Graduate Program in Economics.Yılmaz, Murat.Peker, Ahmet Cem.2023-03-162023-03-162015.EC 2015 P45https://digitalarchive.library.bogazici.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16279Empirical studies suggest that donors are not very responsive to changes in tax/subsidy policies. We construct a framework in which donors imperfectly observe charity's e ort to provide charitable goods/services. Effort is costly for charity. Donors' contributions and charity e ort materialize as a charitable good. Government can manipulate \the price of giving" by o ering tax deductions/subsidies. We show that when price of giving is high enough, charitable giving is more inelastic when charity e ort can only be observed with noise. We also show that for lower prices of charitable giving, equilibrium levels of charity e ort and aggregate contributions under imperfect information are lower than the corresponding perfect information levels. Conversely for higher prices, imperfect information levels are higher than the perfect information levels. iv30 cm.Income tax deductions for charitable contributions.vii, 27 leaves ;