

The Politics of Reform:
Tanzimat in the Province of Trabzon (1839 – 1860)

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A thesis presented to the

Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
at Boğaziçi University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

May 2018

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Abstract

“The Politics of Reform: Tanzimat in the Province of Trabzon (1839-1860)”

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for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2018

Professor Nadir Özbek, Thesis Advisor

This thesis, on the application of the Tanzimat in the province of Trabzon, investigates the negotiations, conflicts, and compromises between central elites, local notables, and ordinary people. It shows how reforms were implemented in two phases in 1841 and 1847 and how they unfolded following resistance from notables and villagers from 1841 to 1860. The work focuses on what Tanzimat Reforms meant for local elites and ordinary people, and how they influenced power relations in the region. This thesis also shows kinds of burdens imposed on villagers with Tanzimat and how these commoners and dissatisfied local elites defended themselves against the reforms. While most of the primary sources used in this thesis are documents of the Ottoman Archives, reports of consuls and the notes of voyagers are also used.

32,500 words

Özet

“Reform Politikası: Trabzon Eyaleti’nde Tanzimat (1839-1860)”

Mehmet Alper, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2018

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Profesör Nadir Özbek, Tez Danışmanı

Tanzimat’ın Trabzon’da uygulanış yıllarını ele alan bu tez, reformların uygulanışı üzerinden merkez elitleri, yerel eşraf ve sıradan insanların arasında yaşanan pazarlık, çatışma ve uzlaşmaları ele almayı amaçlıyor. Bu çalışma, Trabzon Eyaleti’nde uygulanmaya çalışılan reformların yerelden gelen tepki ve direnişlere göre 1841’den 1860lara kadar nasıl şekillendiğini göstermeye çalışıyor. Bu çalışmanın odak noktaları, 1841 ve 1847’de uygulanmaya çalışılan Tanzimat Reformları’nın yerel eşraf ve sıradan insanlar için ne anlama geldiği ve nasıl algılandığı ve reformların bölgedeki etkilerine dayanarak güç ilişkilerine nasıl etki ettiği. Bu çalışma ayrıca Tanzimat Reformları’nın eyaletin köylülerine ne tür yeni talepler getirdiğini ve bu sıradan insanların ve yeni düzenden memnun olmayan yerel elitlerin reformlara karşı nasıl savunma yolları izledikleri hakkında geniş bir resim çizmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu tezde kullanılan birincil kaynaklarının çoğunu Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri belgeleri oluştururken, bunun yanında, yabancı elçilerin raporlarına, gezginlerin notlarına da başvurulmuştur.

32.500 kelime

To the memory of
Yavuz Selim Karakişla

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Acknowledgements

There is a long list of persons that I should thank. If I had not been helped, this thesis could have not finished. First and foremost, I want to offer my gratitude to my supervisor Nadir Özbek for the valuable insights he gave in his courses and during the writing process. Throughout my years at the Atatürk Institute, he helped me to get through the most difficult times. Thanks to his valuable guidance, I could construct my thesis.

I am very grateful to Cengiz Kırılı for his courses at the Institute which gave me the inspiration to work on Ottoman history and also for his kind, helpful comments in the jury as well as whenever I knocked on his door. I also thank my other jury member, Cüneyd Okay for agreeing to serve on my committee and for his helpful, critical comments.

I considered myself lucky to come to this Institute. During my writing process, I received support from a lot of people in the Institute. I am particularly thankful to Tracy Lord Şen for her special interest in my work and her support. I am indebted to my dear friends for their help, especially Kerem Demirköser, Erdal Bilgiç, Emir Küçük, Gülseren Duman, Faruk Yalçın, Ekin Mahmuzlu, and Turan Keskin. I also would like to thank Kadriye Tamtekin for all her help and Leyla Kılıç for her colorful personality. Moreover, I also thank other Institute members, Asım Karaömerlioğlu and Berna Yazıcı, for their comments and contributions to my thesis.

I would also like to thank the staff of Boğaziçi University Library and İSAM Library, as well as the staff of the Prime Minister's Office of Ottoman Archives. Hasan Ali Çakmak's name should be mentioned here, as well, for his support, advice, and friendship in the Ottoman Archives.

There is a person I have to mention: my housemate, Kemal Berkay Baştuji. Our brotherly relation began at Boğaziçi University about eight years ago when we were students in the English preparatory class on the South Campus. We have gone through hoops during our educational and real lives to me: moreover, we stepped out of line many times together.

My deepest gratitude goes to my beloved Aslı. She was the closest witness to this stressful process and was always helpful with her endless love and

patience. I truly owe the deepest thanks to her for all her tolerance and encouragement.

Last but certainly not least, I am grateful to my parents and members of my extended family. They supported me in every way. Without their endless support, I would not have been able to finish this study.

During the writing process I worked as a researcher for the project DPT 2010K120670 “Sosyal Alanda Arařtırmacı İnsan Gücü Geliřtirilmesi Projesi” coordinated by “Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal Politika Forumu Uygulama ve Arařtırma Merkezi” under the supervision of Nadir Özbek. I owe thanks for this opportunity which allowed me to concentrate on my thesis and finish it on time.

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, and syntax of this thesis in compliance with professional, ethical standards for the editing of student, academic work.

Introduction

There is a large literature on relations between the center and local powers in the Tanzimat era as well as on the effects of the centralization and modernization policies of the Tanzimat State. However, Ottoman modernization and centralization should not be seen as top-down because the developments were the result of new attempts to include local notables in the state system, especially in remote areas like Trabzon Province in which the center could not intervene directly. When viewed from this vantage point, the reforms and especially the Tanzimat reforms do not entail the elimination of local powers in the provinces. On the contrary, local powers were not passive agents that were centralized by the center via institutional and administrative reforms; rather they were active agents with which the center had to bargain by giving some privileges in order to include them into the power block. This point of view is important for the conceptualization of Ottoman reforms in the nineteenth century. In other words, it is as appropriate to look at how the center was changed by locals than how the center changed local notables.

This thesis sheds light on the Ottoman centralization and modernization process in the provinces which consisted of negotiations and struggles shaped around the Tanzimat reforms among the center, local powers and villagers. While the thesis looks at the province from a provincial point of view, the struggles and negotiations of the local elites and villagers will be the main concern of the thesis.

The Tanzimat reforms were an important watershed in Ottoman history. The Ottoman Empire had to centralize and increase its tax income and needed a strong treasury in order to continue its existence. The late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries was an era in which the Ottoman elites tried to deal with dramatic problems and eventually set out a reform program known as the Tanzimat in order to overcome the threat to its very existence. The empire showed marked improvement in strengthening its treasury and increasing tax revenues fivefold from the Tanzimat era until the end of the empire. However, this increase in the revenue did not come about by way of the elimination of local intermediaries and direct tax collection by the favour of the state bureaucrats that refers to the modernization theory.

Nineteenth century Trabzon Province is a good example for analyzing the relations between the center and local powers. In this thesis, I am interested in the workableness of Tanzimat reforms in the province. I answer the questions of how they were applied and what the continuities and breaks from the first half of the nineteenth century were in Trabzon Province. Another aim is to answer the question why Trabzon was not initially included in the Tanzimat reforms by Ottoman elites. Even if Trabzon province was not directly included in the Tanzimat, the first step was implemented in 1841 which cannot be considered as a late time. However, Tanzimat reforms were postponed indefinitely because of the rebellious character of the subjects as stated by local authorities. Because local elites resisted the reforms of the Tanzimat, the new order did not work. Despite the fact that reforms could not be effectively applied in the province, the academic researches are unable to show how local notables and common people resisted Ottoman elites and hindered the new system as well as what was nature of the power relations between the center and local powers in the province. On this point, this thesis evaluates the means of the attempts to apply reforms in two phases in 1841 and 1847 for the villagers and local elites in the province, the causes of opposition, and the methods of escape of the villagers and elites from the demands of the Tanzimat state.

The main period on which the thesis focuses is between 1841 and 1860. Why are these years dealt with? The answer to this question is what the Tanzimat meant for the province at that time. Although Tanzimat Reforms included a wide range of affairs related to administration, education, the

military, and public works in general terms, between the years 1841-1860, the new order basically meant a new tax system and conscription for the province of Trabzon. Therefore, looking at these years makes it possible to more clearly see the struggles, bargaining and resistance that stemmed from the demands of the Tanzimat which were manifested as taxation and conscription. Moreover, although the application of the Tanzimat started in 1847, the adoption process in the region continued until 1860s. So the years we study are convenient for shedding light on the struggle against Tanzimat reforms in the province.

The thesis shows the different meanings of the Tanzimat Reforms in the province in the year 1841 vis-à-vis 1847 and sheds light on why the initial steps of the reforms were inefficient with reference to Ottoman archival documents, consular reports and the memoirs of voyagers and consuls. According to Ottoman archival documents, the opposition to Tanzimat Reforms stemmed from the inability of people to understand the benefits. However, this thesis sheds light on why different political groups in the province opposed the Tanzimat Reforms and shows the underlying causes of this opposition. In addition, the thesis aims to fill a gap in the literature by showing the reactions and resistance methods of local notables and ordinary people against the demands and burdens of the reforms by attributing agency to these groups.

The academic literature of the Tanzimat era in the province of Trabzon is limited. The first research in this area resulted in an article written by Musa Çadırcı titled *Tanzimat'ın Karadeniz Bölgesi'nde Uygulanması*.¹ In this article, Çadırcı mentions neither the tax system nor conscription during the application of Tanzimat Reforms but rather focuses on the change of Trabzon after the 60s by evaluating the effects of the Tanzimat on trade and public works.

The master's thesis of Emine Esin Sarıođlan, *Tanzimat'ın Trabzon'da Uygulanması (1839-1856)*, is one of the most important studies in the literature regarding the application of the Tanzimat in the province.² In this thesis, Ottoman archives were used in a rich way. Although completed in 1996, this thesis is still a significant guide for researchers working in this field. The research,

1 Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat'ın Karadeniz Bölgesi'nde Uygulanması" (paper presented at Birinci Tarih Boyunca Karadeniz Bildirileri, Samsun, 1986), 191-98.

2 Emine Esin Sarıođlan, "Tanzimat'ın Trabzon'da Uygulanması (1839-1856)" (Master's Thesis, Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, 1996).

which is comprehensive in terms of the documents were used, is satisfactory as descriptive research but is deficient in terms of lack of its analysis and theory.

Another important source in the literature that should be mentioned is the article *Trabzon'un İdari Yapısı ve Yenileşme Zarureti (1793- 1851)* by Abdullah Saydam.³ In the comprehensive article, Saydam used kadi records and thus filled a gap in a difficult field in which to work.

One of the most important research done in this area is *Tanzimat Döneminde Trabzon*, a doctoral dissertation by Özgür Yılmaz,⁴ which is the most up to date research in the literature. In addition to Ottoman archival documents, Yılmaz used British and French archives which importantly enriched his study. In his book, he conducted the most extensive study of the Tanzimat period in the province, evaluating the period from 1839 to the end of the 1870s. Since Yılmaz deals with the Tanzimat from a very broad perspective and focuses mostly on the period after the 1850s, it can be said that his book is the most comprehensive research on the province of Trabzon in light of the Tanzimat Reforms.

Another study that should be mentioned is *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* by Michael Meeker.⁵ In this study, though it centered on the district of Of, there is a wide-ranging analysis and information pertaining to the general situation of the province. Information given about the structure of the ayans in the region before the Tanzimat period and the evaluation of the region based on an East-West distinction significantly contributed to the basic problematics and conceptualization of this thesis. However, the lack of reliance on Ottoman archival documents and the fact that the changes and transformations mostly caused by the effect of the Tanzimat are the weak points of the work. Despite the weaknesses of limited sources, Meeker's research analyzed the region well and criticized centralization theory

3 Abdullah Saydam, "Trabzon'un İdari Yapısı ve Yenileşme Zarureti (1793- 1851)," *OTAM*, no. 18 (2006): 285-317.

4 Özgür Yılmaz, *Tanzimat Döneminde Trabzon* (Istanbul: Libra, 2014).

5 Michael E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

by showing evidence, and thus leading the way for researchers studying the province.

Finally, even if the periods under consideration in our theses are different, the doctoral dissertation by Hamdi Özdiş, *Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Trabzon Vilâyeti'nde Eşraf, Siyaset ve Devlet (1876-1909)*, which focuses on power relations in the post-Tanzimat period in Trabzon is an important study that should be mentioned.⁶ Although Özdiş's dissertation did not directly contribute to this thesis, it has been useful in terms of seeing how power and power relations in the post-Tanzimat period progressed.

As for primary sources used in this thesis, Ottoman archival documents are the most widely used. However, a distinction must be made with regard to time periods. In order to evaluate the pre-Tanzimat period, the collection of Hatt-ı Hümayun (HAT) was used. After the Tanzimat, in parallel with the bureaucratization of the state, Meclis-i Vala become an important decision-making organ of the empire. In parallel, the collections related to the Meclis-i Vala like the Sadaret Meclis-i Vala Evrakı(A.MKT.MVL.), İrade Meclis-i Vala (İ.MVL.), and Meclis-i Vala(MVL.) were used to ascertain the perspective of the province and the orders written to the province. In addition, the collections of the İrade like İrade Dahiliye (İ.DH) and İrade Hariciye (İ.HR) reveal the regulations concerning the Tanzimat reforms and external relations stemming from the contact of subjects with the Russian Empire and Greece. Apart from these documents, different collections of the Sadaret Mektub-i Kalemi Evrakı (A.MKT.) which includes numerous petitions from the province were used.

As for archival documents, they generally reflect the official perspective of the center. Therefore, in the documents, the details of the locality cannot be found and the agency of ordinary people is ignored. According to the viewpoint of the Porte, the ordinary people are a mass unable to distinguish good and evil, loyal, and not inclined to rise up. In accordance, when rebellions occurred, the agency of ordinary people was ignored in the documents, and

6 Hamdi Özdiş, "Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Trabzon Vilâyeti'nde Eşraf, Siyaset ve Devlet (1876-1909)" (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, Ankara, 2008).

officials accused only a few “seditious” people of tricking the commoners. In other words, ordinary people were seen as figurants in the risings. However, the collaboration between villagers and local elites in the province resulted from the increasing tax burden on villagers and the Sublime Porte’s demand for the conscription in the Tanzimat era. In the same way, the petitions far from reflected the language and mentality of the province because certain rules were taken under consideration while writing an official petition. Under this condition, the mentality of ordinary people cannot be seen in the petitions. Hence, even though petitions came from different regions of the province, they were similar to each other in terms of the language used, the events described and the demands requested. Nevertheless, the documents enable analyses if such weaknesses and deficiencies are taken into consideration.

Apart from the Ottoman archives, the reports and memoirs of British consuls were also used. Although these resources have their own problems, they are useful for understanding the condition of the province and the details of the events. As for the problems of these documents, consuls considered local elites as independent agents who ignored their official duties in the power block like tax collection. Despite these shortcomings, they are good sources of information for understanding the period.

In addition to introduction and conclusion, the present study consists of three substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides the historical and administrative background of the pre-Tanzimat period in the province of Trabzon. Chapters 3 and 4 are based on extensive archival research focus on power struggles, opposition to Tanzimat reforms and methods of negotiation among central political elites, local notables and the ordinary people of Trabzon.

Chapter 2 examines the last decades of eighteenth century and first decades of the nineteenth century, which was an important era that sheds light on the emergence of the power structure in the province. As for the power structure, there were two powerful families in the western part of the province, as the successor and predecessor to each other, the Caniklizades and Hazinedarzades. With the end of dominance of the Caniklizades in the region in 1807, a power vacuum emerged in the region. Between 1807-1811, eight different governors were appointed to the province. However, this power vacuum was filled by Hazinedarzades that strengthened in the lands of Caniklizades.

In the eastern part of the province, lands was rough and agriculture was not suitable. Given this situation, local elites of the region obtained their power and prestige by way of trade, tax collection and banditry. In order to obtain official ranks, these notables consistently opposed the governors and become involved in the power block through the pragmatic policies of the center. In other words, there was an East-West divide in the province, and powerful figures appointed as governors of Trabzon from 1770 to 1846 had large farms in the west of the province, though there were short breaks in their governorship and they could mobilize their sources to dominate the province when it was needed. Thus, these powerful governors coped with the rebellious local elites in the eastern part of the province. Based on this structure, the Porte appointed governors from a manageable west and provided authority through these governors over an unmanageable east. The Caniklizades dominated the governorship of the province of Trabzon from 1766 to 1805 except for short breaks, and the Hazinedarzades dominated it from 1811 until 1846. However, local elites in the eastern part of the province organized as a coalition against the governors and started a series of rebellions that began in 1814 and lasted until the end of the 1830s in order to defend themselves against this system.

In Chapter 3, I try to understand why Tanzimat reforms could not be applied in the province in 1841. Following the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun*, the central elites sattempted to implement reforms in Trabzon in 1841 but encountered the opposition of the governor and of local notables in the province. The new order was postponed based upon that the people could not yet understand the benefits of the Tanzimat reforms. However, this situation has not been examined in detail in the literature. In this chapter, by examining the dimensions of the opposition in parallel with the heterogeneous structure of the province, different causes for the resistance against the Tanzimat in different regions of the province will be shown. The eastern part of the province was the *yurtluk-ocaklık* territory and hereditary property rights belong to powerful *ayan* families. Not only in this province but throughout the empire, the greatest opposition to the Tanzimat stemmed from local elites who such lands. On the other hand, the *ayans* in the eastern part of the province - Lazistan region - were reluctant to give up their autonomy with introduction of the

Tanzimat. In addition, local elites in the region were dissatisfied with the governor, Hazinedarazade Osman Pasha, because of his rigid policy against them during 1830s. The local elites of the Lazistan region were not the only group negatively affected negatively by the rigid policy of Osman Pasha. This policy damaged agriculture and commerce, with the demanding heavy taxes, villagers and local forces in the region coalesced against the ruling elites and the governor on the eve of the Tanzimat Reforms.

The opposition of governors to the reforms was due to different reasons. During the early nineteenth century in the region, the Hazinedarzades, which had begun to gain strength, illegally seized lands from villagers during their governorship, and the villagers were forced to clear-cut forests as *corvée*. Hence, there were no land titles of these large hands. Their opposition to the Tanzimat Reforms was related to the fear of losing these lands. With regard to this concern, the status of these lands was questioned by villagers by bringing to court of local councils after the *Tapu Nizamnamesi* of 1847. Moreover, for almost twenty-five years, Osman Pasha and his brother Abdullah Pasha, who was the governor of the sub-province of Canik, established a largely autonomous government in the province of Trabzon and fear of losing this autonomy became an important reason why the Tanzimat could not be applied in the province in 1841. In other words, this chapter focuses on the question of what the reforms planned for application in the province in 1841 meant for such prestigious power groups, revealing the different causes of the opposition of different groups in the province and measuring the tension of the province on the eve of the application of Tanzimat Reforms.

Chapter 4 focuses on how the Tanzimat was applied in the province in 1847 and what were the reactions to reforms. Central elites tried to accustom local elites to reforms by such means as granting ranks, drawing on their side via gifts, and forgiving the crimes of local elites. In addition, the Tanzimat reforms to be applied in the province in 1847, with the releasing of the reforms like returning to the *iltizam* (tax farming) system again, no longer meant a radical change for local elites like in 1841. Accordingly, notables adapted themselves to the reforms, hence retaining their power. What is more, as many old practices were continued in the new system, thus commoners suffered from the extra burdens of the central elites. Hence a collaboration emerged between

peasants who suffered under the demands of the center to increase its central budget and local elites disappointed with Tanzimat Reforms. This situation caused an opposition against Tanzimat Reforms in the province in different ways.

In brief, this chapter evaluates the dimension of the modernization process which accelerated together with the Tanzimat in the issues of taxation and conscription. I examine the issue not from a state-centric perspective but from the bottom-up that is, how local notables and villagers opposed the reforms, how they defended themselves, and what constituted their bargaining power. In doing so, I grant agency to all these groups.

Ottoman Trabzon and Provincial Notables (1780-1834)

The Ottoman Empire started a profound reform movement in nineteenth century in order to overcome its military, financial, and administrative problems. Because of wars, a decline in tax income, pressure from European powers on administrative reforms, and a breakdown in central authority, the Sublime Porte introduced the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 to strengthen central authority in the provinces, increase tax revenues, reorganize the army, and introduce an Ottoman citizenship which would include all subjects regardless of their ethnic, religious, and sectarian background.¹ With Tanzimat reforms, the Porte declared to ensure the security of the property, life, and honor of all the subjects of the sultan, abolished inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims in the areas of the military and taxation, and provided a basis for constitutional administration by declaring the sultan as the guarantor of these promises.

Before the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun*, newly enthroned sultans declared promises about the security of the life, property, and honor of the subject of the sultan with the name *adaletname*. The main difference with respect to the *Gülhane Edict* was that “it made promises; Sultan Abdülmecid I swore a

1 Yonca Köksal, "Tanzimat ve Tarih Yazımı," *Doğubatı*, no. 51 (2010): 195.

solemn oath, in the holiest sanctuaries, the Chamber of the Sacred Relics, to uphold the guarantees that were granted in the edict.”²

During the Tanzimat Era, many reforms were applied in state administration. A new administrative organization was applied both in the center and in the provinces of the empire. The Meclis-i Vala and Şura-yı Devlet councils enabled leading state bureaucrats to gather and supported with important opportunities in the state administration and legislative system by limiting the absolute power of the sultan.³

With respect to the reforms, the Ottoman Empire took important steps to reorganize its administrative system by centralizing and modernizing. However, in the Tanzimat era, it cannot be said that the empire centralized and modernized absolutely. There were many things that could not be put into practice in order to centralize and modernize the empire. The maintenance of the power and prestige of local elites in the local councils and the return to the *iltizam* system can be taken as examples to this issue.

Besides attempts to centralize and modernize of the state with the Gülhane Edict, the presence of local elites in the new system, patronage relations based on corruption and personal privilege, and decreasing tax revenues in the first years of the era caused a contradiction in the history writing of the Tanzimat era. Thus, the reforms have been evaluated as a story of success or failure in line with the modernization theory.⁴

I argue in this part, with Yonca Köksal, that when the Tanzimat era is evaluated, categorizations like the themes of centralization and modernization theories should be avoided, and focus should be put on the transformation and changings of the Tanzimat reforms.⁵ It is more appropriate to look at how transformations and changes that happened as a consequence of the negotiations and struggles between the actors at the center and in society and its transformative effects rather than to evaluate reforms as a matter of success or

2 Selim Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24.

3 Köksal, "Tanzimat ve Tarih," 195.

4 For seeing this point of view, see *Tanzimat: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle* (İstanbul, Maarif Matbaası, 1940)

5 Ibid., 206.

failure. Hence, a sound analyses must get rid of standard viewpoint like those of modernization and centralization theories which are insufficient to explain the importance of the Tanzimat.

