A World Population Conference was held in Geneva in 1927, initiated, planned, and executed by the birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger. The original plan was to organize the seventh International Malthusian Conference, but her plans to promote birth control had turned into a scientific venue to discuss global population problem.⁷⁹ The conference generated a strong consensus on the importance of furthering the investigation of population and related problems but on the condition that its activities as an organization be divorced from the promotion of any social policy.⁸⁰

A year later, the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems was founded and organized a series of conferences in the early 1930s.⁸¹ Reflecting the political and intellectual conflicts of the interwar period, the conference and the union's organizations were kidnapped by the academic and political rivalry among the participants of whom had various agendas and different backgrounds ranging from

77 Clyde V. Kiser et al., "The Work of the Milbank Memorial Fund in Population since 1928," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (1971): 15–66.

78 Frank W. Notestein, "Reminiscences: The Role of Foundations, the Population Association of America, Princeton University and the United Nations in Fostering American Interest in Population Problems," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (1971): 67–85.

79 Bashford, *Global Population: History Geopolitics and Life on Earth*, 84–85.

80 Frank Lorimer, "The Role of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (1971): 86–105.

81 Alison Bashford, "Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (2007): 170–201.

eugenics, immigration restrictionists, colonialists, anti-colonialists, nationalists, expansionist, Malthusianist and anti-Malthusianist.⁸²

In the League of Nations, global population was framed as an international “health problem” to be solved not by population control, but by better governance of world human traffic and migration. Due to that hesitation to deal with the population control, the League was not responsive for the rare calls from the members to assist them in addressing their population problem.⁸³ Instead, activities on world population were limited to tabulating world population from the earlier preliminary studies and estimations, which already begun by the International Statistical Institute as early as 1920.⁸⁴

These individual interests in the US regarding global and local populations were unified in 1931 under the name of Population Association of America (PAA) which soon morphed into an organization of population scientists after eugenicists and birth controller were removed from the board.⁸⁵ After 1935, the PAA sought connection with the US government and its New Deal program, producing a report on “Problems of a Changing Population” for the US National Resource Committee in 1938, also a significant indicator of the US government’s growing interest in demography.⁸⁶

As a precursor to the planning era of the 1960s, the Great Depression of 1929 and massive unemployment in the US created an urgent need for socioeconomic planning, with all kinds of scientific demographic inputs on the population coming to fore. Furthermore, isolationist policies, such as not joining the League of Nations, which were believed to serve American interest in the 1920s were gradually abandoned and replaced by

82 Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 70–76.

83 Alison Bashford, “Global Biopolitics and the History of World Health,” *History of the Human Sciences* 19, no. 1 (2006): 67–88.

84 J.W. Nixon, *A History of the International Statistical Institute 1885-1960* (The Hague: International Statistical Institute, 1960).

85 Hodgson, “The Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America.”

86 Notestein, “Demography in the United States,” 663–64.

internationalist policies aimed at expanding into new markets and new resources to recover from the economic depression.⁸⁷

The internationalist bloc, consisting of organizations such as Council of Foreign Relations and the transnational investors, which had already established commercial, political, and social ties through philanthropic activities around the world, had already started dominating US foreign policy before the WWII to create indirect global hegemony by supporting decolonization in Africa and Asia.⁸⁸

Reformulating the American internationalism with the categories addressed in the theoretical framework section of the dissertation; by leaving the isolationist policies after the New Deal, the definition of bare and unbearable lives by which US governing elites (good life) seek to improve their capability and functioning upon, has expanded from national borders to a global scale.

Starting from the late 1930s, this changing trajectory created a major market for demographic research on the populations of the underdeveloped world, and new funding flowed into the field.⁸⁹ Notestein and his colleagues at OPR, such as Irene Taeuber, Dudley Kirk, Ansley J. Coale and Kingsley Davis, immediately reinvented and reformulated Thompson's global demographic transition theory, which had been published a decade earlier and found very limited audience among social scientists, politicians, or funding agencies.⁹⁰

Thompson's earlier theory, underling the fertility behaviour dependency on the industrialization and modernization movements, was reinforced and transformed into an anti-colonial manifestation in the works of OPR, as they claimed, that one sided modernization experience of

87 Jeff Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940," *International Organization* 42, no. 1 (1988): 59–90.

88 Cornelia Navari, *Internationalism, and the State in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2013), 145–47.

89 Susan Greenhalgh, "The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and Political History of Twentieth-Century Demography," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 1 (1996): 26–66.

90 Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History," 670.

colonial domination, while it could to some extent reduce mortality, was of no help in reducing fertility, as its predatory nature hampered industrialization by treating colonies as a source of raw materials and a market for the motherland.⁹¹ Furthermore, the Japanese success story in reducing fertility rates was constantly referred as a living example of how an independent sovereign state could achieve rapid industrialization and liberalization that would foster a fertility decline.⁹² Expectedly, this anti-colonial version of the demographic transition theory received a warm reception and approval from all cadres in the US government.

The theory itself offered no quick solution on modernization and for dealing with the “heavy population pressure” in these regions. Nevertheless, in line with organizing post-war reconstruction of the world, political relationships, and the trade from the point of the American interests; granting political autonomy, and the establishment of market economy were prescribed as essential tools to form a democratic society that would gradually stimulate a downward trend in the fertility.

2.2.2 *Into a Policy-Oriented Demography during Cold War Rivalry*

After WWII, demographic transition theory lost its social scientific perspective. The diminishing fertility level, once OPR members defined as an outcome of long-term modernization and industrialization, was redefined by the very same team as an “independent” variable creating a positive impact on the modernization process. Then the question changed from “*how to modernize the Third World to support reducing fertility*” to “*how to reduce the fertility to support the modernization of the Third World.*” Accordingly, OPR members have switched into an active “policy-oriented approach” and initiated birth control policies in developing world to reduce fertility, supported by the funds of private and government-sponsored institutions.

91 Frank W. Notestein, “Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure,” *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (1944): 424–44.

92 Irene B. Taeuber and Edwin G. Beal, “The Dynamics of Population in Japan,” *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1944): 222–55.

The swift intellectual shift was elaborated by various academicians in detail. Caldwell claims the change had no hidden agenda as the further demographic research after 1945 simply did not support the original demographic transition idea.⁹³ Indeed, the original theory did not provide convincing scientific evidence for evolutionary fertility behaviour, with the exception of fertility research in Japan in 1944, the results of which were comparable to the Western sequence of demographic change.

However, Hodgson, convincingly argues that the scope and the scale of the research before and after WWII had changed dramatically due to the political orientation of the field, so the outcomes were not comparable. He identifies four main shifts. First, the narrowing of focus from high-level theoretical abstraction to an operational interest in the more practical issues. Second, the gradual loss of historical perspective, as the main focus shifted from evaluating of the historical time series to analyzing the present and projecting the future. Third, the shift from the macro to the micro level of demographic research, where the structural features of the societies, the key determinants of the fertility change, were replaced by the utilitarian considerations of individuals. Fourth, the shifting view of demographers view of society from a cohesive and integrated system to an atomistic collection of individuals.⁹⁴

Furthermore, Greenhalgh refers to the profound political orientation of demography field by its nature in Foucauldian sense, claiming that the changing scope of demographic transition theory after WWII, was a natural outcome of changing political choices. For Foucault, demography is an essential part of the “power-knowledge” process and demographers are the “gatekeepers” of knowledge and “truth” to secure “governmentality” and “biopolitics” through totalising narratives, structuralist explanations, and modernisation programmes.⁹⁵

93 John C. Caldwell, “Demographers’ Involvement in Twentieth-Century Population Policy: Continuity or Discontinuity?,” *Population Research and Policy Review* 24, no. 4 (2005): 359–85.

94 Hodgson, “Demography as Social Science and Policy Science,” 27–28.

95 Stephen Legg, “Foucault’s Population Geographies: Classifications, Biopolitics and Governmental Spaces,” *Population, Space and Place* 11, no. 3 (2005): 137–56.

The greatest demand for the demography's intellectual products and the most extensive source of funding has been governments, foundations, and international bodies. Thus, to gain access to funding for its work and markets for its products, demography had to act primarily as a policy-relevant field, tailoring its work and theories to the needs of its clientele's action agenda.⁹⁶ In this sense, Greenhalgh refutes the clear distinction between Hauser's "social science" and "social engineering" demography, claiming that the intellectual shift was just another demographic focus on changing population policy.⁹⁷

Finally, Szreter attributes the conceptual and theoretical capabilities and limitations of demography to the foreign policy needs of the US during the Cold War. Since the poor masses in peasant societies were accused of creating economic and political instability that favored communist takeovers, achieving greater and more democratically widespread economic progress in these poor countries became the best hope of strategic policy planners and philanthropic foundations for protection against further communist expansion.⁹⁸

Consequently, OPR members skilfully adapted the shift in US foreign policy from anti-colonialist strategy to the Cold War rivalry on to global demographics, by reframing the developing world (bare life) from the masses to be "unleashed," to the potential unbearable to be "mitigated." Furthermore, they sought in every feasible way to promote this mitigation to the local and international community by means of birth control.

The "defining moment" as Demeny put it, was the report of four OPR members commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation to study demographic problems in the Far East in late 1948, that coincided with the sudden victory of Marxist-Leninist ideology in China. A persistent demand of a local mayor in China's peasant Peipei province for birth control

96 Greenhalgh, "The Social Construction of Population Science: An Intellectual, Institutional, and Political History of Twentieth-Century Demography," 31.

97 Philip M. Hauser, "Social Science and Social Engineering," *Philosophy of Science* 16, no. 3 (1949): 209–18.

98 Szreter, "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History."

methods, have led the OPR members to take the opportunity to construct the fertility behaviour theory on the individual motivation of a “rational man.”⁹⁹ Nevertheless, stimulating the demand of the individuals and smaller groups to lower their fertility by promoting “family planning program” (FPP) was a much faster and more cost-effective way in dealing with the pressing population problem than investing in the modernization process.¹⁰⁰

Accordingly, the primary focus of the US based demographic studies gradually shifted to explore or to “create” an unmet demand for fertility control, which refers to the condition of wanting to avoid or postpone having children but not using any methods of contraception. It was anticipated that the documented existence of an “unmet need” to limit the fertility would generate a preeminent rationale for increased investment in the “supply” of FPP in high fertility countries and inspire local policy makers to support the initiative.¹⁰¹

The method of measurement was simply to conduct KAP surveys in these high fertility countries/regions about women's knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practices of birth control as well as about their family size preferences.¹⁰² The number of such surveys grew rapidly, so that by 1970, about 400 KAP surveys had been fielded in fifty Third World countries.¹⁰³ However, the pioneering work dates back to 1947, as it proved

99 Paul Demeny, “Social Science and Population Policy,” *Population and Development Review* 14, no. 3 (1988): 451–79.

100 A famous quote of President Johnson in 1965 “Less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth” in Martha J. Bailey, “Fifty Years of Family Planning: New Evidence on the Long-Run Effects of Increasing Access to Contraception,” in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 385.

101 Sarah E.K. Bradley and John B. Casterline, “Understanding Unmet Need: History, Theory, and Measurement,” *Studies in Family Planning* 45, no. 2 (2015): 123–50.

102 John Bongaarts, “The KAP-Gap and the Unmet Need for Contraception,” *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 2 (1991): 293–313.

103 Albert I. Hermalin, Barbara Entwisle, and Lora G. Myers, “Some Lessons from the Attempt to Retrieve Early Kap and Fertility Surveys,” *Population Index* 51, no. 2 (1985): 194–208.

the feasibility of conducting surveys in a wide variety of settings, established many of the procedures for future work and set much of the tone for the subsequent studies.¹⁰⁴

Notable among the early studies, was the one conducted in 1951 jointly by the Government of India and UN in Mysore State of India.¹⁰⁵ UN Population Commission Division had long considered undertaking a “necessary” preliminary work on a study of the interrelationship of economic, social, and demographic factors in an underdeveloped area to provide methodological guidance for further studies.¹⁰⁶ And India was chosen,¹⁰⁷ not only for its high fertile structure, but also for the commitment of the local government to lower fertility and their inclination to seek international assistance as it had already approached the World Health Organization (WHO) for assistance in birth control methods.¹⁰⁸

The survey was twofold: first, the household survey in a sample of 10,744 households, and then the fertility and attitude survey, which was administered to 1403 married women and 1,084 husbands. The extensive findings depicted that the average family size of ever-married women was 5.3 children per family,¹⁰⁹ while the ideal family size declared by young married women as 3.7, and their husbands with slightly higher as 4.1.¹¹⁰ However only 15% of the participating men and women who

104 Mauldin, “Fertility Studies: Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice.”

105 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The Mysore Population Study: Report of a Field Survey Carried out in Selected Areas of Mysore State, India: A Cooperative Project of the United Nations and the Government of India,” Population Studies No:34 (New York, 1961).

106 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Report of the Population Commission (Fourth Session),” E/1313 Article: 30-32 (New York, 1949), 9–10.

107 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Population Commission Report of the Fifth Session (May 22nd - June 2nd, 1950),” E/1711 E/CN.9/62 Article:16 (New York, 1950), 3.

108 Samuel, “The Development of India’s Policy of Population Control.”

109 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The Mysore Population Study: Report of a Field Survey Carried out in Selected Areas of Mysore State, India: A Cooperative Project of the United Nations and the Government of India,” 110.

110 Ibid., 140.

expressed no desire have more children had used a family limitation method other than abstinence.¹¹¹

The unmet need for contraception, documented as above, had provided further justification for the Indian government to launch the “first” nationwide FPP of a Third World country as early as 1952. The program, was embedded in India’s first five-year plan, had ambitious targets addressing wives and husbands to reduce “improvident maternity” level from 40% to 5% within 15 years.¹¹² The result was far from the target, mostly due to unwillingness of the Indian government to consider effective family planning methods other than rhythm or safe period.¹¹³

2.2.3 *Population Control in Developmentalist Discourse by the early 1960s.*

An even stronger incentive for national governments to take the necessary measures to reduce fertility rates, other than exploring the unmet need through KAP surveys, has been the “developmentalist discourse on population,” which has changed the perspective from the individualistic and healthcare view to the macroeconomic benefits.¹¹⁴ The categories of “underdevelopment” and “poverty” at the global scale were discursive products of the postwar climate.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, “development,” just like modernization, was promoted to conform the ideas and expectations of the affluent West, to what Western countries saw as the normal course of evolution and progress.¹¹⁶

The perception of poverty was nothing more than the result of a comparative statistical operation, whereas annual per capita income was a

111 Ibid., 172.

112 The “improvident maternity” is defined as a childbirth occurring to a mother who has already given birth to three or more children of whom at least one is alive.

113 Abraham Stone, “Fertility Problems in India,” *Fertility and Sterility* 4, no. 3 (1953): 210–17.

114 Samuel, “The Development of India’s Policy of Population Control,” 55.

115 Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995), 33.

116 Ibid., 26.

single unit of measurement. In 1948, almost two-thirds of the world's population was categorized as poor, when the World Bank defined countries with an annual per capita income of less than \$100 as poor.¹¹⁷ Poverty thus became an organizing concept, the object of a new problematization, and the essential characteristic of the Third World. Accordingly, economic growth and development soon became a self-evident, necessary, universal truth and omnipresent reality as a solution to the problem of poverty.¹¹⁸

In this context, a study in 1958 by two prominent OPR members, demographer Ansley J. Coale and economist Edgar M. Hoover, demonstrated the inverse relationship between population growth and economic development. As expected, the project was sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBDR).¹¹⁹ The study was based on the projection of Indian economy and demography between 1956 and 1986 with alternative fertility scenarios; unchanged fertility level and 50% decline.¹²⁰

The results depict that fertility decline has a positive impact on economic development, whereas the annual growth in total output was found as 4.5% in the low fertility scenario, and 3.5% in the unchanged fertility scenario, and furthermore, per capita income was found to be 38% higher in low fertility scenario than the unchanged fertility.¹²¹

The model identified and the simulations quantified three negative effects of population growth:

- 1 A larger number of consumers tends to limit the mobilization of resources to promote economic growth and reduce private savings and the capability of the governments to collect funds for development.

117 Ibid., 23–24.

118 Arturo Escobar, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World," *Cultural Anthropology* 3, no. 4 (1988): 428–43.

119 Frank W., "Reminiscences: The Role of Foundations, the Population Association of America, Princeton University and the United Nations in Fostering American Interest in Population Problems."

120 Coale and Hoover Edgar M., *Population Growth and Economic Development*.

121 Ibid., 273–81.

- 2 Increased youth dependency forces the government to invest more in new housing, new schools, and new medical facilities at the expense of factories, machinery, and roads that were believed to yield higher returns.
- 3 Less saving, less investment, and less consumption per capita reduce the productivity of the labor force.¹²²

The core of their argument was simple, attractive, and applicable to all developing countries: that reducing population growth would always mean more funds for capital investment as there would be fewer dependents and less spending on consumption and social needs. This approach puts the spotlight on population growth rates in the developing countries as a constraint on economic growth rates.

After the Coale-Hoover thesis, population control became fully embedded into the heart of developmentalist discourse and was mentioned as an indispensable part of the national development plans of most developing countries in the 1960s. Furthermore, it also became an essential criterion for the international lending agreements of IMF and World Bank, together with US foreign aid policy.¹²³

2.2.4 *Institutionalization of Global Population Control after WWII*

After the decay of the Malthusian and eugenic international organizations and conferences by WWII, the very first institution to deal with the world population on a global scale was the Population Commission established at UN in 1946. Yet, neither the Commission nor any other state dared to officially interfere in population control activities or provide assistance to a developing country until 1965.¹²⁴

122 Ibid., 284–91.

123 Allen C. Kelley, "The Population Debate in Historical Perspective: Revisionism Revised," in *Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World*, ed. Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 24–54.

124 Rafael M. Salas, *International Population Assistance: The First Decade* (Oxford ; New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), XV–XIX.

In the early 1950s, birth control was a controversial and sensitive issue in the US, as in most other parts of the world.¹²⁵ Even so, 41st president of the US, George H. W. Bush, recounts how his father lost his bid for reelection to the Senate in 1950 due to his alleged support for birth control. He adds that birth control was a taboo, not only because of religious opposition, but mainly because many people were unwilling to discuss the issue in public, considering it as a private matter.¹²⁶

The US government was not the only one reluctant to participate directly in international population control assistance. Agencies at the UN were also slow to see a role for themselves in this area. Regulation in population growth was universally regarded as a sensitive political issue, and intervention was strongly resisted by the members during the 1950s and early 1960s. Some of the most sustained opposition came from Catholic countries and from the Soviet Union. The former due to its religious interpretation, which restricts the contraception,¹²⁷ and the latter by blaming the economic policies of the colonial powers for creating the circumstances of rapid population growth.¹²⁸

Opposition was so strong that WHO was about to split apart over the question of involvement in family planning in 1952. WHO and most health officials took the position that birth control information and services should be provided in conjunction with health services, while several member governments, including those of Ceylon and India, had already asked the organization to give attention to. In response, representatives of Catholic nations flatly refused to provide any research or technical assistance in the areas of population and family planning, and even threatened to withdraw from the organization. Numbers vary,

125 Oscar Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth, The Springer Series on Demographic Methods, and Population Analysis* (Boston, MA: Springer US, 1995), 14.

126 Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973), VII.

127 Norman St. John-Stevás, "A Roman Catholic View of Population Control," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 25, no. 3 (1960): 445–69.

128 Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh, "The New Politics of Population," *Population and Development Review* 20 (1994): 3–34.

but WHO officials believed that as many as one-third of member governments could withdraw from the WHO.¹²⁹

The UN Population Commission had no political agenda on population too. The commission, headed by the most prominent demographers of the day; Frank W. Notestein, Kingsley Davies, Ansley J. Coale of the US, David Glass of UK, and Albert Savvy of France, was busy compiling and consolidating population data, preparing statistical yearbooks, setting international census standards, training demographers in the regional centers UN established in Bombay (1956), Santiago (1957), and Cairo (1963), and organizing World Population Conferences.¹³⁰

These conferences were particularly important in setting the ground for global population policy agendas. The first global conference organized by UN was held in Rome in 1954 with the participation of 500 experts from 70 countries, including Turkey.¹³¹ More than 400 scientific papers were presented on various aspects of population issues, including techniques for demographic measurements, fertility, and mortality trends in developed and developing regions, international migration, and demographic aspects of economic and social development.¹³²

The “population problem” in developing regions was predominantly acknowledged at the conference, but with no single paper or recommendation on population control or family planning. However, at the second conference, held eleven years later held in Belgrade, a full-fledged family

129 Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, “The World Health Organization and the Population Issue: Organizational Values in the United Nations,” *Population and Development Review* 2, no. 3/4 (1976): 367–93.

130 Frank W. Notestein, “Demographic Work of the United Nations,” *Population Index* 16, no. 3 (1950): 184.

131 The participants from Turkey were, the director of Turkish Central Statistical Office, Prof. Sefik Inan and his deputy, Ratip Yuceuluğ, but no paper was presented.

132 United Nations, “Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Rome 1954: Summary Report,” E/CONF.13/412 (New York: United Nations, 1955).

planning session was organized to discuss achievements, plans, and strategies for combating the “population explosion.”¹³³

By 1970, some thirty nation-states, together accounting for 74% of world’s population, had already changed their official policies to reduce population growth.¹³⁴ And the “heroic work” on population control, as the first president of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) Rafael M. Salas admitted in retrospect was done by the private agencies and the US based foundations.¹³⁵

2.2.5 *The US based Private Initiation*

Individuals, organizations, and foreign policy elites played a pivotal role in shaping the global hegemonic construction of US leadership by establishing the plausibility of the new arguments among other nations and creating a global consensus through their networks in other countries, within the US government and in local public.¹³⁶

This was especially true for sensitive taboos such as population control, as these organizations, supported primarily by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, were able to provide financial, intellectual, and material support for population control in developing world through their well-established networks and transnational business ties.¹³⁷ Without the direct involvement of the US government, they could be much more

133 United Nations, “Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Belgrade 1965, Volume II: Fertility, Family Planning, Mortality,” E/CONF.41/3 (New York: United Nations, 1967), 253–320.

134 Mauldin, “Assessment of National Family Planning Programs in Developing Countries,” 31.

135 Rafael M Salas, *The Multilateral Approach to Population* (Oxford [England] : New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), 15.

136 Stephen Alexander Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II” (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2015), 15–16.

137 Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 1–31.

flexible and less constrained by national borders, national authority, bureaucratic inertia and political backlash.¹³⁸

As noted earlier, the very first private funders on demography before WWII were the Rockefeller Fund and the Milbank Memorial Fund, as they were the principal donors of OPR and other scientific enterprises, most of which were published in the “Milbank Quarterly,” one of the earliest demographic journals.¹³⁹ However, it was not until 1952, when resistance to an international solution for family planning became apparent after the crisis at WHO, that the private initiative accelerated. John D. Rockefeller 3rd had already been dissatisfied with the Rockefeller Foundation's reluctance to prioritize population work in the 1940s and early 1950s, and gathered the leading demographers, scientists, and administrators for a conference shortly after the WHO meeting.¹⁴⁰

Having the Malthusian concerns on the minds with eugenic, anti-communist agenda, the conclusion of the meeting was to help those societies already in need of population control assistance and to make the rest of the Third World “understand” the existence of their population problem by influencing local opinion and policy, such as training local scholars at home or abroad, conducting seminars and KAP surveys, and establishing research centers. Thus, a new organization, the Population Council, was established and became the world's leading institute for policy-oriented research in demography and contraception. It also became a nexus for the rest of the major intellectual studies and the field works on population control in the 1950s and early 1960s.¹⁴¹

That same year, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) was founded by family planning organizations from the US, UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India at a conference in Mumbai. Unlike the Population

138 Connolly, “Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty.”

139 Kiser et al., “The Work of the Milbank Memorial Fund in Population since 1928.”

140 Connolly, “Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” 219.

141 Connolly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*, 154–59.

Council, which kept a low public profile and maintained its organizational legitimacy by promoting itself as a scientific, politically neutral, non-propagandistic organization, the IPPF sought to build its support network by reaching out broadly to the public mostly by using media outlets such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television and public lectures, and conferences to promote publicity of birth control and increase acceptance of its use.¹⁴²

Both organizations were largely funded by the Ford Foundation, which had devoted \$ 100 million over 16 years to combat the world's population problems, more than any other public or private entity. The Foundation has played a major role in three general areas of population work: the establishment and/or expansion of college centers for population studies in the US, support for population programs in developing countries, and finally, research and training in reproductive biology, on which 54% of the funding was spent.¹⁴³

Indeed, from the beginning, the search for better contraceptive technology was one of the main targets of both the Population Council and IPPF, but with different methods and motivations. IPPF defined the purpose of contraception as a method that allows an individual woman or couple to choose when and how many children to have. Therefore, they supported contraceptive techniques with high user responsibility such as oral contraceptives, known as "the pill."¹⁴⁴

In contrast, the Population Council sought to influence the development and invention of new contraceptive technologies so that they would best serve its goal of mass stabilization of world population growth, especially in the Third World. As a result, the Council's conceptualization of the "ideal" contraceptive was a technology that meant little responsibility

142 Suzanne A. Onorato, "Organizational Legitimacy and the Social Construction of Contraceptives: The Politics of Technological Choice" (PhD Thesis, Duke University, 1990), 169–99.

143 Oscar Harkavy, Lyle Saunders, and Anna L. Southam, "An Overview of the Ford Foundation's Strategy for Population Work," *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 541–52.

144 Onorato, "Organizational Legitimacy and the Social Construction of Contraceptives: The Politics of Technological Choice," 223–26.

for the user, was inexpensive and had a long-term effectiveness, such as the intrauterine device (IUD).¹⁴⁵

Both pills and IUDs were assessed, and developed in the late 1950s, and both were approved by US Food and Drug Administration, FDA, in 1960. In some views, this was “single most important medical advance of the twentieth century in terms of improving women’s health” and “one of the greatest successes of reproductive medicine.”¹⁴⁶

The pills were more a product of the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s, and some 10 of 13 million users worldwide were from developed countries.¹⁴⁷ However, they were already on the Turkish market as early as 1961, some four years before the manufacture and distribution of contraceptives became legal. It was introduced and classified by the Ministry of Health as a hormonal preparation but used as an oral contraceptive.¹⁴⁸ This issue was also one of the debates in parliamentary discussions during the approval of population planning item as an inevitable part of the national planning in 1962. A delegate Suat Seren and his fifteen associates have asked to remove population planning section, reasoning that all the contraceptive items were already available on the market.¹⁴⁹

The IUDs on the other hand, were the primary means of birth control in less developed countries because they were relatively cheap, easy to administer, providing faster and measurable results for reducing population.¹⁵⁰ By 1967, IUDs were manufactured in India, Egypt, Pakistan, Hong

145 Ibid., 226–29.

146 John Frederick Kantner and Andrew Kantner, *International Discord on Population and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 22.

147 Lara V. Marks, *Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 184.

148 Robert H. Smith, *Contraceptive Distribution in the Commercial Sector of Turkey* (Westinghouse Population Center, Health Systems Division, April 1974), 31–32.

149 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 6, Meeting No: 7, November 10, 1962), 237–39.

150 Frank W. Notestein, “The Population Council and the Demographic Crisis of the Less Developed World,” *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 553–60.

Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Turkey, and the necessary molds and raw materials were provided free of charge by the Population Council.¹⁵¹

In addition to biomedical research, an intensive family planning agenda was carried out for the less developed countries, primarily by Population Council grantees. In its very early years, the Population Council focused on scholarship, research grants, and institutional support for demographic, biological, and medical aspects of human reproduction and family planning, particularly in the less developed regions of the world. Within 15 years, the number of fellowship grants have reached 529, of which 404 went to scientists, physicians, and practitioners from under-developed countries.¹⁵² Thirty-seven of these fellowships were awarded to Turkey.¹⁵³ Moreover, the Council has established Population Studies Research Institutes in many developing countries including Turkey, to ensure the continuation of networking, surveys, and information flow.

In 1955, 1956, and 1957, a series of meetings were held under the auspices of the Population Council to develop and define general principles for promoting birth control overseas.¹⁵⁴ Turkey was also on the agenda, but it was too early to discuss birth control. Instead, the Rockefeller Foundation invited Professor H.J. Habakkuk of Oxford College to make presentation on "Population Increase and Economic Development" in Istanbul University Economy and Political Science divisions in March 1957.¹⁵⁵

As early as 1955, the Council had advised the Indian government to establish the FPP, and in 1959 another mission went to Pakistan for

151 Emily R. Merchant, "Prediction and Control: Global Population, Population Science, and Population Politics in the Twentieth Century" (PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 2015), 401.

152 Frederic Osborn, "The Population Council Fellowship Program," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1954): 118–19.

153 Aziz Küçük, "Hayırseverliğin Ötesi: Türkiye’de Nüfus ve Tarım Politikalarında Rockefeller Etkisi," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 2019, 1–26.

154 Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response*, 14.

155 Aydın Yalçın, "Bir konferans ‘Nüfus artışı ve iktisadi gelişme,’” *Forum*, April 1, 1957.

technical assistance.¹⁵⁶ As the leading specialized agency on population control, the Council was asked by a number of developing countries, including Taiwan, Tunisia, South Korea, and Turkey, to help establish national FPPs between 1961 and 1963h. By 1965, the Council had expanded its technical assistance program to Thailand, the Philippines, Kenya, Morocco, and Iran.¹⁵⁷

2.2.6 *A Hidden Global Soft Power*

Until the early 1960s, the global population control activities were coordinated by these private organizations. The US government and the institutions of UN avoided becoming politically involved in this delicate matter. On the other hand, in line with the developmentalist discourse, global financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IBRD, and the IMF had already begun to criticize higher fertility rates of developing nations in their country reports as early as 1949.

In the early report on the mission to Colombia, the World Bank expressed concern about the impact of the exorbitant growth of the rural population on economic development and the decline in productivity.¹⁵⁸ A 1949 IBRD economic report for Turkey also highlights the similar comments about the excessive population but foresaw no danger due to excessive cultivable areas.¹⁵⁹ Another report for Ceylon in 1953 was bold enough to urge the government to take immediate action to initiate national family planning.¹⁶⁰ Yet, neither the report nor the Ceylonese

156 In 1959, East Bengal, now the independent country of Bangladesh, was also in the territory of Pakistan.

157 Chikako Takeshita, *The Global Biopolitics of the IUD* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012), 14.

158 Michele Alacevich, *The Political Economy of the World Bank, Early Years* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), 67.

159 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Economic Report on Turkey" (Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949).

160 Gary S. Kyzr-Sheerly, "The Evolution of Population Policies in The World Health Organization" in *The World Bank and The United Nations Fund For Population Activities* (Indiana University, 1980), 96.

government's persistent calls for international aid were heard at UN meetings.

These country reports and their recommendations have been taken seriously by the international donors during the negotiations for financial aid especially by the mid-1950s. And presumably population control should have been considered as an additional "hidden" criterion in these agreements.

In examining the loan agreements with various countries, no written evidence was found that specifically referred to population control, possibly because this issue might stir anti-colonial sentiments in the decolonizing world about the "growth of the poor, dark South under the control of the rich, white North," as one of the senior World Bank officials admitted.¹⁶¹ However, there is some evidence of this conditionality from other sources. For example, during discussions on population control in the Turkish Assembly in 1962, Deputy Prime Minister Turhan Feyzioğlu stated that not only the IMF and IBDR, but also the NATO missions were constantly urging them to lower the fertility rates.¹⁶²

Furthermore, the hidden soft power of these global institutions to impose population planning on developing countries in the late 1950s and 1960s was more evident as part of the developmentalist discourse. Not only did these global institutions set the developmentalist debate in motion by sponsoring Coale and Hoover's work on the inverse relationship between development and population, discussed in the previous sections, but they also ensured that the population control policies were mentioned in the national development reports of all developing countries indebted to the IMF or the World Bank.

Jan Tinbergen, a senior economist, and advent defender of the developmentalist thinking, was appointed by the Turkish and Indonesian governments as a senior consultant for the preparation of their national development reports. However, it was the OECD and the World Bank that forced these governments, which were in the midst of a financial crises

161 Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*, 245.

162 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*), November 10, 1962), 239–41.

and in desperate needed of foreign loans, to accept foreign expertise, and they named Tinbergen in particular.¹⁶³ And he further advised during the process that the reports should be written according to the Harrod-Do-mar model, which puts the population growth as an impediment to economic growth as it is believed to reduce savings the resources.¹⁶⁴

2.2.7 *Into a Full-Fledged International Support*

The idea of population control was gradually put on the agenda by the US government on various occasions. In 1959, the Presidential Advisory Board known as the “Draper Committee,” which was commissioned to study on the US Military Assistance Program, produced a formal recommendation to assist developing countries control their populations. The aid package consisted of monetary assistance, technical and knowhow transfer, maternal and child welfare programs, and research programs in coordination with the UN.¹⁶⁵

This first official mention of the global population problem in a report on international military assistance is a clear indication that controlling population in the developing world was more a matter of security for the US hegemonic enterprise. The “taboo” remained however, and President Eisenhower responded, “This government will not, as long as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with the problem of birth control. That is not our business.”¹⁶⁶

US hesitation continued under the first Catholic President Kennedy, who called birth control a personal and national decision and refused to link it to economic development.¹⁶⁷ Authorization for foreign aid was

163 Erwin Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen (1903–1994) and the Rise of Economic Expertise* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 309.

164 Monica Das Gupta, John Bongaarts, and John Cleland, “Population, Poverty, and Sustainable Development: A Review of the Evidence,” *Policy Research Working Paper* (The World Bank, 2011).

165 The President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, “Composite Report” (Washington D.C., 1959), 96–97.

166 Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response*, 45–46.

167 *Ibid.*, 72–73.

finally signed in December 1963, by President Johnson, who in 1965 had quoted, "Let us act on the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth."¹⁶⁸

The funds were distributed through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided well over half of all international aid, both public and private between 1967 and 1973.¹⁶⁹

Turkey was the first major government to receive family planning assistance in the form of a \$ 3.6 million loan to purchase 1,400 jeeps and audiovisual equipment for rural family planning network, which turned out to be a major disappointment and only half of the loan was materialized.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the Turkish government purchased the full set of equipment on the local market.¹⁷¹

The resistance that still existed to the active involvement of the UN in supporting family planning was largely overcome in 1967 by the establishment of a semi-independent trust fund, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). Not only the changing attitude of the US government, but also the personal efforts of John D. Rockefeller 3rd had a major impact on the creation of this new organization when he distributed "The World Leaders' Statement" to the presidents of developing countries in 1966 and obtained the signatures of thirty countries.¹⁷² The statement, which affirmed that "the ability to decide the number and spacing of children is a basic human right," was submitted to the Secretariat of UN as evidence of world readiness for family planning and was additional leverage for UN to establish UNFPA.¹⁷³

168 Ibid., 78.

169 Peter J. Donaldson, *Nature Against Us: The United States and the World Population Crisis, 1965-1980* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 48.

170 Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response*, 129.

171 Prime Ministry, "Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı ihtiyacı için Jeep, Yedek Parça, Nüfus Planlaması için Tavsiye ve Eğitim Materyalinin satın alınması" (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.18.1.2 / 223.62.6, August 16, 1968).

172 United Nations Economic and Social Council, "General Discussions on International Economic and Social Policy," E/SR.1480, 43rd Session (Geneva, July 11, 1967).

173 Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth*, 53.

Turkish Minister Süleyman Demirel was also among the recipients of the draft statement circulated. Even though the population planning law was already passed a year ago, Demirel, who was aware of the discussions within UN, refused to sign it by stating:

“I strongly believe that the achievement of aspiration at the international level should be realized through the medium of an international forum representing the consensus of a majority of the nations, i.e., the UN organization. Apparently, the time is not yet ripe for such a venture. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that declarations by a comparatively small group carry with them the danger of further controversy already existing with regard to extremely sensitive problem.”¹⁷⁴

Surprisingly, the Soviet delegation had changed its irreconcilable Marxist position on population control and acknowledged it as an acute problem in the UN assembly. Di Maio explains that twist with two motives. First, to avoid becoming irrelevant to the developing world and falling behind its other rival, China, which declared itself the intellectual and political leader of the Third World and was already pursuing a policy of population control. Second, to contain the high birth rates of Central Asian Muslims, who posed a threat to the dwindling European Slavic population.¹⁷⁵

The new organization allowed special funds to be used for specific purposes, so donors could avoid derailing their favorite programs in general assemblies.¹⁷⁶ Within two years, UNFPA became the largest and most influential multilateral organization in the field of population policy. As expected, the largest donor was USAID, they were in belief that UN aid to FPPs would be more politically acceptable and legitimate for many

174 Prime Ministry, “Milletlerarası Aile Planlaması konusunda Başbakan Süleyman Demirel ile John D. Rockefeller 3rd Arasındaki Yazışmalar” (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.1.0.0/ 9.52.1, January 31, 1967).

175 Di Maio, “The Soviet Union and Population,” 110–12.

176 Finkle and McIntosh, “The New Politics of Population,” 8–11.

Third World countries than aid offered by a single developed country, particularly the US.¹⁷⁷

Summary of 2.2

This section depicted the conceptualization of the population control ideology and its institutionalization process for its transfer to the developing world. As the prominent French demographer Alfred Sauvy noted as early as 1949, the fear of world overpopulation reemerged with the demise of colonialism, internationalism, and the rise of the hegemonic rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union on the world domination. And world demography was another venue of the interplay.¹⁷⁸

The issues mentioned in this section such as expansion of the long-studied demographic transition theory to the global sphere in the 1930s, the transformation of the theory from an outcome of modernization to an independent variable after WWII, the focus on measuring “unmet need” through KAP surveys, and finally attaching population control to developmentalist discourse in the late 1950s, had some inevitable correlations with the shift in US foreign policy from internationalism and the anti-colonial agenda in the 1930s to Cold War rivalry after the WWII.

The need for an immediate solution to the “overpopulation problem” led to the creation of more effective and stimulating conceptualizations for the Third World such as “unmet need” and population control as a precondition of the development.

In addition to the changes in the theoretical ground, the US based private foundations had created a flexible organization and used their political, social, and economic connections to promote the movement in the developing world and also among the US government and international associations that were reluctant to intervene. Yet international institutions, especially the financial ones, did not hesitate to put additional

177 Donaldson, *Nature Against Us: The United States and the World Population Crisis, 1965-1980*, 119–24.

178 Alfred Sauvy, “Alfred Sauvy on the World Population Problem: A View in 1949,” *Population and Development Review* 16, no. 4 (1990): 759–74.

pressure on developing countries to adopt population control policies in the context of the developmentalist discourse.

However, all these hard efforts at the global sphere to change the population control discourse and to create effective networks with developing world would not be a meaningful pursuit without the consent of national and individual spheres, which had their own reasons and justifications for switching to antinatalist policies.

§ 2.3 Population Control in National Sphere

This dissertation refutes the notion that the population control movement of the 1960s was a top-down global hegemonic infusion. Instead, it argues that the ideology was equally developed at both the national and individual spheres with different tools, but for the same purpose, to improve the quality of the good life.

This section elaborates the driving forces of population control policies in the national sphere. What did population mean to a developing nation in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of a decolonization approach? How did it affect the capability and functioning of the nation/ruling elites? And mostly what were the economic, political, and social factors that led governments to change their parameters towards antinatalism and interact with the global sphere? These are the main questions that this section seeks to answer by analyzing the changing social, economic, and political conditions in the twenty developing countries that led them to accept population control policies before 1970.

Reminiscing the inception of the population control idea in the nineteenth century industrializing world, in which class conflicts, the French Revolution, and mass rural-urban migration caused unrest, and stimulated antinatalist ideas as a solution. This study contends that the developing nations of the decolonizing world in the 1950s and 1960s also struggled with some major key issues that ignited population control idea in the national sphere.




Figure 2.1 Countries accepted family planning until 1970. SOURCE: <https://historicalmapchart.net> with national borders as of 1965.

The key issues and commonalities, identified during the research process of the population literature of these twenty countries include internal migration, military coups, famines, economic crises, ethnic conflicts, and resource scarcity. In addition to these factors, the strong personal commitment of some of the heads of the state in these developing countries to antinatalist creed as a crucial part of the modernization and developmentalization process was critical key to uncover in a comparative fashion.

However, there were also some pronatalist currents during this period that showed appreciation for the poor lower classes over the ruling elites, even in the national sphere. Therefore, to demonstrate the pragmatic mentality of population change based on life forms and quality of life approaches, this section begins with some notable examples of the shifting policies between antinatalism and pronatalism.

2.3.1 *Pronatalism against Antinatalism*

One of the main assumptions of this dissertation is that population policy decisions are based on the changing impact of bare and unbearable life on the quality of good life, which is not necessarily move towards the antinatalist direction. Countries could adjust their population policies based on their changing capability and functioning.

In Communist China, population growth was perceived as proof of socialist virtue and birth control as a way to wipe out the Chinese people without bloodshed in the early years of the 1949 revolution.¹⁷⁹ Restrictions on access to contraception were soon relaxed after women were called upon to participate in “socialist construction” in the first Five-Year Plan for National Development of 1953-1957.¹⁸⁰ However, hostile confrontation with the two superpowers, and China’s isolation from technologically advanced countries in the late 1950s prompted Mao to endorse the 1958 “Great Leap Forward” movement, which envisioned labor-intensive industrialization and mass mobilization with a full-fledged pronatalist vision.¹⁸¹

In Indonesia, too, Sukarno, the first president after decolonization, presented the population question as one of exploiting the available labor power by mobilizing the masses. And he consistently dismissed the dire warnings of US-educated technocrats that Indonesia had a population problem that threatened the country’s development prospects during his reign until 1967.¹⁸²

In the case of Turkey, which we will discuss in more detail in the next chapters, the rural masses were perceived as voting stock for the DP government in the 1950s. Although they shared the modernist and developmentalist vision of the West and had a heavy economic debt that made them vulnerable to the intrusion of foreign developmentalist ideologies—including population control, the antinatalist demands from the West were persistently rejected by government officials. Even after family planning was legalized, DP’s political heir AP government did not sign the World Leader’s Statement for accepting population control in 1966, and

179 John S. Aird, “Population Policy in Mainland China,” *Population Studies* 16, no. 1 (1962): 38–57.

180 Susan Greenhalgh and Edwin A. Winckler, *Governing China’s Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 65.

181 *Ibid.*, 55–75.

182 Brad Simson, “Indonesia’s ‘Accelerated Modernization’ and the Global Discourse of Development, 1960-1975,” *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 10 (2009): 467–86.

was reluctant to enforce the law, largely for fear of provoking rural constituencies.

In Egypt, although President Nasser expressed concern that the increase in fertility might hinder development and supported birth control initiated by the Egyptian women's movement in the mid-1950s, he soon downplayed his support for these activities for fear of arousing conservative religious opposition.¹⁸³ Moreover, after the construction of the huge Aswan Dam with Russian help and the unification with Syria to form the United Arab Republic in the late 1950s, Nasser became more confident that economic development could absorb the population increase.¹⁸⁴

The above cases confirm that higher population size could still be an advantage for some developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s when it came to economic or territorial expansion and power consolidation through votes. Yet, many developing countries, including those mentioned above, adopted population control policies by the mid-1960s, when the masses were no longer a comfort but a burden to national governments.

2.3.2 *Neo-Malthusian Concerns*

A popular neo-Malthusian and environmentalist myth about the population control movement, still valid today, was simply the “population bomb” of the Third World as a result of the rapidly declining mortality rates after WWII, and fears that this population flow would diminish scarce resources.¹⁸⁵

However, this dissertation argues that this assumption is an oversimplification and misleading for the Third World, with the exception of the Indian Peninsula, where the idea of the population bomb originated.¹⁸⁶

183 Laura Kathleen Landolt, “Norms, Population Control, USAID and Egypt” (PhD Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2004), 121.

184 Haifaa AM El Salam Shanawany, “Family Planning; An Equilibrium Response to Demographic Conditions in The United Arab Republic (Egypt)” (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1967), 226–30.

185 Paul R Ehrlich, *Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986).

186 *Ibid.*, 1–2.

Table 2.1 demonstrates the average annual population growth of countries that accepted population control before 1970 for the period between 1950-1956 and between 1960-1965. Since fifteen of twenty countries did not enforce population control policies until 1965, one could expect to see a visible increase between these two periods to confirm the population bomb assumption.

