"INTERPRETATIVE" APPROACHES TO EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ACTION

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P R E F A C E

The study in hand attempts a critical appraisal of "interpretative understanding" of human action as a viable sociological method of analysis and explanation of human social conduct. More specifically, it aims to elucidate the nature and significance of the concept of "subjective meaning" - which is central to interpretative thought - for sociological studies of human phenomena.

While the study accomplishes one of its tasks, i.e., the survey of interpretative approaches to explanation of human action in a relatively simple and straight forward manner through a secondary exposotion of the relevant literature in Part I, the critical evaluation of the works included in this part poses certain difficulties for the contents and organization of the remaining sections. This is due to a number of reasons: Firstly and most importantly, the lack of intersubjectively agreed criteria of evaluation in the social sciences makes it difficult to choose a set of criteria by which to judge the "legitimacy" of a method or the "validity" ar "adequacy" of a model of explanation. For any such choice requires justification, and as anyone who is acquainted with methodological debates in the social sciences is

certain to attest, some of those justifications are of a philosophical order. The consequence of this for the present context is that the study finds it difficult to confine itself strictly to "science", without occasionally embarking upon the "perilious waters of philosophy". This is also brought about by the fact that some schools of thought included in Part I belong mainly in the domain of philosophy. Even though much care has been taken to strip off their specific implications for sociological understanding and explanation of human action from the broad philosophical contexts in which they were embedded, there still remains a distinct philosophical flavor to most of the writings included in Part I.

On the other hand, a profound understanding and critique of interpretative approaches require an adequate knowledge of positivism in sociology and philosophy. For it is generally argued that interpretative approaches stand in opposition to positivistic or positivistically inclined schools of thought in these disciplines. In fact, all sociologists and philosophers included in Part I explicitly confront the question of the "adequacy of positivistic conceptions and models of explanation of human action and, not too infrequently, come up with answers that are not very sympathetic to the positivistic position on this issue, but this of course does not by itself render the above argument, plausible. For there are also those who are equally convinced of the compatibility of the two and put forward arguments which are not totally unwelcomed in certain academic circles. The study partly addresses itself to this question, i.e., to the question of the

compatabilty of positivistic and interpretative models and methods of explanation of human action, but whatever the conclusion is, it is necessary that interpretative approaches be understood and evaluated in relation to positivistic schools of thought in social theory. Hence, a section on positivistic thought is included in Part II.

The term "positivism", however, seems to have no fixed or agreed meaning for scientists and philosophers. Especially in the recent past, the word "positivist" has become more of a derogatory label than a descriptive concept. Consequently, there has been a sharp decrease in the number of self-acclaimed positivists among social scientists and philosophers despite positivistic tendencies in philosophy and social sciences. Hence, prior to the questioning of the compatibility of positivistic and interpretative thought with special regard to explanation of human action, it is necessary to show in what sense this term is used here and whether there are positivistic tendencies in sociology. For this purpose, Durkheim's theory of suicide and the basic teachings of logical empricism are analysed and compared for parallels. The choice of Durkheim's work is justified by its influence upon prominent schools of present day sociology. Especially in the English speaking world, it is widely recognized that Durkheim's influence overrides that of any other theorist in the field. Hence, the positivistic nature of present day academic sociology is elucidated through an analysis of Durkheim's work. Further justifications for this choice are offered in Part II. On the other hand, the choice of logical empricism is justifie

by the fact that this school of thought in philosophy offers a more sophisticated version of nineteenth century positivism, especially on the issue of "criteria of evaluation" which is immediately relavent to the problems of this study. After the parallels between the two are shown, the term "positivistic" is used without further qualification to refer to the overlapping themes between Durkheim's and logical empricists' writings included in Part II. The points of conflict and overlap between positivistic and interpretative approaches to explanation of human action are explored later. In view of the contents of Parts II and III it can be said that the study in hand is as much a study of positivistic tendencies in sociology and philosophy as it is of interpretative approaches to explanation of human action. As has been said above, this is necessitated by the nature of the problem.

Actually, what is simply referred to as interpretative approaches above consits of a diversity of schools of thought in sociology and philosophy which reflect a shared concern with problems of meaning, language and reflexivity in relation to understanding and explanation of human action. Part I is a secondary exposition of the works which are designated under this name, i.e., "interpretative approaches" or "interpretative sociologies" in recent literature. The section on Max Weber might seem relatively long compared to the other sections on interpretative thinkers in Part I. This is partly brought about by the fact that Weber's interpretative sociology anticipates much of what has been said subsequently on interpretative understanding of human action.

Hence, the section on his work is not only meant as a secondary exposition of the relevant aspects of his interpretative sociology, but also as a general orientation to the works that follow. On the other hand, an adequate understanding of Weber's arguments presupposes familiarity with the nineteenth century traditions of idealistic and positivistic thought as his efforts were mainly devoted to the reconcilation of the conflict between the two. Hence, the major strands of both traditions of thought are briefly summarized in the section on Weber which also accounts for its larger share in the scope of Part I. Part II attempts to abstract an "ideal-typical" model and method of positivistic explanation of human empricists which is necessary for the comparison of positivistic and interpretative approaches in Part III. In Part II, the affiliation of Durkheim's work with the basic teachings of positivistic philosophy is shown. Finally, Part III attempts a critical evaluation of interpretative sociologies with reference to a number of positivistic and interpretative criteria.

P A R T I

"INTERPRETATIVE" APPROACHES: AN OVERVIEW

A. INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF MAX WEBER

Weber's interpretative sociology is generally considered as a bridge, or a work of synthesis between the apparently irreconcilable traditions of idealistic and positivistic thought. In order to elicit the points of articulation of both worlds in in Weber's thought, and to demonstrate the extent to which his work has been able to transcend the chronic conflict between the two, a few of the major strands of the idealistic tradition of thought and some of its focal points of conflict with the positivistic tradition which are particflarly relevant to the problems of the present study will be noted below. This section is also meant as a general orientation to the problems and tasks of interpretative understanding of human action.[1]

The Kantian dualism, which lays down a sharp distinction between the world of nature and the world of men, and between man as physical body and man as spritual being is perhaps the major and the most persistent strain of German idealistic thought. This scheme of radical dualism reduces all phenomenal aspects of man to an "emprical" basis and draws a sharp distinction between this and his spiritual life.[2] In the idealistic tradition, the pheno-

menal aspects of man, especially the biological, belongs in the sphere of nature, of phenomena and of determinism, whereas his spritual life belongs in the sphere of freedom, of ideas and of geist (cultural totality). The ultimate reality of the latter sphere lays in "spirit" and "idea" and the determining factors of human spritual life are found on this level. It goes without saying that the facts of human spiritual life are irreducable to the facts and terms of the physical world.

In the idealistic tradition, the Kantian dualism finds its most acute expression in the distniction between natural sciences and the sciences of culture or mind. Idealists maintain that the spiritual world of man cannot be dealt with by the science of the phenomenal world (natural sciences) nor even by their enelytical and generalizing methods. For in this sphere man is not subject to law in the physical sense, but is "free". And in so far as he is free "... from determination by circumstances of his particular acts".[3] He is also "unique". That is: "A corollary of human freedom is the unique individuality of all human events, in so far as they are 'spiritual'."[4]

The above conception of man and his spiritual world naturally disposes Kantians to a certain "particularistic" mode of treatment of human acts, in which the notion of the uniqueness of the particular human individual and his freedom from physical determination finds its ultimate expression. For this mode of analysis not only dispenses with the general analytical system of theory, but also with the notion of causality which, as far as the

idealistic conception of it goes, is tantamount to that of determinism. This being so, history becomes the only avenue to full and legitimate knowledge in the field of cultural sciences. That is "... since things human can be understood only in terms of concrete individuality of the specific historical case", "It is a corollary that all the important things cannot be known from a limited number of cases, but each must be known by and for itself."[5] This, perhaps among other things, can be said to have, provided the impetus for the monumental works of German historical scholarship.

This, however, is not the only trend of idealistic social thought. Perhaps equally predominant is the branch of idealism which is alternatively referred to as "objectivism" (Hegel), "historical relativism". or "historicism" (Dilthey) in the literature. Instead of being treated by and for itself, an individual human act or complex of action in this branch of idealism is "... interpreted as a mode of expression, or manifestation of a "sprit" (geist) sharing this quality with multitudinious other acts of the same and other individuals."[6] That is, its emphasis is not on individual events or acts as such, but on the totality of a cultural system which constitutes their unity. However, the notion of the uniqueness and individuality of the specific individual case is preserved intact under this branch of idealism, despite its tendency of arranging human acts in relation to a totality of a cultural system or geist. For the unifying concept under which various modes of expression (ideas, acts, symbols, etc.) are subsumed is a unique Geist or a specific cultural tota-

not a general law or an analytical concept."[7] The Kantian dualism which lays down a sharp distinction between the world of nature and the world of spirits or ideas is also maintained in this trend of idealistic thought and also made the basis of the distinction between the sciences of the phenomenal world and the sciences of the mind or culture.

As regards the relations of the elements of a cultural totality to one another and to the cultural totality as a whole, idealists maintain that these relations are of a "meaning ful" order. That is, the "ideal" reality consists of a complex of elements mutually related to one another and to the cultural system as a whole and these relations are of a radically different character from the "causal" relations of the phenomenal world. In the first place, meaningful relations are timeless, whereas causal relations involve processes in time (two entities are causally related if, other things being equal, a change in one is followed by a change in another) or to put if differently, meaningful relations are atemporal. Secondly, meaningful relations are not relations between isolated elements of a system, whereas causal relations involve conjunctions between isolated elements of cause and effect. Thirdly, meaningful relations do not "condition" or "necessitate" actions in the same sense that causal relations necessitate the occurence of events in the natural world. That is, "... they express relations between elements and aspects of an ideal toward which action is oriented",[8] and it is only in this sense that they can be said to condition actions. To take Parsons' example, in playing a musical theme,

there is nothing in the conditions of his situation to prevent the pianist from striking a wrong note, what prevents him is his effort to conform his action to the normative "requiredness" of the correct musical theme.[9] And on the level of methodology, the distinction between causal and meaningful relations finds its reflection in the distinction between "causal theoretical explanation" and "interpretation of meaning". But since this distinction will be one of the main concerns of this study, perhaps a few further remarks on this issue are in order.

Actually, it was Dilthey who first gave explicit formulation to the factors and operations that accounted for the distinction between the methods of the natural sciences and it's mainly through his work that this distinction became standard for historians and to a certain extent for social scientists. On the other hand, the concept of "verstehen" which is central to idealistic social thought, and which will appear time and again in this paper, owes more perhaps to Dilthey than anyone else. And finally, it was mainly through Dilthey's work that Weber was influenced by the idealistic thinking of his time. Hence, the nature of the concept of Verstehen will be clarified with reference to Dilthey's formulation of it.

According to Dilthey, what distinguishes natural sciences from the sciences of culture is their quest for general analytical systems of theory, and their method of observation from without. Cultural sciences, in contrast to natural sciences, concern themselves with the historical, the non-recurrent and

the particular, and they deal with their material in some sort of an inner understanding, verstehen. The method of the natural sciences is totally irrelevant to the sciences of culture, for in the field of human affairs understanding involves intuition - a direct grasp of meaning without the intervention of general concepts or laws of any form. On the other hand, it is also illegitimate to break down the cultural totality to its elements for analytical purposes, for the elements in a cultural totality stand in mutual relations to one another. As has been noted before, these relations are of a meaningful character: the ideal reality is a complex of meanings. And "In so far as these" "meanings" can be said to have an emprical spatiotemporal "existence" at all, it is "in the mind"."[10] Since the method of external observation cannot provide the "inner" knowledge we need of spiritual life, knowledge in the field of cultural sciences should be derived through some kind of internal process-through living experience and understanding (verstehen) rather than merely externally. Hence, the peculiar character of the ideal reality precludes the method of observation from without and causal explanation. Understanding in cultural sciences involve interpretation of meaning: an entity is "verstanden" when it is given a place in a system of meaningful relationships, i.e. when it is assigned a meaning which makes it congruent to such an ideal system.[11]

These distinctions are quickly lost when one moves to the positivistic tradition of through. Firstly, and most importantly, positivists believe in the unity of the scientific

method. This principle asserts that the methods for acquiring valid and reliable knowledge are essentially the same in all spheres of experience. This is to say that with respect to the logic of inquiry there is no essential difference between the study of nature and society. This logic of scientific inquiry, as positivists of early nineteenth century conceive it, is roughly as follows: By means of "controlled" and "systematic" observations into the world of nature and man, scientis come to recognize certain regular and uniform relationships between the phenomena of the outer world (these relations are said to in here in the nature of things). When a sufficiently large number of cases which tend to exhibit the same relationship is observed, this relationship is then read into a hypothesis. A hypothesis is a tentative statement about the nature of this relationship, i.e., a statement about the order and the conditions under which this relationship holds between the specified variables. The confirmation of the hypothesis is then left to critical experiments, which, by resort to the test of experience, either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesize relationship. Those hypotheses which have stood the test of time and repeated experiments are later formulated into higher order laws, which due to their abstractness and generality apply to a larger number of cases than the law is actually derived from and tested for. A theory, roughly stated is a logically interrelated set of such laws (general and abstract which do not apply to any specific time place or individual) in terms of which determinate relations between phenomena are explicated, and a number of other "lower order" generalizations

are derived. Needless to say, these are also subject to the test of experience prior to their establishment and incorporation into the body of scientific knowledge. And however firmly established by critical tests of confirmation, these statements about the world are liable to revision in light of subsequent experience.[12]

In the positivistic tradition of thought, there is a clear boundary between the (observable" and the "unobservable" (or the "metaphysical"), and only the former is said to constitute the province of science. Actually, there is no ontological justification for this distinction in the positivistic tradition, but only a methodological one: systematic observation distinguishes science from other types of claim to knowledge and such observation, according to early positivists of nineteenth century, depends upon the evidence of sense perception, the only type of evidence free from bias. Since science aims to achieve valid and reliable knowledge about the world, i.e., knowledge free from bias or presupposition, it has to rely upon the evidence of sense perception. And since sense perception can, by definition, only take cognizance of the observable, science should deal with facts and entities that fall under this category. To put it differently, the data of sense perception is epistemologically privilaged because it is ontologically neutral.[13]

It is implicit in the foregoing characterization of the positivistic conception of the scientific method that, in the

positivistic tradition of thought, there is no questioning of the historical or psychological foundations of knowledge. It is simply assumed that the human mind in its normal and healthy stat perceives the same things in the same way irrespective of time and place. In other words, perception is not burdened by presuppositions, values, or a priori categories of the mind.