The literature of the history of the Tanzimat from the 1940s to the 1980s has focused on the success and failure of reforms and emphasized the disunity between the center and society. In the grand scheme, this view is based on opinions like the lack of the integration of the state and society, the weakness of the state, and inadequate modernity, all of which parallel centralization and modernization theory.⁶

It would be a mistake to evaluate modernization theory as an accepted fact in the history of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, Tanzimat reforms certainly did not mean the elimination of local powers in the provinces. On the contrary, Karen Barkey has made the point that local powers were no passive agents centralized by the Porte through institutional and administrative reforms; rather, they were active agents with which bureaucrats had to bargain and give some privileges in order to include them into the Ottoman administrative system.⁷ This point of view is important for understanding the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Looking at how the reforms were introduced from the center and changed by local elites as a consequence of bargaining and negotiations in the process of their application and how locals adapted themselves to the changing administrative system is more beneficial than looking at the issue from a state-centric perspective. To do so, continuations and ruptures within the Tanzimat era must be revealed by examining the pre- and post-Tanzimat era in the provinces. Before passing on to the period of Tanzimat, the emergence of the local elites in the provinces will be evaluated in this chapter to shed light on the pre-Tanzimat era.

The rise of local elites in the Ottoman Empire was related to transformations in the tax collection and land tenure system which occurred in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The cavalry (*sipahi*) served as provincial functionaries who were granted *Tımar* lands by the center. Their basic tasks were to collect rural and agricultural taxes from peasants and provide the

6 Ibid., 206.

7 Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 2.

central army with mounted cavalymen for military campaigns when required. However, the transformation in warfare from cavalries to infantries equipped with firearms decreased the importance of the *Timar* system that was based on the cavalry.⁸ Following this transformation of warfare, the empire needed tax reform to cover the expenses of military reforms, and from the seventeenth century onwards, the *Timar* system gradually gave way to the *iltizam* system. According to the new system, the center gave annual tax farming rights to individuals in auctions and individuals who acquired tax collection rights paid a price in cash to the center in exchange for the right to collect taxes from income items like a land, custom or harbor. In time, the duration of the deal was prolonged from one to three years, and at the end of the seventeenth century, extended to the lifetime of the tax farmers and given the name *malikane* (the system of life-term tax farms).⁹

In general, tax farmers who resided in Istanbul or other major urban centers had good political relationships with the Porte and were financially powerful.¹⁰ Thus, most lived far from their tax farms and had to make alliances with intermediaries to control the tax farms, most of whom were the local elites of the regions. These local lords (*mütesellims*) collect taxes and this sub-leasing of tax farms served to strengthen of *ayans*. It is mostly through these subcontracting positions such as *voyvoda*, *mütesellim* and *mültezim* that the locally influential families rose to power and were incorporated into Ottoman ruling class by gaining official ranks, firstly *kapıcıbaşı*, agha and then *bey*, *pasha* and even *vizier*.¹¹

Another reason for the strengthening of the *ayans* was their military power. The size of the personal armed militias of local elites were, continuously increased throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century to protect

8 Cengiz Kırılı, "Tyranny Illustrated: From Petition to Rebellion Ottoman Vranje," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 53 (2015): 6-7.

9 *Ibid.*, 7.

10 Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman Military Power in the Eighteenth Century," in *Warfare in Eastern Europe: 1500-1800*, ed. Brian J. Davies (Leiden: Brill NV, 2012), 331.

11 Canay Şahin, "The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family in Eighteenth Century Anatolia: the Caniklizes (1737-1808)" (PhD diss., Bilkent University, Ankara, 2003), 21.

their profits from other ayans and local elites became allies of the governors in this process and given official duties we mentioned above to maintain the order and safety of their localities from plunderers and bandits. They fulfilled their duty in wartime by sending their militias to the Ottoman army.¹² These irregular units of *sekbans* comprised the largest proportion of the Ottoman army toward the end of the eighteenth century, showing the power and prestige of the ayans as important allies of the Porte.¹³

In the empire, with the help of the official ranks mentioned above, many ayans rose to power during the eighteenth century, including Caniklizades as well as the Karaosmanoğlus and Çapaoğlus. In parallel, there were two powerful ayan families in the province of Trabzon, the Hazinedarzades and Tuzcuoğlus, who can be evaluated as the output of the system that enabled their rise. In order to analyze the pre-Tanzimat in the province, it will be evaluated the risings of Tuzcuoğlus, relations between the ayans and the center, and the structure of ayans in Trabzon province.

§ 2.1 Administrative Borders, Demography and Commoners of the Province

Trabzon became a province in the seventeenth century and its extent was much broader than its current administrative borders. Before the seventeenth century, Trabzon was a *sancak* of the province of Batum.¹⁴ In the early seventeenth century, the sancaks of Trabzon and Batum were counted as a unique province called “the Batum province, alias Trabzon.”¹⁵ This denotation persisted until the 1650s, and after which time the province was called the province of Trabzon. In general, the structure of the province did not substantially

12 Kırılı, "Tyranny Illustrated," 8.

13 Murat Çınar Büyükkakça, "Ottoman Army in the eighteenth Century: War and Military Reform in the Eastern European Context" (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2007), 19.

14 M. Hanefi Bostan, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Trabzon Sancağı'nda Sosyal ve İktisadî Hayat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002), 22.

15 Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Trabzon," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: M.E.B, 1997).

change in the eighteenth century, and in 1740s Trabzon was the main sancak (*pasha sancağı*) of Trabzon Province, and Gönnye, Batum, and Soğucak were its other sancaks.¹⁶

The province of Trabzon was one of the weakest in the Ottoman Empire in administrative respects until the eighteenth century. However, this situation changed in the second half of the eighteenth century when its borders expanded towards to the west. The sancak of Canik was included in the Trabzon province by being transformed into a *muhassıllık* in 1760. Even though Canik was annexed to the province of Sivas in 1779, the western border of Trabzon Province was maintained until the eve of Tanzimat reforms.¹⁷ In the early nineteenth century, Trabzon was a large province the borders of which included around 700 kilometers of coast from Canik to north of Batum.

When it comes to the demography of the province, even if mention about the population with certainty is impossible, two sources – Cadastral Surveys (*Tahrir Defterleri*) and the reports of voyagers and councils – enable one to make deductions about the population. The technics of surveillance before the second half of nineteenth century were not advanced and were based on the taxable strata of the population. Exact information about the population in the provinces is not available and can only be determined deductively.

The first census of the province was in the registers of 1486. Censuses continued in the order of 1523, 1553 and 1583. One of most important items of information in these registers is that the Muslim population increased from 19.22 to 53.62 percent – more than doubled – from 1486 to 1583.¹⁸ According to the registers of 1583, the population of Trabzon province was around 10,500.¹⁹ It is hard to inform of the population of Trabzon in the seventeenth and

16 Fahameddin Başar, *Osmanlı Eyalet Tevcihati: 1717-1730* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 127-28.

17 Yılmaz, 140-42.

18 Heath W Lowry, "The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon;(ca. 1486-1583)" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1977), 307.

19 *ibid.*, 197-99.

eighteenth centuries because of the lack of cadastral surveys from these centuries.²⁰ However, Temel Öztürk, who are dealing with the population of Trabzon Province, estimated the population at around 10-15 thousand in the first half of the eighteenth century by researching the *avarız* and *cizye* registers. The decrease in the population was result of the destructive effects of long wars with Iran and Russia, migration caused by banditry in the region, and heavy taxes.²¹

As for the nineteenth century, the one of most important resources enables deductions about the population of the provinces was the census of 1831, conducted in the era of Mahmut II. According to the census, there were 136,552 men in the province.²² The 92 percent of these was Muslims and 8 percent was the non-Muslims. However, it should be noted that the population of women is excluded from this data.

Another source of demographic information for the province is the writings of voyagers and consuls who came to the province in the nineteenth century. A voyager, John Kinneir, who came to the province in 1813, claimed that the population of Trabzon city was 15 thousand. He did not give any numerical information about religious groups but stated that the inhabitants of the city were Turks, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Georgians, Mingrelians, Circassians, and Tatars.²³ Another voyager, Victor Fontanier, stated that the population in 1827 was 60 thousand with regard to the crowds, vivid bazaars, and streets of the city. He added that this number was not exact but and analysis of the

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- 20 Necmettin Aygün, "Onsekizinci Yüzyılda Trabzon'da Ticaret" (PhD diss., Gazi University, Ankara, 2002). For more detailed information about the cadastral surveys, see Mehmet Öz, "Tahrir Defterlerinin Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırmalarında Kullanılması Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler," *Vakıflar Dergisi*, vol.22 (1991).
- 21 Temel Öztürk, "İki Savaş Döneminde Trabzon (1680-1690/1723-1746)" (PhD diss., Istanbul University, Istanbul, 2004), 207-12.
- 22 Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu, (1830-1914): Demografik ve Sosyal Özellikleri*, trans. Bahar Tırnakçı (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2003), 60.
- 23 John Macdonald Kinneir, *Journey Through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan in the years 1813 and 1814: With Remarks on the Marches of Alexander and Retreat of the Ten Thousand* (London: J. Murray, 1818), 341.

population based on the number of the houses.²⁴ However, his claim was exaggerated. Upon his second arrival in the city in 1830, this time as a French consul, he asserted that there were 24 thousand people in the city including 300 Catholics, 500 Armenians, 3000 Greeks, and the remainder Muslims which was a more realistic inference compared to his first estimate. According to James Brant, who was the British consul between the years 1830-1, the population of Trabzon was around 25-30 thousand and the Greek population was about 3500-4000, the Armenians numbered 1500-2000, and the Muslims at 20-24 thousand.²⁵ In parallel, the Prussian voyager, Karl Koch indicated that the population of the city was 30 thousand in 1843 and had 6000 houses.²⁶

Given this information, the population of the city increased from 15 thousand to 30 thousand from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the eve of the Tanzimat reforms. The ambiguity of the cadastral surveys, and the reports of consuls and voyagers concerning the population – and later, the lack of *temettuat* registers for the province of Trabzon – makes it difficult to deduce about the population of the province in the first half of the nineteenth century.

There was a considerable non-Muslim population in the province. Even though information about the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the province is insufficient, historians who deal with the subject remark that there was a good relationship between them in Trabzon.²⁷ Akbulut says in her thesis, which examined court records between the years 1800-1850, that all the communities in Trabzon lived together in the various neighborhoods. The neighborhood relations were good between them. Moreover, different communities dealt with each other easily with respect to property sales and trade.

24 Yılmaz, 81.

25 James Brant, "Journey Through a Part of Armenia and Asia Minor, in the Year 1835," *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 6(1836), 190.

26 Mustafa Aydın, *Alman Seyyahı Karl Koch'un 1843 Yılına Ait Trabzon İzlenimleri*, ed. Kemal Çiçek, Trabzon Tarihi Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 6-8 Kasım 1998 (Trabzon: Trabzon Belediyesi, 1999), 415.

27 Hülya Akbulut, "Şerhiye Sicillerine Göre XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Trabzon'da Gayrimüslimler (1800-1850)" (Master's thesis, Cumhuriyet University, Sivas, 2007), 123.; Yılmaz, 58.; Aygün, "Trabzon'da Ticaret," 29.

It was a common to produce witnesses from different religious groups in the courts.²⁸

Before the nineteenth century, the neighborhoods were more segregated. After the conquest of the city in 1461, the city was shaped according to its religious structure. The classification "... from the neighborhood of Muslims, dhimnis, infidels" indicates the discrimination among the communities in the province.²⁹ In addition, the denotations "dhimnis and infidels" indicates the partial ghettoization by its emphasis on suburbs densely or completely inhabited by non-Muslims.³⁰

After the conquest of the city, Muslim residents living in the citadel started to spread to the eastern side of the city which was comprised of non-Muslim suburbs as a consequence of the settlement policy of the empire. In parallel, the population started to knit up.³¹ By the nineteenth century, cosmopolitanism had developed in Trabzon with the increasing trade volume and development of the city. On the other hand, even though there is little information about the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in rural areas of the province, it is rational to assume there were good relations between the communities considering the organic relations in rural areas like collective works (*imece*), neighborliness, intermarriage, and compulsory sharing of a common area. However, in spite of these factors, opportunities to attain power for non-Muslims were not equal to those of Muslims. There was no non-Muslim figure in local landlords, uprisings and even, in the local councils in the Tanzimat era in the province which we will discuss in the next chapters.

As for geography, the province can be divided into two parts as west and east. The landscape of the western part was flat and arable. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, many *çiftlik*s (farms) emerged in along the west of Trabzon province. In these regions, from Trabzon to the sancak of Canik,

28 Akbulut, 123-24.

29 Aygün, 27.

30 Ibid., 26.

31 Lowry, "The Ottoman Tahrir Defters," 39-117.

villagers were tenant farmers working on the lands of local elites.³² On the other hand, in the east, the land was rugged and not suitable for agricultural activity. Because of the rugged geography, people could easily escape from the filter of the state and hide from state mechanisms. Under these conditions, the only power that could mobilize the people to meet the military demands of the center in times of war and collect taxes in this region was the local notables. Since the eighteenth century, destructive wars with Russians and Iranians had made local elites important because of their ability to mobilize people for these campaigns and to collect taxes in the province. This ability strengthened the hands of the ayans by giving them bargaining power over the center.

In general, there was a win-win negotiation between the center and local elites. In exchange for the demands of the center concerning the military, taxation, security, and public works, notables were recognized and appointed as state officials. These factors comprised the key elements of the bargaining power of the ayans. Local elites were disciplined by the center by force only when they spun out of control and they were left to their own devices unless they endangered the legitimacy of the empire, which was generally valid for big ayan families like the Tepedelenlis in Rumelia and Caniklizades in Northern Anatolia.

By eighteenth century, many powerful ayan families came into existence and settled in the province of Trabzon. In the early part of nineteenth century, two opposing powers came to the fore – the Tuzcuoğlus in the eastern, and the Hazinedarzades in the western part of the province – as an outcome of the factors mentioned above.

§ 2.2 The Era of Social Uprisings in Trabzon: 1814-1834

When the Caniklizades fell from power by being confiscated and discharged from the governorship of Trabzon province in 1807, a power vacuum emerged in the province. The province of Trabzon became instable, and eight different

32 Canay Şahin, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl'da Samsun'da Çiftlik Sahibi Hazinedarzadeler ile Kiracı-Köylüler Arasındaki Arazi ve Vergi İhtilafı Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler ve Sorular," *Kebikeç*, vol.24 (2007): 79.

people were appointed as governor of the province from 1807 to 1811.³³ Such revisions made difficult for these governors who had no roots in the region to influence the provincial governance. Thus, local notables became even more essential partners in the provinces. These ayans had a voice in society that benefited from their wealth and power. This factor supplied local notables with power to negotiate and given these conditions, the Ottoman Empire established its negotiation methods on this fact.³⁴

Given the consistent the removals of governors, the collection of taxes required the mediation of notables who knew their native homelands that are and who were able to arrange taxes according to local realities.³⁵ Indeed, the operation of the system was easy. The center authorized the ayans and cooperated with them in the administrative domains of the provinces. Many ayans in the provinces were also state officials, such as mütesellim, who collected taxes in local areas because of their power and prestige in society. "Governors often were absent either by choice, or on campaign, or between appointments, but the business of tax collecting could not wait and was carried on by deputies armed with full powers."³⁶ In accordance with this situation, when the governors of Trabzon Province in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had to undertake a military campaign or had a duty like commanding a castle, a person selected from among the ayans of Trabzon was deputized as mütesellim.

The governors of Trabzon appointed with the task of the guarding the castles of Azak, Ozi, Kefe, Faş, and Anapa in the Ottoman Caucasia and guarding the Russian borderland.³⁷ In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha was one of the reliable men the governors called upon to defend these castles against the Russians.

33 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Trabzon Tarihi: Fetihten Kurtuluşa Kadar* (Trabzon: Serander, 2000), 219.

34 Barkey, "Bandits and Bureaucrats," 14.

35 Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans: 1699-1812," in *An economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 659.

36 McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans," 661.

37 Mehmet Bilgin, *Sürmene Tarihi* (Trabzon: Serender, 1990), 279.

Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha was born in Hopa in the east part of the Trabzon Province, and he was powerful in this region. Memiş Agha seized the lands of villagers who could not pay their loans on time, and villagers became dependent on working the lands of Memiş Agha as drudgery labor. With the gradual increase of his power, he became the ayan of the kazas of Rize and Hopa. Tuzcuoğlu recruited young people from these kazas who were of military age for his personal sekban unit.³⁸

On the other hand, he had good relations with the governors until 1814, that is, before the first uprising of the Tuzcuoğlus. Before the first uprising, he helped Şerif Mehmet Pasha who was the governor of Trabzon province and the *sevahil-i serasker* (commander of shores) to fight Russia on the north eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire. He also played an important role in recapturing the castle of Faş, which was in the north of the Caucasus, from the Russians in 1809.³⁹ Thereupon, he was awarded with the rank of *kapıcıbaşı* in 1810. He became the guard of the castle of Faş and ruled his sekban army in the region.⁴⁰ In addition to these assignments, in 1812 the center appointed Memiş Agha to guard the castle of Batum.⁴¹ Thus, he became the most powerful ayan on the east side of the Trabzon Province.

The relationship between Memiş Agha and the center changed after the appointment of Hazinezarzade Süleyman Pasha as the governor of Trabzon province. Süleyman Pasha was a member of a powerful ayan family from the west side of Trabzon province, the kaza of Ünye. He had been the guardian of Gönye, Faş, and Anapa castles before Tuzcuzade Memiş Agha. He was appointed as governor of Trabzon with the rank of vizier in 1811 because of his

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- 38 Mehmet Münir Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı." *Istanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Dergisi* 3, no. 5-6 (1953): 22.
- 39 Şakir Şevket, *Trabzon Tarihi* (Istanbul: Umran Matbaası, 1877), 233.
- 40 Şanizade Ataullah, *Şanizade Tarihi*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası, 1867), 317-18. The rank of "Kapıcıbaşılık" was given as a superior rank for the ayans who proved success in provincial services,
- 41 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 22.
- 40 Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi: Hacısalihzade Hasan Ağa, Ömer Ağa ve Büyük Ali Ağa (1737-1844)* (Trabzon: Serander, 2014), 87.

success in the wars with Russia.⁴² After this, a power struggle started between Memiş Agha and Süleyman Pasha.

Ahmet Cevdet Pasha states that a credit and debit issue between them was the cause of this struggle. When Süleyman Pasha was commander of the Castle of Faş, he borrowed first 100 thousand kuruş and then 150 thousand kuruş from Memiş Agha. When he demanded 250 thousand kuruş more, Memiş Agha refused.⁴³ Süleyman Pasha developed a grudge against Memiş Agha and his efforts to characterized him as a rebel were eventually successful.

However, the main and fundamental cause of this clash was a power struggle between Süleyman Pasha and Memiş Agha rather than the simple debt-credit issue. While Memiş Agha was commander of the castle of Faş, Süleyman Pasha held the same rank and was the tax collector of province of Canik as well as the commander of Karahisar-ı Şarki, which was to the south of Giresun. They were allies and fought against a shared enemy, the Russians, in the Caucasus. However, with his promotion to the governorship of Trabzon province, Süleyman Pasha dominated Memiş Agha and a power struggle started between them. After that, Süleyman Pasha endeavored to characterize Memiş Agha as a rebel. When a death warrant for Memiş Agha was declared by the sultan, he mobilized his armed supporters and rose to defend himself in 1814. We will look into the course of events below.

As a consequence of petitions sent by Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha several times, Mahmut II approved the execution of Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha, saying "the governor has written in this manner [about the request for a death decree for Memiş Agha], if he [Süleyman Pasha] had a grudge, the blame was his. The execution is suitable."⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Süleyman Pasha was charged to help the governor of Erzurum province oppose Russian forces, so assigned his father-in-law, Çeçenzade Hasan Pasha, to contend with the issue of the Tuzcuoğlus.

42 Mehmet Beşirli, "19. Yüzyıl Başlarında Karadeniz Bölgesi ve Ayan-Devlet Perspektifinden Trabzon Valisi Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha," in *Trabzon ve Çevresi Uluslararası Tarih-Dil-Edebiyat Sempozyumu: 3-5 Mayıs 2001* (Trabzon: Trabzon Valiliği İl Kültür Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 2002), 327.

43 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 52.

44 BOA, HAT., 1252/52813, 29.12.1230, February 15, 1815.; Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 25.

When Süleyman Pasha sent troops under the leadership of Çeçenzade Hasan Agha against Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha in 1814, the uprising really started. The Tuzcuoğlus and their supporters defeated the troops of the governor. The rioters conquered the harbor of Trabzon and plundered the city. A document explains the condition of the city and the governor as follows:

Even Abanozoğlu who is an ally of Tuzcuoğlu came to Trabzon and recaptured the places and secured their positions. Süleyman Pasha is in Hopa now and cannot make a move and it is impossible for him to advance toward Rize. The soldiers of Süleyman Pasha in Rize are completely scattered and some of them joined the forces of the rioters.

Şatıroğlu and Kara Numan were sent by Süleyman Pasha to Rize to suppress the uprising, but they were captured by Tuzcuoğlu and also abandoned hope for salvation. In addition to the impossibility of bringing Tuzcuoğlu to heel, Trabzon was destroyed. The subjects of Rize, Sürmene, Of, and Trabzon are helping to Tuzcuoğlu and did so with all their heart and soul. The uprising of Tuzcuoğlu can no longer be suppressed and there is no possibility of this happening. Events occurred in such a situation, and from day to day, conditions were getting worse.⁴⁵

45 “Tuzcuoğlu avanından olan Abanozoğlu dahi bu esnada Trabzon civarına gelüb mukaddem zabtında olan karyeleri yine zabt eyledi el-haleti hazihi Süleyman Pasha Hopa’dan bir hatve berü gelmeyüb yine ol tarafdadır ve berü Rize’ye gelmek ihtimali yokdur ve Süleyman Pasha’nın Rize’de olan asakiri bi’l-cümle dağılub kimisi Tuzcuoğlu’na ve kimisi Hacı Salıhoğlu ve merkum Abanozoğlu’na firar itmişlerdir ve Trabzonlu Şatıroğlu müşarünileyh tarafından Rize’ye gönderilmişidi merkum Şatıroğlu ile Miletli Kara Numan ve yanlarında olan bir miktar neferat ile Tuzcuoğlu tarafından mahsur olub onlar dahi hayatlarından ümidlerini kesmişlerdir ve bundan sonra müşarünaleyh tarafından Tuzcuoğlu’na kat’a zarar isabet etmek ihtimali olmadığından başka Trabzon Eyaleti muhtel ve müşevveş olmuştur şöyle ki Of lu ve Sürmeneli ve Lazistan ve Trabzon halkı umumen Tuzcuoğlu’na imdad ve i’anet ederler ve bir kalınca cümlesi bu maslahatda ez-dil-u can say-i makderet ederler ve fi-maba’d Tuzcuoğlu maddesi rehin-i hitam olmak vechen mine’l-vucuh mümkün değildir olmak ihtimali yokdur bu madde işte bu vechile netice-pezir oldu ve bu hususu bi’d-defaat hakpay-ı devletlerine yazdım ‘alima’llah bitmek ihtimali yokdur ve yevmen fi-yevmen daha fena olmaktadır”; BOA, HAT., 458/22580, 27.08.1231, June 23, 1816.