Table 2.1 Change in population growth 1950-1965

Country	Population Planning Law	Average annual pop. growth % 1950 – 1956	Average annual pop. growth % 1960 - 1965	Change %
India	1952	1.71	2.05	20%
Pakistan	1960	1.51	2.48	64%
South Korea	1961	2.27	2.63	16%
China	1962	1.98	1.85	-7%
Tunisia	1964	1.79	1.70	-5%
Turkey	1965	2.51	2.40	-4%
Egypt	1965	2.54	2.67	5%
Sri Lanka	1965	1.93	2.36	22%
Singapore	1965	4.89	2.79	-43%
Kenya	1966	2.79	3.20	15%
Malaysia	1966	2.83	3.11	10%
Nepal	1966	1.88	1.65	-12%
Jamaica	1966	1.88	1.51	-20%
Iran	1967	2.39	2.61	9%
Bangladesh	1967	2.10	2.86	36%
Indonesia	1968	2.11	2.67	27%
Morocco	1968	3.12	2.87	-8%
Taiwan	1968	3.79	3.42	-10%
Dominic	1968	3.25	3.26	0%
Ghana	1969	2.58	3.08	19%

SOURCE: World Population Prospect 2019.¹⁸⁷

However, the figures show that only five of these twenty countries had population growth of 20% or more between the 1950s and 1960s, and

187 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Population Prospects 2019: Volume I: Comprehensive Tables," 55–66.

all were from South and Southeast Asia. Ironically, nine of the twenty countries that accepted the Population Control Act, including China and Turkey, had lower annual population growth rates in the 1960s than a decade earlier, which is a good indication not to rely solely on the population bomb assumption.

On the other hand, Malthusian claims about resource scarcity as a motive for population control policies are partially true for some countries, especially those with geographic limitations. Taiwan, a small island about 90 miles off the southeast coast of China, had one of the highest population densities in the world in 1965, with more than 350 persons per square kilometer, who concentrated in western part of the island as the eastern half is mountainous.¹⁸⁸ The country then immediately switched on to antinatalist policies, despite the fact that the population was already slowing down.

In Singapore too, population density and the lack of resources was a problem. Even though the annual rate of population growth had already slowed down dramatically from 4.89% to 2.89% between the 1950s and 1960s due to the availability of family planning services without the direct influence of international groups, the new government declared the official FPP immediately after gaining independence in 1965.¹⁸⁹

In Nepal, the population problem was not the population per square kilometer, which was considerably low, but the population density that had accumulated on a very limited arable land and resources within the mountainous terrain.¹⁹⁰

188 G. Cernada et al., "Taiwan's Population and Family Planning Efforts : An Historical Perspective," *International Quarterly of Community Health Education* 27, no. 2 (2007): 99–120.

189 James T. Fawcett and Siew-Ean Khoo, "Singapore: Rapid Fertility Transition in a Compact Society," *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 4 (1980): 549–79.

190 Nanda R Shrestha, "A Preliminary Report on Population Pressure and Land Resources in Nepal," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 16, no. 2 (1982): 197–212.

2.3.3 Urbanization

What appears to distinguish these twenty developing countries between the 1950s and 1960s more than population growth is rapid urbanization. Table 2.2 shows that twelve of these twenty countries that had population control policies before 1970 experienced a net increase in urbanization rate of 30% or more between 1950 and 1965, while five of them, including China, achieved solid urbanization growth of over 50%. The least progress in urbanization was recorded by India, with only 11% growth, not to mention Singapore and Taiwan, where the full urbanization rate had already been reached in 1950.

Reading Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 together, the negative correlation between population growth and urbanization in some countries is striking. For instance, Indian peninsula, a champion in population growth had the lowest rate of urbanization, and China, a forerunner in urbanization, experienced negative population growth. The affinity between urbanization and fertility decline has long been studied. As Martine et al. pointed out, urbanization is a major vehicle in promoting a variety of social changes affecting the fertility transition.¹⁹¹ These factors affecting individual fertility behavior are the subject of the individual sphere and will be discussed in the last chapter.

In governmental point of view that inverse relationship between urbanization and fertility had much contributed the popularity of family planning among both urban dwellers and rural migrants in the developing world in the 1960s, providing an additional leverage for governments to adopt antinatalist policies. It was not only the changing fertility attitudes of rural migrants that stimulated further interest for contraceptives, but also the reluctance of urban locals to share limited resources

191 George Martine, José Eustáquio Diniz Alves, and Suzana Cavenaghi, *Urbanization and Fertility Decline: Cashing in on Structural Change*, vol. IIED Working Paper (London: IIED, 2013).

with newcomers that had reinforced advocacy of antiurbanization and population control.¹⁹²

Table 2.2 Change in urbanization 1950-1965

Country	Population Planning Law	Urbanization 1950 %	Urbanization 1965 %	Change %
India	1952	17.0	18.8	11%
Pakistan	1960	17.5	23.5	34%
South Korea	1961	21.4	32.4	51%
China	1962	11.8	18.1	53%
Tunisia	1964	32.3	39.7	23%
Turkey	1965	24.8	34.2	38%
Egypt	1965	31.9	39.7	24%
Sri Lanka	1965	15.3	17.6	15%
Singapore	1965	99.4	100.0	1%
Kenya	1966	5.6	8.6	54%
Malaysia	1966	20.4	29.9	47%
Nepal	1966	2.7	3.7	37%
Jamaica	1966	24.1	37.5	56%
Iran	1967	27.5	37.1	35%
Bangladesh	1967	4.3	6.2	44%
Indonesia	1968	12.4	15.8	27%
Morocco	1968	26.2	31.9	22%
Taiwan	1968	96.9	96.2	-1%
Dominic	1968	23.7	35.0	48%
Ghana	1969	15.4	26.1	69%

SOURCE: World Urbanization Prospect: The 2014 Revision.¹⁹³

Urbanization has been associated with numerous positive societal outcomes such as technological innovation, economic progress, and higher standards of living, but also linked to social and environmental problems that have significant implications for population policy change. As noted

192 Ned Levine, "Antiurbanization: An Implicit Development Policy in Turkey," *Journal of Developing Areas* 14, no. 4 (1980): 513–38.

193 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision," ST/ESA/SER.A/366 (New York: United Nations Publications, 2015), 204–14.

in the genealogy section, the Malthusian and eugenic concerns of the industrial West that gave rise to the population control movement in the global sphere were closely related to the urbanization process they had undergone in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the “unbearable” foreign labor immigration in the early twentieth century.

Moreover, the rapid urbanization in the developing world after WWII was incomparably more oppressive than urbanization in the industrial world, as it was completely unconventional in terms of scope and scale. First, the scale and speed of urbanization in the developing world after WWII was more than twice that of Europe and the US in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Western world had its own colonies from which it could extract resources from, and export the surplus population onto, while the developing world had to live with the limited resources mostly extracted by the West. And finally, these developing countries had no competitive edge to compete with the Western industrial giants.¹⁹⁴

In low-income settings, rapid rural-urban migration invariably leads to shortages of infrastructure, housing, and basic services (health, education, etc.) and poses financial and service delivery problems for responsible local governments and national agencies.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, this dissertation claims that rural-urban migration and rapid urbanization in post-WWII developing countries have exhausted the capability and functionalities of these developing country governments and triggered a series of problems for political and social stability that have also converted the migrants a major concern in the eyes of the government cadres.

In Malaysia, as in most of other developing countries that experienced the rapid growth after the 1950s, the rate of industrial growth was not sufficient to absorb the increase in the size of labor force accumulated in the urban areas, so urbanization became a transfer mechanism of both underemployment and unemployment from rural areas to cities, with their own housing, health, and education problems. The squatter areas

194 John D. Kasarda and Edward M. Crenshaw, “Third World Urbanization: Dimensions, Theories, and Determinants,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 17, no. 1 (1991): 467–501.

195 Cecilia Tacoli, Gordon McGranahan, and David Satterthwaite, *Urbanization, Rural-Urban Migration and Urban Poverty*, vol. IIED Working Paper (London: IIED, 2015).

that mushroomed were mostly outside formal administrative authority or beyond urban servicing capability, and they were the main source of the general rise in crime rates and juvenile delinquency in many Malaysian cities, which the government was unable to cope with.¹⁹⁶

In Iran, population policy change is largely associated with the Shah's "White Revolution" program, which aimed to improve the legal and social status of women and increase their participation in social and economic life.¹⁹⁷ But more than that, the main impetus for the antinatalist program was the excessive rural exodus that resulted in Tehran's population increasing by 80% between 1956 and 1966 alone. The government had to invest much of its resources to provide jobs, housing, transportation, food, and public services such as health, education, and sanitation. Furthermore, the scarcity of critical resources such as arable land and water had put additional pressure on the urban population.¹⁹⁸

In China, it was Mao's labor-intensive industrialization enterprise and the massive rural exodus of the 1950s that triggered a chain of unfortunate events and paved the way for the most devastating catastrophe in human history: the Great Famine of 1959-1961. For China, the famine also represents the decisive end of the Great Move Forward and a turning point from pronatalism to antinatalism.¹⁹⁹

2.3.4 Famines

As mentioned in the case of China, famines, epidemics, and catastrophes are the strongest and most direct factors paralyzing the capabilities and functionings of governments, and population control has been one of key measures to reduce casualties in the medium term.

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- 196 Hamzah Sendut, "Contemporary Urbanization in Malaysia," *Asian Survey* 9, no. 6 (1966): 484-91.
 - 197 Akbar Aghajanian, "Population Change in Iran, 1966-86: A Stalled Demographic Transition?," *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 4 (1991): 703-15.
 - 198 Richard Moore, Khalil Asayesh, and Joel Montague, "Population and Family Planning in Iran," *Middle East Journal* 28, no. 4 (1974): 396-408.
 - 199 Zhongwei Zhao and Anna Reimondos, "The Demography of China's 1958-61 Famine: A Closer Examination," *Population* (English Edition) 67, no. 2 (2012): 281-308.

Ironically, it was not the shortage of agricultural production in China, but the excessive procurement of grain for use in the urban industrial areas, with serious miscalculations of urban needs and mismanagement of the process, which caused rural China to starve and some sixteen to forty million inhabitants to die.²⁰⁰

In India, where antinatalist policies were accepted at least a decade earlier than in any other developing country, a similar devastating famine occurred in the province of Bengal in 1943, killing some three million people. Sen claims that the famine was not caused by a reduced rice harvest due to unfavorable weather conditions or by the failure to import from Japanese-controlled Burma as asserted in the report of the Famine Commission of Inquiry, but primarily by rapidly rising rice prices due to wartime inflation, black market transactions, and inadequate relief efforts by colonial rulers and local governors.²⁰¹

Nevertheless, the Famine Inquiry Commission emphasized major set of inquiries concerning the Malthusian relationship between food supply and population and urged local governors to consider limiting population to preserve limited resources.²⁰² The request was rejected by the colonial government, but the secretary of that commission, R. A. Gopalswami, who was to become census commissioner in 1951, was the key initiator of the first nationwide FPP in 1952.²⁰³

2.3.5 *Eugenic Agenda and Ethnic Conflicts*

Although the term “eugenic” disappeared from the global agenda and debates on population control after WWII, it was still discernable in some

200 Xin Meng, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared, “The Institutional Causes of China’s Great Famine, 1959–1961,” *The Review of Economic Studies* 82, no. 4 (2015): 1568–1611.

201 Amartya Sen, “Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach and Its Application to the Great Bengal Famine,” *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1, no. 1 (1977): 33–59.

202 Sarah Hodges, “Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 19, no. 11 (2004): 1157–63.

203 Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth*, 129–30.

parts of the developing world, especially in countries with a heterogeneous ethnic distribution.

In India, overpopulation was a concern of local elites for a variety of reasons, including gender equality and maternal health, but also neo-Malthusianism and eugenics.²⁰⁴

The population report of the National Planning Committee, chaired by the future prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1940, concluded that the population should be reduced to manageable numbers in order to increase opportunities for education, sanitation, income, and recreation, but with special attention to the system of representation on the basis of divisions according to caste, community, and religion. Therefore, aside from the positive eugenic measures to increase the decaying upper Hindu castes, such as like inter-cast marriage and encouraging widow remarriage, family planning was recommended for the lower castes and for Muslims to increase the “quality” of the population.²⁰⁵

The Indian government, however, was cautious not to create any misunderstanding about the eugenic view after gaining independence, and therefore the first national development report, which first announced the family planning in 1951, emphasized the suitability of birth control for “all classes.”²⁰⁶ Yet, research on the fertility differences among different social and economic groups was still attached to the government-funded field works.²⁰⁷

After recognizing the ineffectiveness of the early years, which Samuel refers to as the “experimental phase,” the Indian government introduced an aggressive population control program in 1961 with the Third NDP, which included voluntary sterilization, permitting abortion, and importing cheap contraceptives.²⁰⁸

204 Connolly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,” 630–31.

205 National Planning Committee, “National Planning Committee Series: Population” (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1947), 130.

206 Government of India Planning Commission, “First Five-Year Plan - A Draft Outline” (Government of India Planning Commission, 1951), 207.

207 Connolly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,” 637.

208 Samuel, “The Development of India’s Policy of Population Control,” 54–58.

By the end of 1973, some 15 million Indians had been sterilized, and five million women had an IUD inserted. Although not enforced, the enticing financial public and private incentives for sterilization and IUD insertion created an “ad-hoc coercion” as Vicziani asserts, that applied primarily to the urban and rural poor and to members of the lower castes.²⁰⁹

In Malaysia, the weakening ethnic composition of the Malays vis-à-vis the Chinese and Indians was the main concern of the government, whereas the total fertility rate of the Malays in 1957 was one whole child lower than that of the Chinese population and more than 1.5 children lower than that of the Indians. In the early 1960s, however, the difference between Chinese and Malays reversed, and the higher fertility of Malay has persisted ever since. A similar shift in the relative positions of Malay and Indian fertility took place in the late 1960.²¹⁰

The Malaysian government made no attempt to introduce FPP selectively by ethnicity and made contraceptives available and accessible. Yet, it is interesting to note that unlike many other implementations including Turkish case, which the government focus on FPP implementation was more on the more fertile rural population, family planning services in Malaysia became available first in the urban areas, which were predominantly inhabited by the Chinese population.²¹¹

It was primarily the legislative and operational ethnic favoritism of the Malaysian government’s New Economic Program that produced the desired distribution of fertility among the different groups. The legal incentives given to the rural and poor Malays over the urban rich Chinese in various areas such as education, health, employment, and land settlement, created a considerable positive leverage on the social and

209 Marika Vicziany, “Coercion in a Soft State: The Family-Planning Program of India: Part I: The Myth of Voluntarism,” *Pacific Affairs* 55, no. 3 (1982): 373.

210 Pavalavalli Govindasamy and Julie DaVanzo, “Ethnicity and Fertility Differentials in Peninsular Malaysia: Do Policies Matter?,” *Population and Development Review* 18, no. 2 (1992): 243–67.

211 J. Timothy Johnson, “Influences on Family Planning Acceptance: An Analysis of Background and Program Factors in Malaysia,” *Studies in Family Planning* 10, no. 1 (1979): 15–24.

economic welfare of the rural Malay's and further degradation of the higher standards of the urban Chinese and Indians.²¹² This appears to have been the catalyst for the higher use of contraceptives by Chinese and Indians compared to Malays.²¹³

2.3.6 *Military Coups*

The power vacuum triggered by the decolonization process, undermined by the Cold War rivalries, and exacerbated by the political, economic, and social instability of developing nations, had created favorable conditions for military intervention in the 1950s and 1960s. Insomuch that, between 1950 and 1969, 184 coups were plotted in fifty-one developing countries of which 98 of these attempts succeeded.²¹⁴

Six of these fifty-one countries that experienced military coups, Turkey, Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, Dominic, and Ghana, also changed their population policies from pronatalism to antinatalism shortly thereafter. This dissertation claims that periods during the military regime or martial laws induces population control in the following ways.

First the decision-making process is faster in military regimes than in any other form of governing mechanisms, especially compared to democracies. The idea of population control was already under discussion in all of these six countries before the coups, but without a solid political stance. In South Korea, for instance, the head of the Bureau of Medical Affairs in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs made unsuccessful proposals to start a national FPP program as early as 1956, which was refused by the government. However, family planning was accepted only three months later after the coup in May 1961.²¹⁵

212 Gavin W. Jones, "Fertility Transitions Among Malay Populations of Southeast Asia: Puzzles of Interpretation," *Population and Development Review* 16, no. 3 (1990): 507–37.

213 Johnson, "Influences on Family Planning Acceptance: An Analysis of Background and Program Factors in Malaysia."

214 Jonathan M Powell and Clayton L Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249–59.

215 Jae Mo Yang, Sook Bang, and Myung Ho Kim, "Fertility and Family Planning in Rural Korea," *Population Studies* 18, no. 3 (1965): 237–50.

Second, the notion of planning is the essence of military regime by its nature. Therefore, priority was given to all types of socioeconomic planning, including population planning. In Turkey, one of the very first decisions taken after the military revolution in May 1960 was to establish a State Planning Office (SPO), which was charged with preparing the first NPD thereafter, and just as in the case of India, this was the first document to mention population planning in Turkey.

Third, regarding the autocratic nature of the regime, religious, cultural, or traditional sentiments and prejudices against population control are much easier to curb. In Indonesia, the much-feared religious opposition was overcome by the Suharto Regime after the 1966 coup, when his deputies organized a series of panel discussions with various religious leaders until a national consensus on the morality of birth control changed from a strongly negative to a strongly positive attitude.²¹⁶

In Pakistan,²¹⁷ General Ayub Khan, also took a firm stand against religious objections to birth control by stating, "Religion is for the betterment of mankind, and no good religion can stand in the way of human progress and happiness."²¹⁸ In Turkey, it is no coincident that not only was the Population Planning Law triggered by the 1960 coup, but also the much-discussed Law of Abortion in 1983 was a byproduct of the 1980 coup's military regime. The democratic governments between 1965 and 1980 could not dare to put this sensitive issue on their agenda, which was only discussed in health councils and private health associations.²¹⁹

Furthermore, the need for international legitimacy of military regimes leads them to adapt to international standards, requirements, or

216 Terence H. Hull, "Formative Years of Family Planning in Indonesia," in *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs*, ed. Warren A. Robinson and John A. Ross (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), 235–56.

217 Pakistan was consisted of the eastern (today's Pakistan) and the western wings (today's Bangladesh) until the partition in 1971.

218 B. Maxwell Stamper, "Demographic Considerations and Population Policies in Development Planning: A Survey of Third World Countries with Case Studies of Bangladesh and Pakistan" (PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1979), 90–98.

219 Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Türkiye'de Kürtajın Kısa Tarihi," *Bianet*, 2012.

movements such as population control much more quickly. In Ghana, after the coup in 1966, the new military regime focused on eliminating the socialist affiliations of the previous Nkrumah government and invited Western advisory and aid for national development. In this regard Ford Foundations guidance was instrumental not only in economic planning but also in the transition to population control policies.²²⁰

Finally, the distinction between the self and the other is even more profound in military regimes because of the hegemonic security priorities. Accordingly, the good, bare, and unbearable life forms asserted in this dissertation are much crystallized during these periods as the tendency is to keep all life forms under control and surveillance, where population control methods became useful.

In Indonesia, Suharto and his advisors viewed the population problem as a source of economic stagnation, food insecurity, and social conflict that they feared would expand the influence of the “unbearable” Indonesian Communist Party. Therefore, family planning, especially in rural areas, appeared to be a key instrument for national security.²²¹

2.3.7 *Economic Crisis and Search for Economic Aid*

This dissertation argues that economic crises in the developing countries have dual effects on population policies in the national sphere. First, these crises dramatically reduce the capability and functionings of governments and further deteriorate the living conditions of the masses, that can easily lead to social unrest, political instability, and even military coups. Second, a country suffering from economic crises and in dire need of foreign loans for a quick recovery is much more vulnerable to foreign hegemonic intervention. These loans are usually conditioned on limited investment, guided spending and strict economic planning, including population planning.

220 Holly Ashford, “Population Control Development, and Ghana’s National Family Planning Programme 1960-1972,” *The Historical Journal* 63, no. 2 (2020): 469–93.

221 Simson, “Indonesia’s ‘Accelerated Modernization’ and the Global Discourse of Development, 1960-1975, 480.

All these effects are traceable for those developing countries that experienced economic crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Turkey, the economic boom that had been fueled by the international favorable conjuncture due to Korean War had subsided by the end of the 1950s. Besides, the huge foreign debt invested in arbitrary projects with little marginal utility, and other factors such as poor harvest instigated a monetary crisis and currency devaluation in 1958.

The Menderes government had to comply with the IMF's requests to establish a planning commission in order to obtain further foreign loans to overcome the acute crises. But it had no intention of allowing the commission to work or of attending to its advice on planning, including population planning. The relapse into economic hardship accompanied by social unrests prepared the ground for the military coup in May 1960, arguably with some degree of hegemonic intervention. The premature Planning Commission was immediately reactivated as a much stronger institution (SPO) and the first national planning was issued in 1963 with the population control policy attached.

In similar fashion, the economic and financial difficulties experienced by the Sukarno government in Indonesia were largely stemmed from its overdependence on foreign trade revenues, which began to decline in the late 1950s largely as a consequence of unfavorable world market conditions for rubber and other commodities. The authorities proved unable to compensate for the revenue losses by increasing other domestic revenues and therefore opted for deficit financing, primarily from the Soviet Union, as the most convenient route to maintain desired levels of expenditure.²²² Economic vulnerability and poverty spilled over into political instability in the 1960s, and the country became a major contesting area of the Cold War rivalry.

The escalating chaos between communists and anti-communist cadres ended with the mass murder of a million civilians and left the country virtually bankrupt. Economic activity ground to a halt, inflation

222 Miron Mushkat, "Is Indonesia Poised for an Economic Takeoff?," *Asian Perspective* 15, no. 1 (1991): 157–85.

topped 600 percent and the government had lost control by the time the pro-American General Suharto came to power in 1966. And a Western aid package, including economic loans, financial planners, and family planning consultants flooded into the country to adapt the developmentalist discourse to the capitalist framework, in which antinatalist policies were embedded.²²³

In Ghana, too, the catastrophic decline in the international price of cocoa, the waste of resources on unproductive prestige projects, and increasing corruption among government officials were the harbingers of the impending civil unrest and the military coup that paved the way for control of the population.²²⁴

For some developing countries in economic depression, the shift to population control policies was not inevitable, but a cunning move to attract foreign investment and international funds allocated for population control.²²⁵ In Kenya, the desire of the global sphere to share a success story in a population control in sub-Saharan Africa, met with the country's need to utilize a market-oriented development strategy that requires foreign investment. Hodgson and Watkins define these very distinct visions of global and the national sphere as an intricate *pas de deux* that has developed between Kenyan elites and members of the international population movement.²²⁶ Chimbwete et al. assert that Kenyan elites had no intention or interest in population control but accepted the Population Planning Law to gain access to international donor funds in ways that they preferred. They further state that World Bank officials were

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- 223 Simson, "Indonesia's 'Accelerated Modernization' and the Global Discourse of Development, 1960-1975, 467-86.
 - 224 William Burnett Harvey, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana: The Legal Profile of a Coup," *Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1187* (1966): 1096-112.
 - 225 Deborah Barrett and Amy Ong Tsui, "Policy as Symbolic Statement: International Response to National Population Policies," *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (1999): 213-33.
 - 226 Dennis Hodgson and Susan Watkins, "From Mercantilists to Neo-Malthusianism: International Population Movement and the Transformation of Population Ideology in Kenya" (*Paper presented at the Workshop on Social Processes Underlying Fertility Change in Developing Countries, Committee on Population, National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C., January 29, 1998*).

terrified to discover that the funds granted were not used for family planning activities but for infrastructural development.²²⁷

2.3.8 *Developmentalist and Modernist Discourses*

Developing countries, seeking ways to improve their capability and functioning out of social, political, and especially economic hardship, were allured with the global developmentalist discourse and its applicable methods, including NDP preparation with an antinatalist attachment.

In the Cold War era, there was a broad consensus on both sides about state intervention in the economy. The major achievements of Soviet industrialization, labelled by the five-year industrial plans, which had already begun in 1928, were proclaimed as a signifying proof of the superiority of the planned economy over the free-market economies which were being shaken by the Great Depression during the same period. In the early post war era, the Marshall Plan's success in aiding the recovery of Western Europe was also seen as another triumph of economic interventionist policy, this time in the capitalist economy.²²⁸

For many newly independent states in the 1950s and 1960s, the preparation of an NPD was almost as important as a symbol of national sovereignty, but it was also a prerequisite for foreign aid and had effective national and international promotional value.²²⁹ In his analysis of the NDPs of sixty countries in the 1970s and earlier, Stamper reveals that twenty-five of them supported population control and family planning.²³⁰ Following the formula created by Coale and Hoover in 1958, all of those NDPs that supported population control portrayed family planning as an

227 Chiweni Chimbwete, Susan Cotts Watkins, and Eliya Msiyaphazi Zulu, "The Evolution of Population Policies in Kenya and Malawi," *Population Research and Policy Review* 24, no. 1 (2005): 85–106.

228 Admos O. Chimhowu, David Hulme, and Lauchlan T. Munro, "The 'New' National Development Planning and Global Development Goals: Processes and Partnerships," *World Development* 120 (2019): 76–89.

229 B. Maxwell Stamper, *Population and Planning in Developing Nations: A Review of Sixty Development Plans for the 1970s* (New York: The Population Council, 1977), 17.

230 *Ibid.*, 24–70.

effective method of solving economic, social, and demographic problems to reach further economic growth.

Table 2.3 Population planning in the NDP.

Country	Population Planning Law	NDP referring to Family Planning	# of NDP
India	1952	1952	1 st
Pakistan	1960	1960	2 nd
South Korea	1961	1961	1 st
China	1962	1958	2 nd
Tunisia	1964	1962	1 st
Turkey	1965	1963	1 st
Egypt	1965	1965	2 nd
Sri Lanka	1965	1959	1 st
Singapore	1965	1966	1 st
Kenya	1966	1966	1 st
Malaysia	1966	1963	2 nd
Nepal	1966	1965	3 rd
Jamaica	1966	1963	1 st
Iran	1967	1962	3 rd
Bangladesh	1967	1973	1 st
Indonesia	1968	1969	1 st
Morocco	1968	1965	2 nd
Taiwan	1968	1965	4 th
Dominic	1968	1969	1 st
Ghana	1969	1963	1 st

SOURCE: Compiled from the NDP reports of each country.

As shown in Table 2.3, all these twenty countries that switched to population control before 1970, had some reference to family planning in their NDP reports. And with the exception of Singapore and Ghana, where the family planning laws were accepted priorly, these NDP reports were the first official documents evidencing to a population policy shift toward antinatalism.

In addition to developmentalist discourse, radical modernist leadership and personal commitment to population control at the national level played a critical role in the legalization process of national family

planning in some countries. In Tunisia, family planning was part of the modernization effort, initiated by national leader Habib Bourguiba. After gaining independence from France in 1956, some initial measures were taken, such as legalizing abortion after the fifth child and female sterilization. In 1962, the target of family planning was first established in the first national economic and social plan.²³¹ At the same time, the government started to discuss with the Ford Foundation and the Population Council about the support and agreed on a two-year experimental program.²³²

In Sri Lanka, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Minister of Health after gaining independence, was the first government official in the world to speak openly about population planning and birth control as early as 1949 at the Second World Health Assembly.²³³ A year later, he proposed WHO address the population problem, which was refused by a vote of 1 to 30.²³⁴ After becoming prime minister in 1956, Bandaranaike continued his efforts on family planning, and the government signed a bilateral agreement with the Swedish government in 1958 to support pilot family planning activities. Furthermore, a large amount of attention was devoted to population control in the first Ten-Year Development Plan of 1959.²³⁵

Conclusion of Chapter 2

As a conclusion of this chapter, not only the idea of population control a byproduct of a hegemonic global sphere, and the process was not a one-

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- 231 George F. Brown, "Tunisia: The Debut of Family Planning," in *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs*, ed. Warren A. Robinson and John A. Ross (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), 59–70.
 - 232 Warren G. Povey and George F. Brown, "Tunisia's Experience in Family Planning," *Demography* 5, no. 2 (1968): 620–26.
 - 233 Nicholas H. Wright, "Early Family Planning Efforts in Sri Lanka," in *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs*, ed. Warren A. Robinson (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), 341–62.
 - 234 World Health Organization, "Third World Health Assembly," 233–34.
 - 235 Stamper, *Population and Planning in Developing Nations: A Review of Sixty Development Plans for the 1970s*, 179–80.

way diffusion from the developed to the developing nations, but the governments of the developing world had their own reasons for believing that it might also serve to restore or enhance the capability and functionalities of the governing good life.

The social, economic, and political barriers of the developing world that converted the “bare” and “unbearable” lives into a burden in the 1950s and 1960s were analyzed within the framework of several key headlines: traditional Malthusian and eugenic concerns, rapid urbanization, disasters and famines, political instability and coups, economic crises and urgent need for financial aid, and, finally, the need for development and modernization.

In Table 2.4, the topics discussed in this section have been accumulated and grouped by country. Needless to say, there should be other country-specific factors and power relations that affect antinatalist discourse, as well as cultural, religious, and other resistances, contestations, and negotiations in between. Yet this brief overview demonstrates that individual developing countries were not alone in their concerns about their own “population problem,” as many of these obstacles to a governing good life were spontaneously shared by vastly different nations, even from different continents.

The detailed analysis of the national and individual sphere is carried out in the following chapters for Turkey, one of the few countries that well represents the diversity of these key issues.

TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

Table 2.4 Key population issues per developing country

Country	Malthusian Concerns	Rapid Urbanization	Famines	Eugenic Ethnic conflicts	Military Coups	Economic Crisis-Need for Financial aids	Developmentalist Modernist discourse
India							
Pakistan							
South Korea							
China							
Tunisia							
Turkey							
Egypt							
Sri Lanka							
Singapore							
Kenya							
Malaysia							
Nepal							
Jamaica							
Iran							
Bangladesh							
Indonesia							
Morocco							
Taiwan							
Dominic							
Ghana							

LEGEND	Malthusian Concerns	Rapid Urbanization	Famines	Eugenic /Ethnic conflicts	Military Coups	Economic Crisis Need for Financial aids	Developmentalist / Modernist discourse
	Pop increase Below 20%	Below 20%	no	no	no	no	no
	20%-29%	20%-29%		Ethnic			
	30%-39%	30%-39%	yes	Eugenic	yes	Need for financial aid	Developmentalist
	40%-49%	40%-49%					
	Above 50% + scarce res.	Above 50%				Economic crisis	Modernist

The Population Control in Turkey: Actors, Debates, Discussions and Transitions...

On April 1, 1965, a new law on family planning was enacted by the Turkish Assembly.¹ With this law, the individuals were permitted to limit the pregnancy through preventive measures (Article 1) and the Ministry of Health was charged with the promotion, training, education, and application of FPP in coordination with the military, public, and private organizations (Article 2). Furthermore, the law liberalized the importation and sale of contraceptive drugs and materials (Article 9). Castration and sterilization, on the other hand, remained prohibited, and allowed only on a limited basis for health imperatives (Articles 3, 4).

This new Population Planning Law represents a radical break with the pronatalist stance of the Turkish Republic, in which the promotion and use of contraception was defined as a crime against racial integrity and health and punished by six months to two years imprisonment.² Yet the policy transformation was not immediate. The governmental and

1 Turkish Assembly, "Population Panning Law, No: 557," Official Gazette publication on April 10, 1965, No.11976, enacted on April 1, 1965.

2 Turkish Assembly, "Turkish Penal Code, Law No: 3038," Official Gazette publication on June 23, 1936, No.3337, enacted on June 11, 1936, Article 471.

parliamentary discussions about population control have spanned into five years interruptedly started right after the 1960 coup. And the issue had been on the public agenda for at least a decade before the promulgation of the law.

This chapter presents the dynamics, actors, public and parliamentary disputes that triggered the population policy change in Turkey, as well as the implementation of the new policy. Furthermore, social, economic, and political issues, such as the military coup, rapid urbanization, economic crisis, and developmentalist discourses, which were identified in the previous chapter as key factors in eroding the capability and functionings of the country, are elaborated for Turkish case in detail.

The chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores early public discussions on population control in terms of their interrelationship with public health and changing economic and social life, primarily due to massive internal migration. The second section analyzes the five-year period between the 1960 coup and the promulgation of the law in 1965, with some key turning points, antinatalist initiatives, resistance, and parliamentary discussions. The last section consists of the implementation of the antinatalist law and attempts to demonstrate the direction of the investment in population control and the individual response through descriptive statistical data in order to find out the reason for the failure of the huge antinatalist campaign.

§ 3.1 Early Antinatalist Discussions before 1960

Until the mid-1950s, there was a public consensus about the virtues of the population growth, which was reaffirmed in the party program of the ruling DP government in 1954.³ But, from the mid-1950s onward, medical, political, and economic concerns about population growth gradually emerged especially among the medical professionals, economists, and journalists, with vastly different justifications.

3 İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, *Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri*, vol. 2: 22 Nisan 1950 – 20 Kasım 1961 (Ankara, Turkey: TBMM Yayınları, 2013), 1026.

In this section, these concerns are analyzed in three categories and in four sections. First, the medical professionals' calls for a change in natalist policy due to their increasing medical concerns about maternal mortality and high abortion rates are evaluated. Second, the anxieties of sociologists, economists, and journalists regarding rapid population growth and migration are addressed in two headlines, in terms of the cause and effect. Finally, early female voices are tracked from the *Women's Journal* to find a population control debate in terms of women's rights.

3.1.1 *Discussions on Public Health*

How come some of the key health professionals have radically changed the medical discourse from a dedication for increasing fertility until the late 1940s to striving for decreasing it, and what were their arguments and implications? These are the main queries explored in this subsection.

The very first formal attempt to challenge the ongoing pronatalist stance of the state was the petition of Dr. Zekai Tahir Burak to the Ministry of Health in 1958 asking to allow contraceptive use to stop the increasing number of abortion cases causing maternal mortality.⁴ Based on his previous observations of the medical records of 5,000 women who had gone to the Ankara Maternity Hospital between 1953 and 1954, he founded that more than 30% of them had induced abortion or miscarriage experiences in their previous pregnancies. He further observed that the maternal mortality rate for the women who had suffered an abortion was four times higher than for the other normal pregnancies.⁵ And he confidently stated that in Turkey some 500,000 women had either induced abortion or miscarriage annually that caused more than 10,000 maternal mortality.⁶

4 Ragıp Üner and Nusret Fişek, *Türkiye'de Doğum Kontrolü Uygulaması Üzerine İncelemeler* (Ankara: Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı, 1961), 134–36.

5 Sabahat Tezcan and Banu Akadlı Ergöçmen, "Türkiye'de İsteyerek Düşükler," *Türkiye Halk Sağlığı Dergisi*, Özel Sayı: Düşükler, no. 10 (2012): 36–42.

6 Üner and Fişek, *Türkiye'de Doğum Kontrolü Uygulaması Üzerine İncelemeler*, 9.

The Ministry of Health commissioned him to chair a committee to investigate the issue immediately. As a result, the committee was convinced that it was the Penal Code, which prohibited abortion and use of contraceptive methods, that led pregnant women to search for disguised, unsterile and dangerous operations to terminate the pregnancy and endanger their lives. Accordingly, they reported to the Ministry of Health to immediately repeal the Penal Code.⁷

Indeed, the newspaper articles of the era indicate many abortion cases. In this dissertation, the abortion cases mentioned in the prominent newspapers (*Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*) were tracked and classified between 1950 and 1959. Among twenty-six abortion cases mentioned in these newspapers within a ten-year period, only seven were self-abortions, while five of them died due to non-sterile conditions. The remaining nineteen cases mentioned in the newspapers were performed by the doctors, in which nine of these pregnant women were killed during the illegal operations.

In March 1952, after three successive abortion cases ended in death, the Ministry of Health declared that inspections and penalties would be tightened to crack down on doctors' illegal abortion operations.⁸ In December 1953, abortion became a hot topic again, when a doctor, Asım Onur, was caught performing an illegal operation.⁹ The court case dragged on for years and was closely followed by the press and the public, ending with a 10-month prison sentence.¹⁰ In January 1955, an insider news from a doctor telling some 60 illegal abortions had been performed in Istanbul alerted many columnists to the topic.¹¹

Nevertheless, abortion was still enframed in moral and judicial terms by the public and the government and not associated with the pronatalist agenda. Even so, the medical report prepared for the Ministry of Health to cancel the pronatalist penal code disappeared after some

7 Ibid., 131–33.

8 “Kürtaj hadiseleri,” *Milliyet*, March 17, 1952.

9 “Kürtaj yapan bir doktor suçüstü yakalandı,” *Milliyet*, December 9, 1953.

10 “Kürtajdan sanık Asım Onur mahkûm oldu,” *Milliyet*, June 10, 1959.

11 “Günde 60 Kadına Kürtaj Yapılıyor,” *Milliyet*, April 1, 1955.

correspondence between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice and was never taken into consideration until the coup of 1960.¹²

One exception was Fakir Baykurt, an award-winning pastoral novelist, who also published short stories in daily newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*. The subject of his article in April 1958 was excessive multiplication, and he portrayed its harms in a short story: three new cemeteries in an Anatolian village belonging to three young women who had lost their lives performing an unsterile abortion themselves. And asked the readers to consider the economic and social pressures that forced these girls self-abort and kill themselves.¹³ The story was so compelling that Dr. Nusret Fişek, who would become the undersecretary for the Ministry of Health between 1960 and 1965 and drafted the population planning law by himself, admitted in his memoirs and in his opening speeches at most of his conferences that, it was Baykurt's article, made him think how to mitigate the maternal mortality and the abortion.¹⁴

Dr. Fişek, a principal of the Public Health Institute at the time, and inspired by Baykurt's article, asked medical trainees to collect maternal and infant mortality data in their assigned stations in the summer of 1959. The face-to-face interviews were conducted with 7,092 women from 137 villages and the infant mortality rate was found as 167 ‰ and maternal mortality rate as 5.2‰ in which more half of whom had died during abortion. Like Dr. Burak, Dr. Fişek sent his report to the Ministry of Health, urging it to lift restrictions against contraceptives.¹⁵

The design of the survey indicates that Dr. Fişek also considered the infant mortality as a function of the overproliferation, which he believed increased numbers of children could reduce parents' capability to feed, care for, and thus save their lives.

The typical determinants of infant mortality in a Turkish village were already summarized as early as 1950 by a seventeen-year-old village teacher, Mahmut Makal, in his groundbreaking book, *Bizim Köy* (Our

12 Turkish Medical Association, *Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi*, 11.

13 Fakir Baykurt, "Aşırı çoğalma," *Cumhuriyet*, April 12, 1959.

14 Turkish Medical Association, *Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi*, 10.

15 Üner and Fişek, *Türkiye'de Doğum Kontrolü Uygulaması Üzerine İncelemeler*, 137–42.

village).¹⁶ In the book, Makal enlisted birth and death statistics of his village for four years, recording 226 births during that period together with 134 infant mortalities who had perished from malnutrition, lack of breast feeding, malaria, lack of climatization in winters, and diarrhea in summer.¹⁷ His harsh village life depiction was so disappointing to the young republic that he was imprisoned for some time, but equally it was of interest to foreigners, so much that a US mission visited Makal's village to see the conditions for themselves.¹⁸

All these figures justify the magnitude of abortion, maternal and infant mortality, and the changing attitude of some medical professionals towards the continuing pronatalist approach. Yet, these concerns have always been high on the medical agenda, and the timing of this sudden interest needs further elaboration and comparison with earlier data.

It is already known and documented that abortion was widespread since the Ottoman era.¹⁹ Although there is no statistical evidence about its density, the relatively small size of an average Istanbul family, which consisted of 4.1 households according to the 1907 census,²⁰ and the lack of medical and contraceptive technology at the time, may be indicators of a higher abortion utilization which may have led to higher maternal mortality.

As for infant mortality, despite the incomplete and erroneous death registrations several statistical methods were utilized to retrospectively calculate the infant mortality rate in Turkey. Miroslav Macura utilized birth survival histories from the 1968 KAP survey to calculate infant mortality rates from 1945 to 1968.²¹ And Fredrick Shorter regressed infant mortality series even back to 1935 using multiple projection method.²²

16 Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy*, 11th ed. (Ankara: Derinlik Yayınları, 1978).

17 Ibid., 92-94.

18 RAC, "Diaries of John Marshall March 18th - June 13th, 1952," 1952, 63.

19 Gülhan Balsoy, "Gender and the Politics of the Female Body: Midwifery, Abortion, and Pregnancy in Ottoman Society (1838-1890s), 122-63.

20 Cem Behar, *A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in the Kasap İlyas Mahalle* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 136.

21 Shorter and Macura, *Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Turkey, 1935-1975*, 59-90.

22 Ibid., 91-95.

Table 3.1 shows infant mortality rates from 1935 to 1975 in five-year intervals, whereas the rates were in continuous decline except the military mobilization period during WWII. Therefore, this sudden increase in awareness was not necessarily due to increasing abortion, maternal or infant fertility cases but may be the result of an increasing “encounters” between medical professionals and patients.

Table 3.1 Infant mortality rates 1935-1975

Period	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 births)	Change %
1935-1940	273	-
1940-1945	306	12%
1945-1950	260	-15%
1950-1955	233	-10%
1955-1960	203	-13%
1960-1965	176	-13%
1965-1970	151	-14%
1970-1975	126	-17%

SOURCE: Shorter and Macura (1982), 95.

Table 3.2 depicts the trends in the total number of state hospitals and the total number of beds in state hospitals and nurseries between 1935 and 1970. The rapid increase between 1950 and 1955 is discernable as both the number of state hospitals and beds exceeded all other periods. This may help to understand why Dr. Zeki Tahir Burak had found a higher abortion and maternal mortality cases in Ankara Maternity Hospital in 1953 and 1954.

For more accurate assessment, the number of pregnancy cases in hospitals and nurseries is required. However, the Yearbook of Medical Statistics, which contains the relevant medical data, was not published until 1955, and the information before that date is unreliable. Nevertheless, the figures in Table 3.3, which indicate the number of women hospitalized for pregnancy in hospitals and nurseries between 1955 and 1959, confirm the increasing number of encounters between doctors and the pregnant women.

Table 3.2 State hospitals and beds 1935-1970

Year	Number of State Hospitals	Change %	Number of Beds in State Hospitals and Nurseries	Change %
1935	13		3,710	
1940	15	15%	4,395	18%
1945	23	53%	5,745	31%
1950	41	78%	8,654	51%
1955	87	112%	13,646	58%
1960	94	8%	17,041	25%
1965	154	64%	23,115	36%
1970	182	18%	28,181	22%

SOURCE: *Sağlık Hizmetlerinde 50 Yıl*.²³

Table 3.3 Pregnancy cases in hospitals and nurseries 1955-1959

Year	Pregnancy cases in Hospitals	Pregnancy cases in Nurseries	Total
1955	46,456	48,473	94,929
1956	47,265	50,811	98,076
1957	66,534	57,175	123,709
1958	68,167	71,911	140,078
1959	77,906	70,315	148,221

SOURCE: *Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1956-1959*.²⁴

The medical calls to prevent contraception did not trigger the desired effect, as the government persisted with the pronatalist agenda until the 1960 coup, when Dr. Fişek was appointed as undersecretary for the Ministry of Health and maintained close contact with the military junta and the SPO committee. Nevertheless, those scientific figures and the tabulations produced on abortion, maternal, and infant mortality were highly used by the politicians and SPO technocrats as a stereotype for medical

23 Ministry of Health, *Sağlık Hizmetlerinde 50 Yıl*, 422 (Ankara, Turkey: Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı, 1973), 265.

24 Ministry of Health, *Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1956-1959*, No:265 (Ankara: Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı, 1961), 112, 136, 210-16.

and scientific justification of the population planning law after the 1960s and during the parliamentary discussions.²⁵

3.1.2 *Discussions on Economic and Social Perspective – The Cause*

By the mid-1950s, some economists and sociologists started to raise the “population problem” in the daily and weekly newspapers. Yet the definition of the problem and the solutions offered were entirely different from the discussion in the 1960s. These two sections will elaborate on the existence of the population problem and how it has changed in the eyes of economists and sociologists.

