Symmetric equilibrium in contests :|evidence from a TV show

Abstract

This paper analyzes symmetric equilibrium resolving the behaviors of the contestants in a cooking contest where points are revealed at the end of each stage. There is an independent observer who evaluates the cook without revealing her grades until the last stage. This research differs from the past papers regarding these two issues. The focus is on the paper by Schüller et al. (2014) where the pro-social behavior in another cooking contest “Come Dine with Me” is analyzed. This paper depicts the differences and compares the results with that research. It constructs equilibrium for this multi-stage game with the assumption that the contestants are rational. It is also observed that the contestants indeed converge to this suggested equilibrium most of the time; although, coordination is not always possible among the contestants. Moreover, this paper explains the deviations from the equilibrium in behavioral concepts. Furthermore, it is examined that the first contestant is disadvantageous, and that the independent observer has an immense impact on the results.