Although it is impossible to know about the exact intent of Memiş Agha in capturing Trabzon – no evidence explains the situation exactly – the rioters either rebelled as a more radical separatist movement nor demanded an autonomous government. This rebellion lacked an ideological foundation and occurred because of the wish to expand their privileges vis-à-vis the domination of Süleyman Pasha. Good evidence that strengthens this claim is that the rioters did not execute Kaimakam Çeçenzade Hasan Pasha, and he was allowed to return to Ünye which was the main domain of the Hazinedarzades.⁴⁶ There was a demand by the rioters for an alliance with central elites. However, this decision was catastrophic for them because when Çeçenzade Hasan Agha arrived in Ünye, he recruited soldiers with the help of the dynasty of Hazinedarzade and nearby provinces and stepped into action against the rioters. He recaptured the castles of Giresun and Tirebolu which were in western part of Trabzon. From the other side, Süleyman Pasha started to move towards Trabzon and announced that he would reward notables who renounced their actions.⁴⁷ Naturally, because there was no ideological background behind their movement, occupying forces were easily dissolved when things became worse. The leader of the riot, Tuzcuzade Memiş Agha, stood alone. Even, Hacısalihoglu Ali Agha, who was one of the most important supporters of the riot, apologized in a letter to Süleyman Pasha.

... I made a mistake and I became ungrateful. A group of people who are cursed and traitors enticed me, and I did not understand what I am doing my lord. After today, I will not rely again on what these people say... forgive me, help me and have mercy on me... for your blessed prestige, please emancipate this servant of yours and if you do this, let me go my humble home and I never dare to disobey your orders...⁴⁸

46 Mehmet Bilgin, *Doğu Karadeniz'de Bir Derebeyi Ailesi: Sarializadeler(Sarallar)* (Trabzon: Serander, 2006), 78.

47 Şevket, "Trabzon Tarihi," 196.

48 "Hata eyledim küfran-ı nimet oldum bir alay melain müfsidler kulunuzu şaşırtıldır bilemedim efendim estağfurullah hata eddim Bade'l-yevm bir kimesnenin sözüne bakmam... kerem buyur inayet buyur merhamet eyle efendimiz... mübarek aziz başın için kulunuzu azad eyle ruhsat ferman buyurulursa hane-i acizanemize gideyim emr ü devletlerinden dışarı hareket itmeğe haddim olmayub." BOA, HAT., 458/22563-B, 15.03.1234, February 11, 1819.

Even though Memiş Agha was abandoned by some of his fellow fighters, he was still powerful with his main base, Of and Rize, and he took refuge with supporters in this area.⁴⁹

Coping with the uprising took a long time and was harmful for the Sublime Porte. While Süleyman Pasha still wanted to execute Memiş Agha, the Porte did not want to continue this battle because of the danger posed by Russians on the eastern border of the empire.⁵⁰ Accordingly, Ali Pasha who was the governor of Bolu and Kastamonu, came to the aid of Süleyman Pasha to solve the problem in a peaceful way and declared that if Memiş Agha would surrender, he will be pardoned. However, Memiş Agha neither yielded nor did his supporters turn him over to state officials. Ali Pasha who was sent to the region to end the uprising in a peaceful way, stated that negotiation with the rioters was useless and that the problem could only be overcome by force:

Although we made an effort to solve this problem in a peaceful way, the character of these people does not resemble that of others and their decisions change constantly. We could not trust the promises of such people who are seditious and tricky. God help us, amen⁵¹

As it can be seen in the letter of Ali Pasha, even if the center did not want to intervene in the issue directly and sent Ali Pasha to the region as peace-maker, because of the Russian threat on the eastern border, it was unlikely the rising could be broken up without military intervention. Eventually, the center issued an order to the authorities to build an army of soldiers from the sancaks of Bolu, Kastamonu, Amasya, and Tokat and the province of Sivas. This force was placed under the command of Hazine-dar-zade Süleyman Pasha.⁵² When these preparations were completed in winter 1816, a military intervention was organized to advance on the kaza of Of which was main base of the rioters in

49 Goloğlu, "Trabzon," 106.

50 Bilgin, *Sürmene Tarihi*, 290.

51 "Maslahatın bir kolay tarikine bakılmakta ise de ah birader bu havalinin mizaçları bir diyarın mahlukuna benzemez ve karar verilen maslahatları bir gün devam bulmaz televvün olunur adamları böyle muharrik sıfatdır ve derece-i televvünleri tahrir ve ifadeye gelmez ki beyan edelim Hemen rabbim tevfiik kerem eyleye amin"; BOA, HAT., 460/22614-L, 05.10.1231 (h.), August 29, 1816.

52 BOA, HAT., 460/22614-L, 05.10.1231 (h.), August 29, 1816

May 1817.⁵³ In the consequent conflicts between the rioters and the army of the governor, which lasted around four months, Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha was captured on October 26, 1817 and beheaded.⁵⁴

The execution of Memiş Agha did not defuse tensions in the region, and the displeasure of the ayans did not end. Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha exiled the ayans that had taken part in the Tuzcuoğlu rising, and this was the main cause of displeasure in the region. The center, which was aware of the tension, appointed Süleyman Pasha to the governorship of the sancak of Alaiyye (Alanya) in 1818.⁵⁵ However, Süleyman Pasha became sick and settled in his house in Çarşamba to rest. He died in his home three months later.

The province was in disorder during the governorship of Mehmet Hüsrev Pasha (1818-1920), who was the former kaptan-ı derya (chief admiral).⁵⁶ When Hüsrev Pasha collaborated with Şatırzade Osman Pasha, who was the main ally of Süleyman Pasha in the suppression of the first rising of the Tuzcuoğlus, and Kalcızade Osman Bey and Hacısalihzade Ali Agha, who were two important figures in the uprising of the Tuzcuoğlus suspected because of a probable conspiracy. The Kalcızade family was settled in Sürmene and the Hacısalihzade Ali Agha in the center of Trabzon by Süleyman Pasha. Not long after, Kalcızade Osman Agha asked permission to resettle in Trabzon, but this demand was refused by Hüsrev Pasha. Thereupon, Kalcızade Osman Bey and Hacısalihzade Ali Agha, who had an alliance, started a riot against the governor towards the end of 1819. However, Hüsrev Pasha suppressed the rising on January 17, 1819 and the rioters appealed for mercy.⁵⁷

Hüsrev Pasha was not satisfied with the suppression and requested a decree for the execution of the rioters. However, upon the advice of bureaucrats in the center to decide cautiously, Mahmut II sent two different decrees to the

53 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 33.

54 Hacısalihzade Ali Agha, "Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi," 97.

55 Abdullah Bay, "Trabzon Eyaleti'nde Mütegalibe Hareketleri ve Ayanlık" (PhD diss., Atatürk University, Erzurum, 2007), 205.

56 Halil İncalcık, "Koca Hüsrev Pasha," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV, 1999), 42.

57 BOA, HAT., 459/22596, 29.12.1234, October 19, 1819.

province ordering the execution of the rioters or their acquittal.⁵⁸ The proper decree would be applied according to the conjuncture. However, with neither decree applied, Hüsrev Pasha was dismissed because he was seen as unsuccessful.⁵⁹

The dismissal of Hüsrev Pasha was an attempt of the center to appease local elites. The Porte appointed Salih Pasha, who would establish a peaceful dialogue with the rioters, in place of Hüsrev Pasha, who acted tyrannically. The most important reason for this was the difficult situation of the Sublime Porte given the separatist movement among the Greeks and the war with Iran. That is why the center did not want to organize a military intervention. It was not appropriate to send troops to Trabzon and Rize when the Porte had many trouble on its borders.⁶⁰ However, this was also unsuccessful at appeasing the rioters, and the rising get worse when Tuzcuzade Ahmet Agha, the son of Memiş Agha, joined the rising in 1821.

When the center understood that the rising could not be ended in the existing conditions, an authorized official, Mehmet Agha, was sent to solve the problem. Firstly, he declared a decrease in the tax amount for villagers so that they not support the rioters. The local notables who lost the support of the villagers had to make alliances with state officials in exchange for appointments as state officials.⁶¹ In addition, Governor Salih Pasha was dismissed and stability was supplied for a while.

After the suppression of the uprising, there was a short, peaceful period in the province. This peaceful period ended when Çeçenzade Hasan Pasa was appointed as governor of Trabzon province in 1825. A conflict emerged between Çeçenzade and Şatıroğlu Osman Agha, who was an ayan that supported the governors. These two ayans fought against rioters during the Tuzcuoğlu Rising to help Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha.⁶² The main cause of the conflict was that while they held the same rank of mütesellim and worked together, Şatıroğlu could not tolerate that Çeçenzade was governor, a higher

58 Hacısalihioğlu, "*Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi*," 103.

59 *İnalcık*, "Koca Hüsrev Pasha," 42.

60 BOA, HAT., 459/22596, 29.12.1234, October 19, 1819.

61 Hacısalihioğlu, 106.

62 Goloğlu, "*Trabzon*," 103.

rank than his own, and began to oppose Çeçenzade. Şatıroğlu Osman Agha provoked the ayans of the kazas of Sürmene, Rize, and Of, and this provocation posed a danger for the security of Trabzon Province. Meanwhile, Çeçenzade Hasan Pasha wanted to exile Osman Agha from the province.

Not only he does not appreciate the value of what he received from the Sublime Porte, but he also collaborates with the bandits of Sürmene, Of, and Rize, and moreover, he is kin with Tuzcuoğlu Tahir, Abdülkadir, and Abdülaziz who are ferocious bandits and he supports them... He provokes the rioters of Rize and Sürmene, and when we understood their purpose, which is to capture the main citadel of Trabzon, we sent an army to oppose them. Now, he does not come to the city and resides outside the city, in Yomra district. It is obvious that he will be in contact with the bandits of Gönye, Rize, Of, and Sürmene, and this dangerous situation cannot be overcome unless he is exiled.⁶³

The Porte did not prefer to intervene in these issues, which occurred between local governors and the ayans, directly because it was aware that even though these governors were state officials, they were also from ayan families that wanted to dominate other local powers. That is why the center did not act against the ayans by relying to the letters by local governors. Besides, if Şatıroğlu Osman Agha was exiled from the province, he could easily create further conflict with the help of his supporters. In parallel, Osman Agha was appointed as *mübayaacı* in Erzurum province in 1825, and the problem was

63 “Maiyetine inayet buyurulan nimet ve lütfu bilmeyub icra-yı firak ve ikaz-ı fetret ve nifak vadilerinde Of ve Rize ve Sürmene eşkıyalarından bir alay şekavetkarı semt ve Rizeli Tuzcuoğulları Tahir ve Abdülkadir ve Abdülaziz nam şekavet-pişeler akrabası bulunub ve onları dahi sahabet edip... Sürmene ve Rize taraflarını tahrik ve idlal ve cemiyet ettirip tarafımıza suret-i haktan görüldüğü yine iğmaz olunarak defleriyçün gitmeyi iltimasıyla gönderdikte... Şatıroğlu elyevm şehre gelmeyip halen Yomra'ya birkaç mesafe konağında ikamet ve fesattan hali olmayarak bir taraftan Sürmene ve Rize ve Of kazaları ile Gönye sancağını tahrik ve bir fesat ihtiyar edeceği nümudar olmakla mümaileyhin tedip ve islahı için bilad-ı ahara nefy ü icla olmadıkça Trabzon sancağı çirkab-ı fesadından tathir ve rehayab olmayacağı.” BOA, HAT., 460/22616-E, 12.10.1240, May 30, 1825.

solved in a peaceful way.⁶⁴ However, this appointment did not last long time, and he came back to Trabzon in 1827. He was appointed as the guardian of Anapa Castle with the rank of *mirimiran* upon the recommendation of Çeçenzade Hasan Pasha who wanted to keep Şatırzade away from the center of the province.⁶⁵

Şatırzade formed good relationship with Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha who was the successor of Çeçenzade while they were fighting against Russian forces during the Ottoman-Russian War in 1828-1829. With the dismissal of Çeçenzade from the governorship of Trabzon, Şatırzade Osman Pasha regained his former prestige and power in the center of the province during the rule of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha (1827-1842).⁶⁶

In the same manner, in the case of the first Tuzcuoğlu rising, Süleyman Pasha frequently wrote letters to the Sublime Porte about the banditry of Memiş Agha. The center did not act on these reports but investigated them to understand what actually happened. Ottoman rulers made an effort to suppress the rising in a peaceful way through some rewards, appointments, and amnesty as exemplified by Ali Pasha who was sent to the province by the center to resolve the first rising of the Tuzcuoğlus peacefully. However, the center resorted to force as a last resort when there was no other choice to solve the problem. This negotiation method on the part of the center changed little during the governorship of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha.

Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha is an important figure in the history of Trabzon province because of his bitter struggle with the rioters of the last Tuzcuoğlu rising. According to many historians of the late Trabzon history, he supplied the centralization of the province in parallel with the absolutist policies of Mahmut II by eliminating local elites from the province.⁶⁷ However, this idea is too assertive given that many local elites still had official duties in

64 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 43.

65 Bay, "Trabzon Eyaleti'nde Mütegalibe Hareketleri," 314.

66 Goloğlu, "Trabzon," 115.

67 Anthony Bryer, *Peoples and Settlement in Anatolia and the Caucasus: 800-1900* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988), 323.; Hacısalıhoğlu, 97-98.; Yücel Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Trabzon'un Genel Durumu" (paper presented at Birinci Tarih Boyunca Karadeniz Kongresi Bildirileri, Samsun, 13-17 October 1986, 1988), 143.

the province after the suppression of the last rising of the Tuzcuoğlus as well as in the period after the governorship of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha. The cause of this confusion is Osman Pasha's rigid military interventions against the rioters – fighting with them; destroying their mansions, bazaars, and domains; and expelling them. When evaluated as an authoritarian figure who applied the centralization policies of Sultan Mahmut II, Osman Pasha's personal initiative in the struggles with local elites is ignored. However, there is no document or hint of an order or permission granted by the Porte to eliminate the ayans from the province. On the contrary, the center preferred not to execute the ringleaders of the last rising of the Tuzcuoğlus, and they were evacuated from the province to the center as a form of discipline in 1833.⁶⁸

As for the governorship of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha, in the first years of his appointment he had good relations with members of the Tuzcuoğlu family. According to his report, the nephews of Memiş Agha, Tahir and Abdülkadir Aghas were appointed as state officials.⁶⁹ However, in spite of this gratification, rebellion is habitual among these types of ayan families especially those from the east side of the province, in order to obtain more privileges from the center.

In 1831, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha goes up against Ottoman rule in Egypt and the Egyptian army captured Syria and moved towards Anatolia. The center built an army from among the ayans against Kavalalı, and Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha joined the central army with the soldiers recruited from the ayans.⁷⁰ Even through the Tuzcuoğlu family gave 750 soldiers to Osman Pasha for this campaign under the leadership of Tahir Agha, the three Tuzcuoğlu brothers, Tahir, Abdülkadir, and Abdülaziz, wrote to the grand vizier to complain about Osman Pasha because of his pressure on their family.⁷¹

68 BOA, HAT., 459/22608, 17.04.1248, September 13, 1832.

69 “ortancı biraderleri Abdülkadir Ağa Çürüksu’da ordu ka’imakamlığında ve büyükleri Tahir Ağa Rize mütesellimliğinde istihdam olunarak... Kadir Ağa’nın dergah-ı ‘ali kapucubaşılığı rütbe-i refiasıyla kaderi terfi olunmuş idi”; BOA, HAT., 459/22604-B, 17.03.1248, September 13, 1832.

70 Goloğlu, 113.

71 BOA, HAT., 459/22603, 15.03.1248, September 21, 1832.

Additionally, the damage found the Ottoman-Russian war was deeply felt in the region. Agricultural production in 1829 was harmed and the harvest of 1830 was very poor. Because of this situation, the local population was suffering from famine.⁷² Many people died from plague in these years. Despite these conditions, Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha demanded a surcharge from the region, but the population with the support of the ayans of Sürmene refused. However, Osman Pasha succeeded in collecting taxes in the amount of 200 thousand kuruş with the help of ayans who supported him. In 1831, when the governor tried to increase the tax rate, unrest against the governor in the east of the province reached its peak.⁷³

After Osman Pasha went to the military expedition, the coalition by ayans uprising in 1831 under the leadership of the Tuzcuoğlu. Tuzcuoğlu Abdülkadir Agha captured Artvin through alliances with Recep, Süli, and Laz Arslan Beys who were notables of the sancak of Gönnye. Ahmet Pasha, the governor of Kars, moved against them but was defeated. Early in January 1833, after this victory, Tuzcuoğlu forces of around 12 thousand men from among the Lazs; Ofliş, Rizelis, Sürmelis and Tonyalis headed by their respective aghas, planned to attack to the city of Trabzon.⁷⁴ When things became complicated, Osman Pasha received an order to return to Trabzon and suppress the rising with the help of the governor of Çıldır, Ahmet Pasha and his son Aslan Bey.⁷⁵ In the end, the Sublime Porte decided in 1834 to exile members of Tuzcuoğlu family to Varna and Ruscuk.⁷⁶

The rising of 1831-1834 was a repetition of the first rising of the Tuzcuoğlu family. The appointment of Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha, who was a member of a wealthy family with many *çiftlik*s (estates) in the west part of Trabzon province, to the governorship and his effort to extend his rule over the coalition of local powers in the east created the conflict between them. In this process, Şatıroğlu Osman Agha, who was the leader of the coalition of ayans in

72 Bilgin, *Sürmene Tarihi*, 298.

73 Bay, "Trabzon Eyaleti'nde Müteğallibe Hareketleri," 218.

74 Bryer, "Peoples and Settlement in Anatolia and the Caucasus," 203-04.

75 Goloğlu, "Trabzon," 114.

76 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 51.

the center, took sides with Süleyman Pasha against Tuzcuoğlu forces. The power structure in the province was based on this triangle of power groups.

This triangular power structure passed on to their heirs, and Hazinedar-zade Osman Pasha, who was the son of Süleyman Pasha, and Şatırzade Osman Pasha, who was the old ally of Süleyman Pasha, made an alliance against Tuzcuoğlu Abdülkadir, Tahir, and Abdülaziz Aghas, the nephews of Memiş Agha, who were the leaders of the eastern ayan forces in the Tuzcuoğlu Rising of 1831. The result did not change, and the state sides again defeated the writing groups in the East.

Osman Pasha exhibited a negative attitude to local elites in contrast with his attitude in the early stages of his governorship. With the end of the Kavalalı issue in 1833, Osman Pasha implemented more rigid policies against the ayans in the province. He succeeded in disciplining the eastern local elites of the province by sending in military troops, downgrading their ranks, and discharging from their positions. In this process of domination, Osman Pasha demolished their mansions with heavy artillery fire, exiled or executed the leaders of the opposition, and destroyed the market places of these ayans.⁷⁷ Osman Pasha created a powerful image for himself in the history of the province and caused a structural change. After this era, uprisings large enough that the rioters occupied the city centers like those of Sürmene, Of, and Trabzon – such as the Tuzcuoğlu Uprisings – no longer happened.

On the other hand, Osman Pasha neither established a centralized administration nor completely annihilated local forces in the province.⁷⁸ He never reorganized the system of governance based on the absolutist central administration. Even if Osman Pasha intimidated local elites in the province by demolishing their mansions and the sources by which they gained power, the heirs of these ayans were appointed as state officials and performed duties demanded by the center. For instance, they became involved in wars more effectively than in the past. Local elites responded the demands of the center with respect to military affairs by joining the central army and sending more soldier than in the past. Their powers were diminished by the governor, and their

77 Bilgin, *Sürmene Tarihi*, 299-300.

78 Meeker, "A Nation of Empire," 240.

potential for rebellion thus decreased. However, they regained power – though not like before – because neither Osman Pasha nor ensuing governors implemented a policy that would endanger their existence. In parallel, it would be met with resistance in the province against Tanzimat reforms that will be evaluated in the next chapters. These local elites even maintained their existence in the Turkish Republic by dominating administrative staffs.

§ 2.3 Trabzon Ayans: The Politics of Notables in Trabzon

There was a difference between the local elites of the western vis-à-vis eastern districts of Trabzon province. Notables from the eastern part of the province did not possess large estates worked by large numbers of peasants.⁷⁹ Instead, the power of the elites in the east was based on their ability to mobilize large armed forces; thus, they declared themselves as the sovereign power in certain areas. Local elites of the province possessed great wealth by possessing lands, controlling trade routes, and most of all by undertaking official duties. However, this wealth posed a danger because local notables were in conflict with each other to become more powerful in their homeland. To do so, having soldiers was the most important necessity for local elites. They were protected their wealth and prestige against other ayans and dominated over society. Besides, for ayans, having their own soldiers was the most important factor in negotiations with the central bureaucracy. They were the favored alliances of the center when the Porte run into trouble in the provinces. In parallel, the Ottoman Empire frequently consulted the ayans of the Trabzon province especially during the wars against Russians in the Caucasus.⁸⁰ That soldiers would be to the central army was expected by the center and some local notables would go into battles as the head of their soldiers.

The local elites of Trabzon province organized in the form of coalitions that were able to mobilize thousands of armed soldiers when their common interests were threaten by central authorities. However, their aim was neither radical movement like those of separatist movements nor the dethronement

79 Meeker, "A Nation of Empire," 148.

80 Hasan Umur, *Of Tarihine Ek* (Istanbul: Birlik, 1956), 65.

of sultan. Local elites only rebelled in order to protect themselves or expand their privileges. That is, when needed to obtain privileges and official ranks, they could be partisans of the Porte and cater to the needs of the sultan and empire, mostly with respect to military and taxation issues.

Political authority was divided into two – state officials appointed by the center and local powers who stemmed from the region. However, it was no Janus-headed system. This structure emergence with the expansion of circle of government system during the period of decentralization, and local elites became involved in the government system.⁸¹

Because of the powerful status of local elites in provinces, Ottoman officials who represented of the Sublime Porte like the provincial governor were obliged to collaborate with these notables or oppose them in the case that a local chief act contrary to the rule of a state official. In order to include them in the system, the center handed out official ranks by appointing them to state offices. The other side of the coin was the declaration of local powers as rioters when state officials met with a undesirable situation by notbales and in this circumstance, the center organized military expeditions against them. However, this way was undesirable for the empire given that there were many local elites who were potential rioters in almost every corner of the empire.

The relationship between the center and local elites was not stable and easily changed in time. For this reason, local powers were both inside and outside of the governing block. They sometimes rose up against the center but other times enforced orders given by the Porte and met its military needs by sending soldiers to the central army when necessary. In addition, in most Ottoman provinces, state officials appointed by the palace could not carry out administrative affairs without the assistance of local elites because they did not have connections in the local society and they had also no power to carry out those affairs.