The very first written discussions of excessive population growth are found in a fortnightly journal, *Forum*, launched in 1954 by prominent intellectuals to criticize the populist and haphazard executions of the DP government and to offer scientific solutions to the country's economic, social and political problems. In this study, all 379 printed issues of *Forum* magazine from 1954 to 1970 were briefly examined in terms of articles and their content.

In the earlier articles before 1960, population growth was recognized as a constant fact and the focus was not to mitigate it but to neutralize its adverse effects, especially for the big cities, whereas the expanding rural-urban migration became a major concern. Kenan Taşpınar underlines the limited capacity of the cities to absorb the migrants especially in terms of housing and employment that increases the tension between urban locals and rural migrants.²⁶ Şerif Mardin discusses the social problems created by the increasing “masses” in cities, such as the promotion of banality and the marginalization of small but effective organizations and creative ideas through the conformism of herd behavior.²⁷

As a solution, Sami Katircioğlu urges the government to regulate population movements.²⁸ Nejat Bengül, on the other hand, prioritizes

25 Prime Ministry and State Planning Organization, *First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967)*, 69.

26 Kenan Taşpınar, “Şehirlerin Büyümesi,” *Forum*, July 1, 1956.

27 Mardin, “İstikbalimizdeki kütle problemleri hakkında.”

28 Sami Katircioğlu, “Nüfus hareketleri ve Türkiye,” *Forum*, June 1, 1957.

increasing the pace of economic activities to absorb overpopulation and hidden unemployment.²⁹ And Kemal Karpas, acknowledging the irreversibility of the migration process, asks for continuous investment and construction projects in the cities to solve the unemployment and housing problems of rural migrants.³⁰

There have been venues other than the *Forum* for the discussions on excessive population density. At a joint conference with Istanbul University and the Rockefeller Foundation about the "Population Increase and Economic Development" in March 1958, the keynote speaker, Professor H.J. Habakkuk of Oxford College, introduced various implications of population growth for the economy, claiming that it could favor economic growth either as a variable of market expansion in the Keynesian model or as a determinant of labor cost reduction to create additional savings in the Ricardo Model.³¹

Interestingly, although Professor Habakkuk was invited by the Rockefeller Foundation, the main promoter of the antinatalist agenda, he did not even raise the inverse relationship between population growth and development, as this antinatalist idea was introduced to academia by Coale and Hoover in the very same year, 1958.³²

The theories of Coale and Hoover also reached to Turkish academia by the early 1960s and contributed to reshape the overpopulation discourse. As a brief sample of the shift in discourse, the articles of Haluk Cillov, a professor of economics and one of the early initiators of the antinatalist idea, on the causes and effects of population growth are illuminative. In his article of May 1958, he focused primarily on excessive population growth in cities due to internal migration and the problems that may cause. The overall population growth or economic implications was

29 Nejat Bengül, "İktisadi gelişme meselemize dair," *Forum*, April 1, 1955; Mardin, "İstikbalimizdeki kütle problemleri hakkında"; Cillov, "İktisat ve ticaret 'Şehirlerimizde nüfus hızla artıyor.'"

30 Kemal Karpas, "Memleketimizde şehirlere nüfus akını," *Forum*, February 15, 1960.

31 Yalçın, "Bir konferans 'Nüfus artışı ve iktisadi gelişme.'"

32 Coale and Hoover Edgar M., *Population Growth and Economic Development*.

not on his agenda.³³ Yet two years later, he changed his view for the very same problem, as he claimed that the population growth is harmful to economic development as a factor of decreasing the GNP per capita. He further added that reducing population growth should be the priority of all non-industrialized world.³⁴

So, what was the cause, scope, and effect of the internal migration problem that was the center of social and economic concern for population matters in the late 1950s? The vast literature on Turkish migration studies indicates several political and economic ruptures in the mid-1940s that paved the way for major social and political changes of which internal migration was one.

By the end of the WWII, and mostly triggered by frustration with Soviet claims to the Bosphorus and eastern frontiers, the Turkish government immediately took some initiatives to become part of the new world order led by US administration. The key adjustments were the democratization of the electoral system from one-party rule to a multi-party system in 1946, the devaluation of the Turkish lira (TL) by 40% to meet IMF standards in 1948, and finally the sending of military troops to the Korean War in 1950 to show commitment to the anti-communist agenda and the desire to join the NATO alliance. The request was accepted by the US administration and the country became the southern flank of the NATO alliance against the Soviet threat in the context of the Cold War.³⁵

Following the Truman military aid, the country was integrated into the Marshall Aid Program, that was designed for the economic reconstruction of Europe. Turkey's role in this program, which was discussed at length between US Ambassador of Turkey and the US Secretary of State, was to assist Europe with the agricultural and mineral resources.³⁶

33 Cillov, "İktisat ve Ticaret 'Şehirlerimizde Nüfus Hızla Artıyor:'"

34 Haluk Cillov, "İktisat ve Ticaret '1960 Nüfusumuz,'" *Milliyet*, November 16, 1960.

35 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 365–72.

36 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Western Europe, Volume III, eds. David H. Stauffer, Ralph R. Goodwin et al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974, 367–373).

In that respect the largest portion of the aid was directed primarily to agricultural and infrastructural investments, including the construction of harbors, ports, silos, but most importantly the construction of nation-wide road network that would support the expansion of local market.³⁷

Rapid importation of more than 40,000 additional tractors between 1948 and 1956 with the US aid, was instrumental in transforming economic trajectory from ongoing Soviet influenced, statist, heavy industry-based development model to an agricultural development system based on private investment.³⁸ As an immediate consequence, the land cultivation nearly doubled in the very same era and increased from 13,2 million hectares to 22,5 million hectares in less than eight years.³⁹ See Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Tractors and land cultivation 1948-1956

Year	Number of Tractors	Change %	Cultivated Land (000 hectares)	Change %
1948	1,756		13,900	
1949	9,170	422%	13,264	-5%
1950	16,585	81%	14,542	10%
1951	24,000	45%	15,272	5%
1952	31,415	31%	17,361	14%
1953	35,600	13%	18,812	8%
1954	37,743	6%	19,616	4%
1955	40,282	7%	20,998	7%
1956	43,727	9%	22,453	7%

SOURCE: Kepenek and Yenitürk (2001).⁴⁰

37 Anne Krueger O. and Vernon W. Ruttan, "Assistance to Turkey," in *Aid and Development*, ed. Anne O. Krueger, Constantine Michalopoulos, and Vernon W. Ruttan (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkin University Press, 1989), 250–66.

38 Fikret Şenses, "Main Phases and Salient Features of Turkish Foreign Aid Experience," in *Foreign Aid: New Perspectives*, ed. Kanhaya L. Gupta (New York: Springer Science and Business Media, 1999), 233–54.

39 Fritz Baade mentions in his Mission Report that the maximum cultivable land is 16.4 million hectares, and that the expansion was based on cultivation on the hills and sloping terrain which is much open for the risk of erosion. See Fritz Baade, *FOA Türkiye Raporu* (Ankara: T.C Ziraat Bankası 100. Yıl Yayını, 1962), 14-15.

40 Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yenitürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 12th ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2001), 106.

Tekeli says that the agricultural mechanization has not only made the agricultural labor working the farms obsolete, but has also led many small landowners, who have lost their competitive advantage, to sell their property to the large landowners.⁴¹ And he adds that according to a study on the impact of the agricultural mechanization, some 25% of the villagers who were affected by the transition, migrated to the towns or cities between 1948 and 1952.⁴²

Another major investment arena of Marshall Aid was on transportation and infrastructure, especially road construction to enable the transportation of agricultural surpluses to local and international markets. The traditional investment strategy of expanding on railways was discontinued after WWII and replaced by roads and highways, which were expanded by 37% between 1948 and 1960 and reached 61.542 km, only 10% of below of the current length by the end of the 2021.⁴³

The increasing road construction, together with the expanding cultivation through tractors, produced economically viable results in agricultural production and distribution in the first half of the 1950s. Furthermore, transportation and communication facilities have exploded during the period.

As shown in Table 3.5, the number of automobiles, buses, and trucks tripled between 1945-1950 and doubled between 1950-1955 and 1955-1960, respectively. And the total number of telephone lines doubled once in each five years starting from 1945.

However, the increase in transportation and communication in the 1950s, surpassing all other periods, was not only a sign of the transportation of goods and agricultural products, but also of the flow of masses,

41 İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye Tarımında Mekanizasyonun Yarattığı Yapısal Dönüşümler ve Kırdan Kopuş Süreci," in *Yerleşme Yapısının Uyum Süreci Olarak İç Göçler*, ed. İlhan Tekeli and Leila Erder (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1978), 299–329.

42 Ibid., 329, footnote 31.

43 Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ulaşım İstatistikleri 2021*, <https://www.kgm.gov.tr/SiteCollectionDocuments/KGMdocuments/Yayinlar/YayinPdf/KarayoluUlasimIstatistikleri2021.pdf>.

the “migrants.” The direction of these migrants and their deterioration of local elements will be analyzed in the next section.

Table 3.5 Transportation and communication 1935-1970

Year	Constructed Roads	Automobile	Bus	Truck	Telephone Lines
1935	39,583	4,349	747	2,514	15,503
1940	41,582	4,343	1,237	3,520	22,964
1945	43,511	3,649	1,213	5,417	28,875
1950	47,080	13,405	3,744	15,404	58,139
1955	55,008	29,970	6,848	34,429	116,455
1960	61,542	45,767	10,981	57,460	180,030
1965	58,972	87,584	22,169	79,121	243,361
1970	59,543	137,771	15,980	70,730	376,987

SOURCE: *Istatistiki Göstergeler 1927-2009*.⁴⁴

3.1.3 Discussions on Economic and Social Perspective – The Effect

The scale of migration and its impact on the local citizens has always been a central theme in population policies and debates. The tensions between locals and migrants to share the limited resources create fertile ground for population control ideologies to flourish, just as Malthusianism and Eugenie that were explored in the previous chapter. Consequently, the newspaper articles about the population problem in the 1950s mentioned in the previous section did not refer to the population increase as a whole but complained mostly about its explosion in the big cities.

In this section, the epicenter of migration, Istanbul, was chosen as the point of analysis, in order to demonstrate some sketches on how the redistribution of resources by incoming migrant can create a disturbance among locals and how a rapidly growing metropole can absorb the capability and the functioning of the government. For that purpose, the Turkish census data from 1935 to 1970 and the Annual Statistical Bulletins of Istanbul from 1945 to 1959 were utilized to construct data series on

44 Turkish Statistical Institute, *Istatistiki Göstergeler Statistical Indicators 1927-2009*, 370,382.

migration, health, transportation, communication, education, housing, and crime.

Istanbul, the most populous city in the world in the Middle Ages and in the 17th century,⁴⁵ had already undergone a rapid mass migration twice in history; when the city was refounded as *Nova Roma* by the Emperor Constantine the Great in 330 AD and after its conquest by Mehmet the Conqueror in 1453. In both cases, the migration process was forced and controlled by the rulers and the new settlers were provided with many grants and privileges, including lands and houses. But equally massive investments were made in infrastructure to expand the capability of the city.

Coming to first half of the twentieth century, the city was still a trade and commercial center, but lost its valor for the governors of the new Turkish Republic, who were eager to move the resources to the Anatolian heartland and made Ankara the new capital of the republic.⁴⁶ By the second half of the century, the new economic model based on agricultural surpluses gave priority to the portal cities and Istanbul once again, became the center of attraction due to its unique geographical position and well-advanced trade connections.⁴⁷ And the third wave of migration in the history of the city has begun, but this time without any preparation and planning.

According to the census results, the population of the city almost tripled in twenty years between 1950 and 1970, increased from 1.2 million to three million inhabitants. The exact density and origin of immigrants could only be determined from the “permanent residency” information which became available with the 1970 census. For earlier years, the data

45 Tertius Chandler and Gerald Fox, *3000 Years of Urban Growth* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 304–21.

46 Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018), 138.

47 Ibid., 143.

available that helps to make some estimate of migration is the “place of birth” information which can be tracked from the 1935 census.⁴⁸

Table 3.6 shows the population of Istanbul between 1935 and 1970 with the distinction by place of birth. The annual growth of the city was less than 2% before 1950, but grew very rapidly during the remaining 20 years, averaging 4.8% annual growth. Istanbul has always been a vibrant place for foreigners, but their proportion never exceeded that of native-born Istanbul residents until 1950. The average proportion of non-Istanbul-born foreigners to native-born residents was 47.6% between 1935 and 1950, rising rapidly to 63% by 1970.

Table 3.6 Istanbul population by place of birth 1935-1970

Year	Istanbul Population	Annual Growth %	Born in Istanbul	Annual Growth %	Born in Other Places	Annual Growth %
1935	883,599		502,449		381,150	
1945	1,078,399	1.99%	530,023	0.53%	548,376	3.64%
1950	1,166,477	1.57%	617,189	3.05%	549,288	0.03%
1955	1,533,822	5.48%	697,555	2.45%	836,267	8.41%
1960	1,882,092	4.09%	811,576	3.03%	1,070,516	4.94%
1965	2,293,823	3.96%	940,570	2.95%	1,353,253	4.69%
1970	3,019,032	5.49%	1,103,976	3.20%	1,915,056	6.94%

SOURCE: Census results from 1935 to 1970.⁴⁹

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the difference between these two ratios yields the migration between 1950 and 1970, which corresponds to 310,000 migrants between 1950 and 1960 and some 650,000 additional migrants between 1960 and 1970. The focus of this dissertation, however, is on the additional burden of these migrants in terms of health, education, transportation, communication, and housing between 1950 and 1959, the time when the discussions of population problem first emerged.

48 Erol Tümertekin, *Türkiye’de İç Göçler* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1968), 8–18.

49 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası. 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970)

Trends in the number of doctors, beds, and patients (total inpatient and outpatient) in the health report for the reporting period are shown in Table 3.7. Although the number of doctors has increased by 60% and the number of beds by 49% in ten years, the increase in the number of patients has been enormous at 162%, so the capability in health services has depreciated by 63% in terms of number of patients per doctors and by 75% in terms of number of patients per bed, due to migration.

The same formula was applied to education by calculating the changing number of primary school students per teacher and literacy; to transportation by changing the number of passengers per bus and ferry; to communications by changing number of telephone calls per telephone line; to employment by changing the unemployment rate; and to housing by calculating changing the building stock per citizen.

Table 3.7 Health services in Istanbul 1950-1959

YEAR	Patients	Doctors	Patients per Doctor	Beds	Patients per Bed
1950	703,411	599	1,174	9,873	71,2
1951	752,324	553	1,360	10,099	74,5
1952	866,962	610	1,421	11,594	74,8
1953	1,052,399	645	1,632	11,879	88,6
1954	947,236	672	1,410	12,336	76,8
1955	1,139,683	727	1,568	12,731	89,5
1956	1,345,190	823	1,634	12,802	105,1
1957	1,552,154	947	1,639	13,705	113,3
1958	1,540,492	879	1,753	14,002	110,0
1959	1,842,825	962	1,916	14,741	125,0

SOURCE: *Istanbul İstatistik Yıllığı* from 1944 to 1959.⁵⁰

In education, the 83% increase in the number of primary school students has been offset by 2,090 additional teaching positions, and the number of students per teacher has remained at thirty-four within a decade. However, since the very first immigrants were predominantly male workers, the problem was not the schooling but literacy. Previous census figures

50 Municipality of Istanbul, *İstatistik Yıllığı* (Istanbul: Istanbul Belediye Matbaası. 1944-1948, 1947-1951, 1951-1955, 1955-1959)

between 1935 and 1950 indicate that the number of illiterates stabilized between 310,000 and 315,000. With the wave of immigration after 1950, the number of illiterates increased by 42,568 between 1950 and 1955 and by another 91,615 between 1955 and 1960. Therefore, it can be assumed that 14% of those immigrants who migrated the city between 1950 and 1960 were illiterate.

The additional burden of the incoming migrants on the transportation was largely offset by government investment in the road network and public transportation in the 1950s, whereas the number of busses in the city increased from 199 to 647, to meet the additional demand as the number of passengers tripled. By the early 1960s, however, official public transportation was no longer sufficient not only to meet demand but also to access the shanty towns on the outskirts of the city, so a new means of private mini transport, *dolmuş*, become popular among migrants.

Housing issues were one of the key concerns of the time. Figures indicate that between 1950 and 1960, only 9,110 houses and 12,353 apartment buildings were built which could accommodate a maximum 43% of the population growth during that period.⁵¹ Furthermore, being a householder was too expensive for the immigrants to afford, so shanty towns, *gecekondur*, were built on the outskirts of the city, reaching up to 120,000 units in the early 1960s, housing about 660,000 people, more than a third of the city's population.⁵²

Naturally, the rapid population growth in the city, created some additional business and employment opportunities, especially for the men, but much less than the actual growth. Female employment in the city was traditionally low and never exceeded 20% until the year 2000. Furthermore, the first wave of immigrants consisted mostly of single working-age man, so the employment analysis was based on the male population.

51 Assuming that a house consists of an average of five people and an apartment building consists of an average of five apartments, the additional building stock constructed during this period could accommodate a maximum of 354,375 households, while the population increased by 811,576.

52 Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondur: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 59–61.

Data on the male labor force and employment in the city between 1935 and 1970 were compiled from census results and are presented in Table 3.8. The figures indicate a radical and irreversible increase in unemployment in the 1950s from 10% to 22% or more. In the period between 1950 and 1960, the additional male labor force triggered by immigration amounted to 272,093 men, of whom 42% (113,793 men) could not find proper job.

Table 3.8 Male employment in Istanbul 1935-1970

Year	Potential Male Workforce (age 15-65)	Males Employed	Males Unemployed	Unemployment Rate %
1935	317,316	287,367	29,949	9%
1945	446,801	396,198	50,603	11%
1950	443,310	401,122	42,188	10%
1955	620,293	483,700	136,593	22%
1960	715,403	559,422	155,981	22%
1965	845,100	629,293	215,807	26%
1970	1,080,260	855,177	225,083	21%

SOURCE: Census results from 1935 to 1970.

The immigrant labor force was composed of self-employed and blue-collar workers and, while not a threat to white collar and educated locals, caused rivalry in the labor market for blue-collar workers and in some skilled trades, where employment and the earnings of locals declined.

Finally, crime rates were analyzed based on the prison statistics in Istanbul in 1938 and 1959. The literature suggests various theories underlining positive correlation between rapid urbanization and crime rates.⁵³ According to “urban ecology” model, community relations in urban areas are weak due to the constantly changing flow of people, so that the social mechanisms and customs that control the behavior are no longer effective. In the “social disorganization theory,” migration creates fertile ground for the emergence of socially disorganized communities

53 M. Ali Haider and Pawinee Iamtrakul, “Theoretical Concepts of Crime and Practices in Urban Planning and Design Process for Safe Urban Life,” *International Journal of Building, Urban, Interior and Landscape Technology (BUILT)*, no. 12 (2018): 7–24.

that lack solidarity, cohesion, and integration, leading to higher rates of crime and delinquency.⁵⁴

However, the statistics of the period, do not depict any major change in the number of incarcerations, which was 9,806 in 1950 and 12,278 in 1960.⁵⁵ When population growth is taken into account, these figures indicate a considerable decline in the incarceration rate from 854 persons per hundred thousand to 660 within a decade. It is clear that internal migration in Turkish case did not lead to social disorganization among migrants, as they maintained solidarity with their existing rural connections and cohesion with other migrants who emigrated from the same rural spot.

The economic and social bondage created in this fellow township, *hemsehrilik*, ensured that the migrants cope with poverty and other social problems.⁵⁶ Moreover, it also enabled the veteran migrants to expand their social and economic status by profiting from the newcomers and maintaining hope for better life, what Işık and Pınarcıklioğlu coined “*nöbetleşe yoksulluk*,” poverty in turns,”

As a conclusion, the rapid and unplanned expansion of the city through internal migration flow between 1950 and 1960, should have exacerbated tensions between locals and migrant, especially over the sharing of limited resources such as health, transportation, accommodation, and employment. Although these early migrants had nothing to do with crime or subversive activities and maintained solidarity and integrity among themselves, the social and cultural burdens between locals and migrants were still intact even among the wealthy migrants, who were labelled as parvenus, *hacıağa*.

54 Charis E. Kubrin, “Social Disorganization Theory: Then, Now, and In the Future,” in *Handbook on Crime and Deviance*, ed. Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Gina P. Hall (Dordrecht ; New York: Springer Science and Business Media, 2009), 225–36.

55 Turkish Statistical Institute, *Mahkumlar İstatistiği* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1938-1954, 1943-1959)

56 Oğuz Işık and M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk: Gecekondulaşma ve Kent Yoksulları: Sultanbeyli örneği*, 1. baskı (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 75–119.

This dissertation thus claims that it was not actual population growth, but the increasing complaints of local citizens and columnists about the growing migration and its negative effects that triggered the overpopulation discourse. In other words, without the massive rural-urban migration in the 1950s, which distorted the governmental capability and created illusory perception of population growth due to increasing encounters between locals (good life) and the immigrant “others” (bare/unbearable life), the public discussion of the switch to antinatalism would be marginalized as a foreign economic theory for development.

3.1.4 *Antinatalist discourse as Freedom of Rights*

In addition to public health and the anti-migration agenda as sources for antinatalist discourse in the 1950s, this section interrogates the gender dimension will be questioned in this section. Was the idea of population control publicly discussed in the 1950s as a freedom of rights and/or choice for women? For this purpose, the regulations and activity reports of the sole political women association “Turkish Women’s Association” (TKD) are tracked together with the only political feminist journal of the era, the Women’s Journal, *Kadın Gazetesi*.

Admitting the fact that the birth control activism was not even on the agenda of the industrial world before the sexual revolution of the 1960s, except for a few birth control pioneers such as Margaret Sanger in the US and Marie Stropes in the UK, one may wonder whether the issue was also questioned by Turkish women, who already gained advanced women's rights even before many developed countries and had feminist activists such as Nezihe Muhiddin, the founder of TKD, and Iffet Halim Uruz, the publisher and editor of *Kadın Gazetesi*. In this context, another question should be asked; how free were those activists to express their feminist agenda?

In the wake of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Nezihe Muhiddin and her associates attempted to establish a new political party as early as 1923, namely, the Women’s People Party, *Kadınlar Halk Fıkrası*, to gain women’s political rights, but their application was rejected by the

new government. A year later, they reapplied as an association, namely TKD, and deleted their ambitious political goals from their program, limiting it to gender equality and women's empowerment.⁵⁷ This time their application was well received by the new republic and by Atatürk, who granted women basic rights by the 1926 Legal Code.

However, Nezihe Muhiddin's insistence on giving women the right to be elected in the 1927 municipality elections, led to her being dismissed from the presidency of the TKD and facing trial.⁵⁸ Zihnioğlu, describes in her book, "The Revolution Without Women" that women's rights were bestowed from the top down as a sign of modernity and that Muhiddin's ideal of "bellicose women" did not fit the image of the "new women" of the republic, who were also modern, energetic but equally controllable and docile.⁵⁹

The TKD continued to operate in low profile and quietly disbanded a year after the Turkish women were granted full suffrage in 1934 and a few days after the 12th International Women's Congress held in Istanbul in 1935.⁶⁰ Toprak also confirms the Republic's desire for control, as he comments that the reason for the closure was that the TKD involuntarily became part of the Allied peace propaganda at the International Women's Congress, which clashed with delicate Turkish diplomacy on the eve of WWII.⁶¹

In the wake of post-WWII freedoms, the TKD was re-established in 1949 to defend the gained political rights and to strengthen women's political and social participation.⁶² Yet they were still under state control.

57 Ayşegül Yaman, "Siyaset: Türkiye'de Kadınların Siyasal Haklarını Kazanma Mücadelesinden Dişiliksiz Siyasete," in *Cumhuriyet İstanbul'unda Kadın*, ed. Ayla Duru Karadağ (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2021), 111–66.

58 Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadınsız İnkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği*, 4th ed. (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2019), 234–52.

59 Ibid., 220–33.

60 Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye'de Siyaset ve Kadın: Kadınlar Halk Fırkası'ndan Arşulusal Kadınlar Birliği Kongresine (1923-1935)," *Kadın Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 2 (1994): 5–12.

61 Zafer Toprak, "1935 İstanbul Uluslararası Feminizm Kongresi ve Barış," *Düşün*, no. 2 (1986): 24–29.

62 "Çıkış Amacımız," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.

The first president of the institution was Mevhibe İnönü, the wife of İsmet İnönü, who was Turkey's president after Atatürk until 1950. In 1954, in the heydays of the new DP government, the presidency of the TKD was passed to the party members, who then mainly followed the DP program and did basic charity works.

The center of feminist criticism was the weekly women's journal, *Kadın Gazetesi*, which appeared between 1947 and 1979 with 1125 issues. Under the leadership of İffet Halim Uruz, who had founded the southeastern branch of TKD in Diyarbakir with Nezihe Muhiddin in the 1920s, the journal was dedicated to the political, social, and economic empowerment of women.⁶³ The main concern in the early 1950s was to protect their political and social rights, which had been severely eroded by the 1950s populist multi-party environment.⁶⁴ And the journal was well functioned to express strong opposition until 1954, when it became a publication of TKD. Then it lost its critical view.

This dissertation analyzed the first 610 of these issues, published between 1947 and 1960, to grasp the feminist view of the reproduction and population policy. The articles prior to the mid-1950s were actively pronatalist. In 1948, Lamia Onaf complains that only the children of the state officials were entitled to discounted boarding school tuition and suggests that all the poor families with three or more children should have the right to attend boarding school free of charge. This, she states, is the most effective way to show appreciation to fertile mothers and to support the state's pronatalist policies.⁶⁵ In the same year, the editor-in-chief, Uruz, calls Children Protection Institution, *Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu*, to expand its activities in order to reduce the infant mortality and increase

63 İffet Halim Uruz, "Türk Kadınlar Birliği Hakkında Düşünceler," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 16, 1949, 1,2,6.

64 The main discussion in the *Kadın Gazetesi* in 1950 and 1951 was the low political representation of women in parliament after the 1950 elections between the CHP and DP, when both parties fielded male candidates who they believed had a better chance of being elected.

65 Lamia Onaf, "Çok çocuklu ailelere yardım," *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1948, 1,7.

population.⁶⁶ In 1950, Hasene Ilgaz, celebrates the higher population growth as a result of the census conducted in the same year and suggests spreading the news abroad to demonstrate how populous the country is.⁶⁷

The issue of abortion was also a major concern of the editorial board and was regularly discussed and discredited in articles, most of which were written by health care professionals. For instance, Dr. Saim Sağlık complains that abortion has become a fashion.⁶⁸ In a news item about excessive abortion and the Health Ministry's attempt to conduct an investigation into its causes, Editor Uruz confidently predicts that the problem should be economic or moral, because otherwise, she says, no mother would decide to undergo such a risky operation.⁶⁹ And she never thinks of abortion as a consequence of the unmet need for contraception.

From the end of 1955, family planning was gradually discussed as a solution for rural development and for reducing maternal and infant mortality.⁷⁰ Even so, the same author who had cheered population growth in 1950 joined the antinatalist league in 1958 to control excessive births in rural and urban areas.⁷¹

This antinatalist switch of the journal, which became an implicit supporter of the government after 1954, was particularly crucial as a representation of DP loosening their pronatalist rhetoric. However, the journal's articulation of the population policy was not far from the nationalist, developmentalist and anti-urbanist sentiments that was discussed earlier and no specific reference was made to fertility behavior as an individual choice within these 610 issues except one.

66 İffet Halim Uruz, "Çocuk davamız," *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 22, 1948, 1,2.

67 Hasene Ilgaz, "1950 Nüfus sayımı ve propagandası," *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1950, 1,6.

68 Dr. Saim Sağlık, "Kadın hijyeni," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951, 4.

69 İffet Halim Uruz, "Çocuk sıkıntılarını önleme tedbirleri," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 13, 1954.

70 "Nüfus ve doğum konferansı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 16, 1955, 1,7.

71 Hasene Ilgaz, "Dünya nüfusunun çoğalmasını önleyici tedbirler," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1958, 1.

Leyla Kara, in her article “Motherhood Propaganda,” written as early as 1950, heavily criticizes governments and journalists who complain about the contemporary women ignoring their primary duty, motherhood.⁷² She says this is the natural outcome of a patriarchal view, perceiving women as “egg incubators,” confining to their homes and excluding them socially and politically. The women, who could not stand the humiliation, she adds, started searching for the respect they deserved by making their own careers in the public eye, at the cost of neglecting their motherhood. She concludes that no woman will take this pronatalist rhetoric seriously, if mothers continue to have a low and inactive social status.

In summary, the TKD and the Women’s Journal were two primary feminist formations of the time that reflected the status of women in Turkey and could survive as long as their ideas were in line with the ruling elites. Expectedly their vision about the population policy and its transformation had strong similarities with the government’s political and socioeconomic agenda and did not contain any feminist or human rights nuance, except for some personal attempts such as the exceptional article mentioned above.

Summary of 3.1

Reaching 15 million citizens within 10 years was a national pride expressed in the “Hymn of the 10th Year” composed in 1933. Some 22 years later, the country’s population has barely reached 24 million, equivalent to 31 inhabitants per square kilometer, yet the initial public discussions of population control had already taken place by the mid-1950s.

This section covered the early medical, economic, social, and feminist criticism of the Turkish government’s ongoing pronatalist stance. The arguments been raised such as rising maternal and infant mortality, urbanization and its deterioration, this thesis claims, were not primarily due to population growth, but to the increasing encounters between the “others” mostly triggered by internal mobilization. Overcrowding in hospitals, streets, and cities heightened the sense of overpopulation, and the

72 Leyla Kara, “Analık propagandası,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 13, 1950, 2,4.

sharing of scarce resources and business opportunities with the flooding migrants should have increased public sensitivity to question pronatalist population policies.

Yet the early calls for population control had a very limited audience from the public and political cadre and did not trigger any antinatalist movement during the DP government. Nonetheless, these arguments were heavily used as a reference point for antinatalist justification by the military junta of the 1960s and the SPO reports and were discussed at length in parliament in the early 1960s, which will be revealed in the next section.

§ 3.2 Towards the Population Planning Law

Like its rise, the fall of DP heralds a new era in Turkish history. The attempt to achieve rapid prosperity and development, on the basis of populist and unplanned agricultural mechanization, had left the country almost bankrupt in the late 1950s. Under the military regime, the state apparatus evolved to create a different kind of welfare state based on rational planning, which inevitably brought population planning onto the agenda.

Therefore, this thesis proposes to start the political orientation of population planning with the 1960 coup. This section analyzes the major turning points of the political orientation that facilitated the legalization of the Population Planning Law in five distinct but interrelated parts. The first part explores the economic transformation, its distortion, and the foreign tutelage of the late 1950s to demonstrate why and how the country had to switch to the developmentalist economic model embedded with population planning in the early 1960s.

The second part addresses the political deteriorations in the 1950s that triggered military intervention, with the Army's hegemony-security concerns on the southeastern border that could provide additional motivation for population control. The third part deals with the SPO and the drafting of the first NDP, which included population planning. The

debates and objections to population control during the senate and parliamentary votes on the plan are also examined in detail.

The antinatalist preparations of governments and private initiatives to shape the antinatalist agenda and accommodate public opinion in favor of the population control idea is the headline of the fourth part, which also covers the Population Council's the invitation to prepare the population control road map, the first Turkish KAP survey, the activities of the Turkish Family Planning Association, and the nationwide family planning seminars. In the last part, the extensive debates, and discussions during the voting of the Population Planning Law in the parliament and in the senate are tracked and categorized from the parliamentary archives.

3.2.1 *Economic Planning and Population Control*

On May 27, 1960, the military junta took control of the Turkish Republic and immediately established a governing mechanism from the soldiers, the National Unity Committee, *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (MBK), which exercised direct control over the state until September 15, 1961. This period represents a radical break with the ten years of DP government policy, including its pronatalist stance.

One of the first decisions MBK made just eighteen days after the coup was to establish a State Planning Office (SPO) charged with economic and social planning.⁷³ Further discussions in MBK clearly underlines that the primary motive for prioritization of the SPO was the desperate need for foreign funds, which was conditioned on sound and systematic planning.⁷⁴ And population planning was an inevitable part of this systematic planning package, which is clearly expressed in the memoirs of Nusret Fişek.

Fişek, the undersecretary for the Ministry of Health at the time, visits the SPO in the very early days of its establishment to discuss changing

73 MBK General Meeting (Milli Birlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı), Vol.1, Meeting no: 9, September 10, 1960, 15.

74 MBK General Meeting (Milli Birlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı), Vol.1, Meeting no: 14, September 29, 1960, 15.

the pronatalist population policy, which he believed harmful not only to the health of the mothers and children, but also to the economy. SPO members, Chairman Colonel Şinasi Orel, Head of Social Planning Necat Erder and Head of Economic Planning Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, warmly welcome Fişek and inform him that changing the ongoing pronatalist stance was also on their agenda as no sound economic planning could be made based on the persistent population growth.⁷⁵

This section will deal with the changing economic trajectory of the country between 1950 and 1960 to respond following inquiries: What were the material conditions that led Turkey prepare its own strategic planning? How did population planning become a crucial part of planning and what role did foreign pressure play in it?

Until the end of WWII, Turkey's economic program was based on Soviet-type five-year industrial planning, which worked extremely well in the 1930s and the country enjoyed the historically highest economic growth of well over 8%.⁷⁶ However, the Soviet threat at the end of WWII forced the country to seek alliance with the US and it had to undergo a major transformation in many areas.

In the economic sphere, the statist and protectionist Soviet model and the self-reliant development pattern were gradually abandoned with a series of measures. In addition to the devaluation of the TL in 1946, import quotas were gradually loosened to get aligned with the liberalization requirements of the alliance's economic arm, the IMF.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Five-Year Industrial Plan of 1946 was halted and replaced in 1947 by another plan called the "*Vaner Planı*," which curtailed some major industrial investments and added liberal tendencies to the plan in the hope of obtaining a sizeable share from Marshall Aid.⁷⁸

The plan did not attract foreign attention as it still contained many investment elements that were not appropriate to the country's

75 Turkish Medical Association, Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi, 11.

76 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*, 59–82.

77 Ibid., 102–3.

78 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Savas Sonrasi Ortaminda 1947 Turkiye İktisadi Kalkinma Planı* (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1974), 1–26.

economic role, which the US government positioned as supplying Europe with agriculture and minerals. Meanwhile, several foreign economic missions were sent to Turkey as early as 1948 to prepare the inventory of the country and provide investment guidance to the US and Turkish governments, and to the international institutions like IMF, World Bank, and IBDR.

The very first mission was sent in 1949 under the leadership of M.W. Thornburg, a senior executive at Standard Oil. In his report, he first recommended that statist industrial investments be stopped immediately to be replaced by private enterprise, which he mentioned having been obscured by the state for years.⁷⁹ He further reported to increase agricultural investments through mechanization and underlined road construction, warehousing and port maintenance so that these products can reach domestic and foreign markets.⁸⁰ In addition to economic targets, the construction of a nationwide road network was also desirable for NATO military purposes.⁸¹

The anti-industrialist tone was escalated in 1951 by an IBRD mission report known as the “Barker Report.” The government was recommended to reduce the expenditures at all levels and to set up an economic coordination committee to coordinate investments, expenditures, and operations.⁸² These reports played a key role in addressing the direction of foreign loans and grants which would reach up to \$ 354 million between 1948 and 1952. And 2/3 of it was spent on investments, mostly for agricultural mechanization and road construction.⁸³ The number of foreign aid and grants between 1946 and 1962 is shown in Table 3.9.

79 Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry, and George Soule, *Turkey : An Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Found, 1949), 31–34.

80 Ibid., 217–22.

81 Krueger and Ruttan, “Assistance to Turkey,” 254.

82 James M. Barker, *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for Development Program* (Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951), 45–55.

83 Hollis B. Chenery, George E. Brandow, and J. Cohn Edwin, *Turkish Investment and Economic Development* (United States of America Operations Mission to Turkey, Foreign Operations Administration, 1953), 47.

Table 3.9 Foreign loans and grants to Turkey 1946-1962 (million \$)

Year	US Loans	US Grants	Total US Economic Aid	Other Foreign Institutions
1946-1948	45.4	-	45.4	5.0
1949	33.8	-	33.8	-
1950	40.0	31.9	71.9	80.4
1951	-	49.8	49.8	-
1952	11.2	58.4	69.6	35.2
1953	-	58.6	58.6	20.0
1954	-	78.7	78.7	3.8
1955	25.5	83.8	109.3	-
1956	25.0	104.3	129.3	-
1957	25.1	62.3	87.4	13.5
1958	23.2	90.4	113.6	25.5
1959	97.2	107.0	204.2	-
1960	26.5	99.0	125.5	37.0
1961	131.0	89.8	220.8	161.7
1962	102.5	81.6	184.1	15.0
TOTAL	586.4	995.6	1,582.0	397.1

SOURCE: Kepenek and Yenitürk (2001), 102.

In this study, the investment details of the Marshall Aid to Turkey are examined through 46 official quarterly reports issued between 1949 and 1962, to detect whether any aid was donated in terms of population control.⁸⁴ As expected, most of the aid was allocated to the agricultural and infrastructural development of the country, but social elements in the areas of health and education were also present.

Four million \$ was allocated for malaria control between 1949 and 1952,⁸⁵ one million TL was granted for nursing training school of Ankara Hospital in 1951,⁸⁶ and some 30 million TL was allocated for the settlement of immigrants from Bulgaria in the same year.⁸⁷ Apparently, these

84 "Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey," 1949-1962 (General Secretariat of the Office for Economic Co-operation of Turkey).

85 "Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey" (General Secretariat of the Office for Economic Co-operation of Turkey, 1952), 54.

86 "Quarterly Report on the Marshall Plan in Turkey" (General Secretariat of the Office for Economic Co-operation of Turkey, 1951), 131.

87 Ibid., 142.

early aids were intended to serve the Republic's pronatalist stance and promote its productivity. Furthermore, not a single grant in the name of birth control or contraception was mentioned in these reports.

The 1950 elections reaffirmed the political and economic transformation of the country. The newly elected democrats and their leader Adnan Menderes vehemently challenged the etatist regime and the still existing monopolizing tendencies of the state. Moreover, he was very enthusiastic in implementing the economic program recommended by the foreign advisors.⁸⁸

With the support of foreign aids, the DP government enjoyed the prosperity it had promised its voters during the first three years of its reign. Favorable weather conditions, rising agricultural prices due to the Korean War, and the expansion of cultivation with the help of mechanization had boosted agricultural production and revenues, which had relatively raised the living standards of all segments of the population in a short period of time.⁸⁹ And it is no coincidence that until 1953 there was not a single discussion about the negative economic and social effect of population growth.

Nevertheless, the impending economic catastrophe was accurately predicted that same year by economist Hollis Chenery who was commissioned to Turkey on behalf of the US Foreign Operation Administration. In his report, Chenery urged the government to restore the balance of payments, which had begun to deteriorate due to residual long-term investments financed by foreign loans. And he was well aware that the success of Turkey's economic development lay in the sudden combination of favorable weather and higher prices, which could not be sustained.⁹⁰ Moreover, he recommended not only economic coordination but also devaluation of at least 30% to secure the balance of payments, which he called a social return of investment.⁹¹

88 Z.Y Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1968), 139.

89 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*, 104–8.

90 Chenery, Brandow, and Edwin, *Turkish Investment and Economic Development*, 64.

91 Ibid., 56.

The Chenery report, was to become one of the reference points for SPO members after 1960, was confiscated by the DP government as it was shocked by 30% devaluation offer.⁹² Yet, only five years later, the same government had to accept a devaluation of %320, whereas the American dollar rose from 2.80 TL to 9.00 TL in August 1958.

Indeed, even in the early 1950s, when revenues from agricultural exports were at record high levels, the country ran a current deficit due to the rising imports financed by short-term loans. And the central bank's shortage of foreign exchange reserves became apparent after the rapid decline in exports by 1953 due to the poor harvest and falling market prices.⁹³

Contrary to all its liberal rhetoric, the DP government was forced to adopt strict etatist measures to restrict imports, such as imposing restrictions on international transactions, import licensing, and freezing credit importation. Furthermore, as an import substitution, they increasingly relied on the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) to compensate for the lack of private sector investment and kept investing in SEEs to prevent erosion of their domestic support, which further strained the balance of payments.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the need for foreign exchange was so acute, that the government made great efforts to obtain foreign debt, not only from US or international institutions such as IMF, IBRD, and World Bank, but also from various Western European countries through bilateral agreements.⁹⁵ Yet, the negotiations were formidable.

As donor criticism of Turkish economic policy increased, so did the Turkish government's sensitivity to donor interference in internal affairs. Table 3.9 gives some indication of the ruptures in the negotiations. The

92 Atilla Sönmez, "Türk Ekonomisi'nin Altın Yılları ve Chenery Raporu," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 23, no. 4 (1996): 668–75.

93 Anne O. Krueger, *Turkey: Foreign Trade Regimes & Economic Development* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 30–32.

94 Vedat Milor, "The Genesis of Planning in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 4 (1990): 1–30.

95 Krueger, *Turkey: Foreign Trade Regimes & Economic Development*, 31.

cancellation of US funds in 1953 coincides with the rejection of Chenery's report and the termination of the World Bank mission the following year.⁹⁶ Still, government officials did not feel much pressure to listen to donors, as they were still able to find other sources of credit were also confident about the US support in the last instance, due to their NATO alliance.⁹⁷

Withdrawing from the aggressive investment agenda and to governing on the basis of sound planning and coordination was not only a recommendation of foreign advisory, which the government resisted, but was also increasingly echoed by local intellectuals and business cadres from the mid-1950s onward. *Forum* periodical, mentioned in the previous chapters, was their key publication, where the lack of planning was heavily criticized.⁹⁸ Furthermore, by the late 1950s, all international organizations were advocating some form of development planning, as the experiment in national development planning in India was widely admired.

The DP government, however, had no intention of accepting this new consensus, as its early liberal policies and successes were depended heavily on the support of its constituents, especially small farmers and artisans, who clearly had the most to lose from planned development with a focus on industrialization, and thus the planning was cursed as the notion of a totalitarian attitude.⁹⁹

By 1958, the economic situation had deteriorated to such an extent that Turkey could no longer borrow from abroad, and US grants, which were given on the basis of the US anti-communist interest, had also dwindled. External pressures, coupled with the rising costs of political unrest in the country, forced the DP to announce a stabilization program on August 4, 1958. It is also worth noting that the "rescue operation" was held

96 Şenses, "Main Phases and Salient Features of Turkish Foreign Aid Experience," 247.

97 John White, *Pledged to Development: A Study of International Consortia and the Strategy of Aid* (Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 1967), 100–102.

98 Diren Çakmak, "Forum Dergisi : 1954-1960" (PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 2007).

99 Cemal Mihçioğlu, "Devlet Planlama Teşkilatının Kuruluş Günleri," in *Prof. Dr. Fadıl H. Sur'a Armağan* (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1983), 229–57.

only twenty days after the Iraq Revolution and its withdrawal from Baghdad Pact, which may have once again reminded Turkey's geostrategic card to US administration.

The program included de facto devaluation, restraint on government expenditures, and liberalization of the import regime, as well as commitment to planning and coordination, which was also stated in previous IMF Reports.¹⁰⁰ The government's immediate response to the request to add the notion of coordination was to establish a new ministry in the Cabinet, namely the "Ministry of Coordination,"¹⁰¹ and to create a "Ministerial Coordination Board" among the various ministers within the government to act as an overarching council for the investment decisions. Furthermore, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who directly conducted negotiations with foreign lenders and was at odds with the Ministry of Finance, established his own "Investition Program Committee."¹⁰²

However, these were only ad hoc attempts to satisfy lenders, and the government had neither the intention nor the knowledge to apply any strategic planning. In an effort to obtain the German aid, a planning document was prepared by the Foreign Minister's Committee and submitted to Ludwig Erhard, German Minister of Economics in mid-1959. The document was ridiculed by Erhard, who saw it not as a plan, but as a list of projects. Thus, he declined further assistance and recommended Turkish side to prepare a solid plan under the guidance of an internationally recognized expert.¹⁰³

Faced with a lack of credibility that could lead to further turbulence in the economy, the DP government asked OECD's Assistant Secretary General, Flint Cahan, for a reputable advisor a guidance to prepare a national development report. Jan Tinbergen, a prominent Dutch economist,

100 IMF Archives, 'Stabilization Program of the Turkish Government,'" July 23, 1958.

101 Mümtaz Soysal, "Yeni Bir Bakanlığın Kuruluşu," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 13, no. 3 (1958): 276–85.