The idealistic position on this issue, i.e., on the problem of the ontological "neutrality", or "objectivity" of sense-data has been deliberately understated in the preceding section on idealistic tradition of thought, that is the "subjectivism" of Kant, and the "historicism" of Dilthey. For their far-reachin relativistic implications cannot be dealt with adequately within the narrow confines of the present study. Besides, they are only remotely related to the problems and issues that will be raised later. In the following sections however, a few remarks about the "theory-ladden" character of observation will be made, and some of the related arguments will be stated. For in Part I these arguments will aid in the evaluation of the positivistic criteria of "adequacy" and "appropriateness", without carrying the study to the extremities of relativism. But since the importance and the implications of this issue, i.e., the problem of the "neutrality" of observational data, was not fully recognized until after the establishment of the Vienna Circle, the treatment of this problem will be postponed until the section on logical empricisim.

On the other hand, the positivistic position on the problem of causality has also been deliberately understated in the foregoing section on positivist thought. It has only been said, in passing, that general laws, according to positivists, state "intrinsic" and "determinate" relations between phenomena of the outer world. At this juncture, tehese relations can safely be taken as causal relations. That is, at the cost of some oversimplification, the early positivistic conception of causality can be said to involve intrinsic, determinate, and temporal relations between cause and effect. Actually, the question whether causal relations inhere inthe nature of things, or whether causes necessitate, or "produce" effects in the strictest sense of the term, has been the source of one of the hattest debates in the history of philosophy. Consequently, the positivistic position on this issue has been varied and complex. But since this section is only meant as a general orientation to Weber's work, and to the issues and problems of this study, no further remarks on this issue will be necessary here. In the section on logical empricisim, and in Part II, the notion of causality in relation to the problems of this study will be discussed in more detail.

From the above characterizations of idealist and positivist thought, some focal points of conflict between the two may easily be noted. Against the idealistic view that the cultural sciences should concern themselves only with the detailed facts of particular cases, and not attempt to build up any general theories, positivists claim that social sciences should concern

themselves with general laws, of which particular cases are only "instances". That is, social sciences should not be interested in particular cases as such, but only with the discovery of general laws under which they can be subsumed. Against the positivistic efforts of uncovering of intrinsic causal relations in the phenomena, idealists direct their efforts to the discovery of relations of meaning. And finally, against the idealistic method of verstehen, or interpretation of meaning, positivists advocate the method of observation from without and causal theoretical explanation.

In his efforts to transcend the conflict between the two worlds, Weber retains most of the characteristic presuppositions of the idealistic tradition of thought that has nourished him. As has been mentioned before he also accepts elements of positivistic thought. However, he is equally critical of the "imperialistic" tendencies of both traditions to regard and impose their own methods of observation and explanation as the only legitimate means of acquiring and validating knowledge in the field of cultural sciences. For he contends that both methods, i.e., causal theoretical explanation and interpretation of meanin (verstehen) are equally indispensible to an adequate and valid understanding of human phenomena in the social world. Below, the points of articulation of these apparently irreconcilable methods of observation and explanation in the Weberian framework of analysis are explicated in detail. His position on a number of issues that are of immediate relevance to the problems of this study are also noted.

In tribute to the idealistic tradition of thought which has nourished him, Weber emphasizes the desirability of detailed historical research in the field of cultural sciences, and admits that our interest in things human (ideas, acts, symbols, etc.) should not be that of abstract generality but of individual uniqueness.[14] Following idealists, he also maintains that these things human have a special quality of "meaningfulness" and "subjectivity" which make them amenable to the method of verstehen. For there is a specific quality of "immediacy" and "directness" in the understanding of the "meaninful" and "subjective" and the method of verstehen precisely involves "direct" and "immediate" intuitions of meaning. This much Weber accepts. He does, however, deny that the data of verstehen or our direct intuitions of meaning as such constitute valid and reliable knowledge, or that the acquisition of knowledge in the field of cultural sciences could dispense with the use of general abstract concepts. For according to Weber, there is a sharp distinction between "objective scientific knowledge" and the "raw material of direct subjective experience" and the latter do not constitute knowledge unless they pass objective and critical tests of empirical proof which necessarily involve causal theoretical analysis.

In order to clarify the methodological status of verstehem, Weber draws a distinction between verstehen as a process by which knowledge is acquired and werstehen as a process by which knowledge is validated.[15] He maintains that verstehen as a process of acquiring knowledge may provide us with intuitions of meaning which are real and, as such, correct. But the immediacy and

directness of perception of meaning, is at most only one element in the proof of the validity of knowledge, and must not by itself be trusted. Weber argues that verstehen as a process of validation should be checked and corrected by causal analysis of the natural sciences. But since causal analysis involves processes and assumptions that violate most of the idealistic presuppositions that Weber himself holds, a few remarks should be made about the way in which the two are reconciled in his work.

As will be recalled, early nineteenth century conception of causality involves intrinsic, determinate and temporal relation between the abstracted and isolated elements of cause and effect, i.e., if a change in events of type "A" are always followed by a change in events of type "B" they are said to be causally related. Idealists object to the idea of causal analysis firstly because it involves the use of general concepts. For according to them abstract general concepts cannot exhoust the total complex reality of a concrete historical case that they are trying to grasp.

Weber fully agrees with the idealistic contention that the reality of the infinitely complex historical case can never be captured in the full richness of its concreteness and individuality by a system of general concepts.[16] He does however deny the view that it can be grasped by the alternative method of detailed historical research. For no matter how detailed and elaborate a description of the historical particular is, it prac-

tically falls short of all facts.[17] He even goes a step further and claims that even the mere listing of facts about a historical case involves the use of general concepts, i.e., observation and assessment are also done in terms of a selective conceptual scheme. Hence, causal analysis cannot be discarded from the cultural sciences on the grounds that involves general concepts which do not exhaust the total reality of the historical individual.

Secondly, idealists hold that the phenomena of the social world (especially human acts) are not subject to regularities as the phenomena of nature are. For in the social world, human beings are "free" to choose their own acts, and the corollary of this freedom from determination is the unique individuality of all human events. In the idealistic tradition, this position is also expressed in the form that historical reality is "irrational". And since general laws and concepts formulate regularities between types or classes of phenomena, and in that sense, are "rational", they cannot be applicable to the subject matter of the social sciences.[18]

Interestingly enough, Weber refutes the idealistic thesis of irrationality of historical reality (or human action) not by disputing the validity of the notion of freedom of will, but by taking it as his starting point. Hence, he argues that the characterization of the human world as a realm of freedom does not imply that human beings will act in irrational or unpredictabl ways. On the contrary, according to Weber, men act most freely

when they act rationally. In his own words, "Freedom in this case implies freedom from the constraint of emotional (irrational) elements. Hence, given the end, rational action is both predictable and subject to analysis in terms of general concepts. For the general concepts involved in the analysis of rational action formulate general relations of means and ends. It is important to note in passing that in the Weberian framework, "irrational action" is equally susceptible to general conceptual analysis, here rational action is emphasized because of its relevance to the freedom of will argument and also because of the preoccupation of early nineteenth century thinkers with rational action.[19]

As for the "uniqueness" of human events, Weber follows idealists in maintaining that our interest in the events of the human world are not of abstract generality, but of individual uniqueness. This is most clearly expressed in his assertion that general concepts do not constitute an end in themselves in the field of cultural sciences, but are only means to the understanding of the particular, unique, and individual phenomena.[20] But then he carefully notes that the concrete individuality to which our interest is directed is not that of raw experience, but of constructed, selected individuality. That is, our interest is in what Weber calls a "historical individual", as entity which is constructed by selecting a limited number of elements from a given experience according to some scientific purpose. For unless the historical particular is thus constituted

and analysed in its elements, it cannot be subjected to causal analysis, and its descriptions cannot, consequently, be said to constitute scientifically valid knowledge.[21]

At this point, it is necessary to touch upon the concept of "ideal-type" and the related issues of "determination of scientific interest through value rel-vance", and "adequacy of explanation", all of which are of central importance to Weber's thought and also of immediate relevance to the problems of the current study.

In the above paragraph, it has been said that a historical individual is contructed by selecting a number of traits from the historical particular relative to a given scientific purpose. Weber contends that general concepts, or ideal types are build up in the process of analysis of the historical individual and its comparison with others. More precisely, an ideal-type (or an ideal-typical reconstruction) is obtained when the elements abstracted from the concrete whole are put together to form a unified conceptual pattern. Weber notes that ideal types, due to their abstractness and generality are not to be found concretely existing anywhere in reality. They have the significance of a purely ideal "limiting" concept with which the real event or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. It is implicit in the above statements that the construction of historical individuals or ideal-types have the function of preparing and organizing the

concrete material for causal analysis, and ultimately for logical emprical proof of which causal analysis is a condition.[22]

Weber contends that potentially, there are as many ideal typical reconstructions of the same concrete material as there are points of view to study it. That is, the process of selection and systematization of elements given in a particular flux of raw experience should not be expected to lead cultural scientists to one ultimate system of general concepts, but to as many systems as there are value points of view or subjective "directions of interest" of cultural scientists. For according to Weber, the selection and systematization of elements given in experience always involves the exercise of value judgements, i.e., since the total reality of the concrete whole cannot practically be captured, a limited number of its elements must be chosen and this choice is always done with reference to some standard, which according to Weber is the standard of "relevance to value" or the "subjective direction of interest" of the scientist.[23] And an explanation is adequate for the scientific purposes for which it is used. From the above arguments follow the famous Weberian contention, which, due to its crucial importance for the arguments of this study, has to be noted parenthetically at this juncture: the basis of difference between the natural and social sciences does not lie in the "objective" nature of the reality that they deal with, but in the "subjective" directio of int-rest of the scientists in the two fields.[24] The relativistic implications of this assertion are then overcome when Weber's position on the issue of objective emprical proof is

taken into account. According to Weber, there exists a sharp difference between determination of scientific interest through value relevance and the exercise of value judgements. Even though the selection of elements of the historical reality is done with reference to a value, the establishment of relations between these elements, or the verification of the facts included in the reconstruction of the concrete historical individual is done independently of any value system, except the value of scientific truth. That is, the question of the "scientific truth" of a statement is clearly seperable from the question of its significance or relevance to a value. The relativity of value only applies to the latter.

In the above pragraphs Weber's arguments in favor of the thesis that causal analysis cannot be discarded from the field of cultural sciences on the grounds of the "complexity", "uniqueness", and "irrationality" of human phenomena are stated. It will be recalled that idealists also object to the use of causal analysis in cultural sciences on the basis of the "meaningfulness" and "atemporality" of relations between the elements of human (spiritual) world. Since causal analysis is based on the external observation of regular connexions between types of phenomena, it is inappropriate to the task of the cultural scientist which is the understanding of atemporal complexes of meaning. Besides, it will be recalled that the method of verstehen is only capable of the latter, and not the former.

From here on, the study will exclusively refer to human acts under the category of human phenomena, for it is almost entirely in the context of the causal analysis of human action that Weber deals with the question of the susceptibility of human phenomena to causal analysis. That is, according to him, the issue essentially involves the question of the accessibility of the subjective aspect of people's action as a real process in time, since the phenomena with which the causal analysis is concerned constitute a real processes. Actually, Weber's discussion of this issue is highly polemical and his views concerning the applicability of causal analysis to the study of human action as a process in time has to be inferred from this and a number of his other discussions on related issues. Below, his conception of action, and his classification of various types and modes of orientation of action along with his views on the task of sociology, the nature of causal explanation, the method of verstehen, and the concept of subjective meaning or motive are stated for this purpose. The section on the types and modes of orientation of action is highly selective in the sense that if only refers to two types of action, namely, rational action in relation to a goal, and rational action in relation to a value, and only to two modes of orientation of action, namely, interest and moral obligation at the exclusion of others. This is done for a number of reasons. Firstly, Weber's definitions of other types of action (emotional and traditional action) and modes of orientation of action (usage) are very sketchy, i.e. he places both affective responses and traditional conduct, behavior governed by 'unthinking' habit or custom, at the margins of action which

is meaningful and thus amenable to the method of interpretative sociology. Hence, it is more convenient to follow Weber in this respect. Secondly, and more importantly, the interpretation of human action in terms of its subjective meaning can be "causal" explanation precisely in so far as we are able to analyse it in terms of chains of rationality - i.e., by linking ends to the means whereby the actor seeks to attain particular goals. Hence, rational action serves Weber as the model for all meaningful action.

According to Weber, action is "... any human attitude or activity ("... be it overt, covert, omission or acquiescence"), if and "... in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior".[25] And action is social if and "... in so far as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course."[26] And like all action, that which is social may be "... determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings", and through use of these expectations as " 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends",[27] or "... by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success".[28] And the types of action that are determined in the above mammer are called rational action in relation to a goal, and rational action in relation to a value, respectively.

As for the modes of orientation of social action, Weber puts forward three categories in this connection, of which only the two are relevant in the present context, namely, action oriented in terms of interest and action oriented in terms of legitimate order.[29] He also considers these as factors that account for the regularity or uniformity of social action. It will be recalled that Weber regards human phenomena (especially rational human action) just as regular and lawful as the events in the natural world. The stability of regularities of action based on interest lies in the fact that any actor who does not consider the adaptation of means to given ends according to objective standards fails to attain his ends. Hence, social action oriented in terms of interest involves a normative element, namely, the norm of efficiency, which account for observed regularities in the adaptation of means to ends. Similarly, social action oriented in terms of legitimate order also involves a normative element; the norm of legitimacy or moral obligation. And it is this element, i.e., the idea on the part of the actors of the existence of such an order as a norm which account for the observed regularities in action oriented by this mode.[30]

From the definitions and classifications above it is apparent that Weber associates the concept of action with an accessible subjective aspect. This however, should not be taken to mean that action is only expicable in subjective terms. For Weber carefully notes in this connection that nonsubjective processes and objects must also be considered, since they may

have place as occasion, condition, or consequence, favoring or hindering circumstances of action.[31] Moreover, it is also possible that human acts which may seem to the cultural scientist as explicable in subjective terms may turn out to be the product of the laws of nonsubjective systems. Weber however, seems to imply that unless human "behavior" is accessible to understanding through the subjective point of view of the actor, it is not action, and does not concern sociology. Hence, it is essential to the concept of action that it has a subjective aspect.