The two political powers, one of which was official and the other of which was non-official have skirmished many times from the second half of the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century in Trabzon province. Their relationship was not based on regular rule and changed from time to time.

81 Meeker, *"A Nation of Empire,"*186.

Sometimes state officials came to the fore vis-à-vis local elites and sometimes vice versa. When the official governor was stronger, he could force local elites to abandon the region or exile them to another part of the empire along with their family and followers. When local lords were rather more powerful than the official governor, they could force him to take refuge in the castle of the city.⁸² On the other hand, there was a balanced policy between the powers based on making alliances and manipulation. Sometimes the governor made an alliance with one chief against another local lord, and a short time later, he could ally with his former enemy in order to eliminate his former ally.⁸³

The political structure of the system was fragmented as such, but this fragmented structure should not be interpreted as a centralized administrative system against a localized social system. All regional leaders who had armed forces, whether or not they had an official rank, played an important role in governing the provinces. Viewed from this perspective, official governors were dependent on these chiefs and their social oligarchy. On the other hand, local chiefs always took an eager interest in participating in the power block in order to strengthen and legitimize their political power.

In the system, most conflicts were caused by the demands of local powers to obtain official ranks and the interventions of official governors in order to expand their own politic spheres. In accordance with this situation, some local elites in Trabzon managed to enter the circles of state officials by obtaining ranks and tasks. These ranks were used by the central government in order to control or manipulate local lords. On the other hand, stronger provincial governors could expel these lords and appoint one of his own followers. However, no provincial governor entirely dismissed the local chiefs from the administrative system, but rather sought to curtail illegal behaviors by discharging or demoting them, except when the cases got out of hand.⁸⁴

In Trabzon province, there were bureaucratic ties among the ayans. One of these ties important in the making of alliances was marriage. Local elites strengthened their local ties through these types of marriage. The first uprising

82 Meeker, *"A Nation of Empire,"* 157.

83 Ibid.

84 Meeker, *"A Nation of Empire,"* 197.

of the Tuzcuoğlus is an example through which the alliance of marriage can be evaluated. The uprising occurred after the issuance of the death warrant for Memiş Agha, and many local elites gathered around him.⁸⁵ The Tuzcuoğlus with their many relatives and allies that composed by the way of marriage, caused trouble for the center given their influence and wealth. During the uprising, one of most powerful and prominent figures was Kalcıoğlu Osman Bey, the son-in-law of Memiş Agha.⁸⁶ Kalcıoğlu Osman Bey was the henchman of Memiş Agha and he was mastermind of the uprising. Kalcıoğlu Osman cleared the way for the capture of the castle of Trabzon by imprisoning Mustafa Agha and Kakavanoğlu Hüseyin Bey, who were the commanders of Polathane (Akcaabat).⁸⁷ His contributions were not limited to these actions as his relatives also joined the uprising. He sent his brother-in-law to Polathane to be the commander of the city. Another brother-in-law, Pashazade Sadullah, was the voivode of Bayburt and helped the rioters.⁸⁸ Moreover, the daughter of Kalcıoğlu Osman was married to Emin Agha, the son of Genç Mehmet Agha who was the rioter from Sürmene district. The daughter of Genç Mehmet Agha, Tuti Hatun, was the wife of Aziz Agha who was the son of Deli Ahmet Agha who was another rioter from Sürmene. Dedezaade Süleyman Agha who was a rebel from the western part of Trabzon and the ayan of Eynesil, was the father-in-law of Hacısalihoğlu Ali Agha. In addition, Tuzcuoğlu Ahmet Agha, who was the son of Memiş Agha, was himself the son-in-law of Buberoglu Memiş Agha who was one of the local notables from the kaza of Of.⁸⁹ These marriages were a template for concentrating power and acting in unison when the notables were under threat, just as in the case of the Tuzcuoğlu uprising.

Membership in a powerful family or coalition was crucial for the safety of individuals and families. Local notables controlled every corner of regions that had the strategic importance, like harbors or trade routes, with their armed men. Generally, notables of eastern part of Trabzon province possessed single

85 BOA, HAT., 458/22580, 27.08.1231, July 23, 1816

86 Aktepe, "Tuzcu-oğulları İsyanı," 26.

87 Ibid., 27.

88 Ibid., 28.

89 Bilgin, *Sürmene Tarihi*, 311.

valleys.⁹⁰ However, it was hard to control these areas that were crucially important for transportation and trade and maintain safety alone. That is why these local men had to cooperate through local alliances and coalitions to protect themselves and what they own. In other words, being a powerful man required coexistence with other powerful men in the same coalition.

In the region, almost every ayan organized around a mansion called *konak*, and these mansions played an important role in the organization and governance system of the notables. The mansions of local elites were generally located at headlands and in dominant terrains, which were like government buildings with drawing rooms, accounting offices, and prisons, and provincial elites lived in these spacious mansions with many servants including slaves.⁹¹ From their mansions, these people carried out government functions like collecting taxes, catching fugitives, enforcing court orders, assembling irregular troops, requisitioning military supplies, and building roads and bridges by drudgery labor. To do so, they had administrative staffs and moved around with retinues of armed supporters.

The indicated buildings were located near markets, crossroads, routes, or anchorages. For example, the mansion of Memiş Agha was located in the center of Rize, and the center of the kaza of Tonya, next to the mansion of Hacısalihoğlu Ali Agha, is known as *konakyanı*.⁹² So wherever there were leading individuals from large family groupings, there also was a mansion, and wherever there was a mansion, one could be assured that the location was of strategic significance. For the owners of mansions, it was necessary in order to gather relatives, friends, and allies under the same roof. When considered from this point of view, the mansion was a political unit on the local scale and later became the place from which challenges to the power that wanted to annihilate the local forces were led. Servants were employed in these buildings. In the mansion of Tuzcuoğlu, the servants were considered like subjects; *tebaa*.⁹³ “The ayans of the Trabzon province were much like the sultan in

90 Kinneir, "Journey Through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan," 85.

91 Meeker, "A Nation of Empire," 147.

92 Hacısalihoğlu, "Trabzon'da Ayanlık Mücadelesi," 65.

93 Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, "Tuzcuoğulları," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: ISAM, 2012), 452.

Istanbul, which oversee the circles of interpersonal associations. They maintained saloons (*oda*) in their mansions where they received guests and visitors.”⁹⁴

Although most of the large mansions of notables were destroyed in the era of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha in the 1830s, the heirs of these ayans rebuilt the mansions and reestablished bonds with other local elites as the sources of power that had enabled and strengthened the ayans in the province were not completely abolished by Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha.

To sum up, the general tendency for developed states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to eliminate the mediators – that is, local elites – between central rule and subjects. Especially western states followed this path in order to reach their resources and mobilize their subjects more effectively. However, this process did not work in the same way for all states. The Ottoman Empire was one of those states that did not follow this type of modernity. Ottoman elites shared power with local elites ayans by including them in the governing cycle through the granting of ranks, rewards, and grants. Thus, the Sublime Porte and ayans cooperated to govern the provinces, especially those it was hard for the center to control.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when ayans were most visible, Mahmut II tried to eliminate large ayan families that endangered the survival of the empire like Tepedelenli family. However, such elimination of large ayan families in the province of Trabzon did not occur during the rule of Sultan Mahmut II. Even though the exile of the Tuzcuoğlus to Varna and Ruscuk was associated with the centralization policy of Mahmut II, this was a result of the victory of the west over the east in the power struggle among the local elites in the province. The Porte exiled the Tuzcuoğlu family to defer to a more powerful one, the Hazinedarzades.

The attitudes and mentalities of the Ottoman Empire in the risings is the decisive part of this chapter. First, the center did not take direct action against these rioters and acted carefully because many petitions and letters from the provinces were provocative, like those of Hazinedarzade Süleyman Pasha. He was himself from an ayan family, saw Memiş Agha as a rival competing for

94 Meeker, 148-49.

authority over the province, and wanted to eliminate him by acquiring the support of the center. On the other hand, central governors sent officers to the province and offered amnesty to suppress the rising. Military intervention was the last resort because a civil war would destroy the economic system and divide the army when the empire was already under foreign threat. In parallel, the center never pursued a centralization policy to eliminate local elites in the province.

In the province of Trabzon, the ayans were that they would come together through marriages and coalitions and act in tandem against shared enemies. Almost every important location like valleys, trade routes, and coastlines were controlled by a local coalition in the province. Mansions functioned as the governing center of these rebellious movements in the province. However, the era of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha was not exactly a period of centralization in the province as opposed to the arguments of local historians of Trabzon. Even if the era was more radical compared to the past in terms of the struggle with local elites, the annihilation of local elites in the province was never accomplished by Osman Pasha. The steps he took to harshly discipline local elites was called *tedip*, but he did not abolish local elites in the province. They even remained important allies in the countryside in the Republican Era, adapting themselves to the times and varying administrative systems..

Tanzimat Reforms and Opposition (1834-1841)

When the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire is considered, a power struggle would stand out that took shape with the bargains, conflicts, and negotiations between the center and local elites mostly on the issue of taxation. This power struggle stemmed from the demand of the center to increase the tax revenues of the central treasury, and the Tanzimat reforms were a step that shaped this plan for bureaucratization and centralization. Even if such plans emerged in the minds of Ottoman bureaucrats in theory, these steps were not successful in practice because of the realities of the era in the Ottoman Empire; the center still needed local elites to effectively collect taxes in the provinces. However, this issue was not a story of success or failure. The commitments and demands of the center with respect to taxation, military service, education, and public works should not be taken as a certain aim and should not be evaluated as a failure just because the target was not achieved. Evaluating of these demands as a claim rather than as a certain aim would help to make an analyze about the Tanzimat reforms. Central elites came forward forward with a particular claim about taxation, military service, and legislation with the Tanzimat but the composition and degree of those demands changed according to the power, negotiation, opposition, and interests of local

elites and subjects in the provinces of the empire.¹ The Tanzimat reforms were not applied to the same degree and at the same time throughout the empire because local realities of each province differed.²

Besides former attempts at reform that had continued since the era of Selim III, Ottoman bureaucrats started a more extensive reform movement with the Tanzimat compared to those in the past.³ The one of main differences of the Tanzimat from previous reforms was the declaration of the equality of the empire's Muslim and Non-Muslim subjects before the law. Other differences concerned taxation which was to be taken according to individual income and the fact that ordinary people were going to be represented in provincial councils.⁴

In general, even though the Tanzimat reforms included the issues of administration, military, education, infrastructure, and health, they were basically a new tax system. According to the new system, tax collection would be organized by bureaucrats appointed by the center, decreasing the effect and share of intermediaries. Thus, the income of the central treasury would be increased correspondingly. In short, the issue behind the Tanzimat reforms was the problem of who would take the surplus value produced by the peasants in relation to the redistribution process and the claim by the center to gain a larger proportion compared to the past. Naturally, the political result of this demand was social resistance in areas which the Tanzimat was applied because this redistribution process meant less power and a lower economic share for actors who had been humiliated by the *iltizam* (tax farming) system around for 250 years.

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- 1 Yonca Köksal, "Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 27 (Fall 2002): 109.
 - 2 For example, Edirne was one of the first provinces that the reforms were applied, see Yonca Köksal, "Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 27 (Fall 2002): 107-138. On the other hand, reaching of the reforms to Transjordan strung out to the end of nineteenth century. For more detailed information, see Eugene L Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
 - 3 Ahmet Uzun, *Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler* (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2002), 9.
 - 4 Halil İnalçık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu," *Bellekten*, Vol.28, no. 112 (1964): 612-13.

The Tanzimat state made an effort to turn the process of redistribution into its own favor with the *muhassillik* system. The ideal in the minds of Tanzimat bureaucrats was to directly acquire the surplus value of rural production and distribute it from the center. Naturally, this met with resistance from the probable losers under the new system who were mostly local elites, local governors, and *mültezims*. The most disadvantaged group was local elites. They, as part of the government block, had the right to collect taxes and were not paying taxes themselves in exchange for fulfilling this mission. Besides, peasants were being worked in the lands of the ayans as *corvée* labor. The promise of a progressive tax system under the Tanzimat to be calculated according to one's income level and the abolition *corvée* labor provoked local powers. The *mültezims* who were important components of the *iltizam* system were another group whose economic profits would decrease under the new system. In same way, the bankers who bankrolled of the old system also suffered a loss under the *muhassillik* system.

Local governors were another losing group. As emphasized before, there was no set certain salary for Ottoman local governors in the modern sense in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. Some income items like harbors, tariffs, and the right to collect taxes in a place were granted by the center to local governors as a salary as mentioned before. Besides, there was a gift economy in the provinces between governors and local elites based on reciprocity. Governors received presents from the ayans in exchange for giving them official duties. The alliance between governors and ayans over issues of taxation, military service, and public order had been shaped in this manner. This alliance was crucial for provincial administration because provincial governors appointed by the center from among the bureaucrat pool knew little about their new places of duty and had no roots in the province to effectively administrate. To do so, governors endeavoured to win the ayans via the gift economy.

Before the Tanzimat era, the distinction between the public and private expenditures of the governors was insignificant. There was no big differentiation between administrative expenditures and personal expenses. The mansions of the governors served as government offices. Governors also financed their servants from their own budgets. With the Tanzimat, governors were put

on salaries by the center, and the gift economy was abolished by the Penal Code of 1840.⁵ In other words, the old gift system became illegal, and thus the corruption was invented. Governors became potential criminals according to the new system because no a governor could immediately break from the old system in 1840. Thus, the economic power of governors was limited by the center, and nominally, they were to be interested in only political and military affairs. The muhassils who were authorized officials for tax collection did not depend on governors in economic affairs. In parallel, the loss of economic power for governors meant a loss of prestige and administrative power.

When the scheme is considered, agents operating the affairs of governance and economics were dissatisfied with the new system. Naturally, this new movement met with opposition from these groups. Because of the opposition, state bureaucrats first introduced the reforms of the Tanzimat in the pilot areas – regions near to the center where local forces were not so powerful like Edirne, Hüdavendigâr, Konya, Aydın, Sivas, and Ankara – by registering property and populations there.⁶ The old system continued in provinces in which local forces were powerful like in Arabian, Albanian and Kurdish geographies.⁷ That is why the Tanzimat was not introduced in every province of the empire at the same time. During the Tanzimat era, the center followed a path of “trial and error” referred to in archival documents as “kaide-i tedric.”⁸

The province of Trabzon, it was among the prior group of provinces to which the introduction of the Tanzimat was planned. However, the reforms of Tanzimat were postponed upon the advice and reports of the state officials.⁹ The first step was taken on 3 January 1841 with the appointment of the Minister

5 Cengiz Kırılı, *Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi* (İstanbul: Verita, 2015), 14-18.

6 Musa Çadircı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), 66.

7 This categorization of Arab, Kurd and Albanian is not an ethnic classification but refers to the areas in which the powerful armed local elites had a more autonomous structure.

8 Özgür Yılmaz, "Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Taşra İdare Meclisleri (1840-1871)," *History Studies*, Vol.6, no. 6 (2014): 256.

9 Çadircı, 192.

of Quarantine, Lebib Efendi, with a 20,000 kuruş salary.¹⁰ He probably did not report to his new place of duty because the old muhassıl of Galata, Azmi Efendi, was appointed on 27 January 1841 to investigate the prospect of reforms in the province along with two officials upon a decision of the Meclis-i Vala and the consent of the emperor. However, following his report on the unsuitableness of the province for the reforms, the Tanzimat was postponed by the Meclis-i Vala.¹¹ This chapter, searches for an answer to the question why the Tanzimat reforms were postponed in the province of Trabzon by examining the opposition from different power groups in the province.

§ 3.1 Opposition to the Initial Step of the Tanzimat Reforms

The question of why the Tanzimat Reforms could not be put into practice in the province shows the power struggle between local elites and the center in the countryside. In the literature on Trabzon province, the answer to the question is given that the Hazinedarzades, who were a powerful ayan family of the Black Sea region, held the governorship of the province at the time.¹² In general, reference point of this answer is advice that came from the province as follows:

In addition to the fact that applying the Tanzimat right away is not yet appropriate in places whose people are brutal like in this province, the iltizam of the province of Trabzon for the year 1841 was given to Hazinedarzade Osman Paşa, who is the governor of the province of Trabzon, by the decision of the Meclis-i Vala... and according to rumors, notables of the province have dispossessed the lands and properties of villagers and have no bill for these properties, and moreover, if the old system was abolished, they would no longer be able to continue such illegal activities. Because of that, they will plot all sorts of mischief against the Tanzimat, and moreover, the governor will not

10 BOA, İ.DH, 29/1376, 09.11.1256, January 03, 1841.

11 BEO, AYN. 373, p. 145; Çadircı, p. 193

12 Çadircı, 193.; Sarıođlan, 34.; Yılmaz, *Tanzimat Döneminde Trabzon*, 158.; Saydam, 298.

solve the problem because of his own displeasure with the new system; that is why the postponing of the Tanzimat Reforms in the province to later years is required for now.¹³

As can be seen, the most important obstacles for the introduction of Tanzimat Reforms in the region were local elites and the governor of Trabzon, Hazinedarzade Osman Paşa. However, this should be examined in detail to find a more appropriate answer to the question. There was no homogenous structure in the province to generalize about all local elites the same. To make a sweeping statement and neglect the diversity of the land and the differences among local lords in Trabzon Province, the boundaries of which extended along the coast for approximately seven hundred kilometers, overlooks the details. Accordingly, there were significant differences among the regions of the province that will be evaluated below by examining the social and land structure of the different regions and the individual causes for their opposition to the reforms on the eve of the Tanzimat Reforms.

3.1.1 *Opposition in Yurtluk-Ocaklıks*

The administrative structure changed in many times with regard to the Ottoman-Russian wars and the land structure of the eastern region of the province was shaped by the Russian threat. In accordance with this situation, the lands of Batum and Çürüksu, the kazas of the sancak of Gönnye, were granted as yurtluk-ocaklık to powerful local chiefs. The granting of yurtluk-ocaklıks was related to the government mentality of the Ottoman Empire. It is well-known that the Ottoman Empire gave some administrative and economic privileges to local elites.¹⁴ The empire did not adopt an absolutist central governance system but rather acted pragmatically by establishing various administrative systems were customized according to local realities.¹⁵ As a result of this

13 BOA, İ.DH., 33/1541, 24.12.1256, February 16, 1841.

14 Ömer Toraman, "Trabzon Eyaletinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Suretiyle Arazi Tasarrufuna Son Verilmesi (1847-1864)," *Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi* vol.8, no. 8 (2010): 56.

15 Fatih Gencer, "Merkezileşme Politikaları Sürecinde Yurtluk-Ocaklık Sisteminin Değişimi," *AÜDTCE, Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol.30, no. 49 (2011): 30.

mentality, the system of granting *yurtluk-ocaklık* to local dynasties in places far from the center and in frontier zones like Adana, Çıldır, Damascus, Rakka, Tunisia, Bosnia and some Kurdish provinces close to the Iranian border sought to benefit from the dominance of local chiefs.¹⁶ In this conservative land system, tenure could be bequeathed to children but could not be sold, bestowed or devoted.¹⁷

The increasing number of *yurtluk-ocaklık* lands in the Northeastern Anatolia was the result of conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the administrative area.¹⁸ *Yurtluk-ocaklık* lands in the province of Trabzon were prevalent in the *kazas* of Batum and Çürüksu, Acara-i Ulya, Acara-i Süfla and Maçahel of the sancak of Gönnye on the eve of the introduction of the Tanzimat.¹⁹ However, this system was contrary to one of the main principles of the Tanzimat reforms, which planned for a more central economic structure. In the course of introducing Tanzimat reforms, many uprisings and conflicts emerged in the provinces with *yurtluk-ocaklık* system because elites were aware that they would lose their autonomous structures with the new system.²⁰ Because of this critical issue, the empire acted cautiously about the future of *yurtluk-ocaklık* lands and did not abolish the system even in the Tanzimat era. The owners of these land were gradually eliminate in due course of time, and this process lasted until 1908 when the ten-year income of these lands were paid in a lump sum.²¹

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- 16 Orhan Kılıç, "Yurtluk-Ocaklık ve Hükümet Sancaklar Üzerine Bazı Tespitler," *OTAM*, vol.10, no. 10 (1999): 119.
- 17 Yılmaz Kurt, "XVI. Yüzyıl Adana Tarihi" (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, Ankara, 1992), 27.
- 18 Orhan Kılıç, *18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdari Taksimatı: Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı* (Elazığ: Şark Pazarlama, 1997), 65.; The region termed North-Eastern Anatolia includes the provinces of Çıldır, Kars, and Trabzon. In these 3 provinces, there were eight *yurtluk-ocaklık kazas*, but this number reached to twenty-one by 1740. For details, see. Toraman, 56-57.
- 19 Bayram Kodaman and Nedim İpek, "Çürüksu Kazası," *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi* 7, no. 1 (1992): 102.
- 20 For uprisings in the *yurtluk-ocaklık* lands of Cizre, Palu, Eğil, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari, Van, and Erzurum, see Ömer Toraman, "Tanzimat'ın Yurtluk-Ocaklık Ve Hükümetlik Sancaklarda Uygulanması (1839-1864)" (PhD diss., Fırat University, Elazığ, 2010), 72-155.
- 21 BOA, MVL., 120/74, 23.08.1326, 19 September 1908

We have no detailed information about the opposition in these lands except for report of Azmi Efendi which states that the new tax could not yet be imposed on local notables because they were not accustomed to paying taxes, and he suggested to collect taxes from the notables by splitting the taxes into ten or twelve installments. However, the center gave up on the idea of applying reforms, remarking that the people did not yet understand the advantages of the Tanzimat.²²

The uprisings that happened before the Tanzimat was applied in 1847 reveal the aspects of the opposition to the Tanzimat Reforms. On the eve of the Tanzimat Reforms in the province of Trabzon, the most crucial opposition happened in yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Paraleling the fear of central elites about yurtluk-ocaklık lands, a rising by the owners of yurtluk-ocaklık lands occurred in the eastern part of the province of Trabzon in 1845, in the kazas of Acara-i Ulya, Acara-i Süfla, and Maçahel.²³ The local chiefs of these places did not fulfil their economic and military obligations for 1839 and demanded annexation to Trabzon province in order to escape from the new reforms.²⁴ As a consequence, these kazas were annexed to Trabzon province in 1844.²⁵ In spite of the fact that these elites escaped immediate reform, they supported Kör Hüseyin Bey and Acara became base defence area of the uprising.²⁶ A report of Halil Paşa, who was governor of Trabzon province, remarked that if any military intervention was not organized against the rising, the kaza of Lazistan

22 Çadırcı, 192-93.