102 Ümit Akçay, *Kapitalizmi Planlamak: Türkiye'de Planlama ve DPT'nin Dönüşümü*, 1. basım, Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı; Yakın tarih dizisi, 14. 1 (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: SAV Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2007), 69–70.

103 Dekker, *Jan Tinbergen (1903–1994) and the Rise of Economic Expertise*, 311.

and a senior development planning consultant was named as the most suitable candidate and invited to Turkey in March 1960.¹⁰⁴

Along with the other developmentalist economists, Tinbergen had some advanced thoughts on population. His vision too, was on the basis of the inverse relationship between population and poverty and envisioned high birth rate in a causal relationship with poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment.¹⁰⁵ He further states that the duty of the states struggling with poverty is to create conditions conducive to reduce population growth.¹⁰⁶ In that respect he defines family planning not only as a feasible solution to accelerate development, but also as the only weapon left to the poorest groups to improve their situation.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, as an ardent Malthusianist, Tinbergen urges governments to control births to compensate for resource shortages and limited food supplies. Turkey once was praised by UN for increasing agricultural and industrial production at a much higher rate than population growth in 1950,¹⁰⁸ severely criticized after nine years in another UN mission report written by Fritz Baade.

According to Baade, the population grew faster than the agricultural growth. And cultivable land not only reached its capacity limits but began to shrink due to erosion resulting from the excessive cultivation of unsuitable terrains.¹⁰⁹ The report attracted many public reactions and

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- 104 Cemal Mihçioğlu, "Yine Devlet Planlama Örgütünün Kuruluşu Üzerine," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 43, no. 1 (1988): 113–46.
- 105 Jan Tinbergen, *Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: E.P.Dutton & Co., 1976), 73.
- 106 Ibid., 137.
- 107 Jan Tinbergen, "Demographic Development and the Exhaustion of Natural Resources," *Population and Development Review* 1, no. 1 (1975): 23–32.
- 108 United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, "Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East: Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949-50." (New York: United Nations Publications, March 1951), 13.
- 109 Fritz Baade, *F.A.O. Türkiye Raporu* (Ankara, Turkey: Ziraat Bankası 100.Yıldönümü Yayınları, 1962), 13.

became one of the central reference points for Malthusian debates in the parliamentary discussion about population law.¹¹⁰

As a respected OECD economist, Tinbergen's leadership and coordination of the country's first NDP not only contributed significantly to the credibility of the report, but also ensured that its content met the OECD standard, of which the negative correlation between development and population growth was a key component. And the SPO team, consisting of young Turkish economists have embraced Tinbergen's vision.

However, the country was in political turmoil. Only two months after Tinbergen's arrival, the DP government was overthrown by a military coup, and the sincerity of the government in following Tinbergen's advice became an unknown question to be answered. But as his assistant Koopman, who stayed in the country for two months before the coup and neglected during his stay in a hostile environment admitted to the generals a week after the coup, that it might be much easier to set up a planning organization under the military regime, since the politicians are often reluctant to support an institution that might constrain their populist policies.¹¹¹

Indeed, the formation of the SPO was much smoother and easier under the leadership of the military regime, since they did not have to worry about the voters or other interest groups. Furthermore, they were desperately in need of immediate international recognition to resolve the acute financial turmoil. But they also had other reasons to adopt antinatalist policies than economic necessities, which is explored in the next section.

3.2.2 *Military Coup and Further Concerns on Population*

This section explores the sudden switch to the antinatalist agenda after the 1960 military coup, in light of the DP government's political setbacks, which had instigated the army, along with the additional hegemony-security concerns on the southeastern border.

110 Metin Boysan, "Nüfus artışını teşvik mi tahdit mi etmeli?" *Forum*, June 15, 1962.

111 Akçay, *Kapitalizmi Planlamak*, 72.

The economic unrest in the mid-1950s also came along with the increase of the political tension and military discontent. But the “Democrats” had no tolerance for critics and imposed political repression on opponents. In 1953, they began to take began to crack down the main opposition, CHP. All the party property was confiscated, and the party newspaper *Ulus* was also temporarily taken over by the authorities.¹¹² In 1954, the Press Law gave prosecutors direct authority to arrest opposing journalists on the pretext of damaging their reputations through defamatory radio broadcasts and press releases.¹¹³ University professors, too, found themselves exposed to government harassment.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, under the 1956 Meetings and Demonstration Law, public gatherings were so heavily regulated that meetings and political activity outside the assembly became virtually impossible.¹¹⁵ In early 1959, the government took an illusory initiative to further power consolidation and public oppression by creating a bloc namely fatherland front, *Vatan Cephesi*, announcing the new members of the bloc in constant radio broadcasts in order to polarize and stigmatize the masses based on their political support.

The public repression aside, the military officials also had their share in seriously undermining their political and social prestige as well as economic conditions in this era. Relying on public support in the elections, the government felt no need for any additional approval from the army and even unconcerned in its relations. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was widely quoted in 1954 as saying that he could run the army with

112 William Hale, *Turkish Politics, and the Military* (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 94–95.

113 Turkish Assembly, “Press Law, No: 6334,” Official Gazette publication on March 17, 1954, No : 8660, enacted on March 17, 1954.

114 George S Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,” *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 2 (1965): 169–76.

115 Turkish Assembly, “Meeting and Demonstration Law, No: 6761,” Official Gazette publication on June 30, 1956, No : 9346, enacted on June 27, 1956.

reserve officers if he wanted. This had a very inflammatory effect on the regular officers.¹¹⁶

Moreover, most of the military officials, who saw themselves as protectors of Kemalist ideology, had growing resentment of the government because of the concessions made to undermine the Kemalist reform program, such as the easing of restrictions on religious practices, which had led to an upsurge in superstition and even open attacks on Atatürk by religious fanatics.¹¹⁷

The young officers who formed the nucleus of the coup had additional anxieties, such as hampered promotions and declining purchasing power due to very small pay raises. The cost of living increased more than ten-fold in 1960 compared to 1950, and military salaries only doubled during the same period.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the problem of inadequate pay was so acute that by 1956 about one-third of commissioned officers had left the military.¹¹⁹

Membership in NATO also divided the Turkish armed forces along technological lines, and the young officers, especially those stationed abroad, gained much of a self-confidence, mental flexibility, and international vision and started to form detached cell-like micro-organizations to find ways to redress the ills of the government.¹²⁰

The government became aware of the plans of the plot in late 1957 through an incident known as “Nine Officers’ Conspiracy,” but took them much more seriously after the revolution in Iraq in July 1958, when the military regime took control of the government. The military high command too was alarmed by the Iraq revolution, but for entirely different reasons:

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- 116 Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, “27 Mayıs’ın gerisindeki beş yılın hikayesi,” *Milliyet*, May 27, 1962, 5.
 - 117 Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), 41–43.
 - 118 Christopher Gunn, “The 1960 Coup in Turkey: A U.S. Intelligence Failure or a Successful Intervention?” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17, no. 2 (April 2015): 103–39.
 - 119 Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,” 170.
 - 120 Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, 154–55.

fear of ethnical separation, which, this thesis claims, had a significant impact on changing population policy.

Iraq was a keystone for the anti-communist military alliance in the Middle East. The headquarters of the Middle East Treaty Organization, a semi-regional replica of NATO, established in 1955 between UK, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, was in Iraq, as the organization's short name, "Baghdad Pact" also indicates. The military coup in Iraq had taken the Western powers and the members of the organization completely by a surprise and shock, as the coup plotters immediately established relations with China, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.¹²¹ Expectedly, the new military government in Iraq froze relations with the pact until announcing the official withdrawal in March 1959.¹²²

Having the ongoing hegemony-security structure in the Middle East deeply wounded, the US and its allies turned their attention back to their forgotten ally Turkey, which they had neglected for some time. The name of the organization was changed to the Central Organization Treaty, (CENTO) and its headquarters moved to the Turkish capital of Ankara.

Furthermore, in March 1959, the US government signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey and the other members of CENTO, pledging military and economic support to the governments in the event of direct or indirect aggression from any quarter. The internal discussions in the US foreign relations documents evidence that the US government felt obliged to sign the documents immediately to prevent communist elements from flourishing in the region and to save American prestige.¹²³

US economic and political support for Turkish government appears to undermine theories of global hegemonic sphere involvement in Turkish coup. Gunn mentions that the US was not clueless about the coup, yet he finds no convincing evidence that the US was in any way involved in

121 Cihat Göktepe, "The 'Forgotten Alliance'? Anglo-Turkish Relations and CENTO, 1959-65," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): 103-29.

122 *Ibid.*, 107.

123 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula; "Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower" (Washington, 1959), Document 268.

the planning or execution of it.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, the military junta was extremely cautious about the US reaction, and so the first statement on the coup declaration was a commitment to the principles of NATO and CENTO. Furthermore, the military's well-connected network in NATO helped to dispel mutual doubts and facilitate a smoother transition.

Meanwhile, Kurdish autonomy, expanded by the Iraqi regime, became a growing concern for the Turkish government. A few weeks after the coup in Iraq, Kurdish tribal leader Mustafa Barzani returned from his decade-long exile in the Soviet Union, where he had sought asylum after the fall of the Kurdish Mahabad Republic in 1946. His party, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, was recognized as a legal entity and quickly gained great influence in Iraqi Kurdistan.¹²⁵ Barzani attempted to obtain autonomous status for Iraqi Kurdistan but failed to convince Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qassem. The stalling of negotiations sparked an uprising in September 1961 known as the 'September Revolution.' The unrest did not end until 1970, when Kurdish autonomy was granted.¹²⁶

The events on the southern border unearthed the primary national hegemony-security issue of the republic in the 1920s and 1930s: the "Eastern Problem." Turkish security authorities became alarmed at the possibility of such unrest spreading to Turkey.¹²⁷ They went to great lengths to alienate the Kurdish uprising in Iraq. In late 1959, forty-nine Kurdish intellectuals, almost half of them students, were arrested for being involved in separatist and communist activities.¹²⁸ In the same year,

124 Gunn, "The 1960 Coup in Turkey: A U.S. Intelligence Failure or a Successful Intervention?" 138.

125 Beatrice Grapon and Adnan Çelik, "From Tribal Chiefs to Marxist Activists: Kurdistan from 1946 to 1975," in *The Cambridge History of the Kurds*, ed. Hamit Bozarslan, Cengiz Gunes, and Veli Yadirgi, 1st ed. (Cambridge (UK); New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 229–49.

126 Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 104–6.

127 Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 160.

128 Bilal Nergiz, "Devletin Kürt Politikası ve Kürt Hareketi (1945-1960)" (PhD Thesis, Istanbul University, 2019), 172–79.

it was alleged that both the Chief of General Staff Cemal Gürsel, who would also lead the 1960 coup, and President Celal Bayar had their own versions of the Kurdish reports on their desks with different recommendations to increase the “Turkishness” of the citizens in the Southeast.¹²⁹

The issue was at the top of the generals' agenda during the coup of 1960, as the 485 Kurdish notables were sent to the camp in Sivas and 55 of them, accused of advocating the establishment of a separate Kurdish state within the DP government, were exiled.¹³⁰ Furthermore, in the early days of the coup, General Gürsel personally requested to establish a Social Planning division within the SPO to deal mainly with the Kurdish issue.¹³¹ And a subdivision called the ‘Eastern Group’ immediately began preparing the “Eastern Plan.” The document was classified as a national security file that would also to be followed by the forthcoming governments.¹³²

The copy of the document was found in the archives of the Minister of Labor of the 1961 government and the later Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who had found it on his desk on the day of his appointment.¹³³ Resembling the earlier Kurdish reports from the 1930s, the Eastern Plan envisages the following measures to change the population structure in favor of the Turks:

- Reinforcement of Turkish settlement by influx of people from the overpopulated Black Sea region and import of Turkish immigrants from the Eastern Balkans.
- Stimulating Kurds to migrate to the west by proving incentives and additional funding.

129 Ibid., 179–83.

130 “Bir Kürdistan hükümeti İçin DP grubu içinde çalışanlar varmış,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1960.

131 Akçay, *Kapitalizmi Planlamak*, 196. Based on the interview with Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, the head of Economic Division of SPO in 1960.

132 Hüseyin Yayman, *Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 178–91.

133 Rıdvan Akar and Can Dünder, *Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi*, 2nd ed. (Ankara, Turkey: İmge kitabevi, 2008), 91.

- A detailed resettlement plan that would allow the eastern border to be disconnected from the Iraqi and Iranian Kurds.¹³⁴

In the 1930s, the Turkish government faced a series of Kurdish uprisings for autonomy, and high level of Kurdish fertility was also mentioned as a security concern in reports of the time.¹³⁵ By the late 1950s, the issue was not the insurgency, but fear of unrest, which led MBK leaders to consider measures similar to those used in the 1930s: assimilation, mobilization, and forced migration.¹³⁶ But did they consider population control as an additional measure to limit Kurdish fertility?

To respond to that question, the MBK minutes of meetings (108 sessions of the General Assembly and 86 sessions of the Council of Ministers) between June 1960 and November 1961 were tracked with regard to the discussion on population policy. The minutes provide no evidence about any intention to use population control to limit Kurdish fertility. It could also be argued that the antinatalist measures in the ethnic base were not a traditional tool of the army to deal with fear of unrest or separation, as these measures have long-term effects and have the potential to further reinforce separatist ideas.

McDowell thinks the other way, he argues that the state has blocked the introduction of what he describes the much-needed family planning on a very limited scale to stamp out the Kurdish identity, as he believes that family planning would be more likely to be adopted in the Turkish west of the country and thus accelerate the changing demographic balance in favor of the Kurds.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, the records evidence that the army had the full support of the antinatalist vision, though mostly under the guise of economic concerns. In the course of the discussions on the new Income Tax Law in

134 Ibid., 92–103.

135 Fuat Dunder, “Abidin Özmen’in ‘Siyah Raporu’ Vesilesiyle ‘Kürt Nüfusu Artışı Sorunu,” *Toplumsal Tarih* 226 (2012): 76–82.

136 MBK General Meeting (Milli Birlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı), (Vol.1, Meeting No: 24, October 17, 1960). The discussions of the extension of the Settlement Law of 2510 evidence the similar anxieties and suggestions of the past.

137 David McDowall, *The Modern History of the Kurds* (I.B.Tauris & Co., 2007), 404.

December 1960, a proposal to extend tax incentives to families with more than five children was rejected by the committee, citing ongoing studies about the harm of population growth to the economy.¹³⁸ In addition, the 5% bachelor tax, which had long existed in the previous income tax law as an incentive to encourage marriage and pronatalist policies,¹³⁹ was removed in this new Income Tax Law of 1960.¹⁴⁰

The meeting notes show that the notion of “overpopulation” was accepted as a given fact, and discussions centered on how to deal with that. In September 1960, MBK members enframed one of the key missions of the SPO’s to investigate whether overpopulation was harming the Turkish economy.¹⁴¹ (Not to investigate whether Turkey was overpopulated or not.) Similarly, in March 1961, General Gürsel asked SPO members to consider the burden of the additional five million population increase when drafting the NDP.¹⁴²

Even more interestingly, Necmettin Erbakan, who would become the founder of the first grassroot Islamic party, *Milli Nizam Partisi*, the political predecessor of today’s pronatalist champion, Justice and Development Party (AKP), also acknowledged population growth in a Malthusian fashion during the ministry board meeting he attended as a technical advisor for the development of a national motor industry.¹⁴³ He claimed that within ten years, there would be no practical way to cope with the needs and requirements of the huge population growth unless the country took measures for high mechanization and heavy industrialization.¹⁴⁴

138 MBK General Meeting (Milli Birlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı), Vol.5, Meeting no: 67, December 31, 1960, 26.

139 Turkish Assembly, “Income Tax Law, No: 5421,” Official Gazette publication on June 4, 1949, No.7228, enacted on June 3, 1949, article 90.

140 Turkish Assembly, “Income Tax Law,” Law No: 193, Official Gazette publication on January 6, 1961, No: 10700, enacted on December 31, 1960, article 103,104.

141 MBK General Meeting (Milli Birlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Toplantısı), October 17, 1960.

142 Cemil Koçak, *27 Mayıs Bakanlar Kurulu Tutanakları*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009), Meeting no 69, 992.

143 Ibid., Meeting no 67, 949-958.

144 Ibid., 950.

The antinatalist agenda of MBK was further elaborated by the Ministry of Health with some proactive actions between December 1960 and June 1961. On December 12 ,1960, a major birth control seminar was held for the first time, jointly organized by the Ministry of Health and the Central Health Institute and attended by all antinatalist champions from the health and economy to promote birth control. The political and religious advisory was also present for further support.¹⁴⁵

For further entrenchment, a written consent the Ministry of Religious Affairs was obtained from to ensure the morality of birth control.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Supreme Council of Health was gathered for reporting the urgency of the issue,¹⁴⁷ and a letter of recommendation was sent to SPO about population control procedures to be included in the first NDP.¹⁴⁸

In summary, the antinatalist idea, once neglected by the DP government, suddenly gained full-fledged political support right after the coup. On the surface, MBK members seemed to get triggered by economic conditions and strong need for foreign aid linked to development planning based on population control, the existence of the additional security concern about the Kurdish population was unavoidable at least at the higher command.

In terms of Agamben and Bradley's life forms, the threat potential of unbearable lives on the hegemony-security priorities of the ruling good lives should also create its own motivation for further embracing the population control policies.

Potential voices of opposition to population control were either suppressed or pacified during the heyday of the coup, but they did have their say during parliamentary discussions when the SPO's first NDP was voted on in late 1962.

145 Üner and Fişek, *Türkiye'de Doğum Kontrolü Uygulaması Üzerine İncelemeler*, 7–23.

146 Ibid., 143–44.

147 Ibid., 148.

148 Ibid., 145.

3.2.3 *National Planning and the Population Control Discussions*

A new law on the Family Planning was on the political agenda after the 1960 coup, but the law was not passed until April 1965. What was the reason for this delay, despite the seemingly strong antinatalist commitment of MBK leaders? The answer lies in the parliamentary discussions on the adoption of the NDP in November 1962. During the discussions, population planning, which was an integral part of the plan, was vetoed twice, and this section tracks the parliamentary archives to uncover the debates and arguments of the opposing sides.

After ensuring peace and order, MBK members had plans to secure the integrity of the regime before leaving it back to the political parties. Accordingly, they formed a Constituent Assembly to take over the legislative function of the Committee. During the process, radicals within the core who did not want to share power were liquidated, and some 235 generals and 5,000 officers retired.¹⁴⁹

On the first anniversary of the coup, the Constitutional Assembly promulgated the new Constitution, granting sovereignty entirely to the Constitution, with the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial orders.¹⁵⁰ Reflecting the welfare state tendencies, the 1961 Constitution brought a more liberal and freedom friendly spirit into the context with the introduction of syndicate, collective bargaining and strike rights.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, political rights were extended on condition that the programs and activities of political parties conform to the principles of a democratic and secular republic.¹⁵²

Not only the context, but also the structure of the new constitution was fundamentally different from the previous one, as it transformed the Grand National Assembly into a bicameral parliament. The National

149 Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, 165–68.

150 Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa 1961-1982*, 5th ed. (Istanbul: Oniki Levha Yayıncılık, 2020), 12–20.

151 Haydar Seçkin Çelik, “Resurgence of the Cold War State of Mind: The Debate on Constitutional Tolerance of Socialism Vis-à-Vis the Emerging Left in Turkey (1967–1971),” *Cold War History*, August 10, 2022, 1–22.

152 Ibid., 4.

Assembly, composed of 450 members elected by the popular vote on the basis of proportional representation, and the Senate, with 150 members elected by majority vote. Furthermore, the former members of the MBK were senators of life and the president had the right to appoint another fifteen senators.¹⁵³ All laws and plans had to pass two chambers by majority vote. The Senate was the higher chamber in laws but the lower for plans, whereas the final decision to approve plans was made in the National Assembly.

The elections were held on October 15, 1961, and Ismet İnönü and his CHP won 173 out of 450 seats, while AP, the political heir of DP, won 158 seats, which meant that the country was ruled by coalitions until the next election in October 1965. During this period there were four governments and each experienced different phases of the Population Planning Law. The law was drafted during the first İnönü coalition government (1961-1962), submitted to parliament during the second İnönü coalition (1962-1963), debated during the third İnönü coalition (1963-1965), and enacted during the AP led coalition in April 1965.¹⁵⁴ But before that, population planning was hotly debated during the promulgation of the NDP in November 1962.

As mentioned earlier, upon recognition by the USD and its allies, the MBK government immediately took the initiative to establish SPO to create a development plan in hopes of receiving immediate and consistent financial support. Colonel Sami Orel was entrusted with this task, and he immediately activated the previously assembled but muted planners guided by Jan Tinbergen and other foreign advisors.

The plan itself was a declaration of a new chapter in the Turkish economy. The etatist industrialization until the WWII, and the agriculture-based export economy in the 1950s were about to be transformed into

153 Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, 186.

154 Levine and Üner, *Population Policy Formation and Implementation in Turkey*, 59.

an import substitution-based industrialization (ISI) in the early 1960s, and the first NDP of 1963 was its systematic introduction.¹⁵⁵

Foreign capital, frustrated by the DP's unplanned years, was so taken with the news of the Turkish plan, that the third major OECD economic consortium for a developing country, after India in 1958 and Pakistan in 1960, was set for Turkey in 1962.¹⁵⁶ The consortium consisted of fifteen OECD members and representatives of the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank as observers. The objective was to harmonize the cooperation and assistance policies of OECD countries that wished to provide development loans to Turkey. One of the main tasks of the consortium was to review and evaluate the five-year NDP and the annual programs prepared by the Turkish authorities.¹⁵⁷

The backbone of the NDP was to achieve 7% annual growth, and all other elements and policies are designed to support this target. The foreign guidance and consortium ensured that the plan was consistent with Coale and Hoovers developmentalist vision, discussed in the previous chapter, and the Turkish team, which consisted of the young economists, also shared this global vision. Yet the population growth was described not only as a usual suspect impeding growth by the reduction in the governments savings, but also as a reality distorting the social order,¹⁵⁸ which could be provoked by military's hegemony-security concerns, and/or urban-rural conflict.

In the plan, the accumulation of the young working-age population, defined as the "demographic window of opportunity," was perceived as an excessive labor force leading to undesirable unemployment and internal migration.¹⁵⁹ In this sense, the export of labor to Europe, which had

155 Sadık Ünay, *Neoliberal Globalization and Institutional Reform : The Political Economy of Development and Planning in Turkey* (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2006), 58–59.

156 White, *Pledged to Development*, 1–41.

157 Walter F. Stettner, "The OECD Consortium for Turkey," *The OECD Observer*, April 1965.

158 Prime Ministry and State Planning Organization, *First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967)*, 35–37.

159 *Ibid.*, 454–55.

already begun in September 1961 through a bilateral agreement with Germany, was also introduced as one of the key employment policies in the report.¹⁶⁰ The health implications of excessive fertility, maternal mortality and abortion were also mentioned in the NDP as ills of overpopulation, but with less emphasis.¹⁶¹ It should also be mentioned that it was a doctor, Dr. Fişek, who drafted the details of the antinatalist population policy in the plan.

The antinatalist plan mentioned in the NDP, a precursor to the Population Planning Law of 1965, proclaimed the following: the abandonment of pronatalist population policies and the immediate transition to population planning through the liberalization of the importation and sale of contraceptives and their free distribution if necessary, as well as educational activities on the family planning. The plan also emphasized that it should not be understood as a state intervention on fertility, but as granting a freedom of choice to the parents to have the children.¹⁶²

A demographic projection for 1985 was also mentioned in the NDP, on the basis of the high, moderate, and low fertility, estimated at 59, 55 and 51 million inhabitants, respectively.¹⁶³ In 1985, the population barely reached 50 million, below the low fertility projection. However, the official family planning results were far from the targets. This dilemma is one of the puzzles that this dissertation seeks to understand and is explored in the last chapter.

The NDP was first presented in the Senate on November 7th, then in the National Assembly on November 20th. And on both occasions, population control was one of the central debates. During the initial discussions in the senate, Macit Zeren, a senator from AP, made it clear that he was not satisfied with the plan. In his opinion, the planners treat population as a single variable that must be reduced in order to increase national per capita income. He added that the issue requires a

160 Ibid., 456.

161 Ibid., 68–69.

162 Ibid., 73.

163 Ibid., 70.

comprehensive assessment of the strategy in terms of human resources, moral values, geography, geopolitical and military imperatives.¹⁶⁴

Furthermore, Suat Seren, former minister of health and senator from AP, along with fifteen senators accompanying him, petitioned the senate to remove population control from the plan,¹⁶⁵ expressing the following concerns.

- The population control declaration and its action plan are anti-democratic. If the only goal of the plan were free choice of fertility, as claimed, legalization of contraceptives would suffice. But since public education, free distribution of contraceptives, and state propaganda are planned, there are to be further repressive measures.
- The maternal mortality figure cited in the report (12,000 per year) has no scientific background, and if it did, the government's priority should be to prevent it, not to use it as a justification for family planning.
- The drugs and sterilization equipment are dangerous to health and can harm the body if they are not constantly controlled and checked.
- Contraception might lead to moral corrosion and promote extramarital affairs.

Deputy Prime Minister Turhan Feyzioğlu's initial defense of population control was based on anti-communist rhetoric, claiming that neither China nor Russia could implement population control because they were products of a democratic state.¹⁶⁶ This false argument was also further spread in the daily newspapers.¹⁶⁷ As for the claims about the biological and moral ills of population control, he recalled the UN's health reports and the Ministry of Religious Affairs consents about the birth control as justification.

164 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 6, Meeting No: 4, November 7, 1962), 69–72.

165 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), November 10, 1962), 237–39.

166 Ibid., 239–41.

167 “Doğum Kontrolüne Komünistler Karşı,” *Milliyet*, December 9, 1962.

As a last resort, Feyzioğlu admitted that the government was under constant and intense international pressure from NATO, the IMF, and the OECD to lower the high fertility rates. He further shared a personal anecdote with Thorkil Kristensen, the Secretary General of the OECD and head of Turkish Aid Consortium, who persistently told Feyzioğlu during the visit in March 1962 about the consortium's concerns on the 3% annual population growth rate, which they described as a major obstacle to the countries to growth and prosperity.¹⁶⁸

Health Minister Yusuf Azizoğlu further added the modernist discourse on population control as another leverage, saying that the use of contraceptive technology is a contemporary method followed by all modern nations, so Turkey should not lag behind.¹⁶⁹

Suat Selen then took the lead again, asking how a secular government could ask for the approval of a religious authority. He kept criticizing the Malthusianist, developmentalist, and modernist approaches to population control, saying that the country is fertile and capable of feeding millions of people, and that population control is not a tool for developed countries, but a mechanism created by them and applied to others.¹⁷⁰

In the end, Seren's petition to remove population control from the NDP was voted on in the senate and passed by a vote of 49 to 32.¹⁷¹ Since the constitution at the time allowed for revoting a critical change element in the plan, a second meeting was held in the senate to rediscuss population control. And Feyzioğlu intimidated the senate that the plan itself was based on projected population, and if population planning falls, so does the plan. He also claimed that the country would have one million fewer unemployed by 1975 if it succeeds in shifting to antinatalist policies.¹⁷²

168 The OECD Consortium seems to be aware of the possible public and political opposition to population control infusion by a foreigner, so no written document was found as evidence. Yet, Feyzioğlu's narrative could also bear some exaggeration to convince the senators for population control.

169 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), November 10, 1962, 241.

170 Ibid., 242.

171 Ibid., 224-43.

172 Ibid., 283-89.

As a result of the re-vote, the petition was rejected by a vote of 59 to 44, and population plan of the NDP was approved in the Senate and the five-year development plan was sent to the National Assembly for the final approval, where debates over population control further intensified.

Saadettin Tosbi, an economist and senator of the Republican Villagers Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Partisi*),¹⁷³ passionately refutes the developmentalist discourse on population growth and sided with the mercantilist view by mentioning that excess labor power is necessary for price competition and capital growth. It is also worth noting that even at this early stage Tosbi discusses the long-term negative effects of population control on the labor market in terms of aging. Lastly, he strongly echoes the nationalist sentiment on the population planning and asks the senate how the planners could think of reducing the potential of the Turkish generation, and he further claims that Turkey would be much more prestigious, prosperous, and robust with 50 million inhabitants instead of 30 million.¹⁷⁴

Tahsin Demiray of AP also acknowledges that the population policy should be revisited to improve the economy and public health. However, he sees no point to engage in a full force population control activity, as he predicts that the population was already in declining trend thanks to the labor export and huge rural to urban migration, which he states that will reduce fertility pattern in the future.¹⁷⁵ In retrospect, Demiray was right in his prediction about the decline in fertility.

The next day, Demiray, together with Muhiddin Guven, delivers another petition, this time to parliament, to remove population control from the plan.¹⁷⁶ Reminding Macit Zeren's discontent during the

173 This party was the predecessor of today's National Movements Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)

174 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 9, Meeting No:6, November 16, 1962), 195–97.

175 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 9, Meeting No:7, November 17, 1962), 228–29.

176 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 9, Meeting No:10, November 20, 1962), 441.

preliminary discussions in the senate, they also found the report materialistic and oversimplified. Güven further articulates their vision that a population policy and the population optimization require detailed and intensive planning of the political, social, demographic, economic, moral and strategic aspects of population along with other crucial elements such as the efficiency and potential of the land and regional differences, a detailed analysis of the existing human stock with the cultural, moral and educational differences.¹⁷⁷

This time Nusret Fişek, undersecretary for the Ministry of Health, responds to the petition as he summarizes the SPO's position and underlining that this is not a plan, but a matter of freedom and public health. He provides statistics on maternal and infant mortality rates and shares his experience on the necessity of the law, especially from the health perspective.¹⁷⁸ In the end, the offer to reject the antinatalist aspects of the plan was declined once again and the NDP passed in parliament the next day.¹⁷⁹

The aforementioned senate and parliamentary discussions during the NDP approval reveal a number of key hesitations and oppositions regarding population control. Although there was a common sense on its role as a fundamental human right preventing women from suffering, the government's involvement in this issue as part of the development discourse generated a great deal of controversy.

The politicians and even the antinatalist activist were aware of the delicacy of the matter. Nermin Abadan Unat, a prominent sociologist, and the chair of the Turkish University Women Association (*Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği*), stated as early as 1961 that they fully support freedom of choice in fertility, but the name "population planning" should be changed as it has a negative connotation in the public mind.¹⁸⁰

177 Ibid., 441–43.

178 Ibid., 443–45.

179 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 2, Vol. 9, Meeting No:11, November 21, 1962), 552–55.

180 "Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği doğum kontrolüne hararetle taraftar," *Milliyet*, June 4, 1961.

Furthermore, Ismet İnönü, who was a champion of pronatalists in the 1930s but actively supported population control as a prime minister in the 1960s, responded to the initial family planning presentation he received from the experts as “I understood and am convinced of the necessity of population control, but you will have a hard time explaining it to the public.”¹⁸¹ The elder statesman was well aware of the political and public prejudices that the issue might entail.

After 1962, population control was separated from NDP discussions and became an independent topic for further legislation. And the pronatalist bloc in the parliament and in the senate diverged and sharpened their arguments, which will be elaborated in the following section.

3.2.4 *Antinatalist Preparations and further debates until 1965*

On December 3, 1962, one month after the ratification of the NPT, the İnönü government submitted a proposal to the parliament to lift the restrictions on the distribution and sale of the contraceptives that had been in place since 1930.¹⁸² As a result, two commissions were appointed from the health and justice departments to investigate the implications of the change in the law. Both commissions were reported in favor of the amendment, and the government officially requested the legal change in the law on May 27, 1963.¹⁸³

Nevertheless, they withdraw their petition on July 3, 1963, without any further explanation.¹⁸⁴ Presumably not only to save some time to accommodate additional antinatalist public support, but perhaps as a result of the Population Council report they received just one day after

181 Turkish Medical Association, *Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi*, 12.

182 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), “Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanununun 152. Maddesinin Değiştirilmesine Dair Kanun Tasarısı ve Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım ve Adalet Komisyonları Raporları (1/359),” December 21, 1963.

183 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Vol.18, Meeting No:103, June 27, 1963), 591–92.

184 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Vol.19, Meeting No:107, July 3, 1963), 118.

delivering the petition on May 28, which revealed the sophisticated structure needed to implement population control.

This section discusses the preparations for the planning and execution of the population control, as well as the other activities to expand antinatalist support among the public. Undoubtedly, the leadership of the Population Council had the most significant influence in the policy design, as it has had a similar influence in many of the other developing countries mentioned earlier.

The Council followed a similar methodology in almost all the countries it supported. In the self-confidence of positioning themselves as the sole decision-makers for the design and implementation of population control policies, the members of the Council did not engage in promotional activities. Once a developing country drafts a foreign guided NDP, embedded with the antinatalist policy orientation, they fell into the trap of asking the Population Council for advice on population control planning and execution, of which they had no practical knowledge about.

In the same fashion, the Ministry of Health formally requested the Council's support on January 30, 1963, just two months after the parliament approved the NDP. The first expedition was made by Chairman Notestein in mid-February.¹⁸⁵ Two months later, all of the Council's heavyweights, including the Notestein, Berelson, Mauldin, Balfour, and Taylor, were on a three-week tour of Turkey, meeting with anyone they thought would be informative and cooperative in prepare their report, including statisticians, academicians, economists, politicians, and health professionals.¹⁸⁶

The recipe in the report was also standard in all countries, with minor nuances. The essential elements of the program were: well-established institutionalization, standardized continuous and comparable data production through KAP surveys and its institutionalization through the establishment of a population institute, technical knowledge transfer and scholarships in US, financial and medical support, massive anti

185 "Doğum Kontrolü İçin Amerika'dan Teknik Yardım İstedik," *Milliyet*, February 24, 1963.

186 Population Council, *Population Council'in Türkiye'deki Nüfus Planlamasına Dair Raporu*, 20–21.

natalist propaganda, education, and public mobilization including training of military personnel.¹⁸⁷

Immediately after the submission of the report, another foreign guided team was organized to conduct the first KAP survey in the country during the summer of 1963. The survey was conducted among 5,113 people: 2,774 wives aged twenty to forty-five and 2,372 husbands living in 240 villages, 46 towns, 21 cities, and three metropolises. Additionally, political leaders (168 mukhtars in total) and religious leaders (138 imams in total) were interviewed in each village to learn their attitudes towards birth control.¹⁸⁸

More than 100 questions were asked by interviewers, most of whom were teachers trained for the survey, about all aspects of fertility behavior, including pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, infant mortality, attitudes toward birth control, knowledge of contraceptive methods, personal interest in family planning information, desired number of children, etc.¹⁸⁹

Berelson evaluated the results as public approval of family planning, mentioning that couples were having more children than they wanted and that they would like to have fewer children. Further, he notes that a smaller family norm seems to have already been established in many Turkish minds, adding that Turks have little ideological objection to contraception and would like to learn how to use it effectively. According to the report, Turkish families very much want the government to organize a family planning education program.¹⁹⁰ As expected, Berelson's report is selective and emphasizes the statistical results that favor birth control.

Berelson's colleague Stycos, however, transparently shares some sketches of the KAP questionnaire and the general reaction with the rural urban distinction in his article on public leaders' opinion in family

187 Ibid., 33–77.

188 Stycos, "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning," 120–21.

189 Bernard Berelson, "Turkey: National Survey on Population," *Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 5 (1964): 1–5.

190 Ibid., 5.

planning.¹⁹¹ And the results, selectively presented in Table 3.10 could equally be interpreted differently from Berelson's claim.

Table 3.10 Some key responses in the Turkish KAP Survey of 1963. (%)

	<i>Males</i>			<i>Females</i>		
	Village (1294)	City (312)	Metropol (396)	Village (1294)	City (312)	Metropol (396)
Do you favor population growing rapidly	68	41	23	64	47	31
The ideal family size "Less than 4 children"	37	67	82	45	74	87
Do you want to learn birth control methods	62	77	78	72	86	89
Would you use pills to prevent pregnancy	41	61	65	56	76	75
Do you wish government to involve in family planning	71	84	93	86	94	96

SOURCE: Stycos (1965), 122.¹⁹²

In response to the original question "Which do you think would be better for Turkey in the next ten years: rapid population growth, slow population growth, or maintaining the same population size?", 68% men and 64% of women in villages responded in favor of rapid growth, while in cities it was slightly less than 50%. The response to that inquiry clearly indicates that it was mainly the three metropolitan residents who felt the pressure of the "population problem" in the near future, presumably due to the incoming rural migrants.

Another interesting depiction was the answers about the ideal family size. Some 63% of the men and 55% of the women in the villages responded with four or more children to the following question, "If you were just getting married and could have exactly the number of children you wanted, how many would be ideal?", which was still quite high.

In regard to rural public leaders, the mukhtars seem to represent the average attitude of male villagers toward birth control. As for the imams,

191 Stycos, "The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning."

192 Ibid., 122. The questions in Table 3.10 were selected from this page, shortened, and some of them were reversed for a better illustration.

who were said to be the main source of influence in birth control by the 22% of the villagers, (this ratio was 35% for the doctors), had more reservations on the issue as 64% of them declared that they disapprove birth control.¹⁹³

Nevertheless, the predominant respondents were enthusiastic about having information about the birth control and governments involvement on the issue, and two thirds of the overall respondents said they would take the pill, which Berelson prioritized to promote for population planning.

The report was the first installment of one of Turkey's most enduring statistical surveys, which is still conducted every five years. And, as in other parts of the developing world, Turkey's first KAP survey helped solidify public and political opinion in favor of birth control by providing scientific justification. The positive news in the press about the report, such as "the majority favors birth control,"¹⁹⁴ and "mukhtars favors birth control more than the imams,"¹⁹⁵ also support this assertion.

Until 1965, the Population Council further reinforced its activities by providing personnel in Turkey for assistance in planning, field training, and implementation of family planning, and by inviting Turkish academicians and health professionals to the US for training in various aspects of family planning.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, they confirmed to provide monetary aid for demographic research activities.¹⁹⁷

The other international donors were also enthusiastic to assist Turkey in its population control efforts. The Ministry of Health had reached an agreement with USAID to receive a lump sum grant and equipment support. The Ford Foundation offered its support to be materialized

193 Ibid., 126.

194 "Ekseriyet doğum kontrolünü istiyor," *Milliyet*, May 1, 1964.

195 "Doğum kontrolünü muhtalar imamlardan daha çok istiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, April 30, 1964.

196 Turgut Metiner, "Turkey," in *Family Planning and Population Programs; a Review of World Developments*, ed. Bernard Berelson (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 135–43.

197 Nusret Fişek, "Türkiye'de Nüfus Sorunlarının Ele Alınış Tarzı ve Planlar," *Sağlık Dergisi* 38, no. 3–4 (1964): 5–18.

during the implementation phase. The British and Swedish governments also offered their expertise and scholarship opportunities to the Turkish government.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, IPPF was interested in empowering local NGOs in this field and allocated grant to the newly established institution, the Turkish Family Planning Association, *Türkiye Aile Planlaması Derneği* (TAPD).¹⁹⁹

TAPD was founded in late 1963 by prominent local population control advocates from the health professionals, economists, journalists, academicians, and politicians.²⁰⁰ The association actively promoted family planning and organized numerous conferences and seminars on birth control until the Population Planning Law went into effect in April 1965. A major one was held on November 26-28, 1964, attended by the Minister of Health, the Minister of Agriculture, and prominent antinatalists from the health and economic sectors to emphasize the importance of birth control.²⁰¹ The seminar concluded with a statement of consensus on the merits of population planning. Only three delegates out of thirty had spoken against the birth control but unable to provide convincing evidence.²⁰²

Meanwhile, birth control became more integrated into the public health debate. During the 1st Maternal and Child Health Seminar of Istanbul (*1. İstanbul Ana Çocuk Sağlığı Semineri*) held as early as July 2-7, 1962, Nusret Fişek enumerated the economic and health arguments to underline the necessity of population control, especially in rural areas.²⁰³

198 Ibid., 13-17.

199 International Planned Parenthood Federation, "IPPF Europe: Reginal Information Bulletin," April 2, 1979, 8.

200 Türkiye Aile Planlaması Derneği, *Aile Planlaması Derneği Yönetmeliği* (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaası, 1963).

201 Türkiye Aile Planlaması Derneği, *Aile Planlaması Konferansı 26-28 Kasım 1964* (Ankara: Türkiye Aile Planlaması Derneği Yayınları, 1964).

202 Ibid., 4.

203 Nusret Fişek, "Köylerde Sağlık Hizmetleri" (*İstanbul 1. Ana Çocuk Sağlığı Semineri 2-7 Temmuz, 1962*, İstanbul: TC. Sağlık ve Sosyal yardım Bakanlığı Ana-Çocuk Sağlığı Müdürlüğü, 1962), 13-26.

But this time the pronatalists were under pressure from the government. In his speech about the impacts of the birth control on the population and the economy during the 2nd Maternal and Child Health Seminar of Istanbul in July 1963, Professor Sezai Bedrettin Tumay portrayed a pronatalist picture, claiming that the country was still underpopulated, and that the promotion of population control could irrevocably reduce the fertility of the nation.²⁰⁴ In response to the harsh criticism, he received during the discussion session, Tumay mentioned that he had already presented similar arguments in last year's seminar but was censored and neither his name nor his opinion were mentioned in the seminar report.²⁰⁵

However, the competing ideas on birth control were still discernable in the press. In March 1963, Suat Seren, the leader of the natalist coalition in the senate, and Professor Naşit Erez, founder of Istanbul University Gynecology Clinic and co-founder of the Family Planning Association, attacked each other with a series of articles in the same daily newspaper *Milliyet*.

On March 4, 1963, Seren states that the government has no capacity to allocate necessary financial resources and establish an organization for the population control activity. To achieve a similar effect in reducing fertility without additional cost and organization, he proposes that early marriages and polygamy be prevented by law and strictly controlled. Polygamy, in particular, is a pressing concern for Seren, who says that 3.7 million men are married to 4.2 million women.²⁰⁶ Two weeks later, Erez responded that rising abortion rates are proof that the public favors population control and that early marriages and polygamy cannot be prevented by legal and autocratic measures, but by increasing income and social welfare.²⁰⁷

204 Sezai Bedreddin Tümay, "Doğum Kontrolünün Nüfus ve Ekonomi Üzerindeki Etkileri" (*Istanbul 2. Ana Çocuk Sağlığı Semineri 12-16 Temmuz, 1963*, İstanbul: TC. Sağlık ve Sosyal yardım Bakanlığı Ana-Çocuk Sağlığı Müdürlüğü, 1963), 145-62.

205 Ibid., 160.

206 Suat Seren, "Doğum kontrolü," *Milliyet*, March 4, 1963.

207 Naşit Erez, "Doğumların düzenlenmesi," *Milliyet*, March 15, 1963.

On the other hand, Seren claims that abortion would become more widespread with the new law, as it gives the doctor the right to abort on safety-critical issues that can be easily manipulated by doctors, and the reproduction of wealthy families would continue to decline accordingly.²⁰⁸ While Erez still insists that the law would bring about a reduction in abortions,²⁰⁹ Dr. Sait Kırmızıtoprak, provocatively calls for free abortion to achieve social justice by letting the poor benefit from it.²¹⁰

Indeed, the author of law, Fişek, who also created the Law for Socialization of the Health Services to provide social justice in public health,²¹¹ also admits in his memoirs that, he had always thought of including the right to free abortion in the Population Planning Law, but hesitated to add it because he feared a total rejection of the law, so he included the right to abortion for the safety critical points as a safety belt for doctors to implement it. Nonetheless, it took months, Fişek says, before he was able to convince the head of SPO Ziya Müezzinoğlu, to approve that inclusion.²¹²

By the end of 1964, the government had already established a Family Planning Organization under the Ministry of Health and appointed Dr. Turgut Metiner as the director.²¹³ Furthermore some 220 personnel (168 health personnel, 52 statisticians) and 3,940,000 TL amount had already been allocated from the 1964 budget for population control measures.²¹⁴

After all the preparations and propaganda, antinatalist plan was submitted to the parliament and senate for legalization. Yet the strong opposition that had been evident during the NPD vote was still present, with much elaborated arguments that will be discussed in the next section.

