Empiricism, relativity and the spec-ulative an inquiry for elements of a new philosophical perspective

Abstract

In this thesis, I have argued that a constructive approach to the epistemological difficulties facing contemporary analytical philosophy after the collapse of the “framework of givenness” demands us to revisit our commitments regarding the nature of concepthood. An important step in moving towards a new philosophical framework which avoids the apparent dilemma between the “framework of givenness” and a problematic coherentism that loses touch with the world is to recognize the spec-ulative nature of concepthood. The essence of the spec-ulative lies in grasping the opposites in their unity without losing their distinction. Spec-ulative perspective rejects that there is a given non-conceptual component of cognition and involves the idea that all cognitive content is conceptual. Relevance of Hegel’s thought to the problems of contemporary analytical philosophy has been identified by many analytical philosophers like Sellars, Brandom and McDowell. On the other hand, the particular relevance of the spec-ulative aspects of Hegel’s thought to contemporary analytical philosophy has not been studied and remains overlooked. Main aim of this thesis is to incorporate Hegel’s spec-ulative insight and spec-ulative concept of concept into the framework of contemporary philosophy and 2 approach contemporary philosophical problems from a spec-ulative perspective. This approach builds on a number of themes which belong to the internal dialectics of the history of analytical philosophy. These are discussed throughout the thesis with a specific focus on philosophers such as Carnap, Quine, Davidson, James and McDowell.