23 Acaralı Kör Hüseyin Bey was a local elite in the province of Çıldır, and his first uprising happened in the kaza of Ardanuç in Çıldır in 1840 because of a conflict with his brother. It became an uprising against Hafız Paşa, the governor of Erzurum. He surrendered in July 1840 and was sent to Istanbul for trial. At the end of the trial, he was honored with the rank of kapıcıbaşılık and sent to his homeland in 1842. Acaralı Kör Hüseyin Bey enlarged the existing uprising against the central reforms since 1845 when he came to the Acara region. The uprising of 1846 was his second and biggest riot. For detail, see Özgür Yılmaz, "Tanzimat Döneminde İsyancı Bir Ayan Profili: Acaralı Kör Hüseyin Bey Hadisesi," *Bellekten*, vol.78, no. 282 (2014): 630-46.

24 Tanzimat reforms were introduced in the province of Erzurum earlier than in Trabzon and being annexed to Trabzon was a pragmatic way of escaping the reforms.

25 BOA, A.MKT., 11/95, 17.04.1260, 06 April 1844

26 BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 2/16, 21.07.1262, 15 July 1846

and Çürüksu could get out of control.²⁷ At the end of the military intervention, Kör Hüseyin and his supporters were captured and imprisoned in the castle of Samsun on 28 November 1846 and later sent to Istanbul and sentenced to penal servitude in Tersane-i Amire.²⁸ Thus, the region calmed down for a while. The common people and notables of this region opposed Tanzimat Reforms during 1850s as will be evaluated in chapter 4.

As it can be seen, the reforms of Tanzimat have created a great discontent in lands with yurtluk-ocaklıks, of which there were five kazas in the province of Trabzon – namely Batum, Çürüksu, Acara-i Ülya, Acara-i Süfla, and Maçahel – on the eve of introduction of the reforms of Tanzimat. These discontents and risings were related to the opposition movements in other yurtluk-ocaklık lands. According to the remarks of Esad Paşa who was the governor of Erzurum province, conflicts in yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the province of Van affected and motivated Kör Hüseyin Bey, and the disorder in the Acara regions could not be prevented unless problems in the province of Van were solved.²⁹ The uprising of Acaralı Kör Hüseyin was a leak in a chain of opposition movements against the Tanzimat in yurtluk-ocaklık lands. Tanzimat bureaucrats were aware of this discontent, and the existence of this type of land in a province was an important cause for the postponement of reforms. Such opposition continued into the 1860s as it will be evaluated in the forthcoming chapter.

3.1.2 *Opposition of Local Elites of the Lazistan Region*

It was mentioned before that there was no homogenous structure on which to make a generalization about the province. Another region that diverged from

27 BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 87/2462, no.3, 11.08.1262, 04 August 1846

28 Yılmaz, "Tanzimat Döneminde İsyancı Bir Ayan Profili: Acaralı Kör Hüseyin Bey Hadisesi," 649.

29 Cevdet Küçük, "Tanzimat Devrinde Erzurum" (PhD diss., Istanbul University, Istanbul, 1975).; Additionally the center ordered that the resolution of the problem of these lands be postponed because these local elites kept in touch with elites in the province of Van and they were gossiping. The word for "gossip" used in the document, which has a negative meaning, was "kıl-ü kâl": BOA, BEO.AYN.d., no.409, p.60, 19.03.1264, May 21, 1848

other regions in the province was the region between the Hopa and the eastern part of Trabzon, which is called as “Lazistan” – and local elites “Lazs” – in this chapter.³⁰

When it comes to the economic structure, it should be emphasized that cultivated lands were limited in the region. Shore trade had become prominent through many existing harbours.³¹ The bazaars in Lazistan, which were set up on specific days of the week, had an effect on the development of trade in coastal regions.³² When the Prussian doctor Karl Koch, who travelled the region in 1843-44, mentioned the domination of the local chiefs of Lazistan, he emphasized that local elites controlled the bazaar locations and earned high incomes.³³ Lands where maize and rice were grown were also in the hands of ayans. Villagers engaged in small-scale agriculture in small yards and gardens and they sold their surplus in the bazaars to earn a living.

30 These lands called Lazistan included mostly the kazas of Sürmene, Of, and Rize and extended towards the kaza of Hopa which in brutal, armed local elites were powerful. It will be named as the Lazs for the armed brutal groups. This denotation of Lazistan is different from the sancak of Lazistan that was established in 1852. The region of Lazistan will be evaluated as a geographic and cultural unit, not as an administrative unit as a sancak. In accordance, the word “Laz” will not refer to an ethnic categorization because Armanians, Greeks, Circassians and Muslim-Turks were also living in this region in addition to the ethnic Laz. Paralleling our description, the expression “Lazistan” was also used by Evliya Çelebi in the seventeenth century to indicate this region. (Atsız, 2001, p.297). Likewise, Mehmet Bilgin assigns a geographic meaning to “Lazistan” which he uses in reference to the people of the region comprising the eastern part of Trabzon without discriminating among religion, language, and ethnic origin (Bilgin, 2000, p.149). According to Anthony Bryer, this expression came from the era of the Pontic Empire. Foreigners also gave the local people of the eastern coastal region from Trabzon to Batum the name “Laz”. (Bryer, 1988, p.174- 178).

31 Özdiş, "*Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi*," 66.

32 It can be claimed that these bazaars are still effective in the economic life of the region. In the specific days in the week, the portable bazaars would be set up in the city centers and people would go shopping from vilages to the city centers in these days. For instance, tuesday is the bazaar day of Sürmene and Ardeşen, thursday is of Of and Fındıklı (its old name was Viçe), Saturday is of Arhavi. Even if its effect decreased, the bazaars revived after the 1991 when the custom station of Russia was opened after the USSR collapsed by commercialization of cheap Russian products.

33 Özdiş, "*Taşrada İktidar Mücadelesi*," 68.

In Lazistan, there was one lord for every valley and field, and these lords controlled these domains.³⁴ In parallel, according to Koch, Lazistan was governed by ayans, he saw these notables as “spies” whose numbers were not less than fifteen. He summarizes the structure as follows:

Despite the fact that all beys obey the rule of the sultan unwillingly and await an opportunity to get rid of the authority, the old power and prestige of these beys was not completely dispossessed. These local chiefs were recognized as authorities in their domains with the epithet of “spy.” I can say that there are at least fifteen spies in Lazistan with such a status.³⁵

The most important reason for calling local powers “spies” was that these ayans continued their official duties in spite of the military intervention of the governor Osman Paşa to them. Additionally, Koch perceived the region as a different province independent of the province of Trabzon and saw Halim Bey, who was the governor of the sancak of Gönnye, as a governor (vali) of the province.

Halim Bey was richest man in the Paşalık(Lazistan) and appointed as a governor to Hopa. He was a member of enlightened group of the Ottoman Empire and because of this, he dissents from Abdullah Paşa who was the governor of Trabzon province.³⁶

Karl Koch’s impressions about the administrative structure and local elites of the province were wrong because Hopa never became a province in these years. However, this situation was understandable when the administrative and social structure of Lazistan is considered. Like consuls who had served from the beginning of 19th century in the province, Koch perceived these local elites as completely autonomous groups taking a stand against Ottoman governors.³⁷ However, these elites were in the circle of the administrative system in terms of economic, military, and security affairs. On the other hand, his

34 Abdullah Saydam, "XIX. Yüzyılda Reform İhtiyacının Taşradaki Yansımalarına Bir Örnek: Akçaabad Kazası," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, vol.21, no. 21 (2001): 137.

35 Karl Koch, "Rize," in *Prof Karl Koch'un 1843-44 Yıllarındaki Seyahatnamesinin Rize Bölümü*, ed. Muzaffer Arıcı (Ankara: Odak Ofset, 1995), 124-25.

36 Koch, "Rize," 125.

37 Meeker called this perception “the consular theory.”, Meeker, 230.

duality of west and east strengthens the distinctness of Lazistan that it will be argued in this chapter.

Local elites in Lazistan who became strong in the seventeenth century started to control castles of region in the eighteenth century by capturing existing castles and ensuring their authority.³⁸ This trend was not looked upon favorably by the center which initially sent military troops to these local notables to prevent the actions of these ayans. Under these conditions, the dominance of the ayans in these castles did not last long, and they had to abandon them.³⁹ The center wanted to control these castles because they were located in strategic locations like valleys, passes, and along trade routes. However, the center could not maintain its dominance over the castles in rural areas, and in time the presence of the ayans in the castles started to be referred to by the names of their owners. A new alliance was shaped on this ground between the center and the ayans.⁴⁰ In addition to the capture of castles, local chiefs built their own castles and mansions for security purposes in strategic locations. These buildings served as military bases, and the ayans organized attacks, raids, and plundering activities from these centers.

In Lazistan, such castles and mansions were widespread in almost every valley. Such defensive settings were to gain power vis-à-vis other local lords and the center. The viewpoint of the state towards these local chiefs was pragmatic. These lords had the power to mobilize people and the ability to collect taxes in their domains, and they were allies of the center in the eighteenth century. During the eighteenth century, they responded to the military needs of the center by sending soldiers in wartimes. On the other hand, they came together in order to oppose to governors, and tended to uprising, and could defeat the army of governors.⁴¹ The center gave gifts to these lords such as official ranks or recognition. Hence, the bandits could become prestigious figures by entering to the governing block. Controversially, official ranks were

38 Bay, 27.

39 BOA, HAT., 63/2753 A, 10.06.1212, December 30, 1797.

40 Bay, 28.

41 The uprisings described in the first chapter also exemplify these movements organized by the elites of Lazistan.

insufficient for all of the ayans in the region. This situation caused undesirable conditions like widespread banditry, murder, kidnaping, and robbery in Lazistan. According to the pragmatic relation, when the interest ground was disrupted and the ayans with official ranks tended to undesirable behaviors, these local elites would become to the bandits, murderers, and seditious persons in the eye of the center.⁴²

When ‘allies’ became ‘bandits’, the use of ammunition to discipline local lords who had consolidated their power in the castles of the region was considerably higher. In 1765, Sarı Abdurrahman Paşa, who was the governor of Trabzon province, used 697 *kantar* of gunpowder (*barut*), 100 *kantar* of lead (*kurşun*), and 38 bars of pig lead (*kalıp kurşun*) to discipline the notables.⁴³ This information shows that the use of firearms against the ayans who defended themselves in their castles and mansions was very high, and the conflicts was too expensive for the central treasury.

On the other hand, local notables attacked or oppressed the official governors like the mütesellims and pashas of administrative units. In most cases, these uprisings happened because to gain the rank of ayanlık and be recognized by the center. These risings were a process for gaining prestige and power, and if a local elite successfully gained an official rank at the end of the process, he was generally absolved by the center. This process was a transformation from bandit to the honorable person in which paralleled with the pragmatic relation. Official ranks were a tool for the appeasement of the most powerful and brutal ayans; hence, the center absorbed them into the power block.

Banditry, riots and anarchy were the most important ways for local elites in Lazistan to enlarge their privileges in the administrative system. In addition to those of the Tuzcuoğlu, there were many risings in the eighteenth century in Lazistan, and uprisings were a characteristic of local elites in this region. Because of the infertile land and heavy tax burden, the subjects of Lazistan

42 This process can be clearly seen in the first uprising of the Tuzcuoğlu family decribed in the first chapter.

43 BOA, C.DH., 246/12227, 29.08.1178, February 21, 1765. One *kantar* is equivalent to 56.449 kilograms, 39.345 kilograms of gunpowder and 5645 kilograms of lead shot was used to suppress the riot. In 1780, one *kantar* of gunpowder cost 31.5 *kuruş*.

supported the rebels in risings. The villagers in Of, Sürmene, and Rize engaged in risings together with local elites for the reason of high taxes. For instance, the people of Sürmene who had not paid their taxes rioted under the leadership of local elites, forcing the mütesellim to abandon the kaza in 1832.⁴⁴ The notables and villagers of the region grows up once during the mütesellimlik of Salih Paşa, twice during that of Hacı Hasan Paşa, and once again in the time of Memiş Paşa.⁴⁵

Local elites of Lazistan were tougher compared to the ayans in the west part of Trabzon. In spite of the presence of many ayan families in the west, there was one main dominant ayan family – the Caniklizades – and after them, the Hazinedarzades in the sancak of Canik in the years the 1760s-1860s. In general, the era of Caniklizades in the region was from the 1760s to 1805.⁴⁶ The period of the dominance of the Hazinedarzades in the region lasted from 1811 to the 1860s.⁴⁷ These two families gained control of west side of the province, so naturally, this region was more systematic compared to the eastern part of the province. In the West, villagers were sharecroppers who worked the lands of the Caniklizades and Hazinedarzades. Except for these two families, there was no ayan family that could come to the fore in the west like these two powerful families.

On the other hand, the lands of local elites in Lazistan were limited to the valleys. Communication was difficult between these precipitous slopes. Local elites in Lazistan competed with each other for dominance in the region which is why there was no dominant local family in the region as in the west side.⁴⁸

44 BOA, HAT., 576/28205-B, 19.10.1247, March 27, 1832

45 Bay, 41.

46 Şahin, 44-78.

47 Canay Şahin, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl'da Samsun'da Çiftlik Sahibi Hazinedarzaradeler ile Kiracı-Köylüler Arasındaki Arazi ve Vergi İhtilafı Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler ve Sorular," *Kebikeç*, vol.24 (2007): 78.

48 John Macdonald Kinneir, *Journey Through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan in the years 1813 and 1814: With Remarks on the Marches of Alexander and Retreat of the Ten Thousand* (London: J. Murray, 1818), 85-91

The lands of Lazistan were under the control of a mini local elites including the Rizelis, Oflus, Sürmenelis, and Gönyelis.⁴⁹ As seen in the first chapter, these notables organized a coastal coalition, and its leaders maintained a stance against the pashas of Trabzon in order to widen their privileges in the imperial system and support their opposing demands. Otherwise, leaders would loss their legitimacy in the eyes of the notables of Lazistan.⁵⁰ Because of the stance of these elites, they had a negative image in the eye of the Porte.

“Laz” groups in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century refers the armed, barbaric, bandit groups like Albanians in the Balkans, Kurds in the eastern provinces. This negative image was reflected in Ottoman archival documents, the reports of councils, and the notes of voyagers. In the documents of the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry, hundreds of documents apply such negative images to local notables of Lazistan as “bandit, brigand, brigandage, fallen into the habits of harshness and slovenliness, malice and evil”⁵¹ In the last rising of Tuzcuoğlu family, following the apologies of three rioters – Abdülkadir, Tahir, and Abdülaziz Aghas – Hüsrev Mehmet Pasha, who was the main commander of the army (serasker) advised and warned the grand vizier that “these people are not trustworthy persons”⁵²

It is possible to see this negative image in the statements of foreigners who came to the province in the nineteenth century. For instance, the French consul Victor Fontanier, who travelled from Trabzon to Batum in 1831, mentioned the kaza of Of as such “the people of Of were carrying out brigandage like the people of Sürmene. The ayans of Of were more fearless than the Sürmenelis.”⁵³

49 Bryer, 195.

50 Meeker, 222-223.

51 BOA, HAT., 459/22593, 03.04.1237, December 28, 1821.; BOA, HAT., 459/22600-F, 29.12.1232, November 9, 1817.; BOA, HAT., 459/22604, 05.05.1248, September 13, 1832.; BOA, HAT., 460/22616-E, 12.10.1240, May 30, 1825. These are but a few of tens of documents related solely to the risings of Tuzcuoğlu. The most used expressions about the elites were “şaki, eşkiya, şekavet, huşunet ve ruunetle meluf, melanet, fesat...”

52 BOA, HAT., 459/22608, 17.04.1248, September 13, 1832.; “... bunlar pek sağlam ayakkabı değild-irler...”

53 Özgür Yılmaz, Victor Fontanier'nin 1831'de Trabzon'dan Batum'a Seyahati 2, (Spring 2014):

According to Fontanier, the Lazs were quite a barbaric society and their harshness could not be compared to any other group. In addition, he says that these people consistently fought each other and that there were few days that an assassination did not occur. Lastly, Fontanier conveyed information about the region from a conversation between him and Mustafa Agha, who was the mütesellim of Lazistan. "Lazistan is a sea which could swell in a while. These aghas appear to obey now while I am here, but they can begin to kill each other suddenly if I abandon the city (Hopa)."⁵⁴

These statements were important in terms of showing the opinions of the governors about local notables. Additionally, the voyager Robert Curzon, who came to Trabzon in 1842, provides information on how the image of region is represented in Constantinople. He called the region "the bad Black Sea."⁵⁵ He continues his expression by summarizing the image "at Constantinople, they say that everything that is bad comes from the Black Sea: The Plague, the Russians, the fogs, and the cold."⁵⁶ It is possible to give such examples from voyagers and consuls about the issue.

The powerful, prestigious local elites of Lazistan cooperated with governors basically for tax collection. A governor with no military power and no roots in the region could not effectively collect taxes unless he received the support of local notables. The ayans played an important role for tax collection and military affairs in rural areas. However, the methods of local elites were generally based on cruelty and tyranny, and they gained wealth in this way.⁵⁷ During the process of tax collection in the region based on the alliance between the governor and local elites, subjects were being squeezed like an orange.

In parallel, the loyalty of the people of Lazistan (Rize, Of, Sürmene, and the eastern shores of the province) to governor Osman Paşa was ended. The

54 Yılmaz, "Victor Fontanier'nin 1831'de Trabzon'dan Batum'a Seyahati," 128.; Fontanier also used the categorization of Lazistan to indicate the region mentioned. The sancak of Lazistan was not yet established at the time.

55 Robert Curzon, *Armenia: A Year at Erzeroom, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey, and Persia* (London: Harper&Brothers, 1854), 1.

56 Ibid., 2.

57 Bay, 82.

most important reason was poor harvests in 1829, 30, and 31 and increasing taxes despite the starvation caused by these poor harvests.⁵⁸ Moreover, the plague spread in this period and the average number of Daily deaths was thirty in Rize and sixty in the center of Trabzon. The last rising of the Tuzcuoğlus happened in these negative conditions and gains the support of the people easily. In 1831, the tax burden on the Sürmene, which had been 200,000 kuruş, increased dramatically to 500,000 kuruş, and regional tensions increased because of this. The newheps of Tuzcuoğlu Memiş Agha – Abdülkadir, Tahir and Abdülaziz Aghas – took the lead in the rising in Lazistan in 1831, and a coalition of local elites of Lazistan and notables of Batum who had yurtluk-ocaklık lands supported the uprising under the leadership of Laz Arslan Bey. The roots of these local elites were based on the Lazistan and Acara regions, and their common ground was dissent against reform movements from the center.⁵⁹

After the suppression of the last rising of the Tuzcuoğlus in 1834, Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha pursued a rigid policy against the local leites of Lazistan by organizing a military intervention, destroying mansions, exiling the elites, and changing the locations of their bazaars in the 1830s. Hence, the notables in the region lost power. Even though the local elites of Lazistan lost their power, they were not completely eliminated by Osman Pasha but they were no longer as powerful as before. The Tanzimat reforms that were planned for application in 1841 meant further loss of power for the local elites of Lazistan who had already lost power during the 1830s. That is why they opposed the Tanzimat reforms in 1841.

If the balance of power of the province of Trabzon is outlined, there were two main actors to establish the authority in the: The governors who were responsible for the order of the province and central local elites that kept on the right side of the governors. These two powers supplied the balance of power against opposition groups: The local elites of Lazistan and the owners yurtluk-ocaklık lands in the eastern part of the province. The central local elites led of the central coalition comprised of local notables close to the center of Trabzon and supported governors of Trabzon.⁶⁰ Viewed from this perspective, their

58 Bryer, 319.

59 Bryer, 320.

60 Meeker, 219.

tactic was to take sides with the governors to obtain official ranks and supply local networks for the governors.

3.1.3 *Opposition of Ayan-Governors*

In the first steps of applying the Tanzimat reforms in Trabzon province, the opposition of the governors of the province is a well-known.⁶¹ The process coincided with the period of governorship of the Hazinedarzades. In these years, Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha (1827-1842) and Abdullah Pasha (1842-1846) were the governors of the province. These two figures were deeply bound up in the old system and opposed the Tanzimat reforms. The discontent of Abdullah Pasha towards the reforms even impaired his health.⁶²

The power and prestige of the Hazinedarzades was excessive in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. After the end of the era of the Caniklizades in Northern Anatolia, the Hazinedarzades, who secured their income sources, became the most important ally of the state in first decade of the nineteenth century.⁶³ The power and prestige of the family was especially used by the center against the Russian threat and the rigid local elites in the eastern part of the province.⁶⁴ The position and power of the family in the West of Trabzon gave it a significant bargaining power with the center. Thanks to this bargaining power, they could oppose the application of central reforms in the province.

The opposition of Osman Pasha and Abdullah Pasha was not limited to the Tanzimat reforms; they generally opposed orders from the center. Horatio Southgate, who came to the province during the governorship of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha, expresses that reforms introduced by the center that were

61 Sarioglan, 34.; Yilmaz, *Tanzimat Döneminde Trabzon*, 154.; Horatio Southgate, *Narrative of a Tour Through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and Mesopotamia: With Observations on the Condition of Mohammedanism and Christianity in Those Countries* (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1840), 152.

62 FO 195/227, no.4, From James Brant to Stratford Canning, 05.02.1845

63 BOA, C.ML., 10/434, 16.06.1224, July 29, 1809.

64 Mehmet Beşirli, "Trabzon Valisi Hazinedarzâde Osman Paşa ve Zamanı (1827-1842) , (25-26 Mayıs 2005)," in *Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu I*, ed. Kenan İnan (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 407.

in effect in Constantinople were not effective in Trabzon province under the rule of Osman Paşa.⁶⁵

It is beneficial to analyze why the Hazinedarzades opposed the reforms? One of the most important reasons was the fear of losing of their properties and lands illegally obtained by taking possession of the properties of people and common fields.⁶⁶ The Hazinedarzades dispossessed many people's lands and properties in the western part of the province during the era of their governorship. For instance, besides estates in the sancak of Canik like Kurşunlu, Sarıburun, Bumbat, Narlı, Karaduman, and Engiz, many villages and arable fields also passed into the private ownership of the Hazinedarzades.⁶⁷ In parallel, many forest lands were transformed into private property by the family. There were also cemeteries that were the common lands of the people that were seized.⁶⁸ In the same way, other local notables who were allies of the Hazinedarzades also held forest lands. While some of the lands that were transformed into cultivated areas were endowed, some were farmed to villagers.⁶⁹

According to agreements between villagers and landlords, villagers recognized that the landlords had the deed for the lands and paid a tax in cash to them called *maktu*.⁷⁰

Given that the Hazinedarzades did not have the bill for the lands, their opposition to the Tanzimat reforms is an understandable fear for them. Indeed, when the Hazinedarzades started to lose their power after 1846 when their governorship ended, the status of their lands was brought into question

65 Southgate, 154-155.

66 Saydam, "Trabzon'un İdari Yapısı ve Yenileşme Zarureti (1793- 1851)," 308.

67 İbrahim Serbestoğlu, "Tanzimat Döneminde Canik Sancağı'nda Arazi ve Vergi Anlaşmazlığı," in *Samsun Konferansı*, ed. Mahmut Aydın, et al. (Samsun: Samsun Valiliği, 2012), 772.