208 Suat Seren, "Nüfus planlaması mı? Kürtaj kanunu mu?," *Milliyet*, January 31, 1964.

209 Naşid Erez, "Nüfus planlaması tatbikatı," *Milliyet*, April 29, 1964.

210 Sait Kırmızıtoprak, "Kürtaj serbest olmalıdır," *Milliyet*, April 30, 1964.

211 Turkish Assembly, "Socialization of the Health Services Law, No: 224," Official Gazette publication on January 12, 1961, No : 10705, enacted on January 5, 1961.

212 Turkish Medical Association, Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi, 14.

213 Ayşe Akin, "Türkiye'de Değişen Nüfus ve Sağlık Politikaları Doğrultusunda, İsteyerek Düşükler ve Üreme Sağlığı Hizmet Sunumunda Geleceğe Bakış," *Türkiye Halk Sağlığı Dergisi*, Özel Sayı: Düşükler, no. 10 (2012): 43–60.

214 Turkish Assembly, "1964 Budget Law, No: 438," Official Gazette publication on March 2, 1964, No: 11645, enacted on February 29, 1964, 663,767,772.

3.2.5 *The Parliamentary Discussions*

On December 8, 1964, the draft population planning law was submitted to the parliament for approval. After approval, it was sent to the senate on February 18, 1965, for the initial voting and then returned to the parliament for a final vote. Almost all of the wording of the first draft was accepted and legalized after the final vote in the parliament on April 1, 1965, but the parliamentary archives evidence some major debates and discussions during the legalization process.

In this dissertation, the various views and arguments of deputies and senators been expressed during the parliamentary and senate discussions between December 8, 1964, and April 5, 1965, were tracked in the parliamentary archives and classified based on the core themes of the debates. Accordingly, the following topics were identified as the major discussion points: public health, the Malthusian debate, biopolitics, moral discourse, developmentalist discourse, the military debate, and discussions on the quality of the plan.

Table 3.11 Discussion topics during the Population Planning Law

Comments	For Bill	Against Bill	Total
Health Issue			
<i>Health improvement vs harmful medication</i>	13	13	26
Malthusian Debate			
<i>Lack of resources vs huge potential</i>	4	12	16
Freedom Debate			
<i>Freedom of rights vs State Intervention</i>	10	15	25
Moral Ground			
Moral family vs moral erosion	6	20	26
Development Discourse			
Growth with lower vs higher population	14	9	23
Security discourse			
No need vs urgent need for military reserve	2	7	9
Planning and control			
Good planning vs lack of planning and control	5	13	18
TOTAL	54	89	143

SOURCE: Discussions on Parliament and Senate (December 1964 - April 1965)

The breakdown of these arguments is based on the views of speakers who took the floor during the House and Senate debates and is grouped in Table 3.11 as for and against the bill. The numbers below do not reflect the number of speakers, but the number of arguments declared, where each speaker could declare more than one.

As shown above, the pronatalist bloc put forward more arguments against the law than the antinatalist group as a whole (89 to 59), especially on moral grounds and on anti-Malthusian stance. The only issue on which the antinatalists had the upper hand was the developmentalist discourse. Interestingly, there were equal pronatalist and antinatalist arguments in the area of public health, where the main point of antinatalist justification was lied upon.

A full translation of the Law, consisting of eleven articles, was shown in Appendix A. Yet, the first two articles, where most of the debates arose from was copied below.

Article 1. Population planning means that individuals can have as many children as they wish whenever they want to. This can be ensured through preventive measures taken against pregnancy. Castration, sterilization, nor the ending of pregnancies shall not be undergone unless medical necessities require it.

Article 2. Divulging the necessity of Family Planning to the public and training, education, and application connected with it, shall be carried out with the collaboration of military, official and volunteer organizations according to the regulations prepared by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

For this purpose, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is authorized to establish organizations and to take measures to distribute freely, or sell at a lower price, or have sold at a lower price to needy, contraceptive materials and drugs.

The quality of drugs and materials to be used in population planning, and regulation concerning its application shall be determined by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

after receiving the written opinion of a commission which will also include members of the teaching staff of medical schools.

Biopolitics, in the Foucauldian sense, was one of the hottest debates throughout the sessions. What was the nature of the law? Was it a useful tool to enhance the freedom in fertility and improve public health by reducing maternal mortality, or a repressive measure by the state to limit fertility in Turkish society and interfere with family privacy? Government representatives repeatedly stated that the law was for public health and freedom of choice, but many deputies and senators had solid arguments for a broader agenda behind it.

Some seven deputies and senators (Celal Ertuğ, Hüsnü Dikeçligil, Ali İhsan Balım, Tahsin Bangıloğlu, Ahmet Bilgin, Fethi Tevetoğlu, Ruhi Soyer) argued that the general and humanitarian definition of the population control mentioned in Article 1 was misleading and the true intention lies in Article 2, which defines the mission as “divulging the necessity of Family Planning to the public” with the full force of the state apparatus, including a new organization, education, free distribution of contraceptives and nationwide propaganda, even in collaboration with the military personnel.²¹⁵

Bangıoğlu, further provokes the senate to amend the definition of population planning in Article 1 as “population planning means that individuals can have the number of children that corresponds to the state desire.”²¹⁶ In connection with this discussion, there were calls to change the name of the law from population planning to family planning to reduce the totalitarian implication of the law, which was also rejected.²¹⁷

One of the main reasons for the strong opposition to government intervention was that Malthusian and developmental fears about high birth rates were not present among many congressmen and senators. On the

215 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 4, Vol. 26, Meeting No: 57, March 19, 1965), 169–93.

216 Ibid., 170.

217 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 4, Vol. 34, Meeting No:25, December 17, 1964), 213.

contrary, many of them favored continued population growth to spur development. Vedat Ali Ozkan, who is familiar with the original version of the theory of demographic transition before its political orientation mentioned in Chapter 2, asks the deputies not to worry about the population increase in Turkey, which he believes is a natural result of decreasing mortality, and he confidently predicts that the country would experience a decreasing trend as it develops, like the other developed countries.²¹⁸

Ozkan goes on to explain that the Anatolian peninsula, with its very low population density, is still deserted and there is no reason for the Malthusian fears of scarcity of subsistence as long as intensive agricultural techniques are used. Instead of spending energy and resources on reducing population, he suggests focusing on maximizing agricultural efficiency and finding ways to prevent erosion.²¹⁹

Ruhi Soyer points out that European countries have achieved their development progress based on labor, and he adds that Germany, despite its large population, still needs additional labor from Turkey to continue growing. And he underscores a simple but questioning argument about the development discourse: "No country can develop if it reduces its population."²²⁰ Sabahattin Savcı supports the claims of Ozkan and Soyer, quoting from the very first version of the demographic transition theory that population would be reduced by development, but development cannot be achieved by reducing population.²²¹

Health Minister Kemal Demir's response to this pronatalist attack was to repeat the developmental discourse of overpopulation, with higher population numbers causing the government to spend more on basic services and less on savings and more productive investments. And he adds that the government has not been able to absorb the higher

218 Ibid., 223–24.

219 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 4, Vol. 33, Meeting No:19, December 8, 1964), 745–47.

220 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 17, 1964, 208–9.

221 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 8, 1964, 747–49.

unemployment rate.²²² Those arguments have not satisfied the pronatalists, as Ahmet Bilgin calls on the government to find ways to increase employment, not to decrease population, and he also recalls the mercantilist vision of population as the main source of development.²²³

The developmentalist debate in the senate took different forms, as Mehmet Nuri Ademoğlu, who puts it in the family perspective, recounts that rural families were starving and most of them had to leave their ninth or tenth child to die, and that the law would serve their own prosperity and development.²²⁴ But Vedat Ali Ozkan insists that one less child to feed will not help families end their suffering unless the government provides education, health, and new job opportunities, and urges them to prioritize these services over birth control.²²⁵

Although the primary motivation of the law was the economy and development, the longest debates were over its implications on health. Antinatalists' arguments that the new law would reduce maternal mortality, high abortion rates, childcare shortages, and unmet need for contraception based on the KAP survey found common support. Yet the pronatalists also had some arguments to challenge.

The reliability of medical devices was the main concern. Bilgin argues that the imported devices have not been adequately tested in Europe and the United States and warns of their side effects.²²⁶ Kınayturk criticizes the mass distribution of contraceptives without any control, as he explains that the distribution in the U.S. was done after several interviews with the couples and further analysis of their economic and social status.²²⁷ Ozkan also warns that the mass promotion and distribution of contraceptive technology could reduce fertility down to irreversible

222 Ibid., 752–59.

223 Ibid., 749–51.

224 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), March 19, 1965, 180–82.

225 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 17, 1964, 223–24.

226 Ibid., 219–20.

227 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 4, Vol. 26, Meeting No: 55, March 17, 1965), 115.

levels.²²⁸ Both Fişek and Demir as health experts, have made commitments for strict control for licensing and distribution of contraceptives, but also reject applying any selective process.²²⁹

One of the main attacks of the pronatalists on the law was on the moral ground where about fifteen speakers had complaints. One of the fears was the removal of a moral barrier by lifting the ban on contraception.²³⁰ Tevetoglu claims that the free distribution of contraceptives encourages immoral relationships, and he urges the government to prevent early marriages instead.²³¹ These claims were harshly rejected by the government, and the petitioners were accused of having no faith in the moral virtues of Turkish women.²³²

Another opposition on moral grounds was related to the definition of population planning mentioned in Article 1. The right of “individuals” to population planning was asked to change as right of “families” to ensure that the contraceptives would be distributed only to families.²³³ However, that group proposal was found to be inapplicable primarily because of the illegal status of widespread polygamy.²³⁴

On the other hand, Ömer Faruk Kınaytürk, shares his doubts on the population planning as he believes it is a plot by developed nations to reduce the population of underdeveloped countries to counterbalance their declining demographic trend. He cites as an example the

228 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 17, 1964, 223–24.

229 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), March 17, 1965, 127–30.

230 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), March 19, 1965, 173–75.

231 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), March 17, 1965, 121–24.

232 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 17, 1964, 220–21.

233 Ibid., 213.

234 Ibid., 220.

demographic catastrophe in Hungary, where the right to contraception and abortion has halved the fertility rate in just eight years.²³⁵

Moreover, several senators and deputies mentioned population as a crucial necessity for military purposes. Bilgin considers it unacceptable to think of population planning for a country surrounded by countries with a higher population density, especially the Soviet Union with about 200 million inhabitants.²³⁶ Tevetoglu recalls the hot Cyprus debate, in which the ratio of population density on the island was decisive and claims that the country needs a hundred million inhabitants for military deterrence.

In response, Zeyyad Kocamemi, mentions that the habit of establishing a relationship between the military power and the higher population is outdated.²³⁷ His point of reference was clearly the second Arab Israeli war of 1956, in which the Jews occupied Egypt's Sina Peninsula with a smaller but well-equipped force. And the claim that the larger population required a stronger army was to be disproved two years later in the 1967 Six-Day War between Arabs and Israel, which ended with the outnumbered Arab forces humiliated vis-à-vis Israel.

The above issues reflect the main points of discussion in the senate and parliament. However, many other issues were also discussed during the legalization process, such as the relationship between population and crime, population and aging, population and education, costs of population planning, etc. It is worth noting, however, that there was no significant discussion of any form of segregation in the implementation of population control by class or ethnicity.

The distribution of the votes was available only in the senate and is shown in Table 3.12. The antinatalist bloc consisted of the statist CHP and

235 Republic Senate Minutes of Meeting (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi), (Term 4, Vol. 26, Meeting No: 56, March 18, 1965), 113–18.

236 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 8, 1964, 751–52.

237 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi), December 17, 1964, 217–18.

the natural and contingent senators loyal to the military regime, while the pronatalists were clearly the governing AP.

Table 3.12 Composition of votes in the Senate, March 23, 1965

Group	For Bill	Against Bill	Not Voted	Total Seats
AP	3	40	34	77
CHP	36	1	8	45
Other Parties	5	1	9	15
Independent	3	2	6	11
Contingent Senators	17	-	2	19
Natural Senators	7	-	8	15
TOTAL	71	44	67	182

SOURCE: Population Policy Formation and Implementation in Turkey.²³⁸

During the negotiations, the second Inonu coalition collapsed, and on February 20, 1965, a right-wing coalition led by AP was formed. And the new government was reluctant to get deeply involved in an issue that its traditional voters could resist. Furthermore, the topic contained many technical aspects, so they kept the response low profile and, contrary to parliamentary tradition, they appointed Nusret Fişek, who was not neither member of the parliament nor the senate but the undersecretary for the Ministry of Health, as the government's spokesman in two major cases.²³⁹

Fişek, clarifies the dilemma of the AP in his memoirs. Sensing the distrust of the new government, Fişek visits the party leader of AP, Suleyman Demirel, and gets a personal promise from Demirel that he would make sure that the group would vote for the bill.²⁴⁰ But it seems that the party had no desire to compromise from their pronatalist stance. Nevertheless, they balanced the military pressure by not activating the entire opposition, as some 34 senators did not show up for the vote.

238 Ibid.,65.

239 Levine and Ünner, *Population Policy Formation and Implementation in Turkey*, 60.

240 Turkish Medical Association, *Nusret Fişek ile Söyleşi*, 12.

The law was passed by a majority in Parliament on April 5, 1965, but this did not dispel the public and political reservations that became apparent during its implementation.

Summary of 3.2

This section analyzed economic and political transformation of Turkey, along with the economic and technical infusion of the global sphere. As in the other developing countries that introduced population planning laws in the 1960s, the economic crisis and political turmoil in Turkey paved the way for orientation toward globally supported ideologies such as developmentalization and population control, as well as tools such as NDPs embedded in population control, and national KAP surveys. In this regard, the global infusion on population control has been revisited in this section exclusively for the Turkish case.

In addition, this part also highlighted the local conditionalities that facilitated the shift to antinatalist policies, such as the military coup and security concerns on the southeastern border, and the urgent need to restore political and economic stability.

However, the global and national consensus on population control was seriously challenged by the pronatalist bloc in the house and senate, which represented public prejudices and reservations on the subject. This political resistance not only delayed the legalization process but also sabotaged the implementation of the policy, which will be explored in the next section.

§ 3.3 The Population Control Policy Implementation

The passage of the hotly debated Population Planning Law did not end the discussions as expected but led to a vigorous nationwide campaign and mobilization to promote family planning, including training of medical personnel and investment in family planning clinics. But the initial results fell far short of the targets.

This section traces the government's investments in population control and the policy implementation in four subsections. The first section

tracks the public and political reactions of the first three months in various newspapers of the era, representing different political views. The contradictory reactions hinder the fact that the debate on population control was still ongoing.

In the second part, the work on population control and the investments of the Ministry of Health and the Population Planning Directorate are listed together with the financial and technical support from abroad. However, the global and national spheres were not always in consensus on the population control planning and implementation and that is shown the third part through some key encounters.

In the fourth part, the direction of this investment in population planning is analyzed through the establishment of the Family Planning Clinics, to see to what extent the motivations for population control, which were already revealed in the parliamentary discussions influenced the investment decision.

Lastly the public's response to family planning investments, as determined by the political priorities of the national sphere, is analyzed using the geographical distribution of IUD insertion. The last two analysis are based on demonstration of descriptive statistical variables per provincial district.

3.3.1 *Initial Reactions*

In order to check the initial reactions of the Population Planning Law in the press, some eight nationwide daily newspapers namely, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Akşam*, *Tercuman*, *Ulus*, *Son Havadis*, *Dünya*, and *İşçi Postası* were selected and every single news item and article about the law and population control was scanned over a period of three months period between April 5th and June 31st, 1965. In addition to the archival constraints, the selection of newspapers was also based on a fair representation of the different political viewpoints.

At first glance, the law was not on the front agenda of the press, which preoccupied with some leading events such as the growing international tensions in Cyprus, the coalition debates, and accusations between the parties. Nevertheless, each of the newspapers tracked, had published at

least one news item or article about the law and birth control during these three months, which provides some clues about the political stance of their editorial board. The promulgation of the law was heralded in only one out of eight newspapers, *Ulus*, the CHP's press organ.²⁴¹ As mentioned earlier, the party took the main initiative during the legalization process and felt obliged to spread the positive news about the law and birth control. In this regard, Professor Rasim Adasal, in his article on April 18th, enumerated the positive impacts of family planning for families, such as maintaining a better life quality, better childcare, less stress, and mitigating economic burden.²⁴²

The opposing side for the birth control was represented in *Tercuman* with its conservative and nationalist view. In his article on April 7th, Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, reiterated the mercantilist approach by relating development to population density and further stating that the population of the country should be increased to seventy or eighty million. He has also accused the government of fomenting hostility among the population with this law and urged them to find ways to activate the underground and overground rich potential instead.²⁴³ In other negative news from *Tercuman* about birth control, a village in Izmir was in the headlines on June 13th, where the villagers had successfully prepared medicinal herbs to prevent fertility for a decade, yet most of them became infertile.²⁴⁴ The idea of birth control was further snubbed in another headline, mentioning the gathering of ministers' wives to discuss the birth control, which was portrayed in the news as a charity event.²⁴⁵

The press of the ruling government AP, *Son Havadis*, was silent on the issue of birth control, and none of the columnists commented on it. Their stance during the voting process was clearly against the law, but since the law was legalized during the AP led coalition, they were unable to

241 "Nüfus planlaması yürürlükte," *Ulus*, April 10, 1965.

242 Rasim Adasal, "Psikolojik yönden aile planlaması," *Ulus*, April 18, 1965, 2.

243 Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Türkiye'nin nüfusu 70-80 milyona çıkarılmalıdır," *Tercuman*, April 7, 1965, 2.

244 "Bizim köyde 10 yıldır doğum kontrolü var," *Tercuman*, June 13, 1965, 1.

245 "Dişi kabinede önemli bir toplantı yapıldı," *Tercuman*, April 10, 1965, 1.

criticize afterwards. And the party along with its newspaper pretended as if the law did not exist.

The news on birth control in the mainstream press, represented by *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* was as follows. Dr. Osman Koçtürk of *Cumhuriyet* was highly critical about perceiving the excessive birth rate as an additional cost, and not mentioning its potential contribution to development. And for him, birth control was nothing but a plot of the Western powers against the developing countries to stop their sexual power, that he provocatively calls as the only source of the non-developed world to stop the atomic power.²⁴⁶

Milliyet was the newspaper where the news about birth control was most frequent. On the one hand, it actively supported the antinatalist stance for health and development purposes. On April 9th, an interview was published with a woman who recently gave birth to her twenty-second child in a hospital in eastern province, with only nine still alive. In the interview, she begs for having the pills to avoid getting pregnant again.²⁴⁷ On April 12th, the first demonstration of the birth control methods in the suburbs of Ankara was in the headlines of *Milliyet*.²⁴⁸ On June 4th, Haluk Cillov, the economist and the pioneer antinatalist, repeated his arguments about the merits of population planning in economy and social justice.²⁴⁹

On the other hand, the issue was heavily satirized and caricatured by many columnists in *Milliyet* too, as they criticized the government's interference in fertility, which was still considered a private matter for the public. For example, in an interview with the head of the Midwives Association, Sekine Arcan, who spoke out against birth control and was taunted by the reporter with the panic of losing her pregnant "clients,"²⁵⁰ Mete Akyol satirically accuses the imaginary father who has four children

246 Osman Nuri Koçtürk, "Atom gücü ve seksüel güç," *Cumhuriyet*, June 18, 1965, 2.

247 "Dağda Sosyalizasyon, 'Yeter artık çocuk istemiyorum,'" *Milliyet*, April 9, 1965

248 "Gecekondu'da doğum kontrol usülleri anlatıldı," *Milliyet*, April 12, 1965

249 Haluk Cillov, "Nüfus planlaması," *Milliyet*, June 4, 1965, 2

250 "Ebeler Derneği başkanı doğumun kontrolüne taraftar değil," *Milliyet*, April 28, 1965, 1

of ruining the governments entire investment in birth control.²⁵¹ Halit Kıvanç, even exaggerates the humor by claiming that birth control officers would seek out the mothers who are unwilling to ask for birth control.²⁵²

The left-leaning press was represented by the daily Labor Post, *İşçi Postası*. The four-page newspaper consisted mainly of labor news, labor health, and strikes, but the editorial board did not turn away from birth control. In line with their Marxist view, they were not interested in promoting or rebuking the law, but in exposing the classes trying to exploit it. Doctor Adnan Zentürk, calls the pronatalist doctors who oppose birth control and defame it on medical grounds traitors and accuses them of looking after their own interests so as not to lose revenue from induced abortion.²⁵³

Two other nationwide newspapers, *Akşam* and *Dünya* were also monitored for their birth control news. The editorial board of *Akşam*, under the influential editor Çetin Altan, was in socialist tendency, and no news or commentary on the birth control was detected. *Dünya*, followed a strictly Kemalist path, under the authorship of the senior editor-in-chief Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was also a close friend of Atatürk. Although it did not clearly toe the antinatalist line as *Ulus* did, it closely followed government's birth control activities and provided information on medical announcements. On May 19th, they informed about the meeting of state health secretaries and the announcement of the birth control roadmap for. The plan called for selecting plot cities and villages for a six-month contraceptive trial, and then starting to apply nationwide birth control afterwards.²⁵⁴

Not the law itself but the first application in the plot cities was reported in most of the above-mentioned newspapers with different contents reflecting their political stance. In *Akşam* and *Dünya*, the news was reported on June 13th without further comment as follows, "The first

251 Mete Akyol, "İsteyerek olmadı," *Milliyet*, May 5, 1965, 3.

252 Halit Kıvanç, "Kontrol, kontrol," *Milliyet*, June 13, 1965, 4.

253 Adnan Zentürk, "Doğum kontrolü arpalık olamaz," *İşçi Postası*, April 30, 1965, 1.

254 "Doğum kontrolde tek tip ilaç isteniyor," *Dünya*, May 19, 1965, 1.

birth control trials will begin in Istanbul in Zeynep Kamil Hospital with the medical contraceptive devices provided by the Ministry of Health. The pills and IUD devices will be administered to volunteers by a medical team.”

Ulus heralds the news with a positive package: “The women who do not want to get pregnant have started to consult to the hospitals by yesterday.”²⁵⁵ In *Tercuman*, on the other hand, the headline read “35 million children will not be born in 35 years,” and went on to say that not a single women asked for the contraceptive device on the first day due to the fear of becoming infertile.²⁵⁶

The editors of *Son Havadis* were cautious in framing the news. The aim, public will, time period and foreign aid were carefully stated to show that it was not their will but the duty. The news said “The population planning drill was introduced in a press conference. The goal stated was to end 500,000 abortions and 10,000 maternal deaths within five years. The public will not be forced into population control and the nationwide program will only be launched if the initial result of the drill is successful. No license will be issued without committee approval, and the full cost of the contraceptive devices will be covered by the American aid.”²⁵⁷

As shown above, the nationwide press was biased due to their political stance and closely monitored the government's preparations and mobilizations about the Population Planning Law, which will be discussed in the following section.

3.3.2 *Preparations and the Mobilizations*

This section examines the preparations and activities of family planning. As mentioned earlier, the very first implementation of the law was the six-month testing phase in four hospitals, namely Zeynep Kamil Maternity Hospital and Çapa Medical Faculty in Istanbul, and Hacettepe and

255 “Doğum kontrolü için gerekli ilaçlar dağıtılıyor,” *Ulus*, June 8, 1965, 1.

256 “35 yılda 35 milyon çocuk doğmayacak,” *Tercüman*, June 15, 1965, 1.

257 “Doğum kontrolü Haziran’da başlıyor,” *Son Havadis*, May 30, 1965. 1.

Ankara Medical Faculties in Ankara. And during the testing period, some 7,000 women applied for a contraceptive method.²⁵⁸

The detailed report on the testing period is not available, but the results of a sample survey conducted among 996 women who applied to these four hospitals between November 1965 and October 1966 were published by economist Haluk Cillov in two consecutive articles.²⁵⁹ Regarding cumulative outcomes, about 57% of women who requested contraception were under 30 years of age, and 64% of these applicants had three or more children.

Regarding employment level, only 71 of the 996 women were employed, and the rest were housewives. And about 50% of the women applicants were illiterate. Thus, the survey confirms that the higher-status women were not interested in applying for the government-sponsored FPP because they already had this privilege through their own initiative.

After the testing period which proved successful, the Family Planning General Directorate, established under the Ministry of Health immediately began setting up Family Planning Clinics (FPC) in hospitals, maternity clinics, health centers, and in mother and childcare centers.

Additionally, mobile teams were organized to reach remote villages. Table 3.13 demonstrates the number of clinics established between 1965 and 1971, together with IUD insertions by clinics, mobile teams, and inspections. And within seven years, the number of clinics rose to 506, and the IUD insertions to 309,977.

Furthermore, a series of nationwide and local seminars and workshops were also organized to train health personnel to work in these clinics and mobile teams. By the end of 1967, 267 physicians, 455

258 "Yedi bin kadın doğum kontrolünden geçti," *Milliyet*, November 17, 1965

259 Haluk Cillov, "Aile Planlaması Eğiliminde Yeni Gelişmeler," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 25, no. 3 (1966): 138-167; Haluk Cillov, "Aile Planlaması Eğilimindeki Gelişmeler Hakkında Anket Sonuçları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 25, no. 4 (1966): 1-25;

gynecologists, 2,712 midwives, 2,022 health officials, and 790 nurses had been trained to apply family planning methods.²⁶⁰

Table 3.13 Family planning clinics and IUD insertions 1965-1971.

Year	Number of Clinics	IUD Insertions			TOTAL
		By Clinics	By Mobile Teams	By Inspection	
1965	10	5,193	-	-	5,193
1966	243	31,349	683	1,030	33,062
1967	308	37,012	6,682	2,236	46,030
1968	462	49,297	7,645	1,669	58,593
1969	490	49,711	9,094	1,526	60,331
1970	499	50,462	5,238	1,460	57,180
1971	506	41,451	6,207	1,933	49,591
TOTAL	-	264,475	35,549	8,854	309,977

SOURCE: Annual Health Statistics 1964-1967, 1968-1972.²⁶¹

On the promotion side, a nationwide family planning advertising campaign was conducted through the distribution of brochures, posters, bulletins, and radio broadcasts (see Table 3.14), whereas the distribution of these brochures, posters, and bulletins reached 745,672 units over five years. Moreover, in 1968, a 30-minute propaganda movie, namely "Elif's Misery," was shot as a harsh demonstration of a deep contrast between users and non-users of family planning.²⁶²

The Ministry of Education planned to emphasize human reproduction in middle and high school biology courses beginning in the 1965-66 school year, and to include the social, economic, and political implications of rapid growth in social studies classes. In addition, two educational programs were provided for members of the armed forces, one for married

260 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *Nüfus Plânlaması Çalışmaları: 1966-1967 yılları faaliyetlerinin tahlilleri ve 1968 yılı faaliyet programı* (Ankara: Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1968), 21.

261 Ministry of Health, "Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1964-1967," 300, and Ministry of Health, "Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1968-1972," 333.

262 "Elif'in çilesi filminin çekimleri tamamlandı," *Nüfus Planlaması Haberleri*, 18, (1968), 3.

soldiers and one for all soldiers to be conducted shortly before their release from active duty.²⁶³

Table 3.14 Promotional activities on population control 1966-1970.

Year	Radio Talks	Seminars	Publications Distributed		
			Brochures	Posters	Bulletins
1966	4	2	50,000	25,000	-
1967	4	4	100,000	50,000	65,000
1968	5	4	58,717	3,289	91,800
1969	6	5	46,974	2,634	93,000
1970	5	6	60,719	3,789	94,750
<i>TOTAL</i>	24	21	316,410	84,712	344,550

SOURCE: Annual Health Statistics 1964-1967, 1968-1972.²⁶⁴

Furthermore, the first National Family Planning Seminar was held in June 1967, with the participation of 39 public and private institutions.²⁶⁵ Turkish Family Planning Association too institutionalized in 25 cities, opened 13 clinics, and held seminars and training activities nationwide.²⁶⁶ As for periodical publications, a monthly family planning periodical, namely *Nüfus Planlaması Haberleri*, was launched in December 1966, with 10,000 copies to disseminate population planning achievements and best practices.²⁶⁷

Regarding the production and distribution of contraceptive materials, the IUD's were started to be produced locally and half a million contraceptive pills were distributed free of charge in the clinics along with

263 Ayşe Akın, "Emergence of the Family Planning Program in Turkey," in *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs*, ed. Warren A. Robinson and John A. Ross (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), 85-101.

264 Ministry of Health, "Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1964-1967," 300, and Ministry of Health, "Tıbbi İstatistik Yıllığı 1968-1972," 333.

265 Aile Planlaması Birinci Milli Semineri Tanıtım Kitapçığı, 15-17 Haziran 1967.

266 "Türkiye Aile Planlaması Derneği'nin çalışmaları hızla gelişmekte," *Nüfus Planlaması Haberleri*, 37, (1970), 3.

267 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *Nüfus Plânlaması Çalışmaları : 1966-1967 yılları faaliyetlerinin tahlilleri ve 1968 yılı faaliyet programı*, 27-30.

the 1.5 million tablets.²⁶⁸ For all these equipment's and expenditures on population control, the government allocated some 2.3% of the annual health budget.²⁶⁹

In terms of the production of knowledge, as in many other developing countries, a population institute, HUNEE, was established in 1968 with foreign assistance. The Ford Foundation granted \$ 375,000 between 1967 and 1970 for the institute,²⁷⁰ which conducted scientific studies on population and family planning, together with periodical KAP surveys.

Foreign aid for population control was further generated from several sources. In early 1967, The Population Council granted \$ 250,000 to Hacettepe Science Center for use over a four-year period to establish family planning clinics for research, training, and demonstration in the field of population control.²⁷¹

In January 1967, a \$ 3,600,000 loan agreement was signed between USAID and the Turkish government for the purchase of 1,400 jeeps to be used for mobile population control team.²⁷² However, this first-ever USAID global population control initiative failed due to lack of coordination and cumbersome bureaucracy and only 650 of these jeeps were purchased in 1970.²⁷³ This bureaucratic incident may be the reason why USAID invited about twenty Turkish deputies to the US and Western

268 Ibid., 21.

269 Ibid., 33-35.

270 The Ford Foundation, *Annual Reports* (1967-1970), .1967(p.117) 1968(p.126), 1969(p.139), 1970(p.70).

271 Murat Erden and Kenneth W. Rose, "American Philanthropy in Republican Turkey; The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* (2000), 131-157.

272 Prime Ministry, "Hükümetimizle AID arasında imzalanan Karayolları Ekipmanı 2. Kredisi ve Nüfus Planlaması ve Köy Sağlık Ocaklarına yardım anlaşmalarının onaylanması" (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.18.1.2 / 202.1.16, January 4, 1967).

273 Prime Ministry, "Milletlerarası Kalkınma Teşkilatı (AID)'ndan sağlanan krediyle finanse edilmek ve nüfus planlaması ve köy sağlık ocakları hizmetlerinde kullanılmak üzere araç satın alınması." (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.18.1.2 / 250.33.19, May 9, 1970).

Europe a year later to educate them about the world population problem and contraceptive technologies and paid all the expenses.²⁷⁴

Not only the US, but also the Swedish government was keen to support the country with population control, having donated 500,000 Swedish krona worth of contraceptive materials to the Turkish government by 1967.²⁷⁵

The above-mentioned coordination demonstrates a mutual consensus between the global and national spheres on population control activities, but only as long as it serves the purpose of each sphere. These differing views are illustrated with some key encounters in the next section.

3.3.3 *Key Encounters*

During the implementation phase of the Population Planning Law, individuals, groups and institutions of the global, national and individual spheres have interacted and interinfluenced with the different life forms of the other spheres in the Foucauldian and Agambenian sense. These encounters also crystallize the intentions, hidden agendas, and negotiations that this dissertation seeks to uncover. Therefore, this section explores some key encounters that underlie various, mostly conflicting political, economic, and social positions on population policy.

A very special encounter between the global and the national spheres was the exchange of letters between John D. Rockefeller 3rd and the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel between November 1966 and January 1967. Hoping to initiate an institutionalization of population control within the UN, John D. Rockefeller 3rd drafted a statement on the global need and willingness for family planning and sent it to the heads

274 Prime Ministry, "Miletlerarası Kalkınma Teşkilatı (AID)nın daveti üzerine Dünya Nüfus Sorunu ve Aile Planlaması Metodları Teknolojisi konularında Amerika'da inceleme yapmak üzere 20 kişinin gönderilmesi." (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.18.1.2 / 271.67.5, September 10, 1971).

275 Prime Ministry, "Nüfus Planlama Programı için Sağlık Bakanlığı'na ve İstanbul Yapağı Muayene ve Araştırma Laboratuvarlarına gönderilen malzemenin her türlü vergiden muaf tutulması." (Republican Archives, Catalog no. 30.18.1.2 / 209.53.4, July 5, 1967).

of state of developing countries where population control had already begun, and he asked them to sign it.

When Rockefeller made known his high hopes for Turkish leadership in the Muslim world on population control during his February 1966 visit,²⁷⁶ he had no doubt that Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel would approve the letter sent on September 26, 1966. Yet, after learning from the Turkish ambassador that the Turkish governments was reluctant to sign the declaration, Rockefeller sent another letter to Demirel further elaborating on the urgency of the matter on November 30, 1966.

Demirel's official response was received on January 7, 1967, stating that although the government warmly shared the population control objectives, the time was not yet ripe for a global consensus and that private initiatives with a marginal support could exacerbate the controversy. Rockefeller then sent another letter to Demirel on January 31, 1967, expressing his disappointment. The original correspondence is demonstrated in Attachment II.

In hindsight, Demirel was not correct in his assertion about marginal support that might increase the controversy. The original declaration, signed by twelve heads of state and government on December 9, 1966, was warmly welcomed at the UN.²⁷⁷ A week later, a draft resolution on economic development and population control, intended to be a breakthrough for the UN population control activities, was unanimously adopted.²⁷⁸ A year later, on December 11, 1967, 18 new signatories were added to the declaration, including the other CENTO members Iran and Pakistan,²⁷⁹ but Turkey's signature was still missing.

So why has the Turkish government hesitated to side with the international antinatalist bloc, even though the population planning law was

276 "Rockefeller 'Türkiye doğum kontrolünde önderlik edebilir'" *Milliyet*, February 25, 1966.

277 Stanley P. Johnson, *World Population and the United Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 24-25.

278 United Nations General Assembly, "Population Control and Economic Development," A/RES/2211(XXI) E/SR.1480, 43rd Session (Geneva, December 17, 1966).

279 Ayala and Caradon, "Declaration on Population: The World Leaders Statement," 1.

officially passed a year ago? As mentioned in the previous section, AP was the main source of resistance to population control, because the political root of AP, as of DP before them, was based on rural voters among whom nationalist and religious sentiments against antinatalist policies were still strong. And thus, Demirel, who was known as a pro-American politician,²⁸⁰ was wary of engaging in population control, despite economic and political pressures from abroad, as well as military coercion and legal obligations.

Another global national interaction on population control took place in a scientific venue. The Second World Population Conference was held in Belgrade in September 1965, only a few months after the law was passed, and the Turkish delegation had a strong presence with nine prominent figures from the fields of statistics, economics, demography, and planning.²⁸¹

However, the only presentation by Turkish participants, given by Kemal Özok, was not related to the discourse on overpopulation or population control measures, but to urbanization causing additional costs and inefficiencies in services, where he recommended increasing non-agricultural and agricultural investments in rural areas to prevent further migration flows.²⁸² Apparently, the global national divide on the overpopulation discourse was felt not only in the political arena but also among the scientific cadre, as they too were reluctant to take a clear antinatalist stance.

280 Demirel's pro-Americanism was nicknamed "Morrison Suleyman" in the press, alluding to his previous job before joining AP as distributor of an American company in Turkey.

281 Sabahaddin Alpat, (President, State Institute of Statistics), Ratip Yüceuluğ (Head of research, State Institute of Statistics), Aydın Akad (Director, State Institute of Statistics), Turgut Metiner (Director, Ministry of Health Population Planning), Sevkett Eker (Director, Ministry of Internal Affairs), Kemal Özok (Demographer, Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement), Haluk Cillov, (Professor in economics), Kenan Gürtan, (Assistant Professor in economics), Orhan Türkay (Assistant Professor in political sciences),

282 United Nations, "Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Belgrade 1965, Volume IV: Migration, Urbanization, Economic Development 'Urbanization and internal migration in Turkey' by Kemal Özok," E/CONF.41/5 (New York: United Nations, 1967), 466.

The last selection of encounters were the CENTO conferences on FPP. As mentioned earlier, CENTO was a military organization between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan under the auspices of the US and UK to shield the communist threat.²⁸³ However, it soon evolved into a technical cooperation, implementing and funding hundreds of projects in the fields of communications, infrastructure, agriculture, and health. In addition, technology and knowledge were exchanged through conferences and seminars, and family planning was no exception.²⁸⁴

The security fears of NATO regarding rapid population growth in the developing world as a breeding ground for communism were fully shared by his semi-governmental replica, CENTO, and its members.²⁸⁵ Therefore, population control was gradually integrated into the organization's health and statistics conferences and then became a topic of discussion in its own right.

In November 1968, Yaşar Yaşer, the secretary of the Turkish Statistical Institute, made a presentation on family planning methods at a CENTO Symposium on statistical demography in Karachi, Pakistan, in which he reported the initial outcomes of the population control implementation through surveys in Etimesgut district and Ankara Maternity Hospital.²⁸⁶

In the spring of 1971, family planning became a topic in its own right for a series of workshops in Ankara, Tehran, and Lahore, at which many aspects of family planning methods, goals, and results were presented from each country.²⁸⁷ Yet, all the presentations shared a common theme, the virtue of population control, without questioning it.

283 Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance in the Middle East (1959-1979)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 56, no. 6 (2020): 854-877.

284 Ibid., 862-868.

285 NATO, "Basic Assumptions for Long Term Threat Assessment," LOM 87/62, (Paris, May 18, 1962).

286 Yaşar Yaşer, "Family Planning Practices," *Symposium on Demographic Statistics*, Karachi Pakistan, November 5-12, 1968.

287 CENTO Workshop Series on Clinical and Applied Research in Family Planning, Ankara Turkey, February 23-26, Tehran Iran, March 1-4, Lahore Pakistan, March 12, 1971.

Those three sample encounters were selected to reveal the divergences and intersections between the global and national spheres in terms of the political, scientific, and security aspects of population control, which this dissertation claims that it varies on the basis of the capability and the functioning of each sphere.

The next two sections address the extent to which the national sphere's motivation and rhetoric regarding population control influenced the investment decision and individual response to the population planning work planned and carried out by the national sphere.

3.3.4 *Political Orientation in Population Control Investment and Public Reaction.*

In this section, the political orientation of the population control investment will be utilized to verify whether the arguments been discussed in the previous sections, such as Malthusianism, public health, developmentalism, urbanization, and security concerns, had a notable impact on the policy implementation process. Moreover, public reaction to those investments will be tracked to explore whether contraceptive use was in line with the governmental investment on the population control.

For this purpose, a combination of dataset was gathered per provincial district as enlisted in Appendix C. In terms of the political orientation population control, FPC investment per provincial district was selected as the dependent variable. The FPCs established throughout the country were the epicenter of population planning activities and main population control investment items. According to the Family Planning Directorate's activity report, the annual cost of each FPC was 7,000 TL as of 1967, whereas the total cost of nationwide FPCs accounted for 52% of annual family planning budget.²⁸⁸

288 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *Nüfus Plânlaması Çalışmaları: 1966-1967 yılları faaliyetlerinin tahlilleri ve 1968 yılı faaliyet Programı*, 30-35.

THE DATA

The number of FPCs per provincial district was derived from the Ministry of Health inventory list of 1971. FPC investments first started in a small scale right after the legalization of population planning in 1965 and then increased exponentially as shown in Table 3.13. The Health Ministry publication on the FPC location per provincial district was available for the year 1971,²⁸⁹ therefore the analysis is based on a seven-year investment period. The available data did not allow further analysis to distinguish between rural and urban areas, which could have enriched the results.

For the public reaction to FPC investments, the key outcome of the population control investment, the IUD insertions, were tracked per provincial district. The Population Planning Directorate has conducted periodical IUD follow-up surveys to identify the demographic and social characteristics of IUD users across the country and published them annually.²⁹⁰ Another aim of these surveys was to gather information on IUD extractions. Results of the 1969 follow-up survey evidenced that 38% of IUD users had the device extracted within twelve months, mostly because of side effects. Yet these data were nationwide and could not be broken down by provincial district.

On the other hand, IUD insertions were published on *Nüfus Planlaması Haberleri* Periodical on a monthly basis and per provincial district between August 1967 and September 1970. The figures also included the mobile team's insertion as well, which provides a more comprehensive view of the implementation.²⁹¹ Therefore, similar to FPCs these monthly IUD insertion data was also tabulated and paired with the number of clinics in the per 67 provincial districts to track four years of population control investment and implementation between 1967 and 1970. As with the

289 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı ile Çeşitli Kuruluşlara ait Sağlık, Sağlık Öğretimi ve Sosyal Hizmet Tesisleri* (Ankara, January 1, 1972).

290 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *1969 Yılı Rahim İçi Takip Araştırması*

291 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *Nüfus Planlaması Haberleri*, 1-44, (Ankara, 1966-1970).

FPC investment, IUD insertion data are only available on a provincial district basis, with no distinction between urban and rural.

As to the criteria for the investment of these FPCs and the use of IUDs, several variables were gathered reflecting the combination of the parliamentary discussions during the voting process mentioned in Table 3.11 (Malthusian debate, development discourse, health issue,) and the country specific vulnerabilities (urbanization and ethnic conflicts) mentioned in Chapter 2.3. These “independent variables” are total population with urban rural distinction, migration to the three metropolitan cities, development index, fertility, infant mortality, abortion, and the Kurdish minority. Like the FPCs and IUDs, all of these independent variables are consolidated by 67 provincial districts. Table 3.15 depicts the definitions and abbreviations of the dependent variable (FPCs and IUDs) and explanatory (independent) variables.

Table 3.15 Summary of variables, abbreviations, and definitions

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Definition and source</i>
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	
Family Planning Clinics	Number of FPC per provincial district as of 1971
IUD insertions	Number of IUD insertions per provincial district between August 1967 and September 1970.
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>	
Population	Population per provincial district based on 1965 census
Development index	The development index of each provincial district enlisted by SPO as of 1965
Metropolitan migration	Number of lifetime migrants to three metropolises per provincial district as of 1965 census
Abortion	Number of abortions per provincial district as to 1968 KAP survey
Total Fertility rate	Average number of children per woman in childbearing age, enlisted per provincial district for mid 1960s
Infant mortality rate	The number of infant deaths for every 1,000 live births, enlisted per provincial district for mid 1960s
Kurdish density	The density of Kurdish speaking people per provincial district as to 1965 census

The population of the provincial districts was derived from the 1965 census results with urban and local distinction.²⁹² This dissertation asserts that migration to metropolises may have worsened the distribution of the resources relative to locals, which exacerbated the population control discussions. And did the government particularly consider reducing the fertility rates in those provincial districts where the highest number of migrants come from? Or was it not the concern?

Determining internal migration per provincial district is challenging due to the nature of the census method. Ideally, the migration data could be obtained from the difference between two censuses in terms of permanent residency data, which became available after the 1970 census when the method of enumeration changed to *de jure* basis, meaning, residency-based enumeration.²⁹³

The earlier censuses were on a *de facto* basis, which enumerated individuals as of where they were found during the census, regardless of where they normally resided. In the absence of permanent residence, estimation of internal migration could only be achieved by identifying “lifetime migrants” using “place of birth” information, which is traceable since the 1935 census.²⁹⁴ Therefore, those lifetime migrants in three metropolises (Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir) were derived from the 1965 census per provincial district and utilized for the analysis.²⁹⁵

The fertility and infant mortality rates per provincial district were derived from Shorter and Macura’s calculations for the mid-1960s.²⁹⁶ No abortion data per provincial district was available for 1965, which was approximated with the support of 1968 KAP survey, of which the abortion rates per 100 live births were revealed per five regional districts

292 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 24.10.1965* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası. 1965), 7-26.

