The evolution of the separation of powers in the Turkish Republic: the case of the 2010 constitutional referendum

Abstract

This thesis examines the evolution of the principle of the separation of powers in modern Turkish history. At the same time, it links the history of Turkey with recent times, especially with the 2010 Constitutional Referendum, within the framework of the separation of powers. The research presents a comprehensive study of the separation of powers in Turkey, by including the constitutions of Turkey, the political dynamics, the practice of the principle, and especially the relations between the executive and the judiciary. The study first discusses the principle of the separation of powers theoretically, and then explains its development in the West. After that, it focuses on the evolution of the principle in Turkish constitutions and provides an overview of its practice during the periods in question. In a chronological order, the thesis then explains the tense relations between the executive and the judiciary during the period of 2002-2010 with references to their relations in the past. Afterwards, it analyzes the new dimension of these relations with the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. The final focus will be given to the recent crucial political developments closely related to the separation of powers in Turkey. While the evolution of the separation of powers is examined in this thesis, it should be noted that this evolution is discussed within the arguments of the “strong executive” tendency throughout the history of modern Turkey and the dramatically increasing executive influence over the judiciary, particularly with the 1982 Constitution. It is pointed out that in the parliamentary system of Turkey, where the legislative is most likely to function under the control of the strong executive, the excessive authority of the executive over the judiciary as well, hence its over-empowerment, does not comply with democratization.