A critique of Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning
| dc.contributor | Graduate Program in Philosophy. | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Voss, Stephen, | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | İnan, İlhan. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Arslan, Aran. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-16T11:54:59Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-16T11:54:59Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019. | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is a critique of Jaakko Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning. I argue that Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in particular and his reconstruction of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in general fails to be successful in two ways: First, the logical formula which contains an instantiated term (henceforth, instantial term) that is introduced by the rule of existential instantiation in the ecthesis part of a proof of an argument is not even a proper singular proposition whose relation to its object is supposed to be immediate. It is not a proper singular proposition because its truth conditions are general, i.e., it makes a general statement about a class of individuals of the sort instantiated- a statement whose analysis is based on quantifiers. Second, I show that certain proofs in mathematics- those in the form of reductio ad absurdum- are not captured by Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics either. | |
| dc.format.extent | 30 cm. | |
| dc.format.pages | viii, 51 leaves ; | |
| dc.identifier.other | PHIL 2019 A77 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalarchive.library.bogazici.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16139 | |
| dc.publisher | Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, 2019. | |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Mathematics -- Philosophy. | |
| dc.title | A critique of Hintikka’s reconstruction of Kantian intuition in logical and mathematical reasoning |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1