293 Erol Tümertekin, *Türkiye’de İç Göçler*, 8-18.

294 Sevil Cerit, “Türkiye’de İller Arası Göçler (1950-1980),” *NüfusBilim Dergisi* (The Turkish Journal of Population Studies), no.8 (1986): 81-103.

295 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 24.10.1965*, 77-98.

296 Shorter and Macura, *Trends in Fertility and Mortality in Turkey, 1935-1975*, 84-85.

(central, northern, western, southern, and the eastern), together with urban rural distinction per region and the abortion rates of three metropolises.²⁹⁷

The abortion ratios per regional district were transferred to provincial districts with special consideration given to the urban/rural distinction and multiplied with live births to find out the approximate abortion cases per provincial district. The live birth data per provincial district was taken from 1970 census, of which the data became available for the first time.

The SPO published a development index per provincial district starting from 1963, so the 1965 data was utilized to find out the relationship between the development per provincial district and FPC investment.²⁹⁸

Regarding security concerns on an ethnic basis, the Kurdish population density per provincial district is calculated from the mother tongue and second language information available in the 1965 census in which the people who can speak Kurdish and/or Zaza languages as mother or second language in each provincial district were incorporated.²⁹⁹

THE ANALYSIS

The initial aim was to assess a linear regression model to analyze the degree of dependence of the FPCs and IUDs on the explanatory variables introduced. However, as the limitations during the data collection process prevented gathering a unified and synchronized dataset, such an attempt could reduce the reliability and credibility of the analysis. Therefore, the evaluation of the data was limited to the descriptive

297 Nusret Fişek, "Epidemiological Study on Abortion in Turkey," in *Induced Abortion, A Hazard to Health, Proceedings of the First Conference of the IPPF Middle East and North Africa Region*, ed. Isam R. Nazer (Beirut, 1971), 264-285.

298 Prime Ministry and State Planning Organization, *Türkiye'de İller İtibariyle Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Endeksi (1963-1968)*, DPT: 900, SPD:207 (Ankara, Turkey: State Planning Organization, 1969), 46-48.

299 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 24.10.1965*, 166-224.

demonstration, showing FPC and IUD average of the provincial districts per data range of the related determinants as shown in Table 3.16.

Table 3.16 Key determinants of FPC Investment and IUD Use

Key Determinants	Number of Provincial District	Average number of FPC per Provincial District	Average number of IUD insertions per Provincial District
Population			
<200,000	9	4.6	660
200,000 – 299,999	15	5.1	1,391
300,000 – 399,000	9	7.0	1,823
400,000 – 499,000	13	5.5	1,623
500,000 – 599,000	8	5.3	2,222
≥ 600,000	13	16.1	7,049
Development Index			
<50	11	5.6	622
50 – 69	15	6.3	1,642
70 – 89	17	5.2	1,603
90 – 109	11	8.3	3,315
110 – 129	5	7.0	2,576
≥ 130	8	16.5	8,204
Number of Abortions			
<1,000	6	3.7	584
1,000 - 1,999	17	6.0	1,400
2,000 - 2,999	14	5.4	1,903
3,000 - 3,999	14	6.4	1,470
4,000 - 4,999	6	5.3	2,765
≥ 5,000	10	17.5	8,259
TFR (number of children per woman)			
<5	10	13.0	3,393
5 – 5.9	15	6.6	3,819
6 – 6.9	10	3.8	1,768
7 – 7.9	17	7.1	3,021
8 – 8.9	8	8.0	1,181
≥ 9	7	7.3	3,987
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)			
<125	11	5.3	1,835
125 – 139	19	9.5	2,123
140 – 154	14	9.0	4,203
155 – 169	10	7.2	3,144
170 – 184	9	4.0	1,041
≥ 185	4	7.8	3,376

Key Determinant	Number of Provincial District	Average number of FPC per Provincial District	Average number of IUD insertions per Provincial District
Number of Metropolitan Migration			
<10,000	15	15.0	672
10,000 – 19,999	14	5.9	2,018
20,000 – 29,999	13	5.3	2,306
30,000 – 39,999	9	6.3	1,414
40,000 – 49,999	6	12.6	5,008
≥ 50,000	7	5.0	1,433
Kurdish Density in Provincial District %			
<5	47	7.4	3,200
5 – 19	6	7.8	2,026
20 – 39	3	8.6	1,882
40 – 59	5	7.4	460
60 – 79	5	8.4	577
≥ 80	1	3.0	298

As per to the *population* breakdown of the provincial districts, the average of both FPC investment and IUD use per provincial district were lowest in the least populated provinces and highest in the most populated provinces. The *Development index* also follows a similar pattern, as both FPC investment and IUD use change in parallel with the change in the development index of the provincial districts.

The health determinants of FPC investment and UID use in Table 3.16 were abortion, TFR, and infant mortality. The number of *abortion* cases generally follows a similar trend with population and development index. FPC investment and UID use per provincial district were lowest in provinces having the fewest abortions (fewer than 1,000 abortions per province) and highest in provinces having the most abortion cases (with more than 5,000 abortions).

Regarding *infant mortality*, the figures indicate that investment in FPC and use of IUD were comparatively low in the provincial districts having the lowest infant mortality rates. However, the figures do not follow a consistent path, as nine provincial districts had infant mortality rates in the second highest data range (170-184 infant mortalities per 1000 live births), but FPC investments and average use of IUD were the lowest in the entire dataset.

With respect to *TFR*, it appears that FPCs were not invested in the provinces which have the highest fertility rates, on contrary the FPCs were more widespread in the provinces having the lowest fertility level. The number of FPC investments for the provincial districts having less than five children per family average was 13, where it was 7.3 in the provinces having more than 9 children per family average. The IUD use, on the other hand, was at the highest level in those provinces having the highest TFR. No consistent trend was observed in the *infant mortality* rates of the provincial districts for both FPC investment and IUD use.

As for the *metropolitan migration*, it is interesting to note that FPC investment was at the lowest level for the provincial districts where the highest number of people migrated from. This may be due to family planning investment decision makers considered that fertile elements had already migrated out of the cities and therefore further FPC investment in migrants' hometowns was no longer needed.

On the *Kurdish density*, the average number of FPC per twenty districts having Kurdish speaking population above 5% was 7.8, which was higher than the remaining 47 districts having Kurdish density lower than 5% (7.4 clinics per provincial district). Since these provincial districts with high Kurdish density were also known with higher fertility, lower education and income level; this dissertation does not claim that the ethnic concerns were the sole factor of higher investment in Kurdish speaking provinces but might be an additional governmental motivation.

The average number of IUD use in the same twenty Kurdish speaking districts was 1,164 per provincial district which was much less than the other provinces with less than 5% Kurdish density (3,200) indicating that the FPC investment in these provinces had no short terms impact in terms of IUD use. With these new insights, McDowell's previously mentioned assertion should be revisited. In his view, the state blocked the introduction of family planning as he believed that would accelerate the demographic balance in favor of the Kurdish population due to his assumption that the population control penetration in non-Kurdish

population would be higher.³⁰⁰ The figures confirm that the state has invested notably on the family planning in the Kurdish speaking territories. Although the introduction was not blocked, the discouraging outcomes in the use of IUD may indeed have lead the governors to believe that the additional investment on the population planning could distort the ethnic balance against the state's will.

Summary of 3.3

This section covers the efforts to implement Family Planning Law, together with the resistance and outcomes. The initial reaction for the law also hints the failure of the program, as the right-wing newspapers were against, and the left-wing supported the law, the AP government and its media channels hesitated to bring up the subject not to provoke their right-wing voters.

This complicated view of the Family Planning Law was evident not only in the correspondence between Demirel and Rockefeller, but also in the nationwide campaigns and investments, especially in the FPC. The enthusiastic start to global financial support did not seem to match the expectations of the global and individual spheres. The depiction of the dataset about the determinants of FPC investments and IUD usage rates indicates that the investment decision of FPC's may not be based on the factors discussed in the parliament, while IUD usage rates per provincial district may reveal other priorities.

Conclusion of Chapter 3

The third chapter was devoted to the national sphere, where legislation, investment, and implementation of antinatalist policies took place. As demonstrated in the second chapter, the ideology of population control conceived in the Western sphere spread to developing countries in the early 1960s, but only as long as local conditions permitted.

Similar to a century earlier in the Western world, public resentment over the flooding migrants created fertile ground for antinatalist

300 McDowall, *The Modern History of the Kurds*, 404.

discussions in Turkey in the mid-1950s. Moreover, the economy made the country more vulnerable to foreign intervention and ideologies such as developmentalism and planning embedded with population control. In addition, the military regime of the 1960 coup had some security concerns among the population. Nevertheless, a considerable pronatalist opposition was still intact, which caused heated controversy during the parliamentary discussions and afterwards.

The findings on the implementation phase confirm that the consensus of the global and national spheres does not have the capacity to achieve the antinatalist targets as the individual and families have the final authority in the implementation phase. The final chapter highlights the transformation of the individual and family, leading them to take ownership of family planning and adopt their own methods.

The New Family and Women: Between Changes and Practices...

The core message of this dissertation is that there was a simultaneous interaction and consensus between the global, national, and individual spheres in the 1960s regarding the idea of population control. The preceding chapters have analyzed some of the key motivations and initiatives at the global and national spheres to reveal how the "unmet need" for contraceptives was created and how it was communicated and delivered to the public. This final chapter addresses the problem of population control in the individual sphere, from the perspective of women, men, and families. Their priorities, positions, actions, reactions, and negotiations on family planning will be covered to reach the full circle.

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section addresses the main drivers and motivations for fertility reduction in the context of land regime transformation and rapid urbanization. In this sense, the changing family structure, status of women, and value of children are discussed along with other changing demographic elements between 1950 and 1965.

The second section examines women's and families use of contraception to determine how they managed to lower fertility and how they responded to the introduction of state-sponsored modern contraceptive

methods. Women's shifting choices between modern and traditional methods and abortion are traced through newspapers and medical reports.

The final section deals with the aftermath of the Family Planning Act, and the transformation of the family is tracked until the mid-1980s. This section addresses not only fertility preferences and contraceptive use, but also their interrelationship and interdependency with the changing status of women and family.

§ 4.1 Women and the Family in Transition...

As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, the post WWII period, followed by decolonization and the Cold War, accelerated the transformation of the Third World not only politically but also economically, and socially. The common social phenomena of this period such as agricultural mechanization, changing land regime and rapid urbanization have fundamentally transformed the family, women, and their fertility behavior.

This section examines the root causes of the motivations for the fertility reduction through changing family structure, status of women, value of children and other changing social and demographic elements in Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s.

4.1.1 *The Family in Transformation?*

The family and its transformation have long been foreseen by the structural functionalist school as one of the major outcomes of industrialization, modernization, and development. Goode asserts, without neglecting the exceptions, that industrialization, mechanization, increased communication, and mobility have caused societies and the family to change from traditional to modern, from patriarchal to nuclear.¹ Therefore, this section will deal with the changes in family structure in Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s.

1 William J. Goode, *The Family*, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982), 175-178.

As Rasuly-Paleczek observes, many studies consider the patrilineal extended family as a fundamental and characteristic feature of the social settings in Turkey without much investigating the validity of this assumption.² These protagonists, she identifies, including most sociologists of the 1950s and 1960s who studied village and town ethnographies in Turkey, supported Goodes view that industrialization and urbanization transformed the family to dissolve from the patrilineal into a Western type of nuclear family, while the other scholars denied the evolutionary transformation and claimed that the nuclear family preceded industrialization or urbanization. And this dissertation attempts to develop a more nuanced approach to the debate.

Disproving the patrilineal stereotype, Duben and Behar have already demonstrated, using the results of the 1907 census, that 40% households in Istanbul consisted of the nuclear family, even in the late Ottoman Era.³ However, another study from 1968 provides more far-reaching insights into the changing family structure.

The 1968 KAP survey also conducted the first nationwide quantitative study of Turkish family structure to explore the factors and forces influencing changes in family forms. In the survey, about 4500 households were interviewed in detail about their family structures.⁴

In the study, family types are divided into four segments. The “nuclear family,” consisting of husband, wife, and their unmarried children; the “patriarchal extended family,” consisting of husband, wife, their married son(s), and wife(s) with their children; and the unmarried children of the head of household. The “transient extended family,” in which the man, who is the head of household, his wife, and his unmarried child(ren) live together with either the man’s widowed parent(s) or his wife and/or

2 Gabriella Rasuly-Paleczek, “Some Remarks on the Study of Household Composition and Intra-Family Relations in Rural and Urban Turkey,” in *Turkish Families in Transition*, ed. Gabriella Rasuly-Paleczek (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996), 1-45.

3 Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49.

4 Serim Timur, *Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1972), No:15.

their unmarried sibling(s). Finally, in the “dissolved family,” a spouse is missing due to separation, divorce, death, etc., or non-family households.

As the results in Table 4.1 depicts, about 60% of Turkish families lived in a nuclear family, while this proportion was no less than 55% in villages, evidencing that the nuclear family was not a by-product of industrialization or migration, but was already the most preferred family form in Turkey in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the patriarchal family structure was five times higher in villages than in metropolises (25% to 5%).

Table 4.1 Turkish family structure based on 1968 survey. (%)

Family Type	Metropolises	Cities	Towns	Villages	Turkey Average
Nuclear	67.9	63.3	61.5	55.4	59.7
Patriarchal	4.6	9.5	20.0	25.4	19.0
Transient	12.4	15.0	12.7	13.3	13.1
Dissolved	15.0	11.9	5.7	5.9	8.3
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: *Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı*,⁵

In retrospect, the continuing data series on family structures from 1968 onwards demonstrates a slow but steady transition in family structure in favor of the nuclear type, driven by the erosion of the patriarchal family structure.⁶ Indeed, in the survey, about 48% of nuclear family members indicated that they were part of an extended family before they married.⁷

So, what was the reason for leaving the paternal household after marriage? About 16% of households with a former extended family roots responded this question with the death of the elder, 25% with migration, 17% with intra family conflicts, and 42% with financial difficulties.⁸ Thus, adding the economic causes of the migration and the intra family conflicts, poverty seems to be by far the main reason for leaving the parental household shortly after marriage. In other words, the patriarchal

5 Ibid.,31.

6 Sutay Yavuz, Murat Yücesahin, “Türkiye’de Hanehalkı Kompozisyonlarında Değişimler ve Bölgesel Farklılaşmalar,” *Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15, no.1, (2012): 76-118.

7 Timur, *Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı*, 47.

8 Ibid., 52.

extended family can survive as long as its land and wealth provide adequate opportunities for younger generations.

In the 1968 survey, some key socioeconomic variables, such as education and income level, show no consistent relationship with changing family type,⁹ while land tenure pattern proved to be the key catalyst. The relationship between family type and land ownership structure is revealed in Table 4.2 where the average farm size of nuclear families is 30 decares, while it increases to 127 decares in patriarchal extended families. As shown below, some 59% of the families that owned less than 10 decares of land were nuclear families and only 23% of them were members of patriarchal families, and this relationship was completely reversed in the land ownership above 100 decares per family. In this type of large landholding, only 22% of the families were nuclear families and 59% of them were patriarchal.¹⁰

Table 4.2 Family types and land ownership based on 1968 survey. (%)

Land Ownership (decares)	Family Type			<i>Total</i>
	Nuclear	Transient	Patriarchal	
1-10	58.6	18.2	23.3	100.0
11-24	45.9	19.6	34.5	100.0
25-50	42.0	12.5	45.5	100.0
51-100	36.3	12.2	51.3	100.0
>100	22.6	19.2	58.1	100.0

SOURCE: Timur (1981), 66.

A similar trend was observed in rural labor, while the nuclear family increased in rural occupations not associated with land ownership. The proportion of the nuclear family was about 44% among farmers, increased to 64% among sharecroppers, and was highest at 70% among farm workers who did not own land.¹¹

9 Ibid., 60-62.

10 Serim Timur, "Determinants in Family Structure in Turkey," in *Women in Turkish Society*, ed. Nermin Abadan-Unat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 59-73.

11 Ibid., 63-64.

Regarding the regional distribution of family structure, the Black Sea region had the highest patriarchal family structure with 34% of the total family types, twice as high as the eastern and southeastern regions, where one would expect to see more traditional family structures due to its tribal nature.¹² The region had the lowest land ownership per family (42.6 decares) yet a very diversified ownership structure, which was defined as another characteristic of the patriarchal family.¹³ The very same Black Sea region was also the driving force behind the first wave of immigration in the 1950s and 1960s, when the one-third of the immigrants to the metropolises came from the Black Sea and was in a sense, the center of the disintegration of the family structure.¹⁴

The key difference between the patriarchal and nuclear family is patronage. About 65% of male, and 54% of female respondents in the patriarchal family named the elder (predominantly the husband's father) as the head of the family, while it was less than 1% among members of the nuclear family, of whom 95% of men and 88% of women named the husband as the head of the family.¹⁵

Thus, the survey indicates a significant decline in paternal control in nuclear families. Kandiyoti summarizes the family transformation stereotype with authority relations between older and younger men in general, and fathers and sons in particular, declining as younger generation creates independent sources of income. And once married, the young couples look forward to a certain degree of independence from their elders in terms of budget allocation and day-to-day decisions, which would inevitably lead to a separation from the patriarchal extended family.¹⁶

Patronage in daily life was defined in the survey using the following criteria: Who decides which friends and relatives to associate with, what

12 Timur, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı*, 33.

13 Ibid., 59.

14 The data is derived from Appendix C.

15 Timur, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı*, 103.

16 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Women and Household Production: The Impact of Rural Transformation in Turkey," in *The Rural Middle East*, ed. Kathy & Pandeli Glavanis (London: Zed Books, 1990), 183-194.

furniture to buy, what food to buy, and what to spend the family income on. On average, more than half of the members of the patriarchal family named the elders as decision-makers, and in the nuclear family it was only the husband (65%) or both (26%).

However, women in the nuclear family had almost no right to make individual decisions and were restricted even in basic food spending (the proportion of women who declared having full control over food spending was only 29%).¹⁷

As for modernity defined in the survey with the permission of the husband to the wife for the following things: Spouses sitting together on visits, going out without a scarf, wearing short sleeves, going shopping alone, or going anywhere else, the changing family type is not significant in the rural setting. Only about 4% of nuclear families in villages belonged to the "modern" type, rising to 40% in cities and 69% in the three major metropolitan areas.¹⁸

Regarding the final decision making on marriage, 50% of patriarchal family members indicated that it is the elder who makes the final decision on marriage.¹⁹ Moreover, as expected, kinship marriage was more common in paternal families (34%) than in nuclear families (20%).²⁰ Nevertheless, there were no major differences in the age of first marriage among women in terms of family structure, which was 17 years in the paternal family and 17.7 years in the nuclear family.²¹

Among the role of elders in controlling the functions of the patriarchal extended family, Caldwell grants them a key role in making reproductive decisions for younger couples.²² Reproductive decisions, he contends, cannot be separated from economic decisions, since the reproductive pattern is necessary to support the economic one and to maintain the

17 Timur, Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı, 105-108.

18 Ibid., 111.

19 Ibid., 74.

20 Ibid., 80.

21 Ibid., 98.

22 John C. Caldwell, "A Theory of Fertility: From High Plateau to Destabilization," *Population and Development Review* 4, no. 4, (1978): 553-77

existing calibration of material advantage within the family.²³ Because the patriarch owns or manages the means of production, he is virtually unchallenged in economic decisions. His control over reproductive decisions is less direct and potentially less secure, but economic power has traditionally provided him with sufficient reproductive control.

In summary, the dissolution of land ownership structure, triggered primarily by the mechanization of agricultural for the national market economy, not only caused the internal migration but also undermined the patriarchal extended family structure as a whole and in rural areas in particular.²⁴ Yet, the emancipatory potential of the dissolution of the patriarchal extended family for women does not seem to have materialized, as the wives of the nuclear family are still not involved in decision-making and modernization processes, especially in rural areas.

The very same mechanism mentioned above also distorted the nature of occupation structure in general and female labor in particular, both in rural and urban settings, and inevitably changed the role of women which will be discussed in the next section.

4.1.2 *The Changing Role of the Women*

This section is about the economic and occupational transformation of women in urban and rural areas. The very first observation is the fundamental decline in female labor force participation between 1950 and 1970 from 74% to 51%, as mentioned in Table 4.3, which was demonstrated in the literature as a side effect of the key phenomenon of the period, internal migration.²⁵

The movement from rural to urban not only affected the transformation of the family from patriarchal to the nuclear but also led women to withdraw from production and confine themselves to domestic tasks. Rapid urbanization pushed labor out of agriculture faster than it was

23 Ibid.,566.

24 Kandiyoti, "Women and Household Production," 188.

25 Gülsen Kazgan, "Labor Force Participation, Occupational Distribution, Educational Attainment and Socio-Economic Status of Women in the Turkish Economy," in *Women in Turkish Society*, ed. Nermin Abadan-Unat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 131-159.

absorbed by industry. The scarcity of the non-agricultural job opportunities in urban areas, and the unattractiveness of low-skill and low-educational jobs have made women the most economically vulnerable groups at home.²⁶

Table 4.3 Sectoral distribution of female labor force 1950-1970 (%)

Sectors	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970
<i>Female labor force</i>	73.7	72.2	65.5	56.4	50.9
Agriculture	96.1	95.6	95	94.1	89
Industry	2.5	2.3	2.7	1.5	5.1
Services	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.6	5.0
Other	0.1	0.5	0.4	1.8	0.9
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Ergil (1977).²⁷

Kuyaş also emphasizes a strong gender division of labor in the sphere of labor market production. Apart from exceptions among upper-class career-women, most of the rare female occupations in urban areas were in the form of female-concentrated-low-skilled and low-paid jobs.²⁸

Market conditions aside, academic studies for this period provide ample evidence that women themselves did not have much incentive to work, as their employment status challenged normative expectations and reinforced a value system in which not having to work and being a wealthy housewife was considered a privilege, which was also sign of higher social status.²⁹

The increase in women's participation in industry (low-skilled and semi-skilled workers in light industry) and services between 1965 and 1970, visible in table 4.3 and mainly due to metropolitan demand for

26 Nilüfer Kuyaş, "Female Labor and Power Relations," in *Sex Roles, Family & Community in Turkey*, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1981), 181-206.

27 Gül Ergil, *Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması: Nüfus ile ilgili Gelişmeler 1950-1970*, DPT No:1607, SPD No:298 (Ankara: 1977), 20,30.

28 Ibid.,190.

29 Oya Çitçi, "Kadın ve Çalışma," *Anne İdaresi Dergisi* 7, (1974), 45-75.

female labor (with a female employment rate of 11%), has therefore become insignificant, as the total number of housewives increased by 20% between 1955 and 1970.³⁰

Agricultural work, which took the form of mostly unpaid family labor was by far the driving source of female labor. As mentioned above, the decline of the female labor force in general and in agriculture in particular was mainly a consequence of migration and urbanization, yet the census results of the period also evidence that the rural women, mostly from patriarchal families, gradually withdrew from agriculture too.

Table 4.4 tracks the evolution of the agricultural labor force among rural women based on census data between 1955 and 1970. The impact of the rural to urban migration is evident as the density of the rural female agriculture within the total female labor force overall has decayed from 66% to 45%. Furthermore, the rural agricultural female workforce has also in decline as its ratio to total rural female labor force has declined from 86% to 71%, showing the withdrawal of women from agriculture.

Özbay foresees the withdrawal of women from rural agriculture as a consequence of the fundamental change from subsistence farming to a market economy through agricultural mechanization and road construction.³¹ On the farms of wealthy farmers with larger size of landholdings (which also means they have a patriarchal family structure), where the tendency toward mechanization is strong, Özbay adds, wage laborers were hired for non-mechanized work such as house construction and harvesting. As a result, rural female laborers, who belonged to the wealthier patriarchal families, were gradually replaced by professional male manpower.³²

30 Deniz Kandiyoti, *Major Issues on the Status of Women in Turkey: Approaches and Priorities* (Ankara: Çağ Matbaası, 1980), 23-27.

31 Ferhunde Özbay, "Transformation of the Socio-Economic Structure and Changing Family Functions in Rural Turkey," in *Family in Turkish Society*, ed. Türköz Erder (Ankara: Turkish Social Science Association, 1985), 43-78.

32 Ibid., 52.

Table 4.4 Changing Female Agricultural Labor 1955-1970 (%)

Definition	1955	1960	1965	1970
Total Female Labor force (15-65)	6,902,000	7,632,000	8,511,000	9,496,000
Rural Agricultural Female Labor within total labor force %	66.2%	62.2%	55.2%	45.5%
Rural Agricultural Female Labor within total "rural" labor force %	85.5%	84.5%	79.2%	71.4%

SOURCE: National Census 1955-1970.³³

In this context, Kandiyoti points out the irony of women in patriarchal families. It was the same extended patriarchal family structure that included women in strict patriarchal control, but also created the possibility of withdrawal from the production process. Thus, the maintenance of a more patriarchal family structure in the 1950s and 1960s coincides with a significant alleviation of women's workload.³⁴

Women's labor in agriculture predominates among the smaller farms engaged in domestic family production, since the viability of these enterprises depends on their ability to rely exclusively on family labor, to the almost complete exclusion of contractual assistance. And among landless peasants not engaged in domestic production, each family member, whether husband, wife, or young children, must make an economic contribution, usually through seasonal wage labor such as cotton picking.³⁵ However, even with this division of labor within a nuclear family, the woman had no control over the wages she earned, as the husband had

33 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970). The occupation data of the census between 1955 and 1965 was issued for the age 15 and over which was changed as 12 and over by 1970. Since the age distribution was also provided in the censuses, the occupation dataset was adjusted between 15 and 65. Nevertheless, some portion of the decrease in 1970 female rural agricultural labor might have some relation with misleading age declaration.

34 Kandiyoti, "Women and Household Production," 187-188.

35 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Sex Roles and Social Change: A Comparative Appraisal of Turkey's Women," in *Women and National Development: The Complexities of Change*, ed. Wellesley Editorial Committee (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977), 57-73.

sole authority over funds and gained more access to consumption and leisure.³⁶

Childcare should necessarily have a higher degree of attention of mothers who withdrew from work and confined themselves to domestic tasks, which should also have accelerated the reduction of the infant mortality rate and thus reduced births to replace actual or potential infant mortality.³⁷ But reproductive behavior is primarily related to the changing value of children, which is discussed in the next section.

4.1.3 *Shifting Value of the Children... An Asset or a Liability?*

This section identifies the value of the child and how it transformed in the mid-1950s and 1960s to explore changing reproductive behavior. Understanding the value parents ascribe to children is key to gaining insight into family dynamics, gender roles, social norms and attitudes, and fertility behavior. The value of children thus symbolizes motivations for having children and plays an important role in any micromodel of fertility.³⁸

The value of children to parents has generally been conceptualized in two different disciplinary frameworks: economic and socio psychological. In the economic interpretation, parents' reproductive preferences are viewed as an investment decision for a human capital that directly affects the welfare and satisfaction of family members.³⁹

Traditionally, this decision is thought to be more positive in rural settings, where children are viewed as a form of human capital that will make a significant contribution to the parents' future real income.⁴⁰ The

36 Ferhunde Özbay, "Women's Education in Rural Turkey," in *Sex Roles, Family & Community in Turkey*, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1981), 133-150.

37 The impact of the female retreat from labor and the changing infant mortality needs further analysis that is beyond the scope of that dissertation.

38 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "Old Age Security Value of Children and Development: Cross-National Evidence": 133-42.

39 Theodore W. Schultz, "Fertility and Economic Values," in *Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital*, ed. Theodore W. Schultz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974): 3-22.

40 Ibid., 6-7.

potential economic contribution of the child is much lower in urban areas, where the cost of raising a child is much higher.

Moreover, Becker finds that not only the potential but also the current income level of families affects the demand for children, noting an inverse relationship between income and fertility levels in urban settings, as the cost of having children increases with income.⁴¹

This micro-economic approach extends its scope to measure child quality and budget constraints on time and opportunity costs.⁴² Economic factors aside, the socio-psychological framework addresses social and psychological factors such as social status, social mobility, family structure, religious affiliation, rural-urban residence, and inner motivation for having a child.⁴³

The parental motivations underlying childbearing and the values attributed to children were extensively researched in the early 1970s in a multinational project namely "Value of the Child" (VOC), which surveyed more than 20,000 married respondents from nine countries, including Turkey.⁴⁴

The major finding of the study was the evolutionary transition in the value of children at different stages of socioeconomic development. In less developed countries or regions, the value of children depends primarily on their economic and practical contribution in the household; as child labor during childhood and thereafter in the form of the old-age security value for the elderly.⁴⁵

41 Gary S. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Extended Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991): 135-154.

42 Ibid., 144.

43 Bart J. De Bruijn, "Fertility: Theories, Frameworks, Models, Concepts," in *Demography: Analysis and Synthesis*, eds. Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin, Guillaume Wunsch (New York and London: Academic Press, 2006), 549-569.

44 James T. Fawcett, "Perceptions of the Value of Children: Satisfaction and Costs," in *Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries*, vol.1., eds. R. Bulatao, R. D. Lee, P. E. Hollerbach, & J. Bongaarts (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 1983), 429-454.

45 Ibid., 434.

In developed countries and regions where the child has no labor value, this economic utilitarian value of child shifts to more emotional rewards and psychological appreciation, and the concerns of old-age security have been transferred to organized social support systems such as social security, pensions, and insurance.⁴⁶

In the Turkish part of the study, 2,305 married couples (1,762 women, 543 men) represented in a national sample were asked to respond 103 questions on the various aspects of the value of children.⁴⁷

Table 4.5 Advantage of having children, VOC survey results (%)

Advantage	Village	City	Metropole
<i>Economic Factors</i>	75.3	60.0	37.7
Help in Housework	11.1	6.1	3.7
Help in Old Age	39.5	36.0	23.0
Financial Practical Help	24.7	17.9	11.0
<i>Social Factors</i>	44.5	51.8	49.0
Family name/Social obligation	24.1	23.8	15.5
Benefit of Marriage	10.1	12.4	16.9
Adult status/ Social Norms	10.3	15.6	16.6
<i>Psychological Factors</i>	43.2	61.8	90.2
Happiness, fun, love	32.2	40.4	60.7
Living through children	1.3	2.4	3.7
Character achievement	9.7	19.0	25.8

SOURCE: Kağıtçıbaşı (1982b).⁴⁸

The results, presented in Table 4.5, confirm the overall survey findings about the changing value of children based on the socioeconomic strata. In villages, 75% of parents consider children as an economic asset, while this value drops down to 37% in metropolitan areas. In contrast,

46 Ronald D. Lee, Rodolfo A. Bulatao, "Demand for Children: A Critical Essay," in *Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries*, vol.1., eds. R. Bulatao, R. D. Lee, P. E. Hollerbach, & J. Bongaarts (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 1983), 246-249.

47 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "Status of Women in Turkey: Cross-Cultural Perspectives," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 4 (1988): 485-499.

48 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "The changing value of children in Turkey," Pub. No. 60-E (Honolulu, HI: East-WestCenter, 1982), 43.

psychological factors became the key motivation in metropolitan areas (90%) compared to rural residents (43%).

The highest value attributed to the childbearing decision was the old-age security, which also decreases by the rural-urban migration. The old age security value of a child in metropolitan areas was 42% lower than in villages. Nevertheless, the comparative results depict that the overall average in Turkey was ten times higher than in the US and Germany, where the social security system is strong.⁴⁹

It must be emphasized that welfare state institutions were also gradually introduced in Turkey, especially after the military regime of 1960, and that by 1963 about 650,000 employees were covered by the Social Security Law.⁵⁰ Yet the law only covered official employees, and specific industries, especially agricultural labor was out of the social security system. The gap was partially recovered by the socialization of health services in the eastern provinces in 1961.⁵¹ However, the inefficiencies of the system and the lack of financial protection could not replace the old age security value of the children even for today.⁵²

Another indicator of the economic value of the child in the survey was the financial support provided by the children in the form of child labor. Just as with female labor mentioned in the previous section, the statistical data evidences the decline of the child labor in Turkey between 1950 and 1970, mainly due rural exodus, while the overall rate of child labor

49 Kağıtçıbaşı, "Old Age Security Value of Children and Development," 135.

50 Nadir Özbek, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Sosyal Güvenlik ve Sosyal Politikalar* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2006), 232.

51 Turkish Assembly, "Law on Socialization of Health Services, No: 224," Official Gazette publication on January 12, 1961, No.10705, enacted on January 5, 1961. By this law, the health services in the eastern provinces became free.

52 The VOC study of the mid 1970s, replicated in 2003 with the same team in Turkey and the old-age security value of the children have merely decreased 11% within thirty years period. Cigdem Kağıtçıbaşı and Bilge Ataca, "Value of Children, Family Change, and Implications for the Care of the Elderly," *Cross Cultural Research* 49, no.4 (2015), 374-392.

(between the age 10 and 14) decreased from 37% to 28%.⁵³ The research also shows that children in the metropolitan areas were not considered as a source of labor or as a vehicle of housework support.

Among the disadvantages associated with having a child depicted in Table 4.6, 52% of respondents mentioned financial costs and 49% mentioned emotional/physical costs, with the main distinction being gender rather than spatial. In keeping with the social roles of father as breadwinner and mother as nurturer, men were more likely to struggle with the economic burdens and women with the emotional/physical difficulties that an additional child can bring.

Table 4.6 Disadvantage of having children, VOC survey results (%)

Disadvantage	Women	Men	Weighted average
<i>Economic Costs</i>	43.2	62.4	52.0
Cost of Education	5.7	13.2	9.0
General Financial Costs	37.5	49.2	43.0
<i>Emotional/ Physical Cost</i>	56.1	20.4	49.0
More Work	30.6	12.7	22.0
Emotional Strain	20.0	7.9	14.0
Pregnancy	5.5	0.8	3.0
<i>Upbringing Problems</i>	38.1	34.7	37.0
Discipline	19.4	19.7	20.0
Sickness	14.7	7.6	11.0
Worry on Children's Future	4.0	7.4	6.0
<i>Restriction of Freedom</i>	14.0	10.7	12.0
Tied Down	9.8	8.1	9.0
Cannot Work	4.2	2.6	3.0

SOURCE: Kağıtçıbaşı (1982b), 47.

Thus, the economic concerns related to having a child were 45% higher for men and emotional/physical struggles were 275% higher for women. There were no gender differences in terms of restriction of freedom and upbringing problems that were cited as a burden for having a child.

53 International Labour Organization, *economically active population, 1950 - 2010 vol. I, Asia* (Geneva: ILO; 1996), 195.

Regarding the rural-urban difference in hesitation to have another child, economic difficulties were two times higher among parents in villages than among parents in metropolitan areas, who were more concerned about the restriction of their freedom and the future of children.⁵⁴

In summary, the fundamental transformation from subsistence cropping to a market economy and the rural to urban migration also diminished the economic value of children. Although the value of children as an old age security warranty for the elderly remains, the potential value as child labor and in housework duties has gradually reduced.

On the other hand, urbanization, rising education and increasing wealth among parents have introduced additional weights on having a child, such as restriction of freedom and concerns about the child's future. In addition to the diminishing value of children, there were also some other material changes during this period, which will be discussed in the next section.

4.1.4 *Other Key Drivers to Stimulate the Need for Contraception.*

In addition to change in the family structure, the status of the women, and value of the children, there were other demographic changes that directly affected reproductive decision in the 1950s and 1960s. The key issues discussed in this section are changes in the age of marriage, divorce rates, infant mortality, and education.

In their analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility, Bongaarts and Potter state that the level of natural fertility of a society is determined by its marriage patterns.⁵⁵ Natural fertility is highest in populations with a low age at marriage and lowest when marriage occurs late and is largely determined by community customs and thus under social control.⁵⁶

54 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, *Çocuğun Değeri: Türkiye'de Değerler ve Doğurganlık* (Istanbul: Gözlem Matbaacılık, 1981), 216.

55 John Bongaarts and Robert G. Pottter, *Fertility, Biology, and Behavior* (New York: Academic Press, 1983), 21-22.

56 John Bongaarts and Susan Cotts Watkins, "Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions," in *Population and Development Review* 22, no. 4 (1996), 639-82.

In Turkey, the singulate mean of marriage (SMAM), representing the mean age at which individuals leave single status by marrying for the first time, did not change between 1950 and 1970 according to census data.⁵⁷ In 1950, the SMAM was 23.2 for men and 19.6 for women, which only increased slightly to 23.4 for men and 19.9 for women by 1970.⁵⁸

However, the mean age at first marriage offers limited capacity in evaluating the pattern of marriage, since marriage at early and later ages has completely different effects on fecundity. To this end, the marriages of women in different age cohorts were tabulated in Table 4.7, which represents the percentage of married women in a given age cohort.

Table 4.7 Marriage rate of women in different age groups 1950-1970 (%)

Age Groups	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1950-1970
15-19	30.9	39.2	33.9	27.3	23.8	-7.1
20-24	81.7	84.0	83.7	82.7	77.7	-3.0
25-29	91.8	90.5	93.9	94.0	91.9	+0.1
30-34	92.2	90.7	94.3	95.4	91.2	-1.0
35-39	90.6	90.5	93.9	93.9	93.5	+2.9
40-44	85.2	86.5	88.9	90.4	90.2	+5.0
45-49	81.6	81.5	85.1	86.0	87.3	+5.7

SOURCE: Census results from 1950 to 1970.⁵⁹

As shown above, the percentage of married women has declined sharply in the 15-19 age group. In the 1955 census, some 39% of this age group was recorded as married, and this ratio declined down to 24% by the 1970 census. The other young age group (20-24) also experienced a declining pattern but to a lesser extent. The decline between 1950 and 1970 was only 3%.

57 Samira Berksan, "Marriage Patterns and their Effect on Fertility in Turkey" in *Turkish Demography: Proceedings of a Conference*, eds. Fredric C. Shorter, Bozkurt Gönenç (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1969)147-66.

58 Ayşe Yetkin Toprak, "Türkiye'de Evlenme Göstergelerinin Değişimi 1955-1997" (Turkish Statistical Institute Expertise Thesis, 2001), 54.

59 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, Genel Nüfus Sayımı (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1950, 1955, 1960,1965, 1970)

Marriage rates for the older age cohort (35+) have higher penetration but have a very limited impact on fertility. Thus, since 1955, there has been a qualitative shift in the age distribution of the married population from a higher proportion of marriages at younger ages to a higher proportion of marriages at older ages.⁶⁰

In addition to the aging marriage cohort, Goode identifies the emergence of "own choice" marriages as one of the underlying factors in fertility decline, part of a growing repertoire of personal choice about marriage and childbearing.⁶¹ Manglos-Weber and Weinreb tested Goode's hypothesis in Turkish KAP surveys of 1993, 1998, and 2003 and found that women in arranged marriages had 1.48 times more children than their counterparts who married by their own choice.⁶²

Looking at the spatial distribution of the final decision-makers in the marriage, 81% of respondents living in the three metropolitan areas, 66% of respondents living in urban areas declared that they are the sole decision-makers in marriage, while that ratio is only 39% for villagers.⁶³ Considering 68% of metropolitan residents and 55% of villagers were already living in a nuclear family, it could be argued that rural to urban migration provides an additional leverage for the emancipating families from traditional values, which was more vibrant in villages, while 16% (55%-39%) of nuclear family members indicated that elders are the sole decision-makers in marriage.

As for divorces, Turkey had an extremely low average divorce rate (0.28 divorces per 1,000 population in 1970), not only compared to developed countries but also lowest among other Islamic countries. In Levine's comparative study of crude divorce rates in 94 countries, Turkey

60 Ned Levine, "Divorce in Turkey," *Türkiye İkinci Nüfusbilim Konferansı İzmir 1975* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 2001), 154.

61 Goode, *The Family*, 49-51.

62 Nicolette D. Manglos-Weber and Alexander A. Weinreb, "Own-Choice Marriage and Fertility in Turkey," *Journal of Marriage and Family* 79, no.2, (2017): 372-389.

63 Timur, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı*, 47.

ranked as the lowest third.⁶⁴ Moreover, between 1950 and 1970, the divorce rate dropped from 0.37 to 0.26 divorces per 1,000 population.⁶⁵

Yet this age-specific divorce index demonstrates that divorces in the 17 to 18-year-old age group increased steadily by 7.1% each year between 1950 and 1965. In the 20-to 25-year-old age interval, divorce rates are also increasing, but at a slower rate (1% per year).⁶⁶ In the older age groups, which have a lesser impact on fertility level, the divorce rates declined steadily.

The relationship between fertility and infant mortality has long been studied and lies at the heart of the demographic transition theory, in which decline in fertility follows decline in mortality. Carey and Lepreato have also conceptualized this relationship as "two-surviving children psychology" in which parents adjust their total fertility to the frequency with which offspring survive to adulthood.⁶⁷

In an environment with high infant and child mortality, fertility would be high to replace offspring that are expected to die. Similarly, fertility would adjust downwards when infant and child mortality is low, and infants survive to reproductive age.⁶⁸ As in the other developing world, the reduction in infant mortality in post-WWII Turkey, previously demonstrated in Table 3.1, was expected to have a significant impact on the reducing fertility behavior even before the law was promulgated in 1965.

The last determinant of fertility to be analyzed is the change in the educational level of women. The literature suggests that the education affects fertility through a number of different channels, including delay in marriage, higher social status, higher contraceptive usage, and higher opportunity costs due to higher wages⁶⁹ and higher bargaining power in

64 Levine, "Divorce in Turkey," 148-150.

65 Ibid., 153.

66 Ibid., 157.

67 Arlen D. Carey, Joseph Lopreato, "The Evolutionary Demography of the Fertility-Mortality Quasi-Equilibrium," *Population and Development Review* 21, no. 3, (1995): 613-30.

68 Ibid., 621-25.

69 Mustafa Seref Akin, "Education and Fertility: A Panel Data Analysis for Middle Eastern Countries," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 39, no.1, (2005), 55-69.

fertility decisions.⁷⁰ In his study of low-income countries, Schultz estimates that an additional year of schooling for women is associated with a 12% decline in total fertility.⁷¹

Female literacy trends were tracked using census data between 1950 and 1970, with the urban-rural difference shown in Table 4.8. Although the literacy rate is still extremely low compared to developed countries, census results depict that the female literacy rate has increased from 20% to 42% within twenty years' time. In the urban terrain, this ratio increases up to 59%, whereas in the rural level it is only 33%.

Table 4.8 Female literacy rates 1950-1970. (%)

Year	Urbanization Women	Literacy rate Urban	Literacy rate Rural	Literacy rate Total
1950	21.9	43.8	12.5	19.5
1955	21.8	49.9	18.7	25.6
1960	25.5	49.5	16.4	24.8
1965	33.7	52.3	22.9	32.8
1970	34.8	58.9	32.6	41.8

SOURCE: Census results from 1950 to 1970.

The positive impact of urbanization on education is a well-known phenomenon. yet the increase in rural literacy was substantial, especially between 1960 and 1970, as the number of literate women increased by 1.7 million, while the female population increased by 1.2 million in a decade.

Summary of 4.1

In this section, the main drives of parents to limit fertility behavior were elaborated. The evidence depicts that fertility rates were on a declining trend long before the introduction of the Family Planning Law. In Turkey, as in most of other developing countries, the transformation of the land regime in the early 1950s from subsistence cropping to a market

70 Murat G. Kırdar, Meltem Dayıoğlu Tayfur, İsmet Koç, "The Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Teenage Marriage and Births in Turkey," *IZA Discussion Paper Series*, no. 5887, (2011)

71 T. Paul Schultz, "Human Capital, Family Planning, and Their Effects on Population Growth," *The American Economic Review* 84, no.2, (1994), 255-60.

economy, together with the other demographic changes, not only triggered the mass rural to urban migration, but also had a dramatical impacted some core elements of the individual sphere.