It is also implicit in Weber's definition of rational action that this subjective aspect is accessible as a real process in time. It will be recalled that rational action involves adaptation of means to ends according to norms of efficiency or legitimacy. The temporal reference in this means-end chain is inherent in the concept of end, for it always implies an anticipated future state of affairs which will not necessarily exist without intervention by the actor, and which, in the mind of the actor, logically precedes the employment of means. Hence, the elements of action, i.e., the end, means and conditions have causal significance in the sense that variations in the value of anyone have consequences for the values of the others. And action is amerable to causal analysis due to this peculiar nature of the relation (instrinsic and temporal) between its elements.

This intrinsic relation between the meaningful elements and the others in the action complex is called "concrete moti-

vation" by Weber (the meaning systems involved in the two types of rational action are scientifically valid knowledge and normative order). And a motive, according to Weber, is "... a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question."[32] The task of sociology is "... the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects."[33], and a correct causal explanation implies that "... the overt action and the motives have both been correctly apprehended and at the same time their relation has become meaningfully comprehensible."[34]

As has been mentioned before, in the Weberian system of interpretative sociology, verstehen is retained as the basic methodological postulate of the social sciences. However, there is an important difference between Weber's and idealists' conception of verstehen: in the idealistic tradition, the object of verstehen is the discovery of subjective meanings of human phenomena (acts, ideas, symbols, etc.) whereas in the Weberian system of sociological theory, the task of verstehen, in addition to the discovery of atemporal complexes as real processes in time. Actually, the distinction between the two is not as explicit as the above statements may suggest, but is only implied through Weber's distinction between understanding through direct observation and motivational or explanatory understanding. Under the first heading, Weber seems to have reference to an atemporal world of meanings as distinct from concrete motivations. For under this category is included the understanding of the meaning

of a mathematical proposition (2 x 2 = 4) and the understanding of the action of a woodcutter (chopping wood). In both cases, the "meanings" are directly accessible to ordinary observation. On the other hand, it is not evident from this kind of observation and understanding either why the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 is written or uttered, or why the man is chopping wood. It is only through motivational or explanatory understanding that the meanings or motives behind these acts are discovered. Apparently understanding in this sense involves the uncovering of the elements of motivation, i.e., the intrinsic relations between the end, means, and conditions of action.[35]

The tenability of this distinction between direct and motivational understanding has been much discussed in the literature.[36] It is generally argued that direct observational understanding involves motivational understanding and vice versa because a temporal complexes of meaning usually contain elements of concrete motivation and concrete acts, likewise, not only express relations between means and end but also symbolize a system of meanings. But the treatment of this issue, i.e, the question of the possibility of achieving direct observational understanding without motivational understanding or vice versa, or dealing with atemporal complexes of meaning and concrete motivations in abstraction from each other will be postponed until the views of other interpretative thinkers relevant to this problem are stated. Here, it is only necessary to assess the power of verstehen as a potential source of motivational hypotheses.

It will be recalled that Weber highly respects verstehen as a process of acquiring knowledge in the field of cultural sciences. For the method of verstehen, i.e., the grasping of the subjective meanings of human phenomena though intuition, empathy or sympathetic experience, is highly relevant and useful in the context of understanding of human action. As has been mentioned before, understanding in this context involves the uncovering of motivations or the intrinsic means-ends relations between the elements of action, and these relations are in the mind of the actor, as well as external to it. It is precisely this means-end relations in themind of the actor (or from the point of view of the actor) which constitutes the subjective aspect of action. Weber argues that this subjective aspect cannot be grasped unless the cultural scientist imagines himself in the actors place, or fell himself into his experiences. Sence, the method of verstehen precisely involves this process, it is a valuable source of motivational hyypotheses in the social sciences. However, according to Weber's definition of sociology, there is more to the task of the sociologist than the interpretation, or the grasping of the subjective meaning of action: the action should also be explained "causally". For motivational hypotheses which might seem plausible with reference to the actor's subjective meaning or motive may nonetheless turn out to be incorrect because: 1) the apparent conscious motives may conceal from both the agent and the observer the "real driving force" of the action 2) the agent may be subject to different and conflicting motives so that it is difficult to ascertain

their relative strength or importance. 3) the agent and observer may perceive the agent's situation differently, so that what seems a plausible motive to the observer may be based on a mistaken identification of how that cituation appears to the agent.[37]

The above statements imply that Weber's interpretative sociology is as much concerned with the objective consequences and conditions of action either unintended or unmediated by the consciousness of the actor as it is concerned with the subjective means-end sequence in his mind. This is precisely why Weber argues that the method of verstehen should be supplemented by the more objective method of causal analysis of the natural sciences: for the relation of the outward course of action and the subjective meaning (or motive) to be fully grasped.

A few passing remarks about Weber's procedure of causal imputation will be in order before this section on his version of interpretative sociology is concluded. As has been said before, the study will avoid lengthy discussions of this issue, i.e. the logic of causal analysis, until the section on logical empricism. The following is a convenient summary of the steps involved in Weber's procedure of causal imputation: 1) the analysis of the complex phenomenon (or process) into its elements and the construction of an historical individual or an ideal type. 2) Hypothetical elimination or alteration of one or more factors of the process, concerning which it is wished to raise the question of its or their causal significance for

the result. 3) Hypothetical construction of what would then (after the elimination or alteration) be the expected course of events. 4) Comparison of the hypothetical conception of a possible development (that which would have happened if there had been no alteration or removal of a factor or factors) with the actual course of events 5) on the basis of this comparison, the drawing of causal conclusions. The general principle is that in so far as the actual and the possible course of events differ, the difference may be causally imputed to the factors eliminated or altered. If, on the other hand, this removal or alteration fails to make any difference, it can be concluded that the factor or factors in question are not causally relevant.[38]

It is important to note however that in judgements of causal imputation, objective emprical certainity is out of the question, such judgements are only probabilistic in nature. This is due to the fact that these judgements rest on construction, i.e. when it is necessary to make a judgement of causal imputation, the historical individual concerned is analyzed into a larger number of type-units, and each of these are then subjected to judgements of probability as to its line of development under the relevant circumstances. Hence, the predictability of an objectively possible concrete state is subject to error, in the case of construction of each element. This is why objective emprical certainity is ruled out of the coust in judgements of causal imputation.[39]

B. PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ

Schutz' version of interpretative sociology is generally characterized as a descriptive phenomenology of the life world, because of its preoccupation with the reconstitution of the world of everyday life through the subjective consciousness of actors. It is probably due to the inherent descriptiveness and subjectivity of schutz' method, i.e., the method of phenomenological reduction, or the explanation of the world through mind, that his solutions corcerning the pre-existing problems of sociology do not strike most present day sociologists as particularly satisfactory (interpretative and other).[40] The shortcomings of Schutz' work, is of others included here will be shown with reference to a plurality of criteria in Part II, including his own. Despite its shortcomings, Schutz' work is nevertheless important in the present context, because of its concern with the problems of meaning, motive or cause in relation to the explanation of human action. His discussion of the problems of interpretative sociology with reference to the interpretative sociology of Weber also makes Schutz' work immediately relevant to the present context. Below a summary statement of his program is given.

According to Schutz, interpretative sociology "... sets as its primary goal the greatest possible clarification of what is thought about the social world by those living in it."[41] And the method of interpretative sociology involves the estab-

lishment of theoretical constructs of "typical modes" of conduct so as to illuminate the subjective grounds of action.[42]

These statements directly derive from Schutz' belief in the relevance and significance of thought objects of common sense thinking of lay actors for sociological understanding and explanation of their conduct. These thought objects, which are alternatively referred to as "typification". "interpretative schemes" or "lay beliefs" by Schutz are important because it is through them that the lay actors make sense, or interpret the world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives and, "It is these thought objects of their which detekmine their behavior by motivating it."[43] Hence, in order to make sense of these objects and experiences, or to grasp their "meaning" for the actors, the social scientist should make a first level reference to lay beliefs (or alternatively, to "common-sense constructs". interpretative schemes, etc.) about the social world. In his own words, "The thought objects constructed by the social scientist in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world.... the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the social scientist has to observe."[44]

These common sense understandings or typifications derive from "stocks of knowledge" which include beliefs, expec-

tations, rules and biases which are partly formed by actors personal experiences and which are partly inherited from the socially preformed knowledge. It is important to note in passing that these stocks of knowledge are not fixed, i.e., they are subject to refinement and modification in the course of experience and that there are differentials in the distribution of these stocks of knowledge across society.[45] The system of typifications serve the following important functions in the social world and common sense thinking of men as conceived by Schutz: 1) it determines which facts or events have to be treated "typically equal" (homogenous) for the purpose of solving in a typical manner typical problems that emerge in situations typified as being equal. 2) It transforms unique individual experiences "... into typical functions of typical social roles, originating in typical motives aimed at bringing about typical ends."[46] 3) It serves as both a scheme of interpretation and as a scheme of orientation for the lay actors in the universe of discourse and social interaction. That is, "whoever (I included) acts in the socially approved typical way is supposed to be motivated by the pertinent typical motives and to aim at bringing about the pertinent state of affairs."[47] and, 4) It constitutes a common field from which the private typifications of the individual actors originate.[48] As has been said above, this system of typifications is of primary importance in Schutz' work; it is with the help of these common-sense understandings or typifications that human social conduct - which the social scientist triet to make sense of - is motivated, carried out, and interpreted in everyday life.

Lay beliefs or common-sense understandings of the social world also form the basis of "meaningful" constitution or (motivation) of human action. It is implicit in the above statement of the functions of the system of typifications that actors also make use of these typifications in making sense or rendering "meaningful" their own conduct and the conduct of others. Schutz follows Weber in asserting that the aim of interpretative sociology is to analyse and explain human action through the study of the subjective meanings whereby individuals orient their conduct. He also accepts that the method of verstehen is indispensible to the discovery of these subjective meanings. But he denies the adequacy of Weber's arguments concerning these issues; he argues that they need to be pursued farther. In trying to carry his arguments to their logical conclusions, Schutz actually "only" elaborates upon the categories of Weber's throught. But some of his arguments are quite far-reaching in their implications for the solutions of the problems of this study even though these are, rather unfortunately, not elucidated by himself. The problems and the implications of Schutz' arguments will be resolved and elucidated in relation to Winch's arguments in Part III. As regards his critical commentary upon Weber's work, this is partly referred to in the course of this section. The remaining references are made in Part III, in relation to the critical evaluation of Weber's interpretative sociology.

Schutz argues that while Weber's account of "meaningful" or "motivated" action is in important respects correct, it needs to be complemented and expanded by a study of the common sense

world. The analysis of the meaning structures of this world suggests that human action may be oriented in terms of two different classes of motives rather than one. The first set of these motives concern the "projects" or "in order to motives" of action, and they orient actors toward a future attaintment. The second set of motives concern the "genuine because motives" and they predispose or incline actors toward the selection of certain projects rather than others. The difference between the two is that the "in order to" motive explains the act in terms of the project, while the "genuine because" motive explains the project in terms of the actor's past experiences which endow him with certain predispositions.[49] In order to clarify the distinction between the two, Schutz cites the example of a man who murders in order to obtain money. Here, the man's "in order to" motive or his project in murdering the man is the acquisition of money. However, it is apparent that this explanation which is made only in terms of the "in order to" motive is not adequate, since there are other honest ways of obtaining money. In other words, even though we have not yet explained why he chose this particular mean to achieve his end or project. Schutz contends that something in the man's past experiences should have predisposed him to the selection of this particular mean. He then speculates that "having had bad comparisons in his youth" might be a possible factor. Thus with the addation of a "genuine because" motive the explanation becomes "adequate".[50] Schutz contends that an adequate social science should be concerned with both types of motives because action is oriented and interpreted in terms of either or both of them in the common sense world. It is important

to note in this context that the concepts and constructs that are used in social-scientific analysis of human action must according to Schutz obey a number of principles; the "principle of adequacy" being the most important one for the problems of this study. This principle asserts that social scientific concepts must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life.[51] This assertion has a logical basis in Schutz' own theory: Since it is the aim of the social scientist to understand and explain human action precisely in terms which it is oriented and interpreted by lay actors in the social world, the concepts and constructs of the former must "necessarily" bu understandable to the latter. The two other requirements which must be fulfilled by the modal constructs are described in Schutz' postulates of logical consistency and subjective interpretation. The "postulate of logical consistency" asserts that the typical constructs of the social scientist must be established with the highest degree of clarity and distinctness of the conceptual framework implied and must obey the principles of formal logic. Schutz contends that the fulfillment of this requirement gives "objective validity" to the thought-objects constructed by the social scientist, and it is their "strictly logical character" which distinguishes these modal constructs from the constructs of common-sense thinking in everyday life.[52] The third requirement, which is put in the form of "the postulate

of subjective interpration" offers, in a way, a summary statement of Schutz's whole program. This postulate asserts that human conduct must be explained in terms of typical constructs that the actors themselves use in making sense of their own conduct and the conduct of others. In his own words, the fulfillment of this requirement "... warrants the possibility of referring all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor."[53]

Schutz continues his critique of Weber's work by arguing that the constitution of "meaning" in social action is not as simple and mechanical as it is suggested by Weber's statement that the actor "attaches" meaning to his action. In the first place, meaning is not attached to action while it is being lived through, but is constituted retrospectively by a reflexive act on the part of the actor. In this respect, it is important to make a distinction between action as a completed act, and action as a flow of events. According to Schutz, the project or the "in order to" motive of an action is the completed act, and the "attaching" of meaning only applies to completed acts. In his own words, "only the already experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced."[54] This statement suggests that experiences are not intrinsically meaningful, but only become so in virtue of those meaning - endowing, reflexive acts of the subjective ego.

Secondly, Schutz argues that "meaning" is not constituted subjectively, but intersubjectively. For every act of the actor

though which he endows the world with meaning refers back to some meaning-endowing act of another actor with respect to the same world.[55] Meaning is thus constituted as an intersubjective phenomenon. The study will not go into Schutz' highly complex and painstaking analysis of this constituting process, because he eventually fails to bridge the gap between subjectivity and intersubjectivity as parameters of common-sense knowledge even to his own satisfaction. But one important consequence of the intersubjectivity of existential knowledge for Schutz' conception of verstehen must be noted before this section on his work is concluded: the knowledge yielded by verstehen is of an intersubjectively verifiable kind; it is neither subjective nor private. For verstehen is not a technique peculiar to social science but is generic to all social interaction. That is, "understanding" the meaning of the actions of others in an integral part of the routine capabilities of competent social actors. This, in turn, is closely connected to understanding the meaning of one's actions. Since "meaning" is constituted intersubjectively in the latter, and since the former is founded upon the latter, it follows that meaning is also constituted intersubjectively in the former. And since every social theorist is a member of a society, he draws upon the skills associated with such membership as a resource in his investigations: he uses the method of verstehen in making sense of other's conduct, just as lay actors do in their daily lives.

C. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF PETER WINCH

Linguistic philosophy is a branch of the Anglo-Saxon movement of analytical philosophy in which the task of philosphy is defined as the analysis of syntactic and semantic properties of language, both lay and scientific. It is a strange fact that analytical philosophy should initiate two diametrically oppossed schools of thought in philosophy, namely, logical empricism, and linguistic philosophy. It is even more surprising that the name of Wittgenstein should be associated with the initiation of both the positivistic and linguistic turns in this tradition of thought The early work of Wittgenstein is generally regarded as a major source of influence upon the late positivists of the Vienna Circle and aspects of it will be mentioned in the section on logical empricism. On the other hand, the works of a number of philosophers who wrote under the influence of the later work of Wittgenstein, reveal important points of overlap with interpretative thought and and aspect of it are mentioned below. In neither section, however, more than a few introductory remarks will be made on his work. For it is basically through the works of his followers in both camps that the implications of his philosophy for social scientific inquiry are elucidated.

Wittgenstein's early work is founded upon the belief that propositions of language correspond to facts of experience, and that language reflects an exact picture of reality.[56] But some years after the publication of his first work, Wittgenstein

radically changes his position and starts to hold the view that experience receives its meaning from customary language and not vice verse. We know the world only as ordered by a language and the only facts or objects belonging to our world are those which our language recognizes. Wittgenstein contends that semant categories of language are publicly accessible, for our linguistic activities are part of a total cultural tradition, or "forms of life" which we all share.[57]

The implication of Wittgenstein's views for the sociological method of interpretation of human action is obvious. Since experience receives its meaning from customary language, which in turn presupposes definite forms of life, then understanding others' experiences becomes a semantic matter, rather than a matter of empathy, and saves us partly from the problems associated with the method of verstehen. That is, verstehen no longe depends upon a psychological process of "re-enactment", or something similar, but a primarily linguistic matter of grasping the content of familiar and unfamiliar forms of life. It is important to note at this juncture that Wittgenstein considers these forms of life as given, i.e. he doesn't set about to analys the origin or the transformation of forms of life over time.

Winch takes Wittgenstein's "forms of life" as a starting point for his philosophy of action. He does not object to their "givennes" as such, but contends thatthe variety of forms of life which characterize our own and other societies should be recognized and their nature be elucidated. For in order to describe,

understand and explain human action, we have to grasp the form of life in which the action is conducted, and it is only with reference to rules and conventions which are embedded in the form of life that the meaning of an action can be understood. For meaningful action, according to Winch, is rule-following, or rule governed action, and the very notion of following a rule presupposes intersubjective conventions and agreements.[58] It is in this respect that rule following behavior can be said to be essentially social in character. Winch goes on to say that it is not necessary for conduct to be rule-governed that anyone following a rule should be able to formulate it consciously if asked, or even if he does it might not be the one that he's actually following. Even the actions of a rebel, who prides himself with the rejection of the norms of his society can be said to follow a rule of his own, as long as he recognizes "... a right and a wrong way of doing things."[59]

Winch holds that human action is "meaningful" in a way in which events in the natural world are not. From this, he concludes that the method of natural science is irrelevant or inappropriate to social science. For the social scientist seeks to understand the point or meaning of what's being done or said in terms of the particular rules to which those actions relate, and by the standards of the form of life in which the said rules are embedded, not by the standards of other forms of life in which the scientist may find himself. It might appear that this warning only applies to those who study cultures or forms of life that are different from their own, namely antropologists,

who are more phone to the fallacy of judging alien forms of life by the standards of their own. Interestingly enough, it also applies to social scientists who study their own culture by the standards of science, which according to Winch is another form of life withits peculiar rules and conventions. It is probably for this reason that Winch considers explanation of human action as essentially a "philosophical task".[60] For in social conduct, which the social scientist studies, the criteria which are aphlied for judging the rationality of actions, or for distinguishing different kinds of actions or identifying the same action are essentially given by the rules that express different forms of life. Thus, in discerning regularities in human conduct, which presupposes criteria of identity whereby happenings are classified as of the same kind, the social scientist should resolt to the criteria of identity given by the rules of the form of life which he studies.[61] However, Winch does not say that social scientists should stop there. He may use technical concepts and constructs unprovided by the form of life, however these must presuppose and be logically tied to the ones actually employed by the participants of the form of life in question, Winch goes on to say that technical redescriptions should not be cast in causal language, for social conduct does not reflect relations of a causal character, rather they are relations of a conceptual kind. In his own words, "the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences."[62] Hence, motives cannot be regarded as causal factors in human behavior.

Unlike other British philosophers who wrote under the influence of Late-Wittgenstein, Winch does not identify the concept of motive with physical or psychological states. For he holds that learning what a motive is belongs to learning the rules and conventions governing life in the society in which one lives: To say that a person is motivated to act in such and such a way is to say that his behavior is "intelligible" or "meaningful" in terms of the rules of conduct which pertain in the society of which he is a member.[63] It is apparent that the concept of "forms of life" is used as a philosophical catchall in Winch's work, i.e., almost everything is explained in terms of this key concept.

D. CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS

Habermas' critical theory of society encompasses much of what is said in the schools of thought mentioned so far with regard to the understanding and explanation of human action, but it also goes beyond them in asserting that social and political theory must also be "critical" or "revelatory" in respect of the confusions and misapprehensions of "common-sense". That is, it tries to demanstrate that an adequate social and political theory must not only be emprical and interpretative, but also "emancipatory" or critical.[64] It is this emphasis on the critical aspect of social theory which gives Habermas' synthesis its unique character, and, in this respect, distinguishes it from all other phases of "interpretative" thought that are con-

Habermas' division of the social sciences into the "emprical - analytical", "hermeneutic" (interpretative) and "critical" is grounded on the three types of "cognitive interest" which concern man in their relations to both the social and the natural world. These three interests are, namely, the technical, practical and emancipatory.[65] And each of these cognitive interests, is in turn, grounded in one dimension of human social existence: work, interaction and power (domination).[66]

In habermas' formulation, "work" refers to instrumental or purposive-rational action. This type of action covers men's activities which are directed to the control and mastery of their environments. The disciplines that are concerned with it are the emprical-analytical sciences which are guided by a technical cognitive interest. However, by technical interest, Habermas does not mean the technical application of theories in these disciplines, but rather the technical mastery of a set of causal relations, which is accomplished through the isolation of objects and events into dependent and independent variables, and the investigation of regularities among them. Habermas' reconstruction of the logic or the method of the emprical-analytical sciences roughly corresponds to that of the positivists in that he argues that these sciences are characterized by their search for hypothetico-deductive theories which allow for the deduction of emprical generalizations from lawlike hypothesis which are, in turn, tested by means of controlled observation and experimentation.[67] This type of research

discloses knowledge relevant to the organization of work, or instrumental or purposive-rational action which, as has been said before, incorporates a technical interest, and is governed by technical rules derived from emprical knowledge.

Since this type of knowledge is grounded in the dimension of human social existence that involves preservation and survival, Habermas stresses the importance and the indispensibility of emprical knowledge for any society. However, he does not take this as the only type of legimate knowledge, or the method of the emprical-analytical sciences as the only method for discovering and warranting legitimate knowledge, as positivists are inclined to do. For he believes that there are categorical limits on thesedisciplines which remove certain dimensions of human life from their grasp, namely, the communicative action, or symbolic interaction.[68]

According to Habermas, "interaction" or "communicative action" requires distinct categories for its description, explanation and understanding, i.e., categories distinct from those counteranced by the technical cognitive interests. For the level of human action that Habermas calls interaction, is sharply distinguished from the type of action that is characterized as work. Whereas work is governed by technical rules and strategies, interaction is governed by concensual norms. And while the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of emprically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual under-

standing of intentions among actors and secured by their commitment to moral obligations.[69]

The disciplines that are concerned with symbolic interaction are historical-hermeneutic disciplines which are guided by a practical interest. This type of cognitive interest is directed to the understanding of actors participation in an intersubjective life and to the improvement of human communication or self understanding. This understanding is gained through the hermeneutic grasping of the "meaning" of symbolic or communicative action by the social scientist as well as by participants.[70] Here, Habermas explicitly follows Weber, Schutz and most post. Wittgensteinian philosophers in assimilating "meaning" to the interpretation of action.

It has been said above that Habermas is critical of positivists who regard emprical knowledge as the only legitimate type of knowledge. He is just as critical of the claim that historical-hermeneutic disciplines provide the only legitimate type of knowledge about men and the world. For if we are to understand the ways in which men have formed themselves in the course of their historical development, we have to understand the historical forms of symbolic interaction as well as that of purposive-rational action. Work and interaction are "nonreducible" levels of human action, which can only be understood in terms of concepts that are relevant to the types of cognitive interest which govern these two sectors of human social life.[71] Habermas goes on to say that it is only through the comprehension of the characteristics of these two unreducible

media and cognitive interests that a study of the relationships and dynamics between them can be accomplished. Much will be said about the nature of this relationship in the course of the study, but a few passing remarks about Habermas' position on this issue are in order at this juncture.

Habermas argues that in the interpretation of social reality we must make use of the causal analysis which is characteristic of the emprical analytical sciences, for the historical forms of work or purpose rational action have a powerful causal influence on the nature of symbolic interaction. At this point, Marx's influence on Habermas' thought which is felt throughout his work, becomes most apparent. For he recognizes the existence of a determinate relationship between the material conditions of production and the specific historical forms of symbolic interaction. Another reason why the social scientist should have recousse to the causal analysis is that it would enable him to distinguish between invariant, causal regularities of human action and the ideological relations of dependence which, even though they are transformable in principle, are frozen enough to appear unalterable and invariant relations.

The most basic cognitive interest in Habermas' system is the third type of knowledge-constitutive interest: the emancipatory interest. It transcends each of the former two types of interest because it seeks to free man from domination, both from the domination of others, and of the forces which they do

not understand or control.[72] It is the task of the "critical theory", which is guide- by an emancipatory interest, to indicate the intellectual and the material conditions of such an emancipation. Here again, Habermas' indebtness to Marx becomes manifest. For he agrees with Marx that free symbolic interaction or unconstrained communication cannot concretely exist unless non-elienating and nonexploitative conditions maintain.

According to Habermas, the emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the enhancement of human self-understanding or self-reflection through which men can be freed from the domination of forces which they may not understand or control. As long as an observed regularity reflects a frozen relation of dependence, "... information about lawlike connections sets of a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the level of consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed."[73] In other words, Habermas implies that knowledge on the part of the actor about the determinants of his behavior - which may not be known to him on the level of consciousness, or which may not appear to him as subject to his mastery - helps free him from their domination and control.

Habermas takes Marx's critique of ideology and Freud's psycholoanalysis as the exemplars of a science which is at once emprical, interpretative and critical. For Marx's critique of ideology, according to Habermas, shows the concrete historical ways in which men form themselves through labor (emprical),

and how the experience of self-reflection becomes systematically distorted by these historical material conditions of production (interpretative). In addition to these, Marx's critique is also guided by an emancipatory interest. By providing a detailed analysis and interpretation of these various historical forms of production, especially of capitalism, and the characteristic distortions that these produce in self-reflection, Marx aims to give men a true understanding of their historical situation which will lead them to revolutionary praxis (critical).

As for Freud's psychoanalysis, it aims to relieve patients from the causal efficacy of unconscious processes which lead him to behave in ways not subject to his voluntary control (critical). This is accomplished through analyt's understanding and interpretation of the patients verbalizations which reflect misunderstandings and distortions on his part as regards the "meaning" and the significance of the symptoms from which he suffers (interpretative). But the analyst does not suffice with interpretation alone, he goes beyond the hermeneutic level by explaining causally why the patient's representation is distorted, or why the "real" causes of his behavior has become inaccessible to his consciousness (emprical). However, unless the analyst's interpretation of the "meaning" of the patient's symptoms or of the "real" causes of his behavior sets off a process of self reflection on the part of the actor by which he can appropriate the analyst's "true" understanding, the therapy fails to achieve its purpose. For the patient's appro-

priation of this analytical understanding is a necessary condition of a successful treatment.[74]

The same thing applies to Marx's critique of ideology. Men should arrive at a true understanding of their historical situations and the distortions that result from them in order to free themselves from domination.[75] In both cases, the subject's appropriation of the analyst's or the theorist's "interpretation" through self-reflection is considered by Habermas as a criterion of the correctness of the said interpretation. At this point however, a question naturally arises: what if the subject rejects an interpretation, should this be taken as a sign of its incorrectness?

Habermas follows Freud and Marx in claiming that a failure on the part of the subject to appropriate a given interpretation does not necessarily show its incorrectness. Hence, he argues that an interpretation should not be refuted or dismissed on the grounds of the subject's rejection alone. For the individuals may have distorted misconceptions of themselves, the meaning of their actions, and their historical situations which might result in their resistance to accept a given interpretation. However, Habermas also tries to guard against the danger of relying on the individuals appropriation of an interpretation as the sole criterion of its correctness. For while it is necessary, the recognition of the correctness of an interpretation by the individuals involved is not sufficient to assess its truth.[76] It might be the case that the interpre-

tation, or the reconstruction reflects the biases and the prejudices of those investigated.