68 Bay, 243-44.

69 Serbestoğlu, 772.

70 BOA, HR.TO., 216/32

and villagers brought an action against the heirs of the family claiming that the lands were their properties.⁷¹

Another cause of opposition to the reforms was the fear that the autonomous administrative structure of the province would be lost. The Hazinedarzades governed the province arbitrarily. When Hazinedarzade Osman Paşa was the governor of Trabzon province, his brother, Abdullah Paşa was the muhassıl of the sancak of Canik.⁷² They established an autonomous government in the province governing. The British consul R.W. Stevens described this arbitrariness in his report as follows:

Abdullah Bey (Hazinedarzade) pays little attention to the orders of the Porte, is averse to Europeans, and threatens them with no respect, and is cruel and arbitrary in the administration of his government. His character I am told is known at Constantinople, but through the influence of his brother (Hazinedarzade Osman Paşa) and by sending money to the official people there, when complaints are made against him, he manages to retain his place. The wealth he possesses affords him means of doing so.⁷³

The document makes the point that the complaints and demands of the people did not reach to the Porte because the Hazinedarzades were an obstacle. Osman Pasha was raised in the imperial palace and this supplied to establish good networks with the palace. When the wealth and prestige of the Hazinedarzades were added to the networks, these two figures easily had a free hand in the province. When W. R. Holmes who was the British consul in 1846 who had come to the province six years before, pointed out the anarchy in Trabzon province under the rule of Osman Paşa. The streets were like a theatre of violence and tyranny, which was a policy of Osman Paşa.⁷⁴ According to Holmes, security and tranquility in the province was tied to the end of the rule of Osman Paşa.

71 For more detailed information about the land conflict between the Hazinedarzades and the villagers, see Şahin, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl'da Samsun'da Çiftlik Sahibi Hazinedarzadeler ile Kiracı-Köylüler Arasındaki Arazi ve Vergi İhtilafı Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler ve Sorular," 75-88.

72 Mehmet Süreyya, *Sicili Osmani*, ed. Nuri Akbayar, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Tarık Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), 81.

73 FO 195/112, From R.W. Stevens to James Brant, February 15, 1840.

74 FO 195/284, From Holmes to Brant, December 31, 1846.

To sum up, in order to better analyze opposition to Tanzimat reforms, it should be analyze well what the new order meant for the local elites in the province in 1841 and in 1847. The reforms that were tried to be implemented in 1841 would have changed the tax system, so the reforms were confronted by serious opposition from those classes that had long benefitted from the old system. However, when the muhassılık system introduced the Tanzimat was objected to throughout the empire, the center returned to the iltizam system in 1845. In other words, the reforms were moderated. From 1841 to 1847, local elites in the province comprehend how Tanzimat reforms works. Even though the Tanzimat had a revolutionary character theoretically, local elites turned the situation in their favor as a result of their resistance and negotiations. In parallel, opposition to Tanzimat reforms applied in 1847 would not have been as harsh as before and some powerful elites even maintained their power by adapting themselves to the new system.

As explained in the third chapter, even though the Reforms of the Tanzimat began to be implemented in the province in 1847, many old practices continued in order to accustom local elites to the reforms. On the other hand, opposition to the Tanzimat in 1847 was based on an alliance of local notables who could not find an advantageous position in the Tanzimat era with villagers who suffered from the increased tax burden and conscription that the reforms brought.

Tanzimat Reforms in Practice: The Case of Trabzon (1841-1860)

The first step taken to apply of the Tanzimat Reforms in Trabzon Province in 1841 was the appointment of the former muhassıl of Galata, Azmi Efendi for he implementing in 1841 with the ordinance of “taxes will be determined according to individual financial capacity and income, and additionally, local elites and ordinary people will be considered as equals in the registries that will be formed according to the new tax system.” In order to put the new tax system into practice, “officials would work coordinately with one or two local elites in order to determine the exact amount of taxes that had formerly been collected semi-annually from the sub-provinces and villages, the population of towns and sub-provinces, and incomes and financial capacities of individuals.”¹

However, surveys and correspondence mostly referred to social opposition to the reforms by state officials in the province sent to the Meclis-i Vala.² According to the common points among these surveys and correspondence, even if some places in the province were suitable for reforms, the application of the Tanzimat in these places could create a dilemma in the governance system. Besides, local elites of Lazistan from Sürmene, Of, Rize, and Gonio were grim

1 BOA, İ.DH., 38/1793, 27.02.1257, April 20, 1841.

2 BOA, İ.MVL., 27/443, 18.07.1257, September 04, 1841.

men and unable to appreciate the benefits of Tanzimat reforms. That is why the application of Tanzimat reforms in the province was postponed until these elites appreciated the economic benefits and the contributions of the Tanzimat to public peace, as mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis. In this chapter, the transition period from 1841 to 1847 and the attempts of the Porte to make a suitable place for Tanzimat reforms are evaluated. Other points will be the effects of the reforms on the province and opposition to Tanzimat reforms.

§ 4.1 The Transition Period (1841-1847)

The postponing of the Tanzimat Reforms in Trabzon Province does not mean the completely abolition of the reforms in the province. Central elites drove hard bargains with local powers from 1841 until 1847, the year the reforms were applied in the province. The main politics of the center in the province were shaped by the aim to make the province a suitable place for the Tanzimat Reforms. One of most important steps was the appointment of bureaucrat-governors instead of ayan-governors after the governorship of the Hazinedarzades ended in 1846. Why, then, did the center appoint Hazinedarzade Abdullah Pasha, the brother of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha, who was against the reforms instead of a bureaucrat governor when Osman Pasha died in 1842?

When Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha died in 1842, the idea to appoint “a bureaucrat governor who is powerful and famous for his good governance” to the province was considered in the Meclis-i Vala.³ However, this idea could not be put into practice because of “the lack of such a suitable person for the office at this time” so Hazinedarzade Abdullah Pasha was appointed as governor in 1842. The reasons for this appointment were stated in the same document. The most important cause of this appointment was that the governor of the province of Trabzon should be “a little brave and tyrannical” because the people of the province were different from those of the other provinces in terms of “their tendency for violence and rioting.”

Another reason for the appointment was the danger of a probable uprising by the ayans of Lazistan under the leadership of Kalcızade Osman Agha. In

3 BOA, İ.DH., 61/3010, 29.04.1258, June 09, 1842.

the document, the province was described as “the fragile region.” Because of the possibility of a rising, it was demanded that Abdullah Pasha, who was appointed as the müşir of the province of Trabzon with the rank of vizier, needed to report to his place of duty as soon as possible. Otherwise, Kalcızade and his supporters could attempt a rising by taking advantage of the absence of a governor in the province.

Another remarkable point was the dilemma of the center regarding the governorship of the Hazinedarzades. Abdullah Pasha was appointed in order to discipline powerful ayans in the region through he was the leader of the most powerful ayan family in the western part of the province. In parallel, the center assigned him to solve the problem of Kalcızade in the matter of execute him or not.⁴ On the other hand, from the perspective of the center, the appointment of a governor of the province from the same family after the death of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha could cause “hubris” in Abdullah Pasha. Hence, the center demanded that Seyid Efendi, who was the main chamberlain of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha, be a guide to Abdullah Pasha because of his loyalty to the center. It was well-known that Abdullah Pasha was opposed to Tanzimat reforms. Viewed from this perspective, the governorship of Abdullah Pasha was problematic for the center in terms of the application of Tanzimat reforms in the province. On the other hand, the center supposed that Abdullah Pasha would discipline powerful and rebellious local elites in the province. This was the main dilemma of the Tanzimat bureaucrats.

With respect to the governorship of Abdullah Pasha (1842-1846), he made an effort to establish good relations with ayans in the province in general. He maintained good relations with ayans established in the latter years of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha’s governorship as opposed to those established the first years. In a petition written on 24 February 1842 by Osman Pasha, he demanded from the center to award some powerful local elites in the province like Kalcızade Osman Bey, Şatırzade Abdülhalim Bey, Uzunzade Mehmet Agha and Hacısalihoğlu Ali Agha. In the petition, these elites were represented as follows: “They fulfilled their imposed tasks, proved their adequacy,

4 BOA, İ.DH., 61/3010, 29.04.1258, June 09, 1842.

protected the people and the poor, made an effort to send soldier to the army and complied with the law.”⁵ In exchange for these services, Osman Pasha demanded from the center to reward Kalcızade with the rank of the headship of *Istabl-ı Amire* and Şatızade Abdühalim Bey, Uzunzade Mehmet Agha and Hacısalihioğlu Ali Agha with the rank of *Kapıcıbaşılık*. These demands were agreed to by the center.

Another important case in the era of Abdullah Pasha in terms of good relations with ayans was the forgiveness of the Tuzcuoğlu family. As mentioned before, the Tuzcuoğlu family was exiled to Varna and Ruscuk in 1834. Later, their banishment was abolished by central elites and they were allowed to reside in Kastamonu; however, Tuzcuoğlu Tahir Agha could not return because of his paralysis.⁶ According to the same document, Tuzcuoğlu Abdülaziz and his wife Ümmügülsüm fled to Baghdad, abandoning their children and concubines. Thereupon, their children demanded to return to their home, in the province of Trabzon. Their condition was represented in the council of Trabzon as helplessness, and the council demanded a permission for the return of the family to the province. To this end, they were allowed to reside in Trabzon upon a decision of the *Meclis-i Vala*. However, central elites did not approve the return of their grandchild because his return and contact with other elites could cause problems. After that, on 26 February 1844, Abdullah Pasha excused all the family members and allowed them to return.⁷

While Abdullah Pasha maintained good relations with local elites early in his governorship, he was also strengthening the status of his own family by granting the family members with official ranks. He demanded the center grant the children of Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha official ranks, and this demand agreed to by the center. As a consequence, Hazinedarzade Abdülhamit Bey was granted the rank of the headship of *Istabl-ı Amire* and Hasan Tahsin and Nuri Beys were granted the rank of *Kapıcıbaşılık*. Thus, the Hazinedarzades protected their power and status during the governorship of Abdullah Pasha in the west side of the province.

5 BOA, İ.DH., 53/2617, 12.01.1258, February 24, 1842.

6 BOA, İ.MVL., 49/947, 04.04.1259, May 05, 1843.

7 BOA, İ.MVL., 55/1050, 16.02.1260, March 07, 1844.

Hazinedarzade Abdullah Pasha maintained the good relations with local elites early years of his governorship. Even though he had full authority to deal with the issues of local elites of the province, he did not use force against local notables. In parallel, ano large-scale uprisings occured in the province during the governorship of Abdullah Pasha. However, these relations broke down in the last months of the governorship of Hazinedarzade Abdullah Pasha. Abdullah Pasha wrote a petition to the center with the demanding the removal of Kalcızade Osman Agha from Trabzon on 16 July 1845. It is understood that Kalcızade started to exhibit some undesirable behaviors in the words of Abdullah Pasha: “Kalcızade Osman Agha who has formed the habits of treachery and bridangage from of old has been misbehaved up to now”⁸

In the document, it is clear that the issue of Kalcızade had become dangerous for the governor. The banishment of Kalcızade Osman Agha had been abolished in 1842, and he had been granted with the mütesellimlik of the district of Ordu.⁹ Later, the center dismissed him from Ordu and appointed him to the kaza of Arhavi with the same duty, but he was not satisfied in this place. The issue of Kalcızade became dangerous for Abdullah Pasha at this point. According to the petition, Kalcızade Osman Agha then desired to obtain the governorship of one of the sancaks of Gümüşhane or Karahisar-ı Şarki. This demand was refused by Abdullah Pasha on the grounds that it would cause misbehavior if he achieved his goal. After that, Osman Agha started to lobby for the mütesellimlik of Akçaabat, which was close to the center of the province. Abdullah Pasha understood the severity of the situation and also refused this demand of Osman Agha, remarking that Akçaabat was “the lock of the province of Trabzon.”¹⁰ The main aim of Abdullah Pasha was to keep Kalcızade out of the center of the province and thus away from the ayans of Lazistan that make easier to rise. In parallel, Abdullah Pasha offered the mütesellimlik of the sub-province of Arhavi to Kalcızade Osman Agha because “he cannot receive help to rise up in this district.” However, when Osman Agha refused this offer, the issue was out of hands of the governor, and Abdullah Pasha demanded the exile of Osman Agha to Adana or someplace further

8 BOA, İ.DH., 104/5250, 13.06.1261, June 19, 1845.

9 Bay, 327.

10 BOA, İ.DH., 104/5250, 13.06.1261, June 19, 1845

away, denigrating him as “thankless, seditious, and coarse person.” This demand was probably realized because there are no documents regarding Osman Agha after that time.

Tanzimat bureaucrats made an effort to make the province suitable for Tanzimat reforms like in the example of the issue of Kalcızade between the years 1841-1847. Even though Tanzimat reforms were postponed, the center abstained from the coercion and cruelty in matters of taxation and justice as they related to Tanzimat reforms. For instance, Hazinedarzade Osman Pasha had often penalized the region of the ayans of the Lazistan with *nezir akçesi* in many times in order to discipline the local elites.¹¹ Lastly, Osman Pasha penalized the ayans of Rize, Of, and Sürmene with *nezir akçesi* in the amount of 1000 kese akçe, thus, preventing their crimes and misbehaviors to a degree.¹² In the era of Abdullah Pasha, when a possibility of a riot by these ayans emerged, the idea to penalize these ayans with *nezir akçesi* was disapproved by a decision of the Meclis-i Vala, which demanded that only criminals should be tried, not all the people in the region. The institution remarked that the old types of punishment and coercion had been abandoned in regard to the Tanzimat.

With the end of the governorships of the Hazinedarzades in 1845, practices about the application of Tanzimat reforms gathered momentum. After that time, the era of powerful governors appointed from prestigious local dynasties ended and the center preferred to appoint bureaucrat-governors from the center. However, the two governors, Halil Rifat Pasha and Ragıp Pasha who were respectively appointed after the governorship of Abdullah Pasha were ineffective in the governorship. Under the governorship of Ragıp Pasha, the center drew a road map for how the reforms would be applied in the province and sent detailed rescripts to the governor about the reforms. However, he was dismissed without having fulfilled his tasks and İsmail Rahmi Pasha was appointed as the governor who would apply the reforms in 1847.

The road map began with a rescript dated February 1847. According to the document, the provinces of the empire were governed in three different ways:

11 When it was determined that the people of a district were supporting an uprising and the rioters, the whole community was punished with the *nezir akçesi*.

12 BOA, C.DH., 113/5601, 05.01.1260, January 26, 1844.

Provinces like Bosnia and Mosul were given to a governor as *maktuan*, provinces like Baghdad and Maraş whose incomes and expenses belonged to the center after local teachers were excluded, and lastly, provinces like Edirne and Bursa whose expenses and incomes belonged wholly to the center.¹³ Among these, the center decided to govern the province of Trabzon in the second manner. The center wanted to apply the new order in Trabzon Province. However, because of uncertainty concerning in the incomes and expenses of the province and the coming of march, the center preferred to act upon after the governor and provincial treasurer arrived in the province and sent their reports to the center about general conditions of the province. After a while, the center set a course for applying the Tanzimat Reforms in the province with a decree dated 11 March 1847.¹⁴

The center stated its demands and decisions in the decree as follows:

- ◆ All income of the province belongs to the central treasury hence forth as in the provinces in which the Tanzimat was applied. The old expenses of the province will be covered by the central treasury. Hence, the governor, provincial treasurer, and other officials will be put on salary. The records that show the debts of the province to the treasury and the record that shows workers and inventory stocks of the Tersane-i Amire and Tophane-i Mamure were sent to authorities. In the same manner, records for the taxes in kind like those in flax and linen should be kept and sent to the center.
- ◆ The *aşar* (tithe) tax, other taxes and all the income of the treasury should be determined exactly. In the same way, it should also be determined how many types of taxes exist in the province and what is the amount each. More particularly, the proportion of the *aşar* tax should be determined and all this information should be sent to Istanbul.
- ◆ The kind, quantity, and price of goods given to the Tersane-i Amire and other offices should be determined and the records that state how much tax was collected from the people for these goods should be kept and sent to the center.

13 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2471, no.2, 23.03.1263, March 11, 1847.

14 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2471, no.1, 23.03.1263, March 11, 1847

- ◆ The center will undertake control of soldiers that have been under the control of the governor. The expense of the salaries of these soldiers and other officials should be determined and the center should be informed.
- ◆ The security of life, property and honor of the community is the responsibility of the governor. The governor must thus take due precautions to prevent misbehavior like the slaying of people, seizure of property, violence, injustice, and cruelty and he must solve the problems and punish the offenders when such cases occur.
- ◆ The financial structure of the province will not be changed and that is why the taxes in kind, monetary taxes, and poll tax should be collected in the former manner.
- ◆ Because the people of Trabzon province are grim persons, state officials should show them tolerance and take precautions against any possible uprising against the reforms until the people know the value of the reforms. Although Tanzimat reforms were not be applied in this year and postponed to ensuing years, the center should be informed of the incomes of the ayans, mütesellims, and other officers.
- ◆ The independent acts of local elites, mütesellims, and other officers should be prevented because the trust of people can be gained only through fair treatment.
- ◆ The center should be informed about the governance, labor, and incomes of the mines of Gümüşhane.
- ◆ The statements and provisions are not limited to the points above and these points should be used as a guide for problems that can arise in the province. Officers should be cognizant of these points because the application of reforms is directly related to the ability of officers.

This decree was written by the center to the governor of the province, Ragıp Pasha, and the head of the local treasury, Atıf Zeki Efendi. However, both of were dismissed before applying these orders. Hence, this mission passed to İsmail Rahmi Pasha, who was the new governor of the province.

The center was playing it safe in the matter of the applying the reforms in the province and trying to apply them step by step. That is why the center demanded detailed information about the general conditions of the province and old methods of governance from the governor. İsmail Rahmi Pasha

started to apply the reforms as soon as he arrived in the province. He informed the community about the Tanzimat Reforms by gathering the notables and the people.¹⁵ Hence, information given by İsmail Pasha about the province was important for the center and he completed his observations and investigation into the province and sent a report to the center in April 1847.¹⁶ According to the report,

- ◆ All the incomes of the province including the income of the governor will belong to the central treasury. Thus, the center will put the governor, provincial treasurer, and other state officials on a salary.
- ◆ Local councils comprised of reliable persons are needed in every sub-province to protect the safety of property and lives of individuals and to make the province a suitable place for the Tanzimat Reforms. Thus, it would make it easier that administrative and financial issues would be carried out by the law. Every administrative issue will be discussed in these local councils, and authorized persons acting according to the new order will be rewarded. On the other hand, factionist people will be punished without exception.
- ◆ When the imperial edict of Gülhane was read out, the people were happy and thanked the sultan. Local elites promised to adhere to the new order. They also said that they had been great sums of money to the old governors and that they oppressed the villagers to cover their losses. After the Tanzimat, they promised that none of these notables would take money from villagers unjustly.
- ◆ In the province, there are many official “aghas” responsible for two or three villages each, unlike in other provinces. These persons engaged in the administrative and financial issues of the villages. As well as being exempt from paying tax, they were demanding money in the name of different taxes. Although the abolishment of “aghalıks” would be good for the community, the number of these aghas is around 2000, and if aghalıks were abolished, it may cause rumor. It is more favorable to maintain the old system and abolish it step by

15 Sariođlan, 38.

16 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2472, no.5, 18.05.1263, 04 May 1847

step. Thus the people can adapt to the reforms easier and the province will become more obedient than the province of Edirne.

İsmail Rahmi Pasha was aware that he had to receive the support of the notables of the province in order to successfully apply Tanzimat reforms. Thus, the support of ayans strengthened his hand in governing the province and applying the new order. In parallel, he also demanded from the center ranks for the local elites in order to accustom them to the reforms.¹⁷

These opinions and demands were debated in the Meclis-i Vala, and an act enacted according to the advice of İsmail Rahmi Pasha dated 3 May 1847 was sent to Trabzon.¹⁸ In this act, four main decisions were taken.

The sultan appointed administrators to the sub-provinces in accordance with the advice of İsmail Rahmi Pasha. Some of these district governors were old officials and others were newly appointed. In the same way, the aghalık was not abolished; upon the suggestion of the governor, the abolition of this rank was left to time. The incomes and expenses of the governor belonged to the central treasury. Moreover, local councils were constituted in the sub-provinces.

The first cadres of the Tanzimat was constituted in this time. On the other hand, the demand by the governor to gratify some local elites was refused on account of the fact that he was inexperienced. However, it was promised that deserving persons who acted according to the new order would be awarded when their time came. Thus, the Tanzimat era started in the province.

İsmail Rahmi Pasha worked intensively to adapt the province to the Tanzimat Reforms for a year. He created local councils in the sub-provinces of the province and appointed administrators to these councils mostly from among local families.¹⁹ In this period, the governor also made an effort to get along with local notables. After a period of one year after the reforms began to be applied, İsmail Rahmi Pasha and Raşit Efendi, the latter of whom was the local treasurer of the province, introduced a detailed annual activity report that

17 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2472, no.3, 25.04.1263, April 11, 1847.

18 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2472, no.7, 17.05.1263, May 03, 1847.

19 Saydam, 314.

presented the general conditions of the province to the center.²⁰ According to the first report,

- ◆ The province of Trabzon was included in the Tanzimat in 1847. The records that shows all the incomes, expenses, and goods were kept in accordance with the order.
- ◆ Even if the incomes of some sub-provinces are low when the area of their land is taken into consideration, the most important reasons for this are that there is much nonarable land, and most people are not well-versed in trade and commerce, and that most people are poor in the province. Hence, the increase tax in 1846 was normal, and in parallel, the tax increase for this year should be within the limits of the economic power of the community. It is obvious that an excessive increase in taxes would cause some undesirable situation in the province.
- ◆ It would not be a burden on the people if taxes in kind like that of flax and timber are collected by local officials in the former way. In other words, collecting these taxes in the usual way is favorable because the people have been paying these taxes in kind for many years. The application of this suggestion depends on the decision of the sultan.
- ◆ The incomes and salaries of the governor and other officials have belonged to the central treasury since 1847 in line with the order. Thus, all expenses of the province were covered by the center. The income of the province except for former dues was calculated as an estimated 9154 kese akçe for this year.
- ◆ The administrators of the sub-provinces were appointed from local families. These administrators are serving in exchange for two money in a kuruş. On the other hand, aghas responsible for towns are inadequate to run the administrative affairs of these places. However, there is not much choice for the Tanzimat State because most people of the province are poor and there are few qualified persons for this position that can serve for such a low wage. In addition, the appointment of local elites and prestigious persons is more favorable for places whose administration are difficult. However, these people would not serve without a salary. Hence, the appointment of such powerful people to the

20 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2477, no.4, 10.03.1264, February 15, 1848.

governorship of the sub-provinces with a stable salary is suitable in order to apply the Tanzimat Reforms properly in 1848.