Thus, the changing family structure, the role of women, and the value of children, together with the other changing demographic variables, such as the decreasing number of marriages in the younger age cohort, the increasing female education, and the decreasing infant mortality, have become key drivers of fertility reduction and the “unmet need” for contraceptives.

But have Turkish family really embraced the contraceptive solutions offered by the national and global sphere or have they relied on their own methods? This will be elaborated in the next section.

§ 4.2 The Family and the Contraception

As mentioned earlier, traditional methods of contraception and abortion have long been used since antiquity, but the new circumstances mentioned in the previous section also paved the way for further reduction in birth control in the individual sphere. Meanwhile, foreign population control advocates, and the government, invested heavily in modern contraceptives, including IUDs and pills, promoting them as a safer and more reliable method of contraception. The proposition seemed enticing, but initial rates of use fell far short of the government’s targets.

This section focuses on the individual solutions to reducing fertility and how women and families responded to the global and national push for modern contraception. It also addresses the changing fertility regime, changing contraceptive preferences, resistances to modern contraceptives and attitudes for abortion.

4.2.1 *Changing Fertility Regime*

This section expands on Turkey’s changing fertility regime between 1950 and 1970 in a spatio-temporal perspective. Shorter and Macura’s detailed study of fertility trends, shown in Table 4.9 provides evidence of a huge rural urban difference, with fertility lowest in metropolitan areas and

highest in rural zones. In addition, fertility was lower in the rural West than in rural East because of its gradually better socioeconomic conditions. Shorter, however, suggests a traditional pattern of changing regional fertility rather than a transitional one, as he finds similar results in historical fertility data which he traced back to 1935 using the reverse projection method.⁷²

Table 4.9 TFR by residency 1950-1970

Year	Metropolises	Cities	Villages	TFR Turkey
1950	2,65	4,31	6,84	6,85
1955	2,91	4,6	6,86	6,54
1960	2,96	4,72	6,82	6,54
1965	3,04	4,78	6,78	6,10
1970	2,99	4,70	6,73	5,63
<i>Change</i>	+0.34	+0.39	-0.11	-1.30

SOURCE: Shorter and Macura (1982),37,51.

The main indication of Shorter and Macura's study was a steady decline in the country's total fertility rate (TFR) from 6.9 children per woman of childbearing age to 5.6 children. This decline was triggered by changing fertility regime in the villages, which declined continuously after 1955, presumably due to the loss of the younger population, which either migrated to the cities or emigrated to Western European countries. Similarly, migration affected the rise of TFR in cities and metropolises during this period.

To explore the instruments of the general decline in fertility, Shorter and Macura offer to revisit changing demographic indicators of marital status, infant mortality, and the age distribution of women with which they found a strong correlation. Referring to the changing marital status of women, they found that 19% of the decline in total fertility over the past twenty years was due to the aging married cohort, as shown in the

72 Fredric C. Shorter, "Information on Fertility, Mortality and Population Growth in Turkey" in *Turkish Demography: Proceedings of a Conference*, eds. Fredric C. Shorter, Bozkurt Gönenç (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1969)34-35.

previous chapter.⁷³ This ratio was updated to 18% by Ozbay based on the results of the 1973 KAP survey.⁷⁴

Another indicator was the decline in infant mortality, whose impact on the overall decline TFR was calculated at 9%.⁷⁵ The recovery of an infant mortality rate was much faster in the rural plains than in the urban centers, which already had better health, nutrition, and sanitation services.⁷⁶ Therefore, the impact of the decline in infant mortality on fertility reduction was much greater among rural residents.

The final illustration was the changing age distribution of women. The low birth rate during the WWII years due to the military mobilization, malnutrition, and disease, especially in rural Turkey, not only changed the demographic distribution of the era, but also reduced the fertility rates of the next two decades as the potential mothers who should have reached childbearing age in the late 1950s and 1960s dropped out. The potential impact of the changing age distribution on the fertility decline was calculated to be 7%.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the key variable directly affecting fertility reduction was found as the increasing use of contraceptive,⁷⁸ which is discussed in the next section.

4.2.2 *Women and the Contraception*

This section analyzes the changing use of traditional and modern contraceptive methods in light of the KAP surveys. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the first nationwide KAP survey to determine unmet need for the

73 Shorter, "Information on Fertility, Mortality and Population Growth in Turkey," 38.

74 Ferhunde Özbay, "Türkiye'de Doğurganlık Düzeyine ve Değişmelerine etki eden Ara Değişkenler," in *Türkiye'de Nüfus Yapısı ve Nüfus Sorunları* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1978), 79-96.

75 Shorter, "Information on Fertility, Mortality and Population Growth in Turkey," 36.

76 Miroslav Macura, "Estimates of Infant Mortality Trends: 1944-67," *Türkiye İkinci Nüfus-bilim Konferansı İzmir 1975* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 2001), 26.

77 Shorter, "Information on Fertility, Mortality and Population Growth in Turkey," 35.

78 Özbay, "Türkiye'de Doğurganlık Düzeyine ve Değişmelerine etki eden Ara Değişkenler," 90.

contraception was conducted in 1963 at the initiative of the Population Council which was repeated every five years and became the second largest and most consistent nationwide survey after the national census. This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the results of the 1963, 1968, and 1973 surveys. In addition, the periodical reports of the Health Ministry about the demographic characteristics of IUD acceptors are utilized in this section.

As the initial results of the comparative survey indicate, the percentage of married women of childbearing age who reported practicing any of the contraceptive methods has increased significantly over a decade, from 28% in 1963 to 39% in 1968, and finally to 46% in 1973.⁷⁹ The urban-rural difference in contraceptive practice mentioned in Table 4.10 shows that the increase is due primarily to villagers, who doubled their contraceptive use from 15% to 30%.

More than half of women living in metropolises reported using a contraceptive method before the acceptance of the Family Planning Law, and it appears that the introduction of the law did not have a significant impact on overall contraceptive use in metropolises and cities.

Table 4.10 Contraceptive use by residency (%) 1963-1973

Year	Metropolises	Cities	Villages	Turkey
1963	52.9	36.3	15.0	27.7
1968	65.4	49.1	23.0	39.1
1973	56.4	37.1	30.2	45.5
<i>Change</i>	+3.5	+0.8	+15.2	+17.8

SOURCE : Özbay (2001), 95.

The findings on increasing contraceptive use are consistent with the country's declining fertility, but do not provide sufficient evidence to evaluate the impact of the Family Planning Law, as traditional contraceptive methods such as withdrawal, douche, and abstinence had been

79 Özbay, "Türkiye'de 1963, 1968 ve 1973 yıllarında Aile Planlaması Uygulamalarında ve Doğurganlıktaki Değişmeler," Türkiye İkinci Nüfusbilim Konferansı İzmir 1975 (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 2001), 85-101

widely implemented since the ancient times. The law has allowed the use and distribution of modern contraceptive methods including oral pills, condoms, IUD's, and foams. And the transition between traditional and modern contraceptive methods is analyzed in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11 Contraceptive use by contraceptive methods (%)1963-1973

Contraceptive Method	1963	1968	1973	Change	Contraceptive distribution as of 1973
<i>Traditional Methods</i>	21.0	29.8	32.5	54.8	71.4
Withdrawal	10.4	18.0	23.6	126.9	51.9
Douche	10.6	11.8	8.9	-16.0	19.6
<i>Modern Methods</i>	6.7	9.3	13.0	79.1	28.6
Condom	4.3	4.4	4.7	9.2	10.3
Oral Pills	1.0	2.2	4.8	380	10.5
IUD	0.0	1.6	2.3	230	5.1
Foam	1.4	1.1	1.2	-14	2.6
<i>Total Contraceptive Use</i>	27.7	39.1	45.5	64.3	100.0

SOURCE : Ozbay (2001), 97.

The figures demonstrate that 21% of 28% of the overall contraceptive use in 1963 was through traditional methods which further increased to 32.5% within a decade. Withdrawal, the most preferred traditional method, has more than doubled during the period. In 1973, 52% of respondents who declared using a contraceptive method were actually used withdrawal. It was the foam method that women abandoned and largely replaced by withdrawal and modern methods.

Referring to modern methods, which were highly promoted by the government, increased by 79% within a decade (from 6.7% to 13%), but their share of the total was only 29% in 1973, due to the fact that withdrawal was still favored by the masses. Among modern methods, it was the oral pills that attracted the greatest and increasing interest of the married women because of its practicality. No change was observed in the use of condom or foam during the period. The insertion of IUD was the single criterion of the government for the success of the overall program, which fell far short of its targets. In 1973, only 5% of married

women who reported using a contraceptive method used IUDs, yet 38% of them preferred to extract them after one year.⁸⁰

The figures also indicate a homogeneous residential distribution between traditional and modern methods, indicating nationwide availability and accessibility. The share of the oral pills in overall contraceptive methods was 13% in metropolises and 11% in villages, while it was 7% and 5% for IUDs, respectively. The main residential difference was in withdrawal and condom use. The survey indicates that the method of withdrawal was used 10% less in metropolises than in villages; conversely the condom was used 10% more in metropolises than in villages.⁸¹ Furthermore, wealth and education seem to have little influence on the choice of contraceptive method, with the exception of condoms, which increased dramatically with increase in education and wealth.⁸²

In summary, the KAP survey indicates an increase in contraceptive use as expected, but not in the manner desired by the government. Although demonstrated a positive impact in the long run, the penetration of the modern and safe methods that were promoted, such as IUD, was still much lower than of the conventional and unsafe methods, especially the withdrawal in the late 1960s and 1970s. Even worse for the government, the number of abortions that were assumed to be reduced by the law continued to increase, even though it was still banned. The case of abortion is discussed in the next section.

4.2.3 *Unhindered Abortion*

Abortion was one of the key concerns of deputies and senators during the parliamentary discussions on the Family Planning Law. As mentioned in Chapter 3.2, the antinatalist bloc and health professionals viewed and propagated the high abortion rates as an inevitable consequence of legal

80 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *1969 Yılı Rahim İçi Takip Araştırması*, 14.

81 Nusret Fişek, "Türkiye'de Aşırı Doğurganlık ve Kullanılan Gebeliği Önleyici Yöntemler," in *Türkiye'de Nüfus Yapısı ve Nüfus Sorunları* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1978), 97-112.

82 Ibid., 109-110.

restrictions on contraception, which they believed would be eliminated by the law. But was this really the case? This section explores the status of abortion during and after the law in light of Kişnişçi and Akin's comparative analysis of the abortion question in the 1968 and 1973 KAP surveys.⁸³

The estimated number of live births in Turkey based on the 1973 survey was 1,065,295, and the total number of abortion cases was 221,777. Some 48% of these abortions were spontaneous abortions referring to pregnancy loss in less than twenty weeks of gestation in which no selective medical or surgical measures were taken to terminate the pregnancy. The remainder were induced abortions, of which 78% were performed by a medical professional and 22% by the women themselves.⁸⁴

Comparative abortion figures between 1968 and 1973 based on residential differences are shown in Table 4.12. Contrary to the claims of antinatalists during the parliamentary debates on the reduction of abortion rates by the Family Planning Law, the results indicate that the total number of abortions per 100 live births did not decrease but slightly increased from 26 to 27 between this five years period. Despite the dramatic decrease in the total abortion rates in metropolitan areas (from 93 to 49) and in cities (from 41 to 28), the rise in induced abortion in villages and towns seems to be the primary cause of this overall increase.

It is worth noting that spontaneous abortions have declined in all provinces in line with the global trend, with induced abortions following a different pattern in urban and rural provinces. The sharp decline in the metropolitan areas from 62 to 31 induced abortions per 100 live births contrasts with the steady increase in villages and towns. Kişnişçi and Akin interpret the decline in urban areas with the influence of migration, as migrants reduced the abortion regime and increased contraceptive use. And the increase in rural areas with the greater use of traditional

83 Hüsni Kişnişçi, Ayşe Akin, "Türkiye'de Düşüklerle ilgili Epidemiyolojik bir Araştırma," *Türkiye İkinci Nüfusbilim Konferansı İzmir 1975* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 2001), 63-83.

84 Ibid., 67.

methods, which are more prone to contraceptive failure and thus unwanted pregnancies.⁸⁵

Table 4.12 Abortion rates by residency 1968-1973 (per 100 live birth)

	Metropolises	Cities	Towns	Villages	Turkey Average
<i>1968 Survey</i>					
Induced abortion	62	22	12	1	12
Spontaneous abortion	31	19	13	11	14
Total abortion	93	41	25	12	26
<i>1973 Survey</i>					
Induced abortion	31	17	23	5	16
Spontaneous abortion	18	11	11	8	11
Total abortion	49	28	34	13	27

SOURCE : Kişnişçi, Akın (2001), 72.

Regarding the relationship between contraceptive use and abortion, the survey results show that only IUD use had a positive impact on reducing abortion rates during the time period. Yet the impact was limited, as only 3.5% of women of childbearing age (15-44) used IUDs in 1970.⁸⁶ The other traditional and modern methods did not have a significant impact on the change in abortion behavior during this five-year period.⁸⁷

Why have abortion rates not declined with the increased use of contraception, even though many authors believe that abortion is an adjunct to contraception that is triggered by contraceptive failure and should have a negative relationship?⁸⁸ Cleland indicates the complexity of the trade-off between abortion and contraception in his comparison of France and West Africa. In 2010, both countries had similar abortion

85 Hüsni Kişnişçi, Ayşe Akın, "Türkiye'de Düşüklerle ilgili Epidemiyolojik bir Araştırma." in *Türkiye'de Nüfus Yapısı ve Nüfus Sorunları* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1978): 113-132.

86 The total number of IUD insertion by 1970 was 260.389, the female population between 15 and 44 of age based on 1970 census was 7.441.130.

87 Kişnişçi, Akın, "Türkiye'de Düşüklerle ilgili Epidemiyolojik bir Araştırma," 77.

88 Ehtesham Zadeh, "Changing attitudes towards abortion," in *Induced Abortion, A Hazard to Health, Proceedings of the First Conference of the IPPF Middle East and North Africa Region*, ed. Isam R. Nazer. Beirut, 1971., 359-66.

rates, despite the fact that the prevalence of contraceptive use in West Africa was less than a quarter of the ratio in France.⁸⁹

To explore this phenomenon, Bongaarts and Westoff propose additional determinants of abortion, such as the desired number of children, the duration of the active fertile period subject to birth control, and the toleration of unwanted pregnancies.⁹⁰ As to the equation, in European countries with low fertility levels, same as in metropolitan Turkey, the desire to have fewer children also increases the active fertile period compared to rural areas, where it is much lower due to the higher number of children and additional breastfeeding. Furthermore, the metropolitan women are traditionally less tolerable of bearing children resulting from unwanted pregnancies, so abortion is still on the agenda of urban women even with the highest contraceptive prevalence.

On the other hand, Senlet reveals a strong correlation between induced abortion and failure of traditional methods in Turkey, as, as sheds in a comparative simulation between 1993 and 1998 KAP surveys that 43% of failures of traditional methods ended up with induced abortion.⁹¹ Indeed, in the 1993 survey, the first Turkish KAP survey with a direct questionnaire on contraceptive behavior as a reason for abortion, 46% of respondents indicated the traditional method failure, 16% the modern method failure, and 15% of them cited the discontinuation of the modern method as a reason for abortion.⁹² Therefore, the sudden increase in the abortion rate in villages and towns could partly be explained by the prevalence of traditional contraceptive methods.

Overall, the growing need to have fewer children should have led mothers to seek all possible avenues, including traditional and modern

89 John Cleland, "The complex relationship between contraception and abortion," *Best Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology* 62, (2020): 90-100.

90 John Bongaarts, Charles F. Westoff, "The potential role of contraception in reducing abortion," *Studies in Family Planning* 31, no.3, (2000): 193-263.

91 Pinar Senlet, Sian L. Curtis, Jill Mathis, and Han Raggars, "The Role of Changes in Contraceptive Use in the Decline of Induced Abortion in Turkey," *Studies in Family Planning* 32, no. 1, (2001): 41-52

92 Ministry of Health, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, and Macro International Inc. *Turkish Demographic and Health Survey* 1993, 51-58.

contraceptives and abortion, according to survey results. However, the still high proportion of abortions and traditional contraceptive methods, compared to modern methods, especially government sponsored IUD, needs to be further examined in light of the public's reluctance to accept modern family planning methods, which is discussed in the next section.

4.2.4 *Reluctancy for Modern Contraception?*

Figures on diffusion of the modern contraceptives between the late 1960s and the early 1970s evidence that only the oral pills experienced significant expansion, exceeding the rates of traditional contraceptives, while other modern contraceptives such as IUD, condom or foam lagged behind. This section explores the potential reasons for this reluctance through the IUD follow-up survey of 1969 and newspaper headlines.

The low penetration of modern contraceptives, especially IUDs, was also a concern of the government and the Ministry of Health. Therefore, a nationwide follow-up survey of IUD use was conducted in 1969 in a sample of 1656 IUD users. The report initially linked low IUD use rates to reluctance to use the device, which must be inserted into the body.⁹³

As for IUD users, the survey depicted that 38% of them had extracted the device within twelve months and 50% within eighteen months.⁹⁴ Looking at the characteristics of the extractors, urban-rural residence, literacy, or wealth did not seem to make any difference, yet the type of operator appears to be a key differentiator. The extraction rate of the IUD's inserted by the mobile teams was 55% higher than IUD's inserted in clinics or hospitals.⁹⁵ The survey rationalized that notion by individual motivation, where the women operated in the clinics seem to be more motivated to use the method, while the others convinced by the mobile teams in a short time, might lose their belief in the method or forced by their husband for the extraction.

93 Ministry of Health, Population Planning Directorate, *1969 Yılı Rahim İçi Takip Araştırması*, 7.

94 Ibid., 15.

95 Ibid., 16.

In addition, 50% of IUD users who had the device extracted cited side effects, mainly bleeding and pain, as the main reason for extraction, and about 15% of them have come to believe that IUD is a source of cancer or cancer-like diseases.⁹⁶ Indeed, detailed archival research in the *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* newspapers, based on a key word search related to population control terminology between 1965 and 1975, found that news about population control methods was dominated by health concerns.

Public opinion about modern methods seem to be constantly puzzled by medical research and statements about the virtues and side effects of IUDs and oral pills. For instance, a statement by Professor Üner about the carcinogenic effects of birth control pills in June 1967⁹⁷ was immediately denied by the Family Planning Association the next day, and both news appeared in the same newspaper.⁹⁸ HUNEE associates too issued statements to deny the alleged side effects of modern contraceptives.⁹⁹ But news of the latest medical research stating that overuse of contraceptives can cause cancer¹⁰⁰ and even death¹⁰¹ occupied the newspaper columns.

On the moral ground, recalling George H. W. Bush's narrative of how his father lost in the election because of his support for birth control that was mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the population control discussion was still taboo, especially in villages, was considered a private matter. The HUNEE students who conducted a KAP survey in 1968 reported that when they tried to conduct a survey in the suburbs of Konya province, a place known for its religiosity, they were not only turned away but also thrown out by the women of the region.¹⁰²

The relationship between contraception and religion was still a heated debate in the country. The facilitative position of the Ministry of

96 Ibid., 18.

97 "Prof. Üner'e göre doğum kontrol hapları kanser yapıyor," *Milliyet*, June 1, 1967, 3.

98 "Doğum kontrol hapları kansere sebep olmuyor," *Milliyet*, June 2, 1967, 8.

99 "Doğum kontrolü hapi üzerindeki tartışmalar devam ediyor," *Milliyet*, June 4, 1967, 3.

100 "Doğum kontrol haplarının kansere ve kan dolaşımı hastalıklarına yolaçtığı öne sürülüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 28, 1975, 10.

101 "Doğum kontrol hapları ölüme sebep oluyor," *Milliyet*, May 22, 1968, 1.

"Doğum kontrol hapi yüzünden öldü," *Cumhuriyet*, April 20, 1969, 3.

102 "Doğum kontrolü silahsız bir haçlı seferidir," *Milliyet*, August 17, 1968, 3.

Religious Affairs, which already sent written consent about the morality of birth control as early as 1960, has gradually neutralized as the military regime was replaced by the political parties. In 1970, the vice president of the Ministry of Religious Affairs stated unless medical necessities, preventing from pregnancy is religiously forbidden.¹⁰³

Referring to social aspect of the hesitation for contraception, experienced health professionals interviewed for this dissertation also pointed out that very few women visited the FPC's to get information about family planning or to have an IUD inserted because they were afraid of being seen by neighbors and hearing rumors. Instead, most of them had IUD surgeries at state hospitals, where they could better disguise their treatment.

Furthermore, there was still strong political opposition to the introduction of birth control. Pronatalist policies were the political doctrine of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which saw birth control as a plot by the hegemonic powers to further colonization,¹⁰⁴ and its party leader Alparslan Türkeş who was among the elite staff of the 1960 military coup, referred to birth controllers as murderers of the Turkish generation.¹⁰⁵ And in April 1969, a seminar on birth control was attacked and bombed by the youth group of the MHP, who called themselves the Rangers and shouted anti-sterilization slogans.¹⁰⁶

Surprisingly, hegemonic plot trauma was also discussed in the CHP, the political flagship of the antinatalist coalition, during parliamentary debates on the Family Planning Law. During the assembly of the women's branch of the party in 1966, Yurdsever Ağır, head of Ankara province, stated that the only goal of the medical birth control devices supplied from US was to sterilize Turkish women.¹⁰⁷

103 "Diyanet işlerine göre hamileliğin önlenmesi dinen yasak," *Milliyet*, August 6, 1970, 9.

104 Enis Gökyiğit Yörükoğlu, *Dokuz Işıktaki Nüfus Politikası* (Ankara: Dokuz Işık Yayınları, 1971)

105 "Türkeş 'Doğum Kontrolü bir suikasttır' dedi," *Milliyet*, April 21, 1968, 1.

106 "Komandolar doğum kontrol seminerini bastı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 8, 1969, 1.

107 "Türk kadını kısırlaştırılıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1966, 1.

In summary, despite the acute need for family planning, public and political opposition to new birth control technologies, led women and families to continue to utilize traditional methods and abortion in the late 1960s and 1970s. The lower penetration of modern methods was also a scientific concern in the more recent studies. In their analysis of the 1988 KAP survey results, Goldberg and Toros found that the traditional contraceptive methods, basically withdrawal followed by induced abortion as a backup method of ending unintended pregnancies, remained strong compared with modern methods, of which the resistance remained high due to health risk and potential side effects.¹⁰⁸

The growing momentum of induced abortion practices was also discussed in parliament in July 1971. In a parliamentary question by independent deputy Celal Kargılı, who called for liberation of abortion,¹⁰⁹ a commission was set by the Ministry of Health for a detailed investigation in January 1971,¹¹⁰ and although the commission's report also supported the exemption,¹¹¹ the law was not reinstated until 1983, during another period of martial law after the 1980 military coup.

One of the main concerns in pushing abortion in such a short period time was the inefficiency and corruption in the medical system. As the Ministry of Health acknowledges in its own report, the project of socialization of health, along with the family planning clinics, has been virtually bankrupt.¹¹² Most doctors and nurses have preferred not to work in the eastern provinces due to the inefficient payment system and difficult working conditions, while only 761 out of 15,074 doctors have accepted the challenge.¹¹³ Moreover, as the deputy Kargılı complained, opening

108 Howard I. Goldberg and Aykut Toros, "The Use of Traditional Methods of Contraception among Turkish Couples," *Studies in Family Planning* 25, no.2, (1994):122-8.

109 National Assembly Minutes of Meeting (*Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*), (Term 2, Vol. 15, Meeting No:123, July 1, 1971), 112.

110 "Kürtajın serbest bırakılması istendi," *Milliyet*, January 18, 1972, 3.

111 "Sağlık Bakanlığı'nın komisyonu kürtajın serbest olmasını istedi," *Cumhuriyet*, March 27, 1972,1.

112 Ministry of Health, Sağlık Hizmetlerinde 50 Yıl, 238.

113 "Türkiye'de 15.074 doktordan ancak 761'i sosyalizasyonda görev kabul etti," *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1972, 5.

illegal private clinics and performing abortions is a widespread and profitable practice among doctors.¹¹⁴ One of the veteran physicians interviewed during the initial research for this dissertation admitted that he also performed illegal abortions in the 1970s and bought his first car with the income he gained from these operations.

Summary of 4.2

The decline in fertility level and the change in women's attitudes towards contraception were elaborated in this section. The dramatic decline in the fertility level in the 1950s and 1960s due to socioeconomic and demographic factors automatically led to an increase in contraceptive use and unmet need. Yet, the modern contraceptive technologies introduced by foreign NGO's and promoted by the Turkish government have not gained the desired penetration in the short run.

Instead, many women and families, have continued to rely on traditional contraceptive methods and abortion for fear of the side effects and medical concerns of modern contraceptives. And the government unable to retain the medical personnel due to inefficient organization and inadequate financial support, has lost momentum for family planning and was forced to begin discussion on abortion.

What then becomes of the Turkish women and the family? This final question of the dissertation will be discussed in the next and last section of this chapter.

§ 4.3 Turkish Women and Family after 1965.

In this last section, the transformation of fertility attitude and contraceptive choice of Turkish women after 1965, is revealed through some key demographic, economic and social highlights that affected the status of the women. The first part consists of a brief representation of a spatio-temporal demographic series on changing fertility rates and contraceptive use between 1965 and 1985 to reveal the change. The second part

114 "Kürtajın serbest bırakılması istendi," 1.

deals with the change in the status of the women by mainly concentrating on the occupational and educational transition and urbanization.

And in the last part, the correlation among fertility rates, educational background, occupational status, and urbanization is analyzed for the 1965 and 1985 variables per provincial district to explore the changing fertility choice with the real data.

4.3.1 *The Demographic Transition of Turkish Women and Family.*

The transformation process of women and the family, triggered mainly by the changing land regime and migration by the mid-1950s and 1960s, accelerated exponentially in the 1970s. This section traces the changes in fertility, contraceptive practices, and other demographic elements from 1965 to 1985 using census data and subsequent KAP surveys.

There are two reasons for choosing 1985 as the expiration date of the analysis. First of all, the very first official statement of antinatalist policy was the 1963 NDP, which projected Turkey's population through 1985 based on three scenarios of high, medium, and low fertility. And it would be useful to match the government's estimate with the actual data, and in a way evaluate its performance in implementing the Population Control Law of 1965. Second, the mid-1980s represent another chapter in population control policy, as the right to abortion up to the tenth week of pregnancy became legal in 1983.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the periodization should not go beyond the mid-1980s to analyze the individual impact of the Family Planning Law.

To quantify the impact of family planning, the SPO created a projection based on three fertility levels. The high fertility projection implies that the same 1965 fertility rates would hold for twenty years. The medium fertility scenario assumption was based on a moderate adoption of modern contraceptive methods formulated by a 5% decrease in fertility

115 Turkish Assembly, "Population Panning Law, No: 2827," Official Gazette publication on May 27, 1983, No.18059, enacted on May 24, 1983

rates every five years, while the level of fertility decline in the aggressive low fertility scenario was 10%.¹¹⁶

Table 4.13 NDP projections vs actual population 1965-1985 (*in '000*)

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
<i>1963 NPD Projection</i>					
A. High Fertility	31,996	36,697	42,558	49,947	59,162
B. Medium Fertility	31,936	36,401	41,579	47,744	55,016
C. Low Fertility	31,936	36,106	40,635	45,701	51,313
<i>Census Results</i>					
D. Actual census	31,391	35,605	40,347	44,736	50,664
<i>Difference (D-B)</i>	-545	-796	-1,237	-3,008	-4,352
<i>Difference (D-C)</i>	-545	-501	-288	-965	-649

SOURCE: Population Censuses, NDP 1963.

As shown in Table 4.13, the 1985 population was estimated at 59.1 million for high fertility, 55 million for medium fertility, and 51.3 million for low fertility scenarios. Based on the actual census, the 1985 population was 50.6 million, below the low fertility scenario. In addition, the country's average fertility rate fell from 6.10 to 4.11 between 1965 and 1985, a reduction of two births per woman.

The differences in the provincial fertility and their transition over twenty-year period are demonstrated in the following two provincial maps. The map in Figure 4.1 represents the average fertility rates of the 67 provincial districts of Turkey in 1965. Provincial fertility rates are based on Shorter and Macura's demographic estimates. Consistent with the demographic transition theory, which foresees fertility as a function of development and modernization, the map shows that fertility rates were highest in the eastern provinces, where urbanization, education, and contraceptive availability were less present.

116 Prime Ministry and State Planning Organization, *First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967)*, 69-70.




Figure 4.31 TFR per provincial district “1965.” SOURCE: Data, Shorter and Macura (1982), 53. positioned on 1965 provincial map.

The TFR rate exceeded eight births per woman in sixteen provinces, predominantly located in the east. Furthermore, TFR was not less than five births per woman in 58 provincial districts. For the remaining nine out of 67 cities with TFR less than five births per woman that were located in the west, the lowest TFR was in Istanbul, the most developed and urbanized city with three births per woman.

The map in Figure 4.2 denotes the average fertility rate per provincial district in 1985, calculated by Cerit using census data. The TFR is the sum of age-specific fertility rates and is calculated as the ratio of annual births in each age cohort to the female population in the same age group.¹¹⁷ And annual births per age cohort per provincial district have only been available since the 1980 census.

The 1985 map demonstrates a significant TFR decline on average, as the number of provincial districts with less than five births per woman increased from nine cities in 1965 to twenty-four in 1985. And in twelve of these twenty-four cities, TFR is less than four.

117 Henry S. Shryock and Jacob S. Siegel, *The Methods and Materials of Demography* (California: Academic Press, 1976), 287.




Figure 4.3 TFR per provincial district “1985.” SOURCE: Data, Cerit (1989),¹¹⁸ positioned on 1985 provincial map.

Twenty years ago, no city except Istanbul had such a low birth rate. However, the highest birth rate was still found in the eastern provinces, as the TFR rate was higher than eight in twelve eastern districts.

Regarding demographic changes in the major determinants of fertility, namely age at marriage, family structure, contraceptive practices, and abortion between 1965 and 1985, the key points are as follows.

The age at first marriage has increased slightly during these twenty years, having been raised by 1.2 years for men and 2.1 years for women, reaching 24.6 years for men and 21.5 years for women in 1985.¹¹⁹ However, the number of marriages under the age of 18, which is a key determinant of higher fertility has declined significantly.

The ratio of married women under 18 to married women over 18 was 66% in 1965 and fell to 43.5% by 1985.¹²⁰ In his analysis of the determinants of fertility, Hancioğlu notes that the direct impact of the aging

118 Sevil Cerit, *Türkiye’de Doğurganlık ve Ölümlülük* (Ankara: Yeniçağ Yayınları, 1989), 52-53.

119 Toprak, “Türkiye’de Evlenme Göstergelerinin Değişimi 1955-1997,” 55.

120 Ministry of the Family and Social Policies, *Türkiye Aile Yapısı Araştırması: Tespitler, Öneriler* (Ankara: 2014)

married cohort on the decline in fertility was 26% as of 1983,¹²¹ up from 18% a decade earlier.

As for family structure, the patriarchal and the extended family continued to erode but at a slower pace from 32.1% in 1968 to 27.9% in 1985.¹²² The nuclearization of the family was even slower during this period, increasing only 1.9% in fifteen years. And the dissolved family increased from 8.3% to 10.5% over the same period.¹²³

Analysis of the HUNEE academicians based on the subsequent KAP surveys depicted that the change in contraceptive practices had the greatest direct impact on the fertility reduction during the period, which was calculated as 39% in 1968 and increase up to 52% by 1983.¹²⁴

Figure 4.3 shows the progress in contraceptive use in Turkey between 1963 and 1983, along with traditional and modern method breakdown. Overall contraceptive use has almost tripled during the period (from 22% to 61%), and the distribution of traditional and modern methods has changed radically.

Although still higher than modern methods in 1983, the share of traditional contraceptive in total contraceptive preferences declined from 76% to 56%, especially after the mid-1970s, when douche and other folk methods were gradually abandoned in favor of IUD and pills. On the other hand, withdrawal maintained its position as still the single most preferred contraceptive method.

Regarding abortion, successive KAP surveys reveal a steady increase until the mid- 1990s, long after the liberalization of abortion in 1983.¹²⁵ The total number of abortions according to the 1983 KAP survey was

121 Atilla Hancioğlu, "Fertility Trends in Turkey: 1978-1993," in *Fertility Trends, Women's Status and Reproductive Expectations in Turkey*, eds. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies and Macro International (Calverton, Maryland, 1997):1-79.

122 Sutay Yavuz, "Changing household and family compositions in Turkey: A demographic evaluation for 1968-1998 period, *Hacettepe University E-Journal of Sociological Research*, no.2, (2004): 1-34.

123 Ibid.,16.

124 İsmet Koç, "Türkiye'de Doğurganlık Seviyesi ve Örüntüsünün Değişimi," in *Türkiye Aile Yapısı Araştırması: Tespitler, Öneriler* (Ankara: 2014), 188.

125 Ibid., 33.

363,199, of which 215,588 were induced abortions,¹²⁶ an 87% increase over the results a decade earlier.¹²⁷ Hancioğlu finds the direct impact abortion on fertility decline in fertility as 7% in 1983,¹²⁸ which was calculated at 2% a decade earlier.¹²⁹




Figure 4.3 Traditional vs. modern contraception usage between 1963-1985 (%) SOURCES: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (HUNEE). *Turkish Demographic and Health Survey*, 1978, 1983, HUNEE (2010)¹³⁰, Özbay (2001),

- 126 HUNEE, *Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 1983* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 1987), 104.
- 127 Hüsni Kışnişçi, Ayşe Akın, "Türkiye'de Düşüklerle ilgili Epidemiyolojik bir Araştırma," 117. The induced abortion total was 115.692.
- 128 Hancioğlu, "Fertility Trends in Turkey: 1978-1993," 54.
- 129 Özbay, "Türkiye'de Doğurganlık Düzeyine ve Değişmelerine etki eden Ara Değişkenler," 90.
- 130 HUNEE, *Türkiye'nin Demografik Dönüşümü; Aile Planlaması Anne Çocuk Sağlığı ve Beş Yaş Altı Ölümlerdeki Değişimler: 1968-2008* (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, 2010)

The figures above suggests that the decline in fertility, which already began as early as the 1950s, showed increasing momentum in the late 1970s and 1980s, inevitably led increased use of all means of contraception, including modern and traditional methods, along with the abortion. What about the economic and social changes among the women that accelerated this dynamic? This question will be briefly addressed in the next section.

4.3.2 *The Changing Status of Women until mid-1980s.*

A woman's decision whether, when, and how many children to have been influenced by a number of circumstances directly related to her role and status in the family and society. And a woman's status has a major impact on the degree of control she has over her own fertility.¹³¹

Although defining and measuring woman's status is extremely complex because of its multidimensional nature,¹³² some key indicators, such as educational attainment, labor force participation, and urbanization level are generally used as proxies for the measurement. And this section tracks the changing trends of these proxies between 1965 and 1985.

Education is generally considered as an essential tool for enhancing women's status, and although not uniform in every country as Martin demonstrated for 26 developing countries, higher education is found to have a huge impact on reducing fertility.¹³³

As for Turkey's progress, the increase in the female literacy rate over the past twenty years has been impressive, rising from 33% in 1965 to 68% in 1985, as Table 4.14 demonstrates. Undoubtedly, urbanization had a profound impact on the increasing literacy rate, which reached 76% in

131 Banu Akadlı Ergöçmen, "Women's Status and Fertility in Turkey," in *Fertility Trends, Women's Status and Reproductive Expectations in Turkey*, eds. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies and Macro International (Calverton, Maryland, 1997): 80-104.

132 Karen Oppenheim Mason, "The status of women: Conceptual and methodological issues in demographic studies," *Sociological Forum* 1, (1986): 284-300.

133 Teresa Castro Martin, "Women's Education and Fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health Surveys," *Studies in Family Planning* 26, no.4, (1995): 187-202

1985. However, the main cause of this gradual increase was the rural literacy rate, which rose from 23% to 59%. The nationwide literacy campaigns that were more rigorously implemented after the 1980 coup were key to this success in rural literacy.¹³⁴ Still, much remains to be done, as 31% of these female literates did not attend or complete primary school and 14% of them completed high school, and only the 4% of female literates, over the age of twenty-one, were able to earn a could graduate from a university.¹³⁵

Table 4.14 Female literacy rates 1965-1985 (%)

Year	Urbanization Women	Literacy rate Urban	Literacy rate Rural	Literacy rate Total
1965	33.7	52.3	22.9	32.8
1970	34.8	58.9	32.6	41.8
1975	38.2	64.4	41.0	50.5
1980	43.0	66.3	45.9	54.7
1985	51.9	75.9	59.4	68.2

SOURCE: Census results from 1965 to 1985.

Another determinant of improving women's status is female labor force participation. As demonstrated in section 4.1.2, female labor force participation does not necessarily imply control over the wages she earns due to submission to her husband's authority. However, it is still assumed that simply being part of the labor force enhances one's freedom and knowledge of the outside world. With respect to fertility, the theory of role incompatibility states that working- are more inclined to limit their fertility due to incompatibility of work and motherhood.¹³⁶ Yet the transition of female labor force participation in Turkey requires a different interpretation.

Table 4.15 depicts that the withdrawal of women from the labor force continued after 1965, as the labor force participation rate fell from 56.4%

134 "Okuma yazma seferberliği başladı," *Milliyet*, March 23, 1981.

135 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 20.10.1985*, 64.

136 J. Mayone Stycos and Robert H. Weller, "Female Working Roles and Fertility," *Demography* 4, no.1, (1967): 210-7.

to 44.5% in twenty years. As for the sectoral breakdown, the share of agriculture, although still dominant by far, decreased from 94.1% in 1965 to 85.6% in 1985, and was mainly replaced by the service sector, which increased from 2.6% to 9.7% during the same period.

Table 4.15 Sectoral distribution of female labor force 1965-1985 (%)

Sectors	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
<i>Female labor force</i>	56.4	50.9	47.4	46.3	44.3
Agriculture	94.1	89.0	87.5	86.5	85.6
Industry	1.5	5.1	4.3	4.6	4.5
Services	2.6	5.0	7.1	8.2	9.7
Other	1.8	0.9	1.1	0.7	0.2
<i>TOTAL</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE : *Istatistiki Göstergeler 1923-2011*.¹³⁷

Meanwhile, child labor, the basis for research on the value of the child, has also declined from 28% in 1970 to 18% in 1985,¹³⁸ with 80% of them living in villages. This steady decline in child labor indicates not only a declining value of children as a source of labor or as a means off house-work support but also rapid urbanization.

Urbanization, which Unat identifies as one of the main causes of the extraordinary change in the status of Turkish women and a sign of emancipation from a traditional to a modern life,¹³⁹ is also closely related to the increasing education and employment of women, especially in services and industries.

As in most other developing countries, the rise of urbanization accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, and Turkey's urbanization rate increased

137 Turkish Statistical Institute, *İstatistiki Göstergeler Statistical Indicators 1923-2011* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu), 22-6.

138 International Labour Organization, *economically active population, 1950 - 2010*, 195.

139 Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Modernization of Turkish Women," *Middle East Journal* 32, no.3 (1978): 291-306

from 34% in 1965 to 53% in 1985 and the urban population surpassed that of villages for the first time in Turkish demographic history.¹⁴⁰

The population in rural areas remained almost stable during this period, changing slightly from 20.6 to 23.8 million, while in urban areas it increased exponentially from 10.8 to 26.9 million. Migration reports of the period also indicate that about 12.3 million people have changed their permanent residence within twenty years.¹⁴¹

The impact of these proxies on the fertility change is analyzed in the next and last section of this chapter.

4.3.3 *An Analyze on Individual Determinants of Fertility.*

This section attempts to demonstrate the changing educational and occupational proxies of fertility in Turkey through time and place. Many studies have been conducted to economic and social determinants of fertility, especially by HUNEE academicians based on the KAP surveys.¹⁴² Unlike these studies, which divide the county into five geographic regions, this dissertation gathers census data for each of the 67 provincial districts, allowing for a broader representation.

The variables in this analysis, presented in Table 4.16, consist of TFR as the dependent variable and urbanization, education, and occupation rates as explanatory variables. All variables were compiled from census data for each provincial district for 1965 and 1985, respectively.

As for education, not only literacy rates but also primary school and high school graduation figures of each provincial district are included to allow a more detailed assessment. Similarly, the analysis of the female labor force is not limited to the overall employment rate, but includes a

140 Prime Ministry Statistical General Directorate, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 20.10.1985* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1985), 4.

141 Tuncer Karaman, *Türkiye’de İç Göçler ve Göç Edenlerin Nitelikleri (1965-2000)* (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2009), 17-18.

142 Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies and Macro International, *Fertility Trends, Women’s Status and Reproductive Expectations in Turkey*, (Calverton, Maryland, 1997); HUNEE, *Türkiye’nin Demografik Dönüşümü; Aile Planlaması Anne Çocuk Sağlığı ve Beş Yaş Altı Ölümlerdeki Değişimler: 1968-2008*.

breakdown of employment in agriculture, services, and industry for each provincial district. Detailed figures are shown in Appendices D and E.

Table 4.16 Summary of variables, abbreviations, and definitions

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Definition and source</i>
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	
Total fertility rate	Total fertility rate per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>	
Urbanization rate	Urbanization rate per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Female Literacy rate	Female literacy rate (over age 6) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Primary school graduation	Graduation rate of females from primary school (over 11 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
High school graduation	Graduation rate of females from high school (over 18 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Employment rate	Female Employment rate(over 15 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Agricultural Occupation	Female employment rate in agricultural sector (over 15 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Service Occupation	Female employment rate in service sector (over 15 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.
Industrial Occupation	Female employment rate in industrial sector (over 15 of age) per provincial district for 1965 and 1985.

Similar to the analysis conducted in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.4), the evaluation of the data was limited with the descriptive demonstration of TFR average of the provincial districts per data range of the related proxies as shown in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17 Individual determinants of TFR (1965 vs. 1985)

	1965		1985	
Individual Determinants	Number of Provincial District	TFR average per Provincial District	Number of Provincial District	TFR average per Provincial District
Urbanization Rate %				
< 20 %	18	7.57	1	5.91
20 % – 29 %	24	7.13	19	6.29
30 % – 39 %	16	6.32	23	5.49
40 % – 49 %	6	6.12	13	5.03
50 % – 59 %	1	3.99	6	5.22
≥ 60 %	2	4.28	5	3.99
Female Literacy Rate %				
< 20 %	19	8.50	-	-
20 % – 29 %	21	7.03	3	9.35
30 % – 39 %	13	6.14	6	9.92
40 % – 49 %	9	5.09	2	9.38
50 % – 59 %	4	4.97	7	6.72
≥ 60 %	1	3.04	49	4.39
Primary School Graduation Rate %				
< 20 %	34	7.97	6	9.47
20 % – 29 %	15	6.45	4	10.14
30 % – 39 %	12	5.19	5	6.85
40 % – 49 %	6	4.60	20	5.58
50 % – 59 %	0	4.97	31	3.93
≥ 60 %	0	3.04	1	3.3
High School Graduation Rate %				
< 1 %	43	7.45	-	-
1 % – 1.9 %	18	5.95	9	9.32
2 % – 2.9 %	3	5.92	6	6.81
3 % – 3.9 %	-	-	18	5.70
4 % – 4.9 %	1	3.99	15	4.66
≥ 5 %	2	4.28	19	3.75
Female Employment Rate %				
< 20 %	1	3.04	1	3.26
20 % – 29 %	-	-	3	3.52
30 % – 39 %	1	5.52	6	4.76
40 % – 49 %	4	5.92	17	5.18
50 % – 59 %	7	6.23	26	5.39
≥ 60 %	54	7.07	14	6.99

Individual Determinants	Number of Provincial District	TFR average per Provincial District	Number of Provincial District	TFR average per Provincial District
Female Agricultural Occupation Rate %				
< 20 %	1	3.04	3	3.30
20 % – 29 %	-	-	5	4.52
30 % – 39 %	2	4.76	6	4.59
40 % – 49 %	5	6.40	26	4.75
50 % – 59 %	9	5.94	17	6.42
≥ 60 %	50	7.19	10	7.58
Female Service Occupation Rate %				
< 1 %	49	7.35	-	-
1 % – 1.9 %	15	5.67	19	7.98
2 % – 2.9 %	1	3.99	24	5.30
3 % – 3.9 %	-	-	14	3.97
4 % – 4.9 %	-	-	7	3.46
≥ 5 %	2	4.28	3	3.30

The literature suggests the primary role of urbanization in the transformation and modernization of society, which would lead to upgrading of women's status and a reduction in fertility.¹⁴³ The demonstration of the urbanization rates and the TFR average per provincial district between 1965 and 1985 also supports that negative association between urbanization and the fertility as the average fertility rates decreases while the rate of urbanization per provincial districts increases in each sample year.