With regard to the relation of the commonsense thinking of men to the constructions of the theorist, habermas agrees with most of what Schutz and most post-Wittgensteinian philosophers have tosay. As has been mentioned before, these thinkers argue that the models and the constructs of the theorist must be based on or logically tied to those that the individuals use in their everyday lives in interpreting their own actions and the actions of others. However, they also recognize the theorist's right to have occasional recourse to concepts and constructs which may not at first sight be intelligible for those involved. For the actor's judgement as regards the intelligibility or the appropriateness of the teorist's construction - which is considered as a sufficient proof of the correctness and the adequacy of a construction - is dependent upon actor's understanding of the concepts and constructs involved. Habermas can be said to be in complete agreement with these thinkers as regards the significance of the actor's appropriation of the theorist's construction as a criterion for its correctness. However, he's against the contention that this should be the only criterion by which the adequacy or the correctness of the theorist's constructions or interpretations be judged. For he takes cognizance of the possibility that the actor's own understanding or interpretations of their actions or situations might be inflicted with ideological or neurotic distortions which result in their rejection of a true analytic understanding of

their situation. In regard to the limits that the actor's own interpretations place on the theorist's constructions, i.e., the requirement of the intelligibility of the theorist's concepts and constructs for the actors involved, and the necessity of their appropriation for the assessment of the correctness of the theorist's interpretation, Schutz and post-Wittgensteinian plisophers seem to disregard the limits that actors' distortions place on their understanding or appropriation of a true analytical interpretation of their situation.

But how is one to decide whether a given interpretation is being rejected by those involved because it is really false or because it is contrary to their hitherto held beliefs and interpretations about their own conduct which are themselves distorted and false? Habermas' answer to this is that neither the subject's words nor his behavior can be taken as a criterion for the verification or the falsification of an interpretation. For the criterion in virtue of which false constructions fail does not coincide with either controlled observation or communicative experience. The interpretation of a case is corroborated only by the successful continuation of a self-formative process, that is,by the completion of self-reflection and not in any unmistakable way by what the patient says, or how he behaves.[77] It is implicit in this argument that the theorist somewhat knows if the interpretation is false, or the resistance to its appropriation is too strong. That is, by furthering self-reflection till to the point of its completion on the part of the actor, a theorist can hope to

judge the falsity or the correctness of his interpretation. Even though Habermas stresses the insufficiency of the subject's acceptance of the theorist's construction as a criterion of its correctness, he's not very clear about the supplementary criteria by which the correctness of the theorist's interpretation will be judged, apart from the furthering and completion of self-reflection. This process of evaluation of the correctness of an interpretation is problematical in a double-sense. Firstly, this self-reflection or self-understanding is preformed by the interpretative schemes that the actors use in their everyday lives and is thereby susceptible to the same sorts of distortions that these interpretative schemes are. And secondly, in virtua of his membership in a society, the theorist's "understanding of the subject's "understanding" of himself" may equally be inflicted with the sorts of distortions that Habermas talks about in relation to the self-understandings of lay actors. These problems will be discussed in Part III.

P A R T I I

POSITIVISM IN SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

A. DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF SUICIDE

In this part of the study, the logical structure of an "allegedly" alternative model of exhlanation of human action, namely, positivistic, will be delienated along with its basic assumptions and criteria of evaluation with reference to Durkheim's theory of suicide and to the works of a number of positivistically- inclined philosophers associated with logical empricism. Even though the influence of the early nineteenth century positivistic thought upon the writings of the thinkers included in this part is generally recognized in the literature, the study will nevertheless make occasional remarks concerning the points of overlap between the two, if for no other reason than to reaffirm the relationship with special regard to the problems of this study. On the other hand, the influence of Durkheim's positivistic sociology and the positivistic and the positivistic empricist philosophy of the Vienna Circle upon important sectors of present day academic sociology is also explicit and, not too infrequently, acknowledged.[78] It is basically for this reason that the positivistic position on the issue of explanation of human action is delienated with special

reference to Durkheim's and logical empricists' work.

On the other hand, Durkheim's theory of suicide is chosen in virtue of the fact that the positivistic implications of Durkheim's work in relation to the explanation of human action and its points of conflict with the interpretative position on the same problem stand out most clearly in this study. Moreover, the connections between the positivistic and the Durkheimian model of explanation of human action is most frequently established in the literature with reference to his theory of suicide. The study will, to a large extent, rely on these previously established connections in reassessing the relationship between the two with special regard to the problems of this study. For as has been said above these connections are so widely recognized that there is almost no need to reaffirm them in the present context. Hence, the study will specifically focus its attention on Durkheim's theory of suicide rather than any of his other works.

In Durkheim's theory of suicide, the aim of sociology is defined as the construction of theories about human conduct "inductively" on the basis of prior observations of that con--uct: these observations, which are made about externally visible characteristics of conduct, are necessarily "pre-theoretical" in nature,since it is out of them that the theories are born.[79] Such observations, according to Durkheim, have no particular connection with the ideas actors have about their own actions and those of others; it is necessary for the obser-

ver to make every possible effort to seperate himself from common sense notions held by actors themselves, because these frequently have no basis infact. Hence, the observer has to formulate his concepts for himself prior to observation and to break away from those current in everyday life.[80] For the concepts of everyday activity "... merely express the confused impressions of the mob"; "if we follow common use, we risk distinguished, thus mistaking the real affinities of things, and accordingly misapprehending their nature."[81] The analyses which the social scientist makes have to deal with comparable facts whose natural affinities cannot be distinguished by "... the superficial concepts which we employ in ordinary life".[82] Thus, the dismissal of commonsense notions of suicide prepares the ground for Durkheim to work out his new definition of the phenomenon, or to put it differently, to determine the order of facts to be studied under the namu of suicides.

The "facts" to be studied under the name of suicides are "social" facts, and a "social fact" according to Durkheim, is roughly a way of behaving which is universal throughout a given society and has an existence of its own independent of its individual manifestations. Durkheim argues that social facts must always be defined in terms of their visible external characteristics in order to make them amenable to obervation from without. This is done in order to avoid prejidices or preconceptions. For the external characteristics of a phenomenon are all that is given, all that is offered to observation from without, the only reliable method of acquiring knowledge about the

world according to Durkheim. The defining external characteristic of a social fact is the "constraint" it exercises on individuals.[83]

The identification and classification of social facts in terms of their external characteristics is also justified with regard to the following ideas. These are not methodological principles as such but concern properties attributed to social phenomena. According to Durkheim, the social world is independent of, or external to, human consciousness in a way akin to the world of nature. The distinctive quality of a social fact - which is to be considered as a physical "thing" - in thes connotation is that has an independent emprical reality of its own. Hence, social facts are external to human consciousness. Secondly, social facts are external to the members of society because they the property of being refractory to the human will: "The most important characteristic of a thing is the impossibility of its modification by a simple effort of the will..." "... a mere act of the will is insufficient to produce a change in it."[84]

Durkheim contends that social facts lend themselves to causal analysis, since they are observed and discovered in a manner similar to the way in which physical facts are observed and discovered in the physical sciences. On the other hand, social facts lend themselves to causal analysis also because they are "determined" in a manner similar to the way in which physical facts are determined in the natural sciences, i.e., every observable change in a social fact is brought about by a change in another social fact. It is Durkheim's major thesis

that social facts are "caused" by other social facts, and never by the facts of individual psychology.[85]

As has been said above, the boldest application of the above ideas is found in Durkheim's study of suicide. His choice of this particular phenomenon is justified by the "alleged" individual or solitary character of this act. That is, the truth of the above thesis can most forcefully be demonstrated by a case most unfavorable to it: If it can be shown that even the most supremely individual act of taking one's life is determined by society, than the truth of the thesis would be demonstrated. As has been said above, Durkheim starts out his analysis by a definition of suicide which he takes to be clear of the confusions and misapprehensions of ordinary usage: suicide is "... cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result."[86] He then continues with refutation of earlier interpretations which are mostly psychological, psychopathological, or biological in nature, and finally arrives at his most celebrated proposition in which he declares that suicide is a function of the degree of integration of the social groups - which is a social factor - of which the individual forms a part. It is important to note that in Durkheim's analysis of suicide, the suicide rate, and not the particular cases of suicide is explained with reference to the degree of cohesion of the social group in which this incidence occurs.

The critical a-praisal of Durkheim's work will be postponed until Part III. At this juncture, the study will only attempt to delienate the logical structure of Durkheim's model of explanation as it is worked out by Merton.

Merton restates Durkheim's theoretic analysis of suicide in the following manner:

1) Suicide rates vary inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups.

2) Catholics are more integrated than Protestants (both of which are social groups).

3) Therefore, lower suicide rates are found among Catholics than Protestants.[87]

In the above scheme of explanation, the original emprical finding, i.e., the differential rates of suicide among Catholics and Protestans, is restated as a generalized relation between certain abstract and conceptualized attributes of groups and their rates of suicide. In this way, the scope of the original emprical finding is extended through its restatement in an abstraction of a higher order, from which certain other emprical generalizations can be derived which pertain both to suicidal behavior and to fields of conduct which are quite remote from it. For example the differential rates of suicide between married persons and singles and other forms of maladaptive

behavior can also be shown to be related to inadequacies of group cohesion.[88]

Merton contends that the above type of analysis also provides a ground for prediction. Thus, if and when emprical findings indicate a decrease of social cohesion in a specific group, the theorist can confidently predict a tendency toward increased suicide rates in this group.[89]

It should also be noted that all the terms in the above analysis are potentially observable, i.e. capable of being re-defined in operational language, and the event in question is not explained with reference to the notions that the subjects hold about their actions, but with reference to causes which are not necessarily mediated by their consciousness.

The congruence of the above scheme of explanation with the so called "deductive nomological" or the "covering-law" model of explanation and its opposition to the types of explanation and advocated by interpretative thinkers will be shown in the section on logical empricism and in Part III. The reader, however, is certain to notice the affinities between Durkheim's general position and the position of the early nineteenth century positivists concerning the explanation of human action. The construction of theories on the basis of prior (pre-theoretical) observations of external regularities in social facts, the definition of the latter solely in terms of its external

characteristics, the dismissal of subjective notions as irrelevant to the explanations of human conduct clearly affiliates Durkheim's work with the nineteenth century teachings of positivist thought, the major characteristics of which are stated in the section on Weber.

B. LOGICAL EMPRICISM

As has been said earlier, logical empricists are spiritual descendants of the Anglo-Saxon movement of analytical philosophy in which the task of philosophy is defined as the analysis of syntactic and semantic properties of language, both lay and scientific. Logical empricists, however, are more exclusive in their definition of the task of philosophy, in that they redefine it as the logical elucidation of the language in which scientific theories are couched. While logical empricists also draw from other sources, in their approach to the mode of analysing the content of such languages they are basically indebted to Russell. And it is basically under his tutelary spirit that the "Vienna Circle" is established in 1923 by a group of younger men drown from natural sciences, namely Carnap, Feigl, and Neurath.[90]

Russell believes that philosophy should be precise and rigorous, and the way to achieve this goal is the elucidation of the language in which scientific statements are couched. Philosophy is to reveal the logical structure "... which under lies the super-

ficial play of appereances", and which conforms to established scientific knowledge.[91] The work of Russell's young discipline, Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is also a major source of influence upon logical empricist thought. As has been mentioned in the section on Winch, early Wittgenstein believes that propositions of language correspond to facts of experience, and that language reflects an exact picture of reality.[92] Below, the elucidation of the implications of both men's works at the hands of logical empricists for the philosophical reconstruction of the language of science is given.

In the "radical" version of logical empricism - which is later abandoned in favor of a more "liberal" one - it is believed that there is a one to one correspondence between statements of science and the facts of the external world. This contention doubtlessly derives from Wittgenstein's above thesis that language reflects an exact picture of reality, or that the propositions of language correspond to facts of experience. And the facts of experience are those that are given in the sense data of external observation (perception by senses). For "... everything that we can know about the world is necessarily expressed in the sensations... This knowledge exhausts the knowledge of reality."[93] Hence, only that which is "observable" is "real" and logical empricists regard the notion of subjective experience as a "metaphysical fiction". In Mach's own word's, whose work is another source of influence on logical empricist thought, the self or ego does not exist as a unity; "it is merely an aggregate of sensations."[94]

The "certainty" of scientific knowledge derives from the alleged ontological "neutrality" of sense-data out of which scientific theories are born and against which they are tested. The underlying assumption behind all the arguments above is that the facts of the external world are simply "out there" to be observed and gathered by anyone who wishes to do so. It is also implicit in the arguments above that human mind, in its normal and healthy state, perceives the same things in the same way irrespective of time and place, i.e, it is able to record the facts in their original and pure form (assuming, of course, that they have such a form) with nothing addded.

But what is to be said about relationships, like the relationship between cause and effect? How is one to infer "causality" on the basis of external observation? And how is one to make sure that this relationship is "real" in the above sense of the term, i.e, do causes "produce" or "necessitate" effects in a manner which is externally observable for the investigator?

The nature of causality will be delierated with reference to Hume's work, since it is Hume's conception of causality which is adopted by logical empricists. According to Hume, causality is inferred on the basis of observation of constant conjunction between two events. For on the level of external, sensory experience there is only regular succession between cause and effect and nothing else. Hence, there is no basis in experience for

the inference that causes "produce" effects. Causes do not "produce" effects but "precede" them regularly. From these propositions, Hume comes to the conclution that the relation of cause to effect is neither natural, nor necessary but only "contingent". And since there is no natural necessity between -ause and effect, no amount of observation could lead is to the conclusion that the raliotnship would hold for the $(n+1)^{th}$ case that we have not observed yet.[95] The implications of Hume's notion of causality for the logical empricists logic of inductive inference will be elucidated later in relation to Popper's "principle of fatsifiability."

The positivistic position on the logic of scientific inquiry has been stated in the beginning of Part I in relation to Weber's interpretative sociology. The early logical empricist position on this issue is almost indistinguishable from that of nineteenth century positivists in that it is also based upon inductive inference, both in regard to the formulation and testing of theories: theories are contructed on the basis of patient observation of regularities in phenomena, and they are also tested inductively against the facts of experience, i.e., in both cases, the procedures employed involve making inferences on the basis of a finite number of observations. The logical empricists radical version of the "principle of verifiability" asserts thatthe test of experience can conclusively prove or disprove theories, i.e. the logic of verification is absolute, it con conclusively judge the "truth value" of scientific prepositions.