The document composed by İsmail Rahmi Pasha and Ragıp Efendi demanded some ordinances from the central elites – if their statements and opinions were found appropriate by the Porte – no later than March 1848.²¹ According to the document,

- ◆ It is needed that the taxation of the people should be according to their income levels and if anybody did not pay any taxes up to now, a tax should be imposed on them determined according to their land and property. People who do not obey the rules of the Tanzimat and spread rumours must be punished. In addition, a decree should be sent to the province that forbids cruelty and coercion by officials when they carry out a duty.
- ◆ Officials in the province have to be thankful and loyal to the Sultan, be content with their salaries and not be cruel to poor. The center should act to punish people who oppose the law and reward officials who duly perform their duties.
- ◆ All the old taxes that were unfair for the people should be abolished and a single tax should be collected from the people in accordance with Tanzimat reforms.
- ◆ The deed of the owners of Timar, mukata and yurtluk-ocaklık lands should be validated but their operating rights should be abolished, and the owners should be retired. On this basis, their annual incomes from these properties should be calculated and half of the amount for Timar lands and the annual incomes of yurtluk-ocaklık and mukata lands should be covered by the treasuries of sub-provinces.
- ◆ Flax and timber should be collected in the former manner and the daily wages of labors in the mines should be paid regularly. Moreover, a decree was needed about the buying of the main needs for these mines like coal, timber, and so on at affordable price.
- ◆ It is needed that the approval of the candidates for governorship of the sub-provinces that were submitted for the central elites' review in the form of a list. The province of Trabzon is composed of six sancaks and the list that includes

21 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2477, no.4, 10.03.1264, February 15, 1848.

the candidates for the governorship of sub-provinces was submitted to the center. The approval of this list is favorable because when this list was composed, cohesion with Tanzimat reforms was taken into consideration.

- ◆ Timar lands were handled as *emaneten idare* because of the lack of proper records. Such records will be kept March 1848 most lately. After that time, these lands will be subject to aşar tax and the annual revenues from these lands will be around 2-3 thousand kese akçe.
- ◆ There are thirteen mines in total in the province and some of them were handled as *emaneten idare* and the some as *maktuen*. The incomes of these mines will be calculated later.
- ◆ The villagers working in the mine of Şabhane in the sancak of Karahisar-1 Şarki were exempt from taxation and other obligations in return for their labor. With the application of Tanzimat reforms in this region in 1847, the people will be taxed and that is why the employing these people in the mine without wages should therefore be abolished.
- ◆ Even if the right to collect aşar taxes in 1848 will be submitted for bid as iltizam, this is a new implementation. Accordingly, the bid price is not yet known. It would be better to appoint trustworthy officials to every sub-province in the province, and these officials should collect the aşar tax for this year. The right to collect aşar should be submitted for bid for next year according to the amount that officials can collect.
- ◆ Although the center of the sancak of Canik is now Çarşamba, the center of the sancak should be Samsun because it is the sub-province of Canik and it is a port town.
- ◆ Hacı Mehmet Agha who is the district governor of the sancak of Gönye, is a loyal official. Moreover, when the importance of the sancak is considered, it is favorable to award him with the rank of the headship of the Istabl-ı Amire. In the same way, Ahmet Bey, who was appointed as the district governor of Gümüşhane, and Nafi Efendi, who is the district revenue official of the sancak of Canik, should be awarded with official ranks. Lastly, the appointment of Hurşit Agha as the administrator of the sub-province of Rize is favorable.

In the first year after the application of Tanzimat reforms in the province of Trabzon, there was a increase of seven thousand purses in the amount of taxes

transferred from the province to the center.²² As understood from the documents, the Tanzimat reforms were gradually applied in Trabzon, and even after the Tanzimat period, old practices such as the systems of *yurtluk-ocaklık*, *köy aghalığı*, and *iltizam* continued. Thus, the aim was for local elites to adapt to the new system. However, this situation contrasted the promise of tax justice promised by the Tanzimat Reforms. Given the continuation of such old methods in the tax system, the increase in the amount of taxes fell on farmers. This situation naturally caused them to band together with local elites who had been excluded from the power block under the new system as well as peasants who suffered under the burdens of taxes and conscription in the Tanzimat era. Thus, opposition to Tanzimat reforms emerged in Trabzon Province.

The first traces of the opposition are seen in a petition sent to the center by the governor, İsmail Rahmi Pasha, in March 1848. In this petition, the governor wrote that the people of the province are harsh and asked what path he should follow when encountering opposition to the reforms. In the Tanzimat Era, it was desired that the center be notified directly of suspects without their being directly disciplined, and it must be proven whether the suspects are guilty or not in such cases. However, İsmail Pasha stated that such a practice would solve the problem because it would take time and demand that such dissidents be deported to different places. Necessary interrogations would be carried out in those places so that opposition would not harm the Tanzimat.²³

The opposition to İsmail Pasha and the reforms increased considerably before long. He wrote in a petition that he was charged with applying Tanzimat reforms in Trabzon Province without any demand by him for this task and credit to the reforms.²⁴ Nonetheless, İsmail Pasha said that he worked for the good of the people and the benefit of the Sublime Porte during his governorship. He added that he had had no problems until this day but that some mischievous people had been starting to opposition movements against him for 20-30 days by pretending the high taxes and had been writing of their displeasure to the center.

22 One purse was 100 thousand akçe. BOA, İ.MSM, 87/2477, no:8, 10.03.1264, February 15, 1848.

23 BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2478, no.3, 21.04.1264, March 17, 1848

24 BOA, A.MKT., 137/76, 03.08.1264, July 05, 1848

The dimension of the opposition is evident in the report of Holmes, who was the British Consul in Batum.

Owing to the manner in which the Tanzimat was introduced by İsmail Pasha, late of Trabzon. Ever since that period universal discontent has prevailed showing itself in disturbances in various place at different times. First at Çürüksu; then in Acara; then in the district of Hopa; and afterward and lately at Chako and Batum. The reason of this discontent was simply because instead of a benefit, the Tanzimat was made an extra burden to the people, as it imposed a tax of ten percent on produce, without relieving them of any of the old impositions, of almost every thing they possess, to their local governors. But not merely were they to suffer the addition of a tax of ten percent, for, their governors having bought the right of collecting it for a certain sum, lately demanded from the people double that amount, without any reference to its proportion to their actual produce. Such has been the case at Batum, and, I believe, similar demands have been throughout Lazistan. Thus, the utmost irritation has prevailed, and people have been too much engaged in showing their discontent and endeavoring to assist the oppression, to think of commerce.²⁵

Thereupon, Muhsin Hüseyin Bey and Raşit Bey were appointed by the center to conduct the investigation. According to the investigation, İsmail Rahmi Pasha was found blameless, but that the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the province were demanding a reduction in taxes. On the other hand, they stated that if the governor tried to discipline the people for their opposition, some undesired situations were likely to occur. Moreover, if the governor was dismissed as a consequence of this opposition, his removal would likely encourage the opponents even more. In line with the recommendation of these officers, the tax amount was decreased in order to calm the people.²⁶ Shortly after, however, the governor was dismissed and replaced by Hayrettin Pasha.²⁷

The application of the Tanzimat reforms in Trabzon Province started in 1847, and after this date, central elites made an effort to help subjects to adapt

25 FO 195/284, From Holmes to James Brant, December 31, 1848.

26 BOA, İ.DH., 176/9538, 25.08.1264, June 27, 1848.

27 BOA, C.DH., 44/2153, 30.08.1264, August 01, 1848.

to the reforms. In order for the people to adapt to the reforms, the Tanzimat was gradually applied, and as a result, some old systems continued in the former manner. However, a good increase in income was achieved in one financial year. This increase was not due to the taxation of local elites but to the increased tax burden on villagers in the province. In the next section, it will be explained how the Tanzimat reforms were received in the province and what were the attitudes of the people towards the reforms.

§ 4.2 Popular Unrest and the Incorporation of Notables into the Tanzimat State (1847-1860)

During the Tanzimat period, most governors of the sub-provinces of Trabzon were appointed from among local dynasties.²⁸ The lack of qualified official to apply the Tanzimat reforms and the prestigious position of these dynasties in the region played a key role in these appointments. With the introduction of the Tanzimat, local elites adapted to the new system and thus maintained their power and prestige. On the other hand, the Tanzimat State could not offer enough official posts to include all local elites in Trabzon in this era. Naturally, local elites who were excluded from the power block started to oppose the Tanzimat reforms. At this stage, opponents of the reforms collaborated with villagers who were harmed by the reforms.

As for the villagers, they developed their own defense mechanisms to protect themselves against rising taxes and conscription. In general, when they got into trouble respect to taxes or conscription, they first went to the courts of the local councils and then to the Meclis-i Vala if no solution was found. On the other hand, they could choose other paths without taking legal action like to demand the protection of a foreign state by obtaining a foreign passport and citizenship or going to a foreign consulate to force the Porte to withdraw its demands. These methods provided them with an important bargaining

28 When the families of the district governors are considered, it is apparent that many of the governors appointed in the Tanzimat era were members of powerful, and prestigious families of their regions like the Hazinedarzades, Şatırzades, Hacısalihzades, Uzunzades, Dizdarzades, Felekzades and Kethüdazades.; BOA, İ.MSM., 87/2472, no.1-2, 18.05.1263, May 04, 1847.

power. This section evaluates the power struggle of the ayans and ordinary people when the Tanzimat reforms were applied in the province of Trabzon. How old power relations changed or continued under the new system and the reaction of the people to the reforms will be examined.

When the Tanzimat was introduced in the province of Trabzon in 1847, many petitions showing the pleasure of the people were written to the governor of Trabzon and the Porte from the sub-provinces.²⁹ However, it would be taken to assess how the reforms were received by the people just by evaluating these petitions. Even though the historians working on this subject assume that the Tanzimat was welcomed in the province by relying on these petitions, this is not exactly true because they were political writings. In general, these petitions were written in an ornamental language by local elites in the region hoping to be appointed as state officials in the new system. They were written in the name of the province's "subjects" but lacked in representing all the subject. Almost all the signatories of such petitions had power and prestige in their regions. Because of this, ordinary people are not prominently represented in these kinds of writings.

Such petitions almost always begin with praise for the sultan and continues with praise for the Auspicious Tanzimat (*Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye*). The Tanzimat reforms were seen as protecting "everyone's life and property and honor." Later, the governor of the province would be glorified as the implementer of the Tanzimat reforms in the province. Petitioners added that the text of the Tanzimat, which was sent to their location, was read in the presence of elders, religious leaders, the poor, and imams. These figures indicated their satisfaction with the new, fair tax system that the Tanzimat promised, and saw the new tax system – which would be arranged according to individual income – favorably. Finally, they were thankful for this blessing and applied their individual seals to the petition.

29 There are many examples of this kind of petition. BOA, A.MKT., 160/70, 29.12.1264, November 27, 1848.; BOA, A.MKT., 159/91, 29.12.1264, November 27, 1848.; BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 3/88, 29.04.1264, April 4, 1848.; BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 119/18, 03.05.1264, April 8, 1848.; BOA, MVL., 26/13, 13.06.1264, May 17, 1848.

In addition to letters of satisfaction, some complaints also came in from the sub-provinces.³⁰ The reasons for and subjects of these complaints varied widely within the province, but most stemmed from the cruelty and coercion of the governors of the sub-provinces. This cruelty and coercion were often the main causes of corruption in tax collection and conscription. The population, in the face of this corruption, was portrayed as miserable in these petitions, and the petitioners either demanded the dismissal of the governor or if the governor was too powerful to be dismissed, a reduction in taxes.

Events that took place in the sancak of Gümüşhane that caused the dismissal of the district governor show the petitioning process more closely. In a petition written in the name of “the subjects of Gümüşhane,” Tevfik Bey, who was governor of the sancak of Gümüşhane, was described as: “extortionist, selfish, does not take care of the sub-province, does not care of the poor.”³¹ For that reason, 1500 households had emigrated from the sancak and the whole of the tax burden was on the villagers who remained. This tax amount exceeded their capacity. It was stated that all the subjects would “leave their homeland” at this rate. For the benefit of the sancak, the subjects demanded the dismissal of Tevfik Bey because, if he stayed in office even a little longer, the situation would cause the misery of the subjects.

A month later, the subjects of the kazas of Torul and Kürtün of the sancak of Gümüşhane wrote a petition glorifying Tevfik Bey in opposition to the first petition.³² It was stated that Tevfik Bey was always nice to the poor, and all subjects, including the poor, imams, ulemas, and peasants were pleased with him. The first complaint petition did not reflect the views of the subjects but only of a few mischievous people who gathered five to ten supporters and made “gossip.” These opposed the governor because, as a result of the Tanzimat reforms, they could no longer obtain the unfair revenues they had formally obtained. Unless they were hindered, the sancak and its subjects would

30 For some examples, see BOA, A.MKT.UM., 60/89, 25.07.1267, May 27, 1851.; BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 11/53, 17.12.1264, November 15, 1848.; BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 9/6, 20.05.1264, April 25, 1848.; BOA, A.MKT.MHM., 6/62, 25.09.1264, August 26, 1848.

31 BOA, A.DVN., 59/50, 25.06.1266, May 08, 1850.

32 BOA, A.DVN., 60/73, 11.08.1266, June 22, 1850.

not become tranquil. Finally, they stated that the governor acted in accordance with the Tanzimat reforms and displayed good governance and that such rumors should be disregarded for the sake of the poor and weak.

The center sent an officer to the sancak to investigate the situation, and Tevfik Bey was cleared of blame. It was stated that the subjects were generally pleased with Tevfik Bey.³³ However, the same kinds of complaints opposing Tevfik Bey continued after this decision. A group of local elites who disappointed with the reforms continued to complain. In response to these complaints, a new investigation of Tevfik Bey was conducted and he found guilty and dismissed.³⁴

The center was always pragmatic when there was a problem, as the example shows. When central elites had two options, it always chose the easier one. In the example, it was deemed appropriate for Tevfik Bey to continue his tasks according to the results of the first investigation. However, given continuing complaints about embezzlement, cruelty, and torture with respect to Tevfik Bey, he was subsequently discharged from the governorship. Presumably, the center knew that the complaints were shaped by conflicts of interest in the province. Therefore, the center first warned district governors via an investigation, but left him in place. If the governor improved relations with the local elites, he would remain in the office but if the complaints continue, he would be dismissed. In the latter situation, the center decided the future of the governor according to the severity of the opposition. If it was serious, there would be no provision for the district governor to be guilty or innocent.

As stated in the first section, governors of sancaks and kazas in the province were always appointed from among local dynasties due to the lack of qualified bureaucrats available to apply the reforms of the Tanzimat State. In other words, local elites changed their forms under the new system and maintained their power. Some even wrote petitions to the governor of the province to become a governor of a sub-province.³⁵ Therefore, old practices continued in a general sense even though the Tanzimat reforms were introduced in the province. The continuing of old practices like *corvée* labor and unfair taxation

33 BOA, A.DVN., 61/39_1, 30.09.1266, August 09, 1850.

34 BOA, A.DVN., 75/65, 03.05.1268, February 24, 1852.

35 BOA, BEO.AYN., no. 355, p.14.

comprised an important basis for the complaints from the provinces. On the other hand, the necessary cadres for the Tanzimat State were insufficient to include all local elites in the province. In this situation, those outside the power block took a stand against the reforms. In addition, tax justice promised by the Tanzimat could not be provided in the province, and the tax burden on villagers generally increased. Hence, an alliance was established between ordinary people and local elites whose interests had been harmed in the new system. Given increasing taxes and the demand for conscription, the people tried to escape the obligations of the new system by their own means. The manner of opposition against the Tanzimat varied according to the resources available to the people in the province and the various social structures of the regions.

When it was looked at variation, tenant peasants and landowners struggled with each other in the sancak of Canik, in the western part of the province. As mentioned, the Hazinedarzades filled the power gap created by the fall of the Caniklizes in the region. They obtained the right to collect taxes and in time became the governors of the province of Trabzon. In the process, they expanded their lands by forcing villagers to clear waste land in the sancak of Canik and transforming them into private property. The villagers living on these lands were transformed into tenant farmers called *müstecireyn* (share-crop farmer) and were forced to pay annual taxes in cash as tenants of the land owners.³⁶ Land owners also paid taxes to the center on the cash tax they received from tenants, and tenant farmers paid no taxes other than what they paid as tenants.³⁷ This process accelerated with the participation of other local elites in the sancak of Canik in the process and became a general situation in the west of Trabzon. In other words, new lands that cleared with the labor of the villagers, accumulated in the hands of local elites over time.

With application of the Tanzimat in the province, a tithe tax was demanded from peasants. The peasants, however, were already paying this tax as rent to the landowners. Thus, when the tithe was demanded from tenant

36 Şahin, "Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl'da Samsun'da Arazi ve Vergi İhtilafı," 79.

37 İbrahim Serbestoğlu, "Tanzimat Döneminde Canik Sancağı'nda Arazi ve Vergi Anlaşmazlığı," in *Samsun Konferansı*, ed. Mahmut Aydın, et al. (Samsun: Samsun Valiliği, 2012), 772.

farmers, the villagers were double taxed.³⁸ This, in turn, caused villagers to have difficulty paying their rents. At the same time, in the year the Tanzimat reforms were applied in the province, the Sublime Porte introduced the new title deed regulation, the Tapu Nizamnamesi of 1847. According to regulation, central elites demanded that land owners relinquish old titles in their possession in exchange for new titles stamped by the Defferhane-i Amire, the registry office. However, many land owners had no deeds because many properties had been taken illegally from the villagers or were wastelands cleared over time. Only deeds the landowners had were the timar and iltizam bonds that show right to collect taxes in these lands. This situation caused conflict between the tenant farmers and the landowners.

The tenant farmers whose tax burden increased with the Tanzimat reforms took legal action against the landowners to obtain the rights to lands that they had cultivated for generations. In accordance, the landowners conflicted with peasants who could not pay their rents and the issues were brought to trial. The courts decided, first in Canik and then in the local court of Trabzon, that the villagers were unjust. On the other hand, in accordance with the Tanzimat, various old taxes were abolished. It was decided that villagers had to pay a tax of one-tenth of their production to the treasury, and one-ninth of the remaining production would be paid to the land owners as rent. Furthermore, no tax would be levied on lands clear cut by the peasants from time forward.³⁹

The tenant villagers objected to the decision and did not pay their rents. This situation caused the case to be brought before the Meclis-i Vala. A commission called Çiflikat Komisyonu was established to evaluate the matter. The commission listened to representatives of the two sides and decided to consider valid old timar and iltizam bonds of the landowners to solve the problem of the property rights of these lands. These bonds had been valid before the Tanzimat, and from that point forward, it was emphasized, instead of those old bonds, the new bonds signed by Registry Office would be issued. Even if

38 Ibid., 774.

39 BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 78/83, 09.07.1272, March 16, 1856.; Erden Attila Aytakin, "Land, Rural Classes, and Law: Agrarian Conflict and State Regulation in the Ottoman Empire, 1830s-1860s" (PhD diss., Binghamton University, New York, 2006), 19-20.

lands had been forcibly seized before the Tanzimat, this situation would not be taken into consideration.⁴⁰ The rents that tenant villagers paid would not be removed but decreased to an appropriate level. As a result, peasants did not obtain possession of lands that they had clear-cut with their labor even in the era of the Tanzimat. The issue of the ownership of farm lands – that is who owns the tenure of the lands and who should pay the taxes – had long been a problem. The problem was further complicated when local councils were authorized to solve the problem.⁴¹

In the eastern part of the province, opposition to the Tanzimat reforms appeared in various ways. In December 1848, the British Consul in Batum sent a report to the British Consulate in the center of the province about opposition movements in the sancak of Gnye.⁴² In this report, the consul stated that the people of the kazas of Chako and Kaaber were suffering from injustice and unfair taxation by Hamid Bey, who is the local governor of these kazas. When they tried to inform the center about these injustices, they were hindered by Hamit Bey. Hence, these people took up arms and rose to emigrate to Russia. They also reported their situation to the British Consulate. Shortly thereafter, people who had agreed with the governor were convinced to return. However, when they returned, they surrounded the mansion of Tefvik Bey because of the misconduct they had endured from the governor. When the situation became complicated, the consul intervened and became a mediator between the governor and the people, and tranquilized them. In exchange, Tefvik Bey promised that not to tyrannize the people. As a result, the people dispersed to their homes. However, according to the consul, the problems of the subjects would not be solved unless they eliminated the coercion and cruelty of the governor, for which a lot of blood would be shed.

The report of the consul reached competent authorities in the center. The governor of Lazistan, Mehmet Pasha, wrote that the demand for taxes from the people had been a decision of the Tanzimat State and stated that it should be collected according to the income levels of the people. The district governor

40 BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 91/34, 14.03.1274, November 02, 1857.

41 Őahin, "Ondokuzuncu Yzyıl'da Samsun'da Arazi ve Vergi İhtilafı," 82-86.

42 BOA, A.MKT, 161/93, no.5, 25.12.1264, November 22, 1848.

added that events grew out of hand because no such route was followed. He stated that the local governors would obey the justice of taxation and promised to put the tax system into effect, emphasizing that this would be good for both Ottoman and British traders.⁴³

The governor of the province of Trabzon, Hayrettin Pasha, sent Huseyin Hüsnü Efendi to the region to investigate the cases. According to his report, around two thousand armed people had gathered in front of the Batum Mosque and expressed that they have no more patience Hamid Bey. They declared their wishes loudly saying that it was inappropriate for a man (Hamit Bey) to leave our homeland and expatriate to the lands of Moscow.⁴⁴ They also demanded an exemption from giving men to the Tersane-i Amire every year; instead, they wanted to serve as artillery soldiers based in Batum. According to Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, it was a wise for the Sublime Porte to accept this request because the population of the region was low and they were likely to migrate to Russia or become bandits if conscripted into the Tersane-i Amire.

The governor of Trabzon and the provincial treasurer sent a report to the Meclis-i Vala based on the investigation of Hüseyin Efendi and in which they also demanded a reduction in the tax liability of these people in addition to the demands of Hüseyin Efendi. In this regard, tax and military demands were suspended by the governor until the required order was issued by the center. In addition, the governor of these kazas, Hamit Bey, was dismissed upon further investigation and Galip Bey was appointed in his place.⁴⁵

The report of Hüseyin Efendi contains the details of the event and is important in terms of reflecting the viewpoint of the Tanzimat bureaucrats concerning the events. According to the report, the people had made contact with the ruler of Tbilisi, Vorankof, and had obtained necessary permits to take refuge in Russia. This created fear in the administrators of the region because with the expression of Hüseyin Efendi, they also used some “terrible” words about the applying to conversion. Undoubtedly, such a situation would paint a derogatory image of the empire. Hüseyin Efendi stated that “The people’s

43 BOA, A.MKT, 161/93, no.2, 03.01.1265, November 30, 1848.

44 BOA, İ.MVL., 134/3620, no.7, 16.03.1265, February 10, 1849.

45 BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 14/94, no.7, 10.06.1265, May 4, 1849.

taking refuge in the Russian Empire is a situation that damages the reputation of the Ottoman Empire both in the international arena and in the eyes of its own subject.”⁴⁶ Officials sent by local governors to communicate with had achieved no results. After the initial efforts to communicate with the rioters, a friendly letter was sent to the ruler of Tbilisi by the governor of the sub-province of Gönnye requesting that the rebels not be accepted into the country. The ruler accepted this demand and the rebels had to bargain with the officials and finally, had been persuaded to return their homeland.

