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Browsing by Author "Arslan, Aran."

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    A critique of Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning
    (Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2019., 2019.) Arslan, Aran.; Voss, Stephen,; İnan, İlhan.
    This thesis is a critique of Jaakko Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning. I argue that Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in particular and his reconstruction of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in general fails to be successful in two ways: First, the logical formula which contains an instantiated term (henceforth, instantial term) that is introduced by the rule of existential instantiation in the ecthesis part of a proof of an argument is not even a proper singular proposition whose relation to its object is supposed to be immediate. It is not a proper singular proposition because its truth conditions are general, i.e., it makes a general statement about a class of individuals of the sort instantiated- a statement whose analysis is based on quantifiers. Second, I show that certain proofs in mathematics- those in the form of reductio ad absurdum- are not captured by Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics either.

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