It was Popper who first questioned the logic of verification as was originally formulated by the members of the Vienna Circle. Actually, he too was initially associated with this circle, but his later writings stand in peculiar tension to logical empricism. Especially in regard to his views concerning the verifiability of scientific statements, Popper must radically breaks with the tenets of the Vienna Circle: he asserts that since the number of case- that a scientific statement, be it a pypothesis or a theory, is infinite (due to the general and abstract character of laws) it is practically impossible to test scientific statements for all those instances that fall under tham. And since the hypothesized relations between events are of a non-necessary character, i.e. they do not reflect any necessary connection on the level of observation, it can be concluded that no amount of evidence can conclusively testify to the validity or truth of a statement. For there always remains the possibility that the statement would not hold true for the instances that it has not been tested for. Thus, Popper comes to the conclusion that the logic of verification is not absolute, i.e., on the basis of a limited number of observations, we cannot "verify" theories.[96]

Popper's refutation of the positivistic logic of induction do not only pertain to the principle of verification but also to the formulation of theories. He contends that theories are not conceived as a result of painstaking observation and recording of pure facts as positivists assume, but are bold innovations which are prior to any such observation. And he halds that obser-

vations which are made after the theory in order to test its truth value are bound to be theory-empregnated, for it is the theory which determines the kind of facts and operations that are relevant to its testing. This implies that there is no such thing as "pure experience" or "theory-free observation". Popper's arguments shows that there is no natural demarcation between the facts of the external world and our sensations of them. Or put differently, the demarcation between theories and facts is non-existent; all propositions of science are theoretical in character, including the so-called factual or observational propositions which are said to correspond directly to the raw material of experience.[97] The implication of this argument for the testing of theories against facts is obvious: facts can never prove or disprove theories.

On the other hand, findings in modern psychology seems to imply similar conclusions in that they show that healthy and normal minds, when confronted with the same perceptive field, do not necessarily perceive the same things in the same way. This suggests that there is more to healthy and normal mind than simple medical health, or that simple medical health is not sufficient guarantee of unbiased perception. These findings are also somewhat supportive of the idealist thesis that perception is shaped by "à priori categories" of mind (Kant) or that it is determined by the situation in time and the culture of the observer (Dilthey). All this implies that a method of verification which acknowledges the senses as a source of knowledge is bound to contain a psychology of perception, and also as some claim,

a sociology of knowledge. For the mind is not a passive agent in the process of perception, but it actively shapes the elements of the perceptive field. In other words, mind is an intermediary between the external data and our awareness of it.

Findings in quantum physics also point out to the need of abandoning the ideal of "proven truth". Obviously, the study cannot in any way attempt the logical elucidation of these findings, but will only point out to their implications for the positivistic logic of verification. These findings convinangly show that the doctrine of determinism is no longer tenable. Naturally, this calls for certain alterations in the logical empricist position on the issue of "certainity of science". For in the positivistic tredition the certainity of science is grounded in the method of external observation which is supposed to yield knowledge which is free from bias. But the fact that such observation alters the character of what is being observed doubtlessly shakes the secure foundations of scientific knowledge and requires that the philosophical reconstructions of the language of science - especially that of logical empricists, which is entirely modelled after the language of classical physics - be couched in probabilistic rather than deterministic terms.

It is basically in response to the above criticisms and findings that the late positivists of the Vienna Circle abondon the early radical version of positivism in favor of a more liberalized one. In this new version of logical empricism, the ideal

of "proven truth" becomes replaced by the ideal of "probable truth" in order to do justice both to the probabilistic character of the inductive method of verification, and to the theory-impregnated nature of observation.[98] Actually, the problematical nature of the latter has been recognized in the Vienna Circle in relation to the problem of "theoretical terms", long before Popper's attacks. Initially, logical empricists held that scientific theories could in a fairly simple sense be "reduced" to protocol statements. A protocol sentence was supposed to be a statement of actual sense perceptions, immediately recorded and with nothing added. The quest for these sentences was justified by the role they played in the verification of scientific statements, i.e. the verifiability of a scientific statement was identified with the possibility of logically inferring from it a collection of protocol sentences. But Carnap and Neurath later recognized the problematical nature of the translation of general and abstract statements of science to observational language, and started to hold that theoretical concepts cannot "directly" be derived from or reduced to the language of observation. The theoretical language and the observation language however, were to be connected by "correspondence rules", whereby observations would be interpreted in the light of theories, and vice versa.[99] But the nature of correspondence rules has proved a controversial matter among positivistically inclined philosophers. Hence, it has become generally recognized that observation statements are not unchallengeable. And the conclusion might be drawn that the claimed differentiation between the theoretical and observation

language cannot be drawn clearly at all, which brings the logical empricists' position closer to that of Poppers on this issue.

As his own solution to the problem of verification, Popper offers his "principle of falsifiability" as an alternative to the principle of verifiability.[100] His falsificationist program essentially reflects Popper's belief in the possibility and necessity of maintaining an emprical basis on the grounds of which the decisions concerning the acceptance of refutation of theories will be taken. His preference for the falsificationist method is largely determined by the absoluteness of its logic - which was exactly waht he was after. For he believed that there should be some "absolute" way of eliminating theories. Otherwise there would be no scientific progress, and the growth of science would be nothing but growing chaos in the presence of "probable" theories.

Popper argues that while no amount of evidence in favor of a scientific assertion conclusively verify its truth, a single observation of an instance contrary to the assertion affirms its falsity, and this is precisely the grounding for the absoluteness of the logic of falsification. Taking his famous example, the essertion of the logic of falsification. Taking his famous example, the essertion that "All swans are white" cannot be verified conclusively unless the said property is observed in the total population of swans which is practically impossible, but it can be falsified by the discovery to be scientific, it has to be stated in a falsifiable language, it has to specify the kind

of evidence which would falsify it. He also contends that with regard to the truth value of a scientific statement, the only thing that can be said is that it has not been falsified by the amount of evidence collected so far.[101]

While his complete rejection of induction and sensory certainity, and his substitution of falsifation for verification with the corresponding stress upon boldness and ingeuity (rather than patient observation) in the framing of scientific hypotheses dissociates Popper's position from that of logical empricists, it is often asserted that his falsificationist program essentially retains the pivot of the positivistic problematic,[102] by assuming the epistemological independence of facts from theories. That is, even though Popper rejects the designation "positivistic", his principle of falsifiability essentially rests upon the premises of positivism. And the problematic character of both methods of testing, i.e, the methods of verification and falsification, derive basically from the problematic nature of the translation of the theoretical language to the language of observation. The "theory-impregnated" character of the observational language seems to be the basic problem in this regard. On the other hand, all sorts of other mistakes and biases may enter the translation of one language to the other, so as to make it difficult to decide when, for example, if we discover a "falsifying" instance, whether we have really discovered one such instance, or we have "wrongly" translated the language of theory to the observational language.

On the other hand, the anti-positivist philosophers respond in the most radical way to the failure of the positivistic method of verification in providing a rational and absolute basis of proving theories: they deemphasize the role of the rational element involved in the acceptance or refutation of theories and water down the ideal of "proven truth" to "truth by consensus".[103] While their work is generally considered in studies concerned with the interpretative understanding of human action because of their widely-recognized connections, the present study will disregard them for a number of reasons. Firstly, the elucidation of their work requires the elucidation of the history of science, since their views concerning the philosophy of science largely derive from and justified with reference to the latter. But it will be appreciated that such a task, i.e. the elucidation of the history of science, cannot in a fairly simple way be articulated to the tasks of this study. On the other hand, the anti-positivistic philosophies of science are also ignored because of their "relativistic" implications, the logical conclusions of which cannot, within the narrow confines of this study, be pursued far enough.

A summary statement of the characteristics of positivistic though relevant to the problems of this study is given above. Below, the formal structure of the positivistic model of explanation, or the so-called "deductive-nomological" model is stated with reference to Hempel's elucidation of it. This is also called the Popper-Hempel "covering-law" model of explanation in the literature,[104] and is generally recognized as an adequate represen-

tation of a "typical" scientific explanation within positivist circles. As has been said above, this model of explanation, as of all other reconstructions of logical empricists, is modelled after the example of classical physics. Actually, the application of this model of explanation to social sciences has provoked as much discussion as its relevance to natural sciences.[105] The present study will only address itself to the first question in Part III and ignore the latter. For, it is positivists' version of the model of natural scientific explanation that is advocated and followed in positivistically-inclined schools of social thought as will be presently seen in relation to Durkheim's explanation of suicide.

The "covering law" model states that the explanation of an event consists in its subsumption under a general law. These laws are universal conditionals which state determinate relations between phenomena. The explanation consits of two different but logically interrelated parts: The first part contains premises which are universal statements referring to regular and uniform relationships between phenomena. Also in the first part are the statements of antecedent conditions which are said to precede the occurence of the event to be explained and which are also believed to have some relevance and bearing on the occurence of the event in question. The second part of the explanation asserts the occurence of the event and its occurence, as is stated before, is "logically" necessitated by the premises in the first part. The logical structure of explanation stated simply in Hempel's technical language is as follows:

$C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n$
$L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_k$ ➡ explanans

E ➡ explanandum

Hempel also contends that the logical structure of prediction is essentially the same with that of explanation, i.e. there is logical symmetry between explanation and prediction in the sense that if we "reliably" anticipate the presence of antecedent conditions in the explanation, and also given are the universal laws we can predict the occurence of the event.[106]

Hempel's "covering-law" model also allows for statistical generalizations in the place of general laws. In this case, however the explanans do not logically imply the explanandum, but confers a high likelihood upon it. Hence, the resulting explanatory arguments are inductive, rather than deductive in character.

Keat and Urry show the correspondence of Durkheim's study of suicide as it is used in the explanation of differential rates of suicide in domestic society with that of Hempel's model of explanation in the following manner:

explanans
L_1 Suicide rates vary inversely with the degree of integration of domestic society.
C_1 There are two groups, one of married, one of unmarried people.
C_2 Married people are more integrated

explanandum
There is a lower suicide rate among the married group [107]

It is apparent that the above representation meets the requirements of the positivistic model of explanation in that the explanation proceeds as a logical argument where the occurence of the event to be explained is logically necessitated by a set laws and antecedent conditions, the terms in the laws all refer to entities and relations (of a causal kind) which are potentially observable, i.e., capable of being redefined in operational language and the event in question is not explained with reference to the notions that people hold about their actions, but with reference to causes which are not necessarily mediated by their consciousness.

P A R T I I I

"INTERPRETATIVE" APPROACHES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

A. INTERPRETATION OF MEANING VS CAUSAL EXPLANATION

Two discrete traditions in social theory relating to the problems understanding and explanation of human action have been identified in Part I and II: One is the tradition of social theory of which Durkheim stands as the most prominent representative and which, as mediated by his writings, is closely tied into some comtemporary schools of academic sociology especially in the Englisp-speaking world. Because of its close historical and intellectual connections - of which only the latter are demonstrated in Pa-t II - with positivism in philosophy, this tradition of social theory is designated as "positivistic sociology" here. The second tradition - perhaps too recent and varied to be called a tradition - is that which is represented by the authors included in Part I. Despite their mutually dissident views on a number of issues closely related to the problems of this study - which will be singled out in this part - the writings of these authors nonetheless show definite interconnections which warrant their unity as a "tradition".

Because of a shared concern on the part of its representatives with problems of language, meaning and reflexivity in relation to "interpretative" understanding of human action, this tradition in social theory is designated as "interpretative sociology" here, following the designation of some of its representatives (Weber, Schutz) and also that of certain of its more recent followers.[108]

With the partial exception of some of its prominent representatives (Weber, Habermas) this tradition stands in opposition to the tradition of positivistic sociology, i.e. from the point of view of its representatives. From the point of view of its critics. However, this proves to be a controversial matter; it is at least suggested by the enormity of the literature that this question has initiated in the last two decades. A cursory glance at this literature also suggests that the question of the compatability of interpretative sociology with positivistic sociology is inseperabily bound up with the question of its tenability as a "scientific" discipline. That is, those who set out to inquire the compatability of the former with the latter often come up with conclusions - perhaps not incidentally, concerning the validity and relevance of the method of interpretation to scientific studies of social phenomena. As has been said in the beginning of the study, the controversy largely arises from a lack of inter-subjectively - agreed set of criteria of evaluation in the social sciences. This part is meant as a contribution in the above two respect, it attempts to demonstrate the points of conflict and overlap between positivistic and interpretative models of explanation, and tries to assess the "adequacy" of the explanations mo-

delled after the latter. In either case, the emphasis is on the explanation of human action.

The concept of "adequacy" however proves to be an elusive one. From our treatments of interpretative and positivistic sociologies in the first two parts, there seems to emerge two different, and "seemingly" unrelated meanings of this concept. One is the positivistic criterion of "adequacy" which refers to the adequacy of an explanation in terms of the procedural canons of emprical science, i.e to the validity or legitimacy of the procedures employed in arriving at the theoretical and emprical assertions that comprise and explanation and in assessing the congruence or fit of these assertions with facts. For convenience of reference, this will be designated as "emprical adequacy". The other is the interpretative criterion of "adequacy" which refers to the adequacy of an explanation as an interpretative scheme applicable by the expert and the laymen to the phenomena of everyday life. This shall be designated as "interpretative adequacy": while the latter is invariably adopted by all the interpretative thinkers included in Part I - even though in various forms, the former, with the partial exception of the works of Weber and Habermas, is either totally inexistent or appears under the same name but with different implications in the writings of interpretative thinkers. The question naturally arises as to by which set of criteria of adequacy and with what justification interpretative sociologies will be evaluated, since the above two sets of criteria of evaluation do not necessarily imply one another,

at least when they are taken at their face value. We shall, however, argue below that the premises and the implications of interpretative sociologies call for their evaluation in terms of both sets of criteria of adequacy mentioned above. That is, it will be demonstrated that the criteria of interpretative adequacy "implies" the criteria of emprical adequacy at the level of interpretation of meaning. These arguments will largely derive from Habermas' notion that a knowledge-constitutive interest in hermeneutic understanding is inseperably bound up with that of emprical-analytical sciences on the one hand, and with that of critique of ideology on the other.

Below we shall discern some common themes in the writings of those included in Part I in order to demonstrate their points of conflict and overlap with certain positivistic themes arising from the positivistic sociology of Durkheim.

First, we shall deal with the theme of the significance of the notion of human action, or agency. This notion appears with varying degrees of emphasis inthe writings of interpretative sociologists, and it is placed against the sociol determinism inherent in the sort of approach favored in Durkheim's writing, especially in his theory of suicide. In Weber's definition of rational action, the unit of reference is the person, or the acting self. The motive or the end is connected to the means (acts) by the rational monitoring of the actor, and not through some sort of a mechanical effect. On the other hand, the notion of agency

is inherent in Schutz' conception of social life as a skilled performance of its members. Habermas also recognizes the relevance of the notion of agency to the concept of action even though the scope of human agency is much more limited in his critical theory (because of the powerful causal influence that "purposive rational action" exerts on symbolic interaction). The notion of human agency in the writings of linguistic philosophers, on the other hand, is a bit elusive, because of the ambiguous nature or the origin of forms of life (Winch), or moral orders. But it will be shown in the following pages that the linguistic philosophers actually operate on a different level of analysis, namely descriptive, and the notion of agency, which is basically relevant on the level of explanation, thereby assumes secondary significance in their writings.