Even though rebels were returned following the intense efforts of state officials, the opportunity to migrate to Russia and get the Porte into trouble with the threat of apostasy in the Russian Empire supplied the rebels with bargaining power vis-à-vis central elites. This situation was described by Hüseyin Efendi as follows: “Even though they came, back their homelands, they have practiced to threaten the center by manifesting to expatriate to Russian Empire and take an oath of apostasy.”⁴⁷ They used these trump cards to escape the obligations of the Tanzimat after the application of the reforms.

At the end of these events, fifteen people were sentenced to penal servitude by the administrator of the kaza of Çürüksu for the crime of firing on Russian subjects and their boats, violating the border. However, they were sent to Trabzon to be judged upon the intervention of the consul.⁴⁸ After this, measures for the security of the region were increased. Except for the gendarmerie, the carrying of weapons was forbidden in the sancak, and it was decided not to give guns to anyone without the approval of the imam and village chief. Süleyman Agha, who was from among the local elites in Gönnye, was held responsible for the state arsenal in the region. These decisions were valid for the whole sancak. Moreover, even if the task of exiling of criminal offenders inciting people to expatriate to Russia, could be provided by the gendarmerie, it was not

46 BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 14/94, no.4, 05.06.1265, April 29, 1849. “Rusya Devleti’ne müracaat ve ittiba eylemek doğrusu beyne’ d-düvel ve’l milel namus-ı Din-ü Devlet-i Aliyye rehine dokunur bir keyfiyyet.”

47 BOA, A.MKT.MVL., 14/94, no.4, 05.06.1265, April 29, 1849. “hanelerine iskan ve ikame kılınmış ise de bunlar Rusya Devleti’ne tabi olmak ve iyazen billahi te’ala irtidadı kabul eylemek sözü bayağı tervic-i meramlarına medar edinmiş olduklarına”

48 BOA, A.MKT., 221/28, 11.10.1265, August 31, 1849.

safe because most gendarmes were also from among the native dynasties and some were related to the rioters. Therefore, the governor and district governor demanded that one troop of soldiers be deployed in Batum and that two or three troops be sent to the border region.

The threat to leave the homeland was a widespread defense method for the subjects throughout the region during the Tanzimat period. In the same way, the subject of the sub-province of Acara-i Ulya declared that they would abandon their homeland because of overtaxation if the amount were not reduced. The sub-province of Acara-i Ulya, which had previously been tied to the sancak of Çıldır, rebelled against the Tanzimat reforms in 1845 and became a sub-province of the province of Trabzon. Given the introduction of the Tanzimat in Trabzon in 1847, the people escaped from the Tanzimat reforms for only two years. In 1849, a petition sent by the subjects of Acara-i Ulya stated that the people were poor and that their lands stony.⁴⁹ Hence, they demanded a decrease in the amount of the taxes that accompanied the Tanzimat. With the Tanzimat reforms, the condition of poor subjects had become more severe, and they stated that because their soil was not suitable for agriculture, they naturally could not pay their taxes. In this petition, they particularly mentioned that the subjects were not against the Tanzimat reforms but demanded only a tax reduction. Their biggest trump card accompanying this demand was the threat to “abandon their homeland” if there was no tax reduction. Although there is no more information available about the tax reduction, with this regard to this demand, the administrator of the sub-sancak was dismissed.

To expatriate to Russia or any other state was not the only way to escape from the tax pressure. It was possible to migrate elsewhere within the empire. Some 100 household from among the Greek population in the sub-province of Gümüşhane demanded to settle in the lowlands of Erzurum because they were unable to farm their arid lands.⁵⁰ They complained that their present situation was miserable and that their region lacked security and prosperity. If allowed to leave, they said that they were ready to pay double the taxes in exchange for a large area. The essence of the matter was that 106 households had

49 BOA, İ.MVL., 134/3620, no.7 16.03.1265, February 10, 1849

50 BOA, A.MKT.UM, 6/94, no.1, 09.06.1266, April 22, 1850

already migrated to the province of Erzurum but continued to send their taxes to the sub-province of Gümüşhane until the Tanzimat was applied. However, with the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in the province, they stopped sending their taxes. Hence, the tax burden of the sub-province fell on the remaining subjects because even though the Tanzimat was being applied, the taxes had been calculated according to the old system on the village scale. Thus, they had difficulty in paying the increased taxes claim by cultivating arid lands of Gümüşhane, and they demanded to migrate to more fertile land.

The report written by governor Hayrettin Pasha about the issue claims that if the Greek people migrated, Muslims would also migrate in their pursuit. Moreover, the work in the mines would be hampered by the fact that they have been working in the mines. If the request were to be accepted, other peasants doing agriculture in the arid lands of the region also want to migrate, and the work of other mines would also be hindered. Thus, it was considered appropriate that they stay in place.⁵¹

During the Tanzimat era, the influence of the consulates over non-Muslim subjects of the province increased considerably, and when subjects were suffering from a negative situation, the consulates became directly involved. One of the most effective consulate was the Greek Consulate, which was trying to establish close ties within the region. The most common method used to protect non-Muslim subjects was to give them passports to spare them from tax and military obligations. When central elites demanded soldiers from among non-Muslim subjects of the province as part of the Tanzimat reforms, some among non-Muslim population applied for Greek passports and thus tried to eliminate this obligation.⁵² This negative situation for the empire was reported to the Porte by the quarantine manager of the province. The center stated that there was no legal provision for these passports. The conditions of these subjects had to be examined thoroughly and that those who did not meet the criteria for foreign citizenship were to be reinstated as Ottoman citizens.

It was a common for subjects who had problems with the reforms after the application of the Tanzimat to demand the protection of foreign states. In such

51 BOA, A.MKT.UM, 6/94, no.3, 09.06.1266, April 22, 1850.

52 BOA, İ.HR., 76/3712, 25.06.1267, April 28, 1851.

cases, foreign states were directly involved and tried to protect these people by means of consulates in the province. Such events were delicate for the Porte because they were open to the observation of the foreign states. Because of this, governors were unable to apply pressure or violence on subjects that had demanded protection from a foreign state; instead, they tried to find a middle way by communicating with the concerned embassy. The only sanction they could apply was not to recognize their passports and citizenship rights.⁵³

In 1860, in the same manner, a group of non-Muslim people in the province acquired passports via the Greek Consulate. On this occasion, an order from the center requested the London Protocol be applied to these people.⁵⁴ According to the protocol, Greek consuls had no right to safeguard and protect anyone from among the citizens of the Ottoman Empire. The condition for getting a passport was an obligation to stay in Greece for three years without interruption. In accordance, the passport of people who did not fulfill this condition will be cancelled. In order to apply this rule, central elites requested detailed investigations of those who claimed Greek citizenship. The Greek citizenship claims were naturally rejected because these people did not provide the demanded conditions.

As understood from these examples, tax and military obligations of the Tanzimat in the province of Trabzon put a heavy burden on villagers, and dissatisfied people resorted to various ways of defending themselves. When this situation is evaluated in the scale of the province of Trabzon, because the territory of the province is large and its regions have different dynamics, the events that took place occurred in different forms as explained in the examples in above.

53 BOA, HR.MKT., 329/28, 04.01.1276, August 3, 1859.

54 BOA, HR.MKT., 341/49, 25.12.1276, July 15, 1860.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I answer the question of how the Tanzimat reforms were applied in Trabzon and deal with the struggles, bargains, and conflicts that were shaped around the reforms. While concentrating on this question, the power struggle shaped around the demands of the Tanzimat State was put forward in this thesis. In doing so, I reinterpret the events not from a state-centered viewpoint, but by attributing agency to local elites and ordinary people. From this perspective, the push factors for ordinary people to cooperate with local notables were addressed. The application of the Tanzimat reforms was attempted in the province of Trabzon in 1841, two years after the declaration of the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*. However, according to information in the Ottoman archives, this attempt encountered opposition from the provincial governors (the *Hazinderzades*) and local notables of the province. As a result, the implementation of reforms was postponed as demonstrated in this study. The underlying reasons for this postponement were complicated.

In 1841, the Tanzimat reforms were opposed by power groups who stood to gain from the old system. The greatest opposition was from the owners of *yurtluk-ocaklık* lands in the eastern part of the province. With the declaration of the Tanzimat, these landowners showed serious resistance to the new system given their concern that their *yurtluk-ocaklık* lands would be taken from them.

Another power group that opposed the new order in the province was the local elites of the Lazistan region. These notables had created a wide autonomous space for themselves in the provincial government system. In the pre-Tanzimat period, as mentioned in archival documents, there was an – aghalik sistemi – in place that did not exist in other provinces. According to this system, an agha was responsible for the administrative and financial affairs of the village in which he had power and prestige. In addition, most large, powerful families in the region were tax collectors called mütesellims for the regions under the iltizam system. Major opposition to the reforms came from the notables of Lazistan who did not want to lose such privileges. Furthermore, agriculture and commerce in the region had been damaged due to conflicts between governors and local elites since 1814 until the end of the 1830s. In addition to the displeasure of local notables because of the strict policies of Hazine-darzade Osman Pasha, villagers were also tired of both governors and the center due to the demand for the excessive taxes in the region on the eve of the Tanzimat reforms.

According to the archival documents, it is clearly stated that the Hazine-darzades were against the Tanzimat reforms. The most important reason was that they did not possess titles for the lands they had seized illegally from villagers in the west part of the province during their governorship, or dispossessed the forests by forcing the villagers to clear-cut as corvée labor. Concern over the loss of these lands along with the Tanzimat reforms led them to oppose the reforms. In addition, Governor Osman Pasha along with his brother, Abdullah Pasha, the Canik district governor, established an autonomous governance in the province and did not want to lose it due to the reforms.

The most important factor in all this opposition was that the reforms to be implemented in 1841 would have meant a radical change and transformation for such power groups. For this reason, reforms were severely opposed by power groups who stood to gain from the old system.

The Tanzimat reforms planned to be implemented in the province in 1847 had a different meaning for local elites. The Porte acted pragmatically when applying the Tanzimat, and reforms were not implemented in a radical way. The new order was shaped according to negotiations with power groups in the

provinces. Within a short time, the muhassılık system was abolished and a return to the iltizam system occurred in 1842. In other words, the reforms were softened. In parallel, local elites in Trabzon Province did not radically oppose to the Tanzimat reforms in 1847 as they had in 1841. Many of these powerful notables had been appointed as governors of sub-provinces by adapting themselves to the new system, and they maintained their power and prestige under the new system. Opposition after the Tanzimat was applied was carried out by local elites who were left out of the power block in the new system and by villagers who were oppressed by the demands of the Tanzimat state regarding taxation and compulsory military service.

Appendix A: BOA., İ.MSM., 87/2471, no.1

Trabzon Eyâleti Valisi atûfetlû Râğıp Paşa Hazretleriyle Defterdâr Atıf Zeki Efendi'ye bi'l-iştirâk verilecek ta'lîmat-ı seniyyedir.

Trabzon Eyâleti'nin idâre-i mülkiye ve mâliyesi sûret-i istisnâda kalarak henüz idâre-i matlûbe tahtına girmemiş olduğuna ve sâye-i şevket-vâye-i şâhânedede oraların dahî refte refte îcâbât-ı mevkiyyesine ve usûl-i adliyyeye tatbikan hüsn-i nizâma konulması mültezim bulunduğuna binâen havâli-i merkûmenin sıyânet-i emvâl-i hazine ve himâyet-i zîr-i destân ve teb'a-i kaziyye-i hayriyesinin istikmâliyle berâber usûl-i tanzîmiyyesi hakkında evvel emirde icrâsına teşebbüs ve ibtidâr olunması lâzım gelen mevâd-ı âtîde bend bend tahrîr ve beyân kılınır.

Eyâlet-i merkûmenin bundan böyle kâffe-i vâridât ve tayyârât ve sâiresi dâhil-i tanzîmât olan mahallere tatbiken kâffe-i hazine-i celîleleye 'âid olacağı misillü mesârîfât-ı vâkı'ası dahî cânib-i mirîden ru'yet ve tesviye olunmak lâzım geleceğinden ve bu cihetle vâli ve defterdâr-ı müşârun ileyhimâyâ emsallerine tatbikan müstevfî ma'aş tahsîs olunmuş ve eyâlet-i merkûmeden hazîneye 'âid olan vâridât-ı kadîmenin ve tersâne-i amire ve tophâne-i ma'mûre taraflarına olan mürettebât ve eşyâ-yı 'ayniyenin defterleri kendilerine verilmiş olduğundan bi't-tahkîk senevî ne miktara bâliğ olur ise ber-vech-i müfredât bunların ve bundan başka cüzî ve küllî zuhûrât-ı ve vâridâtın başka başka defterleri tanzîm ve kazâlardan taraf-ı Devlet-i aliyye'ye müretteb olup aynî tahsîl olunmakta olan tebl ve kendir ve kundaklık elvâh ve sâir mühimmâtın defterleri kezâlik başka başka terkîm ve bu tarafa takdîm ve mevâd-ı hukûkiyeden yüzde kaç kuruş mu'tâddır keyfiyet-i iş'âr kılına.

İ'şâd ve rüsûmât-ı sâire-i hazîne-i celîlenin vâridât-ı mukarreresinden ve vechle eyâlet-i merkûmede bulunan bu misüllü rüsûmât bedelâtının hak ve hakîkati vechile bilinmesi lâzımeden olmasıyla ol-havâlide bulunan rüsûmât kaç cinsdir ve her bir cinsinden ne miktar şey ahz olunmasında ve bi'l-husûs âşar oranın te'amülû üzere kaçta bir alınmaktadır buraların bi'l-etrâf tahkîk ve tedkîk ve âşar-ı rüsûmât-ı mezkûre vâridâtından gerek hazâin-i şâhâneye ve gerek eshâb-ı mukata'at ve timârâtın senevî ne miktâr bedelât verilmektedir. Ber-vech-i müfredât sebt ve tenmîk ederek miktârını mübeyyen defteriyle berâber keyfiyet-i sarâhaten ve tafsîlen bu cânibe beyân ve izbâra bezl-i vus'

ve makderet eyleyeler ve vülât-ı 'izâm defterine dâhil olmayarak ashâb-ı taraflarından mukata'at timârât ta'sîr olunmakta mıdır? Ve bunlardan semere ve sâire olarak alınan mebâliğin bir senelik ne miktardır başkaca iş'ar kılına.

Ber-vech-i bâlâ eyâlet-i merkûmeden tersâne-i amire ve mahall-i sâireye aynen müretteb olan eşyanın cinsi ve miktârı nedir ve fiyatı mîriyyesinden mâ'dâ beher sene tevzi'a ilâve olunarak tahsîl olunan mebâliğin madde be-madde ve bir de ahâlden vergi olarak türlü nâm ve beher sene mevsimlerinde ve aralık vaki' olan tevzi'anın müfredât-ı vechile ve kemmiyetlerini mübeyyin kezâlik defterini tanzîm ve takdîm ile keyfiyet-i ber-tafsîl bu tarafa bildirile.

İşbu tasmîm olunan idâreye göre mesârifât-ı vâkı'asına ol-tarafda vâliler cânibinden istihdâm olunan asâkir ve sâirenin idâresi tarafı devlet-i aliyyeden icra olunmak lâzım geleceğinden vâli ve defterdâr sâye-i şâhânedede muvazzaf olarak onların mesârifât-ı vâkı'a-i zatiyyelerini dâilerini kendi ma'aşlarından tesviye etmeleri îcâb edeceğinden bundan başka istihdâm olunan asâkir ve sâirenin mikdâr-ı mesârifî her ne ise bi't-tahkîk onların dahî defterlerini tanzîm ve irsâle himmet oluna.

Cemî' zamanda ve bi'l-husûs asr-ı ma'delet-hasr-ı cenâb-ı mülûkânedede kâffe ahâlî ve zîr-i destân hakkında emniyet-i nefsiyye ve mâliye ve arziye ye muhâlif hâlat-ı nâ-marziyye vuku' bir-vechle tecvîz olunur mevâddân olmadığına ve bu bâbda her bir mahalle tahrîr ve tesyîr kılındığı misüllü vâli-i müşârun ileyhe dahi tahrîrât-ı mahsûsa gönderilmiş idüğüne mebnî eyâlet-i mezbûrede dahi itlâf-ı nüfûs ve gasb-ı emvâl hetk-i ırz ve kesr-i nâmus ve bi-gayr-ı hakkın tecrîm ve tekdîr ve sâir ve mu'amelât-ı gadiyye ye ve zulmiye ve usûl-ı ankiye ve tahkiriyye misüllü nâ-marziyye hâlâtın vuku' bulmamasına ve öyle şeyler vâkı' olduğu halde men' ve def' ettirilmesine ve cesâret edenlerin te'dîbât-ı lâzimesinin icrâsıçün bu tarafa iş'ârına ve'l-hâsıl müslim ve re'âya her sınıf teb'anın bi'la-istisnâ her türlü tea'ddiyât tasalludâtan vikâye muhafazasıyla her halde istikmâl-i refâh ve râhat ve tezâyüd-i âsâyiş ve emniyetleri istihsâline kemâliyle dikkat eyleye.

Bu makûle ta'lîmâtın meblûl ve ahkâma pek de mahdûd olmayarak mevad-ı mûndericeden başka zuhûra gelecek mâsâlih-i mülkiyenin lâzım gelecek tedâbir-i îcâbât-ı mevki'yyesine tatbikân icrâ olunması lâzım geleceğine aslı me'muriyetin dirayet-i kâmilesine havâle olunmak tab'iyat-ı

maslahat iktizâsından bulunduğuna mebnî mevad-ı vâki'nın müktezâ-yı
dirayeleri üzere hekimâne icrâsına himmet ve i'tinâ oluna.

Appendix B: BOA., İ.MSM., 87/2471, no.2

İşbu tasmîm olunan idâreye göre mesârifât-ı vakı'a ol tarafda ... (this part of the document is disrupted) sâye-i şâhânedede muvazzaf olarak onların mesârifât-ı vâki'a-i dâilerini kendi ma'aşlarından tesviye etmeleri îcâb edeceğinden bundan başka istihdâm olunan asâkir ve sâirenin mikdar-ı mesârifâtı ... bi't-tahkîk onların dahi dikkatlerini tanzîm ve irsâle himmet oluna.

Çünkü eyâlet-i merkûmenin idâre-i mâliyesi sâbık vechile icrâ olunacağından mukât'ât ve sâir vâridâtın kemâ fi's-sâbık ahâlisi yani usûl sâbık vechile eğerçi bu tarafa vâli bulunan zâtın maktu'an ihâle olunmayacak ise de mahallinde kemâ fi's-sâbık maktû'an ahali olunanların tahammül-i hakîkilerine maktu'an ve emâneten idâre kılınanların emâneten idâresiyle bidâlet ve hâsîlât-ı sahihasının usûl-i tea'mülî vechiyle vakt u zamanıyla istihsâlî ve aynı tahsîl olunacak şeylerin dahi kezâlik sâbıkları vechiyle tahsîl ve irsalleri vesâilin istihsâline gayret oluna ve havâli-i merkûme cizyesi dahi usûl ve sâbık vechile tahsîl ve cibâyet kılın.

Trabzon Eyâlet-i ahâlisi haşînü't-tab' âdemler olarak bunların tanzîmâtı hakkında olan menâfi' anlayınca kadar hekimâne tutularak bir güne uygunsuzluk çıkarılmamasına dikkat lâzımeden olduğuna ve her ne kadar bu sene matlûb olan tanzîmât icrâ olunmayarak ileri seneye bırakılacağı derkâr ise de kazâlarda bulunan a'yân ve mütesellim ve sâirenin temettü'âtı dahî bilinmesi lâzım geleceğine binâen müşâr ve defterdâr mûmâ ileyhima iktizâ-yı dirâyetleri üzre ser-reştesizce o makûle temettü'âtı lâykıyla tahkîk iderek başkaca defterini ve keyfiyet-i sûr-ı icraiyesiyle a beraber bu tarafa tahrîr eyleyer.

Eyâlet-i merkûme ahâlisinin celb ve te'mini mua'mele-i lutfiye ve te'mini ile olacağından müşârın ileyh tarafından bu hususlara iktizâsına göre himmet buyrulması lâzım geleceği misüllü kazâlarda bulunan mütesellim ve a'yân ve sâireden uygunsuzlukta bulunanlar olduğu halde o makûlelerin dahi hûd behûd icrâsına teşebbüs olunmayarak hakimâne erbâbının celbiyle emr u icrâda sûret-i teshiliyeyi ba'de'l-istihsâl keyfiyeti tahrîr ve istizân eyleye.

Gümüşhâne ma'den-i hümâyûnu eyâlet-i merkûme vâlisi tarafından idâre olunmakta olduğundan ma'âdin-i mezkûrenin usûl-i i'mâliye ve amelesinin

cihet-i idâre ve mesârıflarının sûret-i tesviyesi hakkında mua'mele-i câriyesi nedir buraları bi'l-etrâf tahkîk ve bu tarafa iş'âr ve tenmîk oluna.

Sınıf-ı teb'a-i devlet-i aliyyenin her halde mezâlim ve te'adiyâtta ve gâ-yeleriyle ânbeân kesb-i ma'muriyetleri efkâr-ı âdile-i şâhâne iktizâsından olduğuna ve eyâlet-i merkûmede dahi bu kazıyye-i marziyyenin istihsâl-i lâzımeden olarak eğerçi dilhâh-ı âli vechile harekete mübâderet eyleyecekleri derkâr olup fakat kendi taraflarından ve dâireleri cânibinden mesâlih-ı vâki'ada bedâet ve ahâliye ri'ayet hakkında hılâf-ı rızâ-yı âlîden bahs ve te'addi ve irtikâb misüllü şeylerin ve memnu' olan işkence maddesinin vuku'a getirilmemesi ve rüşvet ve cerâyim alınmaması dahi lâzım geleceğine ve'l-hâsıl eyâlet-i merkûmenin ve yed-i kâffe-i ahvâl ve keyfiyet-i vâli-i eyâlete 'âid ve râci' olacağına mebnî eyâlet-i mezkûrede kâin kazâlar me'murlarının tevâbi'ât ve mensûbât dâirelerinin ne sûretle hareket etmekte olduklarının dâimâ hafî ve celîecessüs ve taharrisiyle ber-vech-i muharrer hılâf-ı marziyye hâlet-i reddiye vuku' bulmamasına ve herhalde zabt u rabt memleket-i kazıyyesine ale'd-devâm ihâle-i enzâr dikkat eyleye.

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