Browsing by Author "Selman, Deniz."

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    Electoral rules and strategic voting in Turkey
    (Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2016., 2016.) Adıgüzel, Fatih Serkant.; Selman, Deniz.
    In the rst chapter, we construct and analyze counterfactual election results under di erent electoral rules and levels of strategic voting. We rst divide each of the existing 85 districts in order to de ne 550 hypothetical voting districts, and then use precinct level data from the actual elections in order to calculate counterfactual results under a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) rule. Under a simply tally of the actual votes according to our newly de ned districts, the number of AKP (Justice and Development Party) seats increases to 414 from the actual 327 in 2011 and to 349 from the actual 258 in 2015 (June), while the number of seats of the biggest loser, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), decreases from the actual 53 to just three in 2011 and from the actual 80 to only six in 2015. Next, we simulate results assuming that some \strategic" voters vote only for parties which are competitive in their voting districts by using survey data. We show that strategic voting has only a minor impact on the results. In both elections, MHP is the biggest bene ciary of strategic voting proportionately. In the second chapter, we use survey data in order to nd out the magnitude of strategic voting that HDP bene ts in the 2015 June elections. We apply Artabe and Gardeazabal (2014)'s indirect method of strategic voting. We estimate that 8.6% of HDP votes came from strategic considerations in the 2015 June elections.
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    Simultaneous auctions with private and common values
    (Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2013., 2013.) Nemli, Deniz.; Selman, Deniz.
    We analyze two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions in which n bidders have private values for the good in one auction but a common value for the other, and must choose to participate in at most one auction. The seller in each auction is free to choose whether his good is sold via a first-price or second-price auction. After auction types are announced, bidders simultaneously decide in which auction to participate and their bid in their selected auction. hence bidders bid without knowing the number of other bidders participating in the same auction. Bidders choose auctions according to a cut-off strategy: only those with a sufficiently high private value choose the private auction. For any auction type profile, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (which is the same for all auction type pro.les) and multiple asymmetric equilibria which vary with auction types. At the unique symmetric equilibrium, revenue equivalence fails to hold in both auctions: the private auction revenue is always strictly higher when it is first-price.