Giddens argues that the absence of a "theory of action" is the major point at which the line of thought running from Durkheim to modern schools of positivistic sociology and positivistic philosophy as stemming from logical empricism coincide, and at which positivistic and interpretative sociologies depart. For whereas interpretative sociologies involve a framework that relates motives to the rational monitoring of action, positivistic sociologies are totally lacking in such a concern. That is, each involves a deterministic form of social philosophy which allows no room for a conception of the actor as an agency capable of securing intended outcomes through his reflexively-monitored interventions in the course of events.[109] The truth of Giddens

thesis is most clearly demonstrated in Durkheim"s writings, especially in his theory of suicide where he defines suicide "as all cases of death resulting from the act of the victim which he knows will produce that result" and declares this to be a function of the degree of integration of groups which the individual forms a part. Apparently, Durkheim excludes intention or purpose from his conceptualization of the object of his study, despite his use of the term "knows", because there is certainly a difference between "doing something knowing it will produce that result" and "doing something intending to produce that result".[110] The theory set out in his study of suicide is essentially a deterministic one in that the explanation of suicide in terms of the degree of integration of social groups leaves no room for suicidal acts as rationalized action, that is, as conduct carried out for reasons reflexively applied by the agents involved, or in Douglas' terms as "meaningful" and "intentional" act freely undertaken by the individual.[111]

Second is the theme of reflexivity. The notion of action, especially in the writings of Schutz, Habermas, and Winch is integrally bound up with the capacity of human agents for self-understanding and understanding others. Schutz accords centrality to the notion of self-reflexivity by considering this as the pre-condition of all social interaction and social interaction as the medium of the constitution and reproduction of society. On the other hand, self-understanding and understanding others is inherent in Weber's definitions of rational and social action. And in Habermas writings, the theme of self-reflexivity or self-

understanding figures in the forefront. Actually, the whole object of his critical theory is to render the unacknowledged causal conditions of interaction "reflexively" accessible to its participants so as to offer the possibility of their transformation. Hence, the notion of reflexivity is integrally bound up with that of agency in Habermas' writings. He not only stresses the significance of self-reflexivity as a constitutive capacity, but also recognizes it as one of the initial conditions of transformation of society. (i.e. self-understanding freed from the ideological and neurotic distortions).

In positivistic schools of social theory, self-reflexivity is recognized only in marginal forms and as a "nuisance" to be avoided or minimized - as "self-fulfilling" or self-negating prophecies which complicate the predictive testing of hypotheses.[112] The latter point will be elaborated later in relation to the interpretative criteria of adequacy. In Durkheim's theory of suicide the dislocation of the notion of agency from the concept of suicidal action is complemented by the dislocation of the notion of self-reflexivity from the same concept. This again, is closely related to his deterministic stand, and also to his methodological commitments, i.e. his mistrust of features of conduct that are not observable, where the latter means "directly apprehended by the senses".

The third point is the theme of language. Actually, this theme is worked out more satisfactorily in some recent schools of interpretative sociology (ethnomethodology).[113] But their

insights can easily be traced back to those of Schutz and linguistic philosophers. For the latter two, even if there is no immediate historical continuity between them, seem to reach similar conclusions independently concerning the significance of language to interpretation of meaning. In interpretative sociologies, language is related to actions because the latter are characterized by their agents in terms of the conceptual framework within which they operate. Schutz considers language as a repository of accumulations of meaning and experience. All common sense interpretations presuppose the use of interpretative schemata "... which form the meaning-content of expressions and of the great systems of language, art, science, myth, etc.", and which "... play their own specific role in everyone's interpretation of the behavior of others.[114] The role of "common sense understandings" in human social interaction and the role of the latter in the production and reproduction of society has been stressed before. In linguistic philosophy, following Wittgenstein, notions like self-reflexivity or intentionality are not treated as expressions of an inaccessible inner world of private experiences, but as necessarily drawing upon the communicative categories of language.[115] That is, self-understanding is held to be possible only through the appropriation by the subject of publicly available "linguistic forms". The important point to make is that this applies to philosophers and scientists as well as to laymen. That is, in making sense of others conduct the scientists and philosophers essentially draw from the same resources as laymen do in making sense of their and others conduct in everyday life. This theme will be elaborated lated in relation to the theme of the adequacy of explanation.

The theme of language is integrally bound up with that of "the intersubjectivity of all knowledge and throught" in SchutzI writings.[116] That is, the constitution of meaning as an intersubjective phenomenon definitely pressuposes the common medium of language from which the interpretative schemata of everyday interaction are routinely drawn by lay actors. All this, of course, has consequences for the methodological status of the operation of verstehen. In more recent series of writings in this field, verstehen is treated, not as a method of investigation peculiar to the social sciences, but as an ontological condition of life in society as such, and it is regarded, not as depending upon a psychological process of "re-enactment" or "re-living" of the expe-riences of others, but as primarily a linguistic matter of grasping the content of familiar and unfamiliar forms of life through entering into "dialogue" with their members.[117] Hence, what these writers call "understanding" does not involve an emphatic grasp of others' consciousness in some mysterious or obscure fashion, but is simply a semantic matter. While this newer version of verstehen relieves it from some of the charges levelled against it by positivist sociologists and philosophers, it also creates a host of other problems concerning the interpretation of meaning. But these will be mentioned later.

The significance of ordinary language for understanding or explanation of human action is partly recognized in positivistic schools of social theory, but mostly in relation to "making sense" of actions in alien cultures or forms of life that are different from that of the scientist, that is, in anthropological studies.

The relevance of the scientists immersion in the form of life that he studies, and the significance of the grasping of their language is recognized in the technique of participant observation. But there is one essential difference between interpretative and positivist thinkers in this respect: the above studies are essentially conducted for the purpose of mediating different frames of meaning, and in more orthodox schools of anthropology, for the purpose of judging the "rationality" of alien forms of conduct according to standards of scientific rationality, whereas the universes of meaning especially in the writings of linguistic philosophers and their more recent followers, are treated as "self-contained" or unmediated. This point will be elaborated in our critical assessment of interpretative sociologies.

In Durkheim's writings, the categories of everyday thought and language are deliberately ignored because of their fuzziness and ambiguity. This, of course, is based on the assumption that a dear cut boundary or demarcation could be set between ordinary language and scientific "metalanguages", and that the former is, in principle, corrigible in the light of the latter. This point will also be elaborated later.

Fourth is theme of rationality. This theme, firstly and most importantly appears in relation to causal explanation of human action in Weber's version of interpretative sociology. The interpretation of human action in terms of motives can be "causal" interpretation precisely in so far as we are able to analyse it in terms

of chains of rationality, i.e. by linking "motives" or "purposes" to the means whereby the actor seeks to attain particular goals. The affirmation of the intrinsic rationality of conduct that is "freely" directed by the individual is a major thesis in Weber's analysis.

On the other hand, the theme of rationality appears in relation to identification or classification of human acts. Winch emphasizes the need for contextual criteria of rationality. He argues that the scientific norms of rationality cannot be applied to the analysis of social conduct for in the latter the criteria for judging therationality of actions are essentially given by the rules that express different forms of life.

In positivistic sociology, the notion of rationality is ignored because of its inherent connection with the notions of reflexivity and agency. In so far as the positivistic conception of causality involves constant conjunction, temporality and contingency, no reference is needed to concepts like reflexivity or rationality which "logically" connect the means to ends, or actions to motives or purposes on the level of explanation of human action.

Fifth is theme of adequacy. This is one of the central themes in the writings of interpretative sociologists, and it finds its most radical expression in Schutz' work. Schutz asserts that an explanation is adequate if it is understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow men in terms of common-sense

interpretation of everyday life. According to Winch, the use of concepts and constructs unprovided by the form of life is legitimate in so far as these presuppose or are logically tied to the ones actually employed by the participants of the form of life in question. Habermas follows Winch and Schutz in asserting that the scientist's interpretation of action should be understandable or intelligible for the actor. But the concept of adequacy in Habermas' writings is also oriented to the demands of critical theory; the explication of the unacknowledged conditions of interaction is accomplished through nomological analysis, and as such is substantiated by the criteria of the emprical-analytical sciences. Hence, a failure on the part of the subject to appropriate a given interpretation is not a sufficient proof of its incorrectness or inadequacy. For the subject's own understanding might be inflicted with neurotic and ideological distortions which result in his rejection of a true analytical understanding of his situation.

In positivistic sociology and philosophy, the scientist's constructions obey a principle of verifiability (or falsifiability according to Popper) rather than the principle of adequacy. As has been said above, the significance of actors appropriation of the scientist's interpretation is recognized in marginal forms, but basically as an obstacle for the predictive testing of hypotheses. The above themes of agency, reflexivity and rationality jointly imply the "causal" mastery of the actor over the events of the outer world, including the conditions and consequences of his own conduct. This however should be seen in a different

light from what Giddens, following Taylor calls, "event causality" for whereas event causality implies determinism, "agent causality" leaves room for the notion of freedom of will.[118] Giddens argues that the latter (human freedom) is inherent in the concept of agency because it is analytical to this concept "... that the world as constituted by a stream of events in process independent of the agent does not hold out a predetermined future and that a person could have acted otherwise."[119] He explicates the sense of "could have acted otherwise" with the example of a man who stays in his office by the duties of his occupation on a sunny day. This, according to Giddens, is essentially different from the situation of a man who is "obliged" to stay at home by having broken two legs. The above argument implies that whenever action is caused by willed and conscious purposes, it is free. This is precisely the point that Weber makes in relation to causality and freedom: the less and individual's action is conditioned by the internal impress of affect or by external compulsion of some sort, i.e. the more it is conditioned by conscious and willed purposes, the freer it is.[120]

The sense of "causal intervention of the agent in the ongoing process of events in the world",on the other hand, is a difficult one in the sense that it is not directly connected with the concept of agency or purposive action. For while it is true that human actions bring about a series of consequences which alter the course of events in the outer world. These are not necessarily willed or intended by the agents. This may come about

in two ways: either the intended occurence is not achieved, but instead the action produces another outcome or outcomes, or the intended occurence is achieved, but it also brings about a range of other unintended or unforeseen consequences. On the other hand, the intended outcomes may come about through some fortunate happening and not through the intervention of the agent as such. In either case the judgement is justified that the notion of agent-causality is not necessarily centered upon that of purpose or intention. The consequence of this for the explanation of human action is obvious: neither actions, nor its consequences can be logically derived from actors' intentions or purposes unless some further enquiries and assumptions are made. This, of course, equally applies to the reverse procedure of inferring actors' purposes or intentions on the basis of their actions.

This is precisely where the themes of language and rationality enter the picture. Human beings can provide us, through what they say, withmore or less clear-cut boundaries between which of their doings may be correctly called purposive and which not; it is much more difficult to know where to draw such boundaries in the case of animal behavior, where the motives or purposes have to be inferred on the basis of "observed acts". Rationality is also an important theme in this context, and its scope should certainly be enlarged so as to include rationalities of everyday life. For scientific knowledge is only one out of many possible universes of meaning, and the scientists cannot expect common sense beliefs to embody the perspectives developed by them.

The above arguments imply that on the level of explanation of human action the traditional distinction between verstehen and erklaren (explanation) is untenable. What Weber does in distinguishing direct and explanatory understanding is to transform the division between verstehen and "erklaren" into two sequential aspects of social scientific method where the former becomes the premise of the latter. We have to understand the meaning of what an actor is doing before both the "adequacy on the level of meaning" and "causal adequacy". For upon it depends the possibility of a social science which does more than merely describe actors' own understanding of their acts. But we shall later argue that the theoretical terms in which Weber couches this differentiation are inadequate.

The "adequacy on the level of meaning" is problematical in so far as the motives or purposes professed by the agents are not the causes of their actions. This, however, does not mean that the social scientist should eschew reference to actors motives or purposes unless they are the causes of their actions, in Peters terms unless "their reasons" are "the reasons".[121] His reason, or the meaning of an action for the actor has significance in so far as we want to delienate the particular thought structures of a societal group; how they interpret social reality, including their actions, and in what terms; why do they deviate from the actual operative reasons; how this meaning is correlated with various characteristics of the actor, with his situation in social milieu, and with significant personality patterns. That is, inter-

pretative thinkers' preoccupation with meanings, motives, reasons and purposes can only be substantiated with an interest in the above questions. An as we have shown before, the dislocation of purpose or intention from the concept of agency does not necessarily call for the abandonement of the notion of agent causality. That is to say, it is on a par with the interpretative locution that the production of society is brought about by the active constituting skills of its members. But as Giddens remarks, "... it draws upon resources, and depends upon conditions of which they are unaware or which they perceive dimly."[122] The discovery or theexplication of the latter certainly calls for less impressionistic methods; in so far as the social scientist cannot get access to them through motivational understanding. And the substantiation of the knowledge claims in the latter logically requires something other than the "principle of adequacy", since thay are not formulated "in the actors' own terms". That is to say, actors may or may not appropriate the scientist's interprations, but this cannot by itself be trusted as an evidence of its validity, because subjects' own understanding of their situation may be inflicted with neurotic or ideological distortions which result in their rejection of a true analytical understanding of their situation. Hence, we shall argue that interpretations which are made in terms of unacknowledged social conditions and unconscious motivating elements of action should obey a principle of emprical adequacy.

The problems that attend the use of emprical adequacy and the "principle of verifiability" have been mentioned before. Those,

however, are the problems that arise on the level of philosophical speculation. When it comes to social sciences, and especially to understanding and explanation of human action, the problem of the verifiability of theories assumes new dimensions. Here, the predictive power of theories (or explanations for that matter) - as an evidence of their explanatory power - is seriously challanged by the nature of human social conduct. That is, the assumed symmetry between explanation and prediction in the deductive - nomological model of explanation no longer holds in a simple and straightforward way in the social sciences. For the nature of human social conduct is such that the actors knowledge of the generalizations offered by the social sciences alters the context of their application. This is best shown in self-fulfilling, or self-negating prophecies, and it is indicative of the fact that knowledge produced by the social sciences can be reflexively incorporated into the rationalization of action. This in turn implies that social sciences stand in an "inherently" critical relation to its field of study, i.e. human social conduct, it can be a potential source of revelation or domination. Hence, the problem of the testability of theories should be reviewed in light of the above considerations.

