On the identity of emotions: concepts, feelings, and intentionality

dc.contributorGraduate Program in Philosophy.
dc.contributor.advisorVoss, Stephen,
dc.contributor.authorDolun, Botan.
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-16T11:55:16Z
dc.date.available2023-03-16T11:55:16Z
dc.date.issued2009.
dc.description.abstractHistorically, the philosophy of emotion deals with the question of what emotions are and how they relate to other types of mental states. This thesis gives an answer to this question in two consecutive steps. First, we circumvent the problem of intentionality by making a clear distinction between emotions and emotional feelings. Secondly, an understanding of the fundamental relationship between emotions and value judgements is sought, so that we can come up with a system of classification which applies to all emotion types.
dc.format.extent30cm.
dc.format.pagesvi, 48 leaves;
dc.identifier.otherPHIL 2009 D65
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalarchive.library.bogazici.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16206
dc.publisherThesis (M.A.)-Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2009.
dc.subject.lcshEmotions (Philosophy)
dc.subject.lcshIntentionality (Philosophy)
dc.titleOn the identity of emotions: concepts, feelings, and intentionality

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