Quine on modal logic
| dc.contributor | Graduate Program in Philosophy. | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Voss, Stephen, | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bilgili, Hanife. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-16T11:55:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-16T11:55:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011. | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis aims at examining and evaluating Quine’s objections to modal logic. In the history of the study of modality there has been an effort to offer a system that is capable of putting the subject in question out formally; however, the most accepted one today is the possible worlds semantics created by Kripke. Hence, the investigation will begin with a short introduction to modal logic in order to continue with a powerful tool at hand. The next step will be an examination of Quine’s objections from his articles, starting with his 1943 article and ending with 1971. After presenting the objections, I will give the accounts of the philosophers who have responded to his objections. And after each objection and response, I discussed whether Quine’s points still have a philosophical weight. | |
| dc.format.extent | 30 cm. | |
| dc.format.pages | vii, 78 leaves ; | |
| dc.identifier.other | PHIL 2011 B55 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://digitalarchive.library.bogazici.edu.tr/handle/123456789/16223 | |
| dc.publisher | Thesis (M.A.) - Bogazici University. Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences, 2011. | |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Modality (Logic) | |
| dc.title | Quine on modal logic |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1