The figures also evidence an increasing rate of fertility reduction with the accelerating urbanization level from 1965 to 1985. The number of provincial districts having above 40% urbanization level have increased from nine to twenty-four within, while the average TFR for these districts were reduced from 5.5 to 4.9 within these twenty years.

Yet, the dataset does not always follow this inverse path between urbanization and fertility especially in many Western rural plains of the country where both urbanization and fertility rates were low. This could also be additional evidence that there is no single definition of "rural," as Western rural provinces have higher availability and access to education

143 Unat, "The Modernization of Turkish Women," 296-9.

and employment opportunities which could lead to an increase in the status of women without urbanization.

In addition, it should also be noted that although the decline in fertility and the increase in urbanization coincide at the national level, as in most developing countries, the analysis based on provincial districts has its limits in demonstrating the association. Urbanization is mainly triggered by internal migration, 75% of which occurred from one provincial district to another, mostly to three metropolitan areas. Only the remaining 25% of migrants moved within the same district in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, ability to measure the effect urbanization level on fertility has becoming increasingly difficult at the provincial level.

As mentioned previously, the negative correlation between education and fertility has long been studied. The dataset on literacy rate clearly shows this negative association in the provincial level for 1965. In 1985, however, literacy had advanced to the point where the female literacy was already above 60% in 49 out of 67 provinces, blurring the negative association between literacy and fertility at the provincial level.

This time, primary school graduation became a strong indicator, as it was not yet widespread in 1985 (the rate of female primary school graduates exceeded 60% only in Istanbul). A similar trend was seen in the high school graduation rate. Although still marginal, the rising high school graduation rate for females is accompanied by the declining fertility rates in both years.

The increase in educational attainment within twenty years was observed in all provinces without exception, which could lead to an illusory increase in fertility rates for the same intervals in the dataset. For example, in provinces where the primary school graduation rate was between 30% and 39%, the average fertility rate was 5.19 in 1965 and 6.85 in 1985. This is because the twelve counties that belonged to this rate interval in 1965 had higher graduation rates in 1985 and were replaced by provinces that had much lower education levels in 1965 but reached graduation rates above 30% in 1985.

144 Karaman, *Türkiye’de İç Göçler ve Göç Edenlerin Nitelikleri (1965-2000)*, 17.

Contrary to the literature, associating a negative correlation between TFR and female employment as it is assumed to elevate the women's status, the result of this analysis demonstrates a positive association between overall female employment level and the fertility. The answer lies in the sectoral breakdown, of which the proportion of agriculture in overall female employment was no less than 86% as already demonstrated in Table 4.15. Since agricultural female employment has very limited capacity for the emancipation of the women due to the fact the women had almost no control over the wages they earned in rural settings,¹⁴⁵ the overall negative association between fertility and the employment became mutilated.

On the other hand, female service occupation level shown in the graph, confirms the negative association between service employment and fertility in 1985. Service occupation level of the women in 1965 was marginal as it was less than 2% in all the provincial districts except three metropolises. Therefore, 1965 data was not applicable for a review on fertility and service occupation relationship. Nevertheless, the female employment in the service industry was only 4% of the total female population between the age of 15 and 65 in 1985 and was far from explaining the overall decline in fertility.

Summary of 4.3

In this final section, the change in the fertility behavior and contraceptive use was further tracked until the mid-1980s to find out impact of the Family Planning Law in the long run. Apparently, the governmental targets to reduce the population was in line with the changing views of family and women as decline in the fertility level was above the governmental targets.

And the trend in the contraceptive use indicates that the women and family have reduced the hesitation on the modern contraceptives over time to reach the desired number of children. Yet the traditional methods and especially abortion was still high.

145 Özbay, "Women's Education in Rural Turkey," in *Sex Roles, Family & Community in Turkey*,), 133-150.

During this period, female employment was further reduced. On contrary, the level of urbanization was escalated together with the female literacy. Furthermore, the education level which was found to have a close relationship with the decreasing fertility level on provincial basis.

Conclusion of Chapter 4

The fourth chapter concentrated on the individual sphere, women and the family, and their changing fertility and contraceptive behavior through the transformation of the environment and their changing needs and priorities. In this context, how the response of the individual sphere on the population control law promoted by the global sphere and enforced by the national sphere was covered.

The census data and demographic studies evidence that the fertility rates were already in decline in Turkey in early 1950's as a reflection of the transformation of the land regime. Turkish women being confined to housework as they have gradually withdrawn from agricultural labor, the erosion of patriarchal family structure and increasing female education allowed them for some spaces for empowerment. Furthermore, gradual retreat from agricultural labor and land due to internal migration has changed the value of children from an asset to a liability providing another motivation for the reduction in fertility in the individual sphere.

Not only the motivation for birth control, but also the contraceptive methods of women and the family were quite different from what was propagated by the global and national sphere. The traditional methods and abortion were favored against modern methods, due to religious and cultural prejudices and medical concerns about the modern methods. In addition, financial and organizational incapacities of the governments also had a significant impact on the collapse of the state-sponsored family planning initiation.

However, the extended periodization until the mid-1980s, provided further evidence that the pace of fertility reduction being highly associated with the increasing literacy and educational level, also led to women becoming more accustomed to modern contraceptive methods.

Conclusion

The idea of writing this topic as a dissertation began with the government's persistent calls for at least three children per family since 2007,¹ which was further intensified in 2013² and officially became government policy that same year, when the goal of increasing fertility rates was mentioned in the 10th NDP.³ This represents a radical departure from the long-standing antinatalist policy that ironically had been introduced in the 1st NDP fifty years earlier, in 1963. At that time, the country population was only 29 million, one-third of today's population. Analyzing this earlier shift from pronatalist to antinatalist policies in a country with a such a low population density (40 inhabitants per square kilometer) therefore seemed an equally valuable endeavor that could also contribute to the ongoing debate.

While working on the dissertation, debates on the population policies further intensified not only in Turkey with the influx of migrants from Syria and Afghanistan, but also in the US with the most recent abortion

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- 1 Yasemin Dildar, "The Effect of Pronatalist Rhetoric on Women's Fertility Preferences in Turkey," *Population and Development Review* 48, no.2 (2022): 579-612.
 - 2 "Erdoğan neden üç çocuk istediğini açıkladı," *Milliyet*, January 2, 2021, 3.
 - 3 Ministry of Development, *Tenth Five-Year Development Plan* (2014-2018) (Ankara, 2013), 49.

bans in thirteen states.⁴ And this study aims to shed light on current debates about abortion and migration by providing a historical perspective on the motivations for population policy change that also includes these issues.

Population control has been a well-known phenomenon since the beginning of the nineteenth century, by the Malthusians and eugenicists, both of whom shared similar anxieties of the governing good life to retain their life quality, threatened by the bare and unbearable lives. Yet, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a global consensus on the notion of population explosion and population control for the first and, so far, last time in world history. And in 1969, some twenty developing countries, including Turkey, representing half of the world's population, almost simultaneously introduced antinatalist policies and programs to reduce fertility.

This dissertation analyzes the fragile global coalition that gradually disintegrated in the name of the right for life after the 1994 World Population Conference in Cairo, within three spheres: global, national, and individual, in three separate chapters. The core assertion of this dissertation is that the ultimate goal of each of these three spheres is to enhance their “quality” by maximizing their own capabilities and functionings and the population control is desirable as long as it serves to this purpose, and the 1960s were a rare period when all three spheres briefly converged.

The global sphere explored in the second chapter represents the US, the US-based demographers, and NGOs predominantly Ford and Rockefeller Funds where the idea of population control was created, conceptualized, funded, and introduced to the Third World. This dissertation acknowledges the literature based on US hegemonic interest in reducing the Third World population in the Cold War context. Following Agamben’s forms of life terminology, the developing world and its citizens were the bare lives representing the area of contestation that should not be left to the occupation of the unbearable rival.

4 “Tracking the states where abortion is now banned,” *The New York Times*, February 10, 2023

And these demographers and NGOs have tried every trick in the book to persuade and coerce the Third World to adopt population control policies in their country, including the following. Applying demographic transition theory to demographically unexplored Third World countries and attaching population control to developmentalist discourse to demonstrate that population control is a key to modernization, and development. In addition, conditioning to adopt population control policies on the loan agreements and conducting KAP surveys to demonstrate local unmet demand for contraception have also been widely applied methods to infuse the population control policy to the Third World.

This dissertation, however, refutes the notion that population control is a byproduct of a hegemonic global sphere and that the process has been a one-way diffusion to Third World countries, as these countries also had their own reasons for believing that population reduction would serve to recover or enhance the capability and functionings of their own governing good life.

The second chapter also covers brief analysis of the social, economic, and political obstacles in the twenty countries which adopted family planning laws before 1970 with the following headlines: Traditional Malthusian and eugenic concerns, rapid urbanization, catastrophes and famines, political instability and coups, economic crises, and urgent need for financial assistance, and finally the need for development and modernization. This brief overview from the secondary literature on each of these countries shows that individual developing countries were not alone in their concerns about their own "population problem," as many of these obstacles to the governing good life were shared by vastly different nations even from different continents simultaneously.

The third chapter is dedicated to the national sphere where legislation, investment, and implementation of antinatalist policies took place. For this purpose, the local conditionalities of Turkish case have been analyzed in order to study how the ideology emerges, travels, and expands in the national sphere. The country is also a good representation to explore the entire process in Third World countries world as it already had

many of the common elements mentioned above, such as rapid urbanization, military coup, economic crisis, and ethnic tensions.

Similar to a century earlier in the Western world, public resentment of flooding migrants created fertile ground for the antinatalist discussions in Turkey in the mid-1950s. Early arguments such as rising maternal and infant mortality, urbanization, and its deterioration as it was tracked from the newspapers of the era, this thesis claims, not primarily a consequence of population growth but of the increasing encounters between the locals and the migrants, which deteriorated the life quality of locals, as statistically demonstrated in the example of Istanbul, the center of the migration flow. The potential antinatalist feminist voices regarding the freedom of rights were also tracked through archival sources and no significant evidence was found.

The change in the country's trajectory through the Cold War alliance with the US provided an opportunity to detect potential infusions from the global sphere through aid conditioned to population control. In this regard, foreign mission reports for Turkey, Marshal Aid reports and loan agreements were analyzed. Not a single direct conditionality was identified, except for the loan agreements after the 1958 devaluation, which were tied to the formation of a planning department under the tutelage of developmentalist (and antinatalist) consultants. And thus, SPO was formed in 1960 to prepare the first NDP which included population planning. Yet, consciously, or unconsciously, it was these early reports and aids themselves prioritizing agricultural mechanization, increased road construction and communication that fundamentally transformed the land regime and Turkish society.

The resentment of DP government with the implementation of foreign advisory on population control, so as not to provoke the voters, was abandoned by the military junta of 1960, who were more inclined with the potential Kurdish autonomy, and the acute financial crises that led them to take foreign advisory into consideration.

However, the global and national consensus on population control was seriously challenged by the pronatalist bloc in the parliament and senate, reflecting the public prejudices and the reservations on the

subject. These lengthy debates, which spanned five years in the parliament and in the senate, are meticulously tracked in the parliamentary minutes and explored under the following headings: Malthusian debate, freedom debate, moral ground, development discourse, security discourse, planning and control.

And the political opposition did not cease after the Population Planning Law was promulgated in 1965, as evidenced by the first three months of birth control news, tracked in eight newspapers of the time. The right-wing newspapers were mostly against the law, and the left-wing newspapers supported it. The AP government and its media channels were reluctant to raise the issue to defuse the controversy. Furthermore, the correspondence between Prime Minister Demirel and Rockefeller mentioned in Appendix B is also a good indication of the different perceptions of the global and national spheres.

This complex perception of population control was also evident in the nationwide campaigns and investments particularly in the FPC as the direction of FPC investments did not seem to match contraceptive demand of the public. The regression analysis conducted in this dissertation to measure the impact of the proxies (including metropolitan migration, abortion, TFR, infant mortality rate, development index and Kurdish density) on the FPC investment and IUD usage rates per provincial district indicates that the investment decision of FPC's was based neither on health concerns as been discussed in the parliament, nor on spatial fertility, but on an overall population with a special focus on the "Eastern question." However, the regression on IUD usage rates shows that the individual choice mostly leaned on health and fertility.

The fourth and final chapter covers the individual sphere, women and the family, and their changing fertility and contraceptive behavior in the context of the transformation of the environment and their changing needs and priorities. In that sense, the response of the individual sphere to the population control law promoted by the global sphere and enforced by the national sphere is analyzed.

Census data and demographic studies evidence that fertility rates in Turkey were already on a declining trend by the mid-1950s, as a

reflection of the transformation of the land regime by the agricultural mechanization and increasing transportation and communication. This not only triggered internal migration, but also accelerated the transformation of the family from patriarchal to nuclear, and gradually undermined paternal patronage, a major barrier on women's emancipation.

Moreover, the transition from subsistence farming to a market economy also led to male wage laborers gradually replacing the female labor force, as they found themselves confined to domestic work. In the urban level too, the lack of non-agricultural job opportunities, and the unattractiveness of low-skill, and low-education urban jobs also discouraged urban women from joining the labor market. The gradual withdrawal from agricultural labor, rapid urbanization, and lack of urban job opportunities also reduced the need for child labor and changed the value of children from an asset to a liability, which was another motivation for the reduction in fertility in the individual sphere.

Not only the motivation for birth control, but also the contraceptive methods used by women and the family were quite different from what was propagated by the global and national spheres. Subsequent KAP surveys show that the traditional methods and abortion were still preferred over modern methods, mainly because of religious and cultural prejudices and medical concerns about modern methods, which was also tracked from the newspapers. In addition, financial and organizational incapacities of the governments also had a significant impact on the collapse of the state-sponsored family planning initiation.

However, the extended periodization until the mid-1980s depicts that fertility has declined far beyond the government's most optimistic scenarios. In addition, the use of modern and traditional contraceptives, including abortion, was found to have increased substantially by 1985. The same period also witnessed, a rapid urbanization, exponential increase in women's literacy and education levels (which were still extremely low compared to the industrialized states) and a continuing decline in overall female employment (except for the service sector).

In order to measure the statistical relationship between the decline in fertility and the changing urbanization, women's education, and

employment between 1965 and 1985, a correlation analysis based on provincial districts is carried out in the last part of the fourth chapter. The results reveal that the pace of fertility decline was found to be highly associated with increasing literacy and educational levels, which should also lead to women becoming more accustomed to modern contraceptive methods.

As a final conclusion, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that the transition in population policy in the 1960s from pronatalism to antinatalism in the developing world, and particularly in Turkey, has many dynamics, events, and actors in the global, national, and individual spheres, each of which positioned itself to maximize its capabilities and functioning. Consequently, a change in population policy cannot be reduced down to a single parameter, such as a hegemonic global plot, government legislation, or rhetoric, which could only have the capacity to “tame” the population as long as they respond to improve the capability and functioning of women and the family; the ultimate decision makers on their own reproduction.

Appendix A Population Planning Law (No.557)

I. Basic Provisions

Article 1. Population planning means that individuals can have as many children as they wish, whenever they want to. This can be ensured through preventive measures taken against pregnancy. Castration, sterilization, nor the ending of pregnancies shall not be undergone unless medical necessities require it.

Article 2. Divulging the necessity of Family Planning to the public and the training, education, and application connected with it, shall be carried out with the collaboration of military, official and volunteer organizations according to the regulations prepared by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

For this purpose, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is authorized to establish special organizations and to take measures to distribute freely, or sell at a lower price, or have sold at a lower price to needy, contraceptive materials and drugs.

The quality of drugs and materials to be used in population planning, and the regulation concerning its application shall be determined by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare after receiving the written opinion of a commission which will also include members of the teaching staff of medical schools.

II. Provisions in connection with sterilization and ending pregnancies under medical necessities.

Article 3. The uterus may be evacuated upon a justified medical report based on objective symptoms and given in medical councils authorized by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. In cases in which pregnancy threatens or tends to threaten the mother's life, or the embryo or fetus cannot be developed normally, or in cases which will cause a heavy

infirmity for the child to be born or for the following generations.

The uterus may also be evacuated by an authorized physician who observes the emergency where, if an immediate intervention is not performed, the life or one of the vital organs is threatened.

However, the physician shall notify the provincial directorate of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in cities, and Public Health Officers in towns before intervening, or if not possible inside 24 hours of the intervention, and of its causes.

The basic principles and diseases related with the evacuation of the uterus by intervention can be performed as well as what emergencies consist of, and the form and nature of the notification carried out will be determined by the regulation to be published by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

- Article 4. In case it is medically proved that a women should not be pregnant because of an infirmity or a disease, or a man or woman suffers from a grave inheritable disease, the necessary intervention for the elimination of their ability to procreate without impeding the satisfaction of their sexual needs can be carried out upon a justified report based on objective symptoms given by councils authorized by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. The principles and diseases related with the above-mentioned cases and places where intervention can be performed shall be determined in the regulation mentioned in Article 3.

The intervention performed to cure any disease and causing by their nature castration or sterilization are not subject to this provision.

- Article 5. The intervention mentioned in Article 3 and 4 can be performed upon written consent of the concerned person, if this person is a minor, the consent of his/her parents, or if in the tutorship, the authorization of the Court of Peace is required.

In urgent cases in which authorization from the parent or Court of Peace will take time and a late intervention caused by this loss of time will threaten life or one of the vital organs, permission is not obligatory.

III. Provisions concerning penalties:

Article 6. Individuals who manufacture, or sell, or distribute in any manner, or who import for commercial reasons, or for this reason have in their possession drugs and materials are not approved as contraceptives by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare according to Article 2 of this law shall be punished by imprisonment for seven months to two years and be fined 2,000 TL to 10,000 TL (heavy fine) their factories shall be closed, and their drugs and means shall be confiscated.

The drugs and means which are approved as contraceptives by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare according to Article 2 of this law shall be advertised in accordance with Article 13 of Law 1262. Those who do not abide shall be punished by imprisonment from one to six months and be fined 500 TL to 2,000 TL (heavy fine)

Article 7. Those who commit acts which oppose articles 3,4 and 5 of this law shall be fined from 500 TL to 1,000 TL (heavy fine), unless a more severe is not provided by the Turkish Criminal Code and other laws containing penal provisions.

Article 8. The provisions concerning the increase of population (birth) of the first paragraph of Article 3; the words of "contraceptive or" which are at the beginning of Article 152 and Article 156 of the Law of Public Hygiene are abolished.

Article 9. Paragraph 2 of Article 471 of the Turkish Criminal Code (Law No.765) amended by Law No.3036, shall be amended as follows;

Those who encourage the acts mentioned in the first paragraph (of Article 471) or to make propaganda for the same purpose, shall be punished by imprisonment up to one year or shall be fined up to 1,000 TL. If the above-


mentioned act is committed with the aim of making profit, these two punishments shall be pronounced concurrently.

Note: This means any person who promotes male or female sterilization or who consents are subject to this penalty. Means no vasectomy unless a doctor can certify for medical reasons.

Article 10. Article 1 and Article 2 of this law are to be effective (in force) on the date of the official publication. The other provisions are in effect three months after official publication.

Article 11. This law will be administrated by the Council of Ministers.

Appendix B Correspondences between John D. Rockefeller 3rd and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel on International Family Planning



DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

- 2 -

possible step must be taken to further the effort.

My warmest best wishes and expressions of highest esteem.

Sincerely yours,


John D. Rockefeller 3rd

H. E. Süleyman
Prime Minister of Turkey
Secretariat of the Prime Minister
Ankara, Turkey

030	01			9	52	1

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TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

A4

January 7, 1967

Dear Mr. Rockefeller,

The effort and time you have devoted to the challenge created by the danger of population growth is undoubtedly worthy of the highest praise and the most sincere admiration.

I do not need to reaffirm that your objectives are fully shared by my Government and that the goal you pursue totally conforms with ours. The Turkish Government has been one of the handful that speedily recognized the urgency of this vital problem and the Turkish State took its place among the very first to enact a law and thus open the way for actual measures. The implementation of this law has been and will continue to be one of the most important tasks of my Government.

However, I feel that there exists considerable difference between methods to be adopted on a national level and those to be chosen in the international field. Our position is clear, we are for national and international family planning. Yet, I feel strongly that achievement of this aspiration in the international level should be realized through the medium of an international forum representing the consensus of a majority of nations, i.e. the United Nations Organisation. Apparently the time is not yet ripe for such a venture.

On the other hand, I am inclined to think that declarations by a comparatively small group

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ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

- 2 -

carry with them the danger of furthering the controversy already existing with regard to this very sensitive problem.

Patient efforts within the framework of the United Nations' various bodies towards a gradual but sure achievement of a favorable consensus on the necessity and urgency of World-wide population planning will, in my opinion, serve better our common purpose.

With my above expressed thoughts you will agree with me that my not having joined the signatories of the declaration of concern and conviction about the population problem, indicates only a difference of views as to the best method to be pursued rather than a disagreement and hence should not be taken as a cause for disappointment.

In reiterating my admiration and full hearted support of your objectives, I should like to extend to you my warm wishes and expression of esteem.

Sincerely

Süleyman Demirel

Mr. John D. Rockefeller 3rd,
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10020

030	01			9	52	1

TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10020

Room 5600


January 31, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of January 7th regarding the World Leaders' Statement on Population was most appreciated. I was disappointed at your decision, but I am understanding of the considerations which lay behind it. I was hoping that the role which the Secretary General of the United Nations played in announcing the declaration might satisfy our common aspirations that international family planning should be realized through the medium of an international forum. It was, I believe, quite significant that a few days after the public announcement of this declaration the Second Committee of the United Nations passed unanimously a resolution on population growth and economic development. I was pleased to see that your country was one of the co-sponsors of that resolution.

Your commitment to the philosophy of family planning which you expressed to me in your letter is most heartening. I believe that if world leaders will have the courage and determination which you have shown in supporting a national family-planning program in your country, then and only then will significant progress be made in achieving a life of quality for all mankind.

Sincerely,


John D. Rockefeller 3rd

H.E. Mr. Suleyman Demirel
Prime Minister of Turkey
Secretariat of the Prime Minister
Ankara, Turkey

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-5-

Appendix C The FPC investment and IUD insertions per Provincial Districts

PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	NUMBER OF FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS (FPC) 1971	NUMBER OF IUD INSERTIONS	POPULATION 1965	NUMBER OF ABORTIONS 1868	NUMBER OF METROPOLITAN MIGRATION	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS)	DEVELOPMENT INDEX 1965	KURDISH SPEAKING POPULATION 1956
ADANA	13	4,277	902,712	5.449	16,166	7.1	125	167	7,913
ADIYAMAN	6	193	267,288	1.554	1,990	8.0	139	44	124,030
AFYON	3	262	502,248	2.956	18,146	6.9	180	62	126
AĞRI	9	1,704	246,961	1.563	4,123	9.2	148	40	156,320
AMASYA	2	3,612	285,729	2.870	11,408	5.7	206	96	2,181
ANKARA	27	31,400	1,644,302	43.055	-	5.5	147	259	36,819
ANTALYA	7	4,334	486,910	2.034	14,809	6.7	112	101	23
ARTVİN	2	1,521	210,065	1.686	12,979	6.2	161	67	46
AYDIN	14	1,190	524,918	4.865	19,532	4.8	131	140	170
BALIKESİR	9	2,890	708,342	5.233	43,734	4.8	148	101	568
BİLECİK	1	103	139,041	919	10,534	4.7	169	78	5
BİNGÖL	4	261	150,521	635	4,487	9.4	150	33	87,809
BİTLİS	5	214	154,069	918	4,066	10.1	136	47	94,406
BOLU	7	1,113	383,939	2.667	31,967	5.7	152	85	363
BURDUR	2	2,598	194,950	714	4,800	5.8	138	80	8
BURSA	14	5,037	755,504	7.060	43,608	4.5	158	128	213
ÇANAKKALE	4	127	350,317	2.289	28,238	4.5	136	89	468
ÇANKIRI	2	1,205	250,706	1.510	53,733	7.1	184	61	163
ÇORUM	2	2,067	485,567	3.345	38,078	6.7	208	63	8,733
DENİZLİ	8	3,446	463,369	1.665	18,762	5.7	140	84	288
DİYARBAKIR	17	582	475,916	3.934	9,564	8.6	139	67	294,056
EDİRNE	8	2,389	303,254	2.633	32,996	5.2	177	87	407
ELAZIĞ	6	2,789	322,727	2.737	19,296	7.9	166	102	78,385
ERZİNCAN	7	656	258,586	1.053	57,632	7.7	169	72	14,521
ERZURUM	14	4,995	628,001	3.133	40,889	7.3	213	69	71,834
ESKİŞEHİR	3	1,734	415,101	3.182	24,574	5.7	171	146	327
GAZİANTEP	4	1,861	511,026	4.688	13,749	6.9	133	108	19,955
GİRESUN	7	2,855	428,015	3.363	58,917	7.3	113	68	304
GÜMÜŞHANE	0	1,199	262,731	2.044	29,064	6.8	179	45	2,189
HAKKARİ	3	298	83,937	336	310	10.6	139	36	72,365
HATAY	4	1,098	506,134	3.133	6,751	7.7	114	122	5,702
İSPARTA	4	1,328	266,240	1.203	21,202	5.9	144	87	716
İÇEL	4	1,049	511,273	3.496	10,630	6.5	132	129	1,090
İSTANBUL	40	15,086	2,293,823	41.368	-	3.0	131	348	2,612
İZMİR	21	6,099	1,234,667	15.352	-	4.0	126	212	868
KARS	13	2,831	606,313	3.039	30,415	8.8	192	55	134,136
KASTAMONU	3	218	441,638	3.063	85,091	5.4	161	63	1,090
KAYSERİ	5	9,203	536,206	4.653	45,785	7.4	164	103	8,462

TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

KIRKLARELİ	4	659	258,386	1.800	28,798	5.1	178	103	626
PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	NUMBER OF FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS (FPC) 1971	NUMBER OF IUD INSERTIONS	POPULATION 1965	NUMBER OF ABORTIONS 1968	NUMBER OF METROPOLITAN MIGRATION	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS)	DEVELOPMENT INDEX 1965	KURDISH SPEAKING POPULATION
KOCAELİ	8	1,157	335,518	1.368	21,742	5.0	137	172	245
KONYA	20	6,222	1,122,622	3.431	49,929	7.4	159	93	27,815
KÜTAHYA	5	548	398,081	9.376	11,020	4.8	178	75	107
MALATYA	12	2,585	452,624	3.034	32,904	8.1	135	82	77,804
MANİSA	14	1,701	748,545	2.337	40,153	4.9	141	105	241
MARAŞ	1	874	438,423	5.643	6,486	8.0	131	60	46,458
MARDİN	4	101	397,880	2.016	6,633	8.7	129	47	265,388
MUĞLA	10	2,872	334,973	1.910	11,097	5.7	92	90	7
MUŞ	10	219	198,716	1.162	2,319	9.6	143	44	83,527
NEVŞEHİR	6	6,094	203,316	1.337	20,449	7.5	142	82	22
NİĞDE	11	5,312	362,444	1.297	20,942	7.8	157	67	8,991
ORDU	3	7	543,863	2.487	31,592	7.5	121	72	12
RİZE	4	774	281,099	4.865	50,050	7.1	101	82	12
SAKARYA	2	517	404,078	3.111	21,317	5.7	127	121	2,166
SAMSUN	11	5,180	755,946	3.952	22,402	6.5	147	113	1,366
ŞİRT	7	282	264,832	7.085	8,014	9.0	134	68	179,507
ŞİNOP	1	50	266,069	1.967	32,550	6.3	124	56	2,126
SİVAS	7	1,219	705,186	1.820	88,367	7.4	170	66	52,307
TEKİRDAĞ	10	322	287,381	4.588	38,974	5.1	142	94	566
TOKAT	4	157	495,352	2.067	20,704	7.0	174	81	3,974
TRABZON	5	3,109	595,782	3.143	53,656	7.2	96	77	72
TUNCELİ	7	28	154,175	4.151	6,630	9.4	123	39	33,438
URFA	4	366	450,798	642	8,579	8.2	118	56	192,017
UŞAK	3	386	190,536	2.370	11,991	5.7	164	88	16
VAN	13	1,263	266,840	1.545	4,263	9.5	127	41	147,697
YOZGAT	1	1,364	437,883	1.236	37,121	7.5	149	49	2,427
ZONGULDAK	6	4,694	650,191	2.704	22,365	5.9	124	158	43

Appendix D Fertility rate per Provincial Districts “1965”

PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	POPULATION 1965	URBAN POPULATION 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE LITERATES 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 1965	TOTAL FEMALE OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE SERVICE OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATION 1965
ADANA	7,1	902.712	422.298	115.865	52.401	4.900	103.646	96.326	3.231	2.109
ADİYAMAN	8,0	267.288	51.463	6.732	2.352	100	51.519	51.073	166	100
AFYON	6,9	502.248	125.102	56.961	31.373	875	100.208	97.574	609	868
AĞRI	9,2	246.961	53.420	8.062	2.936	244	44.346	43.857	204	35
AMASYA	5,7	285.729	83.016	35.063	17.646	703	52.643	51.391	616	139
ANKARA	5,5	1.644.302	1.069.761	313.996	139.519	30.258	161.694	131.426	21.932	1.921
ANTALYA	6,7	486.910	129.657	64.178	33.620	1.342	85.670	83.182	1.061	678
ARTVİN	6,2	210.065	30.068	31.610	16.692	240	48.758	48.202	248	72
AYDIN	4,8	524.918	165.953	85.485	45.107	1.663	85.489	79.329	1.937	1.782
BALIKESİR	4,8	708.342	230.353	119.716	68.148	2.178	123.459	118.613	2.107	848
BİLECİK	4,7	139.041	36.356	29.178	16.732	309	29.171	28.254	300	197
BİNGÖL	9,4	150.521	20.401	6.936	2.486	96	29.060	28.874	105	12
BİTLİS	10,1	154.069	43.813	5.225	1.905	164	24.155	23.832	146	38
BOLU	5,7	383.939	70.459	47.832	22.716	875	81.245	79.620	836	220
BURDUR	5,8	194.950	54.135	31.532	18.095	382	38.403	36.138	412	517
BURSA	4,5	755.504	335.048	146.818	78.441	3.144	121.097	111.062	2.926	4.502
ÇANAKKALE	4,5	350.317	81.753	68.890	37.020	974	67.116	64.589	1.045	472
ÇANKIRI	7,1	250.706	43.731	27.777	13.656	335	57.859	57.328	327	42
ÇORUM	6,7	485.567	97.032	40.923	18.727	476	103.533	102.469	498	101
DENİZLİ	5,7	463.369	117.739	66.333	35.858	1.010	84.483	75.850	1.004	1.431
DİYARBAKIR	8,6	475.916	162.467	19.914	8.289	1.197	74.172	72.763	937	98
EDİRNE	5,2	303.254	102.171	59.344	30.075	1.184	53.061	51.128	1.119	188
ELAZIĞ	7,9	322.727	106.180	24.945	10.242	828	48.523	47.401	659	100
ERZİNCAN	7,7	258.586	57.397	28.442	13.507	543	49.184	48.275	401	135
ERZURUM	7,3	628.001	152.183	47.937	21.360	1.487	118.495	116.210	1.193	185
ESKİŞEHİR	5,7	415.101	200.332	93.202	54.585	2.684	55.036	51.766	1.901	535
GAZİANTEP	6,9	511.026	244.215	34.840	13.598	1.371	64.152	61.409	1.509	310
GİRESUN	7,3	428.015	75.069	25.743	9.561	528	91.344	89.338	610	565
GÜMÜŞHANE	6,8	262.731	31.957	23.149	10.284	266	60.919	60.248	238	69
HAKKARİ	10,6	83.937	14.132	967	320	38	15.007	14.865	41	9
HATAY	7,7	506.134	203.610	43.822	16.241	1.868	62.691	59.901	1.337	425
İSPARTA	5,9	266.240	96.551	40.240	22.728	713	47.055	36.427	601	2.148
İÇEL	6,5	511.273	189.382	77.818	36.139	2.189	72.061	68.383	1.796	1.034
İSTANBUL	3,0	2.293.823	1.792.071	620.319	309.355	55.985	109.971	32.921	37.078	26.705
İZMİR	4,0	1.234.667	621.553	272.618	144.157	17.365	143.406	112.547	10.197	15.222
KARS	8,8	606.313	117.363	43.357	18.004	740	118.611	117.123	733	82
KASTAMONU	5,4	441.638	67.163	40.163	18.651	606	112.958	111.512	674	168
KAYSERİ	7,4	536.206	191.221	63.035	29.606	1.235	77.395	70.624	1.013	969
KIRKLARELİ	5,1	258.386	85.856	60.124	31.367	1.039	43.700	41.871	906	285

TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	POPULATION 1965	URBAN POPULATION 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE LITERATES 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES 1965	NUMBER OF FEMALE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 1965	TOTAL FEMALE OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE SERVICE OCCUPATION 1965	TOTAL FEMALE INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATION 1965
KIRŞEHİR	8,5	196.836	42.000	21.932	8.993	330	36.066	35.120	296	52
KOCAELİ	5,0	335.518	136.531	55.030	27.145	2.245	46.693	43.587	1.204	1.121
KONYA	7,4	1.122.622	354.578	152.454	81.651	2.375	188.085	183.056	1.919	902
KÜTAHYA	4,8	398.081	87.084	47.799	24.681	873	82.914	80.233	615	242
MALATYA	8,1	452.624	147.040	38.694	15.653	1.017	72.778	71.139	639	472
MANİSA	4,9	748.545	265.857	115.763	64.055	2.183	132.410	121.543	1.840	996
MARAŞ	8,0	438.423	105.090	24.702	9.779	611	75.163	74.043	519	118
MARDİN	8,7	397.880	90.093	10.699	3.941	364	72.711	72.066	357	49
MUĞLA	5,7	334.973	59.330	60.955	36.672	748	66.854	64.508	851	196
MUŞ	9,6	198.716	32.503	6.623	2.345	190	37.556	37.154	183	20
NEVŞEHİR	7,5	203.316	46.710	27.679	14.306	378	40.742	40.009	270	27
NİĞDE	7,8	362.444	69.956	35.519	14.419	685	66.562	63.363	715	99
ORDU	7,5	543.863	83.585	31.242	13.160	674	117.996	115.996	640	413
RİZE	7,1	281.099	63.554	25.876	10.083	374	60.868	59.576	406	141
SAKARYA	5,7	404.078	124.936	70.835	36.383	1.241	66.718	64.460	1.039	497
SAMSUN	6,5	755.946	197.103	66.661	31.038	2.084	150.279	142.012	2.085	4.532
ŞİİRT	9,0	264.832	75.520	7.369	2.845	279	42.357	41.952	202	22
ŞİNOP	6,3	266.069	38.068	30.117	14.889	386	63.991	63.282	400	88
SİVAS	7,4	705.186	168.685	56.604	22.424	1.081	140.890	138.785	1.000	179
TEKİRDAĞ	5,1	287.381	96.897	60.048	30.764	1.014	50.393	48.879	767	124
TOKAT	7,0	495.352	123.403	44.363	21.647	740	101.996	100.442	832	155
TRABZON	7,2	595.782	108.492	43.622	15.310	1.170	123.318	119.393	1.105	597
TUNCELİ	9,4	154.175	23.240	11.748	4.103	131	29.888	29.663	151	7
URFA	8,2	450.798	150.383	13.932	5.389	456	70.590	69.750	423	70
UŞAK	5,7	190.536	57.133	24.826	12.494	410	35.493	33.653	396	439
VAN	9,5	266.840	60.686	8.623	3.185	397	45.038	44.551	286	18
YOZGAT	7,5	437.883	67.466	35.229	17.291	395	98.109	97.522	346	39
ZONGULDAK	5,9	650.191	157.463	74.906	35.043	2.278	109.278	105.989	1.574	488

Appendix E Fertility rate per Provincial Districts “1985”

PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	POPULATION 1985	URBAN POPULATION 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE LITERATES 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 1985	TOTAL FEMALE OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE SERVICE OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATION 1985
ADANA	5,3	1.485.743	876.752	479.243	261.408	39.710	103.646	96.326	3.231	2.109
ADİYAMAN	8,9	367.595	116.986	81.527	39.832	2.514	51.519	51.073	166	100
AFYON	4,6	596.878	191.298	199.373	127.351	8.791	100.208	97.574	609	868
AĞRI	10,5	368.009	108.414	60.618	26.059	1.976	44.346	43.857	204	35
AMASYA	4,5	341.287	128.077	105.685	66.139	5.209	52.643	51.391	616	139
ANKARA	3,6	2.855.283	2.299.010	1.130.372	575.319	152.343	161.694	131.426	21.932	1.921
ANTALYA	3,8	748.706	296.775	278.154	177.465	18.322	85.670	83.182	1.061	678
ARTVİN	4,5	228.997	46.502	71.065	45.288	3.192	48.758	48.202	248	72
AYDIN	3,3	652.488	245.329	233.843	149.596	14.499	85.489	79.329	1.937	1.782
BALIKESİR	3,1	853.177	344.368	288.175	185.321	18.192	123.459	118.613	2.107	848
BİLECİK	3,3	147.001	56.981	52.511	35.996	2.389	29.171	28.254	300	197
BİNGÖL	9,8	228.702	54.997	42.535	21.514	1.102	29.060	28.874	105	12
BİTLİS	9,9	257.908	93.757	43.404	19.525	1.337	24.155	23.832	146	38
BOLU	4,0	471.751	113.569	162.477	98.417	7.491	81.245	79.620	836	220
BURDUR	3,3	235.009	85.016	83.926	54.294	4.417	38.403	36.138	412	517
BURSA	3,3	1.148.791	679.401	443.819	281.031	29.357	121.097	111.062	2.926	4.502
ÇANAKKALE	3,0	391.568	126.703	134.499	89.021	6.988	67.116	64.589	1.045	472
ÇANKIRI	5,0	259.928	69.325	80.054	51.982	3.468	57.859	57.328	327	42
ÇORUM	5,5	569.523	167.273	169.291	105.231	4.136	103.533	102.469	498	101
DENİZLİ	3,7	603.338	205.938	201.322	126.583	12.222	84.483	75.850	1.004	1.431
DİYARBAKIR	9,0	778.150	378.578	121.884	50.178	9.056	74.172	72.763	937	98
EDİRNE	2,9	363.286	153.236	122.148	76.245	8.975	53.061	51.128	1.119	188
ELAZIĞ	6,2	440.808	195.017	112.922	60.220	7.376	48.523	47.401	659	100
ERZİNCAN	5,3	282.296	95.228	81.324	49.867	4.280	49.184	48.275	401	135
ERZURUM	7,5	801.809	285.182	196.736	113.881	9.761	118.495	116.210	1.193	185
ESKİŞEHİR	3,2	544.033	346.049	214.459	133.423	17.935	55.036	51.766	1.901	535
GAZİANTEP	6,9	808.697	512.918	228.941	117.168	10.444	64.152	61.409	1.509	310
GİRESUN	5,2	480.083	127.111	133.440	72.498	7.128	91.344	89.338	610	565
GÜMÜŞHANE	5,9	275.191	51.404	80.936	52.534	2.218	60.919	60.248	238	69
HAKKARİ	9,6	155.463	44.118	14.297	6.006	549	15.007	14.865	41	9
HATAY	6,0	856.271	366.550	273.395	142.177	17.313	62.691	59.901	1.337	425
İSPARTA	3,8	350.116	158.251	124.426	79.387	7.487	47.055	36.427	601	2.148
İÇEL	4,6	843.931	429.897	320.524	188.940	23.601	72.061	68.383	1.796	1.034
İSTANBUL	3,3	4.741.890	4.514.249	2.017.745	1.075.986	250.028	109.971	32.921	37.078	26.705
İZMİR	3,1	1.976.763	1.485.630	781.076	443.215	83.155	143.406	112.547	10.197	15.222
KARS	8,0	700.238	172.119	174.308	93.142	6.891	118.611	117.123	733	82
KASTAMONU	4,5	450.360	99.680	121.572	76.107	4.582	112.958	111.512	674	168
KAYSERİ	5,2	778.383	407.404	257.269	156.007	13.339	77.395	70.624	1.013	969
KIRKLARELİ	3,0	283.408	118.849	96.940	61.603	7.007	43.700	41.871	906	285

TAMING DEMOGRAPHY

PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN)	POPULATION 1985	URBAN POPULATION 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE LITERATES 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES 1985	NUMBER OF FEMALE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 1985	TOTAL FEMALE OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE SERVICE OCCUPATION 1985	TOTAL FEMALE INDUSTRIAL OCCUPATION 1985
KIRŞEHİR	4,9	240.497	83.965	79.466	49.713	4.160	36.066	35.120	296	52
KOCAELİ	3,9	596.600	322.244	245.498	144.343	17.410	46.693	43.587	1.204	1.121
KONYA	5,0	1.562.546	693.983	554.752	371.284	22.346	188.085	183.056	1.919	902
KÜTAHYA	3,7	497.089	162.031	166.592	111.889	5.907	82.914	80.233	615	242
MALATYA	6,0	606.996	266.379	167.090	91.150	10.087	72.778	71.139	639	472
MANİSA	3,6	941.941	407.254	316.533	210.248	15.278	132.410	121.543	1.840	996
MARAŞ	7,1	738.032	281.382	194.334	103.666	7.990	75.163	74.043	519	118
MARDİN	9,5	564.967	192.085	72.348	29.854	3.180	72.711	72.066	357	49
MUĞLA	3,2	438.145	111.769	161.143	106.995	9.791	66.854	64.508	851	196
MUŞ	10,3	302.406	71.593	46.636	21.975	1.534	37.556	37.154	183	20
NEVŞEHİR	4,5	256.933	80.407	88.056	55.931	3.531	40.742	40.009	270	27
NİĞDE	5,9	512.071	146.141	153.140	86.038	6.459	66.562	63.363	715	99
ORDU	5,5	713.535	169.820	200.766	113.814	9.045	117.996	115.996	640	413
RİZE	4,6	361.258	96.206	110.765	66.924	4.817	60.868	59.576	406	141
SAKARYA	4,1	548.747	206.094	194.584	124.133	8.925	66.718	64.460	1.039	497
SAMSUN	5,0	1.008.113	345.200	327.284	186.481	17.070	150.279	142.012	2.085	4.532
ŞİİRT	9,7	445.483	183.804	68.670	26.620	2.514	42.357	41.952	202	22
SİNOP	5,8	276.464	57.443	81.663	50.568	3.201	63.991	63.282	400	88
SİVAS	6,2	749.610	273.215	205.775	117.279	9.498	140.890	138.785	1.000	179
TEKİRDAĞ	3,2	360.742	167.270	128.442	83.685	7.736	50.393	48.879	767	124
TOKAT	5,5	624.768	200.231	186.471	113.911	6.799	101.996	100.442	832	155
TRABZON	4,8	731.045	186.580	236.553	126.575	14.858	123.318	119.393	1.105	597
TUNCELİ	6,8	157.974	36.184	38.176	20.928	2.159	29.888	29.663	151	7
URFA	9,0	602.736	305.741	89.107	40.068	4.103	70.590	69.750	423	70
UŞAK	3,8	247.224	103.474	80.344	49.840	4.483	35.493	33.653	396	439
VAN	10,0	468.646	157.214	67.124	29.448	3.287	45.038	44.551	286	18
YOZGAT	6,0	504.433	124.825	145.384	92.224	4.055	98.109	97.522	346	39
ZONGULDAK	4,7	955.098	312.843	317.854	187.765	15.432	109.278	105.989	1.574	488

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