Felsefe

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Browsing Felsefe by Author "Arslan, Nesibe Sena."

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    Scepticism and 'atitude' : a Wittgensteinian approach
    (Thesis (Ph.D.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2022., 2022) Arslan, Nesibe Sena.; Sidiropoulou, Chryssi.
    This study offers an examination of a certain kind of philosophical scepticism, e.g., scepticism about other minds, in relation to our way of knowing and understanding others. We take scepticism about other minds as an expression of a certain form of sceptical attitude and find its characteristics in the dualistic treatment of the mind/inner from the body/outer. Thus, we consider solipsism (as traditionally conceived) and the problem of other minds (as an extension of solipsism) with the aim to trace various conceptions of the self, particularly Descartes’ Cartesian ego. Against the backdrop of this conception, we introduce Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remark on “an attitude toward a soul” as a rejection of the Cartesian dualist framework. We then consider David Chalmers’ resurfacing of the notion of the ‘inner’ in his treatment of the problem of consciousness. We thereby argue that such a treatment assumes an explanatory gap between our notion of consciousness and the world, and thus, is a kind of reiteration of the Cartesian position that relates to Cartesian-type scepticism. Lastly, we consider a descriptive case —a sci-fi movie— in which we may find a host of ambiguities about what it means to be human as opposed to a machine. We offer our own treatment inspired by Wittgenstein’s “an attitude toward a soul” as a particular case of applying a rule or understanding a word. In so doing, we find that there is a kind of sceptical position that survives the Cartesian way of putting it.
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    The problem of infinity: A pendulous swing between empiricism and metaphysics
    (Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2016., 2016.) Arslan, Nesibe Sena.; Kurtsal, İrem.
    This thesis is an attempt to evaluate the resolutions and further discussions about Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, which approach the matter from two different viewpoints: empirical and metaphysical. I examine the empirical arguments for the logical impossibility of completing an infinite series of task, and more generally, for the self-contradictoriness of the actual infinite, as well as the metaphysical arguments and analyses which attempt to provide infinity with an extensive comprehension by revising the language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use. I aim to show that the empirical arguments are not justified in claiming that the notion of infinity leads to a contradiction, and that we should strictly accept finitism. In addition, I examine the good and the rather poor examples of philosophical thought experiments about infinite processes, which helps to view infinity from new and substantial perspectives. Through such an examination, my objective is to argue that the arguments holding empirical and metaphysical concerns neither trivialize nor annihilates one another. In fact, they shed light on the notion of infinity by providing distinct understandings. In this regard, even the arguments by the empirical refusal of the actual infinite, when examined thoroughly so that their mistakes and shortcomings are revealed, are illuminating for further metaphysical inquiry.