B. CRITIQUE OF INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES

The most importnat contribution of interpretative sociologies lies in their assimilation of meaning to the explanation of human action. For it is a fact that men assign subjective

meanings, motives or purposes to their actions and it is also a fact that "men entertain and express philosophical, i.e. non-scientific ideas, and ... subjectively associate these ideas in the closest way with the motives they assign to their actions. It is important to know what relation the fact that men entertain such ideas, and that in any specific case, the ideas are what they are, bears to the equally definite facts that they act, or have acted as they do."[123] We shall also argue that in so far as the philosophical or nonscientific ideas of men, and their professed motives or reasons relate to the ways they act, they cannot be thought away on the grounds that they are subjective, private or inaccessible, or that the method: required for their elucidation involve subjective operations like intuition, empathy or sympathetic experience. That is, any serious study of human action should come to terms with facts of this order, whatever their nature or however difficult their observation may be. But it is mistaken to suppose that recognition of the subjective character of action necessarily involves either the relinquishment of the possibility of confronting it objectively, or the abandonment of causal explanation.

In interpretative sociologies, however, the term "meaning", despite attempts at rigorous definitions, remains essentially elusive and obscure. More correctly, it does far too much work, covering various distinct phenomena that have to be seperated in the analysis of social action. Thoughout interpretative writings, the term "meaning" is used as equivalent to the following aspects

of action: actors' intentions or purposes fortheir action; the moral norms or ideals to which action may be oriented; the concepts and generalizations ("common sense understandings") which lay actors use in their day-to-day conduct; and the concepts and generalizations which philosophers must use in describing or analysing such conduct.

On the other hand, the explanatory value of the concept of meaning in all the above senses of the term is exaggerated. A common tendency to explain action in terms of motivating ideals, with the partial exception of Weber and Habermas, leads interpretative thinkers do disregard the unacknowledged social conditions, the unintended consequences, and unconscious motivating elements of action as of explanatory relevance. This has the consequence of extending the scope of agency beyond emprically reasonable limits.

The methodological status of verstehen remains essentially uncertain. The earlier version of verstehen as formulated by Weber fails to be satisfactory at the level of explanation of action and needs to be supplemented by causal understandings (in regard of the unconscious motives, and unacknowledged social conditions relevant to the explanation of human action). The newer version of verstehen, on the other hand, do not allow for mediation between frames or universes of meaning (or forms of life) in so far as ortinary language from which it draws is considered as a closed system.

The "principle of adequacy" brings about explanatory restrictions. That is, in so far as an explanation cannot be framed

in actors' own terms, it is inadequate according to Schutz and linguistic philosophers. This has the consequence of limiting the explanatory power of an explanation. On the other hand, the implications of the principle of adequacy are not pursued far enough: there is a two way connection between the language of social science and ordinary language. The former cannot ignore the categories used by laymen in the practical organization of social life: but on the other hand, the concepts of social science may also be taken over and applied by laymen as elements of their conduct.

In the light of these general considerations the specific shortcomings of the works included in Part I may be noted as follows

Weber's distinction between observational and explanatory understanding is not as clear-cut as his writings suggest. Explanatory understanding involves the placing of an act in an understandable sequence of motivation with reference to a wider context of meaning. But some of the examples cited in relation to direct understanding seems to involve precisely this, i.e. the example of the man holding the doorknob in order to shut it, and the example of the man aiming the gun at an animal in order, to kill. It is obvious that the acts are placed in an understandable sequence of motivation. On the other hand, Schutz argues that what observationa understanding provides us with is the objective (observer's) and not the subjective (actor's) meaning. For the man in the first example might as well be holding the doorknob steady in order to repair it. And as for the man in the second example, he may not be

taking aim at all, but merely watching the animal through the telescopic sight on his rifle. This shows that observational understanding is not enough to settle questions of subjective meaning.[124] Observational understanding is misleading in so far as the context of meaning in the actors mind do not coincide with that of the observer's. Schutz also questions the validity of Weber's motivational (explanatory) understanding as a method of discovering the subjective meanings of action. Weber says that this consists in understanding the meaning-context within which an action belongs, once the action's subjective meaning is itself understood. But in the same place he speaks of this meaning context as one of which this action would be, from our point of view, an appropriate part. Schutz argues that this is confusing if not downright contradictory, for we have no means of knowing that the meaning context which we think appropriate is at all the same as what the actor has in mind. Schutz position on this issue is one of pessimism; it is wedded to the notion that we can never achieve more than a fragmentary and imperfect knowledge of the other, whose consciousness must forever remain closed to us.[125]

The process of "evaluation of the means to an intended result", on the other hand, is also problematical as Weber himself admits. That is, given one clearly defined objective, the choice of the means is not necessarily clear. Rather this choice, perhaps not in every case cmopletely indefinite or ambigious, is determined by a variety of elements the number of which varies according to circumstances.

Despite its claims to explanatory power, Schutz phenomenological program essentially remains as descriptive analysis of the actor's own understanding of their action. In so far as motivational understanding involves a grasp of the actor's own meaning, (or what he alternatively calls intended or subjective meaning) it cannot provide us with an understanding of unacknowledged conditions or unconscious motivating elements of action which may be relevant to its explanation. On the other hand, Schutz formulation of the principle of adequacy is unsatisfactory. As he himself recognizes, the "relevances" of science and everyday life are essentially different. In ordinary life we call a halt to the process of interpreting other people's meanings when we have found out enough to answer our practical question; in short we stop at the point that has direct relevance to the response we shall make ourselves. "To this extent we can say of every meaning-interpretation of the social world that it is" pragmatically determined".[126] Hence, it is difficult to see how the "principle of adequacy" can be tenable - given that, the interests and therefore criteria, that guide the formulation of sociological concepts are different from those involved in everyday notions.

In Winch's linguistic philosophy of action, the concept of rule does too much work, and is not adequately explicated. Giddens argues that what he has to say is mostly informed by a model of linguistic rules or conventions where conformity is essentially unproblematic.[127] This, he says, has two consequences: First, Winch does not pose the question "Whose" rules? And second, there is morethan one sort of orientation which actors may develop

toward social norms: knowing the "meaning" of an action is quite distinct from the commitment to carry it out Winch does not deal with the distinction between moral commitment and cognitive appraisal.

Gellner argues that the treatment of forms of life as given and ultimate (not susceptible to external validation) is refuted through the fact that some forms of life themselves refuse to treat themselves as ultimate.[128] It is equally refuted by the fact that, "in the world as it is", we simply do not have those self-contained units which could be their own standards of intelligibility and reality. What we have instead is a set of traditions so complex, so differentiated internally, that we do not know how to delimit our units - indeed any delimitation is largely arbitrary. And "these traditions are so sophisticated, so systematically aware of conceptual and moral alternatives, so habituated to interaction, that it is quite meaningless to advise them to turn inwards."[128] Hence, Gellner concludes that we must reject the view which presumes that any form of belief or "rule of meaning", when interpreted within its social context, is as valid as any other.

Habermas' critical theory should, of course, be evaluated on a level commensurate with the ambitiouness of its projects. It is impossible to attempt anything like a throughgoing critique of his work here, but we shall suffice by pointing out to some aspects of it, which have proved unsatisfactory to his critiques.

Firstly,the differentiation between purposive rational action (work) and communicative action (interaction) is not as clear- cut as Habermas suggests. The distinction between the two derives from the opposition of "interest in technical control" and "interest in understanding", i.e. according to Habermas, work and interaction "... follow rationally reconstructible patterns which are logically independent of one another".[130] But this is not so in relation to the analysis of social conduct. For in the transformation of nature by human activity, work is not solely directed by instrumental reason, nor is interaction oriented merely to mutual understanding or consensus, but to the realization of ends which are not exclusive of one another.[131]

On the other hand, Giddens argues that Habermas' analysis of reflexivity as the means of the transformation of action in the direction of expanded autonomy is not clear on the question of "who" becomes reflexively aware of the conditions of their action. He remarks that Habermas moves unconcernedly between self-reflection to refer to a total human project, and using it to refer to the reflexivity of particular subjects. In either case, psychoanalysis seems a poor model for critical theory for as Giddens rightly observers psychoanalysis is an encounter between individual persons entered into voluntarily and as such gives us little clue as to how to connect the explication of human action with the properties of social institutions and structures.[132] Hence, the dynamics of the transformation process remains obscure in Habermas' work.

It is also argued that Habermas' reconstruction of the logic of natural scientific inquiry gives a very simple picture of actual scientific practice. More specifically, his critiques contend that his reconstruction of the logic of natural scientific inquiry shares much the same limitations as positivistic reconstructions do.[133] But since the question of the relevance and the accuracy of philosophical or social scientific reconstructions of the logic of natural scientific inquiry is ignored in the present study, it is not necessary to evaluate this aspect of his work here. As has been said above, the extraordinary compass of Habermas' critical theory requires a much thoughgoing critique which cannot be attempted within the narrow confines of the present study.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding sections, the concepts, constructs and some of the basic assumptions of the method of "interpretation" of human action are examined through the works of some prominent representatives of the tradition of interpretative thought and in relation to the positivistic stance concerning this issue. The main controversy between the two is shown to center upon the question of the relevance and validity of the concept of "subjective meaning" for sociological models and the method of explanation of human action.

In Part I, the nature and significance of this concept is elucidated with reference to the works of a number of sociologists and philosophers who are associated with the tradition of interpretative thought in recent literature. Despite their dissident views concerning the nature and province of sociological inquiry (Some argue that it is essentially philosophical in nature, whereas others contend that it is at once emprical-analytical and interpretative. Still others claim that it is, in addition to all those above, inherently critical towards its subject matter.), it is argued that their common emphasis upon the significance and indispensibility of the concept of "subjective meaning" to sociological models and the method of explanation of human action warrant their unified treatment as a tradition here and in recent literature. On the other hand, the nature and variants of the techniques used in gaining access to the subjective meanings of actions are thoroughly examined in the course of Part I. In this context, reference is made to verstehen, observational and motivational understanding, and causal analysis of the natural sciences as conceived by Habermas and Weber. It is shown that with the partial exception of Winch and Schutz, interpretative thinkers reqard causal analysis as an indispensible tool for sociological studies of human action, in addition to the technique of verstehen or subjective interpretation. It is demonstrated that the need for the former in interpretative approaches is justified with reference to the insufficiency of the latter techniques in providing the social scientist with an understanding of the conditions and consequences of action unacknowledged or unmediated by the consciousness of the actors, but which are of explanatory relevance

for sociological studies of their conduct.

In Part III, an "ideal-typical" version of the positivistic model of explanation of human action is abstracted with reference to Durkheim's theory of suicide and to the works of a number of positivistically inclined philosophe-s associated with logical empricism. It is argued that despite their conflicting views on a number of issues, the works of Durkheim and the logical empricists nevertheless show important points of overlap with respect to the understanding and exhlanation of human action; a common lack of concern with the "subjective meaning" of action being the most important one for the issues and problems of this study. On the other hand, a brief survey of the positivistic criteria of evaluatio and the philosophical problems that attend their employment is also attempted in this part.

In Part III the focal points of conflict between positivistic and interpretative models and methods of explanation of human action are demonstrated and the significance and contribution of interpretative approaches to sociological understanding of human action are assessed with reference to a number of interpretative and positivistic criteria of evaluation.

It is concluded that in so far as the subjective meanings, motives or intentions that men assign to their actions relate to the ways they act, they cannot be thought away on the grounds that they are subjective, private, or inaccessible, or that the methods

required for their elucidation involve subjective operations like intution, emphathy or sympathetic experience. That is, it is contended that any serious study of human action should come to terms with facts of this order whatever their nature or however difficult their observation or discovery may be. However, it is also argued that the actors' own motives, intentions, or accounts of their actions or situations must not be taken as the sole means of formulating or validating hypotheses about their conduct. For they might "err" in respect of the consequences and conditions of actions which are unacknowledged or unmediated by their consciousness. The further implication of this for sociological studies of human action is that actions cannot be derived from the motives, of their conduct. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to infer motives or intentions from actions, as the latter may contain elements which are not intended by the actors. There arguments in turn, render the interpretative criteria of "adequacy" inadequate. That is, interpretative accounts of human action which contain a first level reference to the actor's motives, intentions (or subjective meanings) and which, by virtue of this fact becomes "understandable" to the actor and "adequate" to the social scientist may nevertheless turn out to be "false". This is where anayses that go beyond the concepts, constructs, and "causes" that are used or professed by actors' becomes necessary for a "true" understanding of their actions and situations. Needless to say, the validify of the conclusions arrived as a result of such analysis should be evaluated with reference to a set of criteria other than the interpretative criteria of adequacy on the level of meaning, namely, with reference

to the criteria of emprical or causal adequacy.

This, however, must not be taken to mean that no reference should be made to the actors' own reasons or motives unless they are the real causes of their actions. For one thing, it is usually the case that such causes are discovered in the process of analysis of the former. Secondly, one may want to delienate the particular thought structures of a societal group; how they interpret social reality, including their actions and in what terms; why do they deviate from the actual operative reasons; how this meaning is correlated with various characteristics of the actor, with his situation in social milieu and with significant personality patterns all of which requires a reference to the actors' own reason and motives. As has been said before, in many cases a true understanding of the real causes of actions may not even be possible without an adequate understanding of all the above, antropological studies of alien cultures being a case in point.

On the other hand, it is also concluded that the problem of the testability of theories should be re-examined with special reference to the nature of the subject-matter of the social sciences For the nature of human social conduct is such that the actors' knowledge of the generalizations offered by the social sciences alters the context of their application. This is shown through self-fulfilling, or self-negating prophesies and they point out to the problematical character of theory-testing in the social sciences, and also to the inherently critical relation of the

social sciences to its subject matter. The study is concluded with an emphasis upon the need of re-examination of the problem of the testability of theories in the light of the above considerations.

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48) Ibid., Chap. II.

49) Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, Chap. II.

50) Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, Chap. III.

51) Ibid., Chap. VI.

52) Ibid., Chap. VI.

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60) Ibid., p. 91.

61) Ibid., Chap. 3 and Chap. 4.

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63) Ibid., Chap. II.

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65) Ibid., see "appendix" for a summary statement of the three types of interest and the corresponding dimensions of human social existence.

66) Ibid., Appendix.

67) Ibid., Chap. VI.

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69) Ibid., Chap. VIII.

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